

ISTITUTO DI STUDI STORICI GAETANO SALVEMINI – MESSINA



Publicazione realizzata con il contributo della Regione Siciliana
Assessorato dei Beni Culturali e dell'Identità Siciliana
e
con il fondo del Progetto di Ricerca d'Ateneo dell'Università di Messina
(PRA 2005, *Il porto di Messina in età moderna*)

Mediterranean Maritime History Network Conference <2. ; Messina-Taormina ; 2006>

Making waves in the Mediterranean = Sulle onde del Mediterraneo : proceedings of the 2. MMHN Conference : Messina-Taormina, 4-7 May 2006 / edited by Michela D'Angelo, Gelina Harlaftis, Carmel Vassallo. - Messina : Istituto di studi storici Gaetano Salvemini, 2010.

ISBN 978-88-903266-2-2

1. Mare Mediterraneo - Storia - Atti di congressi.

I. D'Angelo, Michela <1949->.

II. Harlaftis, Gelina <1958->.

III. Vassallo, Carmel <1949->.

909.09822 CCD-22 SBN Pa10239815

CIP - Biblioteca centrale della Regione siciliana "Alberto Bombace"



MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME HISTORY NETWORK

**MAKING WAVES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

SULLE ONDE DEL MEDITERRANEO

Proceedings of the 2nd MMHN Conference
Messina and Taormina, 4-7 May 2006

Edited by
Michela D'Angelo Gelina Harlaftis Carmel Vassallo

ISTITUTO DI STUDI STORICI
Gaetano Salvemini

Tutti i diritti riservati
© 2010. Istituto di Studi Storici "Gaetano Salvemini" - Messina

Fotocomposizione e stampa:
Futura Print Service srl - Messina

ISBN 978-88-903266-2-2

Foreword

The Mediterranean Maritime History Network (MMHN) has come a long way since that day ten years ago when a small band of historians decided on a number of initiatives to give the Mediterranean a more prominent presence in international maritime history circles. Increased participation in conferences beyond our shores, our own conferences in Malta, Messina-Taormina, Izmir, and - still to come - Barcelona; publications; a website and a directory hosted by the University of Malta's Mediterranean Institute, are testimony to that commitment made a decade ago.

Throughout these ten years, the MMHN has rested firmly on three major pillars: Professor Michela D'Angelo, of the University of Messina; Professor Ruthy Gertwagen, of the University of Haifa; and Professor Gelina Harlaftis of the Ionian University. All three have been an invaluable source of support for me and an inspiration to us all. More specifically, they have ensured the academic success of each of our meetings by organizing sessions which have given us insights into some of the most exciting research being conducted in the field of Mediterranean maritime history.

Professor D'Angelo, in particular, was responsible for the hosting of the 2006 Sicily conference which put a still fledgling movement firmly on its feet. Ably assisted by a team of young, up-and-coming historians, especially Diletta D'Andrea and Flavio Corpina, Professor D'Angelo had the overall responsibility for the organization of the conference and was able to secure generous backing for it.

Hers as well was the decision to undertake the awesome task of publishing all the papers in these proceedings, over and above the selection of the papers customarily published in the University of Malta's *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, and thus offer researchers access to the wide and varied range of contributions in its entirety. The MMHN owes her a debt of gratitude. I look forward to many more years of fruitful cooperation.

PROFESSOR CARMEL VASSALLO
Coordinator Mediterranean Maritime History Network

In questo volume sono raccolti gli atti del convegno internazionale di storia marittima che è stato organizzato dal *Mediterranean Maritime History Network* (MMHN) e che si è svolto a Messina e Taormina dal 4 al 7 maggio 2006.

Gli autori e i curatori del volume ringraziano l'Assessorato Beni Culturali Ambientali e Pubblica Istruzione della Regione Siciliana, l'Autorità Portuale di Messina, le Aziende Autonome di Soggiorno e Turismo di Messina e di Taormina, il Banco di Sicilia (Messina), la Biblioteca Regionale Universitaria di Messina, la Fondazione Banco di Sicilia (Palermo), la Fondazione Bonino Pulejo (Messina), la Fondazione Mazzullo (Taormina), l'Istituto di Studi Storici «Gaetano Salvemini» di Messina e l'Università degli Studi di Messina per aver concesso il loro patrocinio e/o il loro contributo per la realizzazione del convegno e/o la pubblicazione degli atti.

Un particolare ringraziamento a Diletta D'Andrea, che ha attivamente collaborato alla realizzazione e all'*editing* di questo volume e che ha anche tradotto in italiano i testi di alcune relazioni presentate al convegno e pubblicate sul *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* (2006, vol. 16, n. 1/2); a Pierangelo Pirak, che ha curato il video del convegno; a Valeria Arena, Davide Billa, Roberto Bonsignore, Sergio Busà, Alice Pino e Clara Sturiale, studenti dei corsi di laurea in Scienze Politiche per il Giornalismo e di Scienze dell'Informazione Giornalistica, che hanno realizzato immagini, riprese e resoconti del convegno sotto la guida del giornalista Rino Labate. Un particolare ricordo per l'ambasciatore Salvatore Cilento, che ha dato il suo prezioso apporto all'iniziativa. Infine, *last but not least*, un sentito ringraziamento per Maria Teresa Panella che con competenza e pazienza ha realizzato questo volume.

Per informazioni sull'attività del MMHN e per contattare gli autori dei saggi pubblicati in questo volume si può consultare il sito www.um.edu.mt/events/mmhna

Index

Foreword p. VII

THE SEA AND POWER PROJECTION

- SPIROS N. ASONITIS, *Charles I Tocco and his naval activities in the Ionian region (XIVth-XVth centuries)* " 3
- DIANA GILLILAND WRIGHT, *Bread and Falcons: The view from Crete in 1501* " 13
- MIQUEL ÀNGEL CASASNOVAS CAMPS, *The Ottoman and Barbary attacks on the Balearic Islands during the XVIth century* " 21
- BRIAN SANDBERG, *'Through Naval Practice and Association with Foreigners': French nobles' participation in Mediterranean religious struggles, 1598-1635* " 35
- AHMED RENIMA, *The Navy of the Ottoman Algeria (1515-1830). A brief history* " 43
- KEITH A.J. MCLAY, *'A Mediterranean Amphibian': British warfare, 1693-1713* " 61
- TITO BENADY, *Gibraltar as a naval base for the Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 1796-1808* " 73
- GIUSEPPE RESTIFO, *A night of fire in Tripoli (1804)* " 83
- IAN CHESSELL, *Britain's Ionian Consul: Spiridion Foresti and intelligence collection* " 95
- DILETTA D'ANDREA, *Gran Bretagna e Mediterraneo in età napoleonica tra 'strategia talassocratica' e 'laboratori costituzionali'* " 111
- KYRILLOS NIKOLAOU, *La politique maritime impériale de la Grande Bretagne: Famagouste 1878-1882* " 127
- ELLI LEMONIDOU, *La Marine alliée en Grèce pendant la Première guerre mondiale* " 137
- MAURA HAMETZ, *Envisioning the Italian Mediterranean: Fascist policy in steamship publicity, 1922-1942* " 141
- CARMEL VASSALLO, *Al servizio di Sua Maestà Britannica: i maltesi nella Royal Navy* " 153

PORTS, HARBOURS, SHIPS AND NAVIGATION

| | |
|--|--------|
| PIERRE A. MAC KAY, <i>New light on Negropont</i> | p. 169 |
| Z. KENAN BILICI, <i>New Discoveries in Alanya Castle: Ship-graffiti and some comments on shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean</i> | " 179 |
| EYÜP ÖZVEREN, ONUR YILDIRIM, <i>Procurement of naval supplies during the XVIth century: Venetian Arsenale and the Ottoman Tersane compared</i> | " 191 |
| JEAN-PIERRE FARGANEL, <i>La navigation vers le Levant à l'époque moderne (1545-1715) vue à travers l'exemple de quelques voyageurs français</i> | " 205 |
| JOSÉ-LUIS CORTÉS, <i>La polacre, bâtiment de commerce méditerranéen à travers deux contrats de construction provenant de chantiers navals marseillais au début du XVIII^e siècle</i> | " 219 |
| MIRELLA MAFRICI, <i>Ports et lieux d'abordage calabrais entre le XVIII^e et le XIX^e siècle</i> | " 233 |
| BIAGIO PASSARO, <i>Mobilità delle popolazioni costiere del Mediterraneo. Il caso di una famiglia sorrentina a Corfù nella prima metà del XIX secolo</i> | " 251 |
| MASSIMO MARESCA, <i>Il Museo 'Mario Maresca' a Meta. Una testimonianza delle attività marittime nella penisola sorrentina nel XIX secolo</i> | " 265 |
| MARIO ELLUL, <i>'Seek Perfection'. A Future with the Admiralty H.M. Dockyard School, Malta, 1900-1939</i> | " 279 |

GREEK MARITIME HISTORY

| | |
|--|-------|
| CRISTINA E. PAPA KOSTA, <i>Consoli dei mercanti nel Levante veneziano</i> | " 301 |
| KATERINA PAPA KOSTANTINOÛ, <i>Malta and the rise of the Greek-owned fleet in the XVIIIth century</i> | " 321 |
| FABIO P. DI VITA, <i>Navi greche in Sicilia durante il XVIII secolo. Pratiche sanitarie e relazioni commerciali</i> | " 337 |
| KATERINA GALANI, <i>Foreigners in an unfamiliar Market: European business practices and culture in the Eastern Mediterranean in the XVIIIth century</i> | " 359 |

| | |
|---|--------|
| THEOHARIS PETROU, <i>Cases of espionage in the area of Eastern Mediterranean at the end of XVIIIth and the beginning of XIXth century</i> | p. 373 |
| GELINA HARLAFTIS, <i>The fleet 'dei Greci'. Ottoman and Venetian Greeks in the Mediterranean sea-trade, XVIIIth century</i> | " 383 |
| GERASSIMOS D. PAGRATIS, <i>I Consolati della Repubblica Set-tinsulare in Sicilia (1800-1807)</i> | " 417 |

MERCHANTS, GOODS, IDEAS

| | |
|--|-------|
| SEVEN AGIR, <i>Empires looking Seawards: The benefits and costs of foreign seaborne trade</i> | " 433 |
| GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, <i>Northern Europe and the Medi-terranean System in the 'Long XVIIth century'</i> | " 449 |
| IVAN GRECH, <i>Percezioni di isolamento nel Mediterraneo. Malta nel '600: canali di comunicazione e circolazione di notizie</i> | " 455 |
| ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, <i>The Mediterranean commercial world of the XVIIIth century: Ottoman and Italian ports</i> | " 467 |
| ROSARIO LENTINI, <i>British merchants and goods in Palermo (1797-1816)</i> | " 483 |
| LAURA CALOSCI, <i>La transformation du commerce méditer-ranéen catalan en relation avec Gênes et Marseille durant la première moitié du XIX^e siècle</i> | " 493 |
| IDAMARIA FUSCO, ANGELINA MARCELLI, <i>La Calabria della seta: una regione del Mediterraneo</i> | " 507 |
| LUIGI PICCIONI, <i>Liquorice juice production in Calabria, XVIIIth - XXth centuries</i> | " 531 |
| FLAVIO CORPINA, <i>Il commercio marittimo tra Stati Uniti e Trie-ste (1825-1865)</i> | " 537 |
| NICOLA CRINITI, <i>American shipping and trade with Barcelona (1800-1861)</i> | " 551 |
| SERGIO DI GIACOMO, <i>Trade and consular relations between the United States and Livorno in the mid-XIXth century</i> | " 565 |

THE PORT AND THE STRAITS OF MESSINA

- ANNA MARIA PRESTIANNI GIALLOMBARDO, *Lo Stretto e il porto di Messina nell'antichità (età greca)* p. 571
- MARIA CANNATÀ FERA, *Zancle città bellissima* " 595
- MARIA CACCAMO CALTABIANO, *The coins of the Straits: images and symbols of the political identity of Messana and Rhegion in the Vth century BC* " 601
- ANTONIO PINZONE, *Le port de Messine à l'époque romaine* " 605
- ROSA SANTORO, *The damned charm of Scylla and Charybdis* " 615
- ENRICO PISPISA, *Il porto di Messina dall'XI al XV secolo* " 621
- SALVATORE BOTTARI, *The port of Messina, 1591-1783* " 627
- MICHELA D'ANGELO, *'The Emporium of Trade of the Two Seas': The re-launching of the port of Messina, 1784-1815* " 651
- ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *Il porto e la città di Messina tra rilancio e decadenza (1815-1920)* " 669
- MARIA GABRIELLA ADAMO, *Le Port de Messine, l'emplacement du Phare et le Détroit à travers les témoignages de quelques écrivains et 'chroniqueurs' français au tournant de 1860* " 679
- MARIA TERESA DI PAOLA, *Tra mare e terra. Il porto di Messina all'alba del XX secolo* " 691
- LUCREZIA LORENZINI, *Le Détroit de Messine et la métaphore de l'existence* " 713

THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA: SCIENCE, FISHING & LEISURE

- OLIVER CRAIG, MARCO BIAZZO, MARY ANNE TAFURI, *Paleodietary records of coastal Mediterranean populations* " 721
- ATHENA TRAKADAS, *'Exhausted by Fishermen's Nets': Roman sea fisheries and their management* " 735
- MARIA LUCIA DE NICOLÒ, *Comunità costiere e storia della pesca nel Mediterraneo (XVI-XVIII secolo)* " 749

| | |
|---|--------|
| LISA BOTTER, OTELLO GIOVANARDI, SAŠA RAICEVICH, <i>Migrazioni della flotta peschereccia di Chioggia nel Mare Adriatico tra il XIX e il XX secolo</i> | p. 761 |
| VIVIA BRUNI, <i>Research on marine biology in the Straits of Messina</i> | " 775 |
| CLAUDE ARNAL, <i>Jeannette Villepreux Power à Messine: l'Argonauta Argo et l'invention de l'Aquarium (1832)</i> | " 785 |
| SALVATORE SPEZIALE, <i>Navigare in acque "tem-pestose". Epidemie e controllo marittimo in Africa mediterranea dall'età della peste all'età del colera</i> | " 791 |
| MARIA SIRAGO, <i>La balneazione a Napoli tra '800 e '900</i> | " 801 |

SEA, CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY

| | |
|--|-------|
| RUTHY GERTWAGEN, <i>The emergence of the cult of the Madonna as the Patron Saint of Sailors and of Ports</i> | " 817 |
| ERIC DURSTELER, <i>Muslim renegade women: Conversion and agency in the early modern Mediterranean</i> | " 829 |
| JOSÉ MANUEL VÁZQUEZ LIJÓ, <i>Los escenarios de las deserciones. Refugios y salidas profesionales de los prófugos de la Real Armada del siglo XVIII</i> | " 839 |
| ROSARIA BOTTARI, <i>Questione della lingua: matrice veneta e rotte commerciali</i> | " 851 |
| CARMEN DEPASQUALE, <i>Le rôle de la mer dans la vie maltaise d'après quelques ouvrages en français du XVIII^e siècle</i> | " 857 |
| CARMELINA GUGLIUZZO, <i>Il cosmopolitismo e l'identità marittima maltese</i> | " 867 |
| JAN BERTING, <i>Représentations collectives et manières de penser l'Autre dans le cadre des relations Nord-Sud, Sud-Nord</i> | " 875 |
| CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, <i>Les stéréotypes dans les jeux de l'identité-altérité Nord-Sud dans l'espace méditerranéen</i> | " 889 |

THE SEA AND POWER PROJECTION

Spiros N. Asonitis

Charles I Tocco and his naval activities in the Ionian region (XIVth - XVth centuries)

By the 15th century the eastern Ionian sea had become part of the frontier between the Ottoman empire and the Christian world. That border line was created mainly because Venice, even before 1204, had appraised the strategic importance of the region and by its policies managed to control it for a long time¹. An interesting aspect of that policy is the Venetian attitude regarding the development of naval forces by the local lords in that region

¹ ANTONIO CARILE, "Partitio terrarum Imperii Romaniae", *Studi Veneziani*, VII (1965), 161, 219-220; SILVANO BORSARI, *Studi sulle colonie Veneziane in Romania nel XIII secolo* (Napoli, 1966); JORJO TADIĆ, "Venezia e la costa orientale dell'Adriatico fino al secolo XV", in *Venezia e il Levante fino al XV secolo* (Firenze, 1973), I, 687-704; FREDDY THIRIET, *La Romanie Vénitienne au Moyen Âge. Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e-XV^e siècles)* (Paris, 1959), 76-78, 85-86, 169, 357. After the treaties of Viterbo (1267) the Venetian merchants didn't face any particular problems as far as their relations with the local lords of Western Greece were concerned (FRANCESCO CARABELLESE, *Carlo d'Angiò nei rapporti politici e commerciali con Venezia e l'Oriente* (Bari, 1911), 106-153; PAUL LEMERLE, "Le privilège du despot d'Épire Thomas I pour le Vénitien Jacques Contareno", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XLIV (1951), 389-396; on the treaties of Viterbo and their impact on the region cf. JEAN LONGNON, "Le traité de Viterbe entre Charles d'Anjou et Guillaume de Villehardouin, prince de Morée (24 Mai 1267)", in *Studi in onore di Riccardo Filangieri*, I (Napoli, 1959), 307-314; LONGNON, "Le rattachement de la principauté de Morée au royaume de Sicile en 1267", *Journal des Savants*, juillet-septembre 1942, 134-143; FRANCESCO CERONE, "La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea e sulle isole vicine", *Archivio storico per le Province Napoletane*, XLI (1916), 22-28; ANTONINO FRANCHI, *I Vespri Siciliani e le relazioni tra Roma e Bisanzio* (Palermo, 1984), 145-161. During the Angevin domination in Corfu (1272-1386) a consul established in that island was looking after the Venetian interests in the Ionian region, sometimes advising even the launch of embargoes against peevish local lords (ROBERTO CESSI, *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia* (Bologna, 1954), III, 79 (114), 17 August 1284; FREDDY THIRIET, *Délibérations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Romanie (1160-1363)* (Paris, 1966), I, 48-49 (91); LUDWIG THALLOCY, CONSTANTIN JIREČEK and MILAN SUFFLAY, *Acta et diplomata res Albaniae mediae aetatis illustrantia* (Vindobonae, 1913), I, 109 (369); RICCARDO PREDELLI, *I libri Commemorativi della repubblica di Venezia, Regesti* (Venezia, 1876), I, 27 (114), 34 (147), 205 (171), 1 June 1319; ALBERTO TENENTI, "Venezia e la pirateria nel Levante 1300c-1460c", in *Venezia e il Levante fino al XV secolo*, 1/2 (Firenze, 1973), 739; GIUSEPPE VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Venerata saeculorum XIV et XV* (Panormi; München, 1967), I, 78-79 (112), 29 August 1332.

at the end of the 14th and the early 15th centuries, a period marked by the struggle between the Venice and Genoa as well as by the Ottoman expansion in Greece².

Before that period there is no sign of organised local naval forces in Western Greece³, the former Byzantine naval “theme” of Cephalonia⁴, except for some piratical activity⁵. Their modest resources not allowing the

² DONALD M. NICOL, *Byzantium and Venice. A study in diplomatic and cultural relations*, (Cambridge, 1999), 264-331; MICHEL BALARD, “A propos de la bataille de Bosphore. L’expédition genoise de Paganino Doria a Constantinople (1351-1352)”, *Travaux et Mémoires*, 4 (1970), 431-469; VITTORIO LAZZARINI, “La battaglia di Porto Longo nell’isola di Sapienza”, *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, VIII (1894), 5-45; THIRIET, *La Romanie*, 172-173; THIRIET, “Venice et l’occupation de Tenedos au XIV^e siècle”, *Mélanges de l’Ecole Française de Rome*, LXV (Paris, 1953), 219-245; LUIGI A. CASATI, *La Guerra di Chioggia e la pace di Torino* (Firenze, 1866).

³ One is led to this conclusion not only because the sources of regional history do not mention any office related to naval forces or sea war, but also by the evidence of the sources on the frequency of successful piratical activities against the coasts of Epiros and the merchants operating there by the end of the 13th century (GOTTLIEB LUKAS, FRIEDRICH TAFEL and GEORG MARTIN THOMAS, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels - Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante vom neunten bis zum Ausgang des 15. Jahrhunderts*, III (1256-1299) (Vindobonae, 1857), 159-281; GARETH MORGAN, “The Venetian Claims Commission of 1278”, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, LXIX (1976), 411-438; PETROS CALONAROS (ed.), *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως* (Athens, 1940), 366-367, vss. 9137-9163, 368, vss. 9201-9235), the plundering of the local ports by the pirates in the first decades of the 14th century (VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, I, 21-25 (48), 27 September 1319), the easy conquest of Cephalonia by the Angevin fleet in 1325 (ANTONIO RACHELI (ed.), *Cronache di Giovanni, Matteo e Filippo Villani*, I-II, in *Biblioteca Classica Italiana*, (sec. XIV, No. 21), I, (Trieste, 1857), Lib. IX, cap. 281) as well as by the fact that Nikephoros II of Epiros, intended to conquer his father’s insular possessions, considered indispensable the Venetian support (SPIROS N. ASONITIS, *To Νότιο Ιόνιο κατά τον Όψιμο Μεσαίωνα* (Athens, 2005), 117-119).

⁴ On the naval “theme” of Cephalonia cf. PETER VON SOUSTAL and JOHANNES KODER, *Nikopolis und Kephallēnia* (Tabula Imperii Byzantini III) (Wien, 1981), *passim*; HÉLÈNE AHRWEILER, *Byzance et la Mer* (Paris, 1966), 48, 51, 65-66, 80, 82 n. 2, 83, 84 n. 6, 85, 90-91, 95, 110-111, 120-121, 123, 130, 133-134, 160, 168, 179, 193, 232, 246 n. 3, 399, 425 n. 1; PAVLOS NIAVIS, “Πόσο ελεύθερη επιλογή υπήρξε για το Βυζάντιο η ίδρυση του θέματος Κεφαλληνίας”, *Actes du 5ème Congrès Panionien 1986* (Argostoli, 1989), I, 43-47; ALEXIS G. SAVVIDES, “Το βυζαντινό ναυτικό θέμα Κεφαλληνίας και οι Νορμανδοί τον ενδέκατο και δωδέκατο αιώνα”, 49-57; SAVVIDES, *Τα βυζαντινά Επτάνησα. 11^{ος}-αρχές 13^{ου} αι. Το ναυτικό θέμα Κεφαλληνίας στην Υστεροβυζαντινή Περίοδο*, (Athens, 1986); DENIS ZAKYTHINOS, “Le Thème de Céphalonie et la Défense de l’Occident”, *Byzance, État, Société, Economie* (London, 1973), Variorum Reprints, Study Nr. VIII, 303-312; NICOLAS OIKONOMIDES, “Constantin Porphyrogénète et les Thèmes de Céphalonie et de Longobardie”, *Documents et Études sur les Institutions de Byzance, VII-XV s.* (London, 1976), Variorum Reprints, Study Nr. XI, 118-123.

⁵ ANDREAS KIESEWETTER, “Preludio alla Quarta Crociata? Megareites di Brindisi, Maio di Cefalonia e la signoria sulle isole ionie (1185-1251)”, in *Quarta Crociata. Venezia – Bisanzio – Impero Latino*, a cura di GHERARDO ORTALLI, GIORGIO RAVEGNANI and PETER SCHREINER (Venezia, 2006), 213-255; GEORGIOS ROMANOS, “Γρατιανός Ζώρξης, αυθέντης Λευκάδος”, *Κερκυραϊκά Χρονικά*, VII (1959), 205-211; ERMANNIO LUNZI, *Della condizione*

local lords to develop significant naval forces, they were unable to pursue the political unification of Epiros with the adjacent Ionian islands. On the other hand, the lack of such forces in a region which was a crossroads for merchants heading to the eastern Mediterranean, had turned the coasts of the region into pirate dens⁶.

As the traffic of Venetian merchants became more and more dense⁷, the efforts of the Serenissima to patrol the Ionian sea were gradually intensified. In the 14th century the presence of Venetian fleets patrolling the waters of the region placed the local lords under the effective control of Venice, although their legitimate sovereign was the king of Naples⁸. Aware of the strategic importance of the region, Venice had repeatedly tried to acquire the islands from the Angevins of Naples, who in 1357 conceded the southern Ionian islands to the Neapolitan Leonardo Tocco⁹.

The destitute condition of his insular possessions drove Leonardo, like his predecessors, to practise piracy, often against Venetian targets, urging Venice to implement strict measures against him¹⁰. After his death his

politica delle Isole Jonie sotto il dominio Veneto, proceduta da un compendio della storia della isole stesse dalla divisione dell'impero Bizantino. Versione con note di Marino Dr. Typaldo-Foresti e Nicolò Barozzi, riveduta ed aumentata dall'autore (Venezia, 1860), 39-40.

⁶ The designation of the island of Ithaka as *Val de Compare*, that is bay of the piratical ships, is very instructive on the conditions of insecurity prevailing in the region: ÉMILE LEGRAND (ed.), *Description des îles de l'Archipel par Christophore Buondelmonti. Version grecque par un anonyme* (Paris, 1897), 8; WILLIAM MILLER, "Ithake under the Franks", *The English Historical Review* XXI (1906), 513-514; AHRWEILER, *Byzance et la Mer*, 414; DICAIOI VAGHIACACOS, "Εκ του τοπωνυμικού της Θάκης", *Επετηρίς Εταιρείας Βυζαντινών Σπουδών*, XXIX (1959), 323-333.

⁷ On the presence of Venetian and other merchants in the region cf. FREDDY THIRIET, "Quelques observations sur le trafic des galeés Vénitiennes d'après des chiffres des "incanti" (XIV-XV siècles)", *Études sur la Romanie greco-vénitienne, X^e-XV^e siècles* (London, 1977), Variorum Reprints, Study Nr. VIII, 495-522; BARISSA KREKIĆ, *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Âge* (Paris - La Haye, 1961), *passim*; ALAIN DUCELLIER, "Aux frontières de la Romanie: Arta et Sainte-Maure à la fin du Moyen Âge", *Travaux et Mémoires*, VIII (1981), (Hommage à Paul Lemerle), 113-124.

⁸ FRANCESCO CERONE, "La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea e sulle isole vicine", *Archivio storico per le Province Napoletane*, n.s., II (1916), 319-349; WALTER HABERSTUMPF, "La nobiltà moreotica in un poco noto documento angioino del 1278", *Θησαυρίσματα*, XXIX (1999), 39-40, 42; ANTOINE BON, *La Morée franque. Recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principauté d'Achaïe (1205-1430)* (Paris, 1969), 706; LONGNON, "Le rattachement", 134-143; ASONITIS, *To Nótio Iónio*, 116, 278; ANTONI RUBIÓ Y LLUCH, *Diplomatari de l'Orient Català (1301-1409)* (Barcelona, 1947), 329-331 (248), 20 September 1361.

⁹ GIUSEPPE SCHIRÒ, "Il ducato di Leucade e Venezia fra il XIV e XV secolo", *Byzantinische Forschungen*, V (1977), 353-378; THIRIET, *La Romanie*, 169-170; THIRIET, "Les interventions vénitiennes dans les îles Ioniennes au XIV^e siècle", *Actes du 3ème Congrès Panionien 1965* (Athens, 1967), 1 (1967), 374-385; ASONITIS, *To Nótio Iónio*, 121-125; WALTER HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti Italiani in Levante. I Tocco duchi di Leucade: Regesti (secoli XIV-XVII)", *Studi Veneziani*, n.s. XLV (2003), 173 (5), May 1357.

¹⁰ THIRIET, *La Romanie*, 358; SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 354-356; ANTHONY LUTTRELL, "Vonitza

widow, Magdalena Buondelmonti¹¹, faced a difficult situation, as the Venetian captains of the Gulf not only denied to pay the toll for the use of the channel of Santa Maura¹², but they constantly pressed her to compensate her husband's victims¹³, while the Albanians, who controlled the adjacent continental territories, ceaselessly plundered the island of Santa Maura¹⁴, depriving the Tocco family of its modest resources.

The peace of Turin, which officially ended the War of Chioggia¹⁵, did not stop the rivalry between Venice and Genoa¹⁶, as the Genoese kept trying to acquire naval stations in regions of Romania traditionally controlled by Venice. One of those regions was the Ionian sea, where for the next several decades an undeclared war kept waging between the two Italian maritime republics¹⁷.

Eager supporters of Genoa in that confrontation were the lords of Cephalonia, seeking to rid themselves of the stranglehold of Venetian pressure. It was for that reason that Magdalena Tocco opened the harbours of Cephalonia to the Genoese ships, hurrying to take over the island of Corfu after the death of Charles III of Naples (1386)¹⁸.

in Epiros and its lords: 1306-1377", *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*, n.s. I (XI) (1964), 139-140.

¹¹ On Magdalena Buondelmonti cf. JULIAN CHRYSOSTOMIDES, "Italian Women in Greece in the late Fourteenth and early Fifteenth Centuries", *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi* (*Miscellanea Agostino Pertusi*), II (1982), 123-127.

¹² According to an order of Magdalena Buondelmoti to her vicar in Sancta Maura, he had to collect from every "ligno armato transeunti deinde, yperpera quattuor pro passagio, tam eundo quam redeundo, et cuilibet griparie yperpera quinque», a claim which, according to the Venetian Senate was "contra jus ac antiquam et approbatam consuetudinem": SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 354-355; HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 174 (11), 28 March 1368.

¹³ SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 356; HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 178 (31), 15 May 1383.

¹⁴ GIUSEPPE SCHIRÒ (ed.), *Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di anonimo. Prolegomeni, testo critico e traduzione, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 10 (Roma, 1975), vss. 57-80, 90-91, 121-123, 1016.

¹⁵ THIRIET, *La Romanie*, 178; NICOL, *Byzantium and Venice*, 312-321.

¹⁶ On the Venetian and Genoese presence and antagonism in the the Eastern Mediterranean in that period cf. ELISABETH ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade. Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Mendesche and Aydin (1300-1415)* (Venice, 1983), *passim*; LAURA BALLETO and G. PISTARINO, "Genova ed il suo sistema politico-militare nell'Egeo (secoli XIV-XV)", *Atti della Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere*, serie V, LIII (1997), 461-472; MICHEL BALARD, *La Romanie génoise (XII^e-début du XV^e siècle, I-II)* (Gênes-Rome, 1978), *passim*; ELIYAHU ASHTOR, "L'apogée du commerce venetien au Levant. Un nouvel essai d'explication", in *Venezia centro di mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV-XVI). Aspetti e Problemi* (Firenze, 1977), I, 308-309; on the presence and the activities of the Venetian fleet in the Ionian region during the war of Chioggia cf. DANIELE DI CHINAZZO, *Cronica de la guerra da Veniciani a Zenovesi*, a cura di VITTORIO LAZZARINI (Venezia, 1958), 178-183.

¹⁷ THIRIET, *La Romanie*, 178; THIRIET, *Regestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie*, I (1329-1399) (Paris, 1958), 184 (763), 23 December 1389; ALBERTO TENENTI, *L'Italia del Quattrocento. Economia e società* (Bari, 1996), 68; ASONITIS, *To Nório Ióvio*, 143.

¹⁸ This can be assumed from the information concerning Magdalena's contacts with

The efforts of the Genoese having failed, Venice, now with Corfu under her protection, was in a much better position to control the Ionian region. In 1389, with Venetian pressure escalating, an indignant Charles Tocco, making the very first move of his political career, signed a defence treaty with Genoa, committing himself to support the Genoese fleets against their enemies and offering his ports as naval stations to them¹⁹.

Venice immediately declared an embargo against the Tocco possessions. Five years of strict enforcement of economic blockade were enough to persuade them who was in charge in the Ionian region²⁰. In 1396 he was reluctantly promising that he would never again try to oppose the interests of the Serenissima and that he would behave as a sincere ally of Venice²¹.

This pledge naturally restricted in the short term Tocco's piratical activities, while his resources kept diminishing because of the Albanian raids against Santa Maura. Those raids, however, offered Tocco an alternative. His aggression could now be directed against them, and his pillaging

the last governor of the Angevins in Corfu: EUGENIO BACCHION, *Il dominio Veneto su Corfù (1386-1797)* (Venezia, 1956), 26-27; SPYROS N. ASONITIS, *Ανθηγαυική Κέρκυρα. 13^{ος}-14^{ος} αι.* (Corfu, 1999), 119-120.

¹⁹ SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 356-360; CHARALAMPOS GASPARI, "Il patto di Carlo I Tocco con il Comune di Genova (1389-1390). Una conseguenza delle incursioni albanesi?", in *The Medieval Albanians* (Athens, 1988), 249-259; HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 179 (38) 2 December 1389, (39) 30 December 1389. Cf. ASONITIS, *Το Νότιο Ιόνιο*, 141-146, where Tocco's motivation on the issue is extensively discussed.

²⁰ DONALD NICOL, *The Despotate of Epiros, 1267-1479. A contribution to the history of Greece in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1984), 168; HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 179 (42) 12 December 1390, 180 (43) 11 April 1391, (44) 7 September 1391, (46) 21 March 1392, 180-181 (49) 15 April 1393.

²¹ SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 359-361; ASONITIS, *Το Νότιο Ιόνιο*, 146. In the next few years that pledge gave rise to considerable problems for Tocco; as some warships of the king of Naples were heading for the Adriatic, their captains stopped at the Tocco's islands for supplies. Having to cope with the Venetian prohibition to assist ships considered as hostile to the Serenissima, Tocco claimed that their captains should affirm they would not harm any Venetians, stirring up his overlords indignation. Having by a hair's breadth avoided the consequences of his attitude regarding his overlord's ships, Tocco asked for Venice's viewpoint should a similar problem appear in the future; his envoys were cynically told by the Senate that: "...nos bene cognoscimus eum ita sapientem, et habere ita solidum et sanum consilium apud se, quod occurrentibus sibi de casibus similibus casui anni preteriti, vel aliis, ipse sciet videre, cognoscere et ponderare ea que ponderanda et cognoscenda fuerint et facere per modum, quod ipse dominus rex non habebit justam causam possendi gravari de eo, et nos habebimus causam remanendi certi, quia nos nil aliud querimus nisi quod galee quas ipse sciet vel posset comprehendere fore male dispositas ...non debeat recipere nec eis prebere in locis suis victualia nec favores...": VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, III, 243 (886) 7 July 1401; cf. SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 364-366; HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 187 (107) 3 July 1403; ASONITIS, *Το Νότιο Ιόνιο*, 146. On the antagonism between Venice and Genoa in that period cf. NICOL, *Byzantium and Venice*, 340-346.

could be considered as legitimate self-defence. Venice, moreover, was not opposed to such activities, since by that time the coasts of the southern Ionian were crawling with pirates²².

Having fixed his target, Tocco transferred his headquarters to Santa Maura. There he put together a fleet, consisting mainly of galleys and troopships. As the Albanians were mostly shepherds, transport ships were very useful, since his principal booty was livestock. His naval forces continued to grow over the next several years²³.

The Greek author of the Chronicle of Tocco²⁴ uses various Byzantine and Western terms to describe Tocco's vessels (ξύλα, πλευτικά, γαλιότες, καράβια, κόκες, κάτεργα, ψευδοκάτεργα, βάρκες, σανδάλια, σανδαλόπουλα, μονόξυλα)²⁵. Some of Tocco's galleys had been commissioned from Venetian shipyards, some had been given to him by Venice to patrol the region

²² In some cases even the people of the shoreline were playing a part in those aggressive activities. According to the Chronicle of Tocco, the dwellers of castle of Riniassa, near Preveza, used to attack little vessels sailing along their coast (SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 2440-2469). Nicolò de Martono, on his arrival in Sancta Maura was informed that the channel near that castle had been dug out because of the Albanian attacks: "...*Alias dicta insula Leucate erat unita cum dicta terra Albanie per quodam artum territorium. Deinde, quia Albanenses currebant dictam insulam Leucate, fuit dictum artum territorium per vim cavatum, ita quod mare modo circumdat dictum castrum, et est per dictum mare separata insula Leucate a terra firma Albanie, et sic Albanenses non possunt dictam insulam dampnificare*"; LÉON LE GRAND (ed.), "Nicolai de Marthono, notarii, Liber peregrinationis ad Loca Sancta", *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, III (1895), 662. The anxiety of the travelers as far as the Albanians settled on the coasts of the region are concerned is obvious in the narration of Nicolò de Martono "...*Barcha tantum fuit in dicto litore a fluctibus agitata quod fregit se in dicto litore...Capitaneus dicti castris, qui erat Neapolitanus, pietate commotus, misit ad nos famulum suum cum uno equo et accessimus ad dictum castrum cum timore, eo quod erant ibi Albanenses...*": LE GRAND, "Nicolai de Marthono", 665.

²³ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 332-333, 476-479.

²⁴ On his identity cf. SPIROS N. ASONITIS "Μερικές εύλωτες σιωπές του Χρονικού των Τόκκων" *Τεκμήριο*, V, (2005), 9, 31-48.

²⁵ The information contained in the Chronicle of Tocco on the kinds of ships used in the region is rather vague. Except from the use of nonspecific terms denoting either war or transport ships, like ξύλα (SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 1476, 1837, 2439, 3762), πλευτικά (SCHIRÒ, vss. 400, 479, 533, 690, 691, 785, 805, 1476, 3742, 3758) and καράβια (SCHIRÒ, vss. 1838, 1889, 1883, 2900), the vessels used in the aggressive operations were the cog (κόκα) (SCHIRÒ, vss. 1838, 1859-1864, 1876, 1864, 1873, 1875/7, 1887, 1891, 1894), the galley (γαλιότες) (SCHIRÒ, vss. 316, 478, 523, 551, 588, 596, 871, 904, 915, 916, 2451, 2462, 2465, 2902) or κάτεργο (SCHIRÒ, vss. 335, 478, 533, 546, 562, 599, 611, 1136, 1144, 1838, 1895, 3621, 3747, 3772, 3774, 3804, 3801, 3804) and the brigantine (πριγαντίβι) (SCHIRÒ, v. 551). In the Chronicle are also mentioned other kinds of ships like the large boat (βάρκα or βαρκέττα) (SCHIRÒ, vss. 695, 1457, 2459, 2900, 2441, 2466) used mainly as a transport ship, while smaller vessels are the flat-bottomed boats (σανδάλια) (SCHIRÒ, vss. 388, 2446, 2455, 2459) and the logboats (μονόξυλα) (SCHIRÒ, v. 2444). On the Byzantine terms *karabos*, *katargon*, *xylon*, *sandalion*, cf. AHRWEILER, *Byzance et la Mer*, 408-418.

against pirates²⁶, some belonged to his Italian associates²⁷, and some were booty from his earlier piratical activities²⁸. There is no evidence of organised shipyards capable of building large warships in his islands, only some less significant facilities for the construction of small vessels²⁹. Tocco used his naval forces against the Albanians in various ways. His ships were often used to transport soldiers and siege equipment, facilitating his efforts to surprise the garrisons of the castles near the coast³⁰. In one case his captain steered his galley into the lower, navigable, part of the river Acheloos, to seize a castle³¹. But his main tactic was raids carried out by recruited corsairs (*rhymparaioi*)³². The local populations, terrified by their cru-

²⁶ “*Ad secundam partem, qua ipse [Tocco] requirit, quod complaceamus sibi de una ex galeis nostris novis arsenatus, fulcita necessarijs, quam ipse intendit habere armatam ad persecutionem Turchorum, et ad securitatem mercatorum nostrorum navigantium per illos culphos, ut fecit anno preterito, et hoc pro illo precio quo extimata fuerit. Respondeatur quod licet istud civitas nostra non sit solita multociens facere et concedere alijs, tamen quia amamus ipsum dominum ducham, ut honorabilem civem nostrum sumus contenti complacere sibi de dicta galea fulcita suis coredis, pro illo precio, quo extimata fuerit, nam certi reddimur, quod semper ad omne bene placitum nostrum et nostrorum rectorum serviet nobis de galea predicta.*” (VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, III, 244 (886) 7 July 1401); “*Capta. Cum isti ambassiatores domini duchis Zefalonie rogaverint nostrum dominium, quod placeat concedere dicto domino suo quod possit tenere per unum annum ad gubernationem galee quam sibi vendidimus illum comitum, quem acceperunt pro ipsa, Vadit pars, quod complaceatur dicto domino, de dicto comito per unum annum sicut dominus suus teneatur elapso anno facere ipsum comitum reverti Venetias, et det dictus comitus plezarim officialibus armamenti sicut continetur in dicta parte pridie capta.*” (VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, III, 248 (890) 31 July 1401).

²⁷ VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, VI, 183-186 (1700) 5 November 1411, 198-200 (1718) 17 March 1412, VII, 84-88 (1836) 6 September 1413, 90-91 (1839) 15 September 1413, 127-130 (1886) 12 July 1414, 130-132 (1887) 12 July 1414, 175 (1932, 1935) 6 February 1415, 224-226 (1987) 12 September 1415, 231-232 (1993) 26 October 1415, VIII, 48-49 (2036) 14 August 1416, 379-380 (2176) 17 July 1417, 413-414 (2204) 21 August 1417; HABERSTUMPF, “*Dinasti*”, 191 (132) 5 October 1411, (133) 17 March 1412.

²⁸ VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, VI, 183-186 (1700) 5 November 1411, 198-200 (1718) 17 March 1412, VII, 84-88 (1836) 6 September 1413, 90-91 (1839) 15 September 1413, 127-130 (1886) 12 July 1414, 130-132 (1887) 12 July 1414, 175 (1932, 1935) 6 February 1415, 224-226 (1987) 12 September 1415, 231-232 (1993) 26 October 1415, VIII, 48-49 (2036) 14 August 1416, 379-380 (2176) 17 July 1417, 413-414 (2204) 21 August 1417.

²⁹ VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, II, 145-146 (443) 21 March 1392.

³⁰ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 289-290, 377-396, 785-806; NICOL, *The Despotate of Epiros*, 170 sq., where however the author sticks to the mistaken sequence of the events as they appear in Schirò’s edition of Chronicle of Tocco (ELISABETH ZACHARIADOU, “Οι χίλιοι στίχοι στην αρχή του Χρονικού των Τόκκο”, *Ηπειρωτικά Χρονικά*, XXV (1983), 158-181; ASONITIS, *To Nótio Iónio*, 285-286). For a more sensible sequence of the events cf. ASONITIS, *To Nótio Iónio*, 147-187.

³¹ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 853-923. The besiegers, intending to take over the tower on the little island in the entrance of the lagoon of Anatolikon, approached on flat-bottomed boats and using an appliance made on the spot by their leader they perforated the tower’s wall (SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 391-396).

³² SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 480-481, 962-967, 2006-2071.

elty, sought refuge in the castles³³, creating huge problems for their provisioning and defence³⁴.

Venice having done nothing in two decades to obstruct those activities³⁵, Tocco managed to conquer many Albanian territories, and by 1411 he was the master of most of western Greece³⁶. It was then that their perilous condition drove the Albanians to seek Ottoman support. But when the Turkish troops sent against Tocco proved to be useless, the Albanians started building troopships of their own, albeit of doubtful utility. Since, however, those vessels could be dangerous enough if they were to be used to transport Ottoman troops, Venice promptly hastened to mediate between the two adversaries. A truce having been signed, the Albanian vessels were surrendered to Tocco, who placed them in Santa Maura, out of Turkish reach³⁷.

Tocco's ambitions, not to mention his victory over the Albanians, alarmed the prince of Achaia, who decided to curb his power by attacking his islands. Not disposing of a creditable fleet of his own, however, the prince called for support from the lords of the Aegean islands of Chios and Lesbos, while Tocco's naval force was strengthened by a cog from southern Italy. The naval battle near the island of Zakynthos resulted in a victory for Tocco. It was not his naval superiority that gained him the victory, however, but the assistance of a Venetian fleet which had sailed up from Corfu³⁸. Obviously, Venice still considered Tocco as an important factor for stability in the region³⁹.

³³ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 332-376, 480-481, 960-967.

³⁴ In one case Tocco made use of transport ships for taking away livestock from his Albanian enemies (SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 685-699).

³⁵ Tocco was not hesitant to cooperate with Italian pirates, who used to attack trade ships, even Venetian ones. In 1411 he was indicted for numerous piratical activities against Venetian citizens. On this issue cf. ALBERTO TENENTI, "Venezia e la pirateria", 712; ASONITIS, *To Nótio Iónio*, 277-282. On Venice's policies regarding the lords of the Ionian region in that period cf. SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 366-374. Tocco's naval superiority in the region is evidenced by the fact that in 1410, when Venice was working for a long truce ("*aliquam longam treguam per mare et per terram*") between him and the Albanians, the latter were asking for a truce regarding just naval hostile activities ("*per mare...ut circavicini et subditi partium possint sicut soliti sunt invicem traficare, libere et impune, sine aliquot timore vel molestia*") (VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, VI, 24-25 (1530) 15 March 1410, 86-88 (1600) 27 September 1410).

³⁶ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 1500-1607; NICOL, *The Despotate of Epiros*, 176-177.

³⁷ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 1129-1140.

³⁸ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 1868-1896; SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 370-371; SCHIRÒ, "Contributo alla storia delle isole Ioniche all'epoca dei Tocco (sec. XIV-XV)", *Actes du 3ème Congrès Panionien 1965*, II, (Athens, 1965), 235-244; BON, *La Morée franque*, 284; NICOL, *The Despotate of Epiros*, 180; VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta*, VII, 141 (1896); SPIROS N. ASONITIS, "Relations between the Venetian Regimen Corphoy and the Albanians of Epirus (14th-15th centuries)", in *The Medieval Albanians* (Athens, 1988), 280; HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 191 (134) June 1413, (135) 28 July 1413, (136) 11 August 1413.

³⁹ Despite that victory, the situation was so difficult for Tocco, that he asked Venice

The submission of the Albanians of Arta in 1416 brought about the political unification of the whole region of Epiros with the Ionian islands under Tocco's rule⁴⁰. The role of his naval forces and Venice's support in bringing about that state of affairs is apparent. However, as the Ottomans were now his eastern neighbours, Tocco was forced to come to terms with them in order to keep his continental possessions, and consequently declared his allegiance to the Sultan⁴¹.

His naval superiority over the local lords encouraged Tocco to try to expand his domination to the Peloponnese. It was in 1422 that the Queen of Naples granted Tocco's successor the title of Prince of Achaia. However, his new ambitions and his contacts with the Ottomans brought him into conflict with Venice, which was then working hard to take possession of Morea⁴².

In 1422, when the Ottomans were preparing an invasion to Peloponnese, Tocco was ordered by the Sultan to provide the necessary vessels for the transportation of the Ottoman troops. This was a difficult situation, but he managed to handle it without harm to himself. He immediately informed the Venetians of the Ottoman demands, advising them at the same time to burn his vessels, so that he should not be blamed for not complying with the Sultan's orders⁴³. This notwithstanding, the Ottoman troops marched into Morea through the Hexamilion.

After the Turkish invasion, Tocco launched many naval attacks against Moreotic targets⁴⁴. But as his ambitions were now running counter to Venetian interests, he could no longer count on Venetian support. Thus, when he tried to seize lands from the Greek Despotate in the Western Peloponnese and the Emperor sent out a fleet against him, Venice offered no assistance⁴⁵ and the Byzantines managed to win one of their last naval victories. The destruction of his fleet in that naval battle put an end to his naval supremacy in the region⁴⁶.

to take upon herself the protection of his islands. However the Senate turned down the offer reassuring him that in case of danger she would support him: SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 372.

⁴⁰ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 3026-3061.

⁴¹ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 3730-3746.

⁴² SPIROS N. ASONITIS, "Ο τίτλος του πρίγκιπα Αχαΐας και οι Τόκκοι", *Actes du 5ème Congrès Panionien 1986*, I (Argostoli, 1989), 59-80.

⁴³ SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 375-376; BON, *La Morée franque*, 289-290; HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 195 (172).

⁴⁴ SCHIRÒ, *Cronaca dei Tocco*, vss. 3749-3815, 3832-3837.

⁴⁵ HABERSTUMPF, "Dinasti", 198 (191) 3 June 1426.

⁴⁶ SCHIRÒ, "Il Ducato", 376-377; BON, *La Morée franque*, 290-291; NICOL, *The Despotate of Epiros*, 191-192. In 1428, when the despot of Morea Constantine Palaeologus married Tocco's niece Magdalena, Clarenza and the other possessions in the Morea of the Tocco

Venice's policies regarding the development of Tocco's fleet indicate that, although she was not averse to the presence of a modest naval force in the Ionian sea to combat piracy, such a force was undesirable if it were to challenge her own interests. Although she had accepted, and even supported, the development of Tocco's fairly small naval force as an adjunct to her own in the Ionian sea, she would not tolerate the creation of a really strong and unrestrained local naval power in the region.

family were conferred on the bride as a dowry (PETER SCHREINER, *Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, I (Wien, 1975), 266 July 1428, II (Wien, 1977), 435-436).

Diana Gilliland Wright

Bread and Falcons: The view from Crete in 1501

This paper introduces a collection of sixty previously unknown letters written between August 1500 and July 1502 by Bartolomeo Minio, *capitano e consigliere* in Candia. The manuscript, a copy of the original letters, is kept in the Biblioteca Correr as *BCMV Codici Cicogna 2681: Dal 1500 fino 1502 registro dei dispacci di Bartolomeo Minio*¹. I am publishing this manuscript with John Melville-Jones of the University of Western Australia with whom I have published an edition of Minio's earlier collection of ninety letters from Nauplion (1479-1483). Several of this present collection of letters are summarized in volumes 3 and 4 of Sanudo's *Diarii*². The *Diarii* supplement and explain many of the references in the letters, while the letters provide a check on Sanudo's accuracy. In addition, Sanudo summarizes other letters not in this collection. The Priuli *Diarii* parallel both, often with a slightly different view and more dramatic language³. Further supplementary primary sources are provided in the parallel registers of the Senato Secreta and Senato Mar.

A striking feature of the letters, reinforced by these other sources, is the view of what it meant to be on the front line of defence in a major war when a letter and response could easily take two months. In the summer of 1500, Venice was fighting the Ottomans at Modon, Coron, and Nauplion. Modon fell on 10 August. Minio learned of this on 26 August and of the loss of Coron on the 31st. His letter to the Signoria about the surrenders was read in Venice on 18 October⁴. A letter of early July reporting Minio's arrival in Crete was read in Venice on 23 September⁵. To deal with the problems inherent in such delays, the Venetian administrative system pro-

¹ The manuscript is in the hand of Minio's son, diplomat Marco Minio, Venetian ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan, and *duca* of Crete between 1521 and 1524. In the references given in the text, I have supplied the foliation.

² MARINO SANUDO, *Diarii* (Bologna, 1969).

³ GIROLAMO PRIULI, *I Diarii* (Città di Castello, 1912+).

⁴ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.922.

⁵ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.818-819. While Sanudo indicates he arrived on the 4th, Minio's first letter says he arrived on the 6th.

vided for an overseas administrator, with the aid of two *consiglieri*, to make *ad hoc* decisions. This guaranteed, not only an authority in place, but mutual oversight with a shared understanding of Venetian goals and local practicalities. As a *provveditor* was told in 1485 – after stringent warnings of investigations and jail time: “In reality, if for some important reason you feel you cannot obey our instructions, you can without penalty write back how, because of that reason, you will not be able to fulfill our mandate”⁶. The system of an administrator and two councillors was stretched to its limit in Crete that summer of 1500. The *duca* had died and Bernardo Giustinian, *capitano* and oldest of the councillors, replaced him as acting *duca*. When Giustinian himself became ill shortly afterwards, the other two *consiglieri*, Sier Alvise da Mulla, as acting *vice-duca*, and Sier Piero Falier, *vice-capitano*, then elected a Beneto Baffom, one of the *camerlenghi*, to be their third⁷. That January, this flexibility was stretched to the extreme when *duca* Marco Barbo and *capitano* Minio, disliking the 2-2 vote between them and the two *consiglieri*, selected *camerlengo* Gabriel Trevisan as an additional *consigliere* to break the tie [ff 17-17v]⁸.

In that war-saturated summer of 1500, Bartolomeo Minio, aged about 72 and proud that his vision was still good, completed his term as *capitano* at Famagusta and was waiting for transport back to Venice⁹. When the Signoria learned that Melchior Trevisan, Captain General of the Venetian fleet, was ill at Corfù and expected to die, they instructed Minio to travel to Corfù and wait there for further word from them, as he had been particularly discussed for the position. Then the Signoria learned that Giustinian, acting *duca* of Crete was also gravely ill. The Signoria decided that Minio should go instead to Crete, but they omitted to tell him. When Minio reached Candia, he found the *consiglieri* struggling with military decisions in support of the troops at Modon. He decided to remain to give leadership, but then he received letters from his sons saying he was to replace Giustinian. Without a *duca* and as oldest of the *consiglieri*, Minio became *vice-duca* and so was, for four months, the ultimate authority on Crete¹⁰. He had no question as to his own ability, but his formal *missione* as *consigliere* was slow in arriving, and without a *missione*, he would be vulnerable to serious legal charges if someone became offended, and shows great anxiety about an official letter of appointment [f.4].

⁶ Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV), *Commissioni Provveditori*, b 3/52: Commissione à Francesco Bragadin.

⁷ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.600, 696.

⁸ Interestingly, this was in the matter of the estate of the recently deceased Bernardo Giustinian whom Minio replaced.

⁹ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.302.

¹⁰ *Duca*-elect Marco Barbo was awaiting passage to Crete. He arrived in November.

Minio was immediately confronted with supplying the last ships going to aid Modon and Coron, and shortly afterwards had to receive and repair the damaged ships limping back from the surrender, handle inventories of the goods of the deceased, and deal with the refugees¹¹. The streets of Candia were full of refugees “reducti in tanta miseria che in verità li moveriano uno cuore de diamante”. The letters give a startling view of Cretan administrative and societal poverty: there were neither funds in the treasury that could be used to feed them, nor bread to be bought.

A disturbing off-shoot of that debacle was the delivery of the body, and head, of Carlo Contarini, castellan at Zonchio (Old Navarino). Contarini's surrender of Zonchio without adequate resistance was offense enough, but his appearance in the Turkish camp besieging Corone, dressed in a gold robe and urging surrender, required his execution. When he had attempted to rejoin the Venetian fleet, he was arrested by the Captain-General, tried on board the flagship, and then decapitated on the poop¹². Moving back and forth between Sanudo and Priuli and the letters, one is constantly reminded that these men were long-time acquaintances, their families closely related, and that this was a ruling structure that had survived and succeeded – to a great extent – because its representatives were so strongly invested in a shared set of values.

Resolutions in Senato Mar registers give one view of the process of rule in the *stato da mar*. The Senato's actions are all essentially reactive, responses to situations that have arisen, solutions devised weeks and months after the problems that provoked them. Minio's *dispacci* give the weight of problems at the time and his solutions, limited as they were by weather, information, transportation, food supplies, arsenal supplies, and money. As Candia was a port where galleys – not only Venetian – came for food and repairs, he had to keep stocks of grain and material. One letter [9v] lists of equipment desperately needed for the arsenal, as he says, “Et cerca la Vostra Sublimità che quanto in questa polizza se contiene sia lo evangelio di San Zuanne” [f.9]¹³. Sanudo summarizes the situation he was facing [f.6v-7]:

Di Candia, di sier Bortolo Minio, capetanio e vice ducha e consieri, di 24 octubrio. Come de li sono 4 galie sotil, zonte a di 16; do, sier Andrea Foscolo e sier Polo Nani, fono conze le coperte; voleva biscoto, li dete solum miara 5, per non ne haver, e non esser un soldo in la camera; et le altre zonseno eri, videlicet Marcella e Sibinzana, lassate a la guardia di l'Arzipielago; hanno voluto sartie etc., le darà, no vi hèn; e, volendo ar-

¹¹ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.921. About 700 Candiotti, mostly with the fleet, died at Modon.

¹² SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3. 628, 720, 949, 1106, 1155. Contarini died “molto contento, receipti con summa devutiom tuti li sacramenti di la chiesa”.

¹³ This letter of 30 October 1500 is reported in SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.1149-50. ASV, Senato, Mar R. 15, 48v gives an identical list of material being sent to Candia in response.

mar, bisogna mandar li corpi di le galie e tuti armizi *etc.*; e per la nave Manolessa manderà il bisogno ...*Item*, non vi è munitione, ni bombarde, nè vi hè un passavolante, ni arme; bisogna zente da piedi et da cavallo, sì per la custodia, come per tenir l'isola unita¹⁴.

Letters across the whole period in the *dispacci* discuss difficulties with fief-holders and *villani* and give previously unavailable information on shifts within the Venetian feudal system. He found it impossible to draft *villani* for galley service: half of them did not want to go out against the Turks, while the other half were anxious to sign up for galley service, and the losses and absentees led to a situation of near-famine across the island during those years. Then a landholder visited him with a written analysis of the landholding system and a proposal for supplying and paying for oarsmen [ff.12v-13]¹⁵.

As *capitano*, Minio was responsible for the defense of Crete, and for providing back-up to Monemvasia, Nauplion, and the fleet, and the *dispacci* are full of pragmatic details. One letter includes two *condotte*, for a troop of horsemen, and for four bands of foot, each of which includes a *paga mortua* [ff.10v-11]. Another gives the payroll for the *Manolessa*, mentioned just above in the Sanudo passage, with names, jobs, and rates of pay [f.8v]. Several letters report the condition of the walls in Candia, and discuss plans for construction [ff.2-2v, 9, 11v, *passim*]¹⁶. Minio was compulsively accurate in details involving money, and the traditionally-unpaid taxes of Cretan officials did not escape his notice. A number of letters report on this issue, and on the antagonism of his colleagues when he asks for a ruling so he can collect the taxes, taxes needed to pay for grain and ship repairs and salaries [f.5, for one].

In the letter paraphrased above, three ships are named. Throughout the *dispacci*, ships arrive, leave, sink, need repair, need unloading. The harbour was crowded with small boats and needed dredging. Large ships had to anchor at nearby Fraschea and their men and goods off-loaded and rowed to Candia [f.1]. Enough are named and enough types of ships listed, that this collection provides an exceptional source for shipping of the period. He notes the arrival of the *muda* from Alexandria and Beirut each year, and passes on what he has heard about other ships.

There is less information from other parts of Crete, but Sitia, Rethymnon and Cania all required the *capitano*'s attention. Sitia was under constant threat from pirates, the city was unwallled and the bay broad and easy of access. Landholders and citizens of Rethymnon threatened revolt,

¹⁴ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.1148.

¹⁵ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.1225-1226.

¹⁶ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.922.

not a rare event on Crete where landholders of Venetian origin tended to identify with Greeks in opposition to Venetian rule [ff.14-14v]. Minio was asked to inspect the fortifications of Cania, this after it became known that the commander of the French fleet had been inspecting them *incognito*. A long illness and slow recovery delayed his inspection, but he sent back an admiring description of the site [ff.35, 39, 40v-41].

Beyond immediate issues of administration, the Cretan *dispacci* give intriguing glimpses of the Mediterranean world in 1500-1502. Minio, like other Venetian officials, ships' officers, and merchants, sent back to Venice any information or gossip he heard about political events and fleet movements – Venetian, Turkish, French, Spanish, Portuguese. To convey Minio's view and a sense of the urgency and anxiety in Venetian service, I give here a number of examples with the dates of the letters (*m.v.*).

- The Ottoman fleet is sailing to Nauplion from Modon, and Candia is in panic – “à visto tutta la terra spaventà.” 31/8/00¹⁷

- Reports from Coron indicate that a large number of people there treasonously chose to surrender rather than resist. 6/9/00¹⁸

- The Ottoman fleet has left Nauplion and has passed the Cape of Columns (Sounion) though an army of 5,000 remains at Argos. 24/9/00

- Four French galleys, in service to the Knights of Rhodes, have stopped by Candia. He has given them presents and asked them to join the Captain-General with the Venetian fleet which is following the Turkish fleet up to the Dardanelles. 24/9/00

- The Ottoman fleet has passed Negroponte and is sailing for Chios. 28/9/00

- Candia is full of refugees from Modon. 3/10/00

- The Ottoman fleet has passed Tenedos. The Venetian fleet has taken Samothraki, and has looted several Turkish ships and islands. 8/10/00

- He has received and buried the body of Carlo Contarini. 29/10/00¹⁹

- The new *duca*, Marco Barbo, has arrived and Minio has handed over the *regimen* to him. 20/11/00²⁰

They hear from Chios that Constantinople has the plague. They also hear that 10 Turkish *fuste* are sailing from Sovrasti to raid in the islands. 20/11/00²¹

¹⁷ PRIULI, *Diarii*, II, 9, “Signor Turcho, che per la fama de la sua armata poneva tuto il stato Veneto et li padri in grande fuga.”

¹⁸ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.922-923.

¹⁹ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.1148.

²⁰ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.1225. ASV, Commissione b. 3/70, for 17 September 1496 gives the form for handing-over. The retiring official says, “Consigno hoc regimen nomine Illustrissimi Domini Venetiarum”, to which the incoming official responds, “Ego accepto hoc regimen nomine Illustrissimi Domini Venetiarum”.

²¹ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.1225.

- They hear there is a great shortage of grain in Cyprus which is trying to buy it from Alexandria. Alexandria expects to collect tribute from Cyprus, which will have to come from Venice. 20/11/00²²
- They hear that the galley *Pasqualiga* opened up in the sea and all are lost. 25/11/00²³
- Letters from Rhodes report that island is now free of the plague. 8/1/00²⁴
- The Spanish fleet, sailing off Sicily, captured a large Cretan ship with wine for Naples, and took it to Messina. 2/2/00²⁵
- The *muda* from Beirut arrived on the 2nd, and the *muda* from Alexandria on the 6th, so there are now 14 great galleys in port at Candia. 7/2/00
- Sixty Turkish *fuste* have arrived at Mytileni to raid the island. 1/4/01
- They hear from Cyprus that the new Sultan in Egypt is peaceful and a friend of our people. 1/4/01
- A Venetian spy on Rhodes, Todorin Vlasopoulos, reports that Cem Sultan is in France. 1/4/01²⁶
- The Grand Master of Rhodes, Pierre d'Aubusson, has asked for archers and oarsmen to fight against the Ottoman and sends Crete a plenary indulgence from the Pope for those who would join them. 14/5/01
- Thirty or more Turkish ships are raiding in the Cyclades. 17/5/01
- Disease is running through the Venetian fleet. Crete has to import grain from Sicily to prevent starvation in the cities and to provide bread for the fleet. The *villani* will not volunteer as oarsmen for the fleet and the landowners will not send them. 3/8/01
- The Venetian fleet under Ieronimo Contarini has sacked and burned Caristo on the island of Negroponte. 15/8/01
- They hear that Bayezid has sent the *berler-bey*s of Greece and Anatolia with an army against Hungary. 15/8/01²⁷
- The King of France has called on the Grand Master of the Knights of Rhodes to prepare to sail. 23/8/01
- French ships stopped at Cania (west of Candia) and asked for bread for the ships, but there is not enough to give them. 1/10/01
- The Venetian great ship, *Sodatilo*, was captured by seven Turkish pirate *fuste*, but when 18 *barce* appeared in the company of four French galleys, they released her and fled. 13/10/01

²² SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.302 for earlier comments on this matter.

²³ The owner, Alvise Pasqualin, painted by Antonello da Messina: <http://www.galleriaborghese.it/borghese/img/antone1.jpg>.

²⁴ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 3.1523.

²⁵ Under the command of Consalvo de Ferande.

²⁶ The spy is very late. Cem Sultan, brother of Bayezid II, died 5^{1/2} years earlier, in 1495.

²⁷ ASV, Senato, Secreta R. 38, ff. 59, 124, 135v-136r, *passim*, for the Hungarian-Venetian treaty.

- The Captain General, Benedetto da Ca' Pesaro, is off Cape Malea with 30 *galie sottile*, *galie grosse*, and 8 ships of the Portuguese fleet. Minio is concerned that all these ships will winter in the eastern Mediterranean and that he will be responsible for providing bread for them. There is a very small supply of grain in the storehouses and it is selling for 5 *libre a staro*²⁸. 18/10/01

- Minio has been directed to send food and wine to Mitylini in anticipation of the planned Venetian-French-Knights of Rhodes attack. He will have to send messages across the island asking for contributions. 31/10/01

- The French fleet, en route to join the attack, stopped off Candia and sent an officer ashore to ask Minio for 40 saker falcons²⁹. Minio has written the district administrators across the island asking if they can find any, but it has been a hard winter in Crete and the mountain passes have been impassable because of snow. The prospects of finding falcons are limited. 31/10/01

- The corsair Henrichi has been captured; his ship ran aground on the island of Malo, some of his men were imprisoned, and others cut to pieces. 24/11/01

- The Grand Master of the Knights of Rhodes has sailed with 32 ships to join the Venetians at Mytileni. 24/11/01

- A friar, Joanni Parpiglia, has come to Candia to buy wine and staples for the Grand Master's fleet. 26/11/01

- Reports from the Captain General at Mytileni indicate that the allies are less than satisfactory and the attack might have to be abandoned. 3/12/01³⁰

- The Venetian *rettor* at Cania has suddenly lost his sight. 8/12/01

- Minio is recovering after almost a month in bed with a chest infection and extremely high fever from which he nearly died. He needs to go to Cania but doesn't think he will have the strength for several days yet. 7/1/01

- Galleys have arrived from Dalmatia and asked to buy bread, which Minio has been able to supply. 7/1/01

- Friar Joanni Parpiglia asks Minio to ask the Signoria to use its influence with the Pope to have him made a papal chaplain. 20/2/01³¹

- The corsair Camali is reported at Negroponte with 60 ships, prepar-

²⁸ *Staro*: a measurement of weight which varies between 75 and 100 kilograms.

²⁹ The saker, *falco cherrug*, a large bird of prey of Central Europe and the steppes, winters across southern Italy, Greece and the eastern Mediterranean. There are several subspecies. A favorite of falconers, especially in the Middle East, the saker is on the verge of extinction with fewer than 1200 pairs estimated now in existence. http://www.blueplanetbiomes.org/saker_falcon.htm

³⁰ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 4.205.

³¹ A papal chaplaincy was an honorary position that freed the holder from obedience to religious superiors.

ing to raid the islands for slaves. Minio has heard this from Nauplion, Monemvasia, and from Frate Juliano in Pera. 10/3/02

- Minio has still not been well enough to make an inspection trip to Cania and Suda Bay. 9/4/02

- They have not been able to buy grain from the Genoese at Chios because of the pressure Beyazid is putting on them, although one ship has been able to take on a load. 29/4/02

- The *muda* still has not left Alexandria because the merchandise has not yet been collected. 29/4/02

- Frate Juliano of Pera also wants to be made a papal chaplain. 2/5/02

- Bayezid is collecting a fleet but not as large as usual, only about 150 *fuste*, so he can move more quickly. 13/8/02

- Conte Franzon, an engineer and mercenary at Cania, has made a model of the fortifications of Cania which they are sending the Signoria. They have learned that the captain of the French ships was at Suda Bay last year, *incognito*, looking at the fortifications and was extremely critical of the Signoria's apparent lack of interest in maintenance and repair. 13/8/02

The *dispacci* in this collection do not continue after August, though Minio remained in Candia at least until 5 November³². He was old and cranky and exhausted. He did not work very well in cooperation, and *duca* Marco Barbo who returned to Venice before he did indicated that he had some things to say privately³³. Minio's gift to the modern world is these two large accumulations of letters, a hundred and fifty of them, reporting on the Venetian Mediterranean.

³² SANUDO, *Diarii*, 4.605 reports the arrival of Alvise Venier, his successor on 4th November.

³³ SANUDO, *Diarii*, 4.434-5 for 10 November 1502: "sier Marco Barbo, vento ducha di Candia ... volero dir dil capetaneo, ma si ritene, dicendo, a loco e tempo dicia".

Miquel Àngel Casanovas Camps

The Ottoman and Barbary attacks on the Balearic Islands during the XVIth century

The confrontation of the greatest powers of the XVI century, the Spanish and Ottoman empires, the latter supported by the Barbary corsairs and by the France of the Valois, had great repercussions on the Balearic Islands, due to their condition as islands and a frontier between the Christian and Moslem worlds. Throughout the whole of the XVI century the coasts of the Balearic Islands suffered attacks by the corsairs of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire (under the occasional command of Drub “The Devil” or Cachidiablo, Dragut or the brothers Barbarossa). Many of them were of little importance, with the object of looting farms, robbing cattle and taking captives. On the other hand, others were much more serious and affected numerous coastal villages (Sóller, Pollença, Andratx etc.). However, there were much more important attacks against the walled cities of Ibiza and Mahón. But the most devastating attack was suffered by Ciutadella, in the island of Menorca, in July of 1558. On this occasion it was an attack by a great Ottoman fleet under the command of Admiral Piali Pasha. After nine days of siege, the city was taken and completely destroyed.

As much the attacks carried out as the permanent threat of new attacks, made it necessary to undertake a vast programme of fortification and to organise a complex system of coastal vigilance. Repercussions on the economy (especially on maritime commerce), the population (through the capture of thousands of captives) including the psychological, were also very important.

The Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean geostrategy during the first half of the XVIth century

The Balearic Islands, as well as the rest of the Mediterranean islands, had for centuries been a frontier between Christian Europe and Moslem North Africa. Ever since the XIIIth century Christian powers had imposed their control over the western Mediterranean and the conquest of the Ba-

learic Islands over this century shows this hegemony. Once the Moslem reign had been abolished in 1492, the monarchy of the *Reyes Católicos* (the Catholic Monarchs) began to spread towards the north of Africa. Between 1497 (the conquest of Melilla) and 1510 various north African cities were occupied (Mazalquivir – Spanish name of Mars al-Kibir –, Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, Oran, Bogie and Tripoli), thus forming a strategic cordon for protection against north African corsairs and making possible the future penetration of the territories of Magreb. The Balearic Islands marginally participated in this policy of expansion, as men and ships from the islands contributed to the defence of Bogie in the sieges of 1510 and 1516, the latter led by Haruc Barbarossa.

However, it so happened that this expansive phase was interrupted in 1510 for various reasons, among them the greater interest of the Spanish monarchs in European matters. Thus, the assumption of the imperial crown by Carlos I of Spain (who reigned in the Empire as Charles V), appeared to give preference to the conflicts in Europe while the Mediterranean became of secondary importance. From this moment, the North African pirate activity increased. Also, another danger was on the horizon: the threat of the powerful Ottoman Empire. The growing connection between the Barbary corsairs and the Ottoman Empire would prove lethal for the coasts under Hispanic dominion, including the Balearic Islands, especially from 1521, when Haruc Barbarossa occupied Algeria and offered himself to the service of the Ottoman sultan.

The danger of Barbary and Ottoman attack was increased in 1534 by the alliance of France with Keir Eddin Barbarossa and the Ottoman Empire. France saw in this alliance a way of counteracting the power of the Emperor Charles V. Furthermore, the support of France would multiply the operational capacity of the Barbary corsairs and also facilitate the action of the Ottoman navy in the far-off waters of the western Mediterranean. Thus did the Balearic Islands see the increase of the threat of a devastating attack for which they were not prepared.

Following the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile (1479), the kingdom of Mallorca, which encompassed the Balearic archipelago, had turned into a second category state within the monarchy of the Catholic King and Queen¹. This marginal position was accentuated during the reign on their grandson, Charles, who added to his Spanish inheritance (including the vast American territories in the process of conquest) the

¹ The Balearic Islands were conquered by the Crown of Aragon throughout the XIIIth century. The Balearic Moslem population was expelled or enslaved and the islands were colonised mostly by Catalans. The political and cultural institutions, language and customs, were implanted by the Catalan colonists. However, between 1287 and 1343 the Balearic Islands formed an independent state (the kingdom of Mallorca) gov-

European possessions of the Hapsburgs and the Empire. Around 1550 the kingdom of Mallorca, with an area of 5000 square kilometres, had some 75.000 inhabitants². The City of Mallorca (the present day Palma) was the largest city of the archipelago, with some 20.000 inhabitants. But in spite of its modest demographic and economic strength, the Balearic Islands had a fundamental strategic importance. On the one hand, they were the key to commerce and navigation in the western Mediterranean, on the other hand, the defensive natural bulwark of the eastern Spanish coasts. This is understood as the reason for the special concern felt by, for example, the Catalan authorities towards the islands.

But if the strategic situation of the islands was well known by the Spanish royal court, their defence resources were not up to the growing threat hovering over them. In fact, their defence system was no more than the old medieval walls which protected the main cities (Palma and Alcudia in Mallorca, Ciudadela and Mahón in Menorca and the city of Ibiza) and some inland castles. On the other hand, there were no armies of the King in the islands, and the defence fell to the local militia, under the command of the viceroy of Mallorca and the governors of Menorca and Ibiza. The fortifications were under the island institutions (the councils of each island), which also had to organise coastal vigilance, with very reduced economic resources. Coastal vigilance consisted of a network of watchtowers situated on elevated points of the coast, which warned of enemy ships by fire signals (at night) or smoke (in daytime). Most of these watchtowers functioned only during the most practicable months for navigation, i.e. between May and October.

Furthermore, the islands of Formentera and Cabrera were uninhabited³, which facilitated their use by Barbary corsairs, as much for attacking navigation as for looting the nearby coasts. One example of this is the naval battle in 1529 when Drub, called the Devil or Cachidiablo, attacked the squadron of galleys of Rodrigo de Portuondo on the island of s'Espalmador, si-

erned by the second branch of the Barcelona dynasty, i.e., by King Jaime II of Mallorca (son of The Conqueror, Jaime I) and his descendents. Pedro IV of Aragon annexed the kingdom of Mallorca and its dominions in 1343. Thereafter, the kingdom of Mallorca continued with the historic vicissitudes of the Crown of Aragon until the marriage of the *Reyes Católicos* (Catholic Monarchs) and the union of the Crowns of Castille and Aragon (1479).

² About Mallorca, see the complete study by ONOFRE VAQUER, *Una sociedad del Antiguo Régimen. Felanitx y Mallorca en el siglo XVI*, 2 volumes (Palma, 1987 and 1998).

³ Cabrera with its adjacent islands (with a total area of some 15 km²) continues to be uninhabited in the present day. In 1989 it was declared a National Park. On the other hand, Formentera was colonised from Ibiza as from 1690. It is not just by chance that the colonisation of Formentera took place at a time when the threat by the North African corsairs had appreciably diminished. See JOAN MARÍ CARDONA, *Formentera* (Ibiza, 1983).

tuated between Ibiza and Formentera. Of Portuondo's⁴ squadron only one of the galleys, a *fusta* (a kind of small ship) and a brig were saved. In Cabrera there was a small castle, but which was in a bad state. In 1558 the Great and General Council of Mallorca agreed to proceed with the restoration of the Cabrera castle, which had to be garrisoned by a contingent of soldiers. With this, the idea was to avoid Cabrera becoming a base for attacking the south coast of Mallorca and the merchant vessels heading for Palma.

During the first half of the XVI century the Spanish crown did not introduce changes in this defence system other than sending some troops to Menorca as a consequence of Barbarossa's attack on Mahón in 1535. For the emperor Charles, the Mediterranean front was one more of his many worries and he did not have enough resources to efficiently cover the threat. The conquest of Tunis in 1535, for example, had meant relief for the Italian dominions, but not for the Balearic Islands or the eastern coasts of the Spanish mainland, constantly under the attack of the Algerian pirates. The failure of the emperor to conquer Algiers (1541) did no more than accentuate the Barbary danger. The attacks against the islands increased during the '40s and '50s and culminated in the destruction of Ciudadela by the Ottoman navy of Piali Pasha, in July 1558.

At that time the Spanish crown had become convinced of the need to fortify the Balearic Islands and the Mediterranean coasts of the Iberian Peninsula. From 1543 the Supreme Council of War realised the need for a comprehensive Balearic fortification plan, which, in the first place, consisted of reinforcing the walls of the coastal cities with bulwarks. In this sense, the presence of a French fleet in Balearic waters showed the existing defence system to be insufficient against large scale attacks and that therefore it was essential to substantially improve it⁵. The attack on Alcudia was therefore a serious warning and the authorities planned to improve the walls of this city and those of Palma⁶. But these works were carried out very slowly while the attacks against the island were ever more frequent. The loss of the North African enclaves of Tripoli (1551), Vélez de la Gomera (1554) and Bogie (1555) were symbolic of what could happen in the Balearic Islands unless urgent measures were taken.

The heir to the throne, Prince Philip, regent for the kingdoms of Spain in the absence of his father the emperor, decided to take the initiative and sent some of his military engineers such as Hugo de Cessanne and Juan

⁴ JOSÉ J. GORDILLO, *Formentera. Historia de una isla* (Valencia, 1981).

⁵ Some galleys of this squadron attacked the walled city of Alcudia, on the north of Mallorca, although they were repulsed by the defenders.

⁶ MIQUEL J. DEYÀ, "La geoestratègia mediterrània en el segle XVI. El seu impacte en la creació d'un sistema defensiu balear", in *I Centenari de l'enderrocament de les murades de Palma 1902-2002* (Palma, 2004), 39.

Bautista Calvi to the Balearic Islands with the aim of reconnoitring the fortifications and designing new projects. Of special importance was the action of the Italian, Calvi, who designed the castle of San Felipe (which would protect the Port of Mahón) and the city walls of Palma and Ibiza. These were new modern fortifications, with large bulwarks designed to stand up to artillery attacks. However, and although some of these works began immediately (in 1554 and 1555, the building was started on the new bulwarks of Ibiza and the castle of San Felipe respectively)⁷, economic difficulties prevented rapid completion and they continued throughout the rest of the XVI⁸ century and in some cases were not finished until the end of the XVII⁹. On the other hand, the projects for the fortification of the Balearic Islands have be related to a much vaster plan of fortification which embraced the whole of the Spanish Mediterranean coast and was planned to take in Sardinia and Southern Italy, apart from the Spanish fortified towns of North Africa. A system of defensive war was therefore adopted, based on the construction of costly fortifications¹⁰, which left the initiative in the hands of the Moslems. Also the discussion about whether this was a correct decision or whether, on the contrary, the construction of a powerful Mediterranean fleet designed to attack the enemy at sea or on its North African bases would have given better results. In fact, a powerful fleet of galleons based in the Mediterranean could have kept the Berber attacks at bay. On the other hand, the Mediterranean fleet in the middle of the XVI century only comprised a few galleys, plus the Genoese fleet of the Dorias. Until the beginning decade of the 1560s, the Spanish navy had not the slightest capacity for defence. The victory in Malta against the Ottomans (1565) marked the start of a recovery that culminated six years later at Lepant.

The Ottoman and Barbary attacks on the Balearic Islands. A brief view

During the XVI and XVII centuries numerous alarms occurred, most of them either not coming to anything or being limited to incursions into points on the coast to rob neighbouring farms and capture their inhabi-

⁷ The renaissance walls of Ibiza still exist in their entirety and are an excellent example of the fortifications of that time. On the other hand, the castle of San Felipe in the Port of Mahón, very extended by the British in the XVIIIth century, was demolished in 1782 by order of Carlos III of Spain.

⁸ FRANCISCO FORNALS, "Los ingenieros y las fortificaciones de Menorca. Siglos XVI y XVII", in *Meloussa*, 1 (Mahón, 1988), 101-140; MIQUEL J. DEYÀ, "La geoestrategia mediterránea", 31-46; BARTOLOMÉ ESCANDELL, *Ibiza y Formentera en la Corona de Aragón. Tomo II (siglos XIV-XVI)* (Palma, 1995).

⁹ e.g., the walls of Palma or the walls of Ciudadela.



¹⁰ ALICIA CÁMARA, "Las fortificaciones y la defensa del Mediterráneo", in *Felipe II y el Mediterráneo*, volumen IV (Madrid, 1999), 355-376.

tants¹¹. However, the islands registered, above all in the XVI century, numerous attacks on a grand scale (see the maps), the main ones being:

- A fleet of six ships, with five hundred men, attack Pollença (Mallorca).
- 1535. On fleeing from Tunis after the conquest of the empire, Keir Eddin Barbarossa, with two thousand five hundred men, took the town of Mahón, in Menorca, sacked it and took eight hundred people captive¹².
- 1536. Twelve Ottoman and French galleys bombard the city of Ibiza and attack the suburb called La Marina.
- 1538. Twenty-five Ottoman ships bombard the city of Ibiza and land in the Santa Eulàlia area, to the north of the city.
- 1543. Some one thousand Ottoman land at Santa Eulàlia (Ibiza). They attempt to attack the city of Ibiza but are repulsed with losses.
- 1543. French attack on Alcudia (Mallorca).
- 1544. Landing of the Barbary at Porto Colom (Felanitx, Mallorca).
- 1546. Landing on the Mallorcan coasts of Estellencs, Banyalbufar and Santanyi.
- 1550. Dragut Rais attacks Pollença (Mallorca) with some one thousand five hundred men, but is repulsed by the local militia. Afterwards he heads for Cabrera, where he destroys the castle.
- 1551. Barbary attack on Alcudia (Mallorca), which is repulsed.
- 1552. Sacking of the town of Valldemossa (Mallorca) by a fleet of ten *galiotas* (small galleys)
- 1553. Sacking of the town of Andratx (Mallorca) by an Algerian fleet of twenty-four ships.
- 1558. The Ottoman fleet of Piali Pasha sacks and destroys Ciudadela (Menorca)

¹¹ The documentation of the various municipalities of the islands gives an account of these alarms. They are also of great interest as to daily happenings, such as the *Llibres d'entrevènements* of Ibiza, partially published. See VICENT FERRER, *Memorial de la Guerra contra el turc* (Barcelona, 1997). In spite of the fact that the attack did not take place – in most cases the alarms were produced on sighting suspicious ships sailing close to the coast, although they did not attack – the alarm call (“Moors on the coast”) mobilised the men fit for military service. These were villagers who came with their own arms and were under the orders of officers who, in general, were well-to-do peasants. The municipalities had to pay the maintenance expenses of these men while they kept watch on the coastline to prevent any landings.

¹² Mahón was at that time a town of some 1.500 inhabitants, defended by a XIVth century city wall reinforced by bastions built to house canons. Barbarroja reached Mahón on September 1st, 1535. On the 3rd he was defeated by a relief column sent from Ciudadela; during the fighting the island governor, Galcerán Oliver, died. This fact precipitated the surrender of Mahón on the following day. The main defenders of Mahón were judged and executed in the following months, accused of connivance with the enemy. See RAFAEL BOSCH, *Contribución al estudio del sitio y saqueo de Mahón por Barbarroja en 1535* (Ciudadela, 1934).



- 1561. Ochiali, with twenty-two galleys and one thousand, seven hundred men, lands at the Mallorcan town of Sóller, but is repulsed.
- 1571. Barbary landing in the Santanyi area of Mallorca.
- 1578. Landing on the coasts of Andratx and Lluçmajor (Mallorca).
- 1578. The Algerian fleet of Hassan Pasha attacks the suburb of Ibiza and captures some one hundred and twenty-five people.

If the effects (destruction, sackings, deaths, taking captives) of the direct attacks on points of the Balearic coast were very important – in the odd case, as we shall now see, being devastating – the repercussions on commerce were no less. Commerce was a vital activity for the Balearic Islands. Each island specialised in a few products which were in considerable demand abroad. Thus, Ibiza produced and exported salt; Menorca wool, cheese and cattle; Mallorca cloth and oil. These exports financed the imports, especially wheat and other essential products¹³. As had been pointed out by Fernand Braudel in his day¹⁴, the islands were isolated fortified towns, always on the look out for suspicious ships, apart from fearing the strangulation of their vital maritime communications.

An example of the projection of Ottoman naval power in the west: the attack on Ciutadella

As mentioned before, the worst attack on the Balearic Islands and on Spanish coasts in general was the one that took place in July 1558 against the Menorcan capital of the time, Ciutadella¹⁵. This attack was the fruit of

¹³ The Balearic Islands frequently suffered deficits of cereal production, which made it inevitable to have to turn to importation, on occasion very costly. The causes of this deficit of production are complex. See JOSEP JUAN VIDAL, “El comercio de trigo entre Mallorca y África del Norte en los siglos XVI y XVII”, *Mayurqa*, 15 (Palma, 1976), 73-92; JOSEP JUAN VIDAL, “Las crisis agrarias y la sociedad en Mallorca durante la Edad Moderna”, *Mayurqa*, 16 (Palma, 1976), 83-113; MIQUEL À. CASASNOVAS, “Crisis agràries i comerç blader a Menorca (1558-1600)”, in *Bolletí de la Societat Arqueològica Lul·liana*, 54 (Palma, 1998), 141-162.

¹⁴ FERNAND BRAUDEL, *El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en la época de Felipe II* (México, 1953), volume I, 203.

¹⁵ This episode has generated abundant bibliography in Menorca. Among the most interesting studies can be mentioned COSME PARPAL, *La invasión turca de 1558 en Ciutadella de Menorca* (Barcelona, 1903) and *La isla de Menorca en tiempo de Felipe II* (Barcelona, 1913); JOSEP SALORD FARNÉS, *Pro aris et focis. Sobre la desgràcia de Ciutadella* (Ciutadella, 1958); FLORENCI SASTRE, *El 9 de juliol: Antecedents, protagonistes y conseqüències* (Ciutadella, 1984); GABRIEL JULIÀ, “Estudi preliminar”, in *Acte de Constantinoble* (Ciutadella, 1984); MIQUEL ÀNGEL CASASNOVAS, “Les conseqüències de la Desgràcia de Ciutadella. Anàlisi del manifest de 1563”, in *Revista de Menorca* (Mahón, 1991), 321-350, and “Context històric i repercussions del nou de juliol”, in *Revista de Menorca* (Mahón, 1994), 37-46; JOSEP PELLICER, “Menorca a la segona meitat del segle XVI”, in *Publicacions des Born*, 11 (Ciutadella, 2002), 7-182. However, it is very surprising that, in spite of the magnitude and importance of the at-

the Franco-Ottoman alliance formed at the time of Francis I. The action of this alliance in Balearic waters was not new, as in 1536 Ottoman and French ships had already attacked Ibiza. On the other hand, Henry II of France had suggested that Suleiman the Magnificent should occupy Mallorca in 1551 with the argument that a joint base in this island would enable them to invade Spain¹⁶. However, this attack never took place. In subsequent years, in 1555 the Ottoman fleet attacked the coasts of Calàbria, Messina, Porto Santo Stefano, Piombino and the Eolie Isles, but until this moment had not penetrated the western Mediterranean. However, this was a possibility feared by Spanish authorities, which considered that these were preparations to facilitate the final objective of the Ottomans: the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula¹⁷.

The French defeat of San Quentin (August 1557) reactivated the Franco-Ottoman alliance within a total offensive against Felipe II, in spite of the attempts by the Spanish king to bring about a separate truce with the Ottoman sultan. In fact, at the beginning of the summer of 1558 a powerful Ottoman fleet, with the logistic support by France, entered the western Mediterranean. In principle, the Ottoman fleet was to cooperate with that of the French, with which it was to make contact in the Gulf of Genoa. On April 14th of that year a fleet of more than one hundred galleys set off from Constantinople under the orders of the great admiral Piali Bajá. At the beginning of June it joined up with the squadron of Dragut Rais and both fleets crossed the Straits of Messina and made for the coasts of the Gulf of Naples. On June 8th the Viceroy of Sicily wrote to his counterpart in Mallorca, Guillem de Rocafull, informing him that a great fleet of some one hundred and thirty galleys had crossed the strait. In accordance with the information obtained from the Ottoman prisoners, they expected to be joined by some forty French galleys.

tack, the sacking of Ciutadella is almost unknown to the specialists of Felipe II's time. For a complete overview of this episode, see the book by MIQUEL ÀNGEL CASASNOVAS and FLORENCI SASTRE, *De Menorca a Istanbul. El saqueig turc de Ciutadella, 1558* (Ciutadella, 2010)

¹⁶ MARÍA JOSÉ RODRIGUEZ-SALGADO, *Un imperio en transición. Carlos V y Felipe II y su mundo* (Barcelona, 1992), 380.

¹⁷ RODRÍGUEZ-SALGADO, *Un imperio en transición*, 391. This author reproduces a letter from the viceroy of Sicily, Juan de la Vega, who summarises the situation as follows: "los tiempos presentes son diferentes del de avrá 30 ó 40 años, que se hablaba del Turco y sus fuerças como si se hablaba en los antípodas, aora tenémosle tan vezino y tan plático de las cosas de la cristiandad que tan presto se saben en Constantinopla lo que passa en Sicilia como en España; y cada año pasea su armada por este reyno como cosa ordinaria". (The present times are different from those of 30 or 40 years ago, which talked of the Ottoman and his forces as if talking about the antipodes, now we have him so near and such an expert on Christianity that immediately Constantinople knows as much about what is happening in Sicily as in Spain; and every year he promenades his fleet in this kingdom as a normal occurrence).

The warnings were received in the Balearic Islands in mid-June. Viceroy Rocafull attempted to put the islands in a state of defence, but in reality their resources were very scarce and the building of the new fortifications had barely started¹⁸. There were very few royal troops in the Balearic Islands (only a few hundred soldiers divided between Ibiza and Menorca) so the bulk of the defence fell on the town and country militias of the islands. On the other hand, serious discrepancies existed between Rocafull and the Mallorcan authorities, headed by the *jurats* (the main authorities of the General Council) of the kingdom of Mallorca. In principle, and according to the information obtained in Sicily, it seemed that the objective of the Ottoman fleet was Mallorca. In spite of the efforts of the Viceroy Rocafull, the Grand and General Council of Mallorca refused to authorise the funds necessary to put the island in defence conditions, and only agreed to give him some 4.500 Mallorcan pounds, a totally insufficient sum of money. Instead, the tension between the Viceroy and the Grand and General Council of Mallorca did nothing but increase because of this and other circumstances, generating a grave conflict which ended in the court of Princess Joan of Austria¹⁹.

Meanwhile (June 13th), the Ottoman fleet was sacking Massa and Sorrento, towns situated to the south of Naples, from which more than four thousand people were taken captive. It seems that after taking Sorrento the ships of Dragut Rais separated from Piali's fleet and returned to Barbary; many of the Italian captives were sold in Tripoli and Constantinople. In theory, Piali was to set sail for the Gulf of Genoa, where he was to join the galleys of Henri II of France. However, the Great Ottoman admiral had other ideas. After passing Capicorsu on June 25th, on the extreme north of Corsica, he headed for the southwest, towards the Balearic Islands. The speed of the Ottoman fleet surprised everyone as the voyage was accomplished without intermediate stops. On the other hand, the only fleet which could in some way oppose him, that of the Prince Doria (formed by some 25 galleys) was waiting in Genoa²⁰.

On June 29th the Ottoman fleet was sighted off the mouth of the Port of Mahón, where it was repulsed by the artillery of the batteries of the Fort of San Felipe. Piali decided to steer for the other side of the island where

¹⁸ Until a few months previously, Rocafull had been governor of Menorca.

¹⁹ See the book by ERNEST BELENGUER, *Un reino Escondido: Mallorca, de Carlos V a Felipe II* (Madrid, 2000).

²⁰ At the beginning of July 1558, while the Ottoman fleet was laying siege to Ciudadela, a Spanish fleet left Cartagena heading for Oran with the troops of the Conde de Alcaudete. Evidently, Alcaudete had no news of the presence of the Ottoman fleet in Menorca. The army of the Conde de Alcaudete was annihilated on August 26th by the Algerians.

Ciudadela, the capital, was situated. Menorca had at that time some ten thousand inhabitants, three thousand of which lived in Ciudadela. Protected by its medieval walls, reinforced by some improvised bulwarks and some pieces of artillery, Ciudadela possessed scant means to repel an attack of this magnitude. The defenders were some six hundred and twenty men, all of them local militia except for seventy professional soldiers (forty infantry and thirty gunners). Piali Pasha decided to take the city and disembarked fifteen thousand soldiers, who completely surrounded the capital of Menorca. Furthermore, secondary landings were carried out at other points of the island and the countryside was sacked, the crops burned and the cattle killed. Ciudadela resisted the violent attacks of the Ottoman army for several days until, on July 9th, the city was taken by storm²¹. For three days Ciudadela suffered sacking and destruction, to the point where no building was left habitable. The Ottoman took some four thousand captives, the dead possibly numbering over a thousand. The Ottoman fleet subsequently set a course for the south of France, calling in at the Îles d'Hyères and arriving on July 14th in Toulon²².

In fact, the French were furious about the attitude of the Ottoman admiral. The French galleys, under the command of the Grand Prior Francis de Lorraine, cousin of Henri II, were waiting for the Ottomans in Ajaccio, on the west coast of Corsica. On learning of the presence of the Ottoman fleet in Menorca, the Grand Prior sent a personal emissary, Monsieur de Carces, off in a galley to Ciudadela, to persuade Piali to join the French, as arranged. Carces reached Ciudadela just as the city was about to fall and almost certainly he was present at the last assault. Through him we know that Piali had lost many men in the fighting and a large part of the fleet's munitions. When the Ottoman fleet reached the Provençal coast, at the end of Ramadan, the French tried to persuade Piali to cooperate in various joint operations (the siege of Bastia²³, the conquest of Nice and the capture of Porto Ercole²⁴, which the Ottoman admiral refused with various excuses. Piali justified his expedition to Menorca by the argument that he had not found the French fleet in the Gulf of Genoa, so he decided to take action against Spanish dominions whilst waiting for the French. What finally made the French so furious was that, after refusing to cooperate with them,

²¹ The story of the siege of Ciudadela is told in the act known as *Acta de Constantino*, an act certified by the notary Pere Quintana, drawn up by the Ottoman capital on October 7th, 1558, a requirement of the Menorcan chiefs of defence, Governor Bartomeu Arguimbau and Captain Miguel Negrete. The original is preserved in the Ciudadela Municipal Archives.

²² Some Menorcan captives managed to escape to the coast of Provence and returned to the Island.

²³ This would have allowed the French complete control of Corsica.

²⁴ With the intention of reinforcing the French positions in Tuscany.

he received the Genoese envoys on his galley. The French were convinced that the Genoese bribed Piali with a large sum of money²⁵. On August 23rd, the Ottoman fleet, with its cargo of captives, set course for Istanbul, where they must have arrived some weeks later on an undetermined date.

The disaster of Ciudadela put into question all the defences of Philip II. The Spanish navy had not the capacity to stand up to the Ottoman fleet and neither could it even send help to Ciudadela from Barcelona or Mallorca. In fact it was feared that the true objective of the Ottomans was the coasts of Cataluña, Valencia or Mallorca, who strengthened their defences. Panic broke out all round the Spanish Mediterranean coast, especially in Valencia where it was feared that the numerous Morisco population (descendants of the Moslems who lived in the area before the Christian conquest) could revolt with the help of the Ottomans. Rumours also abounded of a possible Ottoman invasion of Spain. In this respect, the taking of Ciudadela had important psychological and moral repercussions throughout the whole of Spain, which saw a Ottoman invasion as more than a mere threat²⁶. But none of this happened. Piali, as already mentioned, in fact had not kept to his agreement with the French, who wanted to use his fleet for their own operations in the Mediterranean, after spending a few weeks in the harbours of Provença. Henri II of France protested angrily to the Ottoman sultan through his ambassador, Monsieur de la Vigne and also sent a special envoy, Jean Dolu²⁷, to Istanbul. Although de la Vigne informed his king that Soliman the Magnificent was very annoyed with Piali's attitude, he made no move against the ambitious admiral. On the contrary, Piali continued with his duties and in 1560, together with Dragut Rais, inflicted the humiliating defeat on Philip II on the

²⁵ ERNEST CHARRIÈRE, *Negociations de la France dans le Levant* (Paris, 1860), vol. III, 508-529. The bribery of Piali by the Genovese is also mentioned by F. BRAUDEL in *El Mediterraneo*, vol. II, 394.

²⁶ An example of this vision is the brief written by Luis Ortiz for Felipe II, in which it is specified that "si por esta horden Su Magestad no rremedia ni probe e lo susodicho y atiende consejos de personas que pretenden sus particulares yntereses, yo lo doy todo por perdido, y no solo los rreynos de Valençia, Murçia y Granada, y toda la costa de España se perderá y asolará, más aún en las entrañas de Castilla llegarán los turcos, moros y otros enemigos." (If by this order His Majesty does not remedy nor prove the aforesaid and pays heed to advice from people with their own interests at heart, I give it up as lost, and not only the kingdoms of Valencia, Murcia and Granada, and the whole coast of Spain will be lost and destroyed, and the Ottomans, Moors and other enemies will enter into the heart of Castille). MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ ÁLVAREZ, "El memorial de Luis Ortiz de 1558", *Anales de economia XVII*, 63 (Madrid, 1957), 160.

²⁷ CHARRIÈRE, *Negociations*, 509-522. As proof of the charge against the Ottoman admiral, Dolu brought a brief entitled "Discours et rapport du voyage de l'armée de mer turquesque depuis qu'elle est comparue ès mers de deçà, jusques au jour qu'ell est partie d'avec les gallaires du roy pour s'en retourner san riens fair pour le service de S.M."

island of Djerba²⁸. However, never again did a grand Ottoman fleet venture so far west, but the taking of Ciutadella had shown that the Ottomans could penetrate the heart of Philip II's dominions, destroy a city, capture its inhabitants and retire without even being attacked. And this danger did not end even after the battle of Lepant (1571). Philip II did draw up a plan for the evacuation of Menorca's population in 1570, leaving only a military garrison. The unanimous protest by the Menorcan people, added to the pressure of the authorities of Barcelona and Mallorca (who feared that Menorca would turn into a nest for Moslem pirates, from where they would attack the Spanish Mediterranean with total impunity) finally caused King Philip to abandon the plan²⁹.

The consequences of the Ottoman and Barbary threat

Finally, let us summarise the consequences of the attacks by the Ottomans and the Barbary against the Balearic Islands³⁰:

a) Military consequences. The start of a vast fortification plan, the execution of which continued throughout the whole of the second half of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth. To do this it was necessary to invest a great deal of money, as much from the royal exchequer as from the island's councils, who had also to attend to a costly coastal vigilance network. Only at the Castle of San Felipe was more than one hundred and fifty thousand pounds invested. Apart from this military garrisons were detached to Menorca and Ibiza. However, it is better not to take the Balearic fortifications as an isolated case, but rather in the context of the fortification of the Spanish Mediterranean coast and the Spanish possessions of southern Italy.

b) Political consequences. The militarization of the islands because of the serious threat from outside strengthened the power of the Viceroy of Mallorca and of the governors of Menorca and Ibiza. In this context, the conflict of those responsible with the island authorities, jealously guarding their power and independence, were frequent and characteristic of this period.

c) The demographic consequences were devastating for Menorca, but much lighter in the other islands. The Ottoman attack of 1558 alone redu-

²⁸ It is possible that the Ottoman sultan really approved the admiral's action, who hit the heart of the King of Spain's dominions, obtaining, moreover, a strange booty. On the other hand, the Franco-Ottoman alliance broke the following year, 1559, with the signing of the Cateau-Cambresis peace between the exhausted France and Spain.

²⁹ MIQUEL ÀNGEL CASASNOVAS, "Menorca dins la monarquia hispànica", in *Enciclopèdia de Menorca* (Mahón, 2000), volume X, 194.

³⁰ His detailed analysis would require much more space than we have available, so we only include the essential points. See CASASNOVAS, "Les conseqüències".

ced the population of Menorca by half. It was necessary to rescue the greatest possible number of prisoners and to attract immigrants above all from Mallorca to repopulate the devastated Ciudadela³¹.

d) The economic repercussions were mainly concentrated on three aspects. Firstly, the distortion of commerce, a vital activity for the Balearic Islands, who needed to export their surplus in order to import the numerous commodities needed for their subsistence. Secondly, the aforementioned high cost of the fortification work, coastal vigilance and the maintenance of the army garrisons. It increased fiscal pressure on the islanders, who had to defray the bulk of the cost of the fortifications³². Thirdly, the direct impact of the sackings on the people of the coast. For example, the attack against Menorca during the summer of 1558 resulted in the total destruction of the western half of the island.

e) Finally, the psychological repercussions on the people cannot be forgotten. For centuries the Ottoman or Barbary Moslem was the personification of evil for the island people, as can still be reflected in the old legends and folklore in general. Furthermore, the memory of these attacks remains very much alive in the Balearic Islands. In Mallorca, for example, in the villages of Pollença and Sóller, every year a pageant is celebrated, as reminder of the battle between the Barbary corsairs and the Christians³³, while in Ciudadela every July the Ninth (July 9th) the destruction of Ciudadela is commemorated³⁴.

³¹ They also had to contribute by means of work.

³² See CASASNOVAS, "Les conseqüències".

³³ These displays form part of the main local festivities of these towns. Victory, in these cases, is for the Christians.

³⁴ Every year, since 1559, mass is celebrated for the souls of those who died in the siege and sacking of the city. Since the mid XIX century every July 9th a special, solemn session of the entire Town Council is celebrated in the council chamber of Ciudadela Town Hall, in which the *Acta de Constantinoble* is publicly read. The year of 1558 is still remembered in Ciudadela as "the Year of Disgrace".

Brian Sandberg

‘Through Naval Practice and Association
with Foreigners’: French nobles’ participation
in Mediterranean religious struggles, 1598-1635

This article examines a group of ‘military migrants’, French nobles who engaged in Mediterranean maritime warfare, in an attempt to reconsider religious violence in the early modern period. The great religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have often been completely divorced from one another in early modern historiography – the Ottoman-Christian wars in the Mediterranean treated separately from the Protestant-Catholic conflicts within Europe. French nobles engaged in religious conflict within France throughout the long French Religious Wars of 1562-1629, but they also were very active in other religious struggles throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. Analyzing French nobles’ maritime activities exposes their social networks and their religious activism¹.

Introduction: A Unified Religious Struggle?

In June 1619, Sebastiano Montelupo wrote from Krakow thanking a Medici secretary for ‘the good news that you sent me of the peace in France and of the seizure of Turkish vessels by the galleys of the religion of Santo Stefano’. Montelupo found this news ‘*carissima*’ and prayed that God would maintain the ‘union’ in France and grant ‘prosperous fortune’ to the galleys². Montelupo’s linkage of religious conflict within France to Christian warfare against the Ottoman Empire suggests that he saw these conflicts as aspects of a unified religious struggle. Writing from central

¹ Research for this article was made possible by the generous funding of the National Endowment for the Humanities and the support of the Medici Archive Project. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent those of the National Endowment for the Humanities.

² Sebastiano Montelupo to Curzio da Picchena, Krakow, 22 June 1619, Archivio di Stato [hereafter, ASF], Mediceo del Principato [hereafter, MdP] 996, f° 390.

Europe, Montelupo might be expected to confine his vision of religious warfare to the expanding conflict within the Holy Roman Empire, which would become the Thirty Years' War, and to the Habsburg warfare on land against the Ottomans. Yet even in the heart of central Europe, Mediterranean maritime warfare could be perceived as a significant facet of a global religious conflict, as Montelupo's correspondence shows³.

Montelupo's comparative focus on civil conflict in France in 1619 may at first seem curious. The historiography of early seventeenth-century France has long portrayed conflicts as unconcerned with religious issues, but instead motivated by noble rivalries, opposition to absolutism, or peasant discontent. However, new research shows that the 1598 Edict of Nantes was never fully implemented and that it hardly ended religious conflict within France⁴. Confessional politics and religious activism continued to shape French nobles' participation in civil conflicts well into the seventeenth century. Thus, when members of the French court reacted to the Ottoman sack of Manfredonia in 1620, they - like Sebastiano Montelupo - could easily draw connections between this disaster and the calamities of civil war in France and Bohemia⁵.

This article explores the concept of unified religious struggle in the early seventeenth century through the experiences of French nobles involved in Mediterranean maritime warfare. I argue that examining the 'military migrations' of French nobles reveals both the religious motives that drew them into maritime conflicts and the social networks that they developed through their participation in Mediterranean warfare.

Military Migrations

We can better understand the connections between Christian-Muslim and Protestant-Catholic religious violence in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries by focusing on the noblemen who organized, financed, and directed religious warfare in the Mediterranean. A number

³ See Montelupo's other letters in ASF, MdP 996.

⁴ BRIAN SANDBERG, *Heroic Souls: French Nobles and Religious Conflict after the Edict of Nantes, 1598-1629*, forthcoming; MARC VENARD, 'L'église Catholique bénéficiaire de l'édit de Nantes. Le témoignage des visites épiscopales', in *Coexister dans l'intolérance. L'édit de Nantes (1598)*, ed. MICHEL GRANDJEAN and BERNARD ROUSSEL (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1998), 283-302; GABRIEL AUDISIO, 'La réception de l'édit de Nantes en Provence (1598-1602)', in *Coexister dans l'intolérance*, 267-282; FRANÇOISE CHEVALIER, 'Les difficultés d'application de l'édit de Nantes d'après les cahiers des plaintes (1599-1660)', in *Coexister dans l'intolérance*, 303-320; STÉPHANE CAPOT, 'La paix vécue à Castres au temps de l'édit de Nantes (1595-1670)', in *Paix des armes, paix des âmes*, ed. PAUL MIRONNEAU and ISABELLE PÉBAY-CLOTTES (Paris: Société Henri IV and Imprimerie Nationale Éditions, 2000), 303-312.

⁵ Pierre Jeannin to Curzio da Picchena, Nancy, 18 September 1620, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

of excellent recent studies provide increasing detail on the daily lives of sailors and mariners in the early modern period, although often emphasizing an Atlantic world maritime perspective⁶. Many studies probing French nobles' relationships to maritime activities unfortunately still focus either on analyses of royal fleet development or on prosopographical excavations of admirals and naval officers⁷. Too few historians have followed Carla Rahn Phillips's brilliant example in constructing a comprehensive analysis of noble officers and the processes they used in organizing naval warfare⁸.

The concept of 'military migration' can be useful in problematizing nobles' involvement in early modern maritime operations, especially in trans-national contexts⁹. Noblemen serving outside of their native lands have often been labelled by historians as 'adventurers' or 'mercenaries'¹⁰. Such characterizations portray nobles as fundamentally self-interested, emphasizing economic incentives for warfare while denying the possibility that nobles might have had sincere religious motives for engaging in violence. Conceiving of extraterritorial service in warfare as 'military migration' - including travels, voyages, extended stays, and permanent residency abroad involving military/naval activity - allows us to re-think nobles' relationships with their native society, state institutions, religious bodies, and international organizations. The notion of 'military migration' allows us to examine noble involvement in a broad spectrum of maritime activities and to avoid an anachronistic vision of them as 'naval officers'.

French nobles can thus be effectively considered in the context of a new

⁶ See: PABLO E. PÉREZ-MALLAÍNA, *Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily Life on the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth Century*, trans. CARLA RAHN PHILLIPS (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

⁷ For example, see: JEAN MEYER, 'La marine française de 1545 à 1715', in *Histoire militaire de la France. 1. Des origines à 1715*, ed. PHILIPPE CONTAMINE (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 485-525; MICHEL VERGÉ-FRANCESCHI, 'Les amiraux de France: 1492-1592 - Treize terriens', in *La France et la mer au siècle des grandes découvertes*, ed. PHILIPPE MASSON and MICHEL VERGÉ-FRANCESCHI (Paris: Tallandier, 1993), 177-191.

⁸ CARLA RAHN PHILLIPS, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

⁹ The concept of 'military migration' is constructed in dialogue with the burgeoning historical literature on migration, especially in early modern contexts. See: JEAN-LOUIS MIÈGE, ed., *Navigations et migrations en Méditerranée de la préhistoire à nos jours* (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1990).

¹⁰ On 'mercenaries' and 'military entrepreneurs' in the early modern period, see: DAVID PARROTT, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); JANICE E. THOMSON, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); FRITZ REDLICH, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 2 Vol. [*Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*. Beihefte 48] (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964-1965).

historical literature on early modern maritime history and in comparison with various other social groups throughout the Mediterranean that are examined in recent studies¹¹. Alan James's important analysis of French naval organization, *Navy and Government in Early Modern France*, provides a fresh perspective on maritime administrative and naval history in seventeenth century France¹². Jean-François Dubost's work on Italian immigrants to France in the early modern period complements these maritime studies and permits a closer examination of Franco-Italian exchanges¹³.

My current research on the cultural history of violence in southern France and Tuscany during the early seventeenth century builds on these recent studies through an exploration of archival documents, published treatises, and printed pamphlets dealing with French 'military migrants'. A combination of manuscript correspondence, regional reports, and noble family records conserved in southern French *archives départementales*, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, and the Archivio di Stato di Firenze sheds new light on the role French nobles played in religious warfare in the Mediterranean in the early seventeenth century.

Various motives led French nobles to become temporary, itinerate, or long-term 'military migrants'. Early modern noblemen's education normally included international experiences, and many French nobles sought training in arms and military skills in Italy during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries¹⁴. Henri de Gondi, duc de Retz, thus traveled to Florence to study Italian and horsemanship at the Medici court¹⁵.

Naval tactics, navigational techniques, and maritime experience were all valuable skills for early seventeenth-century nobles living along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. Henri de Nogaret de La Valette, comte de Candalle, served with the Tuscan galleys to gain naval experience in the 1610s. Maria de' Medici wrote to Cosimo II de' Medici that she wanted La Valette 'to cruise on your galleys ... and try to render himself more and more capable to serve the king ... through naval practice and association with foreigners'¹⁶. Nogaret de La Valette praised the Tuscan Gran-

¹¹ GELINA HARLAFTIS and CARMEL VASSALLO, 'Maritime History Since Braudel', in *New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime History*, ed. GELINA HARLAFTIS and CARMEL VASSALLO (St. John's: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2004), 1-19.

¹² ALAN JAMES, *Navy and Government in Early Modern France* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press and Royal Historical Society, 2004).

¹³ JEAN-FRANÇOIS DUBOST, *La France italienne, XVI^e-XVII^e siècle* (Paris: Aubier, 1997).

¹⁴ MARK MOTLEY, *Becoming a French Aristocrat: The Education of the Court Nobility, 1580-1715* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 123-168, 193-208.

¹⁵ ASF, MdP 5052, f° 451. Medici Archive Project, Documentary Sources Database, 17119.

¹⁶ Maria de' Medici to Cosimo II de' Medici, Paris, 21 February 1613, ASF, MdP 4729A, f° 301. A letter of thanks followed: Marie de Médicis to Cosimo II de' Medici, Paris, 27 July 1613, ASF, MdP 4729A, f° 317.

duca's fleet as the 'best and most courageous Academy' for a first military experience after his cruise on the Tuscan galleys¹⁷. Members of the Schömburg family also sought military and naval education at the Medici court¹⁸. Some French nobles sought not only to acquire a generalized maritime education, but also to have an apprenticeship in naval command with the forces of the Granduca¹⁹.

French Nobles and Religious Activism

Nobles living in southern France eagerly offered to serve in Italy when wars erupted in Savoy or other Italian states in the early seventeenth century²⁰. Some of these military activities have been recognized in the historical literature, especially when French and Franco-Italian nobles joined Charles de Gonzague, duc de Nevers, in his effort to claim the Mantuan succession from 1627 to 1631²¹. Yet, looking beyond state-sponsored intervention in Italy reveals a much wider and more continuous French participation in Italian warfare, especially in Mediterranean maritime conflicts and religious violence against Islamic enemies.

Members of the Ornano family were active in Corsican maritime activities in the early seventeenth century²². Nobles from Marseilles, Toulon, and other southern French ports frequently offered to serve along with Tuscan maritime forces²³. French nobles seem to have been closely involved with galley-building industries in Toulon, and some of those ships later saw service with Italian-led fleets²⁴. French nobles played important roles in financing Mediterranean religious warfare, but their use of informal credit mechanisms and patron-client ties often left few traces in archival documentation. However, we can occasionally glimpse their

¹⁷ Henri de Nogaret de La Valette comte de Candalle to Belisario di Francesco Vinta, Civitavecchia, 18 June 1613, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

¹⁸ Henri de Schömburg comte de Nanteuil to Cosimo II de' Medici, Lyon, 19 July 1617, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

¹⁹ Louis de Marseillon to Belisario di Francesco Vinta, Livorno, 15 May 1610, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

²⁰ For an example, see: Emmanuel de Crussol duc d'Uzès to Paul Phélypeaux seigneur de Pontchartrain, Assier, 17 June 1613, Bibliothèque Nationale de France [hereafter, BNF], Clairambault 1131, f° 357.

²¹ DAVID PARROTT, 'The Mantuan Succession, 1627-1631: A Sovereignty Dispute in Early Modern Europe', *English Historical Review*, 112 (February 1997), 20-65.

²² Domenico d'Ornano to Belisario di Francesco Vinta, Château Trompette in Bordeaux, 15 September 1604, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

²³ Louis de Marseillon to Belisario di Francesco Vinta, Livorno, 17 October 1607, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

²⁴ Louis de Marseillon to Belisario di Francesco Vinta, Toulon, 26 July 1610, SF, MdP 4759, n.p.

loans, debts, transactions through their exchanges of jewelry, art objects, and currency²⁵. The financing and organization of maritime warfare in this period seems to have been linked to religious orders and confraternities, motivated in part by what I call 'sanctity honour'²⁶.

Religious activism promoted joint maritime initiatives to attack Muslim shipping, protect Christian ships and territories from pirates, and defend Christianity from Ottoman fleets – most spectacularly at the siege of Malta of 1565 and on the Lepanto campaign of 1571. A French noble in the duc de Retz's household wrote enthusiastically to the Medici court proposing elaborate military operations against the Ottomans in North Africa in the early seventeenth century²⁷. The comte de Joigny coordinated Franco-Tuscan naval operations in 1604²⁸. Giovanni de' Medici reported on the fitting out of a corsair to be sent against the Turks in 1607 by French nobles who planned to sail under the ensigns of the Granduca. This 'large ship' was to be armed with 40 bronze guns and crewed by 300 Frenchmen²⁹. However, a common religious cause could not prevent rivalries and differences from threatening the unity of Christian fleets. Medici correspondence reveals the friction between Italians and French involved in joint maritime activities in the early seventeenth century³⁰.

Religious motives can be discerned in correspondence relating to French captives of the Ottoman naval forces and their families attempts to ransom them. Some French prisoners of war were eventually re-captured by Christian galleys and forced to serve on crews as oarsmen. Maria de' Medici and other members of the French court sought to get such French prisoners released through the intervention of the Medici court in the early seventeenth century³¹.

Nobles' religious convictions and confessional programmes were certainly not transparent, instead operating through complex religious-political positions and evaluations. Huguenots' religious motives can be identified

²⁵ Jacques de Cabrol seigneur d'Ariffat [?] to Cosimo II de' Medici, Marseille, 20 April 1613, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

²⁶ On 'sanctity honor', see BRIAN SANDBERG, *Warrior Pursuits. Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore, MD, 2010), 154-159.

²⁷ Marin Malleville to Ferdinando I de' Medici, Firenze 25 April 1600, MdP 4759, n.p.

²⁸ Philippe-Emmanuel de Gondi comte de Joigny to Ferdinando I de' Medici, Marseille, 12 November 1604, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

²⁹ Giovanni de' Medici to Ferdinando I de' Medici, Paris, 18 November 1607, ASF, MdP 5157, f° 722.

³⁰ Jacques Pierre to Ferdinando I de' Medici, Livorno, 12 July 1608, ASF, MdP 4759, n.p.

³¹ For example, see: Maria de' Medici to Cosimo II de' Medici, Paris, 14 November 1620, ASF, MdP 4729A, f° 427. A broader account of Christian slaves in the Mediterranean is provided by ROBERT C. DAVIS, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

in their separate expeditions and certain joint activities with Catholic forces. As the duc de Lesdiguières and his Huguenot noble followers fought in Savoy in the 1610s against Spanish forces and their allies, other French Protestants engaged in warfare against Muslims in the Mediterranean.

Toward a History of Mediterranean Noble Networks

Military orders' bellicose activities promoted the development of broad networks amongst Christian nobles throughout the Mediterranean. Members of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, or knights of Malta, represented an international military organization, with significant participation by French nobles. The order had become an increasingly visible symbol of the defense of Christianity during the sixteenth century, especially following the epic siege of Malta itself in 1565 by a powerful Ottoman army and fleet³². The Christian naval victory at Lepanto in 1571 confirmed the status of the Mediterranean as a site of Christian renewal, even if the battle's strategic significance was fleeting. Nobles who wanted to display their Christian commitment through warfare were attracted to Mediterranean warfare and to service with the knights of Malta.

Contacts between French and Italian nobles were arguably especially important within the Order of Malta during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Two Medici queens of France reinforced Tuscan-French political and social connections in this period. Caterina and Maria de' Medici both facilitated French and Tuscan noblemen's participation in Mediterranean warfare. Jean-François Dubost has found that the greatest number of Tuscans served as knights of Malta precisely during the last quarter of the sixteenth century³³. Members of many Franco-Italian noble families joined the knights of Malta in this period and fought for the Catholic cause. During the early seventeenth century, three noblemen from the Franco-Italian Elbène family, for example, served as knights of Malta³⁴.

The Ordine di Santo Stefano, or Order of Saint Stephen, also provided French nobles with possibilities for service in Mediterranean warfare. Cosimo de' Medici organized this order after receiving papal approval in 1561, providing a new naval force to fight against Muslim navies and pirates in the Mediterranean. Several of the Florentine noble families who were involved in the initial organization of the Ordine di Santo Stefano had close connections with France. Bartolomeo Concini completed nego-

³² For a concise account of the siege of Malta, see: THOMAS F. ARNOLD, *The Renaissance at War* (London: Cassell & Co., 2001), 128-132.

³³ A. Spagnoletti's data cited in FRANCO ANGIOLINI, *I cavalieri e il principe* (Firenze, 1996).

³⁴ DUBOST, *La France italienne, XVI^e-XVII^e siècle*, 246-247.

tiations with the papacy for the foundation of the order, and the Concini family remained active in the order. Bartolomeo had two sons who were members of the order, and his grandson Concino became Maria de' Medici's favourite in the early seventeenth century. Domenico Bonsi assisted in the early development of the Ordine di Santo Stefano in the 1560s³⁵. An important branch of the Bonsi family soon took control of the bishopric of Béziers in southern France and established themselves as Franco-Italian nobles. Such Franco-Italian noble families could use their connections with the Ordine di Santo Stefano to enhance and expand the existing cultural and social exchanges between Tuscany and France. Although the *cavalieri*, or knights, of the order tended to be almost exclusively Tuscan, many French and Franco-Italian nobles joined the order's military-naval expeditions as volunteers to participate in Mediterranean warfare against Muslim fleets and shipping.

The Concini and Bonsi families demonstrate how Franco-Italian families employed their kinship and client ties through religious orders and maritime activities in the Mediterranean area. Many other Franco-Italian noble families also developed Mediterranean maritime networks through the financing and practice of naval warfare in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Members of the Gondi, Orsini, Ornando, Rucellai, Strozzi, Gonzaga, and Savoie families all seem to have established networks of credit and clientage through the organization of Mediterranean warfare.

Conclusion

This brief examination of French maritime activities indicates that French nobles were much more involved in early modern Mediterranean religious violence than has previously been assumed. Catholic French nobles' social and military networks emerge more clearly from this initial analysis of Mediterranean maritime warfare, but there are some indications that Huguenot nobles were also active in the Mediterranean. More work needs to be done on French nobles, and other Mediterranean 'military migrants', to understand fully their roles in linking Christian-Muslim warfare with European religious struggles. Early seventeenth-century French 'military migrants' seem to have forged networks across the Mediterranean that promoted broad conceptions of an ongoing unified religious conflict.

³⁵ ANGIOLINI, *I cavalieri e il principe*, 48-52.

Ahmed Renima

The Navy of the Ottoman Algeria (1515-1830). A brief history

Introduction

Dealing with the history of the Algerian marine is a very hard task. It is a challenge too difficult to win, especially with insufficient means. However, it seems, through the numerous writings on Modern European cultural and political history from 1518 until 1830, that the subject still carries some interest and justifies the importance of one's research on the Algerian fleet during the same period.

Indeed, it is through its squadrons that the Algiers Regency¹ played - during more than three centuries - a first hand role in the epic of the Mediterranean. In spite of many difficulties, and the multiple attempts to crush it, the Algerian State remained respected by the western European States, until the last moment of its existence. It is towards the sea that the government of Algiers was directed and because of it, it became a great naval power. From the 16th century onward, the importance of international trade, the political crises, the military conflicts and the tendencies of hegemony in the Mediterranean made necessary the possession of an efficient fleet. The regency's role extended to protecting the coastal stretch, controlling the maritime traffic and the support of the Ottoman war effort against those who had sworn to annihilate the Moriscos who fled to North Africa.

However, what intrigues us in the first time is what distinguishes this military navy from others of its epoch. It is necessary to know how «This marine had created the Modern Algerian state»².

The Barbarossa³ brothers and their successors in Algiers had put all

* The linguistic revision was done by Dr. Prof. Dahou Fagheror.

¹ At this period the Europeans called the Algerian political system: the Regency of Algiers, the Kingdom of Algiers, the Republic of Algiers or the Algerian State, but the Maghreb states were called the Barbary coasts.

² MOULAY BELHAMISSI, *Histoire de la Marine Algérienne 1516-1830* (Alger, 1986), 7.

³ Barbarossa was a name given to the four brothers sailors: Arrudj (1474-1518), Khayr al-Din (1476-1546), Elyas and Isaac. The name of Barbarous may come from the word

their genius, their courage, their experience and their faith in service of this strong institution that was among the biggest military schools in the history of Islam. «They assured it the supremacy on sea, the upper hand in the fights and the efficiency on its other missions»⁴.

The study of the Algerian marine and its evolution - despite its lengthy treatment in western writings - does not, by any means, reflect a tendency to praise or justify its action, but to serve only one purpose which is to further understand the movement of hegemony and colonialism. My approach is an attempt towards a positive history of the Algerian marine, a moderate summary of its structures, its movements, and the consequences of a long action invested by this Institution and the reasons of so many enviable successes, then of its final fall. While this endeavour is devoted exclusively to the military navy, it is also limited in time to the Ottoman period⁵, which goes from 1518 to 1830, year of the French conquest of Algeria. This does not mean that the central Maghreb⁶ did not have a naval institution before the Ottoman's period. Here we have the testimony of the prestigious Ibn Khaldun on the subject «The Mediterranean Sea is an Islamic Lake, where the Christians have no place to board even a piece of wood»⁷.

What we know of the 16th century as «...a heroic period, as the century of famous battles, of the foundation of glorious institutions. It is also the century of the Piracy and the European trade hegemony around the world»⁸. It is known as the period where frequent coup palaces shook Algeria, added to the Christian crusades, Spanish Reconquista, which chased the Moriscos even those who settled away from Spain. Then, the Spaniards occupied some strategic points on the Maghreb coasts. Therefore, by the arrival of the Ottomans, the conceiving of an organized marine in order to face the new situation was an utmost priority.

“Baba”; “father” in Turkish. They were four sons of a Greek potter of Mitilini. They practiced the war of sea (Jihad bahri) in the name of the sultan of Istanbul. The eldest, Arrudj, get to the service of the Emir of Algiers to fight against the Spaniards installed in the Peñon (a small Island in front of Algiers) in (1515). He invaded the city and submitted the hinterland. His brother, Khayr al-Din, followed him on the North African coasts; he also fortified the city. He attacked the Italian coasts and Nice (1543), and he struggled against the emperor Charles V.

⁴ E. MERCIER, *Histoire de l’Afrique septentrionale*, t. III 1515-1830 (Paris, 1891), 145.

⁵ The “Ottoman Period” is the name of the modern part of the Algerian history; it begins in 1518 and ends with French colonialism, in 1830.

⁶ The Arab medieval nomination of El-Maghreb (Occident) “North Africa and Andalusia” in the opposite of El Mashreq (Islamic Orient), and also the Maghreb was divided on three parts; near Maghreb (Tunisia), central Maghreb (Algeria) and the extreme Maghreb (Morocco).

⁷ IBN KHALDUN, *El Mukadima*, (Beirut, 2003) (in Arabic) for the period before the 16th century; see the following notes in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*: Bahriyya, Bahr Rûm, dâr al Sina’a, Kursân, Safina etc.

⁸ P HUBAC, *Les Barbaresques* (Paris, 1949),VII.

Most sources of this study remain the secret of the archives! But some Algerian studies based on collecting information and comparative analysis could alight a way to controllable facts, and reconstitute with disparate elements a homogeneous idea about this disputed institution.

The sources of this study

Unfortunately, to profit of such study on the Ottoman period is often very disappointing. The sources that one solicits are very rare in Arabic, and though they exist in Ottoman language, they are much dispersed in space. There were in fact many efforts on the part of several researchers at the Algerian universities in recent years. They had begun a vast project of inventory and cataloguing of manuscripts, especially those which treat the Ottoman period in Algeria. Yet, whole chunks of the Marine history remain blurred.

The medieval period is very rich. Many writings relate the first Muslim adventures on the sea, the conquest and also the trade efforts in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. «The first Umayyad Caliph, Mu'âwiya (660-680) organized a naval expedition against Byzantium. The Muslims conceived a marine by constructing some vessels named "Shawânîs". Since the conquest of Maghreb, 'Abou Abdullah ibn al Habhab founded the arsenal of Tunis (732-733). The Caliph 'Umar ibn Abd al Aziz (717-720) ordered Hassan ibn al Nu'mân to build more vessels in Efrikiya, that permitted the conquest of Sicily under the command of 'Assad ibn al Furât. At the epoch of Abd Rahman III al Nassir (912-961), the Andalusian fleet reached 200 ships, and the most Mediterranean islands became Islamic»⁹.

The Fatimids of Egypt (969-1171), the Almohads of the Maghreb and Andalusia (1147-1269), the Zirids (973-1160), then the Hafsids (1228-1574) in Tunisia and Algeria had opposed the European Christians on sea victoriously from the 10th century to the 15th.

The few Arabic sources which give some details about the maritime life in the Maghreb during the Ottoman period are:

- "Gazawat Arruj wa Khair-Eddine" ("the Arruj and Khair-Eddine Conquests"): it is a contemporary chronic related to the life and the activities of the two Barbaroussa Brothers. We can find some details about the fleet and its organization, the zones of operations; with some commentaries etc, this document had been studied by M. Belhamissi, and presented for a master degree at Aix en Provence University, in 1972.

- At the end of the 16th century, a Moroccan traveller called Al Tamagrûti¹⁰, in a mission to Istanbul, stopped in Algeria and recorded briefly his impressions of its capital Algiers, its port, sailors and the drama on the sea.

⁹ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 13.

¹⁰ AL TAMAGRÛTI (ABÛ L-HASAN ALI IBN MUHAMMAD), an author of a journey to the Ori-

- At the beginning of the 19th century, two Algerian writers: Hamdan Khûdja and Hadj Ahmed al Chârîf al-Zahhâr, gave valuable details and indications in their memories on the pre-colonial period (before 1830) with some details on the activities of the Algerian fleet in Mediterranean during the same period¹¹.

Unlike the Maghrebean historians, and their writings with limited documentary value, their counterparts in the West were less neglectful. They wrote a lot on the naval construction, the navigation and the instruction of the officers. We can cite for example Le Père Hoste (1652-1701), author of *L'art des armées navales*¹². Since the 16th century, a succession of events changed the political life in the Central Maghreb; and made it come out of its isolation and start to play a role in the Mediterranean Sea. This new situation intrigued the European nations and awakened a growing attention against the government of Algiers.

Thanks to trade, diplomacy, ransom of the captives, journeys of study and spying activities, the Europeans had innumerable opportunities to know the region, to describe it in every aspect, to relate facts about it, notably its coast, capital and port. In the sum of their publications, the marine of Algiers seems to have been the subject of particular attentions. We find that special messengers, secret agents, diplomats, religious persons. Almost everybody has approached this topic, most often with great passion and less objectivity. Indeed, the military marine and its activity were a major worry and a permanent preoccupation for their governments.

However, these writings disappoint the researcher on many points. «The "Barbary coasts library" - as it is referred to - is only rich in appearance. The importance of its sources falls short from making the historian's day even though on the quantitative plan. It outclasses the local sources»¹³.

Salvatore Bono indicated in the forward of his very interesting study *Corsari nel Mediterraneo* the problem of the European writings and their neglect of many historical facts concerning the Christian Piracy: «This reality remains unknown. Especially what relates to the Christian piracy against the ships of the nations of Islam in particular, the presence of Moslem captives in Christian countries, especially in Italy, Spain and Malta»¹⁴.

De Grammont himself said: «Most historians of the Regency of Algiers were satisfied with copying one on the other, they all rely on the first his-

ent (1584-1595) titled: «النفحة المراكبية في السفارة التركية». The part related to Algeria had been published by M. BELHAMISSI in "Algeria seen by the Moroccan travelers at the Ottoman period", S.N.E.D, Algiers, 1979.

¹¹ HAMDÂN KHÛDJA, *El Mir'ât, (the mirror)* (Algiers, 1981) (in Arabic), 117-118.

¹² BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 14.

¹³ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 15.

¹⁴ SALVATORE BONO, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, (Milano, 1993, 1997).

torian Haëdo¹⁵ whose appreciation on the Maghreb are very hard and with a total dismissal of bad example on the coasts of the Maghreb»¹⁶.

Here are some examples: Algiers was the stream of the uttered injuries and it is very difficult to contain «Republic of thieves»¹⁷, «Nest of pirates and den of brigands»¹⁸, «Lair of thieves, hell of the Christians and cave of African monsters [...] heap of corsairs... whose inhabitants are demons...»¹⁹. It is not so easy to find yourself in front of a double problem: a rare, much dispersed documentation in the south strand of the Mediterranean, and a rich one in the north but very hostile and so heavy by ideology and subjectivity.

Privateering

Basing on an epistemological view, we are between two points of view, two attitudes and two theses. In this case I think that it better to talk about Privateering and not about Piracy, in spite of the practice of these acts. No one can assert that all the Muslim “Jihads” of this period were piracy, in the other hand, not all the Christian actions on the sea were crusades or a piracy.

This permanent problem²⁰ was a universal pain. The kings, the Popes, the princes, the rich and least rich men lived by it or took advantage of it. The Muslims did not have such activity before the 16th century. Europe had known how to exploit this general phenomenon to preach the cru-

¹⁵ Haëdo, Spanish Benedictin abbot, from Fromestra, he had stayed in Algiers from 1578 to 1581, author of three books on the Regency of Algiers, exploited extensively by the European historians. It is necessary to notice that a number of information given by Haëdo is obviously improper. Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 15.

¹⁶ DE GRAMMONT, *Histoire d'Alger sous la domination Turque (1516-1830)*, (Paris 1887), 51.

¹⁷ AVRIEUX Chevalier d', *Mémoires du chevalier*, (Paris, 1735).

¹⁸ RENAUDOT, *Tableau du Royaume de la ville d'Alger et de ses environs* (Paris, 1830).

¹⁹ L. ABELLY, *La vie de Saint Vincent de Paul* (Paris, 1891), cited by BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 15.

²⁰ A privateer was a private ship (or its captain) authorized by a country's government to attack and seize cargo from another country's ships. Prior to the development of international law among European nations, there was no legal recourse for minor grievances. Privateering was a form of covert operation used to resolve these matters without open warfare. The government of a country provided a letter of marque and reprisal to a ship owner that allowed him to arm his ship and attack other ships sailing under a particular flag. In return, he received a share of the seized cargo, while the rest went to the government as payment for the grievance. To the target country, a privateer looked very much like a pirate (which at times privateers would convert to piracy), and indeed this was the intention. The only difference was that pirates were considered outlaws by all nations, while privateers had immunity from the country that commissioned them, and were considered as prisoners of war if caught by other countries. [...] European powers renounced privateering in the 1856 Declaration of Paris. Other countries (including the United States) renounced it later under the Hague Conventions (1899/1907). Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the WIKIMEDIA Foundation, Inc. This page was last modified 07:52, 23 July 2006. The Muslims of that time (Ottoman and Barbary) considered privateering as a legal religious defense (Jihad) against the Reconquista and crusades.

sade against Maghreb and to reconcile Protestants and Catholics in Europe, as well as the writers who have done with their pens.

«Renaudot wrote that: “the existence of the Algerians results from robbery and the misfortune of the desolation of other peoples [...] they enjoy the pains of others...” We meet the same idea everywhere among the professional of exotics: “The Natural position of the powers of Barbary coasts was hired in the war, their hate of all honest industry and their natural greed push them to the Piracy [...] this innate love of the depredation is encouraged by the Barbaric religion”. P. Boyer goes farther in the path of the unlikely: “without the Piracy, the Regency of Algiers would never have existed”. Albertini found that “the real fortune of the Ottomans was on the sea [...] and that the privateering against the Christians represented for them a national industry or, it’s better to say an institution of state”»²¹.

The opinions that contradict these currents of thought are unfortunately rare. But one of Mas-Latrie deserves to be mentioned here:

«We believe that the statistical of the forfeits to which the Mediterranean was a theatre from the 12th to the 16th century, would put on the whole of the Christians a very heavy quantity of depredations and maritime devastations that we reject too easily on account of the Barbarians»²².

One day, whereas ‘Arrûdj came back of a journey of Tripoli (Tarabulus al Châm, “Syria”) he was surprised by the Christian corsairs of Rhodes island. A rough fight began between them and ends with the death of Iliyâs (one of the three brothers) of Arrûdj and many his crew. Arrûdj and the survivors were captured and their boat taken by the adversaries. In 1518, an Algerian embassy went back from Istanbul. They must have a permit from the Venetian consul of one station in the Ottoman capital, in order to be protected by the Pirates of the oriental Mediterranean Sea. The book titled “Ghazawât ‘Arrûdj wa Khayr Edîne” gives many details on the pirates who pursued the Muslims²³. Yet these events were just before the foundation of the Regency of Algiers.

In the west, the sultan Sa’âdien Abu ‘Abd Allah had to solicit on two occasions the king of Portugal Manuel (1469-1521), for a mediation to his corsairs to let pass two of his ships bound for Algiers and Tunis - but vainly. We may also remember that in France the royal edicts prescribed the tenth

²¹ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 18.

²² MAS-LATRIE, le Conte de, *Relations et commerce de l’Afrique septentrionale (ou Maghreb) avec les nations chrétiennes au Moyen-âge*, Fermin-Didot & C^{ie} (Paris, 1866).

²³ Cf. ANONYM AUTHOR, *Gazawât Arrûdj wa Khayr Eddîne*, (in Arabic), studied and edited by Belhamissi.

of the holds to the profit of the big admiral and the fifth for the King! «Beneditto Cotrugli, the merchant of Ragusa in the 15th century said that all Genoese who were impoverished by the reverses of fortune were pirates»²⁴. Therefore the role of the Christian was not only the one of the victim.

«The privateering against the Muslims based in Sicily, La Valette, Livorno, Pisa, Palma, Almeria, and Valencia had its big part in the unhappiness of the navigation. Every year the Order of Malta armed a dozen of big galleys, reinforced in the 17th century of three or four vessels or frigates in order to operate with more efficiency against the Muslims' trade in the sea. They practiced some raids in the non protected inshore villages...»²⁵. «For a long time, the Maltese piracy had maintained a permanent insecurity on the Maghreb coasts»²⁶.

Therefore, the privateering was not solely a Muslim activity. «It is necessary to reject these historic prejudices that put only the Arabs in the range of depredate corsairs of the Mediterranean»²⁷. In the 16th century, Deschamps had written: «The nurseries of the pirates are two riparian nations of the Ocean: France and England»²⁸. Privateering was prescribed by the Christian and by the Muslims reciprocally.

However, if the Muslims' privateering propagated in the 16th century on the North African coastline, the Christian one of Tuscany, Naples, Provence, Spain was more active. Moreover, if the Muslim danger had disappeared on the European coastline since more than one century, the Christian danger always existed on the African strands at the end of the 18th century. Until the French Revolution, the States of Italy and the whole Spain were in continual war with the powers of the Maghreb.

Therefore the Mediterranean Sea was a very conflicted space, usually a theatre of battles, not between two great political states, or legal against non legal powers, but it was another stage of a struggle between two cultures and two religions, dramatically interpreted by conquests, crusades, inquisition and privateering, then colonialism.

A military navy, it was a priority

During the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, the Algerian government attached a great importance to military marine, sometimes more than the army on

²⁴ ROBERT SAINT LONEZ, "Le Marchand Génois", *Annales E.S.C.*, 1958, 501.

²⁵ MATHIEX, "Trafic et prix de l'homme en Méditerranée aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècle", *Annales E.S.C.*, 1954.

²⁶ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 19

²⁷ MAS-LATRIE, *Relations et commerce*, 149

²⁸ HUBERT DESCHAMPS, *Pirates et flibustiers*, PUF, (Paris, 1952), 29.

the soil did. The reasons of this choice were very strong at that epoch. The Eastern and the Western borders were less threatened than the Mediterranean coasts. It is sufficient to compare the European expeditions from the 16th to 19th century with the few skirmishes with the Moroccans or the Tunisians. As for the South, the extent of the Sahara was a sufficiently efficient natural gate that an aggression on this side was unthinkable. Therefore, the real danger came from the sea. The anti-Maghrebean military expeditions had become almost permanent since the fall of Grenada (1492). The danger watched the coastline and in particular the capital Algiers.

The Europeans began exploring the coasts under many motives, curious tourists or businesspersons. When they arrived to Algeria, they marked the strategic places, elaborated some plans, and then collected big sums of money. They also organized the privateering modestly proclaimed against the Barbary Piracy. They got ready «to pierce the abscess of Algiers»²⁹. But it was very rarely for the Algerian or the Muslims, to have some sufficient tolerance to visit or explore the European coasts.

It would be interesting to review a few passages of this propagandist literature destined to revive the Europeans' and to incite them to conquer Maghreb. Haëdo said: «If this earth belongs to the Christians, who worked it by their own hands, there would be no more fertile country in all over the world»³⁰.

«Marmol in his "Description of Africa" glorifies the Saint League Alliance of 1573, and praised the conquest of a so beautiful country. It is why he introduces in his book so many precious documents and sources about this region. It is necessary to mention that the "Description of Africa" of Marmol which was published on the following day of Lépante (1571) and shortly after the failure of the revolt of the Andalusian. The book was translated in French in 1667 in a same intention: to preach for the crusade»³¹.

The projects of occupation were very clear. Lanfreducci³² said:

«The easiest place to give the assault and to seize Algiers is the one of Bebeluet (Babaloued)³³, after having taken the Burchio of the Ucciali³⁴ because in this point the army would protect the other Burchis and the Alcazaba³⁵ that we could attack the hills and the small moun-

²⁹ Cf. the writings of NICOLAS of NICOLAY, VALLEY, BRIEF, F. LA NOUE, HÉRAULT and PANANTI.

³⁰ HAËDO, "Topographia et historia general de Argel", traduction en français par MONNEREAU et BERBRUGGER, *Revue africaine* (1870), 369, 364-373.

³¹ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 25.

³² Lanfreducci and Bosio, two knights' spies of the Order of Malta, come to Algiers in 1587.

³³ One of the great gates of Algiers.

³⁴ They mean the tower of Uldj Ali (Bordj 'Uldj 'Alî).

³⁵ Alcazaba is the name of the fortified city of Algiers in the Ottoman period.

tains easily, then we can dominate the city with cutting water sources for the army»³⁶.

Of all inshore cities of the Mediterranean coastline, Algiers was the main target.

«There is no doubt that once Algiers had been shaven, the whole of the Ottoman house powers would collapse easily, in Barbary coasts and in Egypt. There is no doubt too, that all unfaithful corsairs will disappear and the cities of the Barbary will be taken easily. By the way, not all the coasts of Spain but the whole Christendom will be saved. The missing of Algiers's help will be so faraway and uncertain for all the Levant (Orient). It would be very easy to the Christians to eradicate the other corsairs of Tripoli, Djerba, Monastir, Sousse, Bizerte, Bône (Annaba) and the other...»³⁷.

There is nothing astonishing to meet in the archives of Spain and Italy the descriptions of many Algerian ports made by captain corsairs in view of a landing or a raid. They noted the possibilities of landing and coming back. They cited the sources of soft water, the possibilities of restocking; they joined the sketches and legends there³⁸.

Since a very long time, as noted before, the Algerian coast had been constituted, as the more coveted region of the Mediterranean Sea. The hold of this coast was the dream of several powers in the old continent.

These many plans of conquests were known by the leaders of the country in Algiers. That is why they had put all their hopes in an efficient military navy, capable to make fail so many plans and to raise so many challenges. This is why this marine should be also the better machine of the Algiers Regency.

The structure of the fleet

The Algerian marine was composed of locally constructed ships or taken from the enemies in sea, things that permitted to reinforce the fleet in a very efficient manner. Concerning ship building, the persons responsible of the yards had to take into account some options of the Regency. It required having very fast and very armed ships ready at any moment and to many missions.

³⁶ F. LANFREDUCCI and O. BOSIO, "Costa e discorsi di Barbaria", *Revue Africaine*, (1925), 35-165.

³⁷ F. LANFREDUCCI and O. BOSIO, "Costa e discorsi di Barbaria", 35-165.

³⁸ Among the archives of the former Italian States, there was in Florence (ASF 2077) a voluminous sheaf, of 1542 to 1695, where they talked about some Algerian ports: Gigeri (Dalles), Cerelli (Cherchell), etc. cited by BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 26.

The Regency sought to select and improve some types of ships capable of the privateering or the protection of the coasts. Perhaps, it was the reason why the Algerians never put on sea very big vessels, since – in their view – they were too slow and bad manoeuvred in naval fights. We can understand also why the most valued ship was the galiote; it is a small galley alleviated holding the sea better, more able to use the sails. «The opinion of some contemporaries was that the galiote was from the most successful of this creation. The admiral Uldj Ali had carried it at the time of Lépanthe to its highest degree of perfection. Its offensive capacity in men and in arming had to be very superior to the one of the enemy»³⁹.

Such was the general conception before the constructors achieve their realization. Many ships were constructed in Algeria in spite of some political and economic vicissitudes and that until the last moment of the Regency. The authorities used to this effect the excellent woods of oak and pine of the region of Cherchel. Moreover, when these woods were exhausted toward the middle of the 17th century, they turned to the forests of Bejaia in the east. In order to have wood on favourable conditions, they dealt with the Amokrane (tribute chief) of Médjana, who took the engagement to cut down and to produce the shaft of his region according to the cuts and dimensions received before.

In the domains between Sétif and Wadi Zenati, there was a specialized institution named the “service the Karasta”⁴⁰. It functioned in Bejaia as a base for the marking, and the embarking. The regions of Jijel and Collo were also associated to the operation⁴¹.

The pieces of wood received in Algiers were classified in wood of hull, pieces curves of the stem and the sternpost, framework of the flanks and of the hull, belt or beam, contiguous timbers bordering the ship of a flank to another and serving to consolidate the hems, masts, beams and boards... All these pieces were treated by local technicians or the specialized foreigners (carpenters, locksmiths, coopers, etc...)⁴². The first industry of the capital (Algiers) was ship building. All specialists, captives, Europeans who came under contract and the natives in general were anxious to win money in that industry. In Bâb El Wâd they manufactured the important units, in Bâb Azzûn those of least measurements. But some difficult problems remained to solve: some supplies missed there as the nails, the anchors, hemp, the

³⁹ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 49.

⁴⁰ Karasta means the wood of building and carpentry.

⁴¹ See the treaty of 1702 between the government of Algiers and the Morqânîs of Bâni Abbâss. Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 50.

⁴² HAËDO, “Épitome de los Reyes de Argel”, in *Revue Africaine*, 1880, 41. According to C. VALLIÈRE, the wood of Bejaia served to construct the body and the members of the boat, but the forests did not produce an appropriate tree to the masts.

veils, the ropes, some bowls necessary to every piece of the beech, the walnut-tree, the elm or the larch. These materials made defect.

The sale of wood to the Algerians was forbidden by papal bubbles and royal orders. Spain put the embargo on everything that could serve as equipment for the marine of the Regency: apparatus, saltpetre, accessories of cockle, sailcloth, munitions and weapons...

Next to these yards, there was the foundry where the biggest number of cannons was manufactured. The factory was named *Dâr al barûd* (the house of the gunpowder), and was close to *Bâb al Wâd*. It was a wide building of:

«Thirty meter long and a big enough height; there was only one furnace very well constructed. The mold of melting was placed in a grave just in front of the opening, which flowed out and which was placed over to withdraw the massive piece. This one was drilled [...] On the other side of the street were the workshops of the molds, the gun carriage, several forges, and furnaces to make projectiles, which were manufactured in big quantities...»⁴³.

The government of Algiers suffered from a lack of provision of many necessary materials. The products of the holds in sea permitted to surmount some obstacles. They recovered a large part of the material. The precious cargos brought them what they had needed.

«There were the tributes versed regularly by the Christian nations anxious to live in peace with the Regency. During long years, Sweden and Denmark provided the woods of the North, and Holland provided the pieces of frameworks, the veils and different equipments»⁴⁴.

We can find in the reports of consuls in Algiers, an interesting detail on the indispensable supplies. In 1680, Holland provided to Algiers 8 pieces of cannons of 50 pound of bullets with accessories, 40 masts, 500 barrels of gunpowder, 5000 cannonballs and a vessel full of cables and various apparatuses. Also in 1711, Holland sent to the Regency 8 bronze cannons, 16 of iron, 24 gun carriage, 7000 cannonballs, 600 barrels of gunpowder, 800 rifles, 400 blades of swords, 25 masts and 8 big cables [...] Sweden rushed in 1731, 800 barrels of gunpowder, 8 big cables, 50 masts, 800 rifles, 40 pieces of cannons, 6000 cannonballs⁴⁵.

In 1746, the "Etats Généraux" of France sent three ships escorted by vessels of lines with different presents of which, 60 mainmasts, 140 big pieces of wood for hem, 400 other of 4 inches, 60 thousands barrels of gunpowder,

⁴³ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 50. According to W. SHALER, *Esquisse de l'Etat d'Alger*, Trad. Bianchi Ladvocat (Paris, 1830), 52.

⁴⁴ L. LACOSTE, *La Marine Algérienne sous les Turcs* (Paris, 1931), 304.

⁴⁵ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 51.

80 thousands of lead, 35 big cable, 600 pieces of canvas for veils [...] In 1749, four Dutch ships unloaded the presents from the "Etats Généraux"⁴⁶.

In the same year, 1749, Denmark, in application of the treaty signed in Algiers, committed to provide: 20 cannons of iron with 20 pounds of cannonballs, 20 other of 12 pounds, 8000 cannonballs, 4 mortars of melting, 4000 bombs of 100, and 150 pound, 100 thousand of powder, 2000 tables of 4 inch thick for hem, 50 mainmasts, 10 cables of 10 inches, 30 of 5 to 8 inches and 500 quintals of stringing for the manoeuvre.

The Danish King also committed himself to send annually 50 thousand barrels of gunpowder, 25 big cable, 8.000 cannonballs, 25 yards, 10 cables and as many antennas. The agreements of 1747, 1748 and 1749 stipulated identical supplies. In 1747, the Danish King had offered some mortars to the Regency; the Dey sent them back, noting that these weapons were in melting. He informed him that they would accept only mortars of bronze, and gave him 6 weeks to repair this mistake.

In 1751, the City of Hamburg was committed to send annually to the Regency, 34 thousand barrels of gunpowder, 56 thousand of stringing, 34 thousands of lead, 100 pieces of canvas for veils, and 10 cables and as much of big cables, 10 masts of Vessels, 30 antennas and 800 cannonballs of different calibres. Sweden also sent in 1747, 70 masts, 903 cables for Hems, 170 laths, 294 barrels of pitch, 50 thousands of powder, 19 cables 80 big cables, 200 barrels of tar, 20.000 cannonballs of 6 to 12 inch⁴⁷.

England proposed all sorts of apparatus, iron, steel, sulphur and the saltpetre. The traders of Marseille and Livorno provided the material that had been asked. The contraband permitted to surpass the obstacles. The French services knew it, and an order of Louis XIV to Tourville in date of 17th January 1682, prescribed that:

«His Majesty had been informed that the Dutchmen carry several contraband goods to the so-called corsairs of Algiers in order to equip their vessels and to arm them even of cannons, and as it is important to prevent them, He wants that He (Tourville) must inspect all the Dutch vessels that he will meet in sea»⁴⁸.

In his memorials, the French captain Guillaume Fouques had discovered «French complicities with the marine of Algiers. He denounced, at Marseille, the quick growth of contraband of weapons and strategic products in destination to the Barbary coasts and its naval workshops»⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 51-53

⁴⁷ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 51, more details are in J.A. VALLIÈRE, *Observations sur le Royaume d'Alger*, publiées par Chaillou in «Textes pour servir à l'histoire de l'Algérie au XVIII^e siècle» (Paris, 1979).

⁴⁸ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 52.

⁴⁹ TURBET DELOF (GAY), *Bibliographie Critique*, 74, cited by BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 52.

The Jewish of Algiers had specialized in the import of the weapons from Holland. The trade with Europe allowed importing from Algeria, hemp, horses, wax, copper, leather, coral, and especially wheat. On the other hand, the French and the English could sell in Algiers produces of their privateering, some times near the Algerian costs, where they usually receive the aids when they were in difficulty⁵⁰.

A Knight of Avrieux affirms in his memorials that on the 11th of January 1676, the vessel of the corsair Samson and the one of Mezzo Morto⁵¹ came back from Marseille. They had escorted the Ship of Captain David and other merchant ships that came from Syria, very richly loaded. For fear to fall in the hands of the Spanish corsairs, they had adapted with these two Algerians to escort them. The magistrates of Marseille had received these corsairs very well. They had given them provisions for their return [...] another accident happened; the vessel of the Captain Jérôme Michel of Marseille had perished near Ténès in 29th October 1727. A marabou (Muslim saint) helped the crew and came with the sailors from Ténès to Cherchel by sea and then from Cherchel to Algiers overland with four knights⁵².

«In 1727, The Captain Maillet de Marseille declared that he gave to Omar Raïs⁵³ 50 pilasters and 4 peaks of tip and over 2 pieces of stringing of 4 hundredweight, 3 axes and 14 oars, as recompense to the services that he had received with his crew in Jijel after his Vessel named “la Fortune de la mer”, had been aground there»⁵⁴.

The grants of the Ottoman Sultan or the chiefs of Muslim states also arrived to the Regency. Some Big Lords, in return of their presents of the Dey, never failed to send some materials for the Algiers fleet with the representatives of the Dey.

In 1706, a French ship “Nolisé” had transported from Constantinople to Algiers a quantity of pieces of wood for construction, gun carriage for cannons, six rudders, and twenty six keels of ships, one hundred ninety three big oars and two hundred fifty small oars, twenty two masts, five hundred cannonballs, many hemsps and iron ...⁵⁵.

However, the holds of sea, the grants of the governments and the contraband were not sufficient. The needs were greater. Then, there were other transactions. Laugier de Tracy wrote that in 1725 “the English consul in Algiers was the lonely merchant of his nation”. He provided to the gov-

⁵⁰ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 52.

⁵¹ The Raïs Hadj Hussein, he becomes Dey after 1682.

⁵² Cf. A. DEVOULX, *Revue Africaine*, 1871, p 346.

⁵³ Raïs, an Arabic surname, means the “head or president” given to the Admirals of the Algerian Navy, in the Ottoman period.

⁵⁴ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 52-53.

⁵⁵ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 53.

ernment of the Regency munitions of war and instruments of navigation and received in return oil, wheat and other goods. These commodities were destined to the provision of Gibraltar⁵⁶.

In 1778, an English ship arrived from England bringing 50 cannons made of iron, bought by Mohamed Pasha for the government's account: 28 cannons of the heavy caliber 12 each, 64.565 pounds in all, 6 cannons weighing, or 7961 pounds in all, 16 cannons 34.950 pounds in all. "In payment of these cannons, He had been given 5 measures of wheat for each quintal of iron. He had also bought from the Captain of this ship 3 anchors at the cost of 5 measures of wheat by quintal of iron⁵⁷.

Laugier de Tarcy wonders how a country nearly without wood, without masts, without stringings, without veils, without wax, without anchors, could maintain a great number of vessels with very little fees⁵⁸.

Thanks to all these efforts, these continuous and creative initiatives, the persons responsible of the marine managed to construct «some vessels, good sailboats, fast and very armed»⁵⁹. However, the better testimony of this is Le père Dan: «On 7th August 1634, I saw a fleet of 28 ships, the most beautiful and most armed that it was possible to see»⁶⁰.

When the construction of a ship was finished, the launching will be celebrated in a feast. The crowd of Algiers ran to the port, a Marabou slaughter a sheep and threw it overboard. When the ship was vigorously pushed and put in the waters, it would be blushed by immolation blood.

The holds of the sea contributed extensively to the backing of the fleet. The wars between Algiers and its numerous enemies served the Regency, but loot of war often consisted of the ships which needed some time for a global renovation. Indeed, the catch of boats was sometimes by great score⁶¹ «28 Biscayans at a stroke near Malaga in 1556, about fifty ships in one season in the vicinity of Gibraltar»⁶².

«Some official reports affirm that between 1613 and 1621 more than 800 ships⁶³ fell in the hands of Algerians of which 447 are Dutch, 193 French, 120 Spanish, 60 English, 56 German [...] other than small cra-

⁵⁶ LAUGIER DE TRACY, *Histoire du Royaume d'Alger* (Amsterdam, 1725), cited by BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 53.

⁵⁷ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 53.

⁵⁸ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 53.

⁵⁹ VOYARD, «Chez les Pirates Barbaresques. Les écrivains par mer dans la littérature et l'histoire», in *Bulletin de la Section de géographie du comité des travaux historiques et scientifique*, 1951, 104.

⁶⁰ DAN, le père, *Histoire de la Barbarie* (Paris, 1637), cited by BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 53.

⁶¹ As a little comparison, the city of Saint Malo (France) could catch by privateering; between 1688 and 1697, 200 ships, about 3500 boats of trade and 375 corsairs.

⁶² J. MONLOÛ, *Les Etats barbaresques* (Paris, 1973), 93.

⁶³ DE GRAMMONT talked about 936 ships.

fts. Other documents indicate that between 1630 and 1634, 80 ships were taken from France with 1331 captives. After the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, (between Spain and France), the squadron of Toulon raked in the Maghreb coasts and bombarded Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. The Raïs brought back to the port hundreds of ships in order to weaken the marines which intended to destroy the Regency. In the year of 1681, they captured about thirty French ships and 300 men of crew»⁶⁴.

In the 18th century, the hunt of the European ships continued. Between 1765 and 1799, 376 holds came to enrich the Algerian fleet⁶⁵. The ship named *Augustus III Rex Poloniae* was arranged among the gigantic boats of the time. It belonged to the ship owner J. Ph. Schultz of Gdansk. He declared that he was captured by four Algerian xebecs on 16th October 1749⁶⁶.

If the captured ships did not interest the admiralty of Algiers, they were sold in Europe through the intermediary of the Jewish of Algiers and Livorno Merchants or by Consuls (businessmen) wheeler-dealers. However, the holds were not acquired through a unique way. It some times arrived to the Algerians to lose a part of their fleet.

«In 1620, Beaulieu Persac captured 4 Algerian vessels, and in 1621 he sank three of them. A substantial number of ships were burnt from time to time in the port of the capital. In 24th August 1665, the Duke of Beaufort sank 2 ships in Cherchel and took 3 that he incorporated to the royal marine»⁶⁷.

The *Rose of Algiers* of 40 canons was taken by the Marquis d'Affreville on the outskirts of the Cape Corsica [...] The treaty of peace between France and the Regency, signed in 1689, stipule in its article 6 that the "Emperor of France" will agree to the restitution of the Vessel *The Sun* and the caravels *Le Parrot* and the *Dragon* taken by vessels of his Majesty with their tackle, cannons, effects and crews⁶⁸.

The problem of the appellation

Usually, the Algerian ships only took their commander's name. For example: "xebec" of Raïs Hadj Ali, etc. Sometimes, the designation was preceded of a qualifier: the new brig of such Raïs. The origin of the ship also

⁶⁴ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 54.

⁶⁵ DESFEUILLES, "Scandinaves et Barbaresque, à la fin de l'Ancien Régime", in *Cahiers de Tunisie*, N° 15, 1956, 330.

⁶⁶ CIESLAK, "Les Pirates d'Alger et le commerce maritime de Gdansk au milieu du XVIII^e siècles", in *Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale*, N° 1, 1972, 111.

⁶⁷ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 55

⁶⁸ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 55

served as distinguishing name. For example, the frigate called "Amriquiya" (the American) named thus because it was offered by the United States of America, and another called "Alburtughalia" (the Portuguese) because it was taken from the Portuguese by Raïs Hamidou.

It is only in the 18th century and in the last years of the Ottoman's presence that the ships had assigned some names: "the Rooster of the fort", "the Green wing", "the victorious", "the victory of Islam", "the thing of the divine providence", "the key of Jihad", "the virtuous Iskander". These two last ones escaped from the defeat at Navarino in 1827, and were in Alexandria port at the time of the French conquest of Algiers in 1830⁶⁹.

The sterns of the ships didn't carry any names, but there was a representing figure for example: a "rose tree", a "pearl", a "lemon tree gilded", a "sun flower", "two cypresses", "seven stars" and "two antelopes", etc... The Europeans gave to the Algerian ships the name of these figures and there was some ships named "the White lion", "the Golden rose", "the Big Gazelles", "the Golden lemon tree", "the Crescent", and "the Pearl"⁷⁰. And there were other names according to figures on the sterns of the ships.

Blanchi who accompanied the Count of Bretonnière in Algiers in 1829 affirms that for the first time, in 1825, the Algerians gave particular names to their ships of war. It was an imitation of the Europeans. The names were Arabic, Ottomans or Persian. Here are some examples⁷¹:

| Type of ships | Names | Number of cannons |
|---------------|---|-------------------|
| FREGATES | Miftahi-djihan (the key of the world) | 62 |
| | BEN-el-ghavvâs (the son of the diver) | 50 |
| | Neferi-Iskender (the Alexander) | 35 |
| CORVETTE | Mezaheri-Istavfié | 36 |
| | Fassia | 36 |
| BRIGS | Nimeti-Khouda (the donation of the God) | 18 |
| | Mudjerés (the carrier of good news) | 36 |
| | Feth-El Islâm (the conquest of Islam) | 24 |
| GOELETTES | Djeiran (the Roebuck) | 16 |
| | Tongarda | 14 |
| | Sureia (Luster) | Without cannons |
| | Chahini-Deria (the fulcrum of the sea) | Without cannons |
| POLACRE | Zaghar | 20 |
| CHEBEC | Majorca | 20 |

⁶⁹ Cf. BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 55

⁷⁰ G. TURBET-DELOF, "Noms de navires algériens au XVI^{ème} siècle", in *Revue Internationale d'Onomastique*, N° 3, 1970, 213-219.

⁷¹ BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 56

The problem of the property

It is not astonishing to ask: who shared in the property of this strategic institution, not only for Algeria, but for all the Maghreb? Did the Regency of Algiers have a national marine or a private one?

Actually, everyone took part in privateering: the Government, its entourage, the Beys, the notables, the Jews and even the ordinary people. Sometimes an association of several persons was necessary; the expenses and the costs of the prolonged missions required important funds. These financial necessities explain why the Government could not have alone the monopoly of the privateering. Laugier de Tracy affirmed that:

«In 1722, Dey Mohamed made appropriate a Dutch boat to make it a vessel of the state. All other ships belonged to individuals. Their stores are always well provided. "When a ship had just perished or to be taken by the enemies the owner was held to replace it by the purchases or construction of another. "By this wise maxim", wrote Laugier de Tracy, the Republic (of Algiers) never suffered of reduction in its powers»⁷².

However, towards the end of the Ottomans period, the government's control on the affaires of the marine became nearly exclusive. For many years, wrote Rozet, all ships belonged to the Dey; the individuals could not arm their own boats⁷³. Although individuals were allowed to arm and to choose their ships, some restrictions limited this liberty. Indeed, they were obliged to serve the state in the transportation of garrisons and provisions. They were forced to conform to the Dey's orders at the time of their missions and to be always ready to serve the Ottoman Sultan. Whether private property or state one, the ship was severely protected by the laws of the Regency. The least of damage in sea could lead to a conflict.

«In 1788, De Kerzy the consul of France loaded for the affaires of his Majesty -the very Christian- to the Kingdom of Algiers, wrote; "an Algerian corsair, having been drown on the rating of France by the Vessel "le Partenope" the Dey of Algiers wanted that France was responsible, and threatened the consul to declare the war on his nation, if he didn't immediately replace this vessel. M. de Kerzy offered money but the Khasnadji (finance minister) rejected this offer requiring a similar vessel. The minister of France, considering the circumstances, was obliged to agree to this requirement, in the interest of the peace that was threatened in every instant»⁷⁴.

⁷² BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 57

⁷³ M. ROZET, *Voyage dans la Régence d'Alger*, t. III (Paris, 1833), 379.

⁷⁴ M. DE KERCY, *Mémoires sur Alger* (Paris, 1927), cited by BELHAMISSI, *Histoire*, 57.

Conclusion

I attempted to talk briefly about the dynamics that had characterized this navy army and through it, I tried have a look on the long maritime past of Algeria. It was so brief that I was not able to cover all important parts of this long history. Political life, the international relations, economy, trade and military institutions are some annexes of this study, but the composition of Algerian fleet, and its evolution, the Raïs (princes of sea), and the life of the sailors in sea, and also on the mainland, training and real assault, famous battles and last struggle, all these subjects deserve new approaches basing on the new manuscripts discovered recently.

We must not ignore this marine that gave so much to Algeria: an international prestige, a maritime experience, and necessary means for an independent politics. It was not the instrument or a hideout for pirates as some often wrote and said. It was a weapon whose base was Algiers to riposte and to attack. It went to assault on the seas and did not linger to carve itself an enviable place to fight against great powers. It was a religious marine that fought for freedom and protection of "Dâr al Islam", the national territories for all Muslims. It stopped the Spanish impulsions, then the arrogance of their allies. Marine of war, it was present on a numerous theaters of battle, alone or with Ottomans, facing the squadrons of the Christendom or facing convoys of ships. It provided real treasures from the waters, while the Maghreb was deprived of vital means, living a long crisis. Above all, it could stop a hostile and aggressive expansionist Europe at least for a while.

However, when the weight of the interior and outside difficulties became crushing and the obstacles were impassable, in spite of shy starts, this marine was vanished in 1830 completely from the Mediterranean Sea. Any people possessing a powerful marine can pretend, otherwise to the universal domination, or may be just a respect from the neighbours and enemies. A strong naval army was and remains again the indispensable helper of a political independence and a powerful lever that can raise the weak nations to the level of the strong nations.

Keith A.J. McLay

‘A Mediterranean Amphibian’:
British warfare, 1693-1713

The Historiography of Britain’s Penetration of the Mediterranean

During the winter of 1694-1695, Britain wintered a fleet for the first time in the western Mediterranean thus marking its emergence as a European power in the Middle Sea during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries¹. The historiographical consensus that this penetration of the Mediterranean was a function of naval power has been shaped by earlier works such as John Ehrman’s 1949 article in the *Cambridge Historical Journal* on William III’s Mediterranean policy and his monograph on the Williamite Navy, *The Navy in the War of William III 1689–1697: Its State and Direction* (Cambridge, 1953), S. F. Gradish’s article on British seapower in the Mediterranean and J. S. Corbett’s examination of the same in his text covering England in the Mediterranean from the early Stuart age. More recently this consensus has been vouchsafed by Nicholas Rodger’s second volume of his trilogy on British naval history, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London, 2004). The arguments of these works considered that the Royal Navy’s material and tactical dominance of other European fleets combined with its protection of British maritime trade underpinned this exercise in seapower; opposition fleets were either defeated on the open seas or kept tied up in port, while their merchant marines were harassed from the principal trade routes². This interpretation, ho-

¹ The author recognises the historical pitfalls in using the terms ‘Britain’ and ‘British’ prior to 1707, when the Act of Union established ‘Britain’ as a constitutional entity. However, as this essay straddles pre- and post-Union periods, and is not substantively concerned with constitutional history, these two terms along with the term ‘British Isles’ have been adopted as convenient and largely accurate short-hand.

² JOHN EHRLMAN, ‘William and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy, 1692-94’, *Cambridge Historical Journal*, IX (1947-1949), 269-292; JOHN EHRLMAN, *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697: Its State and Direction* (Cambridge, 1953); S. F. GRADISH, ‘The Establishment of British Seapower in the Mediterranean, 1689-1713’, *Canadian Journal of History*, X (1975), 1-16; J. S. CORBETT, *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influ-*

wever, largely fails to consider the combined service role of the army and the navy in facilitating the strategic penetration of the Mediterranean. Although dismissed in a recent work concentrating on French combined service achievements in the Middle Sea³, the Royal Navy's first winter in the Mediterranean might be viewed as a consequence of William III's combined service deployment on both the French and eastern Spanish coastlines in an attempt to divide and defeat the French Brest and Toulon squadrons. Thereafter, in order to maintain its long term presence in the Mediterranean, suitable bases had to be sought and, during the period 1701-1713, the usual means of acquiring ports at places such as Gibraltar and Minorca was through a combined army-navy operation. Moreover, although it was undoubtedly the case that the Royal Navy exercised the traditional elements of seapower such as the set piece naval battle off the coast of Malaga in 1704 to sustain the strategic penetration of the Mediterranean⁴, amphibious actions served as an important handmaiden to the naval war strategy during the wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries⁵.

The Nine Years' War which broke out in 1688 ranged a Grand Alliance of states including England, the United Provinces, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire against Louis XIV's France. The Grand Alliance's objectives in seeking to check France's territorial aggrandisement on its north-east frontier in the reputed interests of its national security, to respond to recent depredations in the Palatinate following the failure of Louis XIV to secure the election of his candidate as Elector of Cologne and to safeguard the nascent balance of power within the European states system meant that the Grand Strategy was oriented around the land-based fighting on the European continent⁶. Indeed, William III, was most enthusiastic to commit troops to Europe and to lead the fight against Louis XIV's armies. This he achieved: the size of the British corps in Flanders peaked at some 29,000 men with over 27,000 foreign troops subsidized by Britain

ence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603-1713 (2 vols, London, 1917); N.A.M. RODGER, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London, 2004).

³ GUY ROWLANDS, 'The King's Two Arms: French Amphibious Warfare in the Mediterranean Under Louis XIV, 1664-1697', in D.J.B. TRIM and MARK CHARLES FISSEL (eds), *Amphibious Warfare 1000-1700: Commerce State Formation and European Expansion* (Leiden, 2006), 272.

⁴ L.G. CARR-LAUGHTON, 'The Battle of Velez Malaga, 1704', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, LXVIII (1923), 367-390; RICHARD HARDING, *Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650-1830* (London, 1999), 171-172; CORBETT, *England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713*, II, 530-535.

⁵ K.A.J. MCLAY, 'Combined Operations and the European Theatre during the Nine Years' War, 1688-97', *Historical Research*, LXXVIII (2005), 506-538.

⁶ JOHN LYNN, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714* (London, 1999), 191-199; M. SHEEHAN, 'The Development of British Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power Before 1714', *History*, LXXIII (1988), 30.

by the end of the war⁷. The continental contribution to William's Grand Strategy was considerable. However, not only did the land fighting in Flanders reap little decisive reward, it was not the exclusive feature of the Grand Strategy. William sought to organise a series of combined service actions – amphibious warfare, to give it its generic combat term – to debilitate the French fleets operating out of Brest and Rochefort in the north and Toulon in the south, and also to facilitate his ambition to establish Britain as a Mediterranean seapower. Furthermore, a key consequence of the successful fulfilment of William's Mediterranean ambition was the ability to relieve the military pressure in northern Europe by intervening in the war on the Iberian Peninsula, and, in particular, in Catalonia⁸.

British Warfare and the Penetration of the Mediterranean, 1694-1695

In 1694, William dispatched a two squadron fleet: one squadron commanded by Admiral Lord Berkeley was to assault the northern French coast line, particularly at Brest, with the intention of destroying the northern French fleet and also to establish a diversionary front for the fighting in Flanders; the second squadron comprising sixty-three warships and commanded by Admiral Edward Russell was bound for the Mediterranean. Specifically, Russell was headed for the waters off Barcelona where the French Admiral Tourville had taken station to succour Marshall Noailles's army as it advanced on this principal Catalan town⁹. A siege in early autumn seemed probable. However, news of Russell's approach caused Tourville to scurry back to Toulon, believing his fleet to be outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch force and this action effectively allowed Russell to complete his mission of chasing the French from the western Mediterranean Sea¹⁰.

Running short of provisions and with only a few weeks left in which the larger rated vessels could remain at sea, Russell expected that he would shortly head for England. The King, wishing to consolidate this newly gained strategic position in the Mediterranean, had other ideas, however. Towards the end of July, William let it be known to the Cabinet

⁷ JOHN CHILDS, *The British Army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987), 268.

⁸ The following six paragraphs directly embrace and draw upon material first published in my article, 'Combined Operations and the European Theatre during the Nine Years' War, 1688-97', *Historical Research*, LXXVIII (2005), 533-538.

⁹ Anonymous, *An Exact Journal of the Victorious Expedition of the Confederate Fleet, the Last Year, Under the Command Admiral Russell* (London, 1695), 1-4; The National Archives (TNA), SP 42/3, fos. 602-605, 714-717: Russell to Trenchard, 1, 28 July 1694; J. K. LAUGHTON (ed.), *Memoirs Relating to the Lord Torrington* (London, 1889), 67.

¹⁰ Anonymous, *An Exact Journal of the Victorious Expedition of the Confederate Fleet*, 4-7; C. SEVIN DE QUINCY, *Histoire Militaire du Regne de Louis Le Grand* (4 vols, Paris, 1726), III, 54-70.

Council that he wanted Russell to continue as long as possible in the Mediterranean and on his departure to leave a squadron to winter in the Mediterranean basin. Specifically, on 7 August 1694, William ordered Russell to use Cádiz as a base and winter with the whole fleet in the Mediterranean; only the passage of the French fleet through the Straits would admit Russell's departure¹¹. William now had the strategic presence in the Mediterranean which he had long sought and the 1695 campaign season offered the prospect of converting this into territorial gains upon the French Mediterranean coastline or tangible diplomatic currency by helping the Spaniards to force the French back across the Pyrenees.

Aside from the marine soldiers aboard, Russell's fleet had no additional troops to use either as a strike force on the French coast or to offer as support to the Spanish army. Accordingly, it was decided in December to boost Russell's capability by dispatching to Cádiz four regiments – about 3,000 men in total. The transportation of these troops was however beset by chronic delay and it was not until the end of April before they were delivered to Russell in the Mediterranean¹². A descent on Toulon or at Marseilles – similar in form to that undertaken at Brest – was considered the optimum use of these troops by the Ministry and the instructions sent to Russell in May prioritised these targets. Russell, however, first attended to the subordinate part of his instructions which required that he put troops into Barcelona to prevent its capture by the French who were considered likely to make it a priority again in the forthcoming campaign. Then he took the fleet to the Îles d'Hyères whence he was able to reconnoitre Toulon; while Rear-Admiral Neville was sent with four colonels to assess Marseilles. Both missions reported on the extensive French defensive preparations, particularly at Toulon where the French fleet lay, apparently showing no signs of putting out. Russell returned to the Catalan coast to find that the troops were not required in Barcelona, the war in Spain having taken a different course from the previous year¹³.

The opportunity for Russell to intervene in the Spanish theatre was a product of the altered military realities in Catalonia where the energy of

¹¹ W. COXE (ed.), *Private and Original Correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury* (London, 1821), 65-70, 72-75; National Maritime Museum (NMM), SOU/3, fos. 203-206, 315-318; Trenchard to Blathwayt, 31 July, 14, 24 August 1694.

¹² COXE (ed.), *Shrewsbury Correspondence*, 78, 222-224; TNA, WO 5/7, unfoliated, Blathwayt to Bridgeman, 9, 16, 19 January, 6 February 1695, Blathwayt to the Commissioners of Transportation, 16 January, 21, 22 February, 7, 8 March 1695, Blathwayt to Cutts, 17 March 1695; TNA, SP 44/168, 104: Instructions for Brigadier-General Stewart, 12 March 1695; JOHN CHILDS (ed.) 'Lord Cutts's Letters', *Camden Miscellany*, XXX (1990), 394, 396, 398-404.

¹³ COXE (ed.), *Shrewsbury Correspondence*, 228-231; Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC), *Buckleuch Montague MSS* (London, 1903), II, Part I, 182-183.

the new Viceroy and army commander, the Marquis de Gastañaga, caused the Spaniards to take the initiative. In the spring, he moved to capture Ostalric and Castelfollit de la Roca. The French had retired to Gerona and consequently the Viceroy was keen to capture Palamós next; but he required Russell's help¹⁴. Initially Gastañaga had proposed that Russell land his troops at Blanes whence they would march with the Spanish army to Palamós¹⁵. The Admiral, concerned that this held out the prospect of several days marching and presumably keen to firm up the details of the operation, instead informed the Viceroy that he would land up to 4,000 soldiers at a bay near Palamós if the siege looked likely to go ahead. On 7 August two bomb vessels were sent into the Bay of Palamós to throw some shells as a preliminary to the siege. Two days later, upon Brigadier Stewart's word that the military circumstances were propitious with the French army camp reportedly at least four leagues from Palamós at La Bisbal d'Emporda, Russell landed 3,000 English infantry and about 500 Dutch troops under Count Nassau in the early hours of the morning at St. Feliu de Guíxols. Linking up with the Spanish army which had encamped at Calonge, the whole force marched that day to within two miles of Palamós.

In the event, an engagement did not occur. The allies occupied and began fortifying some high ground so that when on 12 August the French marched forward to inspect their opponent's position, they wheeled north and left for the neighbouring town of Palafrugell. Over the 12-13 August, Russell delivered the second phase of naval support. Bomb vessels and ketches with mortars were towed into Palamós Bay to throw their shells at the town and were exacting considerable damage when a frigate, which had previously been dispatched on an intelligence gathering mission along the Provence coast, returned. The captain had taken two Toulon fishermen prisoner and they claimed that the French fleet of sixty warships was now lying in Toulon Road, armed and ready to sail. In order to prevent them passing through the Straits, Russell wished to go in search of them and once a Council of War had sanctioned his resolution, he informed Gastañaga that he was recalling his troops so he could leave the Catalan coast.

The intelligence about the French fleet's imminent departure proved to have been a ruse concocted by Vendôme. When Russell arrived off

¹⁴ QUINCY, *Histoire Militaire*, III, 77-81.

¹⁵ The ensuing account of the operation to retake Palamós is based upon the following sources: NMM, SOU/16 fos. 5-12: 'An account of proceedings from the first time it was desired of me that His Majesty's subjects land in Catalonia', 16 August 1689; TNA, SP 97/74 fos. 4-6: Stanhope to 'My Lord' and enclosure, 28 August 1689; Centre for Kentish Studies (CFKS), U1590 C9/1/33: 'Father' to James, 4 August 1695 [N.S.]; QUINCY, *Histoire Militaire*, III, 77-81; LYNN, *The Wars of Louis XIV*, 251-252.

Toulon the fleet were found to be still in the harbour, though he was unable to determine the extent of their preparations for sea as bad weather forced him off station. By then, however, any further combined action on the Spanish coast could not be contemplated and, although the French did evacuate from Palamós and Castelfollit de la Roca, they maintained a presence in Catalonia. For the remaining two years of the war, England maintained a squadron in the Mediterranean sufficient for the protection of trade, but without the military capability to intervene decisively on the French or Spanish coasts¹⁶. Nonetheless, William had achieved his objective, to secure the strategic penetration of the western Mediterranean and success in this task had been largely a function of amphibious warfare.

British Warfare and the Maintenance of a Mediterranean Presence, 1701–1713

The deployment of amphibious actions within the Mediterranean continued in the succeeding conflict – the War of the Spanish Succession. Diplomatic efforts to solve the imminent succession crisis to the Spanish throne – Carlos II's demise as the last Spanish Habsburg without any children was widely anticipated – foundered in 1700 when Carlos left his inheritance to Louis XIV's grandson, Philip, Duc d'Anjou and then certain of Louis's clumsy actions such as recognising the Old Pretender as James VIII & III – led to the reformulation of the Grand Alliance which had opposed him in the previous conflict¹⁷. Again, the fighting was initially concentrated in north eastern continental Europe and Britain's strategic contribution came in the form of tens of thousand of troops and subsidies for European allies. Significantly, John Churchill, Earl, later Duke, of Marlborough, assumed command of this army and won four notable, and often decisive (certainly in the popular mind at any rate), land victories at Blenheim, 1704, Ramillies, 1706, Oudenarde, 1708 and Malplaquet, 1709¹⁸.

¹⁶ QUINCY, *Histoire Militaire*, III, 178; COXE (ed.), *Shrewsbury Correspondence*, 242-245; TNA, WO 5/7, unfoliated, Orders to Brigadier Stewart, Colonels Brudenell, Coote and Puissar, 2 November 1695; LYNN, *The Wars of Louis XIV*, 251-252; HARDING, *Seapower*, 162.

¹⁷ RICHARD LODGE, 'The Spanish Succession', *History*, New Series XII (1927-1928), 333-338; H. KAMEN, *The War of Succession in Spain 1700-15* (London, 1969), 1-4; W. ROOSEN, 'The Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', in JEREMY BLACK (ed.), *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe* (Edinburgh, 1987), 157-161; M.A. THOMSON, 'Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', in R.M. HATTON and J. S. BROMLEY (eds), *William III and Louis XIV: Essays 1680-1720 By and For Mark A. Thomson* (Liverpool, 1968), 141-144; P. SONNINO, 'The Origins of Louis XIV's Wars', in BLACK (ed.), *The Origins of War*, 129.

¹⁸ See, for example, J.B. HATTENDORF, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712* (London, 1987) and Sir WINSTON CHURCHILL, *Marlborough: His Life and Times* (4 vols, London, 1967).

Combined army-navy actions were, however, to prove of great import to the wartime Grand Strategy, particularly when in 1703 the Alliance committed itself to placing the Emperor's second son, the Archduke Charles, on the Spanish throne. This had not been an initial allied war objective and was a product of detaching Portugal from France's embrace, an event which was precipitated by the amphibious action led by Sir George Rooke and the Duke of Ormonde initially against Cadiz in the late summer of 1702 and then spectacularly against the port of Vigo which harboured the Spanish plate fleet in October¹⁹.

The commitment to the Archduke Charles's Spanish ambitions established Spain as a key theatre of war in the conflict, but it was not the principal focus for Britain. Rather British Grand Strategy emphasised the strategic significance of the Mediterranean basin as part of a broad aspiration of asserting British power from the Straits through to the Levant. As the Southern Secretary of State, the Earl of Nottingham, surmised: a Mediterranean presence meant that Britain could secure her trade routes, assist the Imperial interest in Italy, and provide a powerful diplomatic lever to encourage states such as Algiers and Savoy to break with France²⁰. Accordingly, the Alliance dominated by Britain sought to augment and safeguard its Mediterranean presence through the capture of a convenient port where the ships of the fleet might refit and winter. Consequently, an amphibious action was first deployed against Gibraltar in 1704, with an Anglo-Dutch force led by Admiral Byng and Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt successfully capturing the Rock in July of that year. In annexing a part of the Spanish mainland, British possession of Gibraltar was certainly symbolically significant; but its facilities as a port were limited and, more importantly, as previously articulated by Nottingham, London's ambitions were focused upon broadening British influence in the Mediterranean rather than the Spanish mainland. This would require the fleet to maintain a regional sea command and thus a contemporary pamphlet emphasised the capture of Minorca to gain use of its superior and strategically sited Port Mahón harbour.

Minorca had long been considered the key to the permanent exercise of British naval power in the Mediterranean. Unlike Gibraltar, Minorca did not share a land border with enemy territory and it was also effectively

¹⁹ K.A.J. McLAY, 'Combined Operations: British Military and Naval Co-operation in the Wars of 1688-1713' (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2003), 186-207; A.D. FRANCIS, 'John Methuen and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of 1703', *Historical Journal*, III (1960), 103-124; A.D. FRANCIS, 'Portugal and the Grand Alliance', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XXXVIII (1965), 71-93.

²⁰ Northamptonshire Record Office (NRO), FH MSS 275, 194-196: Nottingham to Marlborough, 27 Oct. 1702.

sited within the Mediterranean as the easternmost of the three Balearic Islands, with the other two – Majorca and Ibiza – already taken by the allies. Moreover, Port Mahón was a commodious and secure harbour, where a sizeable fleet comprising the largest rates might easily winter²¹. The immediate pretext for its capture was generated by the Archduke Charles whose military reversals in Spain through 1707 and 1708 caused him to press the British Admiralty to winter fleets frequently within the Mediterranean. With Gibraltar's manifest limitations as a harbour for larger vessels, this clearly required a forward port other than Lisbon and Minorca seemed the obvious target.

In the early autumn of 1708, fresh from the capture of Sardinia, Sir John Leake brought his fleet with some 1,800 troops aboard commanded by Sir James Stanhope into the waters off southern Minorca²². The troop landings began in the evening of 3 September at a site about three miles from the town of Mahón, well away from the harbour's heavy fortifications. When the landing was completed the following morning, Stanhope marched a detachment of 100 grenadiers to Mahón and dispatched some 400 soldiers north to Ciudadela, which quickly declared for the allies; meanwhile a couple of frigates silenced the fort guarding the harbour at Fornells. Port Mahón, however, remained the allies' main objective, but it was also the most stoutly defended part of the island. Three forts – Philipet, St. Philip and Charles – covered both the harbour mouth and the roadstead. Of these three, St. Philip was the largest, while additional defence for the 1,000-strong Franco-Spanish garrison commanded inside St. Philip by the Frenchman, Colonel de la Jonquière, was provided by the harbour's perimeter stone wall along which were four towers housing four guns each. Due to the poor quality of the ground around the harbour for transporting cannon, an attempt was made on 7 September to land the artillery near to this perimeter wall, but St. Philip's guns beat this off. Notwithstanding, a second successful attempt was made to land the ar-

²¹ Anonymous, *An Inquiry into the Causes of Our Naval Miscarriages* (2nd edn, London, 1707), iii-v; JOHN ARMSTRONG, *The History of the Island of Minorca* (2nd edn, London, 1756), 2-3, 17-20.

²² The ensuing account of the capture of Minorca is based on the following sources: British Library (BL), Add MSS 22231, fos. 79-84: Cope to 'Sir', 29 September 1708 [NS]; Cope to 'My Lord', 30 September 1708 [NS]; TNA, ADM 51/4261, Part vii, unpaginated, *Milford*: 2-8 September 1708; TNA., ADM 51/4402, Part iii, unpaginated, *York*, 3-13 September 1708; BL, Add MSS 5431, fos. 130-131: Leake to the Admiralty Secretary, 4 September 1708; BL, Add MSS 47970, 106-107: 'Leake's Journal', 8 August – 8 September 1708; ARMSTRONG, *The History of the Island of Minorca*, 92-96; STEPHEN MARTIN-LEAKE, *The Life of Sir John Leake*, ed. G. Callender (2 vols, London, 1918), II, 285-287, 293; B. TUNSTALL (ed.), *The Byng Papers* (3 vols, London, 1930), II, 301; H. T. DICKINSON, 'The Capture of Minorca', *History Today*, LI (1965), 198-200.

tillery at a cove to the east of the harbour, with some forty-two cannon and fifteen mortars brought within range of the harbour wall and Fort St. Philip. By 18 September, a nine-gun battery positioned against the two middle towers of the perimeter wall was complete and began firing. Several hours of bombardment successfully silenced all the guns in the two towers and opened breaches in the wall. With the loss of only forty men, the allies carried the wall and the area of habitation in front of St. Philip. The troops lodged themselves amongst the houses there and in the fort's glacis. The Franco-Spanish garrison remained strongly placed however and Stanhope demonstrated his military pedigree by adapting his method of attack. He had already distributed pro-Habsburg propaganda to encourage defections and now he used a captured twelve-year old spy as a human billboard, covering the boy with notices in French and Spanish about the allies' capture of Ciudadela and Port Fornells, while also offering two *pistoles* to every deserter. The boy's return to St. Philip had an almost immediate effect for, the next day, La Jonquière sought terms and a capitulation was signed in early evening.

Aside from the capture of a suitable port for the fleet, Britain's presence in the Mediterranean during the war was directed towards aiding the military contest on the Spanish mainland either by direct intervention upon Spain's coast line or by forcing the French to draw off their resources from that theatre by amphibious attacks upon France. The most notable of the army-navy actions along the Spanish coastline was the capture of Barcelona in 1705 by the combined forces of the Earl of Peterborough and Admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovell. Significantly, this successful action allowed the Archduke Charles a foothold from which he might advance upon Madrid²³. The most celebrated action of the diversionary category of British amphibious actions during this war was the attack on Toulon in the summer of 1707. Notably, Secretary of State, Robert Harley reflected that his first conversation with King William in 1691 had concerned a 'very extraordinary proposal'²⁴ about Toulon. Harley's recollection represented William's early concern to establish Britain as an influential Mediterranean power. In this respect Toulon was thought to entail a double prize: denying the French the port which served as their main southern naval arsenal whence they sought military and commercial control of the Mediterranean region; and secondly, providing a point of entry to the French Mediterranean coastline, along which the allies might extend their

²³ McLAY, 'Combined Operations', 231-265; H.T. DICKINSON, 'Peterborough and the Capture of Barcelona, 1705', *History Today*, XI (1964), 711-715; H. FITZ M. STACKE, 'The Capture of Barcelona, 1705: A Little Known Combined Operation', *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, LXXV (1930), 343-345.

²⁴ HMC, *Portland MSS* (London, 1923-1931), IV, 451-452.

control by linking up with armies marching across the Pyrenees from Spain or, to the east, over the Alps from Piedmont-Savoy. Implicit in any attack was also the immediate benefit that the port's importance to France would necessitate a vigorous defence whereby troops and resources would probably have to be withdrawn from other war theatres.

The operation planned for 1707 was similar to a proposal which had been formulated but ultimately set-aside in 1705²⁵. A combined Savoyard and Imperial army with Victor Amadeus, the Duke of Savoy, at its head but in effect commanded by the Holy Roman Empire's general, Prince Eugene, would march from Piedmont across the Alps into French Provence. As this force advanced to attack Toulon from the interior, an Anglo-Dutch fleet of forty-three vessels commanded by Sir Cloudesley Shovell would approach Toulon harbour with the aim of calibrating a bombardment with the Duke of Savoy's landward assault. Towards the end of June, the Duke's 35,000-strong army left Turin and began its march into France, along the Provençal coastline via Nice, Cannes and Fréjus to arrive in the high environs of Toulon on 15 July. In the coastal inshore waters, Shovell's fleet had shadowed the army's progress, providing additional fire support whenever French defences threatened to impede the advance. At a key meeting on 17 July between Shovell, the Duke and Eugene, disagreement emerged between the Admiral, lamely supported by the Duke, and Eugene over how quickly to press the assault. A compromise was agreed whereby the fleet would continue the unloading of the ordnance while the army would undertake a small scale assault on St. Catherine's Fort, guarding the north-east entrance to Toulon. This fort was swiftly taken but the army commanders continued to drag their heels over pressing forward the siege and assault on the city of Toulon. Shovell argued that the forts – St. Louis and St. Margaret – guarding the Toulon roadstead would have to be reduced first, so that the Navy could effectively support the attack and, although St. Louis was vulnerable from the sea, St. Margaret could only be taken by a landward assault for which Eugene and the Duke showed no enthusiasm. By the first week in August, about a month after the forces' arrival outside Toulon, the two roadstead forts were captured; but in the interim the French had sallied

²⁵ The ensuing account of the operation against Toulon is based on the following sources: BL, Add MSS 28141, fos. 3-18: 'A Journall in my [Norris's] attending his Royall Highness the Duke of Savoy with the Confederate Armies from Turin Prince Eugene being Generall under him'; TNA, ADM 51/4261, Part vii, unpaginated, *Milford*, 3-10 Aug. 1707; TUNSTALL (ed.), *The Byng Papers*, I, 199-235; B. VAN'T HOFF (ed.), *The Correspondence 1701-1711 of John Churchill First Duke of Marlborough and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland* (The Hague, 1951), 329-330; SIR GEORGE MURRAY (ed.), *The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill* (London, 1845), III, 399-400; ANONYMOUS, *The History of the Siege of Toulon* (London, 1708); CHURCHILL, *Marlborough*, III, 233-242.

forth from the town, demonstrating an offensive as well as defensive capability to their protection of Toulon and the Duke of Savoy decided to raise the desultory siege. Admiral Shovell was greatly frustrated by this decision but could not change the Duke's mind and he guided the fleet back along the coast to Nice where the army was disbanded on 23 August. Although, ultimately unsuccessful, the operation did in the short-term force the French to respond and regroup within the Mediterranean theatre and it demonstrated Britain's continued strategic commitment to amphibious warfare within the Mediterranean as part of allied Grand Strategy.

Conclusion

British warfare in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has been too frequently interpreted in a bipolar manner: either it is viewed as predominantly land based continental campaigning or focused on the Royal Navy's command of the seas. While neither interpretation is wholly inappropriate, there is a history of joint service operations, particularly in the Mediterranean, which should force historians to adjust this bipolar picture. During the Nine Years' War, William III and his ministries adopted amphibious warfare as a means to facilitate the Royal Navy's penetration of the Mediterranean and this commitment was subsequently underscored during the subsequent Spanish Succession conflict when successive ministries mounted combined army-navy actions to gain an appropriate Mediterranean port for the fleet. Amphibious warfare was not, however, used simply as a means to gain, and then preserve, a Mediterranean presence for Britain. At key moments during both wars, Britain deployed this form of warfare in an attempt to shape the strategic and military realities of the conflicts. Certainly, during the years, 1693-1713, Britain was a Mediterranean amphibian.

Tito Benady

Gibraltar as a naval base for the Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 1796-1808

The Rock of Gibraltar is a massive limestone ridge 3 miles long which is joined to the Spanish mainland by a low sandy stretch of land about one mile long and half a mile wide, and forms the eastern side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The Rock is precipitous on both the north and eastern sides. The town and harbour are situated on the western side which slopes more gently on its lower side. The approach from the Spanish mainland is very narrow and commanded by the heights and was therefore easily defended with a small force from attacks by land. Oliver Cromwell was the first English statesman to have appreciated these qualities although he did not take into account the difficulties presented by its lack of a natural harbour¹.

The Rock of Gibraltar has the advantage of being situated at a crucial strategic point. It guards the north side of the eastern (Mediterranean) entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar. In the 18th century it had the added strategic advantage that it was interposed between the two sections of the French Navy based on Toulon in the Mediterranean, and Brest and other ports in the Bay of Biscay; and it is only 100 kilometers from Cadiz, which during the period covered by this study became the principal base for the Spanish fleet and that part of the French fleet that was cooperating with it.

The city of Gibraltar was founded by Abd-al-Mumin, Emperor of Morocco, in the year 1166 to secure his communications with Spain. The original port was the beach below the fortifications where the galleys were drawn up. When the beach was enclosed within the city walls in the fourteenth century, a galley house was built. Gibraltar came under Spanish rule in 1462, but it was not until Don John of Austria carried out his inspection of the defences and ports of southern Spain in 1566, and report-

¹ THOMAS CARLYLE, *The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, 3 vols (London, 1904), 2, 489, 503.

ed the need for a mole at Gibraltar, that one was built in the 1570s, near the entrance to the galley house².

The building of the mole interfered with the currents in the area which soon became silted up, and it became unusable for deep draught sailing ships, which had to anchor outside the town walls. In 1607 the Dutch admiral, Van Heemskerck, found a Spanish squadron anchored in the open bay and in a surprise and violent attack destroyed it. This showed the need for a new port to be built inside which ships could anchor and be protected, and led to the building of a New Mole in a small bay to the south of the town, which was completed in 1670, and had a total length of 90 metres, and was protected by a demi bastion³.

Gibraltar was captured by Britain and her allies in 1704 during the War of the Spanish Succession and was ceded to Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The New Mole became a base for the Royal Navy. The facilities were extended. In 1727, Captain George Purvis improved the harbour by blowing up rocks inside the anchorage, so that ships could be careened on their side at the mole, to have their bottoms scraped clean⁴. A mast house and pond, and store houses for the replacement sails, masts and other equipment, required by warships were later constructed, and a small wharf where the boats could be sent for water, was built, which was named the Ragged Staff, after the small derrick that the boats used to hoist their water casks⁵.

But by then the limitations of Gibraltar as a naval base had become apparent, and Minorca, which had been captured in 1708 and was also acquired under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, became the main base for the British fleet in the Mediterranean. Minorca was recaptured by Spain in 1781 and when war broke out again in 1793 Gibraltar had to be used, *faut de mieux*.

When Britain went to war with revolutionary France in 1793 and a blockade was instituted of the French naval base at Toulon, Gibraltar became the Royal Navy's most advanced base in the Mediterranean, from where supplies were provided to the fleet. Gibraltar was a barren peninsula which supplied nothing and everything had to be imported. Materials for repairing and equipping the ships and salt and dry provisions, came from England. Fresh food and wine, which were vital to keep a fleet which was at sea for years, free from scurvy, came from North Africa or Spain.

² C. FERNÁNDEZ DURO, *Armada Española desde la Unión de los reinos de Castilla y Leon*, 9 vols (Madrid, 1895-1903), 2, 107; TITO BENADY, *The Royal Navy at Gibraltar* (Liskeard, 1992), 41-42.

³ E. DE MARÍATEGUI, *El Capitán Rojas* (Madrid, 1985), 40; BENADY, 42-45.

⁴ NATIONAL MARITIME MUSEUM GREENWICH (hereafter NMM), Manuscripts, ADM/A/2129.

⁵ NMM, ADM/Y/6/11.

During the first two years of the war the action was round the south coast of France and the north-west coast of Italy, and for a time, in Corsica. Fresh supplies were readily available from the Italian coast, especially Livorno and Genoa, or Sardinia, and because Gibraltar was a long way from the seat of operations, ships often went for repairs to the neutral port of Livorno. After Corsica was conquered a temporary repair base was set up in Ajaccio in Corsica in 1795⁶.

But 1795 turned out to be a bad year for Britain. Not only were the French threatening the invasion of Britain but attacks across the Pyrenees, forced Spain, Britain's ally, to sue for peace. 1796 was worse. Napoleon as commander of the French forces in Italy overran the peninsula. Naples, Britain's ally, was forced to sue for peace and the Royal Navy was no longer able to use the facilities at Genoa and Livorno for supplies and repairs. Spain declared war on Britain on 5 October and sent a fleet under the Sicilian Admiral Langara to join the French fleet at Toulon. The combined fleet was now 38 strong and outnumbered the 21 ships of the line in the Mediterranean under Jervis.

The possession of Livorno also enabled the French to send troops to Corsica. On 19 October a small French force from Livorno landed on Corsica and was joined by the many local supporters of the Republic⁷. With the bulk of her army committed in the West Indies and for home defence, Britain was not able to send reinforcements, and the British viceroy came to the conclusion that Corsica could not be held with the small garrison at his disposal⁸. Orders were therefore sent to Jervis to take his fleet out of the Mediterranean and use Gibraltar and Lisbon as bases for the Mediterranean fleet, from where it could more easily reinforce the forces defending Britain if the combined Franco-Spanish fleet appeared in the English Channel, and took part in the invasion of Britain.

Jervis anchored his fleet at Gibraltar on 1 December where he received further instructions from the Government. The fleet was to operate west of the Strait, covering the Portuguese and Spanish coasts, and the Tagus was recommended as a base.

The Spanish declaration of war in October could have imperilled the use of Gibraltar as a base, but the governor, General O'Hara, managed to main-

⁶ NICHOLAS HARRIS NICOLAS, *The Dispatches and letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson*, 7 vols (London, 1844-1846), 500-504, Nelson had his ship *Agamemnon* repaired and her masts stepped at Livorno in November and December 1794.

⁷ NICOLAS, 2, 246, Nelson to Duke of Clarence (later William IV), 19 August 1795.

⁸ Collingwood wrote on 25 September 1796, 'I am told the French part wear the tri-coloured cockade, and there is no power in the English Government to prevent it. All our naval stores are embarked in ships, because the people are so hostile to us that they can longer be left with safety on shore.' (G.L.N. COLLINGWOOD, *Selections of the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood*, London, 1829).

tain friendly relations with the local Spanish military commanders and whilst the war at sea was waged relentlessly there were no hostilities by land. There is a story told of the captain of a Royal Navy frigate who had to fight his way to the Mole against repeated attack by Spanish gunboats. The following evening when the Governor invited him to dinner he found himself sharing the meal with the commander of the Spanish gunboats⁹.

Nevertheless, it would not have been politic in the circumstances to anchor the fleet at the north of the bay within range of the Spanish forts, so the ship anchored in two rows at Rosia Bay south of the New Mole, nine in the inner row and five in a second row further out into the bay¹⁰.

The wind turned easterly and began to blow hard, Jervis reported that 'This anchorage is very dangerous.' On 9 December, two ships laden with coal were driven on shore under the Spanish batteries and were captured, three other transports were forced over to the other side but their anchors fortunately held, and with the assistance of rowing boats were able to regain their anchorage. The ship of the line *Culloden* and the frigate *Andromache* drifted away but managed to raise sails and were saved¹¹.

The following day, 10 December, five French ships of the line and three frigates were seen in the Strait sailing to the west, but there was a gale blowing from the ESE and Jervis was unable to intercept. That evening the wind turned to the north east and blew harder. The ships moored close to the shore were on the lee of the Rock and were reasonably protected from the wind, but the *Courageux* on the outer line broke away from her moorings¹². The captain at the time was on shore taking part in a court martial, but by the time she had been driven close to the Algeciras batteries, her sails had been hoisted and she was brought under control. The first lieutenant determined not to attempt to anchor again in the darkness of the night but to keep her sailing in the Strait until the morning and the wind had abated and anchoring would be easier.

The people were hard at work clearing the booms and decks of empty casks, sticking them down in the hold, and taking in the topsails which had split, until eight o'clock in the evening, when orders were given to pipe to dinner, they not having been off the deck from breakfast to that hour. Lieutenant Ainslie

⁹ EDWARD P. BRENTON, *Life and Correspondence of John Earl St Vincent*, 2 vols (London, 1838), I, 469.

¹⁰ J. S. CORBETT and H. W. RICHMOND (eds), *Private Papers of George, second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty 1794 -1801*, 4 vols (London, vols 1 & 2, 1913-1914, vols 3 & 4, 1924); THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, Kew (hereafter NA), ADM 1/395, 195, plan of anchorage drawn up by the Captain of the Fleet, Robert Calder.

¹¹ NA, ADM 1/395, 195, Jervis to Admiralty, 10 December 1796.

¹² The writer of this study has had personal experience of these conditions as in 1977 he lost the mast of his boat at this place under similar circumstances.

(who never had charge of a watch before) was left upon deck to look out, while the first lieutenant, master, and other officers took some refreshment. A little before nine the land was seen ahead, and Mr Anslie, instead of putting the helm a-weather and easing off the main sheet, sent down to the first lieutenant and master to acquaint them of the danger. Mr Burrows, who though an experienced officer was a nervous man, burst into hysterics, while the master made every effort to weather the ship, but it was too late; for the bowsprit struck against the precipice, and the ship going bump ashore, swung alongside it, her foremast went overboard, and she divided into two parts very soon. One of the boat-keepers of the launch heard the voices of the first lieutenant and master on the stern ladders, among many others, and the last sound was dismal shriek from the people¹³.

The *Courageux* was wrecked off the coast of Morocco. I am informed by Athena Trakadas, who has dived there, that the wreck is off the Island of Peregil, near Mount Abyla to the west of Ceuta. Only 129 of the 594 men on board managed to reach safety on shore¹⁴. The *Zealous*, also anchored in the outer line, had to leave her anchorage but returned undamaged the following day¹⁵.

The *Gibraltar* which was anchored on the inner line was also affected, for she was anchored at the southern end of the line opposite the Europa flats and was therefore not protected from the wind by the high ground. The violence of the wind forced her to cut her cable at 9 that evening. She set her foresail and staysails, and half an hour later, in order to clear the opposite point of the bay, her mainsail and maintopsail. At 10 pm the violence of the gale carried away her fore topmast and split her foresail, mainsail maintopmast staysail and mizzen staysail, and struck land. But she was a very strong ship and made no water, and the following day she was able to anchor safely in Tangier Bay where she had been driven by the storm¹⁶.

She was the former Spanish *Fenix*, captured by Rodney off Cape St Vincent during the Moonlight Battle of March 1780. She had been built in Havana of mahogany, which made her stronger than normal ships built of oak, when she was eventually docked at Plymouth in March 1797, a large piece of rock was found embedded in her hull¹⁷. She served with the Royal Navy until 1826.

After this, Jervis took the fleet to Lisbon, for the greater safety of the

¹³ CORBETT, *Spencer Papers*, 1:78-80, Jervis to Spencer 19 December 1796.

¹⁴ WILLIAM M. JAMES, *The Naval History of Great Britain, during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars*, 6 vols (London, 2002), 1, 316. James states that *Culloden* broke free at the same time, but Jervis's letter quoted above shows that it was the day before.

¹⁵ NICOLAS, 2, 318, Nelson to Sir Gilbert Elliot, 24 December 1796.

¹⁶ JAMES, 1, 316-318.

¹⁷ JAMES, 1, 318.

Tagus, and a base was set up there which was able to use the local facilities for docking ships. After being reinforced Jervis went to sea to find the Spanish fleet which he met and defeated off Cape St Vincent on 14 February 1797. After returning to Lisbon and making good the battle damage he commenced a blockade of Cadiz in April, which was to engage the British Navy until Spain declared war on Napoleon in May 1808. Although it was suspended for some months during the Peace of Amiens in 1802 and was not resumed until Spain again entered the war again as an ally of France in 1804.

Gibraltar which was only 110 kilometres from Cadiz became a valuable supply base for the blockading fleet and also a safe harbour to effect minor repairs, although ships requiring docking had to go to Lisbon or England. Most food and naval stores were sent from England but the fleet required fresh food to prevent scurvy breaking out among the crews and these were obtained from North Africa (mainly Morocco) or Spain, because regardless of the state of war, commercial exchanges continued between Gibraltar and Spain with the approval of both the British and Spanish governments¹⁸.

An important factor determining the ability of a fleet to maintain itself at sea was the supply of fresh water for the crews, and ships were sent from the blockading fleet in rotation, which reduced the number of ships outside Cadiz at any one time¹⁹. The supply of water available at Gibraltar was limited, and while there was generally enough to supply individual ships, even this was difficult if the dry summer followed a particularly dry winter. In 1793, Admiral Hood arranged for wells in the neutral ground to be improved so that ships could receive a larger supply; but these were not convenient for a large squadron trying to water in haste, as the transfer of the water in casks in the fleets' rowing boats for two miles where the ships were anchored, took a long time²¹. Ships therefore often went to water at the Portuguese port of Lagos which was almost as near as Gibraltar²², however, when all the ships of a large fleet had to water at the same time, the simplest solution was to go across the Strait to Mazri Bay, near Tetuan, and take the water from the river there²³. As Nelson described it in his diary, "*The River runs inside a sandy beach and parallel to it, so that Boats may lay alongside the beach the whole extent of the Bay, and roll their casks over to the River, and fill them*".

¹⁸ BENADY, 73-75.

¹⁹ NICOLAS, 2, 401, Nelson to Rev. Hoste, 30 June 1797.

²⁰ NA, ADM 1/391, 99, Admiral Hood to Admiralty, 24 June 1793.

²¹ NA, ADM 1/391, 99, report by Hood 24 June 1793.

²² NA, ADM 1/402, 22, Admiral Bickerton to Lord Keith 8 August 1800.


²³ NICOLAS, 6, 486, Diary, 22 July 1805.

The beach was long and many boats could have access at the same time, and as ships could anchor close to the beach where there was from ten to twenty fathoms water, the operation of taking on water could be carried out very quickly. When Nelson returned from chasing Villeneuve to the West Indies, in July 1805, after calling at Gibraltar he took his fleet to Mazri Bay to water, and his ships were able to take on board several thousand tons in just two days²⁴.


After 1808 the operations moved to the central Mediterranean and Malta with its excellent harbour and large work force became Britain's main base. Malta was almost as distant for the fleet blockading Toulon as Gibraltar, so the Maddalena Island in the north of Sardinia was often used as an anchorage where small repairs could be made. Supplies of fresh food were once again obtained from the Italian coast and Sardinia. After the peace of 1815, Malta became the principal British naval base in the Mediterranean, and it was not until relations with France deteriorated in the 1890s and preparations were made in case the two countries should go to war, that the big 'torpedo-proof' harbour was constructed. Gibraltar was in a position to bottle the French Mediterranean Fleet inside that sea and could make sure that it could not operate in the wider ocean or join up with the squadrons on the Atlantic coast. The harbour was completed in 1904, which was the year of the *Entente Cordiale* between Britain and France and all possibilities of the two countries going to war had disappeared²⁵.

²⁴ NICOLAS, 6, 490, Nelson's letter to Admiralty, 23 July 1805.


²⁵ BENADY, 107-113, 118-119.




Strait of Gibraltar




The Rock and Bay of Gibraltar



The anchoring plan of the fleet on 9 December 1796 as drawn by the Captain of the Fleet, Captain Robert Calder



Plan of Gibraltar showing principal places of interest



The new protected harbour from *Brassey's 1903*

Giuseppe Restifo

A night of fire in Tripoli (1804)

“On 16th February 1804 an American brig, the *Intrepid*, commanded by Stephen Decatur, taking advantage both of the darkness and the offshore wind, approached the *Philadelphia* Frigate, which had just been refloated, captured the guards and set it on fire”¹. This was happening in the middle of a winterly month, in 1804, in a place which was definitely uncommon, the harbour of Tripoli, but certainly appears somewhat singular that an American brig set fire to an American frigate with its 36 cannons. But another odd thing was curious, that an American brig, the leading one in the enterprise, was commanded by a man from Messina, as we know from Ettore Rossi. How did then the pilot Salvatore Catalano, coming just from Messina, get to handle an American ship next to the future American national hero Stephen Decatur?

To understand this peculiar war event, and how the two men, the Sicilian and the American, could get to fight side by side, we'll need to take several steps back and look to the wider picture of a Mediterranean determined by the age of Napoleon, and the first appearance of the American Navy in this area. Getting back to Tripoli it gets interesting to follow the way in which the scene is being reported nowadays by some scholars, especially by the American ones, who have been interested in the conflict between the United States and the Maghrebian Regency. Decatur and Catalano bold enterprise was suggested by Captain Bainbridge, chief of the unlucky *Philadelphia* Frigate, imprisoned by the Tripolitans on 13th October 1803, since when his big ship, giving chase to an enemy xebec, ran aground on a reef just opposite Tripoli harbour. That day Captain Bainbridge², “a child of adversity”, as he will name himself, surrendered to

¹ ETTORE ROSSI, *Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania dalla conquista araba al 1911*, posthumous edition edited by MARIA NALLINO (Rome, 1968), 265. On the “dusk” insists also RAYMOND A. SALVATORE commenting the image “Burning of the USS Philadelphia at Tripoli”, in <http://www.irtc.org/ftp/pub/stills/2001-10-31/tripoli.txt>.

² “Biographical Sketch of William Bainbridge”, *The Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2006, in <http://www.masshist.org/objects/query3.cfm?queryID=207>.




Fig. 1. "A perspective View of the loss of the U.S. Frigate Philadelphia in which is represented her relative position to the Tripolitan Gun-boats when during their furious attack upon her she was unable to get a single gun to bear upon them". Contemporary engraving after a drawing by Charles Denoon. Courtesy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1936. U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph




Fig. 2. M. Neroni, Tripoli (incisione), 1600

the Tripolitans, but before that he and his crew had managed to jettison all the weapons and cannons. However the Tripolitans succeeded in re-floating the frigate and regained the arms. It was definitely a dream to them to acquire such a powerful ship, an American ship able to add its firepower to the defence of the port of Tripoli, already assured by the cannons of the Castle³.

³ ADDISON B.C. WHIPPLE, *To the Shores of Tripoli: the Birth of U.S. Navy and Marines* (New York, 1991), 67.

Bainbridge's captivity was probably not really severe, since he and Commodore Edward Preble, a gruff though reasonable commander in chief of the American fleet in the Mediterranean since May 1803, had found a way to exchange letters and informations. Bainbridge wrote a lot about his plans to bother the enemy.

In one of his letters, dating 6th December 1803, he suggested to destroy the *Philadelphia*, since the Tripolitans were repairing her in order to let the ship sail again. There was no doubt the ship was going to be used as a cruiser as soon as the good season would have arrived.

The capture of the *Philadelphia* and of his 300 men, both officers and mariners, let astonished the whole Mediterranean world. News of it had already reached Leghorn on 24th November. In January 1804, the American consul in the port of Leghorn, Appleton, was "fearing Tripolitans could arm the ship to use her in the war. 'Preble was in Syracuse', he wrote to Washington, 'and I informed all other consuls in the Mediterranean'. The fact that the Tripolitans had such a frigate as the *Philadelphia*, built thanks to a money supply raised among the citizens of Philadelphia, was worrying Commodore Preble so much that he decided to destroy her. Leaving such a frigate in the hand of the enemy was a dishonour, besides she could also be used against the Americans as Appleton was afraid of"⁴.

Commodore Preble then gave full attention to Bainbridge suggestion to make a raid and destroy the ship. He talked of it to the young promising officer Stephen Decatur who, in his opinion, could have been in the "right mood" for it. The expedition, a sort of a "special operation", was then entrusted to Stephen Decatur's passionate temper, who, in the meanwhile, had gained a plundered ship, and so could count on one more precious mean to accomplish the mission. The lieutenant, in charge of his schooner *Enterprise*, on 23rd December, 1803, captured the *Mastico*, a Tripolitan ketch, a small two-masted sailing ship with four cannons, which could also be used as a rowing ship. So the ship, Stephen Decatur in command, temporarily in Syracuse, was taken into the U.S. Navy and renamed *Intrepid*⁵.

Taking advantage both of the darkness and the shape of his ship, definitely familiar to the enemy, the 25 year old Decatur with confidence and shrewdness will leave on 16th February 1804, to attack Tripoli harbour and destroy the American frigate, now into the enemy's hands. With Decatur, 74 men, officers, sailors and marines volunteered for what will have been considered as one of the most heroic act of the U.S. Navy. "The mission called for a cool, resourceful and courageous pilot who knew the

⁴ LUIGI DONOLO, *La difesa dai barbareschi dei traffici marittimi statunitensi vista da Livorno (1793-1807)*, in <http://www.okkey.com/Donolo/5.htm>.

⁵ SAL TRINGALI, "Italian Culture. Salvatore Catalano", *Monterey Lodge*, August 2005 / Agosto, 2.




Fig. 3. U.S. Ketch *Intrepid* (1804). Contemporary sketch by Midshipman William Lewis, with a description reading: "The Ketch *Intrepid* taken by the Constitution of Tripoli in Dec. 1803. Was the vessel with which Capt. Decatur burnt the Philadelphia in February 1804. She served as a store vessel off Tripoli and was at last turned into an Infernal in order to blow up part of the Bashaw's castle. In this unfortunate attempt she was blown up & all her crew perished. Cpt. Sommers, Lieuts. Wadsworth & Israel & 10 or 12 men. 4th Sept. '04." The original sketch was in the possession of Captain C.W. Cook, O.R.C.U.S.A., 1925. U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph

treacherous Barber waters and the Moorish tongue": that pilot was Salvatore Catalano⁶.

On 3rd February 1804 the ketch *Mastico*, renamed *Intrepid*, leaves the port of Syracuse "to the shores of Tripoli", like a verse of Marines hymn proclaims. Easy to say, accommodation on board of the *Intrepid* was not the best one could expect, so many people crowding a 40-45 tons vessel. The situation got even worse when the pantry ran out of work, the meat then got spoiled, and there was not much bread or water left. However weather was not bad and wind was favourable, so the *Intrepid* in company with the brig *Siren* arrived in sight of Tripoli in the afternoon of 9th February. In order to prevent any suspicion the *Intrepid* was sailing ahead.

Decatur's orders were simple and clear: first organize the main deck, then the one with the cannons, and at last distribute the troops to settle the fire. To add tons of colour, some storyteller asserts commander had

⁶ PAOLO SOAVE, *La rivoluzione americana nel Mediterraneo: prove di politica di potenza e declino delle Reggenze barbaresche (1795-1816)* (Milan, 2004), 188. For the role played by Catalano see TRINGALI, "Italian Culture", 2. See also STANLEY LANE-POOLE, *The Barbary Corsairs* (Westport, Conn., 1970).

his men disguised in Arab dresses. Other chroniclers point out he had just a few men in Maltese dresses with a British flag flying over their head.

At seven p.m., when the small ship was about to enter Tripoli harbour in the moonlight, the African night was turning into something between grey and blue. At that time the *Intrepid* reached the eastern entrance of the bay and the passage between rocks and shallows. Wind was lightly blowing from east and the American ketch, thanks to the skills of his pilot Sal-




Fig. 4. Burning of the Frigate *Philadelphia* in Tripoli harbor, 16 February 1804. Chart by Charles Wellington Furlong, 1904, depicting (by dot and dash lines) the course followed by the ketch *Intrepid*, under Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, as she entered and left Tripoli harbor on her mission to destroy the captured USS *Philadelphia*. Heavy dashed line indicates *Philadelphia's* drift after she was set afire. Position "A" marks *Philadelphia's* position when boarded by Decatur's men, while "B" is the location of her wreck when Furlong located it about a century later and recovered artifacts. Position "X" (just west of the Jerba Passage) is the location of *Intrepid's* wreck after she blew up on 4 September 1804, during another mission into Tripoli harbor. Courtesy of Charles Wellington Furlong, July 1939. U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph

vatore Catalano (who, according to another observer, was not from Messina but from Palermo), was well directed by a light breeze to the stern of the frigate⁷.

As soon as Decatur's ketch was close enough to see the slipway, the big frigate was also visible, almost one mile far from the entrance of the harbour, swinging in the wind, close to the city, with the castle cannons towering above her.

Her fore mast, cut and taken away when she was still on the reef, was not yet replaced, while the mainmast and the mizzen top mast were lowered, his lower yards were yet on the ship rails: a stunted ship, with no sail and no strength. Rigging and cordage however were in their own places and, as it was later verified, her cannons were still loaded. Next to the frigate were two corsairs vessels with some gunboats and one or two galleys.

Up in the sky a new moon was shining, and while the bold sailors were slowly moving forward to the enemy harbour, all around them was calm and peaceful. Through a slow two-and-a-half-hour journey they were secretly advancing; wind was then gradually ceasing, and any movement was just slightly perceptible. At some distance, as a stop to their trip, a fearful rocky Castle was standing high, with its thick walls, and its 115 big cannons stuck into like a porcupine⁸.

Most of the officers and men on the ship had been ordered to lie down on the boat deck, where some small walls, the windward roofing and all the various objects standing on the vessel could hide them. Since it was used to have a lot of men even in the smallest boats, was no risk to have ten or twelve men standing visible, so these were those discernible, lying the rest of the crew down. The commander was instead standing by the pilot, Mr. Catalano, and that was the right moment for the Sicilian sailor to show all his skills⁹.

Till then, thanks probably to his past experience, Catalano had well leaded the ship through the reef and shallows of the port entrance¹⁰. But from that point on he would work for the benefit of Americans as an interpreter. The pilot was then told to point straight to the sides of the

⁷ VIRGILIO ILARI and FRANCESCA CERIANI, "La prima volta dei marines", *Liberal Risk*, n.3, 2004, 109-116.

⁸ Preble praised the defensive system of Tripoli, "a city well walled, protected by batteries judiciously constructed, mounting one hundred and fifteen pieces of heavy cannon": SOAVE, *La rivoluzione*, 189. See also MAX BOOT, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York, 2003), 3.

⁹ MARCO SIOLI, "Gli Stati Uniti e la guerra di Tripoli del 1804: alle origini del conflitto", *Iperstoria* (2003) (www.centri.univr/iperstoria).

¹⁰ JACK LA BOLINA (pseudonym of Augusto Vittorio Vecchi), "Un precursore degli italiani a Tripoli. Salvatore Catalano ed i bombardieri napoletani nell'anno 1804", *Rassegna nazionale*, vol. CLXXXIII, 1912, 469-474.

frigate bow, intending the master to approach the ship in that position, as the best way to attack and avoid the fire shot from the frigate.

The *Intrepid* was still distant from the *Philadelphia*, when a voice coming from the frigate shouted "Who goes there?" and soon after two shots were fired up in the air. Men on board of the ketch knew a wrong answer to that could cost their life. The Sicilian pilot, cool as he was, speaking Arabic or using "lingua franca", answered the ship was coming from Malta, travelling for trade purpose, and had almost sank and lost its two anchors in the last storm¹¹.

He also asked for permission to stop beside the frigate overnight. The conversation was going on while Decatur suggested to tell those people about their cargo in order to distract them. While Catalano was still talking to them, the *Intrepid* was slowly moving forward, until there was the possibility of slipping near the *Philadelphia* in a minute or two, just in fixed target. At about twenty meters from the frigate the small boat slowly proceeded in the vague air of the night and stopped just in front of the *Philadelphia* cannons. Americans were holding their breath. But suddenly the wind began to blow in another direction and pushed the ship back. This unexpected effect took the ketch just right under the broadside of the frigate, forty meters far from where she was so quietly anchored. There, by the side facing the harbour, slowly drifting, the vessel was dangerously exposed to the enemy cannons.

Not the slightest suspicion still appeared to be fed on board the frigate, although the scene was completely enlightened by moonlight, and some of the crew was coming to see what was happening. The "Turks", totally misled by Decatur's behaviour, lowered a boat and pushed her ahead carrying a large cord. In the meanwhile a few men from the vessel had as well taken a rowing boat to go and get the hawser, which was fixed to the backside of the frigate, in order to tie it to the vessel. The cords were therefore passed to the men still on the ketch, so that they could somehow manage to drag the *Intrepid* by the *Philadelphia*, without getting on it yet.

But as soon as the *Intrepid* was close enough, "Turks" found out her anchors; so they gave the order to leave immediately and started cutting the hawsers. This was happening just in a moment; in a few seconds the cry rose on the ship: "Amerikanos!".

People in the *Intrepid* took the ship quickly by the frigate, right where she was anchored. Till then not one whisper had revealed the presence of men hiding on the vessel. Commands had been too clear, remain quiet till they would have been told to get out, no rush was needed, even in that difficult moment, so the plan was not ruined.

¹¹ SOAVE, *La rivoluzione*, 189.

According to a version of the facts, a mythical one, the Sicilian pilot Salvatore Catalano, panicking, may have started screaming: “attack, captain, attack”, but another voice, one deep and calm, had answered: “no order has to be followed if it doesn’t come from the captain”. This version sees Stephen Decatur jr. on the leading role, dressed up in a Maltese costume, standing cold-bloodedly on deck, waiting some endless seconds till the ketch finally touched the *Philadelphia*¹².

Commander Decatur was standing ready for a spring, with Mr. Laws and Mr. Morris right next to him. As soon as they got closed enough, Decatur jumped at the frigate’s chainplates, and while clinging to the ship himself, he gave the order to board. The two midshipmen were at his side, and all the officers and men of the *Intrepid* arose and followed. The three named gentlemen were in the riggings together, and Decatur and Mr. Morris sprang at the rail above them, while Mr. Laws dashed at a porthole.

To the latter would have belonged the honour of having been first in this gallant assault, but wearing a boarding-belt, his pistols were caught between the gun and the side of the porthole. Mr. Decatur’s foot slipped in springing, and Mr. Charles Morris first stood upon the quarter-deck of the *Philadelphia*. Just the time to recover from these funny inconvenients and soon Commander Decatur and Mr. Laws were at his side, while heads and bodies appeared coming over the rail and through the portholes in all directions¹³.

The surprise appears to have been as perfect as the assault was rapid and earnest. Most of the “Turks” on deck crowded forward, and all ran over to the starboard side, as their enemies poured in on the larboard. A few were aft, but as soon as charged they leapt into the sea. Indeed, the constant plunges into the water gave the assailants the assurance that their enemies were fast lessening in numbers by flight. It took but a minute or two to clear the spar-deck, though there was more of a struggle below. Still, so admirably managed was the attack, and so complete the surprise, that the resistance was trifling. In less than ten minutes Mr. Decatur was on the quarter-deck again, in undisturbed possession of his prize¹⁴.

There can be no doubt that this gallant officer now felt bitter regrets that it was not in his power to bring away the ship he had so nobly recovered. Not only were his orders on this point peremptory, however, but the frigate had not a sail bent, nor a yard crossed, and she wanted her fore-

¹² JOHN R. SPEARS, *The History of our Navy from Its Origin to the Present Day 1775 to 1897 Part One* (Whitefish, MT, 2005), 349-350.

¹³ SPEARS, *The History*, 352.

¹⁴ SOAVE, *La rivoluzione*, 189, specifies also that Decatur in his report spoke of twenty dead Tripolitans and a prisoner fell into American hands.

mast. It was almost impossible, therefore, to remove her, and the command was given to pass up the combustibles from the ketch.

The duty of setting fire to the prize appears to have been executed with as much promptitude and order, as every other part of the service. The officers distributed themselves, agreeably to the previous instructions, and the men soon appeared with the necessary means. Each unit acted independently and everything was ready at the right time.

So rapid were all the attackers in their movements, that the men with combustibles had scarcely time to reach the cock-pits and the storerooms, before the fires were lighted over their heads. When the officer entrusted with this last mentioned duty had got through, he found the after-hatches filled with smoke, from the fire in the wardroom and steerage, and he was obliged to make his escape by the forward ladders.

The Americans were in the ship from twenty to twenty-five minutes and they were literally driven out of her by the flames. The vessel had got to be so dry in that low latitude that she burned like pine: and the combustibles had been as judiciously prepared, as they were steadily used.

The last group of assailants was sent into storage compartments, and when they reached the deck they found most of their companions already in the *Intrepid*.

Joining them, and making sure all was ready, the order was given to cast off.

Notwithstanding the daring character of the enterprise in general, Decatur and his company now faced the biggest risk they could encounter that night. So fierce had the conflagration already become, that the flames began to pour out of the ports.

The head-fast having been cast off, the ketch fell astern, with her jigger flapping against the quarter-gallery, and her boom foul. The fire showed itself in the window at this critical moment; below were all the ammunition the company, covered with a tarpaulin. To increase the risk, the stern fast was jammed. By using swords, however, for there was not time to look for an ax, the hawser was cut, and the *Intrepid* was extricated from the most imminent danger by a vigorous shove. As she swung clear of the frigate, the flames reached the rigging, up which they went hissing, like a rocket, the tar having oozed from the ropes, which had been saturated with that inflammable matter. Matches could not have kindled with greater quickness.

The sweeps were now manned. Up to this moment, everything had been done earnestly, though without noise, but as soon as they felt that they had got command of their ketch again, and by two or three vigorous strokes had sent her away from the frigate, the people of the *Intrepid* ceased rowing, and as one man they gave three cheers for victory. This appeared to arouse the "Turks" from their stupor; for the cry had hardly ended when

the batteries, the two corsairs vessels, and the galley poured in their fire. The men quickly resumed the oars - the *Intrepid* had eight on each side - and favoured by a light air, they went rapidly down the harbour. The spectacle that followed is described as beautiful and sublime. The entire bay was illuminated by the conflagration, the roar of cannon was constant, and Tripoli was in a clamor. The appearance of the ship was, in the highest degree, magnificent; and for surplus effect, as her guns heated, they began to go off.



Fig. 5. "Burning of the Frigate *Philadelphia* in the Harbor of Tripoli, February 16, 1804" Oil on canvas, 60" by 42", by Edward Moran (1829-1901), signed and dated by the artist, 1897. It depicts USS *Philadelphia*, previously captured by the Tripolitans, ablaze after she was boarded and set afire by a party from the ketch *Intrepid* led by Lieutenant Stephen Decatur. Painting in the U.S. Naval Academy Museum Collection. Gift of Paul E. Sutro, 1940. Official U.S. Navy Photograph

Owing to the shift of wind, and the position into which she had tended, the frigate in some measure returned the enemy's fire, as one of her broadsides was discharged in the direction of the town, and the other toward the English Fort. The most singular effect was however on board, where the flames having run up the rigging and masts, collected under the tops, and fell over, giving the whole thing an appearance of glowing columns and fiery capitals. When the flames reached the Santa Barbara, she exploded and the ship blew up, "shaking the night in whole Tripoli"¹⁵.

The success of this daring exploit was sanctioned, few days after, by the safe entrance of the American ship into the port of Malta. "By ten in the morning on February 19, the two ships were in sight of Syracuse [...] News of the *Philadelphia's* destruction circulated throughout the Mediterranean, and Decatur became nearly an instant hero [...] Years later, as the story was retold, it would be reported that Lord Nelson, blockading the French fleet at Toulon, called it the boldest act of naval heroism of the age"¹⁶. "Redeemed the honor of the Navy", "the action not only made famous Preble and Decatur, but helped also to inflame public opinion and national pride and to found the myth of the U.S. Navy"¹⁷. The twenty-five years old official after that night of fire in Tripoli was advanced from the rank of lieutenant to that of captain. Most of the midshipmen engaged were also promoted, and Commander Decatur received a sword. For Salvatore Catalano a new life opened up. The hero landed in America in 1805, was voted immediate citizenship and served in the U.S. Navy, rising to the rank of Sailing Master¹⁸.

Decatur's exploit was brilliant and somewhat legendary, still it was vain, as a matter of fact Commodore Preble would have never succeeded in taking Tripoli¹⁹.

That night, 16th February 1804, is now reconsidered, since 11th September 2001. Twin Towers collapse has raised it from the oblivion in which it had fallen, however, it seems to be mostly situated in a somewhat distor-

¹⁵ SOAVE, *La rivoluzione*, 189.

¹⁶ ROBERT J. ALLISON, *Stephen Decatur. American Naval Hero, 1779-1820* (Amherst and Boston, 2007), 53.

¹⁷ SOAVE, *La rivoluzione*, 189.

¹⁸ JAMES F. COOPER, *History of the Navy of the United States of America* (New York, 1864), 230. For the subsequent history of Catalano see TRINGALI, "Italian Culture", 2. Many protagonists of the war in Tripoli emerge in the list of U.S. Navy graveyard; among these there is also Salvatore Catalano, who, continuing to serve bravely the Navy, was its captain from 1811 to death: JAMES CROGGON, "Historic congressional cemetery in Old Washington (Navy Yard)", *The Evening Star*, November 12, 1910, 4, in http://www.congressionalcemetery.org/Research/History_Local/Croggon/Croggon_19101112.html.

¹⁹ USSAMA MAKDISI, "'Anti-Americanism' in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History", *The Journal of American History*, vol. 89, No. 2 (2002).

ted historiographic context looking like the Mediterranean waters, which were so limpid and transparent at the age of those facts and so polluted and rotten at the beginning of the XXI century. Around that night in Tripoli now are swirling terms like "terrorism", "civilization conflict", "attack", "export democracy", that distort the reality presenting yet another case of history abuse. Myths creation can only use arrogance and it certainly does not help to explain where this event came from and where it was leading to.

Ian Chessell

Britain's Ionian Consul: Spiridion Foresti and intelligence collection

Introduction

Control of the Mediterranean was of vital importance to the major powers engaged in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of 1793–1815, an importance which made the Sea a centre of major military and political conflict. The Mediterranean theatre can be considered as three distinct basins¹, connected together by narrow straits, each potentially under the operational control of an island or island chain. The Eastern Basin between Sicily and the Levant was the highway to the east – to the Dardanelles, the Black Sea, to Egypt and India – with access controlled by possession of Malta, with support from Sicily. The second, the Adriatic Basin, provided passage to Venice and Trieste and access to the western seaboard of Turkey-in-Europe, with its entrance controlled by possession of the Ionian Island chain.

The Western Mediterranean Basin stretching from Gibraltar to Sicily governed access to these two basins, with its entrance controlled at Gibraltar. The importance of the Western Basin was well understood by British naval commanders in the Mediterranean. Nelson wrote in response to Ionian Island concerns of a French invasion and the lack of local British warships, 'the only way for a naval force to protect the [Ionian] Republic is by watching the enemy in their own ports'². Russia relied on passage through the Western Basin to bring its Baltic Fleet into the Mediterranean, but had an alternative via the Dardanelles for its Black Sea Fleet.

Each major power had complex and shifting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, including influencing the balance of power, protection of trade and military supply lines, the suppression of piracy, access to naval

¹ P. MACKESY, *The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810* (London, 1957), 5.

² Nelson to Foresti, British Library (BL), Add MSS 34956, 14 June 1804.

bases and on a larger scale, control of access to the rich resources of India. An overarching factor was the declining power of the Ottoman Empire and the threat of its occupation or fragmentation and the relative advantage that may ensue to one or more of the powers.

For the Mediterranean commander the challenge was huge. Vast distances were involved over which communications were slow at best and subject to the vagaries of weather and enemy action. Orders from London or St. Petersburg could take months to arrive. The shifting alliances of the great powers, declarations of war followed by peace treaties and sudden withdrawals of forces from the Mediterranean (Britain in 1796, Russia in 1799, 1801 and 1807) impacted strongly on the ability to exercise command. Intelligence of all sorts was vital, and commanders such as Nelson paid great attention to intelligence collection despite all the difficulties. At sea, frigates and smaller ships formed the basis of intelligence gathering and these ships were in great demand and numbers were always viewed as insufficient. On land, each nation had a network of representatives at the major trading and political centres and these formed the basis of an important intelligence collection capability.

Against this background the purpose of this paper is to examine the role played by one of the longest serving officials of any country in the region throughout this period of change and conflict, Spiridion Foresti, a native of the Ionian Islands and the British Consul and later Resident Minister. Foresti's broad consular responsibilities will be studied during the period 1793-1805, with an emphasis on intelligence, mainly through an analysis of his correspondence with the British Government and with the military commanders in the Mediterranean.

The Adriatic Basin and the Ionian Islands

The Adriatic Basin was important for its trade and communication access to Venice and Trieste and for trade in currants and oil to the Ionian Islands of Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia. Zante was a major calling place as an important link in the trade from northern and western European nations to Smyrna, Constantinople and Alexandria.

The decline and ultimate defeat of Venice by Napoleon meant that its island and mainland territories in the Adriatic were vulnerable. Napoleon clearly saw their strategic importance and put to the Directory that 'the Islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia are more important to us than all of Italy put together'³. As a result, in 1797, the Islands were occupied by France

³ Bonaparte to the Directory, 16 August 1797, in J. KNIGHT, 'Nelson and the Eastern Mediterranean', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 91 (2), May 2005, 195-215.

under the articles of the Treaty of Campo Formio following the defeat of Venice. Napoleon saw the Islands not only as a source of trade and military supplies but as a stepping stone to Constantinople and to Egypt. The French maintained a small naval force in Corfu and were active in establishing relations with the various pashas who were in control of the Turkish mainland.

The loss of the Islands to a combined Russian and Turkish Force under Russian Vice Admiral Uschakov in 1799 and the creation of an independent Republic of the Seven Islands was clearly a severe blow to Napoleon and he ensured their re-occupation by France in 1807 under secret provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit. France remained in occupation of Corfu until the defeat of Napoleon in 1814. Britain maintained a naval blockade of Corfu during much of this second French occupation and in 1809–1810 successively occupied all the Islands but Corfu which was perceived as too well fortified. The Islands were passed to a British Administration under the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and eventually returned to the new nation of Greece in 1864.

Spiridion Foresti, British Consul and Resident, Ionian Islands

Spiridion Foresti (1752–1822), a native of Zante, held the following positions before and during the War period.

Table 1. Roles and locations of Spiridion Foresti,
British Consul and Resident at the Ionian Islands, 1783 to 1814

| <i>Period</i> | <i>Location</i> | <i>British Foreign Service Position</i> |
|----------------------------|---|---|
| 1783-1789 | Zante | Vice Consul |
| 1789-July 1797 | Zante | Consul |
| July 1797-August 1798 | Corfu (as prisoner of France) | Intelligence agent |
| August 1798-November 1798 | Venice | 'Consul at large' |
| November 1798-March 1799 | Bocche di Cattaro and at Sea with Russian Fleet off Corfu | 'Consul at large' |
| March 1799-September 1799 | Zante | Consul |
| September 1799-August 1807 | Corfu | Resident Minister |
| August 1807-September 1809 | Malta | 'Minister at large' |
| September 1809-March 1810 | With British Force capturing the Ionian Islands | Special Adviser to General Oswald |
| March 1810-1814 | Zante | Resident Minister |

The role of Consul and Resident Minister carried a range of responsibilities that varied in emphasis depending on the state of conflict and regional alliances. The functions Foresti exercised can be summarised as follows.

Diplomatic: the basic function of representing the interests of the British Government and its causes with the host government; conveyance of official correspondence between governments; presentation of proposals on behalf of British government; negotiation; formal representation. For Foresti this diplomatic role became particularly difficult in the dying days of Venetian power. French influence grew and was supported by the popularity of revolutionary ideas amongst the local citizens.

Trade Support: this was a primary focus in Foresti's early days at Zante, and always of importance even during the period of hostilities. Actions included appeals to local authorities for fair dealing for British shipping; monitoring of likely threats from enemy naval elements or from privateers and corsairs; and providing related warning and avoidance advice; advice on the state of crops and commodity prices; petitioning the British Navy to allocate ships to the Adriatic to suppress threats to trade and conduct convoy duties.

Local and Regional Political Activities: exercising influence with local authorities to act in British interests; maintaining relations and influence with regional rulers especially Ali Pasha; paying subsidies to mainland chiefs to frustrate French projects.

Support to Citizens: normal consular support to British visitors, traders and sailors visiting the Islands e.g. support with quarantine and legal matters. Foresti was noted for his hospitality to visiting dignitaries⁴.

Support to the Armed Forces: Foresti provided support in the form of intelligence and local knowledge to elements of British and allied armed forces operating in the Islands eg. assistance with recruiting local brigades to supplement British Forces⁵; working closely with British warships deployed in the Adriatic for trade protection and other duties; acting as prize agent; defending military actions to the host government such as capture of prizes in disputed circumstances.

Combat: Foresti was most unusual for a diplomat and administrator in actually taking part in several military actions. He was on board the Russian flagship at the raising of the siege of Corfu in 1799, was part of the British force that took possession of the southern Ionian Islands in 1809–1810, and was wounded in the fighting for St. Maura⁶.

Intelligence: throughout the war, Foresti was the centre of an active intelligence network in the Adriatic and beyond. He supplied a series of important intelligence updates to the British Government and to the successive Mediterranean commanders. This aspect of his duties will be analysed further in the next sections.

⁴ J. TAYLOR, *Travels from England to India* (London, 1799), 110-115.

⁵ National Archives, London (NA), FO 42/3, 26 April 1799, Grenville to Foresti.

⁶ W.D. WRIGLEY, *The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality, 1821-31* (New York, 1988).

Foresti and the Intelligence Process

The importance of intelligence has been long understood by political and military leaders. The objective of 'know your enemy'⁷ has been pursued with increasingly complex and capable systems up to modern times. Intelligence encompasses a broad range of information – political, economic, geographical and environmental, health and military intelligence. Military intelligence in this period included understanding of the strategic intentions of the enemy; strength and capabilities e.g. number of ships, their size and the number and calibre of their guns, training levels of crew; readiness for deployment and level of provisioning; quality and character of military commanders and plans for operations. Tactical or real-time intelligence covers matters such as the current dispositions of forces and directions of movement. In the age of sail real time intelligence collection was very limited, ranges of observation were small and the ability to deliver the intelligence to the intended user was physically limited. By the late eighteenth century commanders such as Napoleon, Nelson and Wellington were introducing an increasing focus and specialisation on systematic intelligence production. The existence of an established system of diplomatic positions in major foreign cities and their cooperation with the military was an important component of this new capability.

The importance of intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean grew with the spread of the war in the early 1790s, and Foresti found himself in an important geographical and political location. The Ionian Islands were ideally located to gather intelligence on both the Eastern and Adriatic Basins and well positioned to communicate this intelligence to the British Government and to the Mediterranean commanders and other officials. Intelligence on enemy activity in the Islands themselves, on their political situation, on activity in the Adriatic and on French-occupied Italy and on the Turkey-in-Europe littoral was supplied, together with intelligence on the military and political situations in the eastern Mediterranean basin especially from Constantinople, Smyrna and Alexandria.

This intelligence collection activity can be seen as a cyclical process as illustrated in Figure 1.




Fig.1. The Stages in the Intelligence Cycle

⁷ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (6c BC).

Intelligence related activities undertaken by Foresti will be analysed under these headings.

Tasking. Foresti received only limited direction for intelligence collection from the British Foreign Secretary, guidance was provided more in the form of approbation for tasks successfully undertaken. A pro-active collection role was assumed for all diplomatic positions. Particular directions were however given from time to time. For example, when on Corfu in 1799 under French arrest Foresti receives circumspect instructions from Foreign Secretary Grenville to continue providing valuable intelligence of enemy shipping activity⁸. Again in Venice after his escape from Corfu, Foresti was instructed by Secretary Grenville to provide assistance and intelligence to Sir Sidney Smith:

My letter.... will have apprized you of my wish that you should afford to Sir Sydney Smith, who is appointed to a command in the Mediterranean, all the assistance and information which your long residence and observation in that part of the world so eminently qualifies you to give, and which the objects that he may have to accomplish may require⁹.

During 1802–1807, with the Ionian Islands under Russian control, Foresti was charged with working closely with the Russian Plenipotentiary, Count Mocenigo, and actively engaging with him on the mainland in gathering intelligence and supporting rebels ‘to frustrate the hostile projects of the French’. Reflecting the value of his work to Britain, he is even authorised to expend up to ten thousand pounds in these endeavours¹⁰.

Foresti received the clearest directions of intelligence requirements from Nelson during the latter’s periods of command, in a series of dispatches as will be examined below.

Collection. Foresti’s intelligence collection network was built on the network he had established prior to the war for trade and diplomatic purposes. He had regular correspondence with officials and personal friends on all of the Ionian Islands; on the mainland at Ioannina, Prevesa, Ragusa, Cattaro, Parga, Arta, and Patras; in Italy at Venice, Trieste, Ancona, Otranto, Naples, Leghorn, Palermo, and to the east at Salonica, Constantinople, Smyrna, Aleppo and Alexandria. He maintained regular correspondence with officials and commercial agents at Vienna and in London and Bristol. These contacts, together with information obtained from ships’ captains, other officials, and private travellers calling at Zante and Corfu, constituted

⁸ NA, FO 42/2, 17 October 1797, Grenville to Foresti.

⁹ NA, FO 42/2, 29 October 1798, Grenville to Foresti.

¹⁰ NA, FO 42/5, 1 February 1804, Hawkesbury to Foresti.

a rich source of intelligence, which Foresti had become particularly skilled at gathering. From his long period as Consul responsible for commercial affairs, he had many friends and business colleagues within the group of small traders who plied the Adriatic and he used these contacts for intelligence gathering and for the transmission of dispatches. Foresti also made effective use of personal contacts within the occupying powers (even France) to gather intelligence on political issues and military strategies. As a native Greek, he had a long acquaintance with most of the local leaders and public officials as well. Like his father before him, he had a strong personal relationship with successive Venetian admirals in command of the Republic's navy. Foresti was able to use these contacts in the early days of the war, both to gather intelligence and to protect British shipping.

Exploitation. This involved a three-step process of assessing the quality of the intelligence, fusing the information from different sources, and extracting the meaning of the intelligence and its implications. Foresti is notably cautious in providing intelligence and clearly stated the source or sources. He is well aware of the danger of rumours in an era of little solid information, rumours that may have been deliberately started by the enemy for their own purposes. If the intelligence was based on one source only, he carefully signalled his uncertainty and mostly waited until corroborative information was available before forwarding his conclusions.

Foresti's knowledge of local people, politics, places, commerce, geography and weather made his exploitation of intelligence observations particularly valuable to London and the Mediterranean commanders. In addition he was a former merchant sailor endowed with an excellent working knowledge of ships and maritime matters, and this enabled him to make accurate observations and draw valuable conclusions.

Dissemination. The ability to communicate quickly and securely is at the heart of intelligence, and was the major challenge to intelligence utilisation in the age of sail. As a consequence, Foresti spent a large portion of his time as Consul on the transmission of dispatches, attempting to ensure their speedy and safe delivery. The routes used and expenses incurred would depend on the importance of the dispatch, the most important justifying the engagement of express boats to provide an individualized service. Carriage by naval ships was the preferred option for security and quick passage, but these opportunities were infrequent and usually difficult to anticipate. Foresti also used merchant ships when he had personal knowledge of the reliability of the captain.

At times a King's Messenger was used, usually engaged by Constantinople or London and utilised by Foresti as he passed through Corfu. Expresses or other forms of conveyance were shared by the various nations at Corfu, with surprisingly little concern about the security of sealed dispatches (Foresti did not have access to ciphers despite requests). Land

routes were used through Ioannina to the east, and through Trieste and Vienna and across Germany to London. All these routes required an initial sea leg to the coast from Corfu or Zante and this in itself could often suffer long delays because of prevailing winds. At times Foresti employs a small galley to allow urgent dispatches to be delivered in adverse wind conditions. Land routes also had many dangers, Foresti advised of couriers to the east being killed by bandits, drowning in river crossings and being intercepted by the French in crossing Italy.

Overall, the delays in getting intelligence to London were considerable. Foresti's dispatches to the Foreign Office were mostly annotated with the date of arrival (sometimes the hour) and provide a means of estimating the approximate transmission time. The transmission times of his dispatches to London, measured in this way are shown in Figure 2.




Fig. 2. Transmission times for Consular dispatches from the Ionian Islands to London, 1779–1801 (Note [x] indicates Foresti in Venice)

Long delays are clearly involved in reaching London, usually over 40 days and averaging approximately 60 days for the period 1779–1801. Times from Venice are significantly lower, averaging about 26 days (note that they are not included in this average or in the running mean shown in the Figure). During the 1780s the times varied widely, averaging about 60 days. Foresti became Consul at Zante in 1789 and the reduction in transmission times to near 40 days by 1793 suggest his attention to this aspect of his new role. Subsequently, a steady increase is evident reaching an average of approximately 65 days by 1798, most likely caused by the disruptions of war. After this and up till 1801, times are much more variable (26 to 120 days), averaging around 60 days. These figures lump together all paths used by Foresti and thus do not provide a clear differentiation on the causes of the delays above pure travel time at the speed possible for the

period. Judging the value of intelligence gathered by the distant consuls to decision makers in London must take these delays into account.

Transit times for intelligence sent by Foresti on Corfu and Zante to the Mediterranean commanders would have been considerably shorter, for the dispatches could be picked up by normal frigate and other small boat voyages between units of the fleet. It is difficult to make estimates of these times, Foresti reported a transit time of two days from Malta to Zante under the most favourable weather, but this was most unusual.

A more detailed examination of Foresti's role with a focus on his intelligence collection will now be presented, looking at three important stages in the conflict, the period following the fall of Venice and the two periods of command by Nelson in the Mediterranean.

The Fall of Venice, Corfu and the Battle of the Nile (1797-1798)

With the arrival of the French on Zante, Foresti was arrested on 9 July 1797 and sent to Corfu where he was kept under open arrest. Of particular interest to the British command was the state of French forces, naval and military, in the Islands and the disposition of the ex-Venetian fleet that had now fallen into French hands. A major question was if and when these ships would join the French Fleet assembling in Toulon for an expected major action, either inside or outside the Mediterranean. Admiral St Vincent, in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, was keeping Cadiz blockaded. There were no British naval forces inside the Mediterranean. By 13 July 1797, Foresti, though under close French surveillance, was reporting the strength of their naval forces to London and to the British Minister at Naples (Hamilton). On 31 July he reported a total force of 13 ships of the line, 5 frigates, 1 cutter and 5 galleys, potentially a very significant force¹¹. Of these, 6 ships of the line, and 1 frigate were French, while the balance was ex-Venetian. Foresti assessed that these latter ships were, in fact, in a very poor condition and that the French had major manning problems, as regards both officers and mariners. These dispatches reached London in late September and would have reached Naples in late July or early August. Foresti kept track of the progress of these dispatches through his network of contacts. He also reported that the French were collecting very large quantities of naval stores, wood, brass ordnance, ammunition and lead from the galleys at Corfu and Venice and were sending these materials to Toulon¹². During the following months he kept up a steady stream of intelligence to London and Naples covering the activities of the French

¹¹ NA, FO 42/2, 31 July 1797, Foresti to Grenville.

¹² NA, FO 42/2, 5 August 1797 Foresti to Grenville.

ships, the number in harbour at Corfu or on operations, the numbers of troops at Corfu, the worsening situation regarding availability of mariners for the French, and the capture of British commercial shipping.

At the Foreign Office, extracts of all Foresti's dispatches covering naval intelligence were provided to the Admiralty and would have contributed to the general expectation of some new French operation to be mounted from that port. Foresti continued to provide advice that his best estimate was that the ships and supplies were bound for Toulon and that they were only awaiting orders from Paris to depart. Foresti re-iterated that the Venetian ships of the line were in very bad state of repair and were hardly seaworthy. The French naval commanders complained of the very erroneous estimates formed by General Bonaparte with respect to the assistance that the French Navy could derive from the Venetians. They clearly saw that the Venetian ships were actually unfit for service¹³.

In January 1798 he provided intelligence that the French commander at Corfu, Rear Admiral Brueys, was himself reluctant to return to France for he expected persecution because of his aristocratic background – an interesting observation concerning the man destined to become Napoleon's naval commander on the expedition to Egypt.

On 25 February Foresti dispatched the very important intelligence that the whole French squadron has finally sailed for Toulon, including the ex-Venetian ships despite their bad state of repair and low manning levels. The ships were laden with spoils from Venice and the Islands and in his opinion, were very vulnerable to attack¹⁴. This intelligence was sent to Venice, London and to Naples via Otranto. The dispatches reached London on 19 April 1798. There were however no British naval forces in the Mediterranean prior to Nelson's deployment in April 1798 so that the French ships were able to reach Toulon safely on the 2 April. St. Vincent established a communication link with Hamilton at Naples and was kept regularly informed of intelligence gathered by Hamilton. Foresti's letters were passed on to Nelson in May by Hamilton since 'Foresti being always good, I enclose [his letter] for your intelligence'¹⁵.

Foresti's advice about the state of the Venetian ships was proved largely correct as it was only possible to repair two of them sufficiently for them to sail to Egypt with the French fleet, departing from Toulon on 9 May 1798. Malta was taken by Napoleon on the 12 June, the news reaching Foresti on Corfu two days later by a French xebec, whose captain also indicated to Foresti that further stages of the expedition were planned.

¹³ NA, FO 42/2, 5 August 1797, Foresti to Grenville.

¹⁴ NA FO 42/3, 25 February 1798, Foresti to Grenville.

¹⁵ Footnote by Hamilton to Nelson, in Foresti to Henry Smith, BL, Add MSS 37077, 28 May 1798.

Foresti passed this intelligence on to Constantinople and Smyrna and also to Naples and London but it did not arrive there until 7 September 1798. Because of French suspicions of these dispatches and their desire to keep Napoleon's plans secret, Foresti was arrested by the French authorities on Corfu, imprisoned, and then exiled to Venice.

Foresti, interviewing ship captains arriving at Venice from Corfu, learnt of the arrival there of a French 74 gun ship of the line with a British 44 gun frigate as prize, 'both badly shattered'. He advised London of this on 14 September 1798 (received 6 October) and then on 28 September¹⁶ confirmed their identity as the *Leander*, sent by Nelson with dispatches from Alexandria, and the French *le Genereux* that had escaped the Nile under the command of Admiral Villeneuve. He reported on the condition of the captains and crew. On the 24 October he notified London that the two captains, Thompson and Berry, had passed on to Trieste on their way home to London, bringing the earliest first-hand accounts of the victory of the Nile.

Lord Grenville praised Foresti's role in the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence in letters in October 1797¹⁷ and again in October 1798¹⁸. His early advice of the assembling of the naval forces at Corfu and of their likely destination as Toulon would have contributed to the growing awareness in London and with the British commander St. Vincent of an intended operation from that port by France. His intelligence on the gathering and dispatch of large quantities of naval stores and cannon collected from the Adriatic would have reinforced this view. His estimates of the bad state of the large Venetian fleet would have enabled St. Vincent and the Admiralty to better estimate the number of ships likely to be available to Admiral Brueys in any expedition to the east. And this awareness led to the re-call of Nelson to active duty on 16 March 1798 and for the despatch of orders to him to join St. Vincent and to re-enter the Mediterranean with the mission of destroying the French force assembling at Toulon.

Foresti and Nelson

The relationship between Admiral Lord Nelson as a commander in the Mediterranean and Spiridion Foresti was quite a remarkable one given their widely different stations in life and the fact that they never actually met. The respect Foresti earned from Nelson was quite clearly based on

¹⁶ NA, FO 42/3, 28 September 1798, Foresti to Grenville.

¹⁷ NA, FO 42/2, 17 October 1797, Grenville to Foresti.

¹⁸ NA, FO 42/3, 3 October 1798, Grenville to Foresti.

the professionalism and energy that Foresti applied to his role as intelligence agent for Nelson. He encouraged Foresti, recovering from his time as a prisoner of the French, writing in 1799:

Give me leave to say, that throughout my command in the Levant seas, you have done yourself the highest honour, and rendered, as far as was possible, the greatest service to your Country. This public testimony, from a stranger to everything except your good conduct, will, I trust, be not unacceptable¹⁹.

Nelson recommended Foresti's service to Lord Elgin at Constantinople²⁰, to Foreign Secretary Hawkesbury²¹ and to Admiral Lord Keith²².

Their direct correspondence began in 1798, soon after Nelson returned to Naples from the Battle of the Nile and continued until Nelson left the Mediterranean in 1800. Correspondence resumed again in 1803 when Nelson was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and continued until his death at Trafalgar. Approximately 31 dispatches have been found in various archives from Nelson to Foresti and approximately 52 from Foresti to Nelson, with many others lost. Foresti's principal correspondence throughout the war period was with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to whom he wrote regularly, on average about every two weeks, many with copies to Nelson. Hence the intelligence provided to the Mediterranean commanders by Foresti can be tracked indirectly.

Aftermath of the Nile: 1798–1800

The major focus for Nelson during this period was the defence of the Neapolitan Kingdom, to ensure the security of Sicily for Britain and to bring the siege of Malta to a successful conclusion. In addition, activity in the Italian Peninsula and the Adriatic was considered desirable as it provided encouragement to Austria to resume hostilities. Nelson also had to consider the French Expedition still at Alexandria, where Napoleon remained until August 1799.

Nelson indicated he wished to take an interest²³ in freeing the Ionian Islands but once the Islands were re-occupied in 1799 by a combined Russian and Turkish Fleet, he saw the Russian presence as a bulwark against further French aggression in Turkey and Greece.

¹⁹ Nelson to Foresti, in N.H. NICOLAS (ed.), *Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson* (London, 1998), V, 26 March 1799.

²⁰ Nelson to Elgin, in NICOLAS, *Dispatches*, IV, 29 October 1799.

²¹ Cornwall Records Office (CRO), J3/35/36, 16 June 1803, Nelson to Foresti.

²² CRO, J3/35/36, 28 March 1800, Nelson to Foresti.

²³ Nelson to Spencer, in NICOLAS, *Dispatches*, III, 9 October 1798.

During this period Foresti on Zante and Corfu provided Nelson²⁴ with a series of intelligence updates on:

- the strength and disposition of the Russian naval and military forces in the Adriatic;
- Russian strategic thinking and an interpretation of likely outcomes;
- personality profiles of the Russian military and political leaders in the Adriatic;
- the situation in the Ionian Islands and of the Russian plans for a new constitution and of the Islanders' views;
- tensions between the Russian and Turkish commanders on Corfu;
- the progress of Sir Sidney Smith in Egypt and Syria;
- naval and commercial shipping movements;
- the situation on the Albanian mainland, particularly with Ali Pasha;
- more general events around the eastern Mediterranean.

Foresti also ensured the transmission of important dispatches between Nelson and the British Minister at Constantinople. Attendance to this task was an ongoing demand on his time, though the amount of effort and expense varied with the importance of the dispatches. In a case of an important secret dispatch from Constantinople to Nelson (March 1800) brought by special courier, Foresti hired a boat to take the courier to Otranto, and provided an experienced pilot, passports and letters to the Health Office and various officials at Otranto in an attempt to minimise quarantine delays. He also instructed the courier on steps to maintain security during passage in the postal system if letters had to be quarantined: letters were only to be slit (not opened) for fumigation and the courier was never to lose sight of them.

Prelude to Trafalgar: 1803–1805

By May 1803 Nelson was Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and acutely aware of his need for intelligence, soon set about strengthening the network of agents and communication links. One of his many concerns was to ensure that British interests were protected at the Porte and that increasing French influence there was countered. He set up a communication channel with the British Minister at Constantinople.

I think we can establish a mode of communication through Mr Spiridion Foresti, it would be the quickest way, unless any event of great importance would call for a ship being sent direct to Constan-

²⁴ NA, FO 348/3, 23 March 1800, Foresti to Nelson.

tinople. The time an express by land will take from Corfu to Constantinople will be desirable for me to know²⁵.

Foresti used two major overland routes to send dispatches to Constantinople, one through Ioannina, which typically took about twelve days, and one through Patras, which was more secure but slower. Again Foresti made a significant contribution through the processing of these dispatches, even those through Trieste and Vienna.

Nelson provides clear tasking of what he expected from Foresti in terms of intelligence collection

...and you will, of course, let me know the situation of that infant Republic, whether you think that it will be able to maintain its independence, and whether the generality of the people are attached to it; and whether, in your opinion, they wish for a change or dissolution of the present Government; and whether the whole, or any party, would wish to give themselves up to France; and that if that they wish to remain where they are, would they take up arms to defend themselves against the French? Your accurate knowledge of those Islands, and the character of every individual on them, will enable you to give me such answers as will assist me to regulate my conduct²⁶.

In response Foresti provided Nelson with detailed reports on the situation in the Ionian Islands, which were then in the process of becoming the 'independent' Septinsular Republic, and of the growing dominance of the Russians²⁷. In his view the Islanders would always depend on a foreign power and would be unable to provide a suitable structure of governance on their own. In his opinion, the people had been too long abandoned to cruel anarchy, and suffered from strong and bitter divisions based on political differences and class divisions. He considered that it was only the strong presence of Russian troops that was holding society together and the Islanders had insufficient revenues to permit the development of a defensive force of their own. The position prevailing was one of complete dependence on Russia.

Foresti provided regular updates on the strength of the Russian forces in the new Republic. In August 1805, for example, he advised that there were two 74 and two 64 gun warships, 5 frigates of 44 guns and a number of smaller ships. It is interesting to note the listed nationality of the captains of the 9 larger ships: 4 Russian, 3 English (including the senior officer) and 2 Greek.

²⁵ Nelson to Drummond, in NICOLAS, *Dispatches*, V, About 11 June 1803.

²⁶ Nelson to Foresti, in NICOLAS, *Dispatches*, V, 16 June 1803.

²⁷ NA, FO 42/5, 2 July 1803, Foresti to Nelson.

Trade had always been fundamental to Foresti's thinking and during this period he was very active as British shipping was frequently threatened by privateers and corsairs operating under a variety of flags, often sponsored by the French. Foresti kept Nelson informed of these activities and made a strong case for the deployment of British naval units in the Adriatic and for the provision of a convoy system. Nelson responded swiftly and sent a small force to the Adriatic under Captain Cracraft²⁸. Foresti worked closely with this commander, providing him with local knowledge and intelligence of threats. Convoys were organised to protect local trade, particularly the important trade between Zante and Smyrna and Trieste. The operation was very successful with a number of prizes taken and British trade rendered safe. In the early part of 1804 there was great concern in the British Government at the possibility of a French landing in the Adriatic, either at Corfu or on the mainland. Foresti and Cracraft worked together to keep watch on the likely ports of embarkation and advising Nelson of their findings.

Naval stores were always in short supply and in September 1803 the British government ordered Nelson to examine the possibility of sourcing stores and in particular timber from the Albanian and Greek mainland. The possibility of '...opening to His Majesty's Ships the Port of Panormo in the Adriatic, and facilitating the purchase of Naval Stores...'²⁹ had been raised by Ali Pasha in conversation with Hamilton, the Private Secretary to Lord Elgin, Minister at Constantinople. Foresti was tasked by Nelson to investigate what Ali Pasha might have to offer in terms of trade privileges, timber for shipbuilding and the growing of hemp³⁰. Cracraft was also tasked with exploring the potential for port facilities and for his observations on resource availability. The matter was very sensitive in regard to both the Russian and the Ottoman Governments and Nelson wrote to Ali Pasha through Foresti in cypher on the matter. The reports of Foresti and Cracraft were sent under cover to Lord Hobart at the War Office by Nelson³¹ in March 1804. Foresti's report was much more positive than Cracraft's and identified a series of potential ports providing good anchorages and access to timber³². This intelligence was not immediately acted upon but laid the basis for an alternative source of naval stores in the Adriatic in post-war years³³.

Foresti's close working and personal relationship with Nelson contin-

²⁸ Nelson to Cracraft, in NICOLAS, *Dispatches*, V, 16 June 1803.

²⁹ NA, CO 173/1, 23 September 1803, British Government to Nelson.

³⁰ Nelson to Foresti, in NICOLAS, *Dispatches*, V, 25 November 1803.

³¹ NA, ADM 1/407, 17 March 1804, Nelson to Hobart.

³² NA, ADM 1/407, 31 January 1804, Foresti to Nelson.

³³ KNIGHT, 'Nelson and the Eastern Mediterranean', 210.

ued intermittently up to the time of Trafalgar. The last letter to Nelson in the Consular Letterbook is dated 24 November 1805, a month after Nelson's death at Trafalgar, a sad indication of the delays in the transmission of news across the Mediterranean.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the role of Spiridion Foresti, the British Consul at the Ionian Islands. A particular focus has been his role in the provision of intelligence to the British Government and to Mediterranean naval commanders during the period 1793–1805. The unique position of the Ionian Islands and the fact that Spiridion Foresti was a native of the country to which he was the British Consul gave him particular strengths in intelligence exploitation that were highly valued in a critical period for both Britain and for the Ionian islands. His claims for compensation for substantial losses resulting from enemy actions were supported by written testimony from no less than four naval commanders, Jervis, Keith, Nelson and Collingwood.

Foresti's contributions highlighted for Britain the value of the possession of Corfu not only as a fortress and a naval base but also as 'an observatory over the whole of European Turkey'³⁴. These arguments were used in support of the invasion of the Islands by British Forces in 1809 and indirectly led to the British Mandate following the Congress of Vienna.

³⁴ NA, FO 42/9, 12 December 1807, Myer to Canning.

Diletta D'Andrea

Gran Bretagna e Mediterraneo in età napoleonica tra “strategia talassocratica” e “laboratori costituzionali”

1. Alle origini della “Ideological War”

Nell'aprile del 1793, nell'ambito della prima coalizione antifrancese, il premier britannico William Pitt *the Younger*¹ decise di inviare una flotta nel Mediterraneo a protezione degli interessi inglesi in quell'area². Nel corso del '700, dopo l'acquisizione di due basi strategiche fondamentali come Gibilterra e Minorca³, la presenza britannica nel Mediterraneo era andata progressivamente intensificandosi, mentre nella primavera del

¹ Su William Pitt (1759-1806), figlio dell'omonimo statista, cfr. The Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (da ora RCHM), *Papers of British Cabinet Ministers, 1782-1900*, London 1982, 51-52; JOHN HOLLAND ROSE, *William Pitt and the Great War*, London 1911; THOMAS B. MACAULAY, *Macaulay's Essays on William Pitt the Younger*, ed. by WILLIAM K. LEASK, London 1918; REGINALD COUPLAND, *The War Speeches of William Pitt the Younger*, Oxford 1940 (3rd ed.); ARNOLD D. HARVEY, *William Pitt the Younger, 1759-1806: a biography*, London 1989; ERIC J. EVANS, *William Pitt the Younger*, London 1999; WILLIAM HAGUE, *William Pitt the Younger*, London 2004.

² Tra le numerose pubblicazioni sulla partecipazione della Gran Bretagna alla prima coalizione antifrancese (1793-1798) cfr. JOHN A. LYNN, *International rivalry and warfare*, in *The Short History of Europe. The Eighteenth Century. Europe 1688-1815*, ed. by TIMOTHY C.W. BLANNING, Oxford 2000, 203 e ss.; WILLIAM M. JAMES, *The Naval History of Great Britain, during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars*, 6 vols, London 2002; ROBERT HARVEY, *The War of Wars. The epic struggle between Britain and France: 1789-1815*, London 2007; ROBERT TOMBS, ISABELLE TOMBS, *That Sweet Enemy. Britain and France. The History of a Love-Hate Relationship*, London 2007.

³ Per quasi tutto il secolo (1708-1756, 1763-1782, 1798-1802), Minorca era appartenuta alla Gran Bretagna e, insieme a Gibilterra (conquistata nel 1704), aveva rappresentato una base strategica molto importante, anticipando il ruolo svolto da Malta nel corso dell'800: cfr. WALTER F. LORD, *The lost possessions of England*, London 1896, 98; WINSTON F. MONK, *Britain in Western Mediterranean*, London 1953, 39; GEORGE HILLS, *Rock of Contention. A history of Gibraltar*, London 1974; TITO BENADY, *The Royal Navy at Gibraltar*, Liskeard 1993; MICAELA MATA, *Conquests and Reconquests of Minorca*, Barcelona 1984; DESMOND GREGORY, *Minorca. The illusory prize*, London 1990; MICHELA D'ANGELO, *In the English Mediterranean (1511-1815)*, in “Journal of Mediterranean Studies”, vol. 12 (2002), n. 2, 271-285.

1794 lo sbarco delle truppe inglesi in Corsica avrebbe portato anche alla costituzione del Regno Anglo-Corso⁴.

Fino a quel momento, la *Foreign Policy* del governo di Londra era stata imperniata sul mantenimento di un sostanziale "equilibrio dei poteri", allo scopo di conservare e tutelare gli interessi commerciali sui quali la Gran Bretagna basava gran parte della sua ricchezza e potenza. Il diffondersi delle idee rivoluzionarie e dell'influenza francese in Europa, tuttavia, costringeva la classe politica britannica a prendere in considerazione anche un'altra componente fondamentale dell'ormai prossimo conflitto anglo-francese, quella ideologica. L'idea che al «*military and revolutionary code*» dei francesi si dovesse contrapporre il sistema costituzionale britannico si configurava nelle parole del segretario di Stato agli Esteri Lord William Wyndham Grenville all'inizio della cosiddetta *Ideological War* del 1793-1795. Nel tempo, questa stessa idea sarebbe stata largamente condivisa. Palese risultava, infatti, la volontà di alcuni tra i più importanti uomini politici britannici *whig*, come William Windham, Gilbert Elliot e il duca di Portland in stretta connessione con quanto Edmund Burke teorizzava da alcuni anni. Era, cioè, necessario opporsi alla prospettiva di *universal empire* che iniziava a delinarsi sull'Europa continentale e che era ritenuta incompatibile con gli interessi commerciali e con il tradizionale modello politico, istituzionale e sociale dell'Inghilterra.

Al sistema francese di occupazione militare si contrappose, dunque, la strategia "talassocratica" elaborata in quegli anni dai diversi governi succedutisi a Londra, nel tentativo di "esportare" nelle principali isole del Mediterraneo (Corsica, Malta, Sicilia, Isole Ionie) «i principi e gli istituti del costituzionalismo» d'oltre Manica. Questa strategia, nel suo evolversi, tese a contenere l'espansionismo politico-ideologico del giacobinismo in Europa e, più oltre, a porsi in aperta contrapposizione rispetto all'egemonia napoleonica che ne aveva sovvertito l'equilibrio⁵.

Ispirata dalle teorizzazioni di Burke e dall'ala dei *whigs* collegata allo scrittore politico irlandese, col tempo essa fu recepita nel pensiero di diversi intellettuali e pubblicisti inglesi e fu condivisa da parte di molti dei sudditi di Sua Maestà Britannica che a vario titolo, nella qualità di ufficia-

⁴ Sulla nascita del Regno Anglo-Corso cfr. DESMOND GREGORY, *The Ungovernable Rock. A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom and its role in Britain's Mediterranean strategy during the revolutionary wars*, London-Toronto 1985, e soprattutto CARLO R. RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico nel Mediterraneo (1794-1818). I. Il modello corso*, in "Clio", XVII (1991), n. 3, 367-451; FABRIZIO DAL PASSO, *Il Mediterraneo dei Lumi. Corsica e democrazia nella stagione delle rivoluzioni*, Napoli 2006.

⁵ Cfr. PAUL SCOLFELD, *British Politicians and French Arms: The Ideological War of 1793-1795*, in "History", 77 (1992); CARLO R. RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico nel Mediterraneo (1794-1818)*, Milano-Roma 2005, 5-7 e 30-31 (da ora citato RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico*).

li della *British Army* o come rappresentanti diplomatici del governo di Londra nel Mediterraneo, vissero più o meno direttamente gli avvenimenti del periodo⁶. Secondo molti di essi, l'attuazione di tale strategia da parte del governo di Londra era ancora più urgente nella particolare congiuntura rappresentata dal conflitto anti-napoleonico e delineata dal precario equilibrio dell'impero turco prossimo al crollo, dal pericolo che la Francia estendesse il suo dominio in Asia Minore minacciando così i possedimenti inglesi in India e dalla prospettiva di un conflitto tra Inghilterra e Russia a causa del tentativo progressivo di quest'ultima di incrementare la propria presenza nel Mediterraneo.

All'inizio del 1806, in realtà, la "strategia talassografica" veniva riformulata da Lord William Grenville alla guida di quella particolare coalizione di governo nota come "ministero di Tutti i Talenti", che intendeva fare delle isole del Mediterraneo «*an important chain of stations*» utile sia per la guerra che per il commercio. Poco tempo dopo, essa avrebbe avuto una sua nuova teorizzazione con gli scritti del *landowner* e scrittore politico inglese Gould Francis Leckie che proponeva di "britannizzare" le principali isole del Mediterraneo, e in particolare la Sicilia.

2. Il governo di Tutti i Talenti: "a chain of Mediterranean stations"

La politica estera britannica nel Mediterraneo conosceva una nuova fase all'inizio del 1806. Nel febbraio di quell'anno si intensificavano, infatti, i rapporti tra la Gran Bretagna e la Sicilia dove Ferdinando IV di Borbone e la sua corte si rifugiavano per la seconda volta, come già era avvenuto sette anni prima, con l'aiuto degli inglesi. Un primo e consistente contingente britannico sbarcava a Messina per difendere l'isola dalle truppe francesi stanziato al di là dello Stretto e per coadiuvare il re borbonico nel recupero dei propri domini peninsulari.

Diversamente da quanto era accaduto nel 1799, però, la lunga permanenza degli inglesi sull'isola era destinata questa volta a esercitare una forte influenza sulla vita politica, sociale ed economica siciliana⁷. Aveva, infatti, inizio il cosiddetto "decennio inglese" (1806-1815), durante il quale la presenza dei rappresentanti militari e diplomatici britannici non si li-

⁶ Cfr. EDMUND BURKE, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, London 1790. Sulla risalente amicizia tra Burke ed Elliot cfr. Sir GILBERT ELLIOT, *Life and letters*, 2 voll, ed. by COUNTESS MINTO, London 1874, vol. II. Sull'opinione di Portland, secondo la quale i principi costituzionali delle *Reflections* di Burke rappresentavano "the true whig creed", cfr. JOHN ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck. The Making of a Liberal Imperialist, 1774-1839*, London 1974, 74.

⁷ Sul precedente sbarco di truppe inglesi sull'isola nel 1799 cfr. CAIO DOMENICO GALLO - GAETANO OLIVA, *Annali della città di Messina*, Messina 1893, vol. V, 209-210; DILETTA

mitò a una funzione meramente strategica, ma incise profondamente sulla realtà e sulla storia dell'isola, catalizzandone alcuni fondamentali cambiamenti, non ultimo quello che portò alla costituzione del 1812⁸.

L'inizio del "decennio inglese" in Sicilia veniva a coincidere con la svolta politica indicata dal nuovo governo di unità nazionale che si era formato a Londra nel febbraio del 1806, il cosiddetto ministero di "Tutti i Talenti", costituito da un'insolita coalizione *whig-tory* che, fino al marzo del 1807, unì Lord William Wyndham Grenville, Charles James Fox e il *Viscount Sidmouth* Henry Addington⁹. Nell'ambito della III coalizione, che segnò uno dei periodi più intensi delle guerre rivoluzionarie e napoleoniche, il governo di "All the Talents", presieduto da Lord Grenville, adottava una nuova linea politica che, prima con Fox e poi con Howick al *Foreign Office*, puntava a consolidare la presenza britannica nel Mediterraneo per contrastare la minaccia napoleonica e, in questo ambito, a dare consistenza anche alla prospettiva di una Sicilia "inglese"¹⁰.

Quando ancora la Gran Bretagna stava tentando di negoziare un armistizio con il governo francese, Charles James Fox aveva già ricordato al nipote Lord Holland «quanto fosse importante la Sicilia»¹¹. Dopo il fallimen-

D'ANDREA, «*If Sicily should become a British Island*». *Sicilia e Gran Bretagna in età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica*, Messina 2007, 28 e ss.

⁸ Cfr. GIOVANNI ACETO, *De la Sicile et des ses rapports avec l'Angleterre à l'époque de la constitution de 1812*, Paris-Londre 1827; ACETO, *Della Sicilia e dei suoi rapporti con l'Inghilterra all'epoca della costituzione del 1812*, Palermo 1848, ristampa con *Introduzione* di FRANCO VALSECCHI, Palermo 1970; NICOLA NICEFORO [EMILIO DEL CERRO], *La Sicilia e la Costituzione del 1812*, in "Archivio Storico Siciliano", N.S. 38 (1913-14), 197-263; 39 (1914-15), 269-328; 40 (1915-16), 20-44, 268-303; 41 (1916-17), 321-358; 44 (1922), 70-153; 45 (1924), 1-84; 46 (1925), 1-35; VIRGILIO TITONE, *La costituzione del 1812 e l'occupazione inglese della Sicilia*, Bologna 1936; FRANCESCO RENDA, *La Sicilia nel 1812*, Caltanissetta-Roma 1963; ENZO SCIACCA, *Riflessi del costituzionalismo europeo in Sicilia (1812-1815)*, Catania 1966; RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico*; GIUSEPPE GIARRIZZO, *1812. Sicilia inglese?*, in *Il modello costituzionale inglese e la sua ricezione nell'area mediterranea tra la fine del '700 e la prima metà dell'800*, a cura di ANDREA ROMANO, Milano 1998, 59-70. Per il testo costituzionale del 1812 cfr. *Costituzione del Regno di Sicilia*, riedizione anastatica a cura di ANDREA ROMANO, Messina 1996; DILETTA D'ANDREA, *Nel «decennio inglese» 1806-1815. La Sicilia nella politica britannica dai «Talenti» a Bentinck*, Soveria Mannelli (CZ) 2008.

⁹ Cfr. ARNOLD D. HARVEY, *The Ministry of All the Talents: the Whigs in Office. February 1806 to March 1807*, in "The Historical Journal", XV, 4 (1972), 619-648; HARVEY, *Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century*, New York 1978, 170 e ss.; ALAN F. FREMANTLE, *England in the Nineteenth Century 1806-1810*, London 1930; Millwood, N.Y., 1978; JOE BORD, *Whiggery, science and administration. Grenville and Lord Henry Pitt in the Ministry of All the Talents*, in "Historical Research", vol. 76 (2003), 108-127. Cfr., inoltre, «The Morning Chronicle», 1 febbraio 1806; «The Independent Whig», 30 marzo 1806. Su Lord Grenville, in particolare, cfr. ARNOLD D. HARVEY, *Lord Grenville, 1759-1834: a Bibliography*, Westport-London 1989.

¹⁰ Cfr. HENRY E. BUNBURY, *Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France 1799-1810*, London 1927, 150.

¹¹ Cfr. GEORGE M. TREVELYAN, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill*, London 1920, 147. Su Charles

to dei colloqui di pace con la Francia, il premier Lord Grenville decideva, insieme a Fox, di porre in essere una «politica siciliana di lungo termine» proprio per sottolineare – secondo quanto scriveva lo stesso Grenville a Fox il 22 giugno del 1806 – «*the great importance of Sicily*» per gli interessi inglesi in quell'area¹².

Il premier dei Talenti già nel 1793, quando ricopriva l'incarico di *Foreign Secretary* del primo governo Pitt, era stato tra i teorici della cosiddetta "*Ideological War*". Traendo origine dalle dottrine burkiane sulla necessità di un intervento della Gran Bretagna contro la Francia rivoluzionaria, questa strategia si basava sulla contrapposizione del sistema britannico, storicamente fondato sulla costituzione inglese, al sistema militare dei francesi che stava sovvertendo l'equilibrio dei poteri in Europa¹³.

La Sicilia, insieme alla Sardegna, a Malta, alle Isole Ionie e ad altre piccole isole, era tra i pochi territori dell'Europa mediterranea a non essere ancora caduti in mano francese. La sua difesa era allora essenziale e alla base di quella "*long-term Sicilian policy*" che Lord Grenville auspicava: il governo di Londra intendeva, infatti, fare «*of all these islands an important chain of stations highly useful to us both in war and in commerce*». La Gran Bretagna avrebbe dovuto continuare a proteggere Sicilia e Sardegna anche dopo la fine del conflitto, in modo da creare nel Mediterraneo una "catena" di isole che sarebbero state estremamente utili sia in tempo di guerra che, successivamente, per il commercio¹⁴.

Il segretario di Stato alla Guerra e alle Colonie William Windham, contestualmente, predisponeva un piano strategico militare per contrastare il dilagare della presenza di Napoleone nel Mediterraneo¹⁵.

James Fox e Henry Richard Vassal Fox (Lord Holland), cfr. RCHM, *Private Papers of British Ministers*, 20-21. Sui termini del trattato con la Francia cfr. «*The Morning Chronicle*», 8 luglio, 29 agosto 1806. Cfr. anche «*The Times*», 25 dicembre 1806; 3 e 6 gennaio 1807.

¹² Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fortescue Manuscripts (da ora HMC, Fortescue Ms), VIII, 196, Grenville a Fox, 22 giugno 1806, cit. da JOHN ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the British Occupation of Sicily, 1811-1814*, Cambridge 1956 (ed. it.: *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione britannica in Sicilia 1811-1814*, a cura di MICHELA D'ANGELO, traduz. di ANTONELLA COSMAI, Palermo 2002, 261; nelle successive note di questo saggio si farà riferimento all'edizione italiana).

¹³ Cfr. SCOLFIELD, *British Politicians and French Arms*; RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico*, 5-7 e 30-31; EPHRAIM D. ADAMS, *The influence of Grenville on Pitt's foreign policy, 1787-1798*, Washington 1904.

¹⁴ HMC, Fortescue Ms, VIII, 196, Grenville a Fox, 22 giugno 1806,

¹⁵ Del piano di Windham si parlò ampiamente sui giornali: cfr., ad esempio, «*The Morning Chronicle*», 11 aprile 1806: «*Napoleon continues to take every measure which he thinks calculated to secure the stability of his Government, and the establishment of his Dynasty. The Kingdom of Naples and Sicily is fixed upon Joseph Bonaparte, and his heirs in the male line*».

Coerenti con questo orientamento della politica estera inglese erano le linee-guida che il *Foreign Secretary* dei Talenti, Lord Howick¹⁶, che dal settembre aveva preso il posto dello scomparso Fox, aveva preparato per il rappresentante diplomatico inglese a Palermo William Drummond¹⁷. Con le parole di John Rosselli, «tali misure avrebbero reso la Sicilia un virtuale protettorato britannico in pace come in guerra». Non possiamo, tuttavia, sapere cosa sarebbe scaturito dalla loro attuazione. Le istruzioni di Howick, infatti, non furono mai inviate a causa della caduta del governo di Tutti i Talenti il 25 marzo del 1807¹⁸.

Per il nuovo governo presieduto dal duca di Portland la Sicilia e le altre isole del Mediterraneo non erano più così rilevanti per la politica estera inglese. D'altra parte, anche la congiuntura internazionale era, a sua volta, profondamente mutata. Nell'estate del 1806, dopo l'esito favorevole della battaglia di Maida, il governo britannico poteva ancora pensare di impiegare l'isola borbonica come base per una prossima invasione della penisola italiana. Nel 1807, e soprattutto dopo la conclusione del trattato di Tilsit tra Francia e Russia, quell'ipotesi era ormai venuta meno. Così, nel periodo compreso tra il 1807 e il 1809, quando George Canning subentrava alla guida del *Foreign Office* e Lord Castlereagh assumeva l'incarico di *Secretary at War*, «Sicily figured very little in Britain's war plans»¹⁹.

Proprio in quegli anni, tuttavia, sottolineando la portata degli interessi politici e militari britannici in quell'area, Gould Francis Leckie avrebbe sostenuto a gran voce la necessità dell'adozione di una "*insular strategy*" fondata sull'occupazione e/o sul controllo delle principali isole del Mediterraneo da parte della Gran Bretagna.

3. Leckie: "*an insular empire*"

Gould Francis Leckie (1767-1850)²⁰ era un *landowner* inglese che nel 1801 scelse di lasciare Londra per trasferirsi in Sicilia, dove riuscì a impiantare una fattoria modello "all'inglese" nella campagna siracusana²¹.

¹⁶ Sulla morte di Charles James Fox e la nomina di Howick cfr. «The Morning Chronicle», 15, 23 e 27 settembre 1806. Su Charles Grey, *Viscount Howick*, cfr. RCHM, *Papers of British Cabinet Ministers*, 26-27.

¹⁷ The National Archives (UK), Foreign Office (FO) 70/30, Londra, marzo 1807, Howick a Drummond.

¹⁸ Cfr. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck*, 50-51.

¹⁹ Cfr. JOHN M. SHERWIG, *Guineas and Gunpowder. British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1969, 193.

²⁰ Cfr. DILETTA D'ANDREA, *Great Britain and the Mediterranean Islands in the Napoleonic Wars: the 'Insular Strategy' of Gould Francis Leckie*, in "Journal of Mediterranean Studies", vol. 16, n. 1/2 (2006), 79-90.

²¹ GEORGE B. GREENOUGH, *Diario di un viaggio in Sicilia 1803*, introduzione di DACIA MA-

A quel tempo Leckie era uno dei pochi sudditi britannici, per lo più mercanti, che risiedevano nell'isola borbonica. A differenza dei pochi connazionali stabilitisi nelle due principali città siciliane per attività commerciali²², Leckie decise di dedicarsi all'agricoltura, alla conduzione diretta del suo fondo. Inoltre, diversamente dai tanti viaggiatori europei del *Grand Tour*, che arrivavano in Sicilia per ammirare le testimonianze del mondo classico²³, Leckie si inserì nella realtà dell'isola e, pian piano, nel corso della sua lunga permanenza di quasi sette anni, ne studiò a fondo la struttura economica, sociale e politica. Tra il 1801 e il 1807, oltre a rappresentare un punto di riferimento per i viaggiatori stranieri di passaggio a

RAINI, Siracusa-Palermo 1989; *The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. by KATHLEEN COBURN, 2 voll., London 1962; CHARLES BOOTHBY, *Under England's Flag, from 1804 to 1809. The Memoirs, Diary, and Correspondence of Charles Boothby, Captain of Royal Engineers*, London 1900; SALVATORE RUSSO, *Gould Francis Leckie a Siracusa*, in "Archivio storico siracusano", 1994, 61-76; D'ANDREA, «If Sicily should become a British Island», 86 e ss. La presenza di Gould Francis Leckie in Sicilia tra il 1801 e il 1807 è oggetto di una ricerca in corso di pubblicazione.

²² Fino al 1806, infatti, erano circa una mezza dozzina gli inglesi stabilitisi nell'isola che erano impegnati in attività prevalentemente commerciali, soprattutto a Messina (John Broadbent, John Thomas Roche, William Mendham) e a Palermo (James Tough, Abraham Gibbs), o anche in attività imprenditoriali, come nel caso del vino *marsala*, nell'area tra Marsala e Mazara (John Woodhouse, John Hopps): cfr. MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia 1806-1815*, Milano 1988, 45-52; D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina tra XVIII e XIX secolo*, Messina 1995, 44; D'ANGELO, *British Trade and Merchants in the Mid-Mediterranean: an alternative Market during the Napoleonic Wars*, in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean. Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries)*, ed. by CARMEL VASSALLO and MICHELA D'ANGELO, Malta 2007, 97-114; ROSARIO LENTINI, *L'organizzazione commerciale e l'attività finanziaria di Benjamin Ingham (1809-1830)*, in *Benjamin Ingham nella Sicilia dell'Ottocento. Atti del seminario di studi (Marsala 15/16 giugno 1985)*, Marsala 1987; LENTINI, *Benjamin Ingham e la colonia inglese in Sicilia*, in RALEIGH TREVELYAN, *La storia dei Whitaker*, Palermo 1988; TREVELYAN, *Principi sotto il Vulcano*, Milano 1977.

²³ Cfr., tra i tanti, PATRICK BRYDONE, *A Tour through Sicily and Malta*, London 1773; HENRY SWINBURNE, *Travels in the Two Sicilies in the Years 1777, 1778, 1779, and 1780*, London 1785; RICHARD PAYNE KNIGHT, *Expedition into Sicily. 1777*, London 1986; THOMAS WATKINS, *Travels through Switzerland, Italy, Sicily, the Greek Islands to Constantinople; in the Years 1787, 1788, 1789*, 2 voll., London 1794; *Goethe's Travels in Italy, translated from the German by the Rev. A.J.W. Morrison and Charles Nisbet*, London 1892; RICHARD BINGHAM THOMAS, *Letters from Sicily. Written in the Year 1798*, London 1800; ALEXANDER THOMSON, *Letters of a Traveller, on the various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa: containing Sketches of their Present State, Government, Religion, Manners, and Customs*, London 1798; WILLIAM H. THOMSON, *Sicily and its Inhabitants. Observations made during a residence in that country, in the years 1809 and 1810*, London-Edinburgh-Dublin 1813; JOHN GALT, *Voyages and Travels in the Years 1809, 1810, and 1811*, London 1812; THOMAS BARING, *A Tour through some parts of Istria, Carniola, Styria, Austria, The Tyrol, Italy, and Sicily, in the spring of 1814, by a young English merchant*, London 1815. Per la Sicilia in particolare cfr. HÉLÈNE TUZET, *Viaggiatori stranieri in Sicilia nel XVIII secolo*, Palermo 1988, e SALVO DI MATTEO, *Viaggiatori stranieri in Sicilia dagli Arabi alla seconda metà del XIX secolo*, 3 voll., Palermo 2001.

Siracusa e a intrecciare rapporti di amicizia con le più illuminate personalità siciliane (come, ad esempio, l'abate Paolo Balsamo e il principe di Belmonte), Leckie era una fonte autorevole, una vera "eminenza grigia", per i suoi connazionali che per vari motivi erano interessati a conoscere la realtà dell'isola²⁴: da Sir Alexander Ball, *Civil Commissioner* di Malta²⁵, al poeta Samuel Taylor Coleridge, che dal 1804 al 1806 fu alle dipendenze di Ball come suo *private secretary*²⁶; da Sir Charles William Pasley, *Royal Engineer* di stanza a Malta in missione in Sicilia nel 1806, ai generali della *British Navy* Sir John Moore e Henry Fox. All'inizio del 1807, Leckie fu anche una sorta di "personal adviser" per l'ambasciatore britannico a Palermo Sir William Drummond²⁷.

Nell'estate di quell'anno, proprio a causa della sua collaborazione con Drummond, Moore e Fox e del suo sempre maggiore coinvolgimento nella realtà politica siciliana che compromisero la sua posizione nei confronti della corte borbonica, Leckie si vide costretto a far ritorno in Inghilterra. Qui pubblicava il suo primo e più importante lavoro, intitolato *An Historical Survey of the Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, with a view to explain the causes of the disasters of the late and present wars*²⁸, allo scopo di richiamare l'attenzione del governo e dell'opinione pubblica del suo paese sulla politica inglese nel Mediterraneo.

L'analisi di Leckie sulla politica estera britannica durante gli anni delle guerre rivoluzionarie e napoleoniche prendeva il via da un semplice assioma. La Francia aveva totalmente alterato l'equilibrio dei poteri in Europa e la sua influenza si stava diffondendo su tutto il vecchio continente. Inoltre, in seguito al Blocco Continentale, i porti europei erano stati interdetti al commercio britannico²⁹. Ma, mentre i francesi consolidavano in un unico impero gran parte dell'Europa continentale appropriandosi delle risorse dei paesi occupati e imponendo loro «*to convert the youth of each into efficient combatants in their cause*»³⁰, l'Inghilterra attuava, secondo Lec-

²⁴ Cfr. D'ANDREA, *Nel «decennio inglese»*, 36.

²⁵ Cfr. JOHN W. DAMER POWELL, *Sir Alexander Ball: The Father of the Maltese*, in "The Blue Peter", 1935; MICHAEL GALEA, *Sir Alexander John Ball and Malta. The beginning of an era*, Malta 1990.

²⁶ Cfr. DONALD SULTANA, *Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Malta and in Italy*, Oxford 1969; D'ANDREA, «*If Sicily should become*».

²⁷ D'ANDREA, *Nel «decennio inglese»*.

²⁸ Cfr. GOULD FRANCIS LECKIE, *An Historical Survey of the Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, with a view to explain the causes of the disasters of the late and present wars*, London 1808. Quella utilizzata in questo lavoro è invece la seconda e più corposa edizione del 1810: *An Historical Survey, of the Foreign Affairs of Great Britain. For the years 1808, 1809, and 1810, with a view to explain the causes of the disasters of the late and present wars*, London 1810.

²⁹ Sul Blocco Continentale cfr. FRANÇOIS CROUZET, *L'Empire britannique et le Blocus Continental (1806-1813)*, Paris 1958, 146. Cfr., inoltre, LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 5.

³⁰ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 7.

kie, un sistema opposto e sostanzialmente “chimerico”, in quanto meramente difensivo³¹: «*If we reduce the share of it to a fatiguing exertion confined to defence alone, we must not blame the war for the sinister result, but attribute it to our own neglect of the advantages it offered*»³².

La soluzione a questo evidente stallo era, secondo l'opinione di Leckie, a portata di mano: «*we must therefore sometimes conquer, and if we are excluded for a time from the continent of Europe, form for ourselves an insular empire, complete in its parts, and sufficient to itself*»³³. Bisognava, in altri termini, potenziare le risorse della nazione al fine di opporsi al dilagare dell'influenza francese nel continente e di mantenere quel commercio sul quale storicamente si fondava il sistema economico inglese.

L'impero britannico era costituito da numerosi e lontani territori, molto distanti l'uno dall'altro. La sua forza non avrebbe mai potuto essere concentrata realmente se non mediante il mare, il cui dominio rappresentava «*a band of union to the whole empire*». Francia e Gran Bretagna divergevano profondamente: «*France is a continental, Britain a maritime power*»³⁴. L'oggetto naturale delle sue conquiste dovevano allora essere le isole³⁵.

Il tradizionale *balance of powers* in Europa era stato ormai sconvolto. Prospettivamente, nell'analisi di Leckie, il vecchio continente sarebbe stato caratterizzato dal nuovo equilibrio tra due grandi potenze, Francia e Russia; all'Inghilterra non restava allora altra scelta se non quella di ergersi a elemento compensatore, come forza di interposizione, tra di esse³⁶.

La storia aveva mostrato come Napoleone Bonaparte aveva sottoposto al proprio dominio la parte occidentale del continente, che la Russia estendeva il suo controllo su gran parte dei territori rimanenti e come entrambe minacciavano il vacillante impero ottomano. L'unico modo per confrontarsi con questa realtà era quello di “*Britannize*” ogni parte dell'Europa insula-

³¹ «*With regard to foreign policy, the British government is purely passive*»: cfr. GOULD FRANCIS LECKIE, *Essay on the Practice of the British Government; distinguished from the abstract theory on which it is supposed to be founded*, in “The Pamphleteer”, XXI (1817), vol. XI, 84.

³² Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 8.

³³ Per la citazione cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 8 (ed anche 425).

³⁴ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 17; e LECKIE, *An Historical Research into the Nature of the Balance of Power in Europe*, London 1817, vi-vii.

³⁵ «*By the conquest of these, she opens new fields of commerce, colonization and riches to her own subjects*»: LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 294-295.

³⁶ Ancora qualche anno dopo, Leckie avrebbe espresso questa sua convinzione in una lettera a Lord Aberdeen: British Library (da ora BL), Additional Manuscript (Add. Ms.) 43230, *Aberdeen Papers*, ff. 167-172, Londra, 11 novembre 1812. Pochi mesi prima, Leckie gli aveva trasmesso un suo progetto per il Medio Oriente: «*Lord Aberdeen (entre nous), to whom I communicated my plan for Schmirne*» (BL, Add. Ms. 41962, *Pasley Papers*, ff. 269-279, Londra 27 marzo 1811, Leckie a Pasley). Su Lord George Aberdeen, futuro ambasciatore inglese in Austria (1813-1814) e segretario di Stato agli Esteri (1828-1830; 1841-46) cfr. RCHM, *Private Papers of British Ministers*, 28.

re strategicamente rilevante e, allo scopo di dare stabilità a queste conquiste, «*to establish, as much as lied in our power, our laws and government*»³⁷.

Qualche anno prima, Burke aveva cercato una giustificazione ideale all'intervento della Gran Bretagna in una guerra contro la Francia rivoluzionaria ed era arrivato alla conclusione che l'Europa era un "Commonwealth". Considerare il vecchio continente come un'unica entità culturale e politica consentiva, secondo Burke, di applicare il diritto romano privato, "the law of vicinage" in particolare, tra Stati indipendenti³⁸.

Nel sottoporre al lettore questa sua metafora, Leckie sembrava rievocare il pensiero dello scrittore politico irlandese: «*if the ruin of my neighbour's house threaten my own, and he neither can nor will repair it, I have a right to interfere. [...]. But if he cannot prevent my enemy from getting into it, I have a right to occupy it first, lest my enemy by that means set a fire to mine*»³⁹.

La prima legge di natura era, infatti, secondo Leckie, il diritto di "self-defence".

4. Il progetto di "britannizzare" le isole del Mediterraneo

Nel particolare contesto rappresentato dal conflitto anti-napoleonico, secondo Leckie ogni guerra era destinata a essere "a war of opinion". La Gran Bretagna non poteva sperare di vincere il conflitto contro la Francia soltanto mediante l'uso della forza. I veri strumenti per combattere con successo un tale nemico potevano essere soltanto il potere dell'eloquenza e l'influenza esercitata sull'opinione pubblica, «*the power of eloquence and the influence of the press*»⁴⁰. Pochi anni prima, già Granville Penn, assistant-clerk al ministero della Guerra e delle Colonie e autore di un pamphlet sul-

³⁷ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 191. «*The means suggested were the acquisition of an insular empire, dispensing privileges and freedom analogous to our own, the dominion of the seas, and the friendship and commerce of the most distant regions of the globe*» (500).

³⁸ Cfr. BURKE, *Letters on a Regicide Peace*; IAN HAMPSHER-MONK, *Edmund Burke's changing justification for intervention*. Granville Penn riprendeva il concetto burkiano di *Republic of Europe*: cfr. GRANVILLE PENN, *The Policy and Interest of Great Britain, with respect to Malta, summarily considered*, London 1805, 105 e ss.

³⁹ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 503. Sull'adesione da parte del pubblicista inglese alle tesi di Burke cfr., inoltre, *Essay on the Practise of the British Government*, 73. L'esercizio di un diritto naturale di autodifesa e di *self-preservation* era molto dibattuto tra i pubblicisti del tempo: cfr., ad esempio, PENN, *The Policy and Interest of Great Britain*, 84-85; CHARLES W. PASLEY, *Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire*, London 1810, 152-153; e GEORGE COCKBURN, *A Voyage to Cadiz and Gibraltar, up the Mediterranean to Sicily and Malta, in 1810, & 11. Including a description of Sicily and the Lipari Islands, and an excursion in Portugal*. By L.^t Gen.^l Cockburn, 2 voll., London 1815, vol. II, 232n.

⁴⁰ Fondamentale era, in altre parole, «*the influence we obtain over the mind and affections of the people whose energies we are desirous to wield*»: cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 70. Ancora nel 1812, lo scrittore inglese avrebbe ripetuto la stessa convinzione. «*The most*

la centralità dell'isola di Malta per gli interessi inglesi nel Mediterraneo, aveva indicato la stampa come «*an engine for moving the public mind*», come uno strumento prezioso per superare le barriere imposte sul continente europeo dal dominio napoleonico⁴¹. I francesi erano riusciti a estendere il loro potere annettendo i paesi conquistati e imponendo il loro modello di governo; per sconfiggere questo sistema, la Gran Bretagna, secondo Leckie, doveva allora propagare «*among mankind the principles of freedom and justice*» su cui si basavano le istituzioni inglesi. «*Were the spirits of our institutions imitated in other parts of Europe*», scriveva Leckie, «*whenever this happened we should find friends and allies*»⁴².

La Sicilia, insieme a Malta e ad altre piccole postazioni strategiche, costituiva uno dei pochi territori dell'Europa mediterranea a non essere ancora caduto sotto il dominio francese. La sua difesa era allora imprescindibile, così come soltanto un anno prima Lord Grenville e il suo governo di "Tutti i Talenti" avevano ben intuito.

«*Let us reflect that at this moment Sicily and Malta are the only friendly ports we have in the Mediterranean, [...]; and that if we lose the two former that sea is effectually close to us; this point once gained by the enemy, the frontiers of French empire will be not the coasts of Europe alone, but the Euphrates and the Atlantic ocean!*»⁴³.

Secondo Leckie, la Sicilia rappresentava allora per la Gran Bretagna «*a necessary point*»⁴⁴. Anche senza spodestare manifestamente il legittimo sovrano dell'isola, il governo britannico doveva, secondo Leckie, mantenervi un forte controllo. Interferire nella situazione politica interna siciliana e attuarvi una riforma era, cioè, ritenuto indispensabile affinché la Gran Bretagna potesse mantenere salda la sua presenza nel Mediterraneo.

«*The revenues of that island will then probably pay the expense of its maintenance and defence, while the population may be useful to serve either by sea or land; the measure will increase the number of our partisans in Italy, while the Greeks islanders will wait in anxious expectation for us as deliverers*»⁴⁵.

Il possesso di Gibilterra, della Sicilia e di Malta, di Creta e Cipro, avrebbe consentito al governo inglese di opporsi con successo allo strapotere che la Francia aveva ormai sull'Europa continentale e, soprattutto, avrebbe ostacolato le mire espansionistiche francesi in Asia Minore e nel Levante⁴⁶.

powerful empire which a human being can exert over his fellow creatures is that of opinion»: LECKIE, *Essay on the Practice of the British Government*, 57.

⁴¹ Cfr. PENN, *The Policy and Interest of Great Britain*, 118.

⁴² Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 81.

⁴³ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 71.

⁴⁴ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 71.

⁴⁵ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 343.

⁴⁶ Durante il conflitto anti-francese, in Inghilterra erano emerse due linee strategiche

Al fine di perseguire l'attuazione di questa strategia, così come Leckie spiegava al generale John Moore in una lettera scrittagli da Gibilterra nell'agosto del 1807⁴⁷, centrale era il ruolo delle isole greche, in special modo di Creta e Cipro.

Creta rappresentava, così come la Sicilia, una base di estrema importanza per gli interessi inglesi nel Mediterraneo. Essa si trovava in un'area del mare Egeo dalla quale era possibile controllare la costa egiziana. Il suo suolo era fertile e ben coltivato e, «*though under the yoke of Turkey, the superior activity of the people makes the state of the country less languishing than that of Sicily*»⁴⁸. Inoltre, «*as the property and person of every individual would be secure, the population of Crete would increase by the emigration of Greeks from every quarter*»⁴⁹.

Gli abitanti più facoltosi di Smirne, Salonicco e Costantinopoli vi avrebbero trasferito i propri capitali e le proprie navi.

«*Crete, well administered, would probably pay its own expenses; it would be a depot of commerce for Egypt and Syria, and as its population would increase with its prosperity, it would not only be induced to enter into our service, [...]. The island might in a short time be able to furnish about twelve thousand men*»⁵⁰.

Il territorio di Cipro aveva un'estensione maggiore di quello di Creta, era meno montagnoso e più fertile; anche se l'isola non possedeva porti attrezzati, vi erano molti approdi e la sua vicinanza alle coste della Siria la rendeva di estrema importanza strategica per le comunicazioni con Bassora. Preordinata a qualunque altra considerazione vi era, inoltre, la consapevolezza che «*were it in the hands of an enemy, or any jealous power, the consequences would doubtless be severely felt by the East India Company*»⁵¹.

Fare di queste isole degli Stati indipendenti, sotto protettorato britannico, si sarebbe presto rivelata una misura necessaria. Per prevenire qualsiasi

di politica estera prevalenti totalmente opposte l'una dall'altra. «*There was a continual conflict between the principles of concentration of force to enable a telling counterstroke to be launched, and dispersal to cover or hold positions of maritime importance*». Nell'ambito di questa seconda categoria, nell'opinione di Mackesy, quella formulata da Leckie era «*the extreme dispersionist view*»: cfr. PIERS MACKESY, *The war in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810*, London 1957, 392. Su Malta, cfr. anche quanto scritto due anni prima da William Eton a Lord Sidmouth, in BL, Add. Ms. 37883, ff. 38-39, Londra 3 febbraio 1806.

⁴⁷ Cfr. *Letter to Sir John Moore, K.B., &c., on the French expedition overland to India*, ed anche le *Three Letters on the propriety of occupying the Greek Islands* in LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 314-326 e 357-376.

⁴⁸ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 209.

⁴⁹ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 214.

⁵⁰ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 214.

⁵¹ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 215. Pochi anni dopo, in una lettera a Lord Aberdeen, Leckie avrebbe commentato: «*the East India Company [...] has become to awake to the affairs of Turkey*». Il fatto che la compagnia decidesse nel 1812 di inviare un suo capitano «*to travel over that Empire and report to them on the subject*» dimostrava, secondo

tentativo della Francia di espandere la propria influenza a est dei suoi domini continentali, la realizzazione di una “strategia insulare” in quest’area del Mediterraneo avrebbe, infatti, creato una barriera tra i due continenti:

«*The existence of such a state would disturb their machinations in Asia Minor, and prevent them from laying the foundation of a power, which, by extending gradually to Persia, may fully obviate all the difficulties [...] in their intended march to India*»⁵².

5. Dalle “chimerical theories” di Leckie ai “laboratori costituzionali”

Sottesa alla *insular strategy* di Leckie vi era la convinzione che il bacino del Mediterraneo giocava un ruolo cruciale, rappresentando un’area di mezzo tra gli interessi economici e strategici della Gran Bretagna nella parte meridionale/insulare del continente europeo e le province più orientali del suo impero.

Il concetto veniva ulteriormente chiarito in un rapporto indirizzato dallo scrittore politico inglese direttamente al governo di Londra nel 1808⁵³:

«*In the present condition of the world, two distinct figures are to be observed: the northern and western parts of the continent are evidently under the influence of the enemy, while the southern and all islands may be considered as under that of Britain*»⁵⁴.

I principali teatri di scontro tra Francia e Inghilterra sarebbero stati da allora in poi le isole del Mediterraneo⁵⁵, la Persia e le frontiere dell’India⁵⁶.

«*It is from this consideration that the necessity of acquiring the islands naturally occurs; for having once established our power in them, we shall increase it on the ruin of that of the Turks. Islands are both useful and necessary to a great maritime power, and it is incumbent on such a power, in such changes of states and*

Leckie, che il suo punto di vista rispetto alla questione non era isolato («*the fact however of this appointment shows that I am not singular in the view I take of these affairs*»): BL, Add. Ms. 43230, ff. 167-172, Londra 11 novembre 1812, Leckie a Lord Aberdeen.

⁵² Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 324-325. Qualche anno più tardi Edward Blaquiè, dopo un lungo viaggio in Sicilia, sulla costa nordafricana e a Malta, avrebbe condiviso il punto di vista di Leckie: cfr. EDWARD BLAQUIÈ, *Letters from the Mediterranean, containing a civil and political account of Sicily, Tripoly, Tunis, and Malta*, 2 voll., London 1813, vol. II, vi-vii.

⁵³ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 381-386: «*Address to the British Cabinet on the Invasion of India*».

⁵⁴ Cfr. LECKIE, *Address to the British Cabinet*, 383.

⁵⁵ Il generale Cockburn, autore nel 1804 di un pamphlet sull’annessione della Sicilia alla Gran Bretagna, condivideva pienamente l’opinione di Leckie sulla centralità del Mediterraneo nello scontro tra Francia e Inghilterra: cfr. COCKBURN, *A Voyage to Cadiz and Gibraltar*, vol. II, 232-233n.

⁵⁶ Cfr. LECKIE, *Address to the British Cabinet*, 383-384.

empires, equally to provide against their belonging to its enemies or becoming a nest of pirates»⁵⁷.

Il governo britannico presieduto dal duca di Portland, la cui politica estera nel Mediterraneo, com'è noto, differiva profondamente da quella dei ministri che lo avevano preceduto, non accolse la formulazione di Leckie della strategia insulare.

La principale critica mossa al progetto elaborato dallo scrittore inglese riguardava la scarsità di forze militari a disposizione: la Gran Bretagna, per estensione e quantità di popolazione, non avrebbe potuto fornire truppe sufficienti ad affrontare un tale incremento territoriale, che avrebbe, tra l'altro, gravato sui già altissimi costi della guerra. Leckie, tuttavia, superava questa obiezione sostenendo che, a fronte della grande domanda di uomini che già proveniva dai territori delle Indie Occidentali e Orientali e del Capo di Buona Speranza, le isole del Mediterraneo avrebbero potuto fornire gli uomini occorrenti alla loro difesa⁵⁸.

Anche Charles William Pasley, grande amico del *landowner* e scrittore politico inglese, era contrario, con poche eccezioni, all'idea di un impero insulare, sostenendo invece l'opportunità che la Gran Bretagna ingrandisse il proprio impero mediante l'acquisizione di territori più vasti⁵⁹.

Anche nel corso degli anni seguenti, gli uomini di Stato inglesi continuarono a ignorare l'analisi di Leckie sull'importanza delle isole del Mediterraneo, come unica base per accrescere la potenza britannica in contrapposizione alla Francia napoleonica, e a impiegare la naturale superiorità navale e marittima della Gran Bretagna solo come un mezzo per perseguire la ricostituzione dello *status quo* in Europa. La sua *insular strategy* veniva definita "teoretica" e Leckie stesso veniva considerato a "*chimerical theorist*"⁶⁰.

Tuttavia, queste idee avrebbero trovato una nuova eco nel 1811. All'inizio di quell'anno, Lord Wellesley, *Foreign Secretary* del governo Perceval, avrebbe offerto a Lord William Cavendish Bentinck l'incarico di una missione in Sicilia molto speciale. L'arrivo di Bentinck a Palermo, nell'estate, come comandante in capo delle forze britanniche nel Mediterraneo e ministro plenipotenziario presso la corte borbonica, avrebbe sanzionato l'inizio di una nuova fase nei rapporti tra l'isola e la Gran Bretagna, che sarebbe sfociata nella creazione del testo costituzionale del 1812, basato sul modello inglese.

⁵⁷ Cfr. LECKIE, *Address to the British Cabinet*, 385.

⁵⁸ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 390, 491 e ss.

⁵⁹ Pasley, che aveva conosciuto Leckie a Malta e ne era diventato molto amico, sosteneva nel suo trattato che un impero "insulare" sarebbe stato caratterizzato da un'eccessiva debolezza intrinseca, dovuta alla sua frammentarietà e alla difficoltà di difenderne e gestirne le diverse parti: cfr. PASLEY, *Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions*, 64-65, 75-88.

⁶⁰ Cfr. LECKIE, *An Historical Survey*, 398 e 458.

Le isole del Mediterraneo (la Sicilia, Malta e le Isole Ionie) sarebbero gradualmente entrate in una nuova prospettiva nell'ambito della politica estera inglese, in quella "strategia talassocratica" che le avrebbe rese veri e propri "laboratori costituzionali" nei quali il governo britannico poté sperimentare il sistema in seguito adottato nei suoi domini coloniali⁶¹.

⁶¹ Cfr. RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico*, x, xxiv, 217. Sulle Isole Ionie cfr., in particolare, GERASSIMOS PAGRATIS, *The Ionian Islands under British Protection (1815-1864)*, in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean*, ed. by VASSALLO and D'ANGELO, 131-150.

Kyriillos Nikolaou

La politique maritime impériale de la Grande Bretagne: Famagouste 1878-1882

1. *A la veille et au temps du congrès de Berlin. Les besoins navales de l'Angleterre dans le Levant*

L'importance géopolitique toute spéciale qu'avait pour l'Angleterre le Proche-Orient exigeait une nouvelle poche maritime qui permettrait à l'Angleterre de contrôler le mieux possible cette région¹. De cette façon, donc, un autre pion vint s'ajouter à l'échiquier de la Grande-Bretagne et permit de combler le vide depuis Malte à Aden². Disraeli craignait une éventuelle prise de Constantinople par les Russes³, ce qui offrirait à ces derniers un débouché sur la Méditerranée, avec pour les Anglais un danger possible pour la route des Indes⁴. Ainsi, dès cet instant, il commença à faire des plans dans le but de trouver un nouvel emplacement dans la région, d'où il pourrait contrôler la progression russe qui semblait inévitable⁵. Ainsi le Ministère de la Guerre charge-t-il le Capitaine Ardagh⁶, puis plus tard, le 29 octobre 1876, le Colonel Robert Home (de l'Intelligence Département) ainsi qu'une équipe de confrères des Services Secrets, d'examiner un emplacement défensif qui se situerait dans l'espace géographique s'étendant verticalement depuis la région de la Thrace, à l'ouest de Constantinople, en mer Noire et dans la mer de Marmara, jusqu'à la Crète et Suez. Lorsqu'ils auraient fait leur choix, ils devraient élaborer des projets pour cette place défensive et estimer le potentiel néces-

¹ D. THOMSON, *England and the Ninethenth Century, 1815-1914* (Baltimore, 1996), 20-25.

² Cf. ROBERT H. STEPHENS, *Cyprus: a Place of Arms* (London, 1966).

³ R.H. LANG, *Cyprus: Its History* (London, 1878) II, 101-104.

⁴ M.E. YAPP, *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923* (London-New York, 1987), 59.

⁵ Voir T.C. DJUVARA, *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie* (Paris, 1914); TH. VAKALOPOULOS, *Istoria tou Neou Ellinismou* (en grec), t. 4 (Thessalonique, 1973), 66-74.

⁶ Cf. W.L. LANGER, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890* (London-New York, 1931), 99-105.

saire pour s'en emparer⁷. Ainsi le Général Simmons prépara-t-il le mémoire du 28 avril 1877 destiné au Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Edwards et au Commandant de la Navy Egerton pour trouver un port où les navires pourraient se réapprovisionner et effectuer de petites réparations en toute sûreté, sans être obligés de se réfugier à Malte. Un tel port devrait remplir les deux conditions suivantes: pouvoir être protégé par une petite puissance durant l'absence des navires de guerre, et se trouver dans une île, afin que les navires fussent à l'abri des bateaux ennemis⁸.

Dans une lettre de Layard à Salisbury, le 15 mai 1878, il été souligné que la route des Indes devait passer par le nord de la Syrie. Layard écrivait que, à partir du moment où les Turcs étaient prêts à construire la ligne de chemin de fer vers Bagdad, l'Angleterre devrait s'assurer le contrôle des populations des pays par lesquels passerait le chemin de fer. Il ajoutait qu'un port sur les côtes nord de la Syrie devrait constituer le terminus de cette ligne ferroviaire⁹. Ici, il nous faut rappeler que durant la procédure devant guider au choix de Chypre¹⁰, entre autres possessions proposées, la diplomatie anglaise avait signalé que pour les besoins navals, la nouvelle acquisition devrait disposer d'un port approprié et facile à protéger, dans une région qui se trouverait près des lignes de communication avec l'Inde¹¹. Hardington, expliquait à la Chambre des Communes l'importance qu'aurait pour le gouvernement de l'Inde le futur chemin de fer de l'Euphrate¹². Par ailleurs, Sir Charles Dilke, le 29 juillet, rappela que la ligne de Constantinople au golfe Persique constituerait une route alternative pour les Indes¹³ et

⁷ The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NA), F.O. 358/1, *Strictly Confidential Reports and Memoranda Relative to Defence of Constantinople and Other Positions in Turkey, also on Routes in Roumelia* (0631), printed at the War Office.

⁸ G. CECIL, *Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury* (London, 1932), 145-147. Cf. C. 1830, Turkey, no. 26, 1877, Layard, Desp. No 546, Therapia, May 30, 1877.

⁹ D. LEE, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* (London-Cambridge, 1934), 76, 136.

¹⁰ Pour la Convention anglo-turque sur Chypre, voir *Parliamentary Papers*, [Turkey], N. 36, C. 2057 (1878). Toutes les clauses étaient calculées pour établir que l'occupation de Chypre n'avait qu'un caractère provisoire. Voir *Documents Diplomatiques Français* publiés par le Ministère des Affaires étrangères 1871-1914, t. II, 352 et suivantes. Voir également R. STORRS, *Orientalism* (London, 1943), 462.

¹¹ LEE, *Great Britain*, 77: "Since the eighteenth century, Indian Muslim attachment to the Ottoman Empire, the last Muslim great power, had been increasing"; PH. MANSSEL, *Constantinople, City of the world's desire, 1453-1924* (London, 1995), 306. Voir aussi *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, vol. 4, 102-105, doc. 89, Layard to the Earl of Derby, Constantinople, December 4, 1877, 104.

¹² LEE, *Great Britain*, 125.

¹³ Pour les transports au Moyen-Orient, voir en general: E. EARLE, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway* (New York, 1923); E. ELEFTERIADES, *Les chemins de fer en Syrie et au Liban* (Beyrut, 1944); CH. ISSAWI, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York, 1982).

que l'occupation de Chypre était indispensable en période de guerre¹⁴, car elle assurerait ainsi la sécurité de cette ligne de chemin de fer.

Chypre constituait le point de départ des plans anglais, un dépôt militaire¹⁵ et la clé du golfe d'Alexandrette, et en outre elle était appelée à se transformer en station commerciale du Levant¹⁶. En ce qui concerne l'importance de la position géographique de Chypre quant aux projets du chemin de fer, nous pouvons lire dans la presse la chose suivante: «Située à proximité des côtes de Syrie, à six heures de Beyrouth et à douze d'Alexandrette, le seul port de la Syrie ; distante de vingt-quatre heures de navigation des côtes d'Égypte, elle occupe dans l'est de la Méditerranée une position de premier ordre. Des aujourd'hui, elle commande le canal de Suez et, lorsque suite sera donnée au projet de chemin de fer de l'Euphrate, elle se trouvera, en quelque sorte, au débouché des deux grandes voies de communication ouvertes par la science moderne entre l'Europe et le monde oriental»¹⁷. Home reconnaissait que ses ports n'étaient pas sans défauts, mais il pensait néanmoins qu'il y aurait facilement possibilité d'en construire un bon, et le gouvernement de Disraeli jeta finalement son dévolu sur l'île de Chypre, laquelle avait justement été décrite à la Reine d'Angleterre comme la clé de l'Asie de l'ouest¹⁸.

2. Le projet de réorganisation du port de Famagouste

C'est dans ce contexte que fut également mis en place le projet de réorganisation du port de Famagouste. C'était là une chose indispensable, car il fallait aux Anglais un poste de ravitaillement et de sécurité pour leurs projets plus vastes visant à étendre leur influence sur les populations du Proche-Orient, projets qui comprenaient entre autres, la question du chemin de fer. La politique de Beaconsfield semblait intelligente et bien menée. A ce moment-là, les intérêts de l'Empire britannique imposaient en priorité la réfection du vieux port de Famagouste. En janvier 1882, Castillon notait:

«Le Sous-secrétaire d'Etat avait profité de son séjour dans l'île pour se rendre personnellement compte de certaines questions de détail au point de vue militaire et pour discuter sur place les conclusions, encore confidentielles, d'un rapport qui vient d'être dressé par une troisième commission d'officiers, dernièrement désignée pour contrôler les projets de deux commissions précédentes et dresser de nouveaux plans des travaux à entreprendre pour faire de Famagouste un port militaire de premier ordre, ou les flottes anglaises pourront trouver plus tard,

¹⁴ Cf. STEPHENS, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*.

¹⁵ E. CAZALET, *The Berlin Congress and the Anglo-Turkish Convention* (London, 1878), 3-4.

¹⁶ LEE, *Great Britain*, 128.

¹⁷ *Le Temps*, 24 juillet 1878.

¹⁸ H. TEMPERLEY, "Disraeli and Cyprus", *English Historical Review*, 1931, 274-279.

avec un abri assuré, une puissante base d'opérations dans les eaux orientales de la Méditerranée»¹⁹.

Les Anglais pouvaient utiliser Chypre comme une étape transitaire commerciale mais aussi militaire, en association avec leurs plans de chemins de fer sur la rive opposée²⁰. Pourquoi les diplomates français, autant le consul à Larnaca que l'ambassadeur à Constantinople, étaient-ils si inquiets? Le consul de France à Larnaca écrivait le 18 mars 1886 que il avait été question en 1878 de créer à Chypre un port franc, d'où les produits anglais auraient pu faire une très sérieuse concurrence aux produits français en Syrie et en Caramanie, car l'Angleterre pourrait se faire une clientèle assez étendue parmi les populations du Liban²¹. La remise en fonctionnement d'ancien port de Famagouste²² avait déjà été signalée comme nécessaire par les Anglais en 1878. L'Amiral Hornby croyait que cela pouvait se faire à peu de frais²³. Layard considérait que l'absence de port, à Chypre, faisait perdre à l'île son caractère opportun en tant que station maritime, mais il reconnaissait néanmoins l'importance de sa position géographique²⁴. La vérité est que Chypre n'était pas réputée au XIX^e siècle pour avoir de bons ports. Celui de Famagouste en particulier, après la période vénitienne, avait perdu de son éclat²⁵. L'historien Theodore Papadopoulos mentionne que Famagouste n'a jamais recovered comme port commercial pendant la période ottomane²⁶. Le Capitaine George Hope, en 1789, dans un rapport sur les rades et mouillages de Chypre, n'avait même pas mentionné celui de Famagouste. Il nous informait que le meilleur port se trouvait à Larnaca (Enrica) et que celui de Limassol était inadéquat en période hivernale²⁷. Le consul Niven Kerr, dans la décennie de 1840, avait insisté sur le fait qu'hormis Alexandrette, il n'y avait pas sur les côtes syriennes de meilleur *roadstead* que Larnaca, et que

¹⁹ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAE), CPC, Larnaca, vol. 3, le 16 janvier 1882, direction des affaires politiques, no 12.

²⁰ D. LEE, "A Memorandum concerning Cyprus 1878", *Journal of Modern History*, t. 3 (1931), 235-241.

²¹ AMAE, CPC, Larnaca, le 18 mars 1886, f. 271v-272r.

²² Cf. H. LUKE, *Cyprus. A Portrait and an Appreciation* (London, 1957), où on lit "It was the fall of Acre, the last outpost of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem, in 1291 which made of Famagusta for the ensuing century the busiest mart of the eastern Mediterranean" (118). Et aussi: "For Famagusta, the seaport in question, had still, when Shakespeare wrote, some measure of its earlier glamour" (117).

²³ C. 2224, Parliamentary Papers, Hornby to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Jan 20, 1879; cf. A. BRASSEY, *Sunshine and Storm in the East* (London, 1880), 324.

²⁴ LEE, *Great Britain*, 121.

²⁵ Cf. TH. IOANNOU, *Emporikes scheseis Kyprou-Gallias kata to 18o aiona* (Nicosie, 2002), 16.

²⁶ TH. PAPADOPOULLOS, *Social and Historical Data on Population (1570-1881)* (Nicosie, 1965), 30.

²⁷ G. F. HILL, *A History of Cyprus*, vols I-IV (Cambridge, 1952), 270-271.

Famagouste, sans trop de dépenses, pourrait se transformer en un refuge sur, même pour les bateaux de guerre les plus petits²⁸. Plus tard, en 1859, l'auteur d'un rapport mentionnait que le port de Famagouste ne pouvait accueillir que dix petits vaisseaux et que les navires de plus de 250 tonnes ne pouvaient y entrer que s'ils étaient vides. Si le port était nettoyé, il pourrait accueillir 100 vaisseaux de toutes les dimensions²⁹.

Il ajoutait que l'on y entreposait de temps en temps de grandes quantités de munitions de guerre, et disait aussi que les murailles d'un côté du port étaient détruites³⁰. Le vice-consul White, en 1863, disait que Chypre, si elle était occupée par une puissance européenne, verrait Famagouste reprendre un rôle plus important, et Savile, en 1878, reprenait l'observation de White, en ajoutant que ce serait la une chose nécessaire si le projet de chemin de fer de l'Euphrate devait se concrétiser³¹. Le journal *le Temps*, écrivait le 10 juillet 1878, que Chypre avait dans Famagouste les éléments d'un port de guerre de premier ordre quand on aura par des jetées et des dragages agrandi le port actuel, totalement abandonné depuis les Vénitiens. En un tour de main, les anciennes fortifications, dues à l'ingénieur Marinengo qui, devant son époque, avait déjà deviné le système de Vauban, ces fortifications remises en état rendront Famagouste une place de guerre de premier ordre³².

Lord Brassey, qui visita l'île en 1878, écrivait qu'avec de petites dépenses, Famagouste pourrait devenir un entrepôt de charbon pour une flotte, au moins égal à ceux qui existent à Gibraltar. Le port fut étudié par le commandant d'Etat-major Millard dans la même année, et des plans et devis pour sa restauration furent préparés par ce même officier en 1879³³. L'amiral Sir Geoffrey Philips Hornby, commandant en chef de la Flotte Méditerranéenne et spécialiste des questions navales, était donc d'avis qu'un tel port pouvait être construit sans trop de dépenses. Il rapporta à l'amirauté qu'il avait inspecté le port et que celui-ci pourrait abriter davantage de bateaux de guerre que le *Grand Harbour* de Malte (à quatorze contre neuf). Il était certain que le port attirerait tout le commerce des côtes syriennes et de Caramanie, en tant que seul port dans la région offrant une sécurité parfait-

²⁸ HILL, *A History of Cyprus*, 270.

²⁹ HILL, *A History of Cyprus*, 270 où l'on trouve le renvoi à : NA, F.O. 78/802, 31 May and 21 Sept. 1849; NA, F.O. 78/621, 31 Dec. 1845. Le port était alors remblayé, sans toutefois que l'on eut pris la peine d'enlever les boues et les déchets, et il n'y avait que onze à douze pieds d'eau.

³⁰ HILL, *A History of Cyprus*, 270, qui renvoie à NA, F.O. 198/13.

³¹ LEE, *Great Britain*, 172.

³² *Le Temps*, 10 juillet 1878, «l'île de Chypre»

³³ AMAE, CPC, Larnaca, vol. 5, le 11 juin 1892. Pour l'importance du port de Famagouste voir A. STYLIANOU and J. STYLIANOU, *The History of the Cartography of Cyprus* (Nicosie, 1980).

te ainsi que les facilités de chargement et de déchargement rapides qu'exigent les navires de commerce³⁴. Famagouste constituait selon le journal *Le Temps*, «le seul port ferme qu'offrent les mers du Levant, de Rhodes à Alexandrie»³⁵. La rade, d'une superficie de 32 hectares, pourrait facilement être creusée à dix mètres, et l'étendue du mouillage serait aisément portée à une soixantaine d'hectares si l'on construisait une jetée en avant du port existant. Ses fortifications pourraient être restaurées et elle deviendrait alors «à la fois ville de guerre, port militaire et port commercial. Son importance, à ce dernier point de vue, ressort de sa situation même. Famagouste commande le port d'Alexandrette et sera forcément le rendez-vous de navires lorsque le chemin de fer de la Syrie à l'Euphrate viendra déboucher, soit à Suedieh, soit sur tout autre point du littoral syrien»³⁶.

En janvier 1880, un ingénieur expert, Ormiston, étudia à nouveau la question et fit un rapport non seulement sur les ressources du port, mais aussi sur la facilité avec laquelle il pourrait être restauré, appuyant ses recommandations de nouvelles cartes, de plans et de devis pour trois projets différents³⁷. Enfin, Samuel Brown, qui avait été nommé Ingénieur du Gouvernement de Chypre, principalement en raison de la grande expérience dont il avait fait preuve dans la construction du nouveau port d'Alexandrie, fit un troisième rapport, comparant favorablement le port de Famagouste à celui d'Alexandrie sur plusieurs points essentiels. Brown dessina de nouvelles cartes et de nouveaux plans et, le 30 novembre, proposa trois projets comportant des dépenses plus ou moins importantes³⁸. Beaconsfield écrivait à Victoria que le général Sir Edward Hamlay avait dit que Famagouste pourrait acquérir un port «which will conveniently receive all your Majesty's ironsides»³⁹. Selon le point de vue officiel anglais, Famagouste deviendrait l'un des meilleurs ports du monde⁴⁰. Bien que, comme le signale Hill, le lieu était insalubre et la construction du port ne pourrait être menée à bien sans le concours du Trésor Impérial⁴¹. En août 1880, Alphonse Baudin, administrateur de la Compagnie ottomane de la Route de

³⁴ *Accounts and Papers* LIV (1879), C. 2244. Reports to the Admiralty on the Anchorages, etc., of Cyprus.

³⁵ *Le Temps*, 24 juillet 1878.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ Report by Mr Ormiston, C.I.E., M. Inst. C.E., on Improvements proposed at the harbour of Famagousta, dated January 10, 1880, from Bombay 1880, C. 2544, xlix, 737.

³⁸ AMAE, CPC, Larnaca, vol. 5, le 11 juin 1892; Voir aussi: "Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Cyprus" to accompany a report by S. Brown, Government Engineer, from Nicosia, dated November 30, 1881, 1882, C. 3384, xlv, 15.

³⁹ W. MONYPENNY - G. BUCKLE, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*, vols I-IV (London, 1929), vol. II, 1267, 27 Nov. 1878.

⁴⁰ S. BAKER, *Cyprus as I saw It in 1879* (London, 1879), 154-157.

⁴¹ HILL, *A History of Cyprus*, 273.

Beyrouth à Damas, écrivait à Jagerschmidt, directeur des affaires commerciales au Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Paris, en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer de Syrie et d'Asie Mineure et le rôle de Famagouste, que l'Angleterre tenait ouverte la route de l'Inde par le canal de Suez dont elle surveillait l'entrée par ce même port de Famagouste. En liaison, des voies ferrées relierait les côtes de l'Anatolie avec les vallées du Tydmur, du Tigre, de l'Euphrate et de l'Indus⁴².

Selon l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople, Fournier, la Sublime Porte et le Cabinet Britannique envisageaient de construire une voie ferrée conduisant de la Méditerranée à la vallée du Tigre en passant par Marache, Diarbekir, Mardin et Mossoul⁴³. Elle serait la voie militaire directe dont les Turcs et les Anglais avaient un besoin absolu afin de venir – soit du bassin méditerranéen soit de l'océan Indien – prendre une position stratégique de premier ordre dans les défilés de Tiflis entre le lac de Van et le massif de Diarbekir Dag. Il expliquait comment l'occupation de l'île de Chypre fut la première étape devant permettre le contrôle de l'Asie Mineure par les Anglais, lesquels, avec les projets de construction du chemin de fer, se pré-occupaient de la Syrie et du Liban⁴⁴.

Bien que, de ces projets, rien ne fut réalisé⁴⁵, le consul français écrivait en 1885 qu'il était inquiet des faits qui viendraient à se produire dans le pays de sa résidence; que les intérêts majeurs que la France avait en Syrie pourraient être directement attaqués par la création d'un centre aussi important que celui que le nouveau ministère anglais se proposait d'établir à Chypre⁴⁶. Il mentionnait que «*La question se présente dans des conditions toutes différentes si on envisage l'avenir. Le gouvernement anglais n'a pas, il est vrai, cherché jusqu'ici à tirer un parti sérieux de la position si favorable que lui procure dans la partie la plus orientale de la Méditerranée son occupation de Chypre; mais il est à prévoir que cet état de choses ne tardera pas à se modifier. Avant peu de temps, Larnaca sera selon toute vraisemblance appelé à devenir, par la création d'un port franc, le centre d'où le commerce et la politique de la Grande Bretagne rayonneront en Syrie, en Caramanie et en Asie Mineure*»⁴⁷.

Le consul de France à Larnaca avertissait des conséquences pour les intérêts français dans le Levant, qui produit le fait que l'Angleterre se trouve si rapprochée de Syrie en occupant Chypre et surtout l'ancien port de Fa-

⁴² Affaires Diverses, Turquie 1880, vol. 17, Paris, le 17 août 1880. Voir aussi le rapport du commandant de la «Reine Blanche», chemins de fer projetés par l'Angleterre en Orient.

⁴³ Voir Affaires Diverses, Turquie 1880, Dépêche télégraphique du Capitaine de Torcy, attaché militaire à l'Ambassade de France en Turquie, Capitaine de Torcy à Monsieur le Général Farre Ministre de la Guerre, le 13 octobre 1880.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 265r-266v.

⁴⁵ Cf. F. CROUZET, *Le Conflit de Chypre 1946-1959* (Bruxelles, 1973), 66.

⁴⁶ AMAE, CPC, Larnaca, vol. 4, le 6 Juillet 1885.

⁴⁷ AMAE, CPC, Larnaca, vol. 4, le 24 Décembre 1885.

magouste. Il faisait observer que les intérêts français n'avaient pas eu encore beaucoup à souffrir de l'établissement de l'Angleterre à Chypre car l'Angleterre elle-même n'avait pas exploité complètement les possibilités que lui donnait cette occupation de Chypre et du port de Famagouste⁴⁸. L'inquiétude des Français était concentrée sur le fait que l'Angleterre, à partir du moment où elle avait occupé Chypre, avait entre ses mains le point-clé de la Méditerranée orientale et montrait une suprématie maritime qui l'aiderait par la suite à imposer son influence et son pouvoir sur la terre ferme. Nous avons bien vu de quelle façon l'ambition de l'Angleterre de construire des lignes de chemin de fer au Proche-Orient avait une relation avec la nécessité d'imposer sa suprématie dans la mer en face d'Alexandrette⁴⁹. Quatre ans après l'occupation de Chypre, les journaux Times (12 juin 1882), écrivirent que Beaconsfield avait dit à Bismarck au Congrès de Berlin que le rôle de Chypre était entre autres de couvrir le terminus du chemin de fer⁵⁰.

3. *Le projet de la reconstruction du port de Famagouste ne fut jamais réalisé*

Néanmoins, nous devons dire que le projet de construction du port de Famagouste, tel qu'il aurait pu trouver toute son utilité, et bien qu'il eût pour les Anglais un grand intérêt, ne fut jamais réalisé. Le *Revue d'Edinbourg* en juin 1892 écrivait que pour 49.000 livres sterling l'Ingénieur du Gouvernement anglais aurait pu construire un bassin intérieur de 9 acres d'étendue, avec une profondeur minima à l'entrée de 26 pieds d'eau, et un bon port commercial avec les environs et les approches restaurés et réparés. Pour 138.000 on aurait des restaurations plus importantes, alors que pour 340.000 M. Brown aurait achevé un bassin intérieur et un bassin extérieur, un mole, des quais capables de contenir douze vaisseaux, chacun de 400 pieds de long, avec des bâtisses appropriées à un port naval. «*Le plans et les devis de M Brown furent publiés dans le Blue Book, furent sans doute comparés à ceux du Commandant Millard et de M. Ormiston, et toute la collection fut alors jetée dans le panier officiel de Downing Street*»⁵¹. Le projet ne se concrétisa pas, même si l'Angleterre, selon Sir Thomas Brassey, devait «*faire de Chypre un port libre et le Hong-Kong et Singapour de la Méditerranée Orientale*»⁵².

⁴⁸ AMAE, CPC, Larnaca, vol. 4, le 18 Mars 1886, f. 268v.

⁴⁹ *Le Temps*, 10 juillet 1878.

⁵⁰ *The Times*, 12 June 1882.

⁵¹ AMAE, CPC, Larnaca, vol. 5, le 11 juin 1892, f. 51r. Le consul de France à Chypre transmet le texte à la *Revue d'Edinbourg*.

⁵² *Ibidem*.

Et le rédacteur de la Revue d'Édinbourg de conclure que: «*Si Chypre était tombée dans les mains d'une autre puissance moins bien douée et avec des intérêts maritimes moindres que la Grande Bretagne, nous savons quels efforts et quels sacrifices auraient été faits pour changer l'île en une station navale, commandant les mers du Levant et les cotes de Syrie et d'Égypte, et pour l'ouvrir au commerce et au trafic du monde. Avec un peu plus de prévoyance et un peu plus de libéralité, Chypre pourrait devenir une possession non inférieure en valeur à Malte et supérieure à Corfou. Seule l'Angleterre a choisi de laisser l'œuvre non-faite*»⁵³.

Dans la première moitié de 1882⁵⁴, la grande agitation qui régnait en Égypte conduisit les Anglais et les Français à convenir d'une démonstration navale en commun sur les cotes égyptiennes⁵⁵. Par la suite, le 20 juillet⁵⁶, l'Angleterre envoya un corps expéditionnaire et, afin d'assurer le contrôle du canal de Suez – même si Disraeli avait écrit le 23 octobre 1876 que la clé de l'Inde était Constantinople et non pas l'Égypte et le canal de Suez⁵⁷ – décida d'agir toute seule et, en septembre 1882, conquiert l'Égypte⁵⁸. Miller écrit que l'occupation de l'Égypte par les Anglais réduisit de manière capitale l'importance stratégique de l'île pour les Anglais⁵⁹. La même avis partage Purcell qu'il estime que le contrôle d'un port comme Alexandrie avait fait non nécessaire pour les Britanniques de développer un port à Chypre⁶⁰. L'occupation de l'Égypte, le contrôle de Suez mais aussi l'implication politique et stratégique directe des Britanniques en Anatolie et dans la région entre Alexandrette et le golfe Persique, réduisirent l'importance de Famagouste pour les communications impériales et la défense. Ainsi, l'amirauté cessa de s'intéresser au développement du port naval de Famagouste, qui coûterait trop cher au contribuable an-

⁵³ *Ibidem*, f. 56v.

⁵⁴ NA, F.O. 78/2997 British Policy on Egypt 16 October 1879.

⁵⁵ Cf. S. SAUL, *La France et l'Égypte de 1882 à 1914. Intérêts économiques et implications politiques* (Paris, 1997), 237.

⁵⁶ Déjà, le 11 juillet, la flotte anglaise avait bombardé l'Alexandrie. Jusqu'à la fin du mois d'août, les violents incidents et les actes belliqueux de la part de la flotte anglaise furent des faits quotidiens sur le canal. SAUL, *La France et l'Égypte*, 237.

⁵⁷ YAPP, *The Making*, 156-157.

⁵⁸ LANGER, *European Alliances*, chaps 16, 17. Sur l'importance de l'événement qu'était l'occupation de l'Égypte, voir R. HYAM, *Britain's Imperial Century (1815-1914)* (London, 1993), 192.

⁵⁹ W. MILLER, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors 1801-1922* (Cambridge, 1923), 468-469. Cette opinion est partagée par F. ZANETOS, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre. De l'Occupation anglaise à nos jours* (en grec), vol. II (1911), 375.

⁶⁰ "Control over a good harbour at Alexandria made it unnecessary for the British to develop the shallow ones in Cyprus. Indeed, possession of the island by a power which also has control over better ports on the nearby mainland has always meant that the Cypriot ports played a less important economic role than would otherwise have been the case". H. D. PURCELL, *Cyprus* (London, 1969), 205.

glais⁶¹. Le Colonial Office, en outre, signalait que si la Grande-Bretagne devait entrer en guerre contre un ou plusieurs pays en Méditerranée, il ne serait pas dans son intérêt de réunir à Chypre de grandes forces, car l'armée pourrait s'y faire piéger⁶².

⁶¹ Voir en general: *Reports made to the Admiralty on the Anchorages etc. of the Island of Cyprus*, C. 2224 (London, 1879).

⁶² NA, C.O. 67/28, Admiralty to Colonial Office, November 7, 1882, enclosing report by Major-General Pasley R. E.

Elli Lemonidou

La Marine alliée en Grèce pendant la Première guerre mondiale

Au début de la Première guerre mondiale la Grèce se trouvait dans une situation très ambiguë: le roi Constantin, subissant l'influence de sa culture germanique, optait en faveur d'une politique de neutralité, tandis que pour le Premier ministre, Eleuthérios Vénizélos, le pays était l'alliée naturelle de l'Angleterre et de la France.

La flotte alliée devait peser de façon décisive sur l'évolution de la situation, constituant une arme puissante, utilisée par les Alliés dans plusieurs occasions pour exercer une pression sur les divers gouvernements royalistes qui succédèrent à Vénizélos au pouvoir¹, et pour, le cas échéant, pousser la Grèce à quitter sa neutralité et ainsi la faire basculer dans la guerre aux côtés de l'Entente. Son rôle devint encore plus important après l'expédition alliée de Salonique, en octobre 1915; elle se trouva alors impliquée dans la sécurité de l'armée d'Orient et dans l'évolution du camp retranché de Salonique.

Dès novembre 1915, les navires alliés procédèrent à l'occupation des îles de Lemnos, de Milos, de Mytilène, de Castellorizo, de la baie de la Sude, en Crète, pour y établir des bases. Le 11 janvier 1916, on occupa l'île de Corfou, destinée à abriter les débris de l'armée serbe² et quelques mois

¹ Vénizélos démissionna le 5 octobre 1915, quelques heures après les premiers débarquements des soldats franco-britanniques à Salonique, à cause du refus du roi d'entrer en guerre.

² Le 6 octobre 1915 la Bulgarie déclencha son offensive, simultanément avec les troupes austro-allemandes, contre la Serbie. Les forces alliées de Salonique, incapables de rejoindre l'armée serbe, durent se replier sur Salonique, alors que l'armée serbe continuait à battre retraite à travers l'Albanie, talonnée par l'adversaire. Elle gagna la mer Adriatique et embarqua à Durazzo, où elle fut transportée par la Marine alliée à l'île de Corfou pour y être ranimée. En mars 1916, on décida le transfert de cette armée reconstituée à Salonique; l'opération fut dirigée par l'amiral de Gueydon, et les transports qui durèrent presque deux mois, furent effectués sans la moindre perte. A la fin de mai 1916, les troupes serbes, comptant 120.000 hommes, se réunirent dans les camps prépa-

plus tard, le 9 juin, ce fut le tour de l'île de Thassos, occupée par des troupes françaises.

Le 21 juin, les Alliés décidèrent la remise d'une note collective au cabinet d'Athènes, accompagnée d'une démonstration navale dans la baie de Phalère. Cette note exigeait la démobilisation de l'armée hellénique, le remplacement du ministère, la dissolution de la Chambre et la proclamation d'élections générales. Pour forcer le gouvernement grec à céder, la flotte alliée procéda à un blocus partiel des côtes grecques³. Fin août 1916, le refus du gouvernement d'Athènes de s'opposer à l'invasion de la Macédoine orientale par les Bulgares, conduisit les Alliés à une nouvelle démonstration navale au large du Pirée, suivie de la remise d'une note collective qui exigeait l'expulsion de la ville des agents ennemis⁴.

Le 26 septembre 1916, Vénizélos embarqua secrètement et avec la collaboration de la légation française, pour se rendre d'abord en Crète et puis à Salonique, où il forma un gouvernement provisoire. La flotte alliée aida de manière décisive Venizélos à accomplir la destruction définitive de l'État d'Athènes; plus précisément, elle contribua à ce que les navires chargés de troupes vénizélistes s'approchent des îles grecques, dans le but d'inciter les populations à la révolte, à l'abolition des autorités royalistes et à l'adhésion au gouvernement provisoire. C'est ainsi que fin décembre 1916, les vénizélistes devinrent maîtres des Cyclades, puis, en avril-mai 1917, de Zante, Céphalonie, Ithaque, Sainte-Maure et Scopélos⁵.

Or, les événements où l'action de la Marine alliée fut prépondérante, prirent place les 1er et 2 décembre 1916 à Athènes. Depuis novembre 1916 les relations des Alliés avec Athènes ne faisant qu'empirer, les gouvernements alliés décidèrent d'adopter une attitude rigoureuse à l'égard du roi de Grèce. Dans le cadre de cette politique, l'amiral Dartige du Fournet, commandant en chef de l'armée navale alliée, adressa les 16 et 24 novembre deux ultimatums au gouvernement grec, exigeant la livraison d'une quantité considérable de matériel de guerre. Les réponses du gouvernement grec étant négatives, Dartige fit débarquer à l'aube du 1^{er} décembre à Phaliron et au Pirée trois bataillons de fusiliers-marins, commandés par le capitai-

rés pour elles en Chalcidique par l'armée d'Orient, et un mois après elles étaient prêtes à entrer en campagne: Commandant M. LARCHER, *La Grande Guerre dans les Balkans* (Paris, 1929), 113-121.

³ Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères de France, *Série Guerre 1914-1918* (désormais cité ainsi: AMAE), 256, J. Guillemain, ministre français à Athènes, à Briand, 1270 du 21 juin 1916. Texte intégral de la note dans AUGUSTIN PASSADIS, *La Question d'Orient et la Grèce* (Paris, 1929), 264-265.

⁴ AMAE, 259, Briand à P. Cambon, ambassadeur français à Londres, 1765-1766 du 28 août 1916. AMAE, 260, Guillemain à Briand, 1663 du 3 septembre 1916.

⁵ YANNIS MOURÉLOS, *L'intervention de la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre (1916-1917)* (Athènes, 1983), 70-71.

ne de vaisseau Pugliesi-Conti, avec pour ordre d'occuper certains points stratégiques de la capitale grecque.

Le débarquement se déroula dans le calme, mais après quelques heures d'observation, des chocs se produisirent et l'engagement devint général. Quelques navires dont le *Mirabeau* ouvrirent le feu; soixante-quatre coups de canons furent tirés sur la ville par l'escadre, un obus tomba dans le parc du palais du roi.

Les combats cessèrent dans la nuit, quand le gouvernement grec annonça qu'il consentait à ce que 6 batteries de montagne soient mises immédiatement à la disposition des Alliés, mais le bilan de pertes subies des deux côtés était lourd: 57 Français et cinq Britanniques furent tués, plus de 160 hommes furent blessés; du côté des Grecs on comptait 45 à 50 tués et 100 à 150 blessés⁶.

Comme première mesure de coercition contre la Grèce, on décida d'imposer un blocus qui commença le 8 décembre au matin; ce blocus devait durer plusieurs mois et entraîner de lourdes conséquences pour la nation qui dépendait de la mer pour sa nourriture et son existence matérielle. Quant à Dartige qui avait dirigé l'opération, il fut accusé d'imprudence et de faiblesse par l'amiral Lacaze, ministre français de la Marine, et se vit remplacé, le 12 décembre 1916, par l'amiral Gauchet, qui conservera le commandement de l'armée navale jusqu'à la fin de la guerre.

En effet, Dartige avait fait de son mieux pour faire accepter à la Grèce les conditions sans cesse plus dures des Alliés. Or, il se trouvait dans une situation équivoque à cause surtout de la politique incohérente des Alliés, des instructions peu précises de Lacaze, et de l'action du capitaine de frégate, Roquefeuil⁷.

Henri de Roquefeuil était arrivé en Grèce, comme attaché naval français, en novembre 1915. L'objet principal de sa mission était l'établissement d'un service de renseignements qui devait repérer les réseaux d'espionnage des Allemands en Grèce et l'organisation du ravitaillement des sous-marins allemands au large des côtes grecques⁸. Or, très vite Roquefeuil dépassant ses fonctions se lança dans l'agitation politique. Ardent partisan de la manière forte à l'égard de la Grèce et du roi Constantin, il poussait constamment le ministre de la Marine dans la voie des opérations coercitives. Il ne recula devant aucun moyen; il organisa, entre autres, le 9 septem-

⁶ LÉON MACCAS, "Les événements d'Athènes des 1^{er} et 2 décembre 1916", in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, tome XXXVIII (mars-avril 1917), 96-135; LOUIS DARTIGE DU FOURNET, *Souvenirs de guerre d'un amiral. 1914-1916* (Paris, 1920), 210-273; MOURÉLOS, *L'intervention*, 41-45.

⁷ Quelques années plus tard, Dartige publia ses mémoires, dans une tentative de réparer l'injustice qui lui avait été faite: DARTIGE DU FOURNET, *Souvenirs*, 215, 276-280.

⁸ Archives de la Marine, SS X f 8, Roquefeuil à Lacaze, 32 du 6 janvier 1916 et 36 du 11 janvier 1916 et SS X f 9, du même au même, 599 du 26 mars 1917.

bre 1916, une manifestation d'hostilité contre l'Entente dans les jardins de la légation de France à Athènes et il conçut même un projet d'enlèvement du roi Constantin, qui ne fut pourtant jamais réalisé⁹.

L'affaire grecque fut réglée en juin 1917, quand un haut-commissaire des Alliés, le député français Charles-Célestin Jonnart, vint en mission à Athènes pour exiger l'abdication du roi Constantin. Afin de soutenir l'action de Jonnart, Sarraïl prépara une véritable expédition à destination du Pirée et de Corinthe, tandis qu'en même temps des grands bâtiments renforcèrent l'escadre mouillée en baie de Salamine qui comptait ainsi quatre cuirassés (*La République, La Démocratie, La Vérité, La Justice*) et quatre croiseurs (*Waldeck-Rousseau, Jurien de la Gravière, Bruix, Latouche-Tréville*)¹⁰. En effet, le 12, le roi abdiqua en faveur de son fils, le prince Alexandre, alors que quelques jours plus tard un gouvernement ayant à sa tête Vénizélos fut formé à Athènes et la Grèce entra en guerre aux côtés des Alliés.

Après l'élimination de Constantin la pression navale de l'Entente sur la Grèce se relâcha. Désormais, la priorité pour la flotte alliée en Méditerranée fut la surveillance des routes maritimes et la lutte anti-sous-marine¹¹; vis-à-vis de la Grèce, les navires alliés furent principalement utilisés pour assurer le transport à Salonique des soldats grecs mobilisés et le ravitaillement de l'armée d'Orient.

⁹ Dartige du Fournet et sir Basil Thomson, chef des services secrets britanniques durant les années 1919-1921, dans leurs souvenirs se montrèrent extrêmement critiques à l'égard de Roquefeuil, alors que le commandant Clergeau, qui succéda à Roquefeuil au poste d'attaché naval en Grèce, défendit son prédécesseur: DARTIGE DU FOURNET, *Souvenirs*, 112-116, 251-252; BASIL THOMSON, *Le service secret allié en Grèce* (Paris, 1933), 63-76, 88-90; EMMANUEL CLERGEAU, *Le Commandant de Roquefeuil en Grèce* (Paris, 1934).

¹⁰ CHARLES REGNAULT (général), *La Conquête d'Athènes (juin-juillet 1917)* (Paris, 1919), 30-31, 219-222, MOURÉLOS, *L'intervention*, 127-130.

¹¹ PAUL CHACK et JEAN-JACQUES ANTIER, *Histoire maritime de la Première guerre mondiale*, vol. III: 1916-1918 (Paris, 1971), 130-147; LOUIS CAUBET, «Les opérations navales en Méditerranée pendant la Première Guerre mondiale», in *Comité de Documentation historique de la Marine. Communications, 1989-1990* (Vincennes, 1992), 147-149; HENRI DARRIEUS, *Histoire de la Marine française (1815-1918)* (Saint Malo, 1997), 205-218.

Maura Hametz

Envisioning the Italian Mediterranean: Fascist policy in steamship publicity, 1922-1942

The Italian people long for the Mediterranean [...], the Roman lake on which the ports of Venice, Trieste, Genoa, Naples, and Amalfi shone, the ports from which imperial galleons and republican warships set sail to conquer the world¹.

Depictions of the Mediterranean Sea figured prominently in steamship lines' publicity during the years of Fascist rule in Italy. These images of the sea promoted and publicized Italian foreign policy aims and aspirations as they shifted over the years from 1922 to 1942. At the same time, the images' emphasis on Italy's maritime heritage provided a rallying point for Italian national identity. Mussolini's government used Italian associations with the Mediterranean to foster a national as opposed to regional consciousness and to project abroad a vision of a culturally-unified and powerful Italy.

Throughout the Fascist *ventennio* (twenty years), the Mediterranean played a key role in the Italian imagination. Collective memory of Italian leadership in the ancient Roman world and perceptions that the Mediterranean formed a locus for the assertion of power in Europe drove Italian Fascist commercial aims, political aspirations, foreign relations, cultural policies and leisure priorities. Major Italian shipping lines' publicity materials reflected the Fascist government's vision of the sea and Italy's role in conquering the Mediterranean. Designed to capture popular attention and appeal to Italian 'longing' for the 'Roman Sea', the materials did not present static visions of the Mediterranean. Rather, these characterizations of Italy's relationship to the sea changed with the shifting emphases of the regime's domestic and international policies.

¹ CORRADO MOSCHITTI, 'Per il disciplinamento delle fiere campionarie in Italia', Congresso nazionale per l'espansione economica e commerciale all'estero, 4-8 novembre 1923 (Naples, 1923), 9.

Mussolini and the Mediterranean

Mussolini's imperialist vision and aims to conquer the Mediterranean have been the focus of several studies of Italian foreign policy². Well-documented are Mussolini's grandiose proposals for the extension of Italian political and economic hegemony across the 'Roman Lake' and the failure of Fascist plans due to the lack of resources, power, consistency, and even political will³. Italy's Mediterranean identity and its relevance to Fascist racial ideas and policies has captured scholars' attentions in recent years⁴.

'Mediterraneanism' has even been cast as the basis for a Fascist typology different from the German model⁵. Nearly all scholarship examines the Mediterranean's importance to Mussolini's plans in the final years of his rule, after he established a formal centre for the study of the Mediterranean and after he made clear, by his intervention in Ethiopia, his aggressive tendencies and intentions. Less studied in the context of the Mediterranean are the early years of Mussolini's rule and the cultural impact of Mussolini's exploitation of the myth of the Italian Mediterranean⁶.

Modern Italy and the Mediterranean

Associations with the Mediterranean provided a reminder of past glories throughout Italy's history. Italy's relationship to the Roman Empire and the Mediterranean formed a basis for claims in the nineteenth-century Risorgimento (Italian Unification) period, the liberal era, and into the Fascist period⁷. In the late nineteenth century, Italian anthropologists most notably Giuseppe Sergi, later to make a name as a proponent of Fascist racial

² See, for example, ROBERT MALLETT, *The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935-1940* (London, 1998) and ARISTOTLE A. KALLIS, *Fascist Ideology and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945* (London, 2000), 168-181, in particular.

³ For a summary of the debate on Mussolini's leadership, see R.J.B. BOSWORTH, 'Mussolini the Duce: Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?', in R.J.B. BOSWORTH, *The Italian Dictatorship* (London, 1998), 58-82.

⁴ RUTH BEN-GHIAT and MIA FULLER, *Italian Colonialism* (New York, 2005); JACQUELINE ANDALL and DEREK DUNCAN, *Italian Colonialism: Legacy and Memory* (Oxford, 2005); PATRIZIA PALUMBO, *A Place in the Sun* (Berkeley, 2003); and AARON GILLETTE, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy* (London, 2002).

⁵ CHARLES F. DELZELL, *Mediterranean Fascism* (New York, 1970), in the realm of politics, and GILLETTE, *Racial Theories*, in the realms of cultural policy and ideological foundations.

⁶ One step in this direction is taken by NICOLAS DOUMANIS, *Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean* (New York, 1997). Another study is MANUELA WILLIAMS, *Mussolini's Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-1940* (London, 2006).

⁷ DENIS MACK SMITH, *Mussolini's Roman Empire* (New York, 1976), offers the classic study of the impact of associations with ancient Rome on Fascist imperialism.

policy, focused on Italians as part of the 'Mediterranean race', 'a race composed of many peoples of mixed blood, [who] have occupied the Mediterranean with diverse ethnic names'. Sergi glorified the proud heritage of Italians, differentiating them carefully from Aryans on the basis of ethno-anthropological traits, to establish them as founders of 'the most ancient civilization of the Mediterranean'⁸. Following the First World War, such claims were reiterated and emphasized in Sergi's work focusing on Italy's proud origins⁹. By the time Mussolini ascended to power, therefore, the Mediterranean already held an esteemed place in the Italian mind. It represented a sea of opportunity for Italians, a link to common Italian heritage and prestige for Italians living inside and beyond Italy's borders.

By no means did Italians monopolize discussion of the Mediterranean in the interwar era. Frenchman Fernand Braudel's classic work was conceived and largely written during the period from 1923 to 1939¹⁰. Braudel's study saw the early modern period as the era of the eclipse of the Mediterranean world with Spain, the Netherlands, France, and England's turn toward development across the Atlantic. Nonetheless, his work provided a framework for integration of the European, Asian, and African shores of the Mediterranean. For Italians with no Atlantic coast, this Mediterranean world remained central. Throughout the twenty years of rule, the Fascist government conjured up images of the Mediterranean to support the promise of rejuvenation and underline Fascist prestige. These images helped to drum up support for Italian intervention in Mediterranean lands far from modern Italy's shores.

Fascist Steamship Propaganda and the Mediterranean

Depictions of the Mediterranean in Fascist era steamship publicity reflected shifting policies and ambitions. The themes of depictions in materials disseminated by steamship lines seem to fall into four chronological periods. The first period from 1922 to 1926 represents a continuation of priorities set by Italian liberal governments since the turn of the century. In the period from 1926 to 1931, the Fascists sought to extend Italian commercial markets in the Mediterranean and cultural influence through emphasis on the mission of Catholic Italy in the Mediterranean and the Near East. From 1931 to 1935, emphasis fell on Fascist modernity and technological advances as well as ambitions abroad. Finally, the period from

⁸ GIUSEPPE SERGI, *Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea: induzione antropologiche* (Rome, 1895), 40-41.

⁹ GIUSEPPE SERGI, *Italia. Le origini. Antropologia, cultura e civiltà* (Milan, 1919).

¹⁰ FERNAND BRAUDEL, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York, 1972 [reprint, trans. 1949]), 15, 19.

1935-1942 marked the shift to imperial priorities – to Fascist militarism and conquest of Mediterranean lands.

In the Liberal Tradition, 1922-1926

Mussolini's March on Rome served as the vehicle by which the Fascists gained power and began the process of 'fascistization'. During the period of consolidation of power, policies remained on the liberal trajectory. From 1922 to 1926, steamship lines' promotion priorities and publicity for the Mediterranean changed little from the depictions of the post-World War I liberal period. The Fascists, like their liberal predecessors, promoted Mediterranean commerce as part of post-war recovery and reconstruction. Publicity materials for travel to the Mediterranean offered bucolic sun filled scenes, touting the trip from Italy using the 'sunny southern route', to undercut traditional competitors in northern Europe, primarily German lines¹¹.

Lloyd's concentration on its *Conte* (*count*) line from 1921 until the consolidation of the shipping lines under centralizing corporatism in 1932, was indicative of the continuity of Fascist programmes with the pre-war and post-World War I liberal programmes. The *Conte Rosso*, the first of the 'counts' to be launched, was touted in 1921 as the 'largest and fastest Mediterranean oil burner', catering to 'the wonderlands of the Mediterranean'. Following quickly on the *Red Count's* heels were the *Conte Verde*, *Conte Grande*, and *Conte Biancamano* (*Green Count*, *Great Count*, and *Count Whitehand*). Their names made clear Lloyd's attachment to nationalist iconography in the Risorgimento tradition. Publicity in green, red, and white tones, echoing the Italian tricolour, touted 'I gloriosi quattro conti', 'the Four Glorious Counts'¹². The names of the ships honoured historic figures linked to the Savoy dynasty, the monarchy of the modern Italian state and Fascist Italy. *Conte Grande* celebrated the memory of Amadeus V, renowned as the thirteenth century founder of the dynasty. The *Conte Verde* was named for Amadeus VI (1334-1383) and the *Conte Rosso* for the red colours of his son Amadeus VII (1360-1391). *Conte Biancamano*, Humbert I Count of Moriana, known as 'white hands' was an eleventh century ancestor of these counts¹³.

¹¹ The Library at the Mariners' Museum (Newport News, Virginia, USA) (LMM), Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 144, *Navigazione Generale Italiana*, Genoa, later *Italian Line*, various bulletins.

¹² GIUSEPPE RICCOBALDI, 'Lloyd Sabauda. I gloriosi quattro Conti', 1927, available at http://www.idealobby.it/articoli/collezionismo/MANIFESTI_CROCIERA/02.html [accessed 16 August 2006].

¹³ LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 157, Lloyd brochures.

In the early 1920s, Mediterranean routes were served by such Cosulich line ships as the *Martha Washington* (originally of the Austro-Americana line, interned at New York during World War I and returned to Cosulich in 1922) and the *President Wilson*, clearly a nod to American influence. Commercial trade fairs in Italy focused on maritime trade and links in two regions. Padua served as the northern node for commerce, an entrepôt for trade from the Adriatic and Ligurian seas to Central Europe. Naples served the south and as a hub for commerce in the Mediterranean.

The Catholic Mediterranean and Commercial Expansion

Emphasis on commercial recovery and admiration of the Americans in the early 1920s gave way to concentration on commercial expansion abroad and Italian nationalist priorities by the late 1920s. Commercial trade fairs and maritime initiatives evolved to support Fascist aspirations. At the Padua Fair in 1927, a Sea Pavilion dominated the space. But, promotion of Italy's commercial and cultural links to the sea was no longer reserved to these specific locations. Commercial maritime initiatives proliferated. The Fascist government initiated a Trade Samples Fair in Tripoli in 1927, a testament to ambitions abroad and colonial aspirations. In 1929, Trieste hosted a Gold Coast Exhibit. In 1930, Bari emerged as the site for a *Fiera del Levante* highlighting trade ties to the Near East. In 1932, Trieste inaugurated a *Mostra del Mare* (Sea Exhibition) focusing on trade in the Adriatic.

The consolidation of the regime's power and the reorientation of foreign policy with the resignation of Foreign Minister Salvatore Contarini in 1926 brought changes to the steamship industry and to publicity. After 1926, emphasis on nationalist ties based on the inheritance from ancient Rome in the Risorgimento tradition gave way to overt emphasis on association with the glories of ancient imperial Rome. In 1928, Cosulich introduced the *Saturnia* and *Vulcania*, the names of the ships recalled the powerful Roman deities Saturn (ruler of the universe) and Vulcan (god of fire and metalworking). A clear departure from the Risorgimento precedent which emphasized modern Italy's links to medieval Italian city states and the heritage of ancient Rome, these names signalled imperial priorities embodied in historic Roman domination of the Mediterranean world.

Increasing militancy in foreign affairs was linked to an increasingly strong hold in the domestic arena. Mussolini's attention turned to cultural priorities. Among them, rapprochement with the Catholic Church and the Papacy in Rome was given high priority. Steamship lines emphasized Italian service to the Holy Land. In 1926, Cosulich line began offering two to three week cruises of the Mediterranean, including stops in North

Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. The company advertised the trips 'to the land where Christian Europe meets Mohammedan Africa'¹⁴. Figures astride camels, for example one on the cover of the September-October issue of Lloyd Triestino's magazine *Sul Mare*, enticed leisure travellers and pilgrims to use Italian lines to explore the Holy Land¹⁵.

The conclusion of the Lateran Pacts, Mussolini's triumph of rapprochement between the Italian state and the Catholic Church, ushered in a period of emphasis on religious mission and journey to the Holy Land after 1929. In November-December 1930, *Sul Mare's* cover featured an image entitled 'Christmas in the Holy Land'. A king on camelback approached the temple in Bethlehem guided by a shooting star descending from the heavens¹⁶.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Italian attention also shifted to the campaign to secure and 'save' (in the name of Catholicism and civilization) populations on the nation's borders. Fiume or Rijeka, the former Hungarian port championed by Gabriele D'Annunzio after the First World War and joined to Italy in 1924, became a particular target of Fascist attention. In 1925, the Italian National Institute for Economic Expansion Abroad organized an exhibition in the city¹⁷. Ostensibly initiated to spur recovery of the city's trade networks, its major purpose was to affirm Italian hegemony in two ways. First, in the city on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, emphasis on ties to the sea linked the city to the coastal towns and the Italian peninsula rather than lands to the interior dominated by Slavs. Second, emphasis on Italian culture reinforced Italian visions of 'saving' coastal populations from uncivilized Slavs (albeit in this case largely Catholic Croats and Slovenes).

Adherence to tradition and emphasis on Catholic mission remained an important element in steamship publicity. While *Saturnia* and *Vulcania* were named for Roman gods, they both supported Fascism's emphasis on Italy's civilizing mission with regard to Catholic priorities in their design. Each ship boasted a chapel as 'a central feature of the ship'. Advertisements touted the ships as the 'only vessels in the world authorized to carry the Blessed Sacrament on board at all times'¹⁸.

Emphasis on Italy's civilizing and imperial mission in the Mediter-

¹⁴ LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 63, Cosulich Line brochure.

¹⁵ SERGIO VATTA, *Sul Mare. Grafica pubblicitaria ed editoriale attraverso le copertine della rivista di viaggi del Lloyd Triestino dal 1925 al 1944* (Trieste, 2000), 44 (illus. 21).

¹⁶ VATTA, *Sul Mare*, 51 (illus. 34) and 63 (illus. 52).

¹⁷ On the fairs in Fiume, see MAURA HAMETZ, 'Excellent Citizens, Perfect Italians: The Triestines and the Fairs, 1920-1954', (PhD Diss., Brandeis U, 1995), 142-149.

¹⁸ LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 63, Cosulich Line, *Eucharistic Congress Cruise* brochure.

anean continued throughout the early 1930s. In 1930, Italian shipping lines contributed to an exhibit dedicated to Italy's 'imperial grandeur' at the Belgian Colonial, Maritime and Art Exposition¹⁹. Italy's Catholic role figured prominently in steamship cruise offerings, including a 1932 Eucharistic Congress Cruise from New York to Dublin sponsored by Cosulich lines²⁰.

Fascist Technology and Modernity

Italia - Society of Navigation, Genoa - followed the Roman naming trend of the early 1930s with the launching of *Augustus* and *Rex*. These ships' names, like those of the *Saturnia* and *Vulcania*, recalled the Roman empire, but the vessels themselves embodied the Fascist spirit and emphasis on modernity and technological advance²¹. *Rex*, launched in 1931, was lauded as a technical marvel. The ship drew international attention in 1933 for its record-breaking trip between Gibraltar and New York, completed in 4 days, 13 hours, and 50 minutes²². A depiction of 'the victorious ship', her name prominently displayed on the hulking hull graced the cover of *Sul Mare* in July-August 1933²³.

The image of the *Rex* was in line with steamship lines' publicity from 1931 to 1935 that focused on bolder ships and cleaner lines, consonant with the monumental style becoming popular in Fascist architecture. Renderings promoted the idea of strength and efficiency of Italian vessels, meeting economic priorities and setting new modern technological standards. Depictions of Catholic priorities were also redesigned somewhat. The theme of the king guided by divine light was picked up again in *Sul Mare* in November-December 1933, but this time with much cleaner lines and devoid of background setting. Three kings astride prancing horses were framed only by a pale blue sky. The star relegated to outline form appeared in the corner²⁴.

Publicity reflected Fascist consolidation of the shipping sector in 1932 at Genoa to form what was touted as a more efficient, resourceful, and logi-

¹⁹ ROBERT RYDELL, *World of Fairs* (Chicago, 1993) discusses the Belgian exposition. *Il Piccolo*, the Triestine daily carried articles with detailed plans for Italian participation, 27 and 28 March 1929.

²⁰ LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 63, Cosulich Line, *Eucharistic Congress Cruise* brochure.

²¹ On modernity and the Fascist aesthetic see RUTH BEN-GHIAT, *Fascist Modernities: Italy 1922-1945* (Berkeley, 2001).

²² LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 144, *Rex* brochure, Italian Line, 1933.

²³ VATTA, *Sul Mare*, 61 (illus. 50).

²⁴ VATTA, *Sul Mare*, 63 (illus. 52).

cal administrative centralization of various lines to better promote national interests. It was clear that the *Conte di Savoia* launched under the newly unified Italian banner and named in the Risorgimento tradition was a testament to a passing era. The ship was touted simply as the beautiful sister to the more powerful and technically advanced *Rex*.

Ambitions Abroad, 1931–1935

From 1931 to 1935, Mussolini attempted to project Italian power abroad. He took an active role in international negotiations and sought to intensify Italian involvement in Central Europe through defence of Austria and in the Middle East through interference in British affairs in the eastern Mediterranean. The changing image of a ship on the cover of Lloyd Triestino's handbook demonstrated the progression of Fascist priorities²⁵. The 1922 image [Figure 1] was closely replicated in the 1928 handbook. Both depicted the steamship *Helouan* (part of the Lloyd fleet from 1912 to 1937) named for the city Helwan in modern day Egypt. In both 1922 and 1928, the ship steamed under the twin banners of Lloyd Triestino and Trieste with the Italian flag obscured. The ship, accompanied by seagulls, departed a port, vaguely visible in the distance. By 1928, the *Helouan* had clearly been refitted, and rode a bit higher in the frame. A slight shift in priorities was evident in a change in the cover text. Lloyd Triestino 'Steam Navigation Company, Trieste' was, by 1928, advertised offering the 'quickest routes to Greece, Constantinople, Palestine, Egypt, India, and to the Far East', focusing on links to the eastern Mediterranean.

In 1931, the text mirrored that of 1928, with a change only in the name of 'Constantinople' to 'Istanbul'. However, the 1931 image [Figure 2] differed in subtle, yet distinctive ways from the earlier cover. The *Victoria*, named to signal Italy's ascendancy, replaced the *Helouan*. *Victoria*, a more modern model, no longer belched steam. She glided across the ocean against the background of an azure sky dotted with white clouds. Gone were the images of the port in the background and the seagulls. Neither Lloyd Triestino's banner nor Trieste's halberd was shown. Not even an Italian flag detracted from this 'clean' image of Italian mastery of the sea.

The image on Lloyd Triestino's 'General Itinerary' booklet for 1933 was similar in feel. Sleek, clean, nameless steam ships lined up against a non-descript background. Further, the image on the 1931 handbook was presented as a true work of art, signed by the artist P. Klodic²⁶. This reflected

²⁵ The three handbooks, from 1922, 1928 and 1931, are available in LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 157, Lloyd Triestino.

²⁶ Paolo Klodic de Sabladoskj was a noted Triestine artist whose work focused on

the increasing politicization of art—the reach of the control of the ‘patron state’, the centralization of artists’ work, and the intention to guide presentation of the arts to reflect nationalist priorities²⁷.

National maritime commercial fairs and exhibitions held throughout the country in the 1920s and early 1930s were centred in Genoa by the mid-1930s. As the ‘Mostra della rivoluzione fascista’ (Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution) promoted the Fascist government’s priorities and power in Rome in 1932, celebrating ten years of Fascist rule, the ‘Mostre del Mare’, or Sea Exhibitions, in Genoa grew into annual celebrations of the country’s maritime achievements²⁸. By 1935, coordinated efforts and consolidated lines focused attention on Italian conquest of the Mediterranean based on historical claims to the ‘Roman Sea’. The January 1935 cover of *Sul Mare* bore a depiction of ‘Italia Mediterranea’, a naked fair-skinned kneeling woman with flowing hair. Roman columns and a flowering desert plant punctuated a black background silhouetted by the moon²⁹. A bulletin of the new Italian Line entitled ‘The Ships and Men of the Italian Line’ outlined Fascist intentions. Referring to Italy’s ‘twenty centuries of shipbuilding’, it claimed the link to the sea as Italy’s ‘natural heritage’ and touted her ‘mastery of it’ as a ‘great and lasting tradition’³⁰.

Militarism and Conquest, 1935-1942

Steamship publicity reflected the turn toward militarization and aspirations for conquest. Gone was the emphasis on Catholic ‘missionizing’ and travel to exotic Holy lands. Covers of the Italian Line’s *SS Roma* Mediterranean cruise brochures of 1934 and 1937 testified to the shift in attitudes regarding the peoples and lands of the Mediterranean. The 1934 cover depicted an exotic, yet civilized, eastern Mediterranean. An attractive woman in a provocative pose, dressed in western clothing, carried a water jug on a bare shoulder through an outdoor café or market where men of a variety of cultures appeared in the shadow of classical Roman columns [Figure 3].

By 1937, Mediterranean populations and lands were portrayed as prim-

maritime subjects and ships. His work was featured in a maritime art exhibit and in the Italian Coast Guard bulletin *Notiziario della Guardia Costiera* 4:4 (2002).

²⁷ On the role of the Fascist state as patron in the arts and arbiter of culture see MARLA STONE, *The Patron State: Culture and Politics in Fascist Italy* (Princeton, 1998).

²⁸ On the importance of *mostre* or exhibitions to the construction of Italian history under Fascism, see CLAUDIO FOGU, *The Historic Imaginary* (Toronto, 2003). On the Fascist sea exhibitions in Trieste, see HAMETZ, ‘Excellent Citizens, Perfect Italians’, 168-172.

²⁹ VATTA, *Sul Mare*, 70 (illus. 59).

³⁰ LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 144, Italian line bulletin, ‘The Ships and Men of the Italian Line’, June 1935.

itive and the cultures as backward. A veiled figure relegated to the background in a street scene depicting shepherds and robed men and a donkey in a narrow street replaced the attractive woman with a western appearance and posture and the café scene [Figure 4]³¹.

Depictions of Africans also underwent a dramatic change. On its September 1930 cover, *Sul Mare* featured an 'African Beauty'. She sported exotic jewellery, but the close-up on her face and features clearly revealed a western European style, particularly in her make-up including rich red lipstick outlining 'pouting' sensuous lips³². The April 1935 cover 'Tripoli' portrayed the mixture of western and eastern once again, but this time from a distance. The woman in the background balancing a jug on her head wore a western style dress, but she stood as a part of the background against the city wall with the clearly 'eastern' minareted cityscape behind³³. By March 1937, the only figures that appeared in the African desert scene on *Sul Mare's* cover were completely robed, discernibly dark-skinned and dwarfed by a monumental Fascist arch³⁴. By implication, Eastern Mediterranean populations were those that Italy should colonize. Steamship companies provided the transport for conquerors rather than adventurers and tourists.

Conclusion

From 1922 to 1942, Italian Fascists employed visions of the Mediterranean to promote a unified vision of Italy. The roots of Italy's association with the Mediterranean lie in Rome's historic links to the Roman Empire and Roman predominance over the sea. Italy unified in the nineteenth century with Mazzinian visions that portrayed a nation 'encircled by the Alps and the sea, [with] boundaries marked out by the finger of God for a people of giants'³⁵. But, the modern association of Italy and the Italians with the Mediterranean owes much to Fascist efforts to nationalize Italians and centralize Italy, to Mussolini's government's promotion of the Mediterranean as a unifying factor in the creation of a national, as opposed to regional or local, identity. Throughout the twenty years of Fascist rule, steamship companies disseminated materials that painted the

³¹ 31. LMM, Collection of Steamship Ephemera MS15, Box 144, Navigazione generale italiana, Italian line.

³² VATTA, *Sul Mare*, 50 (illus. 33).

³³ VATTA, *Sul Mare*, 70 (illus. 62).

³⁴ VATTA, *Sul Mare*, 82 (illus. 85).

³⁵ GIUSEPPE MAZZINI, 'To the Young Men of Italy', 1848, reproduced in *The World's Famous Orations. Continental Europe (380-1906)*, 1906, available at <http://www.bartleby.com/268/7/43.html> [accessed 13 April 2006].




Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3



Fig. 4

Figures by courtesy of The Library at the Mariners Museum, Newport News, VA, USA.

Figures by courtesy of The Library at the Mariners Museum, Newport News, VA, USA.

Mediterranean, in a variety of iterations, as an Italian Sea. The publicity echoed Fascist polemic to reinforce notions of Italian economic, political, and cultural mission in the Mediterranean and legitimize Fascist ambitions for conquest abroad.

Visions of Italy as a nation linked to and by the Mediterranean Sea resonate today. The success of the 1991 film *Mediterraneo*, directed by Gabriele Salvatores, testified to the continuing allure of the Mediterranean for Italians. The film's stereotypical depictions of regional types in characters of soldiers from all over Italy who grew together while stranded on a Greek island during World War II was immensely popular in Italy. The film earned acclaim abroad as well, including winning the American Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Oscar for the Best Foreign Language Film 1991. The resonance of the metaphor of the unification of Italy through shared experience and the allure of the Italian relationship to the sea was and remains strong enough to translate across national boundaries to symbolize a unified Italy today.

Carmel Vassallo

Al servizio di Sua Maestà Britannica: i maltesi nella *Royal Navy*

Premessa

Malta è stata una base importante per la *projection of power* di altri Stati. In realtà, Malta è l'area che ha ricevuto la più grande attenzione negli studi di storia marittima da parte degli storici maltesi e non, che hanno scritto sulle imprese e sulle attività di corsa dell'Ordine dei Cavalieri di S. Giovanni in età moderna¹. Anche le attività della *Royal Navy* (o *Senior Service*) nel Mediterraneo nei secoli più recenti sono state ben studiate. Il libro di Peter Elliott, *The Cross and the Ensign. A Naval History of Malta 1798-1979* (1980), costituisce una sintetica introduzione e, nonostante l'assenza di note, è evidente che l'autore ha consultato molte fonti documentarie. Egli fornisce anche una buona ed essenziale, anche se ora certamente datata, bibliografia.

Tema di questo saggio non è la *Royal Navy*, ma la presenza dei maltesi nella marina britannica. Alcuni contributi hanno già considerato la tipologia del servizio, volontario o meno, nella marina dell'Ordine, e qualche altro ha preso in esame i marinai a bordo dei vascelli corsari o nella marina mercantile nello stesso periodo².

La natura del servizio nelle attività marittime in generale nel periodo britannico ha ricevuto, invece, scarsa o nulla attenzione. Questo è avvenuto in modo particolare per i marinai arruolati sia nella *Royal Navy* che nella marina mercantile. Riguardo ai maltesi che erano al servizio della *Royal Navy* sulle navi o nelle basi a terra, per esempio, abbiamo riscontrato nei *media* locali solo alcune interviste realmente molto interessanti e commoventi a maltesi sopravvissuti a drammatiche esperienze di guer-

¹ Cfr. ALAIN BLONDY, *Bibliographie du monde méditerranéen (1453-1835)*, Paris 2003, e JOHN CHIRCOP, *Maltese Maritime Historiography: A critical Assessment*, in *New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime History*, edited by GELINA HARLAFTIS and CARMEL VASSALLO, in "Research in Maritime History", St. John's, Canada, n. 28 (2004), 83-101.

² CHIRCOP, *New Directions*.

ra, come l'affondamento di una nave e/o la prigionia trascorsa nei campi del nemico³. Sappiamo ancora meno sulla vita quotidiana, spesso monotona, che gli uomini della *Royal Navy* conducevano durante i lunghi periodi di pace. È chiaramente una priorità per gli storici registrare queste fonti orali, dato che con il tempo i testimoni stanno diventando sempre meno numerosi.

I maltesi come marinai

I maltesi hanno una lunga tradizione come marinai⁴. Già nel '400 essi avevano una marina mercantile che non solo provvedeva ad approvvigionare l'arcipelago, ma anche a collegare tra loro diverse zone dell'Italia meridionale⁵. Queste imbarcazioni erano, molto probabilmente, impiegate in modo redditizio anche in azioni corsare. L'Ordine di San Giovanni aveva una vocazione marittima ancor prima di insediarsi nell'isola, e l'attività legata al mantenimento e alla presenza della sua piccola flotta portò alla creazione di numerosi impieghi, sia a bordo delle navi che sulla terra ferma, come già rilevato da molti studiosi⁶.

³ Per il *Leading Steward* C. Paris cfr. ERIC C.B. LEE, *The Cruiser Experience*, Fleet Hargate (UK) 2000, 195-200. Cfr., inoltre, *Malta at War*, Malta 2001, 130-139, sull'affondamento della *Glorious*, nel quale morirono 39 maltesi, tra i quali il *Petty Officer Steward* Carmel Vassallo, mio nonno paterno.

⁴ Questo lavoro riguarda i maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy*; attualmente, tuttavia, sto svolgendo una ricerca sui maltesi in servizio nella marina mercantile. I primi risultati sembrano indicare che questi ultimi, compresi quelli arruolati nella *Royal Fleet Auxiliary*, erano più numerosi di quelli presenti nella *Royal Navy*, quantomeno fino alla seconda guerra mondiale. In termini generali, sembrerebbe che i maltesi della *Merchant Navy* durante la guerra avessero un'età notevolmente maggiore, che fossero in gran parte celibi e che provenissero da località diverse dell'isola rispetto a quelli arruolati nella *Royal Navy*. Un dato particolarmente importante era il numero di marinai originari di Gozo, che rappresentavano il 50% del totale. Un'ulteriore caratteristica sembra essere la tendenza, assai frequente, da parte dei membri di una stessa famiglia a prestare servizio sulla stessa nave, circostanza che, in non poche occasioni, ebbe conseguenze disastrose. Giuseppe Tarcisio, Coronato Tarcisio e Carmelo Attard, rispettivamente di 36, 30 e 20 anni, erano arruolati come addetti alle caldaie, molto probabilmente sulla stessa imbarcazione, dato che morirono insieme il 15 settembre del 1941. Essi erano i figli di Joseph e Angela Attard di Nadur, Gozo.

⁵ HENRI BRESCH, *Sicile, Malte et Monde Musulman*, in S. FIORINI and V. MALLIA-MILANES, *Malta. A Case Study in International Cross-Currents*, Malta 1991, 47-79 (in part. 57-61).

⁶ GODFREY WETTINGER, *The Galley Convicts and Buonavoglia in Malta during the Rule of the Order*, in "Journal of the Faculty of Arts (Malta)", 3 (2), 1965, 29-37; ANDREW P. VELLA, *Storja ta' Malta*, Malta 1979, Vol. 2, 291-299; J.F. GRIMA, *The Rowers on the Order's Galleys (1600-1650)*, in "Melita Historica", 12, 2001, 113-126. A Senglea, nel *Grand Harbour*, sulle navi di linea o sulle galee dell'Ordine lavoravano 172 dei 1.112 maschi di età superiore ai 15 anni, inclusi in un elenco del XVIII secolo: NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MALTA (NLM), Ar-

Come ho già evidenziato in altre ricerche, nel '700 i marinai e i comandanti della marina mercantile di Malta erano quasi interamente maltesi, mentre le navi corsare avevano un equipaggio più cosmopolita⁷. Lo stesso schema si ripropone anche nell'800, quando il numero dei vascelli della flotta mercantile maltese raggiunse il suo massimo e la Camera di Commercio aprì anche una sua sezione per i "capitani di mare" o capitani marittimi⁸.

Uno scenario in parte diverso emerge per i maltesi arruolati nelle flotte delle potenze straniere che, tra il '500 ed il '900, governarono le isole dell'arcipelago.

Nella flotta dell'Ordine di San Giovanni le cariche più elevate erano appannaggio dei Cavalieri, anche se i maltesi avevano comunque accesso ai ruoli intermedi come scrivani, ufficiali medici, timonieri, piloti, bombardieri, ecc.⁹. Nel corso del '700, tuttavia, le difficoltà finanziarie dell'Ordine determinarono una riduzione dell'offerta di lavoro in questi settori¹⁰. Il Gran Maestro, fino ad allora contrario all'arruolamento di maltesi nelle marinerie straniere, iniziò a consentire il loro reclutamento da parte di altre potenze, come attestato da molti documenti relativi a maltesi arruolati nelle flotte militari e mercantili straniere. I maltesi erano particolarmente stimati dagli spagnoli, che ne reclutarono centinaia, se non addirittura migliaia¹¹. Avevano paghe e condizioni di lavoro identiche a quelle degli

chives of the Order of Malta (AOM), Ms. 1067, *Ruolo degl'Uomini della Citta Senglea e Cospicua*. Nella più popolosa Cospicua, anch'essa vicina al *Grand Harbour*, erano 368 su un totale di 2.391. Nella corrispondenza tra i membri dell'Ordine ed i diplomatici britannici nel 1793, citata da Vella Bonavita, si fa riferimento alla possibilità per la *Royal Navy* di arruolare sull'isola un "pool" di 15.000 marinai, ma questo numero sembra eccessivo (cfr. ROGER VELLA BONAVITA, *Britain and Malta 1787-1798*, in "Hyphen" (Malta), No. 1, 1977, 2-17, in part. 6-7). All'inizio del '700, il totale degli uomini impiegati a bordo delle navi dell'Ordine era stimato in circa 2.500 (ANTON QUINTANO, *The Maltese-Hospitaller Sailing Ship Squadron 1701-1798*, Malta 2003, 156). Non è chiaro se fossero più numerosi nella flotta mercantile.

⁷ CARMEL VASSALLO, *Corsairing to Commerce. Maltese Merchants in XVIII-Century Spain*, Malta 1997, 74-80; CARMEL VASSALLO, *Maltese Corsairing or Christian Corsairing based in Malta? A Reassessment*, in *L'Ordre de Malta, el regne de Mallorca i la Mediterrania*, ed. by ROMÁN PIÑA HOMS, Palma de Mallorca 2001, 285-290.

⁸ CARMEL VASSALLO, *The Maltese Merchant Fleet and the Black Sea Grain Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, in "International Journal of Maritime History", 13 (2), 19-36; CARMEL VASSALLO, *The Malta Chamber of Commerce 1848-1979: An Outline History of Maltese Trade*, Malta 1998, 176.

⁹ VELLA, *Storja ta' Malta*, 292.

¹⁰ J.F. GRIMA, *Economy Measures in the Order's Navy (1793-98)*, in TONI CORTIS and TIMOTHY GAMBIN, *De Triremibus*, Malta 2005, 519-524.

¹¹ CARMEL VASSALLO, *El reclutamiento de marineros malteses en la armada española durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII*, in "Revista Historica Naval" (Madrid), 8/30, 1990, 21-29.

spagnoli e avevano anche la possibilità di andare nelle ricche Americhe¹². Altri maltesi erano arruolati su navi russe, olandesi, pontificie, veneziane, inglesi e francesi¹³. Alla fine del '700, il loro reclutamento sembrò divenire del tutto libero e non è da escludere che, durante le guerre napoleoniche, marinai maltesi abbiano combattuto su entrambi i fronti. Numerosi maltesi, infatti, prestarono servizio nelle navi militari e mercantili francesi. Nel 1780 erano 927 i marinai, cannonieri e timonieri maltesi arruolati dalla flotta militare francese e Timothy Le Goff afferma che erano uno dei gruppi più folti tra i tanti marinai stranieri a bordo delle navi mercantili attive nelle rotte di Marsiglia e nel periodo 1769-85 erano circa il 10% dei marinai stranieri¹⁴. È altresì noto che migliaia di maltesi furono reclutati da Napoleone per la sua spedizione in Egitto¹⁵.

Nell'età moderna, e specialmente in tempo di guerra, anche la *Royal Navy* era a corto di uomini. I marinai stranieri erano un numero consistente e, anche se non sono disponibili dati ufficiali, potevano anche costituire circa il 15%, se non più, dell'equipaggio di una nave¹⁶. Nel 1793, l'ammiraglio Hood chiese al Gran Maestro il permesso di reclutare un migliaio di marinai maltesi, ma in realtà alla fine ne vennero assunti solo 440¹⁷. A Trafalgar, nel 1805, vi erano almeno 25 maltesi a bordo delle navi inglesi¹⁸. L'equipaggio della *Victory*, la nave da guerra forse più nota della *Royal Navy*, era costituito per il 14,63% da stranieri: tra questi vi erano 6 maltesi, cioè 2 *Royal Marines* (Gaetano Altomaro e Domque Gentile) e 4 *Ordinary Seamen* (Josh Benjna, Emanuel Camelaire, Natbl Pirch e Jno Tart)¹⁹. Pochi

¹² I maltesi avevano già avuto precedenti esperienze in America. Nel 1540, il capitano maltese Giovanni da Zurbano con la sua nave scortò lungo la costa la spedizione di Pedro de Valdivia verso l'interno del Cile: FRANCESCO D'ESPOSITO, *Presenza italiana tra i 'Conquistadores' ed i primi colonizzatori del Nuovo Mondo (1492-1560)*, in *Presenza Italiana en Andalucia Siglos XIV-XVII*, Seville 1989, 498 e 511.

¹³ FRANS CIAPPARA, *Marriage in Malta in the Late Eighteenth Century*, Malta 1988, 92.

¹⁴ TIMOTHY J.A. LE GOFF, *De la paix a la guerre: les origines des équipages de la marine de commerce en Méditerranée pendant les guerres de XVIII^e siècle*, in *Guerre et Commerce en Méditerranée IX-XX^e siècles*, ed. by MICHEL VERGÉ-FRANCESCHI, Paris 1991, 279-308 (in part. 290).

¹⁵ HANNIBAL P. SCICLUNA, *Acts and Documents relating to the French Occupation of Malta in 1798-1800*, in "Archivum Melitense", 10, 1921, 1-300 (in part. 2).

¹⁶ MICHAEL LEWIS, *A Social History of the Royal Navy 1793-1815*, London 1960, 129.

¹⁷ VELLA BONAVITA, *Britain and Malta*, 8.

¹⁸ <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/trafalgarancestors> (22/11/2005).

¹⁹ <http://www.hms-victory.com> (30/6/2005). Secondo la comunicazione inviata il 13 giugno 1996 da Tony Sheen al *Marine History Information Exchange Group* (www.mar-museum.ca), a bordo della *Victory* c'era anche la moglie di uno dei marinai maltesi, ma la sua identità femminile era probabilmente sconosciuta al resto dell'equipaggio poiché indossava abiti maschili. La donna era ancora in vita nel 1841. Sheen cita come fonte E. FRASER, *The Sailors whom Nelson led: their doings described by themselves*, London 1913, ma non ho ancora potuto verificare questa informazione.

anni dopo, tuttavia, la fine del conflitto comportò una riduzione delle forze armate britanniche: la *Royal Navy* scese da un picco di 142.098 uomini nel 1810 fino a 21.141 nel 1835²⁰. E gli stranieri furono i primi ad andare via²¹. Il lungo periodo di pace dal 1815 al 1914, infatti, comportò non pochi cambiamenti all'interno della *Royal Navy* che sembrò divenire il più "inglese" dei reparti delle forze armate per la quasi esclusiva presenza di uomini nati nelle isole britanniche, mentre l'esercito faceva ancora grande affidamento sull'arruolamento di soldati provenienti dalle colonie. I maltesi rappresentavano una eccezione²².

"Rule Britannia"

Come messo in evidenza da Parry, nei primi decenni dell'800 la Gran Bretagna era la maggiore potenza navale non tanto perché aveva navi dovunque quanto perché nessuna altra potenza aveva comunque tante navi²³. Per quanto riguarda i marinai maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* è dunque probabile che non fossero meno numerosi di quelli impiegati nella cosiddetta «età dell'oro» della flotta mercantile maltese²⁴. Nel 1871 vi erano 2.227 uomini sulle navi mercantili²⁵, a fronte di 255 a bordo della *Royal Navy*, ma successivamente il numero di questi ultimi aumentò, mentre diminuirono sia le navi che gli uomini della flotta mercantile maltese.

Il grafico indica il numero complessivo degli uomini a bordo della *Royal Navy* di stanza nel Mediterraneo (a sinistra) ed il numero dei maltesi (a destra) arruolati nell'arco di un secolo, dal 1861 al 1964.

²⁰ SARAH PALMER and DAVID M. WILLIAMS, *British Sailors, 1775-1870*, in PAUL C. VAN ROYEN, et al., 'Those Emblems of Hell? European Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570-1870', in "Research in Maritime History", St. John's, Canada, n. 13, 1997, 93-118 (in part. 98).

²¹ Fino al 1900 non vi erano differenze nel pagamento delle pensioni tra le diverse nazionalità presenti nella *Royal Navy*, ma in quell'anno gli stranieri furono espressamente esclusi: National Archives (UK), PIN 15/698, *Maltese, Non Europeans, Men of Colour serving in the Royal Navy or Marines*, lettera dell'Admiralty al Ministry of Pensions, 16 giugno 1917. Nel 1904 tale esclusione fu estesa a tutti i soggetti di colore.


²² Le liste dei marinai della *Royal Navy* nel periodo 1853-1923 sono disponibili sul sito web dei National Archives (UK). Su 580.525 marinai inseriti in queste liste, i maltesi erano in totale 5.807 (tra questi sono inclusi anche alcuni cognomi inglesi). Gli altri erano nati in Irlanda (2.493), India (1.872, tra cui 1.314 nati a Goa), Africa (523), Australia (494), Canada (391), Stati Uniti (337), Indie Occidentali (327), Francia (219), Indie Orientali (125) e Germania (95).

²³ J.H. PARRY, *Trade and Dominion: European Oversea Empires in the Eighteenth Century*, London 1974, 443.

²⁴ Cfr. VASSALLO, *The Maltese Merchant Fleet*, 19-36.

²⁵ *Malta Census* 1871.

MARINAI MALTESI DELLA ROYAL NAVY NEL MEDITERRANEO, 1861-1964



Fonti: *UK Censuses* (anni 1861-1881); *Malta Censuses* (anni 1891-1911 e 1931); National Archives (UK), ADM 1/8611/147 (1921); *Report on the Department of Labour and Social Welfare 1939-1946*, 464 (1946); *Malta Year Books* (1950-1955); *Reports on the Working of the Department of Emigration, Labour and Social Welfare* (1957 e 1964), citato in CHRISTOPHER POLLACO, *An Outline of Socio-Economic Development in Post-War Malta*, Malta 2003, 7 e 154 (rispettivamente, per il 1957 ed il 1964).

Dai censimenti inglesi per gli anni 1861-1881 e da quelli di Malta e Gozo per il periodo 1891-1931 si hanno informazioni dettagliate sugli ufficiali ed i marinai inglesi e maltesi in servizio sulle navi di Sua Maestà Britannica di stanza a Malta. Secondo queste fonti e da quelle dell'Ammiragliato, i maltesi costituivano tra il 4,7 ed il 9,9% del totale degli equipaggi della *Royal Navy* nel Mediterraneo²⁶. Sia nella prima che nella seconda guerra mondiale, i maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* erano circa 2.000, anche se non siamo in grado di dire quanti di essi prestavano servizio a bordo delle navi e quanti, invece, a terra²⁷.

²⁶ Nel calcolo dei maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* non abbiamo incluso i marinai a bordo delle navi della *Royal Fleet Auxiliary* (RFA). La RFA, che ha celebrato 100 anni nel 2005, è in una posizione intermedia tra la *Royal Navy* e la *Merchant Navy*: fornisce supporto logistico alla *Royal Navy* sulle navi militari, ma con equipaggi mercantili. Nel 1938, vi erano più di 250 marinai maltesi a bordo delle navi della RFA di stanza a Malta che avrebbero dovuto essere censiti come marinai della flotta mercantile, come si legge nel *report* del Segretario della sezione maltese della *UK's National Union of Seamen* («Times of Malta», 13 agosto 1938).

²⁷ Per la prima guerra mondiale cfr. The National Archives (UK), ADM 178/181, lettera dell'Ammiraglio Dudley Pound, 23 aprile 1937; per la seconda guerra mondiale cfr. il *Report on Depart-*

Le caratteristiche dei maltesi arruolati nella Royal Navy

I maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* possono essere suddivisi in due gruppi²⁸. Il primo, che nel periodo 1891-1938 comprendeva da 100 a 200 uomini, prestò servizio prima sulla *Hibernia* e poi sulla *Egmont*. Essi erano impegnati principalmente nei servizi portuali, come marinai scelti o marinai semplici o fuochisti²⁹. Pochi erano gli artigiani, come maestri d'ascia, falegnami, ecc. che talvolta avevano una limitata esperienza marittima.

Il secondo gruppo, più numeroso, era per lo più composto da fuochisti e da quelli che, nel periodo 1891-1911, erano definiti "domestici", cioè *stewards* e cuochi. Questi uomini svolgevano le proprie mansioni a bordo della flotta ed erano circa due dozzine sulle navi più importanti, come la *Royal Oak* o la *Resolution*. Fino alla fine del primo conflitto mondiale, vi erano anche numerosi suonatori delle bande musicali, che furono poi sostituite dalle bande dei *Royal Marines*. La maggior parte di questi uomini serviva nel Mediterraneo, ma una piccola parte era impegnata anche altrove, specialmente in tempo di guerra. Dei maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* e scomparsi durante la Grande Guerra, almeno 1 su 4 morì in zone lontane dal Mediterraneo (specialmente nella battaglia dello Jutland). In tempo di pace, invece, i maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* erano quasi esclusivamente impegnati nel Mediterraneo, dove spesso si trovava circa la metà della flotta inglese. Nel 1901, ad esempio, pochi maltesi erano a bordo delle navi britanniche di stanza a St. Helena, Aden, Hong Kong, in Australia e nell'Atlantico: essi rappresentavano circa il 10% di tutti i maltesi a bordo della flotta britannica. Non vi sono riscontri sui luoghi in cui morirono i maltesi vittime della seconda guerra mondiale.

La principale suddivisione all'interno della *Royal Navy* era quella tra ufficiali e marinai semplici. Fatta eccezione per un paio di casi isolati, i maltesi appartenevano alla seconda categoria³⁰.

ment of Labour and Social Welfare, Malta 1947, 460. Il numero di 2.000 maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* sembra essere stato il massimo, anche se un quotidiano nel 1979 riporta il dato di 3.000 uomini intorno al 1930-39 («Times of Malta», 31 marzo 1979).

²⁸ I maltesi, dei quali è noto l'estremo sacrificio della vita, vengono ricordati in questo paragrafo in rappresentanza di tutti i marinai maltesi. Il nome, il rango, la data di morte, l'età, il settore di servizio, la nazionalità, la tomba, il luogo di nascita e lo stato civile sono reperibili nel *database* della *Commonwealth Graves Commission*. A titolo comparativo è stato selezionato a caso un campione relativo alle vittime britanniche il cui cognome è Adams o Adamson.

²⁹ The National Archives (UK), ADM 178/181, *Office of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station*, 27 December 1938.

³⁰ L'assenza di ufficiali di origine maltese nel *Senior Service* appariva molto irritante all'opinione pubblica dell'isola. Oltre che nei reggimenti locali, un numero ristretto di ufficiali maltesi fu ammesso ad arruolarsi nei reggimenti della *Royal Artillery* e della *Ro-*

I primi risultati di una ricerca ancora in corso sul *database* della *Commonwealth War Graves Commission* indicano che i maltesi della *Royal Navy* morti nella Grande Guerra erano in media più anziani di qualche mese (oltre i 32 anni) dei soldati britannici presi a campione. Questo divario era superiore a due anni nel secondo conflitto mondiale, quando l'età media dei maltesi era di circa 31 anni. D'altra parte, i soldati maltesi sposati erano molto più numerosi (63,8%) rispetto ai britannici (31,4%), almeno nella prima guerra mondiale. Questo fattore, aggiunto alla loro richiesta di restare nell'area mediterranea, può indicare che per i maltesi il servizio nella *Royal Navy* era in gran parte motivato dal desiderio di provvedere alle loro famiglie, piuttosto che da desiderio di avventura³¹. Nella seconda guerra mondiale, i maltesi sposati erano scesi al 56%, mentre il corrispettivo campione di britannici cresceva fino al 39,5%. La riduzione del *gap* era, forse, dovuta agli effetti della coscrizione obbligatoria in entrambi i paesi.

Nella Grande Guerra, la maggior parte delle vittime maltesi erano fuo-

yal Infantry della *British Army*. Ciò fu recepito positivamente dalla stampa maltese, ma l'Ammiragliato rifiutò fermamente di seguire l'esempio dell'esercito [The National Archives (UK), ADM 178/181, *Enlistment of Maltese in the Navy 1937-1939*, lettera del Comandante in Capo nel Mediterraneo al Segretario dell'Ammiragliato, 21 luglio 1937]. Ancora nel 1956, un corrispondente del «Sunday Times of Malta», a proposito della flotta britannica nel Mediterraneo, si chiedeva perché nelle liste dei corsi di addestramento per ufficiali dell'esercito a Sandhurst figuravano nomi maltesi, mentre non altrettanto accadeva per le liste dei corsi di addestramento per ufficiali di marina a Dartmouth («Sunday Times of Malta», 5 febbraio 1956). Per il periodo considerato, ho personalmente riscontrato solo due casi di ufficiali maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy*. Uno era un certo Joseph Camillieri, il cui padre, Gabriele, era stato fedele sostenitore degli inglesi durante l'assedio che nel 1800 portò alla liberazione dell'isola dai francesi, che avevano confiscato gran parte delle sue proprietà (cfr. LEWIS, *A Social History*, 78). Come ricompensa, il figlio era appunto stato ammesso come ufficiale nella *Royal Navy* e, successivamente, promosso Comandante. Egli aveva sposato una donna inglese del Kent e si era stabilito in Inghilterra. Non è noto, invece, il nome del secondo maltese, ma la Tabella LXVI del *Census of the Maltese Islands for 1901* (pubblicato nel 1903) indica un ufficiale a bordo della *Caesar*, insieme agli altri 584 maltesi arruolati sulle navi in porto, inclusi i 170 sulla *Hibernia*. La corrispondenza del 1938 tra l'Ammiragliato ed il *Colonial Office* fa riferimento ad uno sfortunato tentativo di ammissione al corso di Dartmouth da parte di un *gentleman* indicato come maltese sia nella bozza che nella versione finale della lettera [National Archives (UK), ADM 178/181, *Enlistment of Maltese in the Royal Navy 1937-1938*, 19 luglio 1938]. Una nota a margine sembra porre l'interrogativo se la persona in questione, di nome Strickland, fosse o meno maltese.

³¹ Tra i motivi per arruolarsi nella *Royal Navy*, McKee indica, infatti, come di gran lunga più importanti quelli di natura economica [cfr. CHRISTOPHER MCKEE, *Sober Men and True. Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy 1900-1945*, Cambridge (Massachusetts) – London, 2002, 28-29]. È, perciò, difficile immaginare cosa avesse in mente lo staff dell'ufficio di reclutamento della marina britannica quando in pieno conflitto mondiale, il 6 febbraio del 1941, fece pubblicare sul «Times of Malta» questo annuncio: “*Join the Navy and see the World!*” (Arruolati in Marina e vedrai il mondo).

chisti o addetti alle caldaie (35%), seguiti da *stewards*, cuochi, cambusieri, assistenti e camerieri (33%) e da suonatori della banda (10%). Le vittime britanniche, d'altra parte, erano per lo più, nell'ordine, marinai, fuochisti e *Royal Mariners*; non bisogna, però, dimenticare che la metà delle perdite della *Royal Navy* durante il conflitto avvenne sulla terraferma.

Nella seconda guerra mondiale, la situazione era in parte diversa e la stragrande maggioranza dei maltesi morti in servizio era costituita da *stewards* (57%) e cuochi (22%)³². Un ulteriore 4,3% riguardava cambusieri e assistenti del NAAFI, mentre i fuochisti, con il loro 7%, stavano al terzo posto. Tra le due guerre, la percentuale di *stewards* e cuochi, infatti, era più che raddoppiata. Per le vittime britanniche la situazione era più o meno simile a quella della prima guerra mondiale, tranne che per il quasi dimezzato numero dei fuochisti in seguito al tramonto del carbone.

Per quanto riguarda le loro origini, i maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* durante la prima guerra mondiale provenivano in gran parte dall'area del *Grand Harbour*: Valletta (22%), Senglea (12%), Vittoriosa (8%), Cospicua (8%) e Hamrun (8%)³³. All'epoca della seconda guerra mondiale, tuttavia, quell'area aveva già ceduto il posto ad altre città in rapido sviluppo come Sliema e Gzira. Valletta, comunque, rimase al primo posto con un ridotto 17%, seguita da Sliema (16%), Gzira (9%) e Hamrun (9%).

I maltesi della *Royal Navy*, ed in particolare *stewards* e cuochi, erano considerati dai loro connazionali come *la crème de la crème* poiché erano tanto fortunati da essere impiegati al servizio dell'impero britannico³⁴. Essi erano ben retribuiti e, grazie alla loro vicinanza agli ufficiali, avevano probabilmente anche la possibilità di incrementare i loro introiti³⁵. Il salario mensile era circa £ 15, mentre un lavoratore specializzato nei *Dockyards* ne guadagnava da 2 a 2,2 la settimana³⁶. Nella sua autobiografia, Herbert Ganado, l'uomo politico maltese che fu internato dagli inglesi nella seconda guerra mondiale per i suoi legami con l'Italia, parla dell'affetto e della stima esistenti tra gli ufficiali britannici della *Royal Navy* ed i

³² *Stewards* e cuochi erano sufficientemente organizzati da avere un proprio club, il *Royal Naval Officers' Stewards and Cooks Club*, le cui riunioni sembrano aver avuto luogo regolarmente («Daily Malta Chronicle», 13 ottobre 1921)

³³ Ci riferiamo, ovviamente, al luogo di residenza delle persone. Al contrario di quanto accadeva per i maltesi imbarcati sulle navi mercantili che stavano per lunghi periodi lontani dall'isola, i maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy* trascorrevano molto tempo in porto e, di conseguenza, anche chi era originario di località lontane dall'area portuale era incentivato a trasferirsi nella zona del porto per essere più vicino alla sua nave.

³⁴ MARIO ELLUL, *Maltese Imperial Mentalities: Subjecting the Maltese Mind to Imperial Rule*, in "Storja '98", 1998, 95-114 (in part. 103-105).

³⁵ Cfr. MCKEE, *Sober Men and True*, 85-88, per eventuali introiti extra a bordo della *Royal Navy*.

³⁶ ELLUL, *Maltese Imperial Mentalities*, 102-104.

loro *stewards* maltesi³⁷. Ganado evidenzia come ciò fosse di grande e reciproca utilità citando il caso di uno *steward* maltese, di cui egli certificava il reddito: lo *steward* aveva prestato servizio su una delle più grandi navi della flotta ed era creditore da parte di una ventina di ufficiali britannici di somme che, talvolta, superavano le 100 sterline. In termini più generali, Ganado, che non era un anglofilo, sostiene che i maltesi erano molto felici dei loro rapporti con i britannici³⁸.

I maltesi al servizio della *Royal Navy* erano normalmente impiegati nei cosiddetti incarichi di servizio non continuato, a differenza dei britannici che invece godevano di una sicurezza maggiore. D'altra parte, sembrerebbe che le pensioni di anzianità, di invalidità e di reversibilità concesse ai maltesi fossero simili a quelle dei britannici, almeno fino alla Grande Guerra, anche se non è chiaro quali fossero le condizioni necessarie per accedervi³⁹. Secondo il censimento del 1921, la *Royal Navy* corrispondeva 311 pensioni di anzianità e 53 di reversibilità, quando invece l'esercito ne versava, rispettivamente, solo 119 e 14. In un periodo in cui le politiche sociali e assistenziali erano minime o inesistenti, la prospettiva di ottenere una pensione deve aver rappresentato per i maltesi un incentivo non secondario per arruolarsi nella *Royal Navy*. Vi era però, indubbiamente, un rovescio della medaglia.

Per gran parte del periodo britannico a Malta, il servizio nella *Royal Navy* o nell'esercito non presentava rischi maggiori di ogni altro lavoro civile mentre, come abbiamo già evidenziato, esso offriva, di contro, benefici economici considerevoli; tuttavia, in tempo di guerra, i maltesi che si arruolavano, e soprattutto i fuochisti, e gli addetti alle caldaie, che lavora-

³⁷ HERBERT GANADO, *Rajt Malta Tinbidel, Volume 1 (1900-1933)*, Malta 1977 (3rd edition), 331.

³⁸ GANADO, *Rajt Malta*, 329.

³⁹ The National Archives (UK), PIN 15/699, *Maltese, Non-Europeans and Men of Colour serving in Royal Navy or Royal Marines. Pensions and Gratuities to Widows and Dependents*, 30 giugno 1925. La situazione sembra essere peggiorata notevolmente per i maltesi dopo la Grande Guerra. Nel 1917 un rappresentante del *Ministry of Pensions*, che aveva trascorso otto o nove giorni a Malta per analizzare la questione, dichiarò in un primo tempo che "the present rates are ridiculously excessive for Maltese" [The National Archives (UK), PIN 15/698, *Maltese, Non-Europeans and Men of Colour serving in the Royal Navy, or Marines*, nota a margine della lettera del 27 luglio 1917]. I *Royal Navy Ratings Rates of Pay* per il 1920, tuttavia, includevano anche i maltesi (http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.com/~pbtyc/LondonGazette/Pay_Rates_1920.Html). Le nuove tabelle dei salari comprendevano una indennità di navigazione nei mari tropicali (a 'Steaming in Tropics' Allowance) per tutti i macchinisti e i cuochi, inclusi i maltesi, ma non i locali. Negli anni seguenti, d'altra parte, sembrano emergere differenze tra le paghe dei maltesi e quelle dei britannici. Durante la seconda guerra mondiale, le indennità per i maltesi erano dimezzate rispetto a quelle degli inglesi al fianco dei quali erano arruolati e, come si evince anche dalla nota 45 (*infra*), rimasero così negli anni '50 ([The National Archives (UK), ADM 1/10435, *Maltese Ratings - Increase in Family Allowance*, 28 dicembre 1939]).

vano all'interno delle navi, correvano seri rischi⁴⁰. Durante la Grande Guerra, la *Royal Navy* perse circa 30.000 uomini, metà dei quali morì combattendo a terra per la *Royal Naval Division*⁴¹. Dei circa 15.000 morti in mare, almeno 255 erano maltesi della *Royal Navy*⁴². Essi rappresentavano, quindi, poco meno del 2% sul totale delle perdite subite in mare dalla *Royal Navy*, ma era una percentuale notevole se calcolata sulla relativamente piccola popolazione dell'isola.

Le perdite della *Royal Navy* nella seconda guerra mondiale sfiorarono i 50.000 morti, mentre il numero dei maltesi che persero la vita si fermò a 198, rappresentando comunque il 10% dei 2.000 maltesi arruolati in questo conflitto. Di contro, le 50.000 vittime britanniche rappresentavano meno del 5% sul numero complessivo di 866.000 uomini e donne in servizio nella *Royal Navy* nel 1945. Perciò, la percentuale dei maltesi morti in guerra era doppia rispetto a quella dei britannici. Ciò detto, non bisogna dimenticare che il numero di vittime civili, a Malta come altrove, superò di gran lunga quello di uomini e donne in uniforme.

Il contributo dato alla guerra da uomini e donne provenienti da ogni angolo dell'Impero britannico, non solo dei corpi militari australiani, neozelandesi, canadesi e sudafricani, ma anche indiani, caraibici e africani, è ora finalmente riconosciuto⁴³. Ma, anche se erano state abbastanza generose da versare il loro sangue per l'Impero, le popolazioni delle colonie, e in particolare alcune di esse, non venivano spesso considerate del tutto positivamente da una parte dell'opinione pubblica britannica.

“Maltese, non-Europeans and men of colour...”

In un Act del 1817, Giorgio III sanciva *“That for the purposes of this Act, and for all purposes whatever, the Island of Malta and its Dependencies shall be deemed and taken to be in Europe”*⁴⁴. Tuttavia, la questione se i maltesi dovessero essere considerati europei rimase tendenzialmente alquanto controversa, almeno nel periodo della dominazione britannica⁴⁵. Parlando dell'Impero

⁴⁰ DOMINIC FENECH, *A Social and Economic Review of Malta during the First World War*, Unpublished B.A. (Hons) History Dissertation, University of Malta, Malta 1973, 158.

⁴¹ <http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk>.

⁴² «Malta Government Gazette», 19 novembre 1938.

⁴³ NIALL FERGUSON, *Empire. How Britain made the Modern World*, London 2004, 330 e 347; ed anche *Colonies, Colonialism and World War Two* nel sito <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/colonies-colonialism>.

⁴⁴ *An Act to regulate the Trade to and from places within the limits of the Charter of the East India Company, and certain possessions of His Majesty in the Mediterranean*, 20 June 1817.

⁴⁵ Ancora intorno al 1975, la questione razziale rappresentava un serio problema per la *British Army*. Non pochi sforzi furono compiuti per far sì che le unità avessero una

britannico in generale, infatti, Stoler ha sostenuto che il “*colonial control was predicated on identifying who was ‘white’ and who ‘native’ [...]*”⁴⁶.

Prima che le sue teorie venissero interpretate in modo distorto dal nazismo, l’eugenetica aveva, sul finire dell’800, conquistato un certo favore negli ambienti politici in Occidente, e la purezza razziale e sessuale era tenuta in alta considerazione da parte degli ideatori dell’Impero britannico, come emerge molto chiaramente dalle posizioni di alcuni *Senior Officials* dell’Ammiragliato nei confronti dei maltesi e dei ‘*coloured*’, o meglio dalle considerazioni sulla capacità di questi ultimi a prestare servizio nel *Senior Service*, il più rinomato custode di tutto l’Impero.

In una lettera del 20 luglio 1921, il *Rear-Admiral* J.D. Kelly sottolineava che i “*Maltese are not white men [...]*”⁴⁷. L’ammiraglio era convinto che, nonostante la loro indole in tempo di pace fosse equilibrata, sobria, docile e affatto pigra, i maltesi mancavano di “fegato” e di iniziativa e che, di conseguenza, essi erano inaffidabili e inadatti a svolgere incarichi di comando⁴⁸. A sostegno delle sue affermazioni, egli citava la sua personale esperienza con i fuochisti maltesi a bordo della *Dublin*: durante un’azione nei Dardanelli, egli era stato costretto a farli tornare giù alle caldaie tenendoli sotto la minaccia delle baionette.

Kelly non era l’unico *Senior Officer* della *Royal Navy* a riconoscere le qualità positive dei maltesi “in tempo di pace”. Il *Rear-Admiral* Barttelot, ad esempio, in base alla propria esperienza dichiarava che “[...] *the educated Maltese is equal to the English boy in intelligence and in many ways he is quicker*”⁴⁹, mentre l’ammiraglio Fremantle sosteneva che i marinai maltesi

maggioranza di uomini con ‘*North European facial features*’, dunque né ‘*Chinamen*’ né ‘*Maltese*’, e agli ufficiali medici veniva richiesto di certificare nei loro referti quali individui avessero il cosiddetto ‘*D factor*’. Si può solo supporre cosa indicasse quella ‘*D*’. Cfr. *Maltese dismissed alongside Negroids by British Army*, in «*Malta Today*», 9 gennaio 2005.

⁴⁶ Per Stoler cfr. LINDA BRYDER, *Sex, Race and Colonialism: An Historiographical Review*, in “*The International History Review*”, 20 (4), 1998, 806-822 (808).

⁴⁷ The National Archives (UK), ADM 178/181.

⁴⁸ Comuni erano tra gli europei le accuse di codardia nei confronti dei “non bianchi” ovvero, come in questo caso, contro coloro la cui appartenenza alla “razza bianca” fosse dubbia. Come evidenziato da Argyros, ciò traeva origine dalla convinzione che le altre razze non possedessero le stesse qualità morali dei “bianchi”, quali il coraggio e la capacità di comando (LEONIDAS ARGYROS, *Employment Patterns and Working Conditions of Crew Members in the P&O Fleet, 1890-1910*, nel CD del *4th International Congress of Maritime History*, Corfu 2004, 13). Nel caso dei maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy*, ciò era amplificato dal fatto che la maggior parte di essi svolgeva servizi di cucina e cambusa. Sari Mäenpää, ad esempio, afferma che gli uomini del reparto approvvigionamento spesso non venivano considerati veri marinai [SARI MÄENPÄÄ, *Galley News: Catering Personnel on British Passenger Liners, 1860-1938*, in “*International Journal of Maritime History*” (St. John’s, Canada), 12 (1), 2000, 243-260 (in part. 243)].

⁴⁹ The National Archives (UK), ADM 1/8611/147, 7 ottobre 1921.

avevano un fisico forte, erano ottimi lavoratori e capaci di una grande resistenza⁵⁰.

Le osservazioni di Kelly nel 1921 suscitarono grande impressione e, ancora alla vigilia del secondo conflitto mondiale, erano citate nella corrispondenza riguardante lo *status* dei maltesi arruolati nella *Royal Navy*, anche se il Governatore Bonham Carter sosteneva che l'unico modo per assicurarsi la fedeltà dei maltesi era costituito dal "*removal of any ground, however illusionary, of discrimination against the Maltese*"⁵¹. Se da un lato, infatti, l'Ammiragliato continuava a non consentire ai maltesi l'accesso a tutti i settori del *Service*, si deve osservare tuttavia che i maltesi, come anche tutti gli uomini di colore residenti in Inghilterra e arruolati nella *Royal Navy*, ricevevano regolari pensioni, e non pensioni ridotte, come proposto, invece, dal governo britannico per i non-europei impiegati localmente al servizio nei paesi stranieri⁵². Agli occhi dei britannici e, in particolar modo, nell'ottica della *Royal Navy*, i maltesi occupavano una sorta di posizione di mezzo, nel senso che, pur non essendo parificati agli inglesi, essi venivano considerati in modo più favorevole dei *lascars* (marinai indiani), dei malesi o dei cinesi che vi prestavano servizio⁵³. Ciò, ad ogni modo, era dovuto anche ad altri fattori.

Indipendentemente dalla loro predisposizione, o meno, ai ruoli militari, di solito i maltesi consumavano i pasti separatamente dal resto dell'equipaggio⁵⁴. I *Senior Officers*, infatti, affermavano che ogniqualvolta il personale inglese e maltese addetto alle cucine mangiava insieme, l'armonia regnava solo per un breve periodo⁵⁵. In un ambiente tanto ristretto come quello di una nave, il "*comradeship began in a ship's messes*"⁵⁶. Un altro fat-

⁵⁰ The National Archives (UK), ADM 178/181, *Enlistment of Maltese in the Navy 1937-1939*, lettera dell'Ammiraglio Sydney R. Fremantle, 28 aprile 1938.

⁵¹ The National Archives (UK), PIN 15/698, lettera del Governatore Charles Bonham Carter, 9 novembre 1937. La questione della parità di salari e pensioni con il personale navale britannico divenne ancora più pressante e dibattuta dopo la fine della guerra. Nel 1951, l'allora giovane Dom Mintoff propose, senza successo, di istituire un comitato ristretto per lo studio del problema, denunciando le differenze di salario nei tre servizi della *Royal Navy*. In termini generali, infatti, il trattamento economico riservato ai britannici era quasi doppio rispetto a quello dei maltesi («Times of Malta», 13 gennaio 1951).

⁵² The National Archives (UK), PIN 15/698, lettera dell'Ammiragliato, 5 ottobre 1917. Una lettera del 6 settembre forniva una lista di alcuni dei "*various types of Coloured men entered (in service)*". Tra questi vi figuravano "*Kroo Boys, Seedies, Lascars, Chinese Servants, Malay Servants*".

⁵³ Vedi *infra* nota 37.

⁵⁴ The National Archives (UK), ADM 1/8611/147, lettera del *Rear Admiral Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron*, 19 settembre 1921. Ciò è emerso anche dagli esiti dei questionari inviati ai maltesi che avevano prestato servizio nella *Royal Navy*.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ McKEE, *Sober Men and True*, 73. Nella *Royal Navy* pranzare separatamente, a secon-

tore che spingeva i maltesi a non fare gruppo con gli altri era lo speciale rapporto che li legava agli ufficiali per i quali svolgevano le loro mansioni di *stewards* e di cuochi.

In termini generali, dunque, sembrerebbe che i maltesi costituissero un piccolo gruppo che, per la religione cattolica e per la identità tipicamente mediterranea, restava separato rispetto ai nordeuropei di lingua inglese, e per lo più di religione protestante, che formavano il grosso dell'equipaggio. La sensazione di essere un gruppo distinto mi è stata confermata dai maltesi della *Royal Navy* con i quali sono entrato in contatto e che hanno gentilmente accettato di sottoporsi ai miei questionari e di rispondere alle mie domande.

In un mondo diverso

I due conflitti mondiali, ed in particolare il secondo, hanno rappresentato uno spartiacque e hanno unito inglesi e maltesi in un modo che è difficile da comprendere appieno oggi. Nel 1946 i maltesi della *Royal Navy* erano 1.736, numero che rappresenta, probabilmente, un record assoluto in tempo di pace⁵⁷. Dopo la fine della guerra, la *Royal Navy* offrì ai maltesi l'opportunità di prestare servizio sull'isola nella *Malta Port Division*, ovvero di arruolarsi nelle file della *Royal Navy* e dei *Royal Marines* del Regno Unito alle identiche condizioni dei britannici⁵⁸. Il primo gruppo di giovani reclute maltesi si arruolò nel 1952 e, successivamente, si trasferì in Gran Bretagna per svolgere un ulteriore apprendistato sulla *Ganges*. La *Malta Port Division* fu sciolta nel 1979, quando le forze militari britanniche si congedarono definitivamente dalle isole maltesi.

da delle diverse componenti della nave, era in uso fino alla metà degli anni '50, quando fu introdotto l'attuale *self-service*.

⁵⁷ *Report on the Working of the Department of Emigration, Labour & Social Welfare for the Year 1946*, Malta 1946, 464.

⁵⁸ JOSEPH BONNICI and MICHAEL CASSAR, *A Century of the Royal Navy in Malta*, Malta 1999, 182-183.

PORTS, HARBOURS, SHIPS AND NAVIGATION

Pierre A. MacKay

New light on Negropont

Around 1895, an alliance of short-sighted nationalists and magnate property developers decided to strip away every identifiable trace of mediaeval Negropont except for one church in the south central part, and that was protected because it had become the seat of the bishop of Chalkis. Across the street from the west face of the church, a contemporary building of uncertain function was also spared. The radical obliteration of all other monuments was doubly effective in that no official photographs were taken, no drawings, whether views or plans, were made and no descriptions were recorded¹. Attempts during the twentieth century to rediscover the history of the city depended almost entirely on inferences from documents that were often of uncertain reliability and unevaluated local traditions. The church was usually declared to be an early Byzantine wood-roofed basilica, and the building opposite is still known unofficially as the “House of the Bailo”². A propaganda tract written after the Ottoman capture and sack of the city on July 12th, 1470, was adopted as the primary source for the description of the Venetian fortifications and this³, together

¹ SPYROS KOKKINIS, “Τστορικὰ μνημεῖα καὶ λαϊκὴ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ στὴν Χαλκίδα”. *Ἀρχεῖον Εὐβοϊκῶν Μελετῶν*, 15 (1969), 149-248.

² GEORGE LAMBAKIS, Ἐβδομάς I, B (1884), Φύλλον, 267-268, in his initial survey of this monument judged it to be of western European origin but, following the publication of J. STRZYGOWSKI, “παλαιὰ βυζαντιακὴ βασιλικὴ τῆς τῆς ἀλίας Παρασκευῆς ἐν Χαλκίδι”. *Δελτίον Ἱστορικῆς καὶ Ἐθνολογικῆς Ἑτερείας τῆς Ἑλλάδος*, 2 (1989), 71-128, Lambakis, along with an overwhelming consensus of scholars, adopted the view that the building was Byzantine in origin with some Frankish modifications. The latest statements of this position are in HIERONYMUS LIAPES, *Μεσαιωνικὰ Μνημεῖα εὐβοίας* (Athens, 1971), 93ff. and JOHANNES KODER, *Negroponte: Untersuchungen und Siedlungsgeschichte der Insel Euböia während der Zeit der Venezianerherrschaft* (Vienna, 1973), 92-93. Koder provides a full bibliography of the publications which support various incorrect identifications of the building. He assumed (95 n174) that the Dominican Priory was located outside the walls.

³ GIACOMO/GIACOPO CASTELLANA, *Perdita di Negroponte, scritta per Frate Iacopo dalla Castellana*, in FILIPPO-LUIGI POLIDORI, “Due Ritmi e una Narrazione in Prosa di autori contemporanei intorno alla presa di Negroponte”, *Archivio Storico Italiano* IX (1854), 399-440 Appendices.

features of the defense system and of the general layout of the town. In 2001 I drew the attention of David Jacoby to this map, and it was incorporated into a recent article, along with a reproduction of the Camocio plan⁶.

Jacoby's article brought together the most significant documents illustrating the development of Venetian Negropont, and by 2004, I was able to build on this base and to identify the mediaeval church, now dedicated to Ayia Paraskevi, as the Dominican priory church of St. Mary and St. Dominic. The archaeological evidence uncovered by Nikolaos Delinikolas, director of conservation and restoration at this church (and also at Osios Loukas and Daphni), confirmed the documentary evidence, showing that all surviving parts of the basic structure date from the 13th century or later⁷. Along with this structural evidence, Delinikolas also exhibited the first detailed photographs of the sculptured ornament embellishing the great triumphal arch at the east end of the nave. Two figures carved in deep relief at the springing of this arch represent St. Dominic on the left, and St. Peter Martyr of Verona on the right.

The identification of the Dominican priory is of great importance since it serves as a landmark for several of the documents discussed by David Jacoby⁸. Using this, the Camocio plan, and one or two other recently published maps and documents, it is now possible to start on recreation of mediaeval Negropont with several fixed points of reference, most of which were unavailable to Johannes Koder for his extensive study of the city in the 1970s⁹. At the time of his investigations almost no topographic location was securely known except the Euripus itself and the small swampy inlet at the south end of the city, the *Bourkos*. The existence, rather than the exact location, of two mediaeval gates in the defensive wall was understood,

altri Principi Christiani, et al Sig.or Turco, novamente poste in luce (Venice, n. d. [ca. 1574], alla libreria del segno di S. Marco); JAN MORRIS, *The Venetian Empire* (New York-London, 1980), 57

⁶ DAVID JACOBY, "La Consolidation de la Domination de Venise dans la Ville de Négropont (1205-1390)", in *Bisanzio, Venezia e il mondo franco-greco (XIII-XV Secolo)*, ed. by CHRISNA A. MALTEZOU and PETER SCHREINER (Venice, Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e PostBizantini di Venezia, 2002), 151-187, reproduction of map on 564.

⁷ NIKOLAOS DELINIKOLAS and VEMI VASILIKE, "Αγία Παρασκευή Χαλκίδας. Ένα βενετικό πρόγραμμα ανοικοδόμησης τον 13^ο αιώνα", *Βενετία-Εύβοια, Από τον Εύριπο στο Νεγροπόντε. Πρακτικά Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου, Χαλκίδα, 12-14 Νοεμβρίου 2004*, επιμέλεια Χρύσα Α. Μαλτέζου-Χριστίνα Ε. Παπακώστα (Βενετία-Αθήνα 2006), 229-266; PIERRE A. MACKAY, "St. Mary of the Dominicans: The Monastery of the Fratres Praedicatorum in Negropont", *Venezia-Eubea. Da Egripus a Negroponte. Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Chalkida, 12-14 novembre 2004*, ed. by CHRYSNA A. MALTEZOU and CHRISTINA E. PAPAOKOSTA (Venezia-Atene, 2006), 125-156

⁸ JACOBY, "La Consolidation", 163-164.

⁹ KODER, *Negroponte*, fig. 8, relied on a British Admiralty chart, where the indications of landmarks within the walls are entirely imaginary.

and one of these, the *Porta di Cristo* was correctly assumed to be at the high point of the terrain where it led out to the main road eastward from the city. The second, however, the *Porta del Tempio*, was mislocated by reference to the propaganda document mentioned above, the *Perdita di Negroponte*, the author of which claimed to have been present during the siege although he was probably drawing entirely on other people's reminiscences. He may never have actually seen Negropont¹⁰.

From the Camocio plan we know that the *Porta del Tempio* was the same as the later *Katō Pyli*, near the north corner of the walls, and very close to the shore of the north Euboean channel. After 1470, when Negropont became the headquarters of the Ottoman Archipelago command (*Sandjak* of the Archipelago), this was the most important gate except for the one at the bridge over the Euripus. It is likely that it was the same under the Venetians, since it was close to the main customs dock¹¹. The location of both the *Porta del Tempio* and the *Porta di Cristo* can be fixed in relation to the modern street grid owing to the discovery of an 1840 urban-renewal plan, which shows the complete system of mediaeval walls¹². Excavations for building foundations in 1972 uncovered two separate short runs of the wall and the footings for the drawbridge leading out of *Porta di Cristo*, which allowed for a tracing taken from the 1840 map to be laid over a modern street map, so that we now know precisely the location of both mediaeval gates¹³. In 2004, I was told by residents of Chalkis that remains of the *Porta del Tempio* had briefly been uncovered in the middle of the wide divided roadway, Leoforos Venizelou, but I have been unable to find any archaeological report concerning this occasion.

We can also be quite certain of the location of the *Portello del Patriarcado*, a smaller postern in the east wall about half way between the *Porta di Cristo* and the Bourkos. It is possible that there may be significant remains of this structure, but it has not been explored since it is inside the walls of the military reservation that covers a quarter of the entire area of the mediaeval walled city. This is the gate that was incorrectly identified as *Porta del Tempio* during the twentieth century. The Camocio map notes that it had been

¹⁰ For a full discussion of the reliability of various sources see GIOVAN-MARIA ANGIOLLELO, *Relazione* (= *Relazione*), PIERRE MACKAY (edition and commentary), in preparation.

¹¹ GIACOMO RIZZARDO, *La Presa di Negroponte fatta dai Turchi ai Veneziani*, EMMANUELE CIOGNA (ed.), with 5 Appendices and notes (Venice, Giambatista Merlo, 1844), 9, "alla parte del commercio". Castellana's distorted view of Negropont gives no indication that this gate near the north Euboean channel even existed.

¹² GIANNIS GKIKAS and SPYROS, KOKKINIS, "Τὸ πρῶτο πολεοδομικὸ διάγραμμα τοῦ «Κάστρου» τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ κατάλογος τῶν κτισμάτων". *Ἀρχεῖον εὐβοϊκῶν Μελετῶν*, 19 (1974), 277-291.

¹³ M. GEORGOPOULOU-MELAINI, "Μεσαιωνικὰ Μνημεῖα Εὐβοίας", *Ἀρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον*, 29 (1973-74) Χρονικὰ, 499-512, especially figures 1 and 6; ΝΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΠΑΔΑΚΗΣ, "Τὸ μεσαιωνικὸ τεῖχος τῆς Χαλκίδος", *Ἀρχεῖον Εὐβοϊκῶν Μελετῶν*, 20 (1975), 277-317.

converted to an artillery casemate even before the time of the siege. In the interior of the town, the only certain identification is the Dominican priory. The contemporary building to the west of this has been worked on extensively by Nikolaos Delinikolas, who argues convincingly that its date and shape indicate that it is the Venetian state *Loggia*, mentioned in accounts of the siege of Negropont as the place where the captain of mercenaries, Tomaso Schiavo, was executed on suspicion of treacherous communication with the Ottomans. There is a large underground cistern in the center of town just north of the one surviving mosque from the Ottoman period, and close to where the Ottoman aqueduct coming in from the east must have terminated. The cistern, which I explored briefly through the kindness of the Byzantine Ephorate of Chalkis¹⁴, is regarded as mediaeval rather than Ottoman in construction, but it has to be remembered that the aqueduct itself was only recently shown to be a seventeenth century building¹⁵.

A somewhat dilapidated house a bit south of the bridge over the Euripus is presently regarded as Ottoman in origin, but it could quite easily be Venetian. The Ottoman traveler, Evliya Çelebi noted in 1668 that much of the housing in Negropont was preserved from the time of the Venetians, and this building was in an area beyond the range of the siege cannon that smashed up much of the northern and southeastern part of the city.

There is no physical evidence to carry us beyond this point, but a number of locations in the mediaeval town can be identified from the Camocio plan and the 1840 map, along with a few photographs taken rather as souvenirs than as historical evidence. I know of three panoramas taken from Kara Baba hill on the Boeotian mainland, although only one of them has been published, unfortunately from a mirror-image print. There are also three good views of the fortifications at the Bourkos, taken just before the destruction began¹⁶. With the aid of these, we can get some idea of the Venetian defences in the last decades before the Ottoman siege.

Giovan-Maria Angiolello¹⁷, who wrote the only genuine eyewitness ac-

¹⁴ THODOROS I. SKOURAS, “Οχυρώσεις στην Εύβοια”. *Ἀρχεῖον Εὐβοϊκῶν Μελετῶν*, 20 (1975), 327-400. The cistern, Figure 102, lies under *Plateia Pesonton Opliton*, and is said to have been used as a prison during the occupation in the second World War.

¹⁵ MACHIEL KIEL, *The Turkish Aqueduct of Chalkis: A Note on the Date of Construction and the Identity of its Founder*, in S. C. BAKHUIZEN, *Studies in the Topography of Chalcis on Euboea* (Leiden, 1985), 151-157.

¹⁶ SPYROS KOKKINIS, “Ἡ ἐπανάσταση καὶ ἡ δίκη τοῦ Κριεζῶτη στὰ 1847”, *Ἀρχεῖον Εὐβοϊκῶν Μελετῶν*, 17 (1971) 33-96.

¹⁷ GIOVAN MARIA ANGIOLELLO, *Viaggio di Negroponte*, ed. by CRISTINA BAZZOLO (Vicenza, 1982). This is a good, but minimally annotated, transcription of MS Vicenza, Biblioteca Bertoliana, Gonzati 24.10.5. I am currently preparing an edition, translation and commentary for this valuable source.

count of the siege from the opening shots to the end, refers to three “*rivellini*” = ravelins, which, in the normal use of the term, would mean fortified redoubts outside the walls and on the other side of the defensive ditch which surrounds the wall. There is no trace of anything of that sort before 1687 and, until the publication of the 1840 map, this aspect of Angiolello’s account was a bit of a mystery. On the 1840 map, however, it becomes clear that the *Rivellino del Tempio*, the *Rivellino “il Stretto”* and the *Rivellino del Burchio* (these names are given in Angiolello’s *Relazione*) were semi-detached redoubts built inside the walls, to provide platforms for cannon too heavy to be placed on the curtain walls or the old-fashioned towers¹⁸. The *Rivellino del Burchio* is actually visible in three photographs of pre-1895 Chalkis¹⁹. The *Rivellino del Tempio* is at the opposite end of town, by the shore of the north Euboean channel, and the *Rivellino “il Stretto”* can be identified by elimination of the other two. Evliya Çelebi describes these redoubts in 1668²⁰.

Two monuments mentioned above are identified with the district known as *il Tempio*. Attempts have been made to associate the name, *il Tempio*, with the Cathedral of Negropont, with the Latin Patriarchate and with the church now identified as the Dominican Priory. It is none of these. *Il Tempio* is a district named for the Augustinian Canons of the Temple of the Lord in Jerusalem, who were assigned a church of St. Nicholas mentioned in a letter of Innocent III in 1208²¹. Just as in Acre, the Canons gave the name of the Temple (the Dome of the Rock on the Jerusalem citadel) to their neighborhood, and this identification also gives us the location of the church of St Nicholas, which is a landmark in one or two definitions of boundaries in Negropont.

The Camocio map shows that the cathedral and the surrounding neighborhood, *Vescovado*, is in the north third of town, and by elimination it appears that it was in the eastern half of that third. Even when the Venetians held the entire west half of Negropont, from the second decade of the fourteenth century on, the cathedral does not appear to have been under their control.

We now have enough fixed points on the plan of the city to start on the

¹⁸ ΓΚΙΚΑΣ and ΚΟΚΚΙΝΙΣ, “Τὸ πρῶτο πολεοδομικὸ διάγραμμα”, 280-281. The *Rivellino del Tempio* is at the top center of 280, the *Rivellino ‘Il Stretto’* is 3 cm. down and 6 cm. right of this, and the *Rivellino del Burchio* is the large complex at the bottom center of 281. This last structure encompasses the earlier Giudecca.

¹⁹ ΚΟΚΚΙΝΙΣ, “Ἡ ἐπανάσταση”, figures 2, 3 and 4, following page 96.

²⁰ G. I. FOUSSARAS, “Τὰ «Εὐβοία» τοῦ Εβλία Τσελεβή”. *Ἀρχεῖον Εὐβοϊκῶν Μελετῶν*, 6 (1959), 150-171. Unfortunately, the translator who supplied the Greek text for Fous-saras was working from a defective manuscript, and the passage on the redoubts is quite baffling.

²¹ Innocent III, *Letters of Pope Innocent III = Patrologia Latina* 216 (1885) Book XI, 250.

more problematic identifications, which must be established in the absence of any direct evidence either from names or from archaeological remains. The location that is of most interest is the initial settlement of the Venetians, the *burgesia* from which they expanded to take over the entire city. Except for some possible holdings acquired through intermarriage with local families – and these would be precarious, since they were strongly deprecated by the Byzantines – the Venetians owned nothing in Negropont in 1203, and they do not seem to have owned much more in 1205. Their situation, their safety and their livelihood depended on the church of St. Mark, which the emperors assigned to the Venetians for their use, even their exclusive use, without ever having to consider detaching it from Byzantine ecclesiastical jurisdiction, since it was still part of the ecumenical Christian church²². It was the church of St. Mark that could provide a quasi-title to the other amenities required by the small number of Venetians resident in Negropont²³. The church, still technically a Byzantine entity, could own or lease the minimum group of properties, a *fondaco*, a bakery, a bath and a hostelry²⁴, without ever raising the question of extraterritorial ownership. Until 1204, and for a few years after, San Marco will have remained subordinate to the bishop of Negropont. When, by 1216, the Venetians succeeded in placing it under the authority of S. Giorgio Maggiore in Venice, that was one of the earliest and most significant claims of direct Venetian control over territory within the bounds of the city²⁵. From then on, we may picture a general policy of purchasing from both Greeks and Lombards so that, by mid-century, many properties, perhaps even the majority in the west half of the city, were already in Venetian hands.

S. Marco of Negropont was important, therefore, not for its size and distinction but for its legal position. It may very well have been a rather insignificant building, but it was the essential nucleus around which Venetian territorial expansion began. Since we know a good deal more about the organization of the city than we did a decade ago, we may search for where it can have been by eliminating the regions where it cannot have been. It was not in the Temple district, and it was not in the *Vescovado* district, which seems to have been isolated from the water. The details of the

²² Before 1204, the disagreements between Rome and Constantinople were serious, but not yet irreparable.

²³ VSEVOLOD SLESSAREV, "Ecclesiae Mercatorum and the Rise of Merchant Colonies", *Business History Review*, XLI, 2 (1967) 177-197. This study explores the several ways in which the church located at a commercial outpost could serve to manage the assets and properties of the merchants there.

²⁴ OLIVIA REMIE CONSTABLE, *Housing the stranger in the Mediterranean World* (Cambridge, 2003), especially 107-157.

²⁵ SILVANO BORSARI, "La Chiesa di San Marco a Negroponte", *Medievo Greco. Rivista di storia e di filologia bizantina*, Numero "0" (2000), 27-28.

first formal expansion of Venetian influence in the treaties of mutual support between the dalle Carceri and the Venetians in 1256 (renegotiated in 1262), though not as clear as we might wish, make it evident that the center of Venetian influence was somewhat to the north, and that the initial expansion was toward the south. It was also close to the western wall, so as to provide access to the sea, but apparently Venice did not achieve control of the land gate, *Porta del Tempio*, since the Temple district can later shown to be still in Lombard hands. By elimination, we are left with an area for the original nucleus of Venetian expansion lying somewhere between the north end of town and the Euripus bridge. The Camocio plan shows a major sea-gate halfway along the corresponding stretch of wall, *La Castagnola*, and another close to the bridge at the Euripus. The Venetian district, the *Campo San Marco*, might center on either, but *La Castagnola* is a bit more likely, since it is more distant from the Euripus bridge, which was initially under Lombard control and was left that way until well into the 14th century²⁶.

If the building west of the Dominican priory is confirmed as the Venetian *Loggia*, it suggests that Venice moved quickly after 1262 to emphasize its hold on the new properties. This does not, however, mean that the commercial center, the original *burgesia*, migrated away from the north. Giacomo Rizzardo, in his account of the last days of the siege of 1470, identifies a region outside the walls at the north end of town as the *commercio*, and the Camocio map seems to support this where it shows a major wharf, *el Sponton*, extending from the right bank of the defensive moat outside the city wall. This area is conveniently accessible to incoming traffic from the north Aegean and beyond, but the north Euboean channel is not a safe, long-term harbor like the wide bay south of the Euripus. War galleys that were sent from Candia to remain on station almost certainly remained in the south harbor. Commercial vessels came in through the south channel from Venice, Crete and even the Levant, while others came in from the north, but continuous voyages may have been rare. The Euripus provides a passage between the north and south Euboean channel, but a very narrow and somewhat hazardous one. On the western side of the little island, between it and the Boeotian mainland, a passage may occasionally have been passable by small boats, but there are suggestions from previous centuries that it was sometimes dammed up altogether. The eastern passage, between the island and walls of Negropont, is estimated to have been somewhere between 8 and 12 meters wide before it

²⁶ I have not yet found a specific reference to the *Campo San Marco*, although the use of the Latin term *campus* for the Venetian enclave is well attested, *Campus* may not, however, mean quite the same thing as Venetian *campo* in this context. BORSARI, "La Chiesa di San Marco", 27 n2 associates the term *campo* with the church of San Marco.

was blasted out to make a wider channel for 19th and 20th century hulls. No galley could row through such a channel even at slack water; there would not be enough room to pull the oars. It would have to be towed, and towing would probably restrict passage to the two reasonably long periods of slack water in each day.

I have seen only one incantus for the voyage to Negropont, and that is from 15 May, 1462, so it is probably abnormal. It mentions only a single galley, and is concerned with products of northern Greece: silk, probably still from Boeotia, and grain, probably from Thessaly. Such documents probably offer the best opportunity to see how freight was handled through the Euboean channel. As a working hypothesis, I suggest that merchandise coming in from the north arrived on various sizes of *grippi*, and was restowed in galleys at Negropont. Customs inspection and taxation was carried out along the wharves in the north channel. A document recently published, the trial of Bartolomeo Querini, provides some details of shipping in 1374²⁷. It involves *griparia* passing through the channel from south to north and then going on up the channel although they were expected to unload in Negropont.

The broad outlines of the description of mediaeval Negropont are now in place. The small nucleus of Venetian settlement was in the northwest, between the Euripus bridge and the beginning of the north wall along a road which must have closely paralleled the present day Odos Angelí Govioú. To the north of this original Venetian quarter (attested as a formally recognized *burgesia* only after 1211) was the Temple quarter, centering on a church of St Nicholas. East of that was the Episcopal quarter which probably included the dalle Carceri palace, later turned over to the Venetians.

The Lombards, under the dalle Carceri, began by controlling the whole south end of the town and all the northeast as well, except for what they conceded in 1211. In the negotiations of 1256 and 1262, they effectively relinquished the entire west side of the town, retaining rights of passage from their territories to the east end of the Euripus bridge and the bridge itself. They also retained commercial rights over traffic across the bridge. The north gate, the *Porta del Tempio* appears to have remained under Lombard control as did the Temple quarter.

In the center of town, the Dominican priory became a dominant landmark after its formal establishment in 1249²⁸. Somewhere northwest of it

²⁷ MARINA KOUMANOUDI, "Contra Deum, Ius et Iustitiam. The Trial of Bartolomeo Querini, Bailo and Capitano of Negreponte (14th c.)", in *Bisanzio, Venezia e il mondo franco-greco (XIII-XV Secolo)*, ed. by CHRISIA A. MALTEZOU and PETER SCHREINER (Venice, 2002), 235-287.

²⁸ *Monumenta Ordinis Praedicatorum Historica*, Vol. III (Rome-Leipzig, 1898), Cap. Gen. 1249, 48.

and close to the head of the Euripus bridge, was the Convent of the Crociferi who were still resident there in the 1460s, although the order was clearly in terminal decline. South of the Crociferi was the neighborhood of S. Margarita, and south of that was the administrative center of the Venetians, which seems to have been developed at the same time as the Dominican priory²⁹. Still further south and partly on land now incorporated into the Greek military reserve, was the neighborhood assigned to the Latin Patriarchate after the flight from Constantinople in 1261.

In the fourteenth century, the region along the south wall bordering the Bourkos, was divided between the Arsenal, toward the southwest corner of the site, and the *Giudecca* (conceded after 1350) on the east³⁰. In the last decade of Venetian Negropont's history (1460-70) the *Giudecca* was cleared to make room for the Bourkos redoubt inside the southeast corner of the walled town.

Even though we cannot hope for large amounts of corroborative documentation from mediaeval Negropont it is likely that wills, property titles and similar texts will come to light, and it can be hoped that with this broad outline of the town as a framework, some additional precision can be given to its topographical organization, which was previously almost unknown, and often grossly misunderstood.

²⁹ The ceiling was formed in exactly the same way as that of the Dominican Priory church and probably from the same shipment of timber. I am accepting Delinikolas's judgement that this building was the *loggia*.

³⁰ JACOBY, "La Consolidation", 169, arsenal, and 179-180, *giudecca*.

Z. Kenan Bilici

New discoveries in Alanya Castle: Ship-graffiti and some comments on shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean

Undoubtedly, for those who know to look the past, there is no other *expressive* image telling the history of a society.

Alanya is a highly interesting medieval archæological site on the southern shores of Turkey. It is situated on a very attractive peninsula and its most remarkable monuments belong to the Byzantine and particularly Seljuk periods from 13th century. For the Medieval Eastern Mediterranean studies, Alanya is a fascinating point with its more or less preserved monuments, ruins and landscape. With its military potential obtained by the excellent walls and towers, Alanya lied far from the medieval power centers and main shipping lanes; yet, it was the second great port of Seljuks opening to the Mediterranean world after Sattalia (now Antalya). This site therefore is also worth of case studies within the framework of medieval geopolitics.

Alanya Castle is a medieval settlement which became more important and well-known after its conquest in 1221 by the Seljuk Sultan Alâ'eddin Keykubad I. Thereafter it turned to an important harbor of east Mediterranean and a winter throne-city as well which is called "*Alâ'iyye*" in attribution to its conqueror. It is not only the solely and the first medieval town of Anatolia to which a Seljuk Sultan gave his name, but also a Seljuk city in Turkey which well-preserved the medieval urban features, historical and monumental buildings such as city walls, Inner-Castle, Red Tower, Ship-yard so-called *Tersane*, and *Ehmedek* (a sort of second inner-castle or *chateau*) and various ruins at the best. In this way, Alanya is an *archaeo-park* in itself on a most beautiful peninsula.

Formerly renown as an important port and *palace-city* in Eastern Mediterranean, Alanya, despite the fact that it has gradually lost this city character adopted in the middle ages continues to tell the story of not only a city but also all physical and cultural changes experienced by human beings and the society through the city walls, gates, monumental structures,

mostly ruined dwellings, streets and graveyards on the historical peninsula, a unique natural site created by nature and human beings.

Handling this story in a rather restless and universal cultural environment - like the Mediterranean - with various ethnicities gathered along its shoreline, where people of different languages and customs continuously intermingle and interact would undoubtedly be very exciting. Indeed, this large cultural area Braudel passionately loved and described as an inner sea "*with life blended with that of the land*", has also become a sea of cultures created by societies inhabiting this region who lived in an interesting *modus vivendi* at times by fighting and at other times by trading, each time creating new social, political and economical settings. In such a panorama, it is not surprising to find that terms relating to the sea and seamanship are mostly common just like the climate peculiar to this geography.

It is possible to find, for instance, many other words like *capitânia / capitana / capitano / kapudana*; *galeón / galeone / kalyon*; *bastardo / bastarda / bastarda*; *skarmoz / iskarmoz*; *tonnellata / tonilato* or *scandiglio / iskandil*. The etymology of the words is not important. These words that were borrowed from *Lingua Franca* used in the Mediterranean indicate the same things in Portuguese, Spanish, Catalan, French, Provence, Italian, Venetian, Greek and Turkish languages and in the dialects of these languages. On the other hand, the impact of Italian is dominantly felt in some terms related to commerce like *polizza / poliçe*; *fatura / fatura*; *agente / acente*; *banca / banka* and *bilancio / bilanço*. It would also be possible to find out that the terminology related to cuisine too consists of similar terms across these languages, just as it is the case with the terminology related to the wind types like *Poyras / poyraz / boyraz* or *lodoz / lodos* and the others.

In this regard, some examples such as naming of the north-west wind as *provença* by some fishermen in Alanya or the use of *la porta* to mean *door* in İbradı, a mountainous settlement, are somehow evidence of an influence spread from Mediterranean shores to inner areas. Nevertheless, it is hard to compile data on historical and cultural changes as well as these language associations established thanks to the sea in Alanya, as a city with gradually erased collective social memory.

It is, however, possible to find these relationships from other evidence as well. Alanya's relationship with the Mediterranean is not only because it is a settlement established near this sea. Indeed, this *ship-yard* opening to the sea through its five-arched, as a *unique* medieval marine structure rather than as an urban symbol, emphasizes the fact that the history of Alanya has sea-dependent line of destiny. Built as a marine base during the reign of Seljuk Sultan Alâ'eddin Keykubad I, who bestowed his nickname to the city with virtually a profound envy not much encountered in the Eastern Islamic world, the city continued to be a mysterious attraction and the focus of interest for many travelers curious of the exotic East even

much later than the 13th century. It is common knowledge that the marine trade of Eastern Mediterranean with Europe was principally dominated by Italian cities, which would later turn into maritime states, starting from the 10th century until the late middle age. Among them, the *Levant* trade was sustained mostly by two major Italian city-states during the 14th and 15th centuries: Genoa and Venice. Both city-states are unrivalled in seaborne trade not only in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also with the northeastern Europe. Thanks to the long-distance trade, distribution of spices and luxury items such as silk, porcelain, perfume, ivory, pearl and carpet purchased from the East in Europe was generally handled by these two city-states. However, the leader role of Florence must be especially indicated in English wool trade. So, thanks to the economic power gained with the distribution of trade with Eastern world to Europe and developed international banking systems, the Medici Family, which has come out as a monarch power during the 15th century, would turn Florence into the cultural center of Italian Renaissance. The same economic power will also ensure the emergence of famous Függer family in Augsburg.

Although these two Italian city-states are in a fierce competition on seaborne trade in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is certain that Venice had most of the control. Its hegemony was balanced with the cooperation of Florence and Genoa and becoming the financial and commercial centers of Europe. It is certain that Venice had its power in the Mediterranean not only by shipbuilding and repair, but also successful diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, Anatolia and Europe, and by sharing commercial information with merchants and providing them security. This great marine force of the Middle Age processed the raw cotton it had purchased from the *Levant* in Italy; sold it to southern Germany together with the silk textiles it produced; processed sugar, one of the most vital import product in Europe in the conquered islands of Cyprus, Crete and then Sicily and Malta, which were later conquered, sold it to the European market; and also made exports through the developed glass, mirror and crystal production, majolica and paper industry it had.

It is doubtless that Alanya was one of the most important interests of Venice in Eastern Mediterranean. As early as the beginning of the 13th century, as a natural result of the commercial agreement made by the Seljuks following the conquest of Antalya on the southern shore with Cyprus Kingdom and Venice Republic in *Levant* trade, particularly with the conquest of Alanya and during the period of Keykubad I, it is known that many more Venetian, Pisan, Provence and Genoan merchants settled in Seljuk lands and established trade colonies (*fondiculum*) compared with the past.

It may be suggested that during this period Alanya was not much different from Mediterranean port cities where we found the political, eco-

conomic, and geographical diversity of many civilizations and that it had a cosmopolitan pattern.

In this regard, it is obvious that the city is an important center for export goods such as deodar and pitch used in ship-building as well as being a marine base. Taxed in the 16th century during the Ottoman Period under the title of *Öşr-i Harnûb (Locust Tithe)*, locust may be considered among these export goods. In later periods, some mines must have been added to them.

Perhaps due to its commercial importance, Francesco Balducci Pegolotti of Florence, who has written a guide book for Medieval merchants (*La Practica della Mercatura*), felt the need to organize a schedule showing the measurements used in Alanya in comparison with Italian measurements.

With the advancement of excavation works in Alanya, there may be a chance of finding some archaeological data suggesting the existence of Italian city-states, foremost Venice, meanwhile, bringing to light some architectural remains such as consulate buildings known to have been used sometimes as courts for the purpose of remedying the cases and disputes that might arise in overseas trade during the Seljuk period, and encountering some ship-wrecks in underwater studies.

Towards late 15th century, sugar cane plantations established in southern Spain and some islands on the Atlantic, and sugar imports in Mediterranean, started ending the sugar import from the Middle East to Europe, while textile export and import balance started failing and a shrinkage emerged in the consumption of luxury items. Discovery of alternative sea routes by Portugal and Spain in 1500, although shaking the dominance of Italian city states in the Mediterranean, did not cause any major change even until the end of century. Ships of Ancona still carried salt; Genovese and Catalanian ships continued carrying olive oil. There were mutual relationships; there was a *fondaco* inhabited by the Muslim merchants in Ancona, and even today there is a big Turkish trade center, named as *Fondaco dei Turchi*, in Venice over the *Canal Grande*; Ottoman merchants whose names are inscribed in printed documents such as Çelebi Mehmed Reis of Angora or Resul Ağa received orders to sell silk textile for undercoat, cereals, spices, fleece, raw silk, leather, fur, alum, wax or hemp. However, in the eyes of the Europeans, Turks seemed reluctant to export to foreign countries over the sea although they traded with all parts of the Empire; besides, they had few ships to do that.

The spread of cheaper and more abundant products in Europe as well as the technological recession in the Middle East caused the developed industries in the Eastern Mediterranean to annihilate in the course of time: soap production was one of them; sugar and textile industries also gradually disappeared. Italian city-states still existed in the 17th century. However, Portugal and Spain was replaced by the Dutch and British and the

Levant trade was mostly dominated by them. Dutch ships started sailing in the Mediterranean from the late 16th century. Holding the biggest commercial power of the era with the *Dutch East India Company* established in 1602 and the *Dutch West India Company* established thereafter in 1621, Holland also dominated the Mediterranean trade. The growth in Dutch shipping is striking; before all, total carrying capacity increased; and ships changed their shapes in parallel. So that, in late 16th century, granted to trade for the first time in the *Levant* under the patronage of France, the British started complaining, after some time, about the Dutch exporting large quantities of clothing to the Mediterranean thanks to their large ships, cheap freight and low costs and about the exportation of large quantities of Turkish-origin products from Holland to England.

Of course, piracy and slave trade dating much back also continued in the Mediterranean. To illustrate, thanks to the studies of *defteroology* (study of registers), it has been possible to shed light on the role of Malta in the history of piracy and slave trade and its economic power between the years 1580-1680 and particularly in the 1620s, named as the golden era of piracy.

Constituting the major naval power of the old world in the Mediterranean in the 17th century, Venice entered the process of evanescence with the *30-Year Wars*, towards the mid century, the maritime power of Spain, the major maritime power of the previous century and home of Cervantes, Velázquez and El Greco, was almost erased. In an age when global economy started rising, world sea trade as well as the commercial domination of the Mediterranean was now taken over by the Dutch.

So, from late 15th century when the European economy grew and expanded until early 17th century, the port of Antwerp has become an international market and *entrepôt* thanks to the intercontinental trade, evidence of the economic power Holland has gained.


Following the *100-Year wars* shaking the entire Europe, in an age when the Mediterranean trade started reviving again, it is certain that many foreign ships called at the port of Alanya starting from the second half of the 15th century, with the foremost aim of trading. One of them was the attack of Medici navy under the command of Admiral Jacopo Inghirami di Volterra in 1608. This attack has gravures of extraordinary importance. Other visual data may also be found about the city to witness its busy trading life starting from at least the 16th century after many battles throughout its long history and after seeing may changes, disorders, reforms, shiny days, falls and rises. These are not the information in archive documents or building remains, but surprisingly ship graffiti depictions made on stucco encountered on a wall in the narrow streets of the city, in a derelict building or in secret corners of a cistern. These recently-discovered depictions, despite being badly worn out, host the physical memoirs of Alanya with the Mediterranean as a large cultural area.



Among the depictions (Fig.1-4) are examples such as *cocha* widely used in the Mediterranean or those in simple sailboat type examples such as *latin* (*caravela latina*), *randa* (*caravela redonda*) and *alamana* in addition to oarboats or *karaka* (carrack), galleons, frigates, brigs with *pruva-grandi* and *mizana* masts, booms and sails processed in detail and high deck Dutch cargo ships (*fluyt*) with details such as bowsprit sail and boom and artillery portholes, captain's cabin, anchor and flag depicted. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make any sense of the flags. One of the two examples that may be considering dating earliest is the typical *Venice Cocha* with flat backbone, head and stern mast and Latin sail; while the other is a typical *karaka* (sailboat) with a round hull, high deck, upper head and stern structures and four masts. Linear-processed human figures are also seen in some of the ships, in rather deteriorated condition. Depictions of fish are also encountered from time to time.

Ship graffiti depictions found, in a way, seem to explain the extent of the commercial relations of Alanya with the external world between late 14th century and the 19th century.

It is striking that there are more ship depictions particularly during the 16th and 17th centuries in Ottoman Era. Because they are not made into a building as a wall illustration and not formed on a certain thematic program or are not designed as such, although majority of them has a poor pictorial quality, and are even deteriorated, but considering the variations in boat models, one can claim that a considerable number of ships called at the port of Alanya as from the 16th century onwards. Whether it was called at for trade, a hydrographic discovery on the shores of Mediterranean, or for meeting water and other similar needs during a trip made along the coast, it is clear that the city had many visitors in different time periods. Perhaps, western pilgrims who were permitted to visit the sacred places in Jerusalem by the Ottoman Sultan were also among them. With the analysis of ship flags by time, it will be possible to shed light on the countries of origin in the future. As a matter of fact, the extent of the relations of Alanya with Europe during this period will increasingly be better understood as the amount of tangible data such as some silver coins that belong to Phillip II from late 16th century to Saxony Electorate and from the beginning of the 17th century to Spanish-Netherlands period that are known to be in *Alâ'iyye* and even the *ibero-islamique* sherds of Valencia from early 17th century increase with the help of coincidences.

In this regard, looking at Alanya's gloomy post-card views giving the impression of virtually a derelict place during the early years of the last century, I may be misleading to conclude that it was a rural town and a quiet port. In the old settlement area, which is today in ruins, we can imagine many dwellings containing ship depictions and decorated with wall illustrations in parallel with the *westernization fashion* of the 19th cen-





ture, just as other similar ones in Anatolia. One may think that such illustrations were ordered by the notables who had earned their wealth thanks to the sea-borne trade. Çanakkale ceramics with ship illustrations of the time shows that love for the sea and ships is also reflected on items of daily usage.

It is sad that the traces of the relationships established thanks to the sea-borne trade and the cultural interactions developed over the ages in Alanya do not survive today. However, it is still possible to feel the distant memoirs of architectural styles spread over the Mediterranean shores in the past on bow windows with *levant-style* girdles on the façades of several houses that could still remain more or less authentic in Tophane neighborhood, on some wooden post entrances or on some roof tiles, as signs of a settled society.

The ship depictions we today encounter in one of the narrow streets of the city distant from the eyes, on the walls of an unused small mosque (mesjid) or a ruin, on the cosy corners of closed and moist spaces like cis-

terns register the history of a port city that has been devalued by time due to changing world conditions and long-distance sea trade. If one looks at the building stages and techniques of the structures they are settled on, we find, on these illustrations, not the memoirs of a splendid past, adventurers dreaming to reach the wealth of the *Levant* world, pilgrims or travelers thinking of reaching the sacred lands during the middle age, recorded almost on every building, stone or column along these coasts, but rather, the scratches of the late inhabitants of a Mediterranean town where each new day is indifferent from the previous, with no concern of leaving a visual document to the future, one on top of the other and one into the other of what they saw or dreamed of. Almost every wall of all old and derelict buildings in the city, almost as a canvas where they comfortably reflected their inner feelings, seems to have hosted different people in different times. Though there are some inscriptions on ship illustrations, they are impossible to read.

Unfortunately, perhaps we will never know who made these illustrations. Although they are made by sharp pointed tools on stucco and in a random pattern, encountering exciting workmanship details such as anchors, sails, portholes, flags, decks, and even ropes in many of them, there remains no doubt that at least a majority of them are made by those who know about the sea and ship. It is also possible that a few of them are men of the sea who spend perhaps a large part of their lives in the dockyard only making the boats to be used along the shore. It is a pity for the cultural heritage of Alanya that no written documents and material memoirs have remained from these seamen. Leaving these depictions aside, unfortunately, Alanya's association with the sea can only be established with names on several grave stones that have luckily survived today and indicate a life very much related with the sea. Belonging to a history span from the mid 1750s to early 20th century, these grave stones are the oldest witnesses of Alanya's material tie with the Mediterranean.

Ships of Alanya are, in a way, visions of time frozen in a moment, and dragging us along the flood of past life, expectations and curiosity. On these naïve illustrations haphazardly scratched sometimes on the walls of a small mosque or a cistern one on top of the other, it is possible to find the yearnings of a group of illiterate people expressed in shapes resembling drawings of a child, the excitement created by ships arriving from distant lands, the dream of distant places desired to be conquered some time in the past or, for some others, times lost and gone.

This is a preliminary study focused on understanding the historical memoirs and relations that have started to disappear. I hope that we can have access to other historical and archaeological data with the progress of studies and that we can establish new scientific collaborations taking Mediterranean as the basis and reveal more information.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AKARCA A., "Gemi Tasvirli Bir Çanakkale Tabağı ve Ressamı", *Sanat Tarihi Yıllığı*, VII, İstanbul 1977, 1-19.
- ALTIER S. S., *Osmanlı Bahriyesi nin Yelken Devri ve Türk Korsanları*, İstanbul 1995.
- ARIK R., *Batılılaşma Dönemi Anadolu Tasvir Sanatı*, Ankara 1976.
- ASHTOR E., *East-West Trade in the Medieval Mediterranean*, London 1986.
- BILICI Z.K., "Seyahatnâmelerde Alanya", *Prof. Dr.Yılmaz Önge Armağanı*, Konya 1993, 307-318.
- BOSTAN İ., *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı: XVII.Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire*, Ankara 1992.
- BOXER C.R., *Dutch Merchants and Mariners in Asia 1602-1795*, London 1988.
- BRAUDEL F., *Akdeniz ve Akdeniz Dünyası*, I, Çev: M. A. Kılıçbay, İstanbul 1989.
- BRUIJN J.R., "Productivity, profitability, and costs of private and corporate Dutch ship owning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", in *The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. J.D. Tracy, Cambridge 1990, 174-194.
- CONWAY'S HISTORY OF THE SHIP: *The Age of the Galley, Mediterranean Oared Vessels since pre-classical times*, ed. Robert Gardiner, London 1995.
- DURSTELER E., "Commerce and Coexistence: Veneto-Ottoman Trade in the Early Modern Era", *Turcica, Revue D'Études Turques*, Tome 34 (2002), Leuven 2002, 105-133.
- FAROQHI S., *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentliler, Kent Mekanında Ticaret, Zanaat ve Gıda Üretimi 1550-1650*, Tr: N. Kalaycıoğlu, İstanbul 1993.
- FAROQHI S., "Before 1600: Ottoman Attitudes Towards Merchants from Latin Christendom", *Turcica, Revue D'Études Turques*, Tome 34 (2002), Leuven 2002, 69-104.
- FODOR P., "Piracy, Ransom Slavery and Trade", *Turcica, Revue D'Études Turques*, Tome 33 (2001), Strasbourg 2001, 119-134.
- GINIO E., "Piracy and Redemption in the Aegean Sea during the first half of the Eighteenth Century", *Turcica, Revue D'Études Turques*, Tome 33 (2001), Strasbourg 2001, 135-147.
- GÜRÇAY L., *Gemici Dili*, İstanbul 1968.
- HENDERSON J., *The Frigates, An Account of the Lesser warship of the wars from 1793 to 1815*, New York 1971.
- HEYD, W., *Yakın-Doğu Ticaret Tarihi*, Çev: E. Z. Karal, Ankara 2000 (2).
- HUTCHINSON G., *Medieval Ships and Shipping*, London 1994.
- KAMPMAN A.A., "XVII. Ve XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hollandalılar", *Belleten*, Cilt: XXIII, Sayı: 89-92, Ankara 1959, 513-523.
- KAHANE H. & R. - TIETZE, A., *The Lingua Franca in the Levant*, Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin, Urbana 1958.
- KINDER H. - HILGEMANN W., *The Anchor Atlas of World History*, Vol. I, New York 1974.
- LLOYD S. - RICE D.S., *Alanya ('Alā'ıyya)*, Çev: N. Sinemoğlu, Ankara 1989 (2).
- MASON R., "The Medici-Lazara Map of Alanya", *Anatolian Studies*, Vol. XXXIX, Ankara 1989, 85-105.
- ÖNEY G., *Türk Devri Çanakkale Seramikleri*, Ankara 1971.
- ÖZDAŞ A.H., "Akdeniz ve Kuzey Avrupa'da Kullanılan Karaka Tipi Tekneler",

- V. Ortaçağ ve Türk Dönemi Kazı ve Araştırmaları Sempozyumu, Bildiriler, Ankara 2001, 385-394.
- PEGOLOTTI F.B., *La Pratica Della Mercatura*, ed. by. A. EVANS, New York 1970.
- PRYOR J.H., *Commerce, Shipping and Naval Warfare in the Medieval Mediterranean*, London 1987.
- PRYOR J.H., *Geography, Technology, and war, Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1571*, Cambridge 1992.
- PRYOR J.H., Akdeniz'de Coğrafya, Teknoloji ve Savaş, Araplar, Bizanslılar, Batılılar ve Türkler, Çev: F. Tayanç - T. Tayanç, İstanbul 2004.
- ROSSABI M., "The 'Decline' of the Central Asian Caravan Route", in *The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. J.D. TRACY, Cambridge 1990, 351-370.
- SKILLITER S.A., *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578-1582*, London 1977.
- SMITH R.C., *Vanguard of Empire, Ships of Exploration in the Age of Columbus*, New York-Oxford 1993.
- SOUCEK S., "Certain Types of Ships in Ottoman-Turkish Terminology", *Turcica, Revue D'Études Turques*, Tome VII (1975), Strasbourg 1975, 233-249.
- SPHYROERAS V. - AVRAMEA A. - ASDRAHAS S., *Maps and Map-Makers of the Aegean*, Tr. G. COX - J. SOLMAN, Athens 1985.
- STEENSGAARD N., "The Growth and Composition of the Long-Distance Trade of England and the Dutch Republic before 1750", *The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. J.D. TRACY, Cambridge 1990, 102-152.
- TURAN Ş., "Venedik'te Türk Ticaret Merkezi", *Belleten*, Cilt: XXXII, No: 126, Ankara 1968, 247-283.
- TURAN Ş., *Türkiye-İtalya İlişkileri, I, Selçuklular'dan Bizans'ın Sona Erişine*, İstanbul 1990.
- VAN DER WEE H., "Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and particularly in the re-export trade from South to North, 1350-1750", in *The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. J.D. TRACY, Cambridge 1990, 14-33.

Eyüp Özveren - Onur Yıldırım

Procurement of naval supplies during the XVIth century: Venetian *Arsenale* and the Ottoman *Tersane* compared

Introduction

In our preceding work, we studied shipbuilding within the Venetian *Arsenale* and the Ottoman *Tersane-i Amire* during the long sixteenth century¹. Our work was informed by the conceptual and analytical tools of contemporary industrial organization studies. We demonstrated that both the Venetians and the Ottomans produced highly similar ships in their impressively-scaled shipyards. However, when the comparison came to the actual organization of the shipbuilding processes within the confines of these massive enterprises we were faced with a sharp contrast. The Venetian shipyard constituted a 'factory'-type enterprise with an 'assembly-line' around which the principle of the division of labor was meticulously organized, whereas its Ottoman counterpart seemed to bring together, metaphorically speaking, under one roof, a vast number of simultaneously operating parallel 'workshops' benefiting from the advantages of a so-called 'industrial district' yet within the parameters of a highly flexible organization of production. In other words, both the Venetians and the Ottomans built the same ships in giant enterprises, yet the organizational logic of their enterprises differed sharply. Given the high level of interaction between the two powers, this was indeed a puzzling finding as the Ottomans could have copied the Venetian model just as they copied Venetian ships, if only they truly wished to do so. Therefore, this major difference we identified in the 'vertical' integration of shipbuilding operations within the shipyards begged for an explanation. Before we attempted such an explanation however, we better had first

¹ EYÜP ÖZVEREN - ONUR YILDIRIM, "Ottoman and Venetian Shipbuilding in Early Modern Mediterranean History", Unpublished paper; Presented at the 10th International Congress of Economic and Social History of Turkey, Venice, 28 September-1 October, 2005.

looked beyond the shipyards. It therefore remained to be seen whether this was the only major difference between the two shipbuilding traditions. In this follow up study we now turn to the shipbuilding-related activities concerning the procurement of naval supplies that entail a horizontal stretch beyond the limits of the actual shipyards. Once again, we approach the study of Ottoman provisioning of resource materials with the already well-studied Venetian model at the back of our minds. We want to see whether and to what extent the Ottoman practice of procurement of naval supplies converged to, or diverged from, this Mediterranean trend-setting model.

A Brief Description of the Venetian Model

The Venetian procurement model for naval supplies attained its most mature form during the sixteenth century under the pressure of increased naval warfare at a time when the inevitable long-term trend in resource depletion had already made itself felt. The most important single resource for the shipyards was the availability of nearby forests from which timber could be obtained. With the wide range of forestry products, masts formed the ultimate bottleneck. As far as timber in general is concerned, transportation costs were as important as physical availability. Relatively short and smooth overland transport combined with navigable waterways facilitated the economic exploitation of timber resources. The Arsenal competed with the merchant marine as well as other local and private interests for the exploitation of these resources. Venetian ships were built of oak, larch and fir of which oak was the one most widely used especially for the hull. Even so, fir was used for masts and spars and posed the ultimate bottleneck to shipbuilding. Fir and larch came from the Rhaetian and Carnic Alps. In the late sixteenth century, Venetians depended on the same regions that they had already tapped in the thirteenth century. The number of large fir trees suitable for masts gave some concern especially at times of massive naval build up. The arsenal had a fortunate recourse to additional supplies in the neighboring Habsburg territories. The sources of oak timbers were more varied (Trevisana, Friuli, as well as Istria across the Gulf of Venice) yet also more quickly depleted. Already at the end of the fifteenth century supplies of these regions were diminishing alarmingly. Restrictions were posed on tree cutting; policies were adopted for forest conservation and even replanting and a census of oaks was intended. In spite of it all, destruction of oak forests continued throughout the sixteenth century. The Arsenal was assigned forests and trees suitable for shipbuilding. For the timber cut for the Arsenal, the villagers were obliged to avail without pay themselves as well as their wag-

ons and animals for transport to the nearest waterway. After 1520 the Arsenal was given the exclusive right to grant licenses to cut oak. The first complete cadastre of oaks came next in 1568, thereafter periodically repeated until 1660. Private shipbuilders were increasingly forced to search for supplies abroad especially after 1559, as the Arsenal came to monopolize the domestic resources and to actively manage them especially on the eve of the War of Cyprus. In Arsenal's reserves the much needed curved timbers were specially prepared to take the desired form. As the century proceeded the original rights of communes on behalf of the Arsenal were repealed and the Arsenal put in their place a direct mode of administration. Soon after, these policies were extended from oak forests to beech, fir and larch. Meanwhile, the radius of the territory from which timber was procured continued to increase. New and further sources were explored and brought into the orbit of the Arsenal. The distance barrier was most easily violated when it came to the quest for quality fir masts without which the Arsenal could not do.

The tow or oakum was driven by the caulkers employed in the shipyard into the seams of the ship which was then covered with pitch. In general the hull was covered with tar or grease. The blackest pitch was applied to the whole wooden structure including the ropes for the sake of protection against rot by the water. Availability of pitch did not become a serious concern since in 1546 it cost less rather than more in comparison with the past. Nevertheless, within a decade, we are told of a certain Piero Pegolotto in 1560 who claimed to have found a new way of cleaning the pitch so that 10% more could be saved. He was hired by the Arsenal for less than what he demanded². This incident that did not go unnoticed in the annals of Venetian shipbuilding indicates the increasing concern with a more economizing use of naval supplies by recourse to piecemeal innovations. Within the arsenal there were two storehouses, one for pitch received and the other for heating it and for storing this prepared pitch ready for application.

The ropes were used for working the sails as well as for the anchors. The quality of ropes used for the anchor was of strategic importance on which the security of galleys and ships as well as sailors and capital depended in case of a storm³. This meant an obsession with quality control. Within the walls of the Arsenal, there existed a closely supervised state rope factory, the famous Tana, because of the quality concerns about the

² FREDERIC CHAPIN LANE, *Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance* (Baltimore, Maryland, 1992), 165-166n, 217.

³ FREDERIC CHAPIN LANE, "The Rope Factory and Hemp Trade in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", in *Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane* (Baltimore, 1966), 270.

ropes and cables needed. The Tana's essential function was the sorting and grading of all hemp on which all else concerning the cordage depended. The better quality hemp was then worked into ropes in the Tana while the rest was commissioned out to private craftsmen. Even the craftsmen working outside of the Tana were closely supervised and regularly inspected⁴. Within the Tana, the Admiral himself was expected to make sure that all ropes and cables were properly manufactured at the desired length and thickness. The craftsmen were paid by the piece rather than a certain wage. In spite of it all, the Tana represented:

“a hybrid form of industrial organization, a mixture of craft tradition and state supervision. The economies made possible by linking together under one control the successive steps in the manufacturing process were not entirely different in kind from those effected by the “vertical trust” of modern times, namely the elimination of rehandling and re-selling. These the putting-out system might effect. But such savings must have been comparatively infinitesimal. A far more important advantage of this miniature vertical combination was the possibility of controlling continually through all the work the grade of the materials employed”⁵.

Between 1579 and 1583 a new larger building for Tana was constructed. This suggests that the role and importance of the rope factory was expanded. Tana was primarily ideally to be engaged more in the manufacturing of high grade hemp used for the cordage of larger ships. Tana first acquired the monopoly of the manufacture of all sizeable ropes as early as in 1515. In 1580, this monopoly was “extended to cover all but the very lowest grades of hemp”⁶. In tune with the demands of this rope factory, the native hemp industry was encouraged as well as highly regulated. Whereas first grade hemp came from Bologna, the cultivation of the hemp of lesser quality was encouraged and greatly expanded in Montagnana⁷. State policies were designed to break the original monopoly of private merchants over Bologna hemp in favor of state procurement as of the fifteenth century. Hence state monopoly was promoted at the expense of private monopolies so much so that no further complaints of private monopolists were being raised during the sixteenth century⁸. The state did not hesitate to fix the hemp price as well as extending the privilege of being the first buyer to the Arsenale. This price-fixing did not hamper the industry and reduce output at least until 1565 but did so by 1591 amidst

⁴ *Ibidem*, 277.

⁵ *Ibidem*, 281.

⁶ *Ibidem*, 271-274.

⁷ *Ibidem*, 282.

⁸ *Ibidem*, 274.

the general-sixteenth century inflation⁹. From time to time, Venetians were forced to comprise from these standards. As early as in the beginning of the sixteenth century, a rope-spinner was hired by the Arsenal to manufacture ropes of low grade hemp that the Tana was traditionally forbidden to use¹⁰.

The ironworks were hierarchically divided up with the most important remaining within the Arsenal while the least being commissioned out to private enterprise. Hence, nails and anchors were made by masters working for daily wages in the Arsenal. In addition, there were others employed for piecework. Moreover, there were ironsmiths who worked in their own shops outside the Arsenal but who were supplied with quality iron and paid by the piece in return.

The one resource-processing activity that was definitively removed from the Arsenal in the course of the sixteenth century was the manufacture of sailcloth. Whereas before 1504 sailcloth was made in the Arsenal itself, afterwards it was gradually discontinued and dispersed to the district and beyond. The product was purchased as needed from suppliers and stored in the Arsenal when not in actual use. This may well have to do with the need for economizing from the positive externalities created by the vast private textile sector in Venice, but especially from women's part-time work for the occasional repair activities. Obviously, a strong force in favor of decentralization of this production process was at work so long as no shortage of the resource material was faced.

The Ottoman Provisioning of Naval Supplies

From the moment of its establishment the Ottoman Imperial Arsenal brought under its orbit a vast stretch of imperial lands for the supply of its numerous shipbuilding materials. During the classical era, the provisioning policies of the state ensured the unremitting supply of these materials through the system of *ocaklık*, which required that the tax-paying population of a given judicial district (*kadılık*) is to fulfil their tax obligations by way of supplying resource materials to the state. The state also resorted to another system, namely *Avarız*, which in some ways overlapped with the practice of the *ocaklık* system, in order to meet the urgent needs of its military machinery particularly during war times. In this regard a variety of extraordinary taxes, paid in much the same way, were demanded from the imperial subjects in addition to their regular tax obligations. The collection of the *ocaklık* obligations as well as extraordinary

⁹ *Ibidem*, 283-284.

¹⁰ LANE, *Ships and Shipbuilders*, 169.

taxes took place by the hands of the financial officials who were dispatched from the centre and collaborated with the provincial authorities (*sancakbeyi* and *kadi*). They realized the procurement of the demanded materials at the point of production. It should be noted that the valuation of these materials took place according to a fixed price system which showed little or no variation over the years. It was therefore not an unusual occurrence that the tax-payers tended to evade those obligations by way of selling their produce to the interlopers who offered the market value of these goods. The state acted promptly to control clandestine activities for the bigger part of the sixteenth century; but with the increased scope of these activities towards the end of the sixteenth century it became more and more difficult to effectively respond to the flow of these materials away from their intended destinations. The Registers of Important Affairs in the Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives in Istanbul contain a good deal of orders dispatched from the seat of the Empire to the provincial authorities for the prevention of illicit trade, particularly, in timber destined originally for the Imperial Arsenal¹¹.

From the late sixteenth century onwards, sources of finance became more diversified and the state purchased some of its materials from merchants at market rates with the revenues obtained from the tax-farms¹². We also have evidence to suggest that in addition to the *avarız* taxes which were used mainly for the supply of material for ship construction, arbitrary fees were levied on the subject populations of certain *sancaks* to meet the cost of the timber that would be used in ship construction during the seventeenth century.¹³ However, in the eighteenth century, problems associated with the procurement of timber, iron, pitch, tar, resin, hemp, sails and other shipbuilding materials from the provinces through the provisioning mechanisms caused the state to increasingly obtain its needs from merchants at market rates. By the time the reform of the navy was launched around the late eighteenth century, the traditional provisioning mechanisms had already been dismantled and all the materials used in the construction of ships were purchased from producers via the mediation of merchants. Where the needs of the Imperial Arsenal were concerned, the principal item of demand was timber which came primari-

¹¹ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defterleri (MD), 24, Evaili/za/1002 (1593), A. REFIK, 11. *Hicri Asırda İstanbul Hayat*, (Istanbul, 1988), 12. Also BOA, MD, 62, 9 Cemayizilahr 1016 (1607), REFIK, 11. *Hicri Asırda İstanbul Hayatı*, 32.

¹² BOA, Cevdet/Belediye (CB), 8729, 26 S. 1015/3.7.1606. This order states that the cost of the material to be used in the construction of a galley and a horse-ship in the Süzebolu iskele was to be drawn from the tax-farms located in the seaside towns of Ahiyolu and Midye.

¹³ BOA, MD, 83/96, 20 L. 1037/23.06.1628; MD, 83/99, 21 L. 1037/24.06.1628.

ly from the mountainous areas along the Sea of Marmara (Propontus) and the Black Sea¹⁴.

The neighbouring regions (*sancak*) of Kocaeli and Bursa which included settlements with large forests such as İznikmid, İznik, Yalakabad, Sabanca, Akyazı Geyve and Akhisar supplied most of the timber needed by the Imperial Arsenal. The quality of its wood coupled with the favourable conditions of overland and seaborne transportation played a crucial role in the designation of these locations as the principal supplier of timber. The transportation of timber from the İznikmid region, around one hundred kilometres to the east of Istanbul, was realized by ships from the port of Izmit which acted as the principal point of transit for the timber that was brought from the forests in the neighbouring regions. Although timber was found in abundance, it was quite difficult to find wood suitable for the masts. The fir trees used in the making of masts were also obtained largely from the area of İznikmid, more specifically from the areas of Ada, Akyazı, Sarıçayır, Akhisar and Geyve. For the procurement of such highly specialized items as masts, the Ottomans did not hesitate to make use of distant and diverse sources of supply such as Albania, the Carpathian Mountains in the Balkans, Wallachia, Moldovia and the Taurus Mountains in southern Anatolia¹⁵. When the demand was great, these new locations were designated also to send ordinary wood to supplement the regular shipments from the neighbouring districts of Istanbul. For example in 1565 and 1571-72 timber from Crimea, previously not a major source of timber, was brought in bulk numbers from Caffa to furnish the ships in the Imperial Arsenal¹⁶. In 1559, the authorities in Istanbul sent an order to the provincial authorities in Rhodes to exploit the possibility of locating trees suitable for the construction of galleys¹⁷.

Where the methods of procurement were concerned, the subject populations (*reaya*) of the districts designated as *ocaklık* were obliged to provide the state officials (*kereste emini*) with sufficient timber – these people

¹⁴ KATIP ÇELEBİ, *Tuhfetü'l Kibar fi Esfari'l Bihar* (Istanbul, 1980), 238-244; HEZARFEN HÜSEYİN EFENDİ, *Telhisü'l-Beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman* (prepared for publication by Sevim İlgürel) (Ankara, 1998), 162-169. Original editions of these two books date from the mid-seventeenth century.

¹⁵ SAFFET, "Karadeniz-Izmit Körfezi Kanalı", *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası*, 3, Nos:13-18, 949.

¹⁶ BOA, MD, 6/1289, 19 Zilkade 972 (1565). BOA MD, 6/1103, BOA MD 6/411.865.

¹⁷ BOA, MD, 3/596, 967 (1559). BOA, MD, 3/463, 28 Muharrem 967/30.10.1559. For the small arsenals, the procurement of wood was less of a problem. Since the high cost of transportation led small arsenals such as the ones in Basra and Sinop to rely exclusively on the supply of timber from the neighbouring areas. While the Basra Arsenal secured its wood supplies from the mountains of Maraş, the arsenal at Sinop relied on the supply of timber from its own hinterland as well as the Black Sea forests further away.

were not only responsible for felling the trees but also for cutting them into shape – to construct the number of ships planned for a particular year. Although the amount of timber was expressed in monetary terms, the type and number of the timber were also specified in the relevant official registers. (*Beher sene meremmat için üç yük akçalık kereste ve levazım ocakdır, tahsil olunur*). For each year, the amount of timber to be drawn from a given district was adjusted according to the military circumstances as the number of ships envisioned for a specific year varied accordingly¹⁸. The great naval campaigns such as the Djerba expedition of 1560, the siege of Malta in 1565, the sieges of Chios and Cyprus led the government authorities to mobilize all the arsenals throughout the imperial domain¹⁹. Certain unusual events such as the destruction of the major part of the Imperial Navy at Lepanto in 1571 also necessitated the mobilization of all the shipyards to make up the loss, causing them to double or triple their production capacity²⁰. For example in 1572, all the judges of the neighbouring districts (Şile, Sabancı, Akyazı, Konrapa and Göynük, Bender, Ereğli, Yenice-i Taraklu, Geyve and Akhisar) were urged to ensure the supply of timber sufficient in amount to rebuild 10 galleys²¹. These circumstances in turn exerted significant pressure upon the populations of the designated districts who were held responsible not only for the supply of local arsenals but also that of the Imperial Arsenal in Istanbul. As it is attested by the archival documents, some settlements were deserted owing to excessive demands of the government authorities. The authorities, in turn, tried to restore the number of households back to its former level²². In the same vein, there was apparently a tendency to run off among the labouring populations (e.g., *marangoz, bıçkıcı, baltacı, bıçakçı*) who were recruited to fell the trees and shape them into timber as well as among those who were compelled to work in the local arsenals such as the one in Kandra²³. It should also be

¹⁸ In the mid-seventeenth century, the construction of a galley or galleon required roughly 7,000-10,000 units of timber costing between 56,000 and 86,000 *akçes*.

¹⁹ COLIN IMBER, "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 17.

²⁰ In his opus magnum, *Tuhfetü'l Kibar fi Esfari'l Bihar*, Katip Çelebi suggests that "Building ships for the Imperial Navy should take place for the most part (*mümkün oldukça*) in the Imperial Arsenal; thus the ships could be built quickly and on time. Furthermore the subject populations in the provinces could thus be subjected only to minimal oppression". KATIP ÇELEBİ, *Tuhfetü'l Kibar fi Esfari'l Bihar*, 246.

²¹ BOA, MD 18, 26 Şevval 979 (1572); M. ZEKAI KONRAPA, *Bolu Tarihi* (Bolu, 1960), 236.

²² BOA, MD 12/98, 979 (1571). Apparently the government authorities closely watched the movement of populations. They seem to have had a precise information as to the number of households in this location. The subject of the document is the village of Küreci in Lapseki which had 45 households and now recorded to have decreased to 19. The local authorities are urged to restore the original number of households.

²³ BOA, MD 12/1209 979 (1572).

pointed out that under the pressing circumstances the government authorities intensified their efforts to keep the nomads (*yörüks*), gypsies and farmers away from the forests designated for the use of the Imperial Arsenal on account of their potential to damage the trees. To this effect many orders were dispatched to the governors and judges of the districts where such forests were located²⁴.

During the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman navy was involved with large scale naval campaigns, the large woodlands along the Sea of Marmara supplied most of the wood for building the ships at the Imperial Arsenal, leading to the gradual deforestation of that region²⁵. By the mid-seventeenth century the problem had gained a more serious outlook, urging the district officials to ask the Porte to waive a certain portion of the timber demanded. The Porte must have taken this request into consideration as it began to exploit other possibilities to procure timber for the use of the Imperial Arsenal. By the end of the seventeenth century, the principal source of timber had been shifted from the Marmara region to the forest areas of Bolu, several hundred kilometres to the east of Istanbul. The declining size of forest areas in the Marmara region prompted state officials to include in the provisioning network of the Imperial Arsenal the other forested areas of the Black Sea such as Samsun, Sinop, Çayağzı, Kitros and Alaçam²⁶.

In the list of shipbuilding materials iron was only second to timber. It was used in the making of nails, hulls, anchors (each galley required three) and other metal accessories for ships. It is reported that an amount of 80-100 kantars²⁷ of nails was needed for the construction of a galley. That number showed significant variation for the construction of larger ships such as *başarda* which required almost five times more nails than a galley. The most important source for the supply of iron, nails and other iron parts was the Bulgarian town of Samokov, located in the *sancak* of

²⁴ BOA MD 26, 8/R/979 (1571). AHMET REFIK, *Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri* (Istanbul, 1989), 14. Also BOA, MD, 6/1103. BOA MD, 3/285, 966 (1559).

²⁵ It should be noted here that a common theme to the Venetian observers (e.g., Con-tarini, Petricca) of the Ottoman naval activities during the sixteenth and early seven-teenth century was the use of the badly seasoned wood (green wood) in the construction of ships in Ottoman shipyards. The wood that is cut without observing the moon results in the construction of less resistant and durable ships. Also the fact that the forests could not gain their vigour owing to untimely cutting explains why the Ottomans exhausted the wooded areas of the Marmara region in such a short period of time and moved on to procure their supplies from areas a few days' travel distance inwards. NICOLÒ BAROZZI and GUGLIELMO BERCHET (eds.), *Le Relazioni degli stati Europei lette al Senato dagli ambascia-tori Veneti nel secolo decimosettimo* (Venezia, 1866-1872), 349-351.

²⁶ BOA, MD 12/70, 978/1571.

²⁷ HEZARFEN HÜSEYİN EFENDİ, *Tellihü'l-Beyan*, 163. One kantar of nails is sold at 610 akçes. One kantar is equal to approximately 56,5 kilograms.

Sofia, which was accorded the status of *ocaklık* in the early sixteenth century and maintained its role during the period under consideration²⁸. Similar to timber, iron was procured from the local populations through the *ocaklık* system or in return for their *avarız* payments, the amount of which was adjusted to the circumstances by the Porte. When the required supply of iron could not be obtained through the *ocaklık* or *avarız*, the government resorted to the purchase of the remainder on market value from the merchants (*miri mübaya*).

Samokov had both iron mines and iron foundries. The Ottoman state run its own iron foundry in the town under the supervision of a centrally appointed *emin*, who was responsible, among other things, for the arrangement of transportation of the materials to Istanbul. For transportation purposes camels were widely used in addition to carts (run by buffalos) that were hired locally. As for the production of nails, the local judge (*kadı*) was in charge of recruiting the blacksmiths in the area to manufacture nails and other metal parts with a view to being dispatched to Istanbul. The Imperial Arsenal in Istanbul had also its own workshops and employed ironsmiths for making nails and other iron parts. Here the ironsmiths manufactured different types of nails out of raw iron that was brought not only from Samokov but also from other regions of the Empire such as Sofia, Rodoscuk, Erzurum, Sinop and Bartın. The latter locations did not have any iron mines but simply acted as centres for the storage and transport of used iron (*hurda*) brought from the neighbouring settlements. Given the fact that the amount of iron demanded from Samokov was not limited to the needs of the Imperial Arsenal and that the iron mines in the town had to supply the Imperial Artillery as well, the scope of burden upon the inhabitants of the town becomes comprehensible. However the available sources on hand do not present any information as to the ways the local populations coped with this pressure.

Pitch was another major shipbuilding material that was consumed in great amounts by the Imperial Arsenal. It was used primarily for caulking the hulls. The Porte secured the pitch supplies of the Imperial Arsenal from diverse locations throughout the Empire but more specifically from the region of Avlona in Albania²⁹. This was supplemented with the pitch coming from the island of Mythilene, Gallipoli and Lapseki. The procurement of pitch also took place within the framework of the *ocaklık* system in which the local populations made the payment of their tax obligations in kind to the government authorities. As it was mentioned above, fol-

²⁸ The iron mines and foundries continued to operate well into the modern times. For the working conditions in these mines and foundries during the early nineteenth century see NIKOLAI TODOROV, *The Balkan City, 1400-1900* (Seattle-London, 1983), 410-414.

²⁹ BOA, MD 3/272,26 Zilkade 966/30.8.1559.

lowing the defeat at Lepanto, the growing demand for raw materials prompted the government to exploit some new locations for the supply of the Imperial Arsenal. In the case of pitch the Imperial Arsenal kept large stocks in its warehouses which enabled it to continue its shipbuilding activities. But the uncertain situation in the Adriatic Sea following the defeat at Lepanto led the government authorities to procure a certain portion of required pitch from Walachia and the coastal settlements of the Black Sea such as Sinop, Samsun, Bartın and Bafra. To illustrate the amount of pitch procured from a single location per annum we have the information for Mythilene for the year 1647-1648. The total amount of pitch destined for Istanbul from the island of Mythilene for that particular year was about 300 kantars³⁰.

The cloth accessories of the ships built at the Imperial Arsenal had to be replaced every two to three years. Therefore the regular supply of sail-cloth and other textiles was critical to the building and maintenance of ships. The Imperial Arsenal's demand of sail-cloth was met by supplies from Izmir and Manisa in western Anatolia and Euboea, Athens, Thebes and Levadhia in Greece. Different types of cloth were used for the ships built at the Imperial Arsenal. For the making of sails and tents a raw cloth known as *kirpas* was widely used. When the demand for cloth was great, the government authorities also sent orders to such regions as Cyprus, Egypt and Aleppo to supplement the materials brought from western Anatolia and Greece. During the sixteenth century, Aleppo rose to supply some of the cloth needed at the Imperial Arsenal via Adana. Another location, namely, Gallipoli, came into the picture in the seventeenth century to supply the greater portion of the sail cloth required by the Imperial Arsenal. The silk cloth used in fitting out the ships came from Bursa. Another kind of textile, namely broadcloth (*çuka*), was usually obtained from Salonica.

Similar to other shipbuilding materials, the procurement of sail cloth was realized through the *ocaklık* system to be supplemented by the *avarız* taxes but the government also resorted to the direct purchase from the producers by the hands of local officials, primarily the *kadi*. The cash for the purchase and transport of the material came directly from the Imperial Treasury or was raised locally. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, there was a significant development as to the source of cloth for the Imperial Arsenal. Then the Porte resorted to foreign merchants, particularly French, for the purchase of raw cloth to be used in the making of sails.

Fibre products constituted yet another group of materials required by the Imperial Arsenal. Particularly for cordage, a large crop of fibrous

³⁰ İDRİS BOSTAN, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire* (Ankara, 1992), 130.

plants were procured from locations such as Samsun, Sinop, Küre and Ayandon along the coast of the Black Sea where “humid climate favoured their cultivation”³¹. Hemp was the most needed fibre material and the government authorities had no difficulties in the procurement of this resource material through the *ocaklık* system for the bigger part of the sixteenth century. It was brought from the designated locations to the Imperial Arsenal with a view to being manufactured into rope but there is evidence to show that hemp was also worked at the point of production and “sent as fully prepared rope” to the Imperial Arsenal³². Obviously the intensification of shipbuilding efforts in the post-Lepanto era made hemp, similar to other shipbuilding materials, a direly needed item of construction. Such locations as Aytos, Vize and Pomorie in eastern Thrace as well as the Bulgarian coastal settlements, which had been previously marginally used for the procurement of hemp, began to be more vigorously exploited by the Ottoman state. In the first half of the seventeenth century, there is evidence to suggest that the state failed to meet the demand of the Imperial Arsenal and a certain portion of the required hemp was imported, together with wax, from Italy. But Katip Çelebi and Hezerfan Hüseyin Efendi, both writing in the mid-seventeenth century, refer to Samsun as the principal supplier of hemp (7000 *kantars* annually) to the Imperial Arsenal to be supplemented with the supplies from Ahtabolu, İzmir, Mihaliç, İnebolu, Salonica, Misivri, and Bartın.

Conclusion

In light of the above description we would now like to return by way of a comparison to the questions we raised as our intellectual point of departure in our introductory remarks. First of all, it is quite clear that the Ottoman model of procurement converged to the Venetian model as far as its overall characteristics are concerned. In both cases, we observe a certain shift in, and an expansion of supply zones in accordance with the increasing demands of the naval shipyards and the exhaustion of, if not nonrenewable than certainly not so easily renewable, resources. This is most clearly case with timber in general and the masts in particular. As far as other supplies were concerned, the methods of procurement were similar yet geographical specialization was more often the case than major shifts in supply points. This is to do with the fact that other resources were not as easily exhaustible at least over as short a period as a ‘long’

³¹ IMBER, ‘The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent’, 20.

³² *Ibidem*, 21.

century³³. Secondly, in both cases, the state control of resources tended to increase at the expense of communal and private interests as needs became all the more pressing³⁴. Indirect modes of procurement left their place to direct state administration and exclusive monopoly as soon as the circumstances of pending scarcity dictated so. Thirdly, in both cases, the shipyards relied on the use of local manpower and animal power whenever they could via the authority of the state in order to reduce their costs. Fourthly, whenever cases like sailcloth making – but also occasionally ironware such as nails and anchors – were concerned, there was a tendency to resort to artisans and workers outside of the shipyards in order to benefit from the presence of existing subsidiary industries. To put it differently, the shipyards sought to reap the positive externalities presented by the already existing industrial districts – oftentimes conveniently located – in their vicinities. Much work remains to be done on this issue. Finally, there was a general awareness that shipbuilding required the coordinated presence of procurement activities together with the actual on-site construction of ships and thus organizational precautions were a must for the success of naval buildups. This brings us to the ultimate question of how the extra-shipyard activities impacted upon the organization of within the shipyard activities. From this study we infer that the Venetians were more constrained by the scarcity of their resources than the Ottomans with a vast territory were. As a consequence, the Venetians were forced to move from the extensive exploitation of these resources by way of the expansion of their procurement zones to a more intensive exploitation of resources within a given geography. In contrast, the Ottomans could by and large continue along the extensive exploitation of their domestic during the period under study. Because they trusted their supplies they could treat the ships they built as renewable. This explains why they did not care as much as the Venetians did about the quality of their ships during the war-ridden sixteenth century. Furthermore, it seems to us that a further consequence of pending resource scarcity in Venice had been to strengthen the vertical, highly centralized and all-encompassing organization of the *Arsenale* in accordance with the principles

³³ The one exception was high quality hemp where a strategic commodity such as masts was involved and a bottleneck was easily discernable, the procurement and processing of which was taken up rather seriously in the case of Venice. LANE, “The Rope Factory and Hemp Trade”, *passim*.

³⁴ In the aftermath of the Lepanto defeat, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Sokullu is quoted to have responded to the concerned parties that “the power of this Exalted State is such that if a fleet were commanded with anchors of silver, ropes of silk thread and sails of velvet, it could easily be built”. Thus he showed his confidence in the vast human and material resources available in the Empire. ISMAIL HAKKI UZUNÇARŞLI, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* (Ankara, 1988), 446.

of strategic storage of supplies, economizing logic and the subsequent obsession with quality control. In contrast, the Ottoman *Tersane* could afford a more flexible organization of production in conformity with the relative ease with which resources could be tapped in a vast empire the internal territorial connections of which were facilitated by seaways. Hence, in the last instance, the difference in the organization of the two major shipyards reflected also the relative positions of the two states in procuring the necessary naval supplies.

Jean-Pierre Farganel

La navigation vers le Levant à l'époque moderne (1545-1715) vue à travers l'exemple de quelques voyageurs français

Si les conditions de la navigation en Méditerranée à l'époque moderne sont relativement bien connues, en revanche, nous possédons relativement peu d'éléments sur la façon dont les passagers ont vécu les traversées transméditerranéennes. Toutefois, nous pouvons nous référer à une précieuse source constituée par les relations de voyage au Levant. Ces voyageurs, souvent peu accoutumés à la mer, ont relaté leurs impressions de voyages. Nous disposons d'un corpus d'une quinzaine de relations de voyages au Levant répartie sur une période s'échelonnant entre le milieu du XVI^e siècle et le début du XVIII^e siècle. Il existait hétérogénéité sociale et culturelle chez ces voyageurs dans la mesure où la possibilité de se rendre au Levant était encore ouverte à tous jusqu'au milieu des années 1680. La fin du XVII^e siècle, en effet, fut marquée par les réformes des consulats français dans l'Empire ottoman, le départ pour le Levant et le séjour des Français furent soumis à une autorisation préalable de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, puis plus tard, du ministre lui-même. La voie de terre, autrefois autorisée, fut prohibée au profit de la voie maritime avec un embarquement obligatoire à Marseille¹. De même, on s'efforça de contrôler la navigation vers les Echelles, après inspection du lieutenant de l'amirauté, un passeport et un congé valables pour la

¹ Pour les secrétaires d'Etat à la Marine, l'individualisme et l'indisciplines des marchands et des autres résidents étaient préjudiciable à l'intérêt général et à l'enrichissement du royaume. Ils devaient donc être encadrés par une stricte réglementation, de même, il fallait rapatrier tous ceux dont la présence au Levant était jugée inutile ou nuisible: les femmes, les filles, les hommes trop jeunes ainsi que les faillis, les déserteurs et les fauteurs de troubles. Les ordonnances encadrèrent d'une façon de plus en plus draconienne l'exercice du commerce et le séjour au Levant et en Barbarie. JEAN-PIERRE FARGANEL, *Les marchands français dans l'Orient méditerranéen aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles: la présence française dans les Echelles du Levant [1650-1789]* (Thèse Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 1992).

durée prévisible du trajet aller-retour étaient délivrés au capitaine, il lui était interdit de compléter un chargement dans une autre Echelle que celle de destination, la navigation se faisait donc en droiture avec les mêmes itinéraires à l'aller comme au retour².

Cette diversité des XVI^e et XVII^e siècles constituent la grande richesse de ce corpus. En revanche, le groupe des Français (diplomates, consuls, marchands etc.) autorisés à s'embarquer pour l'Empire ottoman au XVIII^e siècle formait un groupe homogène et très professionnalisé. C'est la raison pour laquelle, nous semble-t-il, une étude doit être menée sur ce groupe dans un autre contexte. Nous sommes encore loin de pouvoir présenter un tableau exhaustif de la vision des traversées transméditerranéennes aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles par les voyageurs français, toutefois en l'état présent de notre chantier nous disposons déjà d'un faisceau de faits relativement significatifs permettant de présenter un premier bilan provisoire de la représentation de la navigation vers le Levant.

Les conditions de la navigation vers le Levant, itinéraires et techniques de navigation

Depuis Marseille, les routes maritimes à destination de la Méditerranée orientale piquaient vers le sud en longeant les côtes italiennes ou celles des grandes îles méditerranéennes la Corse, la Sardaigne et l'île d'Elbe. Malte était souvent une escale obligée. Depuis Venise, on descendait le long de l'Adriatique vers le Sud jusqu'à Corfou. Les deux voies maritimes doubleraient le cap Matapan et se scindaient en deux itinéraires, le premier au nord via l'Archipel permettait de gagner Smyrne et Istanbul, le second au sud, via Chypre et Rhodes conduisait en Egypte. L'île de Candie constituait une étape importante sur ces itinéraires. Ce sont sensiblement ces trajets que Robert Paris identifie dans son histoire du commerce de Marseille³. Charles Carrière, toutefois, à l'encontre de Robert Paris et de Victor Bérard, note qu'au XVIII^e siècle les patrons français n'utilisaient pas les services de pilotes levantins et naviguaient à droiture pour doubler le cap Matapan, ces données n'ont pas pu être vérifiées pour le XVII^e siècle⁴. Gilbert Buti dresse une carte comparable sur le plan des itinéraires empruntés par la caravane provençale⁵.

La plupart des patrons, à l'exception de la marine royale qui naviguait

² ROBERT PARIS, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille* (Paris, 1957), tome V, 166.

³ PARIS, *Histoire du commerce*, 163-170.

⁴ CHARLES CARRIÈRE, *Négociants marseillais au XVIII^e siècle* (Marseille, 1973), tome II, 613.

⁵ GILBERT BUTI, «La caravane provençale aux XVI^e et XVIII^e siècles: un voyage à l'aventure organisé?», in A. LEROY et C. VILLAIN-GANDOSSI (dir.), *Stations navales et navigations organisées en Méditerranée* (Toulon, 2004), 135-149.

aux instruments, préféraient naviguer à l'estime qui faisait preuve d'une relative efficacité lorsque le pilote possédait une bonne connaissance des côtes, des courants, de la vitesse de son navire et savait tracer une route en utilisant le compas et les cartes marines. Les voyageurs, en général considéraient que les techniques de navigation en Méditerranée étaient archaïques. La boussole ou compas, était le seul instrument sophistiqué utilisé. Le compas était un des rares instruments que possédaient les corsaires au XVI^e siècle, notait Pierre Belon⁶. En 1621, Deshayes notait que la navigation en Méditerranée différait fortement de celle de l'océan. Selon lui, la connaissance de la hauteur du pôle était inutile dans cette mer fermée qui, du nord au sud n'avait que 578 mille de large, alors que la distance était en fait d'est en ouest. «Deux choses sont à désirer pour y naviguer assurément, la cognoissance des terrains, & l'estime de la course des vaisseaux; l'un et l'autre ne s'acquièrent que par l'expérience»⁷. Cette expérience, selon Deshayes, reposait sur une connaissance des courants, souvent changeants et à peine perceptibles en surface. A cela s'ajoutait la connaissance du navire dont l'état modifiait l'allure de la marche. Un navire neuf, soulignait Deshayes, allait un quart de fois plus vite qu'un ancien. Le pilote marquait sur la carte le point où il pensait se trouver avec un morceau de plomb comme le faisaient la plupart des marins. En cas de doute on se consultait entre membres de l'équipage. La connaissance des contours des côtes et l'utilisation de la boussole et des cartes faisaient le reste.

Vers 1630, Fermanel faisait sensiblement les mêmes remarques: «La navigation de cette mer est fort différente de celle de l'océan, l'expérience y est plus requise que la science, la connaissance de la hauteur du pôle y est presque inutile»⁸. A la lecture des différentes relations il ne semble pas que le loch ait été utilisé en Méditerranée pour calculer la vitesse du bâtiment.

La médiocrité des instruments de navigation et de la formation des marins, qu'il faut relativiser comme l'a montré Charles Carrière, expliquent un certain nombre d'erreurs de navigation relevées par quelques voyageurs. Le patron du navire de Thévenot se croyant moins loin qu'en réalité, avait doublé l'île de Sapience sans s'en apercevoir et au lieu de passer bien au large du cap Matapan il fut obligé de passer entre le Cerigo et la terre ferme au risque de s'échouer. Enfin un des derniers handicaps de la navigation en Méditerranée consistait en l'inexactitude des cartes marines comme Joseph Pitton de Tournefort le faisait très justement remarquer. «Les fautes que font les géographes sont très essentielles, et elles

⁶ PIERRE BELON, *Les observations de plusieurs singularitez et choses mémorables trouvées en Grèce, Asie, Judée, Egypte, Arabie et autres pays estranges* (Paris, 1554), second livre, 86-87.

⁷ DEHAYES DE COURMESNIN, *Voyages du Levant, faits par le commandement du Roy en l'année 1621* (Paris, 1629), 446-449.

⁸ FERMANEL, *Le voyage d'Italie et du Levant* (Rouen, 1687), 460-463.

sont cause que très souvent les voyageurs, les pilotes, et même quelquefois les officiers généraux, prennent de fausses mesures. Je voudrais qu'on exigeât des géographes quelques marques de leur capacité, avant que de leur permettre de publier des cartes ... Nos plus fameux géographes travaillent le plus souvent à vue de pays, sans connaître les endroits qu'ils veulent représenter; ils copient des cartes qui ont déjà paru, ils s'en rapportent à des relations imparfaites»⁹.

Les traversées étaient fort lentes, la navigation de Marseille à Istanbul durait entre une quinzaine de jours et un mois, parfois le double¹⁰. Si la navigation trans-méditerranéenne souffrait de nombreux archaïsmes en regard de l'aire atlantique, en revanche la taille des bâtiments, en moyenne inférieure à celles des navires océaniques, ne semble pas être le fait d'un retard technique. D'après Charles Carrière¹¹, dans l'esprit des armateurs et des négociants, c'était le rapport optimum entre le coût de l'investissement pour la construction du navire et celui de son entretien pour un trafic commercial donné.

La traversée vers les Echelles et leurs aléas

Pierre Belon précise qu'il avait utilisé un brigantin pour rallier Lemnos. Il a décrit des galiotes, des brigantins et les fustes ou petites galères; surtout, il a décrit ces bâtiments utilisés dans les détroits dont la poupe s'ouvrait pour permettre l'accès aux chevaux et aux chameaux, les «maonnes» (mahonnes)¹². André Thevet à la même époque avait fait la traversée sur une nave vénitienne¹³. Vincent Leblanc, un marin, avait notamment navigué sur une polacre¹⁴. Pietro Della Valle avait emprunté un vaisseau de guerre vénitien armé de 45 canons¹⁵. Beauvau s'était embarqué à Venise sur un vaisseau, «une sitie française (*sic*)».

Deshayes avait utilisé des galiotes, une petite «galère», naviguant à la voile et à la rame pour gagner la Palestine depuis Constantinople¹⁶. Fermanel évoquait un navire sans autre précision. Tavernier, en 1638, passait au Levant sur un navire hollandais de quarante-cinq canons. En 1651 il s'embarquait sur un petit vaisseau. En 1663, il utilisait plusieurs bâtiments: une barque marseillaise, une barque de Frontignan, une barque

⁹ JOSEPH PITTON DE TOURNEFORT, *Voyage d'un botaniste* (Paris, 1982), tome II, 144-145.

¹⁰ CARRIÈRE, *Négociants marseillais*, tome II, 612-613.

¹¹ CARRIÈRE, *Négociants marseillais*, tome II, 602-603.

¹² BELON, *Les observations*, second livre, 79.

¹³ ANDRÉ THEVET, *Cosmographie du Levant* (Lyon, 1554), 88.

¹⁴ VINCENT LEBLANC, *Les voyages du fameux sieur Vincent Leblanc, marseillais qu'il a fait depuis l'âge de 12 ans jusques à 60 aux quatre parties du monde* (Paris, 1684), 1-2.

¹⁵ PIETRO DELLA VALLE, *Les fameux voyages de Pietro Della Valle* (Paris, 1670), 2.

¹⁶ DEHAYES DE COURMESNIN, *Voyages du Levant*, 333.

génoise, une felouque. Du Loir s'était embarqué pour Constantinople sur un vaisseau naviguant de conserve avec le Lion d'or qui transportait l'ambassadeur de La Haye¹⁷. La Boullaye Le Gouz s'était embarqué à Venise sur un vaisseau anglais¹⁸.

Doubdan précisait seulement qu'il avait effectué son retour sur le navire du capitaine Panoux de la Ciotat¹⁹. Thévenot était parti de Malte sur le vaisseau du capitaine Martin de la Ciotat armé de six canons de fer et huit pierriers de bronze²⁰. Il naviguait de conserve avec un autre vaisseau et une polacre. Entre Smyrne et Chio il avait emprunté une petite barque. De Samos à Alexandrie ce fut une saïque qui transporta. Tournefort, son équipe et lui avaient effectué la traversée de Marseille à Candie sur une barque française²¹. A l'intérieur de l'archipel Tournefort et ses compagnons hésitèrent à emprunter des bâtiments du pays jugés trop dangereux et affrêtèrent une barque française qui pratiquait le cabotage en dépit des interdictions des autorités françaises.

Les routes maritimes étaient déterminées par les contraintes géographiques, mais elles étaient toutes théoriques. Il fallait compter avec les vents contraires et autres aléas de la mer. Pierre Belon, en route pour l'île de Thasos, fut dérouté sur Scyros par des vents contraires. Le navire de Della Valle dut louvoyer pendant plusieurs jours pour sortir de l'Adriatique. Il dut, aussi, regagner l'île de Tenedos qu'il venait de quitter en raison de fortes rafales. Doubdan dut rebrousser chemin après son départ de Candie. Un grain obligea Jean Thévenot, en partance pour Alexandrie, à retourner rapidement à Chio. Le mauvais temps dissuada Tournefort de prendre la mer pour Pathmos.

De nombreux aléas pouvaient contrarier la navigation en Méditerranée, les éléments naturels, les accidents ainsi que les corsaires et les pirates. Beaucoup de voyageurs attestent avoir essuyé une tempête au cours de leur traversée. Beauvau avait subi la grêle et la pluie au cours d'un orage. Deshayes avait failli chavirer entre Metelin et Smyrne lors d'un grain. Une tempête avait dispersé le convoi de Tavernier dans la nuit du 1er avril 1664. Doubdan dut mouiller dans l'île de Serpho en raison d'une violente tempête. Thévenot, lors de sa traversée de Smyrne à Chio sur une petite barque, fut durement éprouvé par le mauvais temps: «Nous eusmes un très mauvais temps, qui me fit repentir plu d'une fois de ma curiosité»²². Tournefort fut bloqué à Raclia par une tempête.

¹⁷ DU LOIR, *Les voyages du sieur Du Loir au Levant* (Paris, 1654), 2.

¹⁸ LA BOULLAYE LE GOUZ, *Voyages et observations* (Paris, 1657), 18.

¹⁹ DOUBDAN, *Voyage de la Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1661), chapitre XVIII.

²⁰ JEAN THÉVENOT, *Voyage du Levant* (Paris, 1980), 179.

²¹ TOURNEFORT, *Voyage*, tome I, 149.

²² THÉVENOT, *Voyage*, 187.

Les éléments déchaînés ne constituaient pas les seuls dangers auxquels les voyageurs étaient confrontés. Les accidents étaient relativement nombreux et quelques relations font état de ces incidents et accidents qui ont émaillé les traversées transméditerranéennes.

Vincent Leblanc n'eut pas de chance pour sa première traversée, son bâtiment avait été sabordé par des marins à la solde de marchands ruinés désireux de toucher l'assurance. Le bâtiment de Thévenot avait heurté une saïque grecque au cours d'une tempête. Ainsi trois hommes tombèrent à la mer mais ils furent fort heureusement repêchés. «la nuit étant fort obscure, sur les dix heures du soir, une saïque de compagnie nous vint croiser et, passant sa proue sur notre saïque, donna de son arbre de trinquet dans notre maestre; ce choc fit tant de bruit que nous nous crûmes tous perdus»²³. Immédiatement on arrima solidement la saïque tamponneuse avec un câble pour éviter que l'équipage coupable ne s'enfuit. Toutefois, les dégâts étant mineurs on laissa filer les auteurs de la collision.

Le navire de Tavernier le 5 avril 1664 fut éperonné à la poupe par le navire amiral de son convoi²⁴. Si Beauvau avait failli s'échouer, en revanche, le Capitaine Martin qui transportait Thévenot, drossa son navire sur la côte anatolienne. Quant à Della Valle, il vécut un début d'incendie à bord provoqué par une passagère juive qui avait approché imprudemment une chandelle des toiles et des cordages. Il nous semble que cette remarque sur les origines de cette passagère relevait d'un antisémitisme classique à l'époque.

Les corsaires et les pirates infestaient la Méditerranée aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles et il n'était pas rare d'être pris en chasse par un corsaire ou un pirate. Généralement, on trouvait le salut dans la fuite. Parfois, l'affrontement était inévitable et un combat quelquefois incertain s'engageait. Le risque d'être réduit en esclavage si l'on tombait entre les mains de corsaires ou de pirates barbaresques était réel, toutefois la rencontre avec des corsaires maltais n'était pas, non plus, sans danger.

Le bâtiment de Belon, au XVI^e siècle, fut pris en chasse par trois navires pirates et fut contraint de se réfugier dans le port d'Imbros. Pierre Belon relate l'échec d'un raid de corsaires dans le port de Naxie qui évita la captivité à plusieurs passagers d'une barque voisine. «Les pirates qui estoient huict de compagnie, se vindrent cacher dans les roseaux, attendant le poinct du jour, esperants entrer en la barque, qu'ils trouverent au rivage, & la emmener par force avec ceulx qui estoient dedens. Et certainement l'eussent fait, sans le secours que nous leur donnasmes»²⁵.

²³ THÉVENOT, *Voyage*, 187-188.

²⁴ JEAN-BAPTISTE TAVERNIER, *Les six voyages en Turquie et en Perse* (Paris, 1981), tome II, 13.

²⁵ BELON, *Les observation*, Livre second, 88.

Il ajoutait enfin que cinq galères mouillaient en permanence dans le port de Rhodes. «Le Grand Turc y tient ordinairement cinq galeres forcées, dont le capitaine est commis pour purger la mer des incursions qu'ont accoutumé de faire les corsaires»²⁶.

André Thevet, quant à lui, avait été très impressionné à la même époque par l'attaque de son navire par cinq galiotes corsaires. «Nous fusmes veuz de loin de certains corsaires Pirates, & escumeurs de mer, Turqs... vindrent à l'encontre de nous, pour nous prendre esclaves, & ravir ce qui estoit dedens la nave: mais quand nous les vismes nous commençames de nous preparer à combattre... Ce combat dura l'espace de deux heures: puis lesdis Corsaires conoissans aspre notre defense alencontre d'eux, & que leurs virevoltes & bravades ne proufитоient de gueres contre nos forces, aussi non facilement, ny sans estre bien estrillez ilz n'en pouvoient venir à bout ... sélongnerent de nous & prindrent autre route»²⁷.

Dans la plupart des cas, il n'y avait pas d'affrontement, le bâtiment poursuivi par des corsaires pouvait souvent s'échapper grâce à sa vélocité ou à la faveur de la nuit comme Beauvau l'attestait dans son récit au début de XVII^e siècle. «Ayant peur d'un vaisseau qui nous avoit cotoyé tout le jour, & nous cotoyoit encor, nous estions préparés à le combattre... Mais l'obscurité de la nuict & l'estonnement du patron, furent cause que nous perdimes nostre chemin»²⁸. Plus tard dans le siècle, Fermanel et ses compagnons échappèrent à un corsaire grâce à l'habileté manoeuvrière de leur patron. «Au milieu du chemin nous fûmes poursuivis d'une frégate de corsaires, qui nous donna si vivement la chasse»²⁹. Deshayes, quant à lui, invitait le candidat au voyage au Levant à éviter la voie de mer pour se rendre à Constantinople en raison du risque que représentaient les corsaires. «Pour aller de France à Constantinople, il y a quatre chemins differens: par mer: par la Hongrie: par la Grece & l'Esclavonie... mais les hazards des corsaires & de la mer le rendent si dangereux & si incertain, que je n'estime pas que l'on doive prendre, si l'on y est contraint»³⁰.

Plus tard, lors de son troisième voyage au Levant, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier fut pris en chasse au large de Candie par un corsaire qui tenta un abordage en lançant deux chaloupes aux troussees de son bâtiment. La tentative échoua en raison d'une salve d'artillerie parfaitement ajustée. «Les corsaires voyant qu'ils ne pouvaient nous aborder, nous envoyèrent quatre ou cinq volées de canon, qui passèrent au dessus de notre vaisseau

²⁶ BELON, *Les observations*, Livre second, 90.

²⁷ THEVET, *Cosmographie*, 32-33.

²⁸ HENRI DE BEAUVAU, *Relation journalière d'un voyage au Levant par Henri de Beauvau* (Nancy, 1615), 22.

²⁹ FERMANEL, *Le voyage d'Italie et du Levant*, 243.

³⁰ DESHAYES, *Voyage*, 455.

sans que nous en reçussions aucun dommage. Notre canonnier leur en envoya autant, dont l'une démonta leur mât de poue, et, de trois autres volées qu'il redoubla courageusement, il y eut une à ce que nous pûmes juger qui donna dans la chambre de poue et leur tua quelques gens»³¹.

Au cours d'un autre voyage, le quatrième, en 1651, le navire du capitaine Glaize de Marseille sur lequel Tavernier s'était embarqué, fut pris en chasse par un corsaire. «Le vingt-septième au matin, nous aperçûmes cinq vaisseaux, dont deux nous donnèrent la chasse environ six heures. Dès que nous les eûmes découverts, nous fîmes force de voile vers le sud, parce qu'ils avaient le vent sur nous; mais quand ils virent qu'ils ne nous pouvaient joindre, ils 32 nous quittèrent»³².

La Méditerranée orientale n'était pas la seule infestée par la course, on pouvait être attaqué à proximité des côtes françaises par des corsaires ou des pirates. Tavernier fut pris en chasse par des corsaires en 1657, entre Toulon et La Ciotat, il dû débarquer et revenir à Marseille par la voie de terre pour prendre un autre navire en partance pour Livourne³³.

Tavernier donnait quelques conseils pour échapper aux corsaires. Soit on se joignait à un convoi protégé par la flotte anglaise ou hollandaise partant de Livourne au printemps et en automne. Soit l'on était pressé et on s'embarquait sur un brigantin naviguant en vue des côtes et se réfugiant chaque soir dans une crique ou un port³⁴. Selon Tavernier, les corsaires ne s'aventuraient pas dans l'Adriatique alors que les corsaires, notamment maltais, et les pirates infestaient la Méditerranée orientale, obligeant ainsi l'Égypte à renoncer à l'envoi par mer du tribut annuel dû à la Porte. Toutefois, ajoutait-il, la route terrestre le long du littoral syrien n'était guère plus sûre. En effet, le Chevalier Paul, un corsaire maltais, avait tendu une embuscade à la caravane transportant le précieux tribut. Toutefois, son plan fut éventé. «Ce fut entre Alexandrette et les Païasses que le Chevalier Paul, monté sur un vaisseau de trois cents hommes, faillit à surprendre la caravane qui porte tous les ans à Constantinople le tribut d'Égypte, lequel ne s'envoie plus par mer de peur des Maltois. Ce chevalier avait déjà mis ses gens à terre et les avait fait cacher; mais par malheur pour lui, son dessein fut découvert, et la caravane qu'il aurait pu aisément enlever se tint sur ses gardes»³⁵.

Si les corsaires et les pirates barbaresques étaient craints en raison des risques de tomber en esclavage, la mésaventure de Jean Thévenot survenue le 10 juin 1658 au large d'Acre démontrait qu'une rencontre avec des

³¹ TAVERNIER, *Les six voyages*, tome I, 239.

³² TAVERNIER, *Les six voyages*, tome I, 278.

³³ TAVERNIER, *Les six voyages*, tome I, 332-333.

³⁴ TAVERNIER, *Les six voyages*, tome I, 39-43.

³⁵ TAVERNIER, *Les six voyages*, tome I, 200.

corsaires chrétiens était aussi redoutable. «Nous n'avions point d'armes, et quand même nous en aurions eu, nous n'aurions eu garde de nous défendre contre des gens que nous croyions être de nos amis ... quoiqu'un capucin de notre compagnie leur eût crié que nous étions Français ... ils ne laisserent pas de tirer contre notre barque... je ne nommerai point ce chevalier pour son honneur... après avoir fait ce beau coup, ils montèrent en grande hâte sur notre barque, et nous sortîmes pour nous faire connaître, mais ces jeunes fripons... ne voulurent point nous connaître, quoiqu'ils fussent aussi tous Français, et d'abord ils s'occupèrent à nous dépouiller»³⁶.

Lors d'une rencontre avec deux bâtiments corsaires greco-italiens, Thévenot fut surpris de trouver un nombre inhabituel d'esclaves levantins tant hommes que femmes et enfants, une cinquantaine en tout, enlevés dans la région d'Acre et de Jaffa. Cette razzia était la conséquence de la trahison d'un Turc qui avait indiqué en échange de sa liberté à ses ravisseurs la possibilité d'un plus gros gain en attaquant une place non gardée³⁷.

Dans d'autres cas, un incident grave pouvait se produire alors que les corsaires n'avaient pas d'intentions hostiles. Pensant échapper aux conséquences du conflit en cours, Thévenot s'était embarqué en 1659 sur un navire neutre anglais. Lorsque son bâtiment fut croisé par deux corsaires tunisiens qui, après s'être enquis de la nationalité du bâtiment ne se montrèrent pas hostiles. Ils saluèrent le britannique par une salve de trois coups de canons. Le salut fut rendu avec des canons chargés de boulets. Il y eut mort d'homme et des blessés. Les Tunisiens, furieux, exigèrent la livraison du coupable. Le capitaine, dans son refus de livrer son canonnier, était prêt à l'affrontement, mais les Tunisiens ne voulurent pas prendre le risque de rompre la paix. L'incident se solda par quelques libations et la remise au capitaine de deux lettres pour Tunis par les corsaires qui reprirent leur route. «Les trois heures après-midi, nous aperçûmes sur vent deux vaisseaux qui venaient avec tous leurs voiles sur nous ... nous fîmes bannière anglaise, laquelle ils saluèrent d'un coup de canon sans balle, à quoi nous répondîmes... lorsqu'ils surent que le prince Dom Philippo était sur notre vaisseau, ils le saluèrent de trois coups de canon, et notre capitaine ayant commandé qu'on lui rendit le salut, mais sur vent à cause que tous nos canons étaient chargés à balle, et que ces messieurs étaient sous vent, le canonnier en tira deux sur vent, mais le troisième n'ayant pas pris, il courut vivement au plus proche, sans faire aucune réflexion, et le tira; il se trouva que c'était sous vent, du côté où ils étaient vis-à-vis de nous; de sorte que la balle donna dans le milieu du gros vaisseau»³⁸.

³⁶ THÉVENOT, *Voyage*, 23.

³⁷ THÉVENOT, *Voyage*, 23-24.

³⁸ THÉVENOT, *Voyage*, 331.

Au début du XVIII^e siècle, la course était toujours aussi présente en Méditerranée orientale comme Joseph Pitton de Tournefort a pu l'attester. Il n'a pas été directement confronté aux corsaires durant son exploration de l'Archipel grec, en revanche il a pu constater des relations cordiales, voire une collusion, entre les corsaires et les insulaires. En effet, la dégradation de l'Etat ottoman se traduisit par un système généralisé de corruption de l'administration. Ainsi, une administration ottomane, bien accueillie par les chrétiens aux XV^e et au XVI^e siècles parce que moins dure que celle des anciens maîtres chrétiens, fut progressivement détestée par les sujets chrétiens de l'empire ottoman lassés de subir vexations et exactions. Tournefort avait noté que le *cadi* itinérant de l'Argentièrre n'avait ni valet ni servante et évitait de parler haut de peur que les habitants ne le livrent aux corsaires maltais³⁹. Selon Tournefort, les corsaires hantaient l'Archipel grec et y disposaient de solides sympathies et appuis, comme à l'Argentièrre⁴⁰. Toutefois il soulignait que la piraterie était pratiquée d'une façon endémique par les Grecs de l'Archipel⁴¹. En ce qui concerne l'affaire survenue à Siphanto une cinquantaine d'années avant le passage de Tournefort, il ne s'agissait plus d'une cohabitation pacifique mais d'une complicité entre les insulaires et les corsaires. A l'époque, un groupe de Juifs avait été pressenti par le Divan pour examiner la possibilité de mettre en valeur un gisement de plomb sur l'île de Siphanto. Les habitants craignaient d'être contraints au travail forcé dans cette mine, et ils soudoyèrent le capitaine qui coula son navire avec ses passagers juifs. La Porte organisa une seconde mission sans plus de succès. Le bâtiment transportant les Juifs chargés d'expertiser le filon de plomb fut coulé par un corsaire provençal payé par les habitants de Siphanto. «Quelques autres Juifs étant revenus à la charge n'en furent pas meilleurs marchands. Les Siphantins, pour s'en débarrasser tout de bon, donnèrent une somme d'argent à un corsaire provençal qui était à Milo et qui perça à coups de canon une seconde galiote chargée de juifs et de mine, si bien que les Turcs et les Juifs abandonnèrent l'entreprise...»⁴². Quant aux fortifications qui protégeaient certains ports ou villes, elles ne servaient qu'à abriter les officiers turcs, les garnisons et les classes dominantes chrétiennes, comme à Andros où la forteresse abritait le *cadi* et la noblesse de l'île⁴³.

Peut-on tirer quelques généralités de cette petite dizaine de relations de voyages qui constituent notre corpus provisoire? Il est trop tôt pour établir un véritable bilan, toutefois on peut relever l'aspect émotionnel qui

³⁹ TOURNEFORT, *Voyage*, tome I, 151.

⁴⁰ TOURNEFORT, *Voyage*, tome I, 155.

⁴¹ TOURNEFORT, *Voyage*, tome I, 226.

⁴² TOURNEFORT, *Voyage*, tome I, 175.

⁴³ TOURNEFORT, *Voyage*, tome I, 283.

transparaît dans les récits de combats et d'abordage opposant les corsaires à leurs victimes françaises. D'autres relations font état de considérations plus générales sur la course en Méditerranée orientale, notamment au début du XVIII^e celles de Tournefort qui notait le caractère endémique de la piraterie dans l'Archipel; toutefois il soulignait que la présence des corsaires français avait fait régner un certain ordre et une certaine justice dans les îles avant que Louis XIV n'interdise leur présence dans cette partie de la Méditerranée. Pour Tournefort, la complicité qui s'était établie entre les corsaires occidentaux et les habitants grecs de l'Archipel constituait une forme de résistance face aux abus de l'administration ottomane.

Si nous avons déjà envisagé les premiers aspects de la traversée vers le Levant à travers les itinéraires, les types de navires et les aléas du trajet représentés par la course, les éléments et les divers accidents qui peuvent survenir dans un voyage hasardeux, il nous reste à donner vie à ce cadre en restituant quelques-uns des éléments du quotidien des passagers dont les relations de voyage font état.

La vie à bord

La vie à bord présentait deux aspects pour nos voyageurs, le premier était celui des conditions de la vie à bord qui n'avait rien des croisières d'agrément.

Une des premières sensations que l'on devait éprouver sur un bâtiment de l'époque moderne était certainement la promiscuité. Della Valle rapporte qu'il avait effectué sa traversée en compagnie de cinq cents autres passagers: «Le mélange de cette grande compagnie eut été agréable, si ce nombre excessif n'eut apporté la confusion & l'embarras que vous pouvez imaginer»⁴⁴. Selon Della Valle, cette promiscuité avait engendré la propagation de nombreuses maladies qui avaient engendré trois décès. Même si l'on échappait à la promiscuité en louant une cabine, le confort n'était pas garanti. Thévenot pour sa traversée de Samos à Rhodes avait loué la cabine de l'écrivain située à la poupe du navire. Elle était si étroite que lorsqu'il y était couché avec son domestique il ne restait plus qu'un demi-pied de libre dans la pièce. Thévenot conseillait en outre de se munir d'un vêtement de marin indispensable, le capot, qui protégeait du froid, de la pluie. En outre, le capot qui pouvait servir également de couverture et de matelas, évitait que les vêtements soient salis et deviennent poisseux. Quant à l'ordinaire, il valait mieux, comme Thévenot, s'embarquer avec ses provisions. Parfois, le menu était agrémenté par la capture d'oiseaux qui se posaient sur le pont du navire comme Thévenot ou Tournefort l'attestent.

⁴⁴ DELLA VALLE, *Les fameux voyages*, 2.

Un des désagréments que pouvait éprouver un être humain peu habitué à l'élément marin était l'appréhension devant les dangers potentiels de la traversée. André Thevet appréhendait particulièrement les horribles dangers d'une traversée toutefois, en homme de Dieu, il ne rédigea pas de testament avant de s'embarquer. Le principal inconvénient que la plupart des voyageurs subissaient était le mal de mer. Della Valle l'éprouva au deuxième jour de mer: «Nous rendions gayement par la bouche le tribut à la mer, en nous riant des uns et des autres»⁴⁵. Bien qu'habitué à la mer Thévenot fut pris d'un fort mal de mer, lors d'une tempête en rade de Stancho. Un Turc essaya de le soulager avec de l'opium. «Nous ne laissâmes pas de souffrir beaucoup de ce vent. Pour moi je fus dans des vomissements horribles, après lesquels j'eus de si grandes douleurs de côté, que je croyais en mourir... Il y eut un turc qui ayant pitié de mon mal me donna de l'opium à manger: moi qui ne savais ce que c'était, je l'avalai, mais comme il voulut me faire réitérer, je lui demandai ce que c'était, et il me répondit, mange, cela est bon, c'est de l'opium; alors je lui dit qu'il m'avait empoisonné, et faisant quelque effort, je vomis»⁴⁶.

Vantardise ou réalité, nous ne trancherons pas, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier conte que contrairement à certains de ses compagnons de voyage, il ne souffrit nullement des aléas de la traversée en 1664. «Le même vent continua avec une mer fort haute, ce qui rendit fort malades plusieurs de nos passagers ... nous sortîmes du vaisseau et vînmes à terre. Nous n'étions nullement fatigués de la mer et nous l'avions eue si commode pendant vingt jours que j'écrivis dans le vaisseau avec autant de repos que si j'eusse été à terre dans un cabinet»⁴⁷.

Le froid, l'inconfort, l'exiguïté et le mal de mer étaient les principales inconvénients de la traversée vers le Levant, toutefois lorsque le roulis et le tangage laissaient en paix l'estomac de nos pauvres voyageurs, ceux-ci pouvaient se livrer à quelques observations sur le milieu marin et la navigation en Méditerranée.

Au cours d'une traversée on pouvait observer certains phénomènes naturels. Beauvau, par exemple, lors de son voyage vit un feu de Saint-Elme: «Quelque temps après Saint Elme parut sur le plus haut de l'arbre, la forme de trois petites estoiles éclairantes comme chandelle: aussi tost les mariniers commencèrent à rendre grâce de ce bon augure, car ils croyent fermement que c'est bonheur aux voyageurs lors que ce feu apparoist, n'arrivant jamais que sur la fin de la tempeste»⁴⁸. Les éruptions volcaniques étaient une autre manifestation de la nature. Si un certain nombre

⁴⁵ DELLA VALLE, *Les fameux voyages*, 18.

⁴⁶ THÉVENOT, *Voyage*, 186-187.

⁴⁷ TAVERNIER, *Les six voyages*, tome II, 12-15.

⁴⁸ HENRI DE BEAUVAU, *Relation*, 19.

de volcans en Méditerranée étaient actifs à l'époque moderne, il était moins fréquent de déceler en pleine mer les traces d'une éruption. Au cours du XVII^e siècle, des signes d'activité volcanique attribués au volcan Santorin furent attestés par quelques voyageurs. Doubdan, en mars 1652, en longeant la côte de la Crète remarqua des pierres ponces flottant à la surface de la mer. Thévenot a consigné des témoignages relatant une éruption du Santorin vers 1650.

En dehors de ces quelques phénomènes naturels, les observations des voyageurs portaient essentiellement sur la description des bâtiments et les conditions de la navigation en Méditerranée.

Thévenot définissait une saïque comme une sorte de grosse barque au corps rond et dont le grand mât ou arbre de meistre était fort haut et très gros. Ces bâtiments, notait-t-il, possédaient une grande capacité mais étaient lents. Ils n'avaient une bonne allure qu'avec le vent en poupe, en revanche ils étaient incapables de naviguer à la bouline. Doubdan faisait le même type de remarque sur l'allure des navires méditerranéens qui avaient le plus grand mal à louvoyer et qui n'avançaient qu'avec le vent arrière.

Au début du XVII^e siècle Della Valle décrivait les manoeuvres de son bâtiment pour sortir du port de Corfou. Réalité ou inexpérience du néophyte, Della Valle attribuait aux marins une grande maladresse; selon lui le patron de son navire avait failli drosser le bâtiment à la côte. Il avait fallu affaler les voiles et appeler à l'aide deux galères pour remorquer le navire.

A défaut d'un dépouillement exhaustif des relations de voyage au Levant et en Barbarie, nous pouvons proposer, cependant, quelques pistes de réflexion. Les voyageurs avaient souvent noté une différence sensible entre la Méditerranée et l'océan. Les navires méditerranéens étaient plus petits et surtout, comme les voyageurs pour la plupart l'avaient constaté moins manoeuvrants que ceux de l'Atlantique. Autre constat, la navigation à l'estime régnait en maître sur cette mer fermée et l'on ne connaissait guère le point. L'inconfort des bâtiments, le mal de mer, les maladies, la promiscuité, les tempêtes, des erreurs de navigation ou encore les corsaires faisaient apparaître la traversée vers le Levant comme une épreuve. Des points sont encore à préciser et des hypothèses à vérifier; c'est pour cela que nous souhaitons une enquête collective apportant les mises au point espérées.

José-Luis Cortés

La polacre, bâtiment de commerce méditerranéen à travers deux contrats de construction provenant de chantiers navals marseillais au début du XVIII^e siècle

Dans le fonds des amirautés de Marseille, La Ciotat et Arles aux archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône est conservée, pour les XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles, une série de contrats de vente de navires et parts de navires, et parmi eux, de quelques contrats de construction; cette très intéressante série est malheureusement en mauvais état et en grande partie incommunicable.

Parmi la vingtaine de contrats de construction que nous avons pu trouver, nous choisissons d'en analyser deux, de l'année 1719, concernant un bâtiment de commerce connu sous le nom de polacre, parce qu'ils donnent un certain nombre de détails de la construction et aussi en raison des termes techniques employés par les charpentiers de marine. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'on puisse suivre pas à pas la construction de ces bâtiments car il y a des lacunes et des non-dits dans les procédés de construction mais ils apportent beaucoup de renseignements en ce qui concerne les dimensions et l'espace de certaines pièces de la coque.

Dans son *Traité de construction*, Blaise Ollivier¹ décrit la polacre comme «un bâtiment de charge qui sert au commerce dans la Méditerranée. Les polacres sont de même grandeur et même construction que les barques à voiles latines; elles ont un grand mât comme les vaisseaux sur lequel est guindé un mât de hune et un mât de perroquet. Ces trois mâts portent chacun une voile carrée; elles ont aussi un mât de trinquet et un mât d'artimon comme les barques à voiles latines, ces deux mâts portent des voiles latines». En effet, c'est le gréement qui différencie la polacre de la barque; alors que l'arbre de mestre porte des voiles carrées, le mât de trinquet garde la voile latine, dite polacre, d'où par extension le nom du bâtiment.

Blaise Ollivier ne donne la description d'aucun des éléments architectu-

¹ BLAISE OLLIVIER, *Traité de construction*, 1736 (Nice, 1992).

raux mais on peut tirer quelques déductions du dessin d'une polacre fait par Guéroult du Pas² en 1710³.

L'importance de la polacre justifie l'existence de deux ponts. Le pont inférieur devait être situé au-dessus de la préceinte; sa position dans la coque est marquée par les deux sabords de l'arrière ainsi que par les deux dalots situés dans la partie centrale de la coque, au niveau de l'arbre de mestre (grand mât), de part et d'autre de celui-ci. La disposition des mâts de même que certaines caractéristiques des gréements ne sont pas présentées dans notre étude.

1. Contrats de construction de deux polacres à Marseille en 1719

Le premier contrat concerne la polacre *Saint-François Xavier* et est daté du 3 décembre 1719. L'autre est celui de la polacre *Sainte-Thérèse* daté du 14 décembre 1719, soit onze jours après⁴.

Après leur édition in extenso, nous en ferons l'analyse selon les paramètres suivants: dimensions principales, dimensions des différentes pièces mentionnées et commentaires.

Contrat de construction de la polacre *Saint-François Xavier*, Marseille, le 3.12.1719

- 1 Enregistrement d'une convention
- 2 de construction de la polacre Saint
- 3 François Xavier
- 4 au nom de Dieu
- 5 Mémoire de la construction d'une barque noire
- 6 à la mer de vingt goües de long portant sur terre
- 7 de vingt six pans de large, dix pans et demy destive
- 8 franc de latte et de payol lentrepont de cinq pans
- 9 de hauteur de long en long franc de latte de lavant jusques
- 10 à l'arrière, dix huit pans et demy à tout obre ou hauteur
- 11 franc de payol, dix huit pans avançant sur lavant
- 12 et six pans sur l'arrière et treize pans de planepause
- 13 lesquelles seront de cinq pousses 1/2 espesseur par
- 14 dix pouces de hauteur, les madiers et estamenaires de
- 15 quatre pouces et demy espesseur par quatre pouces
- 16 hauteur et les escaumes quatre pouces espesseur
- 17 par quatre moins un tiers hauteur le tout bois du
- 18 pais bon et recevable et franc de serre, les dits

² P. J. GUÉROULT DU PAS, *Recueil des veuës de tous les differens bastimens de la mer Mediterannée et de l'Océan* (Paris, 1710).

³ Voir aussi *Bastimens qui naviguent sur la Méditerranée dessinés par Jean Jouve* (1679), Bibliothèque nationale de France, Département des Estampes, Ic46 fol, publié par MICHEL VERGÉ-FRANCESCHI et ÉRIC RIETH, *Voiles et voiliers au temps de Louis XIV. Édition critique des deux Albums dits de Jouve et de l'Album de Colbert* (Paris, 1992).

⁴ Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône, 9B7.

19 madiers auront sept pouces de distance lun
 20 de lautre, la carlinge ou palemege, lecou, un
 21 contrequille, dapoupe, trois varengle de chaque
 22 coste, le droment et contre escou, un droment
 23 et un varengle a chaque costé de lentrepont
 24 le droment de lestive, celluy de lentrée, la varengle
 25 [...] et la premiere den haut de lestive auront chacune
 26 huit pouces de larges par quatre depaisseur endentee
 27 sellon lusage et toutes les autres varengles auront
 28 sept pouces et demy de large par trois et demy
 29 espaisseur le tout franc de serre et en parelle
 30 a cadeau de trois plans, les lattes de lestive auront
 31 trois pouces espaisseur tant plaint que vuide
 32 et les lattes du pont en auront trois moins quart
 33 aussy tant remply que vuide, le tout franc de serre
 34 Bien entendu que les lattes a baud ou mestresse
 35 seront plus espesse a proportion du batiment
 36 Les rombaud du planc de chenne de cinq aupans
 37 franc de serre, les rombaud de contre mestre
 38 tout dune busque de six aupan comme ceux des
 39 couvertes franc de serre le tout, les trinquenins
 40 de trois pouces 1/2 espaisseur celluy de pond avec
 41 son rivet franc de serre deux baus avec
 42 ses courbes et rembades, un fourca au pied
 43 du trinquet, un a chaque couverte et une entre
 44 deux ponts, les mouisselas du trinquet viendront
 45 joindre ceux de mestre endenté aux lattes
 46 et les deux rambades qui remplissent son vuide
 47 de la meme espaisseur de trois en trois lattes, tout a
 48 lestive et au pont, un courbatton avec son pert
 49 [a clavette] chacun masane et [contremasane]
 50 une escoue de chenne, la sentine soutte a
 51 poudre, deux clerons a lentrepont avec ses
 52 compaignes, la chambre sur le pont avec ses
 53 caissons, armoire et lit a la satisfaction
 54 du capitaine clef en main, la cadenne des bittes
 55 deux bittons et deux cordes, une cuisine
 56 couverte labitacle, les jas dancre a la facon
 57 la facon decrite, la mature et la chaloupe
 58 proportionnée au batiment avec son arganeau
 59 et timon ferré, celluy de la bougne de timon
 60 avec sa ferement et ses deux barres, le cabestran
 61 a cloche avec ses deux barres, les affus
 62 des canons. Sabors ferres et ses roües, bois
 63 et facon de toute la esculture et menuiserie
 64 a la satisfaction du capitaine, une gallerie dapoupe
 65 assortie, tous les caus, escostes et serrette
 66 necessaire, son payol et la barquet, les

67 mouissellas des battyporte viendront prendre
 68 quatre lattes et trois dapoupe, de trois en trois
 69 place, un pert sur la varengles de lentrepont
 70 aussy bien que la premiere den haut de lestive
 71 de long en long a toutes les deux, de trois en trois
 72 place aussy un pert sur les trinquenins, toute
 73 la claveson a ribler et proportionnée au
 74 batiment soit du long que de lepesseur toutes
 75 les boucles et pert necessaire, le tout tout bois
 76 que fer bon et receptable, et finalement
 77 tout ce que nous pourrions avoir oublie
 78 de lun et de lautre propre et necessaire pour la ditte
 79 barque de ce qui concerne notre art et metier
 80 et ce quon dit noir a la mer
 81 a ete convenu entre Mademoiselle Laurence Audibert
 82 et Estienne Daumas et Jean Louis Bernard
 83 maitres constructeurs de cette ville de faire la ditte
 84 barque par tout le mois prochain aux proportions
 85 mentionnees cy dessus pour le prix et somme
 86 de sept mille deux cent cinquante livres le jour
 87 quon dressera la quille, et le restant sera
 88 paye aproportion du travail, bien entendu
 89 que ladite Audibert gardera en main huit
 90 cent livres jusques a ceque le batiment soit
 91 dans la perfection de ses mains et travail
 92 Voullant et entendant que la presente
 93 convention aye autant de force et de valleur
 94 comme cy cetoit un contract public
 95 Notant a peine aux contrevenants de tout depens
 96 dommages et interests, Fait double a Marseille
 97 le troisieme decembre 1719 Signes Jean Louis
 98 Barreau aprouve la rayeure
 99 Je dis Daumas a loriginal
 100 Recouvre loriginal de la ditte convention
 101 cy dessus enregistree par moy remise
 102 au greffe le 15^e 8bre 1721
 [signé] A Daumas

Contrat de construction de la polacre *Sainte-Thérèse*, Marseille, le 14.12.1719

1 Enregistrement de la convention de la construction
 2 de la polacre Ste
 3 Therese passe en faveur du sieur Alfanty secretaire du roy
 4 Il a este convenu entre maitre Alphanty secretaire
 5 du roy et les sieurs Nicolas et Simon Fattie freres maitres
 6 constructeurs pour la construction d'une barque avec les
 7 proportions cy après mentionnes scavoir vingt un goues
 8 de longueur en quille portant sur terre, laquelle aura
 9 dix pouces especeur, je veu dire haulteur et cinq et demy

10 especeur, seize pans de lancement devant et six pans de
 11 lancement derriere, dix pans dix pans destive franc de serre
 12 et de paillol quatre pans et demy dantrepont franc
 13 despeceur des couvertes et deux pans de vibord a compter
 14 par-dessus le trinquenint, vingt six pans de largeur
 15 en droite ligne et treize pans planepauze. La chambre
 16 aura dix pans de fond avec sa porte ferree Les
 17 madies stemenaire et escaumes de quatre pouces et demy
 18 largeur par quatre despeceur et seront places de sept
 19 pouces de distance l'une de l'autre. Les adromens auront
 20 huit pouces largeur et quatre despeceur, les trois varengles
 21 de l'estive et celle de lentrepont auront sept pouces
 22 largeur et trois et demy especeur. Ly aura un contre rode
 23 et un contre capien a poupe bois de chesne, sa carlingue
 24 contre escoue et mazane contre mazane un forcat audit contre
 25 mazane. Un autre forcat a proue et un a lentrepont et une
 26 des deux couvertes au baud a poupe au baud de chaque couverte
 27 avec ses courbes escaffes deux et trinquet bois de chene deux
 28 baud a lestive avec ses courbes et rambarde. La sentaine
 29 paillot lecuberyer. La cloison de la soutte poudre et celles
 30 porte avec cables. Les courbes a lestive comme aussy a
 31 lentrepont de trois en trois lattes avec son pert a clavette et
 32 charamine de memes que les pert a la clavette a la varengle
 33 destivage..Les lattes tant de lestive que de lentrepont auront
 34 trois pouces despeceur et celles descoutilles et celle de proue
 35 du grand mat de meme que celles du cabestrand pour lestivage
 36 en auront quatre et seront placees a huit pouces de distance
 37 dune a lautre. Les batesporte prendront trois lattes a
 38 proue du grand mat et trois a poupe de la coutille seront
 39 de sept pouce au carre. Les mouisselas seront de bois de
 40 chene, les portes descoutilles, la cloison de la ste Barbe
 41 deux compagnes, un armoire a proue pour serrer
 42 des depances. La cloison au devant a lentrepont le dregan
 43 a dix a sept pans et demy de largeur. Les perceintes
 44 de quattres pouces et especceur en diminuant par degre
 45 jusques au bordage de chesne. Les bordages du plan
 46 auront deux pouces especeur bon et de recepte. Les
 47 bordages de larbre morte es de pin pinie au choix du
 48 capitaine Bremond et seront de cinq aupans de meme que
 49 ceux de la courvette. Ly aura une ferrette a poupe de
 50 chaque coste et tous les cassescotte avec le pert a
 51 clavette, le trinquenin auront quatre pouces especeur
 52 avec son rivet et un pert a clavette de quatre en quatre
 53 escaumes, les bittes, taillemer, esperont, cuisses et toutte
 54 la garniture de la proue et du mat a trinquet et
 55 generalement tout ce quy est necessaire pour faire
 56 naviguer la ditte barque comme il se pratique quand
 57 on les vent noire a la mer, la chaloupe son arguinet

58 son timon et ferrement, le timon avec sa ferrement
 59 ces deux bancs et toutes les 6 louques de fut et
 60 clavette pour les tailles de guindas et aux [autres]
 61 endroits la cuisine couverte la gigeolle, le cabestrand
 62 et ces barres, quatre jas dancre, deux affuts de canon
 63 un pert a clavette, deux madie l'un et l'autre
 64 non passant au dessus de la carlingue, la facon
 65 de la mature, facon et fourniture de
 66 lesculture, la facon et fourniture de la menuiserie
 67 laquelle sera ordonnee par le capitaine Bremond
 68 Les dits maitres Fattie freres sobligent [...]
 69 de fournir toute la clavaison fort neuf. Les dits
 70 clous quy ribleront tous, payera la claviture
 71 Faire calfater et gadrouer la barque, fournir
 72 tout le bois et la facon dont le bois sera bon
 73 et de recepte de la grosseur mentionnee a la
 74 presente convantion, le tout franc de lignolle
 75 et bois de pais. Les dits maitres Fattie sobligent
 76 solliderement de construire la dite barque dans
 77 six mois a compter de ce jourdhuy a paine des
 28 dommage et intherets cause par tou retardement
 79 et monsieur Alphanty soblige den payer le
 80 prix de sept mille livres et de plus cent livres
 81 de present dont les sept mille livres leur
 82 seront payees en quatre quartiers, savoir le
 83 premier lorsque la dite barque sera dressee, le
 84 second lorsqu'elle sera armee et lattee
 85 le troisieme lorsqu'elle sera a la mer, et le
 86 dernier lorsqu'il y aura plus rien a faire
 87 De la presente fait double et nous
 88 voullons quelle ait autant de valleur quun
 89 contrat. Publie a Marseille le quatorze
 90 decembre 1719, signe Alphandy
 91 Recouvre loriginal de la ditte convantion
 92 dessus enregistree le 21 janvier 1723

Ces deux contrats, du point de vue de la construction navale, sont incomplets; ils nous donnent les dimensions principales de la coque ainsi que les dimensions de quelques pièces appartenant à la coque sans qu'il y ait un ordre dans le processus de construction. Les textes signalent quelques points propres aux constructeurs; ce qui veut dire qu'il y a des «obligations» à respecter que nous pouvons trouver dans un contrat et pas dans l'autre. Les dimensions de ces deux bâtiments sont pratiquement les mêmes comme nous le montrerons par la suite; ces navires ne proviennent pas du même chantier mais de la même ville, Marseille; datés de la même période, décembre 1719, ces deux contrats sont complémentaires pour notre travail.

a) *dimensions principales*

Nous donnons les dimensions principales dans les mesures utilisées dans les textes, goues et pans, et nous les traduisons ensuite en mètres.

| | <i>Saint-François Xavier</i> | <i>Sainte-Thérèse</i> |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| longueur portant sur terre | 20 goues | 21 goues |
| largeur au pont | 26 pans | 26 pans |
| largeur planepause (au fond) | 13 pans | 13 pans |
| élanement devant | 18 pans | 16 pans |
| élanement derrière | 6 pans | 6 pans |
| creux | 10 pans et demi d'estive | 10 pans d'estive |

Les dimensions principales longueur, largeur et creux sont les paramètres à partir duquel découlent la conception du bâtiment. Ces données nous permettent de calculer les caractéristiques géométriques de ces deux polacres:

| Dimensions (m) | <i>Saint-François Xavier</i> | L/1 | L/C | C/1 | <i>Sainte-Thérèse</i> | L/1 | L/C | C/1 |
|--------------------|------------------------------|------|-----|------|-----------------------|------|-----|------|
| longueur de quille | 15 | 3,23 | 8 | 0,40 | 15,75 | 3,35 | 8,7 | 0,38 |
| largeur | 6,50 | | | | 6,50 | | | |
| creux | 2,62 | | | | 2,50 | | | |
| élanement | 4,50 | | | | 4 | | | |
| quête | 1,50 | | | | 1,50 | | | |
| longueur totale | 21 | | | | 21,75 | | | |

La différence de longueur entre les deux polacres est donc de trois pans. Le contrat de construction de la polacre *Saint-François Xavier* ne mentionne pas la dimension de la quille mais celle de la polacre *Sainte-Thérèse* a une hauteur de 10 pouces (25,4 cm) et une épaisseur de 5,5 pouces (13,97 cm arrondi à 14 cm). Par le devis de la *Sainte-Thérèse* on sait que la polacre avait une contre-étrave et un contre-capian en bois de chêne.

b) *dimensions de quelques pièces de la membrure*

| Pièce | <i>Saint-François Xavier</i> | <i>Sainte-Thérèse</i> |
|--------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| quille | | 25,4 cm x 14 cm |
| membrures | 11,43 cm x 10,16 cm | |
| espacement madiers | 18 cm | |
| hauteur du bordage | 4,62 m | |
| préceinte | | 10 cm d'épaisseur |
| largeur au fond | 3,25 m | 3,25 m |
| vaigrage du fond | | 5 cm d'épaisseur |

Une fois la structure principale définie, voyons les membrures. Les membrures formées par les madiers et les estamenaires selon la terminologie technique méditerranéenne (varangues et genoux) ont comme di-

mensions: épaisseur: 4,5 pouces (11,43 cm) et hauteur: 4 pouces (10,16 cm). Dans la *Sainte-Thérèse*, les madriers seront espacés de 7 pouces (17,78 cm, arrondi à 18 cm). Cette donnée nous permet de calculer le nombre de couples (membrures) de la palacre: 84 unités.

La hauteur du bordage est de 18,5 pans (4,62 m); le devis de la *Sainte-Thérèse* nous précise que l'œuvre morte est de «pin pinié» (pin parasol), le reste de la coque étant en chêne car on peut lire: «les préceintes de quatre pouces espeeceur et diminuant par degre jusques au bordage de chesne». On économise du bois de chêne pour l'utiliser sur les œuvres vives en ce qui concerne le bordage. La préceinte est d'une épaisseur de 4 pouces (environ 10 cm).

Un entrepont «de cinq pans de hauteur de long en long» (1,25 m) implique la présence d'un deuxième pont au moins. La hauteur du pont principal «franc de latte et de paillol» est la distance du bordé du fonds au bordé du pont; c'est différent de la hauteur sous barrot prise du paillol (planches du fond de la cale) jusqu'au dessous du barrot qui est la hauteur qui serait donnée en cas d'affrètement commercial.

La largeur au fond dans la partie centrale du *Saint-François Xavier* est de «treize pans de planepauze», c'est-à-dire 3,25 m, comme dans la *Sainte-Thérèse* où d'une façon plus claire il est dit: «vingt six pans de largeur en droite ligne (la largeur au pont), et treize pans planepauze». Le bordage du plan (le vaigrage du fond) avait une épaisseur de 2 pouces (5 cm environ) dans la *Sainte-Thérèse*.

On peut constater une des «règles» pratiques de conception/construction utilisée sur le chantier. Elle concerne l'obtention des escaumes, ceux-ci auront: «quatre pouces espeeceur par quatre moins un tiers hauteur».

c) la terminologie

Une fois les dimensions principales établies ainsi que celles qui concernent les membrures avec leurs dimensions et l'espacement de celles-ci les contrats mentionnent quelques autres éléments, principalement des types de vaigrages ou des serres. Voyons maintenant quelques termes utilisés par le charpentier de marine et typiquement méditerranéens; leur définition peut nous aider à comprendre quelques lignes parfois obscures de ces contrats⁵.

Ces termes étaient utilisés au départ pour nommer des pièces appartenant aux galères; ils sont restés dans le vocabulaire technique et sont appliqués aux bâtiments au moins en ce début du XVIII^e siècle.

«ecou, escou»: vaigre d'empâtüre.

⁵ Les définitions qui suivent sont extraites du livre de NOËL FOURQUIN et PHILIPPE RIGAUD, *De la nave au pointu: glossaire nautique de la langue d'oc (Provence, Languedoc), des origines à nos jours* (Saint-Tropez, Toulon, 1993).

«adromens» «droment» (dormant): serre bauquière.

«contre escou (contre escouet)»: double de la vaigre d'empâture.

Dans nos contrats ces pièces auront chacune huit pouces de large par quatre pouces d'épaisseur (20 x 10 cm environ) «endantee sellon lusage», c'est-à-dire, en utilisant les procédés et techniques de construction habituels dans le chantier et qui n'ont pas besoin d'être décrits dans le contrat car tout le monde connaît de quoi il s'agit; les dimensions des «varengles» varient de sept pouces et demi à huit pouces en largeur sur trois et demi à quatre pouces «espaisseur», selon leur emplacement (voir le devis de la polacre *Saint-François Xavier*) (19 à 20 x 9 à 10 cm environ) le tout «franc de serre»; la solidarité de ces pièces se fait selon un écart «en cadeau» (en parelle) de trois pans (0,75 cm).

Les bordages (les lattes) de la cale (estive) auront une épaisseur de trois pouces (7,62 cm) tandis que ceux du pont supérieur auront une épaisseur de 7 cm.

Le «rombaud», ce sont des planches de remplissage en chêne; «ce sont les ais qui ferment la barque par dehors, clouez aux madiers; il y en a quatre au pan (1630, Bouchard)».

La pièce appelée «trinquenin» ou «trinquetin» est la dernière planche qui achève «de fermer la couverte (le pont) ou le dessus de la galère et dans laquelle on fait des trous pour faire passer la teste des estamenaires» (1672). Cette pièce a, dans le *Saint-François Xavier*, une épaisseur de 3,5 pouces (8,89 cm arrondi à 9 cm), celle de la *Sainte-Thérèse* a 4 pouces (10 cm) «avec son rivet et un pert (perne) à clavette».

L'«escaume» (ou escalme) semble désigner deux pièces différentes selon l'époque car on trouve pour 1622: «toutes les rames attachées par une grosse corde qui se nomme astroc, à une grosse cheville de bois qui se nomme escome... (Hobier)»; pour 1672, donc une date plus proche de nos contrats, le terme escaume «est une pièce de trois pans et demi [0,875 m] de longueur figure ronde par le haut et quarrée par le bas qu'on fait entrer à plomb dans l'aposty».

L'«apostis» est, selon une définition de 1685: «une pièce qui regne depuis le joup de poupe jusques à celui de proue, et endentée sur toutes les extrémités des baccalats, faisant toute la largeur de la vogue, autrement dit tallard de toute l'œuvre morte, les dittes pièces doivent être de bois de sapin de 30 à 35 pieds de longueur plus ou moins, 9 pouces de hauteur sur 6 pouces 2 lignes d'épaisseur empattées ensemble de deux pieds». Donc, dans le système métrique cette pièce a environ entre 10 et 11 mètres de long, vingt centimètres de hauteur par quinze centimètres d'épaisseur.

Les «courbes» ou «courbatons», situés sous les ponts, sont reliés par des pernes. Les courbes dans la cale comme celles de l'entrepont sont posées de trois en trois barrots avec leur perne à clavette. Au XVII^e siècle on distinguait les pernes en pointe dont la pointe était en général rivée, ceux qui

ne l'étaient pas étaient qualifiés de pernes perdues; il y avait les pernes ronds, à clavette qui permettaient le démontage et les pernes à vis.

«Mouisselas» ou «moisselas»: c'est une partie du bordage. Le moisselas de l'arbre de mestre (le grand mâ) «ce sont de pièces de bordage toutes droittes posées deux de chaque coste en dedans de la coursier pour fortifier le vuide du canal de l'arbre de mestre 2 desquelles sont endentees sur les testes des lattons et le restant des pieces endentes sur le lattes et les deux autres attachees a l'extremitez du surcoursier, servant a y mettre les poulies pour hausser et baisser l'antenne (1685)». Il est dit que les «mouisselas du trinquet», c'est-à-dire ceux situés à la proue du bâtiment car c'est là où se trouve le trinquet (sous-entendu le mâ de trinquet), «viendront joindre ceux de mestre (le grand mâ) endenté aux lattes (aux barrots?)». Ils sont en bois de chêne dans la *Sainte-Thérèse*.

«Masane» ou «massane»: «la massane est une petite enceinte qui lie par dehors la teste des estamenaires de rebec et d'empty et des forcats au tail de la galère, ce tail qu'on nomme autrement stelle est au dessous de la batarde». Diverses soutes sont mentionnées: à câble, pour la poudre, les vivres («compagnes», «compaignes»); le cabestan et ses barres ainsi que d'autres fournitures concernant les jas d'ancre, la chambre du capitaine, une cuisine couverte par exemple.

Enfin les deux contrats stipulent la construction d'une barque auxiliaire, «la chaloupe, son arguinet, son timon et ferrement» avec deux bancs pour la *Sainte-Thérèse* et «la chaloupe proportionnee au batiment avec son argeaneu et timon ferre» pour la *Saint-François Xavier*.

Signe des temps les deux contrats mentionnent la fourniture d'affûts de canons (deux pour la *Sainte-Thérèse*).

d) *Les maîtres constructeurs et la construction*

Les frères Nicolas et Simon Fattie, maîtres constructeurs de la *Sainte-Thérèse* s'obligent à la rendre «noire à la mer» dans un délai de six mois tandis que pour la *Saint-François Xavier* les maîtres constructeurs Estienne Daumas et Jean Louis Bernard ont convenu avec Mademoiselle Laurence Audibert «de faire la ditte barque par tout le mois prochain aux proportions mentionnées» et «noire à la mer». Pour un délai étonnamment si court la coque du bâtiment devait-elle être pratiquement achevée au moment où le contrat était rédigé ou s'agit-il du montage de pièces préconçues à l'avance, stockées et prêtes à l'emploi?

Un point intéressant est le fait que le commanditaire est une femme armateur, chose assez rare dans cet univers d'hommes⁶. Appartient-elle à la

⁶ PHILIPPE RIGAUD signale une autre femme armateur du début du XVI^e siècle, Magdeleine Lartessuti, «Les fournimens de la Bolha» in TONI CORTIS et TIMOTHY GAMBIN (ed.), *De trirremibus. Festschrift in honour of Joseph Muscat* (San Gwann, Malta, 2005), 397.

famille du constructeur Audibert installé en Languedoc au début du XVIII^e siècle?

Le paiement doit se faire selon l'habitude de cette époque; une certaine somme au moment où l'on «dressera la quille» (7250 livres pour la *Saint-François Xavier*) et le reste peut-être comme il est exprimé dans le contrat de construction de la *Sainte-Thérèse*: le second paiement lorsqu'elle sera «armée et latée», c'est-à-dire, quand la coque sera terminée; le troisième paiement quand elle sera «a la mer», donc, calfatée et imperméabilisée, et le quatrième paiement «quand il y aura plus rien à faire» donc après le passage des voiliers, pouliers, les gréements mis en place.

2. Contrat de construction et jauge d'une polacre à La Ciotat en 1743

Pour compléter notre étude, nous présentons un manuscrit daté du 15 novembre 1743; qui donne le calcul de la jauge d'une polacre de dimensions équivalentes à celles déjà vues ci-dessus; il s'agit de *La Parfaite*, construite à La Ciotat.

Enregistrement du certificat de jauge de la dite polacre⁷:

«Du 15 novembre 1743 nous nous sommes portés dans la polacre nommée La Parfaite commandée par le capitaine Jaques Guerin de cette ville et constructeur par le Sr Joseph Cabisol du dit lieu de laquelle polacre nous avons pris ces justes proportions

Scavoir

| | |
|---|----------------|
| Longueur de la quille portant sur terre 22 gous | |
| Faisant 66 pans et pieds du roy | 49 |
| Chute devant 13 pans | |
| Chute derriere 6 pans | |
| Somme 19 pans | |
| Moitié 9 1/2 | [7] |
| Large au maitre baud 29 pans faisant | [21 3/4] |
| | 112 |
| | 28 |
| | 140 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 1218 |
| Creux jusques au second pont a toucher | |
| la latte maitresse 14 pans 1/2 | 10 3/4 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 12180 |
| | 609 |
| | 301 |
| | <hr/> |
| | toneaux 130.93 |

Nous soussigne certifions nous etre porte dans la ditte polacre La Parfaite pour prendre ces justes.....»

⁷ Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône, 10B4.

Cette polacre a une longueur du même ordre (21,25m) que celle de la *Saint-François Xavier* et de la *Sainte-Thérèse*.

| Dimensions (m) | <i>Saint-François Xavier</i> (1719, Marseille) | <i>Sainte-Thérèse</i> (1719, Marseille) | <i>La Parfaite</i> (1743, La Ciotat) |
|-----------------|---|--|---|
| longueur quille | 15 | 15,75 | 16,5 |
| élancement | 4,50 | 4,0 | 3,25 |
| quête | 1,50 | 1,50 | 1,50 |
| largeur | 6,50 | 6,50 | 7,25 |
| creux | 2,62 | 2,50 | 3,62 |
| longueur totale | 21,0 | 21,75 | 21,25 |

Le certificat de jauge de la polacre *La Parfaite* nous donne un tonnage de 130 tonneaux. Ce tonnage devait être du même ordre pour les polacres *Saint-François Xavier* et *Sainte-Thérèse*.

Nous avons essayé de vérifier la jauge de cette polacre en utilisant la «règle de Marseille». L'application de cette règle exige les dimensions des différentes mesures en pans: «Mesurez en pans la longueur du navire de l'étrave à l'étambot: sa plus grande largeur au maître bau et son creux au même endroit, depuis la ligne qui a servi à déterminer la largeur, jusqu'à la carlingue. Multipliez ces trois dimensions entre elles, retranchez les deux dernières figures de la droite du produit et prenez la moitié de celles qui restent à gauche; cette moitié indiquera le nombre de tonneaux de poids et d'arrimage qui constituent la capacité du navire»⁸. En appliquant cette règle nous avons obtenu un résultat de 158 tonneaux.

En suivant la formule de l'ordonnance du Roi de 1681, «il faut multiplier la longueur de tête en tête (de la perpendiculaire d'étrave, à celle d'étambot) par la plus grande largeur hors bordages, correspondant au maître couple. Le produit étant multiplié par le creux mesuré du dessus de la quille à la ligne droite du maître bau du premier pont. Toutes ces dimensions appréciées en pieds. Le résultat divisé par 100 donne le port en tonneaux de poids.»⁹ En appliquant cette formule telle quelle nous arrivons à 148 tonneaux.

Nous souhaitons faire deux remarques sur le certificat de jauge. Tout d'abord, le jaugeur a pris la moyenne de la somme de l'élancement de l'étrave et de la quête d'étambot et le résultat a été incorporé à la longueur de la quille. Cette opération peut avoir pour but de tenir compte d'un espace à l'intérieur du bâtiment (celui représenté par l'élancement et la quête) peu utilisé pour des marchandises; en revanche la longueur prise de l'étrave à l'étambot supposerait cet espace occupé, en grande partie au


⁸ JEAN BOUDRIOT, *Le navire marchand, Ancien Régime, étude historique et monographie* (Paris, 1991), 10.

⁹ BOUDRIOT, *Le navire marchand*, 6.

moins, par des marchandises, ce qui n'est pas tout à fait exact. L'autre remarque concerne l'application de la conversion des pans en pieds du roi comme il est dit dans la formule de 1681. À partir de la nouvelle longueur et en suivant la formule de 1681 nous arrivons à un résultat de 134 tonneaux, proche de celui du jaugeur.

Pour conclure, il semble que la polacre ait atteint un ordre de dimensions assez constant dès peut-être la fin du XVII^e siècle, comme on le voit dans le tableau ci-dessus qui compare les dimensions de nos trois polacres.

C'est la fin du XVIII^e siècle qui voit l'apparition de la polacre «moderne» avec une transformation de la coque et des gréements ainsi que son agrandissement de peut-être deux ou trois mètres au XIX^e siècle.



Mirella Mafri

Ports et lieux d'abordage calabrais entre le XVIII^e et le XIX^e siècle

Dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle la mer constituait la principale voie de communication pour la commercialisation des produits qui, partant des lieux de production, arrivaient aux escales maritimes les plus proches, soit pour faire face à la carence des infrastructures routières soit pour échapper au banditisme, comme témoignent les mémoires remis au ministre John Acton après le tremblement de terre de 1783¹. C'était l'économiste Giuseppe Maria Galanti qui, envoyé en 1792 par le roi Ferdinand IV en Calabre comme visiteur général du Royaume des Deux-Siciles, à ce propos affirmait:

L'interno è inceppato da riti doganali e dalla quasi totale deficienza delle strade; la natura aveva fatto questo paese per essere di facilissima comunicazione, ma io non ho veduto provincia dove questa sia più difficile e rara. Una contrada è quasi sconosciuta all'altra [...]. Nelle Calabrie si viaggia all'uso de' Tartari².

La politique menée par la monarchie bourbonnienne, visant à augmenter les échanges commerciaux, favorisa l'adoption de dispositions afin de renforcer la marine marchande dans le Royaume des Deux-Siciles, ainsi que l'apport théorique de certains représentants du siècle des Lumières

¹ GIUSEPPE MARIA GALANTI, "Relazione sulla Calabria al ministro Acton (9 luglio 1792)" et "Relazione sulla Calabria meridionale per la Segreteria di Giustizia (13 agosto 1792)", dans GIUSEPPE MARIA GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio in Calabria (1792)*, éd. A. PLACANICA (Napoli 1981), 303-331 (*Scritti sulla Calabria*, éd. A. PLACANICA (Cava de' Tirreni 1993); ATTILIO SIMIONI, *Le origini del Risorgimento politico nell'Italia meridionale*, I (Messina - Roma 1925), 84 (nouvelle édition, Napoli 1997). Sur l'argument AUGUSTO PLACANICA, *Uomini strutture economia in Calabria nei secoli XVI-XVIII*, I, *Demografia e società* (Reggio Calabria 1974), 85 sgg.; PLACANICA, *Mercanti e imprenditori nel Mezzogiorno moderno* (Reggio Calabria 1974), 30 sgg.; PLACANICA, *La Calabria nell'età moderna*, I, *Uomini, strutture, economie* (Napoli 1985), 243 sgg.

² GALANTI, "Relazione sulla Calabria meridionale per le Finanze (25 febbraio 1793)", dans GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 346, 350.

en Italie méridionale, de Genovesi à Filangieri, et de Palmieri à Galanti, inspirés par des résolutions libérales sur le plan économique, finit par influencer l'action du gouvernement pour la restructuration des ports³. D'après Luigi De Rosa les navires étrangères effectuaient en 1760 le quart du trafic napolitain, duquel le tiers était génois; les navires d'Hollande, de Livourne, de Danemark, suivaient. La vie maritime était préférée à celle de terre même pour le commerce entre les provinces du Royaume, baigné par trois mers – le rappelle Nicola Fortunato en 1760 à propos *Delle opportunità del commercio interno per beneficio del mare* –, et par conséquent, ses provinces «hanno la comunicazione chi in uno, chi in due de' cennati Mari, ove possono i popoli agevolmente commerciare». En particulier, la Calabre septentrionale et celle méridionale méritaient «la man destra pel Commercio interno, ed esterno fra tutte le altre; considerate la loro pregevole situazione, la varietà prodigiosa de' prodotti naturali, l'attitudine e la perspicacia de' Popoli»⁴.

De Naples à Messine il n'y avait pas de véritables ports d'après Galanti: le littoral tyrrhénien «per lo lungo spatio di 300 miglia è del tutto mancante del menomo ricovero de' bastimenti», et dans la Calabre méridionale il n'y avait non plus «scari, tenitori, moli, sebbene da per tutto vi siano luoghi opportuni a costruirli»⁵. À part Reggio de Calabre, le seul port pour l'abordage et le transit de marchandises, Tropea était dans de très mauvaises conditions, mais «vi sono due luoghi opportuni per costruirvi porti»: l'un, que aurait comporté grands frais, «avrebbe 60 palmi di fondo» et l'autre aurait eu construit à peu de frais «consistendo in un ridotto, dove tirandosi un braccio si metterebbe il luogo [San Leonardo] al coperto di un vento che lo domina». Il conseillait le lieu de Santa Venere «nel mezzo del littorale tra il Pizzo e Monteleone», signalé par Giorgio Stinci, pilote génois qui avait trouvé «un naturale rifugio al pericolante suo le-

³ FRANCO VENTURI, *Settecento riformatore*, I. *Da Muratori a Beccaria* (Torino 1969), 550 sgg.; NINO CORTESE, «La Calabria Ulteriore alla vigilia della Rivoluzione», dans NINO CORTESE, *Il Mezzogiorno e il Risorgimento Italiano* (Napoli 1965), 79-115; CLEMENTINA BARUCCI, «I porti delle Calabrie in periodo borbonico», dans GIORGIO SIMONCINI (éd.), *Sopra i porti di mare*, II. *Il Regno di Napoli* (Firenze 1993), 296 sgg.; MARIA SIRAGO, *La città e il mare. Economia, politica portuale, identità culturale dei centri costieri del Mezzogiorno moderno* (Napoli 2004), 39 sgg.

⁴ NICOLA FORTUNATO, *Riflessioni intorno al commercio antico e moderno del Regno di Napoli, sue finanze marittime, ed antica loro polizia, navigazione mercantile e da guerra* (Napoli 1760), 71; LUIGI DE ROSA, «Trasporti terrestri e marittimi nella storia dell'arretratezza meridionale», *Rassegna Economica*, 3, 1982, 720; MARIA GIUSEPPINA MARRA AMADDEO, «L'attività commerciale reggina ed il Regio Consolato di Terra e di Mare», dans RENATO GIUSEPPE LAGANÀ (éd.), *La città e il mare. La storia, l'attività marittima e la costruzione del fronte a mare di Reggio Calabria sulla riva dello Stretto* (Roma-Reggio Calabria 1988), 93.

⁵ GALANTI, «Relazione sulla costruzione di un porto tra il Pizzo e Monteleone», dans GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 439-440; GALANTI, «Relazione sulla Calabria meridionale», 347.

gno» dans cette rade⁶. Sur la Ionienne, Crotone était un simple ancrage et, malgré les travaux exécutés par Ferdinand IV, était sujet

a gran interimenti – le rappelle Galanti – per cui si spendevano circa 12 mila ducati all'anno per bonificarlo. Nella porzione buona non vi possono stare che 20 bastimenti circa. Vi entrano con fastidio le polacche di 3 mila tomoli, ma non le più grandi. Ci si disse che non mai un buon ingegnere l'ha visitato, ma sempre l'operazione è stata affidata a soprastanti che assumono il nome d'ingegneri [...] Il Re ritrae circa 12 mila ducati dalle dogane di Cotrone, che si spendono nel porto⁷.

Les navires, pourtant, pratiquaient le petit cabotage, qui se réalisait dans les ancrages naturels près des embouchures de fleuves et torrents, où d'habitude se passaient les opérations de chargement et déchargement des marchandises. Et le manque de ports, d'après l'économiste Domenico Grimaldi, «fa sì che noi non abbiamo altri bastimenti, che le feluche [...]; i bastimenti di grossa portata, che possono allontanarsi dalle coste [...] non possono approdare e soggiornare che nei porti». Les plus petites avaient un équipage de 10 à 12 hommes, les plus grandes de 18 à 20 hommes. Elles ne pouvaient s'éloigner des côtes, étaient facilement manoeuvrables et transportaient des marchandises (400 «tomoli» e 60 tonneaux) à Naples et dans les autres endroits n'allant pas au-delà de Malte et Marseille, même si certaines d'elles arrivaient à Trieste, à Venise, en France⁸: c'est le cas de la société maritime constituée à Scylla en 1793⁹. La figure principale était le «patron», quelquefois propriétaire de tout ou de part de la felouque, quelquefois «patron» pour un seul voyage ou beaucoup de voyages de la felouque de propriété de la famille ou de personnes intéressés au com-

⁶ L'information de Stinci avait permis à beaucoup de navires d'éviter le naufrage: «In una grave tempesta, mentre molti legni erano trasportati in alto mare dalla furia de' venti, quattro di essi, cioè uno Genovese di Padron Alessandro Margante, e tre Procedani, ebbero ricovero nel ridosso naturale di Santa Venere». GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 231; GALANTI, "Relazione sulla costruzione di un porto", 440; MARIA SIRAGO, "Porti, caricatori, approdi del regno meridionale in età moderna (1503-1806)", *Studi Melitensi*, V, 1997, 80.

⁷ À Scylla «per lanternaggio, per ancoraggio e per jus porti non si ritraggono che circa 3 mila ducati all'anno» d'après Galanti, qui affirmait l'existence de deux localités pour la construction de ports près de Reggio, Pentimele et Spartivento. GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 131-132, 211.

⁸ Ainsi Grimaldi: «Non potendo le felluche più grosse trasportare più di quattrocento tomola o sessanta botti, ed essendo necessario equipaggiarle di diciotto in venti marinai, ciascuno vede quanto devono essere cari i noli, e quanto poco profitto ne deve ricavare la nostra marineria». DOMENICO GRIMALDI, *Saggio di economia campestre per la Calabria Ultra* (Napoli 1770), 162-163; DOMENICO LUCIANO (éd.), *Domenico Grimaldi e la Calabria* (Assisi-Roma, 1974), 162; GAETANO CINGARI, "Uomini e navi nell'area dello Stretto di Messina", in ROSALBA RAGOSTA (éd.), *Le genti del mare Mediterraneo*, II (Napoli 1981), 1008 sgg.

⁹ Archivio di Stato di Reggio Calabria (ASRC), Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 2/86, Scilla 3 agosto 1795.

merce à terre, aux activités agricoles. Les marins naviguaient d'après les circonstances, «a soldo» ou «a parte», et le petit navire était la projection sur la mer de groupes non de marchands mais des «partitari» ou des actionnaires qui donnaient aux protagonistes leurs misérables épargnes. En 1773 Gregorio Frisina de Bagnara était propriétaire de une felouque, maîtrisée par Vincenzo Savoca; et en 1795 la felouque maîtrisée par Tommaso Sciplini était de propriété du marchand Antonino Denaro¹⁰.

De Reggio à Scylla, de Bagnara à Parghelia, les calabrais «hanno genio per la marina – le rappelle Galanti – ma per impotenza esercitano il traffico solo con feluche lungo le coste». À Scylla «fanno il viaggio di Venezia, Trieste e della Dalmazia», les principales étaient sex, «ciascuna ha circa 25 uomini e portano un carico d'intorno a 250 cantaia. Si possono contare [...] sopra a 300 marinai». À Parghelia c'étaient deux felouques, chacune avec 24 marins, «le quali fanno il viaggio di Francia, di Corsica, di Genova», deux felouques qui faisaient voile vers Naples et deux «paranze che fanno il tragitto continuo delle Sicilie»; les marins étaient environ 200, qui

fanno il loro negozio sopra i detti legni o sopra legni forestieri. Portano da ponente le prime due feluche zuccaro, caffè, [...] vellutini, indaco, sale, calzette di seta, fazzoletti, cappelli, droghe, legni da tingere, sottovesti ricamate, ecc. Trasportano da Tropea coperte di cotone, cotone filato, manifatture di seta di Catania a Catanzaro, spirito di bergamotti e limoni di Reggio¹¹.

À côté des felouques, construites par les maîtres de Bagnara avec le bois de ce territoire-là, les «uzzi» et les «paranze» commerçaient avec la Sicile, Malte et Naples: l'«uzzo», plus petit de la felouque, était frété à «cambio marittimo», la «paranza» était longue, de 32 à 34 palmes, la moitié d'une felouque. Les premiers transportaient charbon, bois et cercles, les secondes huile à Naples et Palerme et pierres à chaux de la côte sicilienne¹², surtout après le tremblement de terre de 1783 qui avait frappé la Calabre Ulérieure¹³, et effectuaient une route pour les passagers de et vers Messine, qui déterminait le commerce des deux rives du Détroit¹⁴. À Scylla,

¹⁰ ASRC, Notaio Savoia, Bagnara, fasc. 75, 13 febbraio 1773; Notaio Fedele, Bagnara, fasc. 148, 3 aprile 1795; CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1009-1010.

¹¹ GALANTI, *Della descrizione geografica e politica delle Sicilie*, ed. F. ASSANTE et D. DEMARCO, II (Napoli 1969), 187; GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 220, 230.

¹² CINGARI, *Scylla nel Settecento. «Feluche» e «venturieri» nel Mediterraneo* (Reggio Calabria 1979), 25; CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1008 sgg.

¹³ Sur le tremblement de terre, PLACANICA, *L'Iliade funesta. Storia del terremoto calabro-messinese, I, Corrispondenze e relazioni della Corte, del governo e degli ambasciatori* (Roma-Reggio Calabria 1984); PLACANICA, *Il filosofo e la catastrofe. Un terremoto del Settecento* (Torino 1985).

¹⁴ Sur Messine et sur son port, LILIANA IARIA, "Per una storia economica di Messina

en 1780, Girolamo Laganà, Antonio Paladino, Giovanbattista Riganati e Giovanni Santisi avaient constitué une société pour le passage quotidien des personnes avec leurs quatre «paranze»: ils disaient

che in quel giorno che spetta a qualsivoglia paranza d'andare in Messina, nessun'altra paranza seu patron possa andare a portare passeggeri, né farli trattenere per il giorno appresso; ma nel caso che fosse partita la barca, e sopravvenissero altri passeggeri, in tal caso possa quel patron a cui spetta il giorno appresso andare a prenderli, sempre col patto della medesima società e senza restare pregiudicato per il viaggio che li tocca per il giorno appresso¹⁵.

La marine de Scylla était en particulier dotée de «paranze», de «palamitare» et d'«ontre», qui donnaient la chasse à l'espadon, celle de Bagnara était dotée d'autres types d'embarcation: à part les «gozzi» et les «brigantini», apprêtés par les maîtres locaux en 1760 et dessinés sur projets français «portati in contrabbando», dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle les sources documentaires annotent la présence dans les contrats de construction des «barche latine»¹⁶. Le long du Tyrrhénien ces embarcations déroulaient un échange intense: Reggio était le centre le plus grand pour la production et l'exportation de la soie et la bande côtière entre Reggio et Villa produisait et exportait agrumes, chanvre, et surtout essence de bergamote¹⁷. En 1750 environ dans la rade Giunchi le bourgeois Nicola Parisi créait la première plantation du bergamote pour l'augmentation de la demande d'essence par toute l'Europe¹⁸; en 1797 Antonino Focà de Catona était débiteur

nel '700. Un inedito rapporto del viceconsole francese M. Lallement", *Nuova rivista storica*, 1968, 661 sgg.; MICHELA D'ANGELO, "Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo. Messina (1795-1805)", *Atti dell'Accademia Peloritana*, LV, 1979, 218 sgg.

¹⁵ CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento*, 25-26; CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1022.

¹⁶ CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1007; CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento*, 26; SIRAGO, *Le città e il mare*, 99.

¹⁷ «La contrada di Reggio - le rappelle Galanti - abbonda di agrumi di un genere squisito. Produce ancora il dattilo, che non perfeziona il seme, come avviene in Sicilia. Gran copia di fichi d'India». GALANTI, *Memorie storiche del mio tempo*, éd. A. PLACANICA (Cava de' Tirreni 1996), 93; CARLO AFAN DE RIVERA, *Considerazioni sui mezzi da restituire il valore proprio ai doni che la natura ha largamente concesso al Regno delle due Sicilie* (Napoli 1832), 295; CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento*, 8-9; DANIELA CICCOLELLA, *La seta nel Regno di Napoli nel XVIII secolo* (Napoli 2003).

¹⁸ Sur le bergamotte, connu à la cour de Louis XIV, VINCENZO DE DOMENICO, *Sulla virtù medicamentosa della essenza di bergamotto* (Reggio Calabria 1854); ANGELO DI GIACOMO et CARLO MANGIOLA, *Il bergamotto di Reggio Calabria*, Reggio Calabria 1989; ALFREDO FOCÀ (éd.), "Francesco Calabrò medico, il primo a rilevare le proprietà balsamiche del bergamotto", *Helios Magazine*, II, 1997, n. 5, 21-22; CARLO MANGIOLA et GIUSEPPE POLIMERI (éd.), *Un agrume molto colto. Il bergamotto, mito e storia* (Reggio Calabria 1997); PASQUALE AMATO, *Storia del bergamotto. L'affascinante viaggio del principe degli agrumi* (Reggio Calabria 2005); PLACANICA, *La Calabria nell'età moderna*, 292 sgg.

de 152 ducats à Vincenzo Vitali pour l'acquis de essence de bergamote¹⁹. Dans la même rade les caisses de citrons et tonneaux étaient déposées en attendant l'embarquement, destinées aux marchés de Gênes, Venise et Livourne, mais également aux marchés de l'Adriatique grâce à l'importance acquise au XVIII^e siècle par les ports de Trieste et Fiume, emporiums maritimes du vaste hinterland austro-germanique. En 1795 c'est la cédula douanière pour le transport d'un chargement de citrons – 100 caisses – de Messine à Trieste avec la «polacca» de Carlo Villa génois, nommée *Regina Coeli*: le chargement devait être consigné à Giuseppe Viezzoli et «di nolo li sarà pagato tari quattro moneta di Sicilia per ogni cassa»²⁰.

Aux relations commerciales avec Gênes c'était lié le ravitaillement de Reggio en épices (noix de muscade, gomme arabique, etc.), à celles avec Trieste et Venise le ravitaillement en étoffes, surtout par les habitants de Scylla: de 1803 c'est la sommation de paiement à aucuns marchands de Scylla par un commerçant d'étoffes de Trieste. En général, les navires qui partaient de Reggio avec des produits d'exportation revenaient chargés de blé, produit dont ce territoire était en pénurie, si tant qu'en 1780 on avait constitué une société pour le commerce de grains et de victuailles, comme on déduit de la documentation du Consulat de Mer et Terre. En 1805 le capitaine Biagio Cappello de Surrente transportait avec sa «polacca» nommée *La Madonna del Lauro e L'Anime del Purgatorio* un chargement de blé – «tomolate 6000» –: imbarqué à Vasto e Calvano, le blé était consigné au conservateur «dei granai della pubblica annonaa» Felice Guerrera d'ordre de Giuseppe Buonocore de Naples dans la rade Giunchi²¹.

Le ravitaillement de blé pour les troupes était indispensable à Reggio pour les fonctionnes militaires de la localité, place de grande importance stratégique pour la défense du ce territoire et de la Sicilie par les incursions turques et barbaresques. En 1801 le «patron» Giuseppe Morace de Gallico avec sa felouque nommée *S. Maria di Portosalvo*, deux timoniers et 20 marins, transportait de Crotona à Reggio un chargement de 1000 «tomoli» de blé pour compte du négociant Giovan Battista Paturzo, malgré la tempête déchaînée au large de Roccella. Et en 1802 le «patron» Antonino Focà de Catona recevait par Antonio Genoese 120 ducats «ad uso de cambio maretime» pour le voyage qui devait faire du bord de Catona à Crotona [...] transportant du blé avec sa felouque nommée *S. Ilaria di Portosalvo* et 99 ducats que

¹⁹ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 5/607, Reggio 27 maggio 1797.

²⁰ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 2/95, Messina 2 marzo 1795; CINGARI, "I traffici tra l'area calabro-sicula e la costa orientale adriatica nel Settecento", *Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale*, CXXV, 1979, n. 2-3, 277 sgg.; MARRA AMADDEO, *L'attività commerciale reggina*, 95.

²¹ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 8/969, Trieste 7 dicembre 1803; b. 5/598, Reggio 24 dicembre 1780; b. 9/1162, Reggio 19 luglio 1805.

restano imposti sopra la detta filuga [...] nel viaggio che sta facendo carica di grano da Crotone, e detto Patron Antonino Focà si oblige [...] dietro otto giorni del suo felice arrivo pagare il solito cambio maretime in detti docati 99 e detto Sig. Genoese accorda la dilazione per tutto il viaggio del venturo anno 1803: da restituire esso Focà detti docati 99, con dover però pagare ad uso maretime per ogni viaggio farà detta barca in detto spazio di tempo secondo e' il costume, ed il solito del luogo, ove anderà a caricare, e scaricare, sempre dietro otto giorni del suo salvo arrivo, dovendo star soggetto detto Sig. di Genoese a tutti li danni e risichi di mare ad eccezione de contrabanno, truffa e gaberia [...]²².

La carence des infrastructures portuaires entravait les activités commerciales. C'était le cas de l'arrière-pays de la plaine de Gioia: les abondantes productions d'huile partaient du bord de Pietrenere et de Bagnara en route vers Marseille. Le trafic «che si esercita in Palmi - le rappelle Galanti - è di olio, che diversi incettano dalla Piana e vendono a' Genovesi [...]. I carichi si fanno alle Pietre nere territorio di Palmi e a Gioja». En 1802 Antonio Schepis de Varapodio devait donner à Gaetano Suriano de Palmi 11 boîtes de huile «chiaro, giallo e lampante» pour le protêt de deux lettres de change; et Domenico Falleti, pour le protêt d'une lettre de change, devait payer 330 ducats à Camillo Ieraci «in tanto olio d'ulivo alla voce», c'était à dire 20 carlins «cafizo di rotoli diecioto al trenta». De la même année c'est la certification relative au prix de l'huile introduit sur le marché locale et étranger²³. En ce territoire le commerce de la soie, d'après Grimaldi «il più ricco della Calabria», n'était pas trop développé²⁴; la soie de Reggio, au contraire, un tissu brut tiré à aspe, ne craignait pas la concurrence d'autres états (le Piémont, la Lombardie, la Toscane) qui avaient commencé un autre type de production, avec tirage à aspe petit et organsin²⁵. En 1753 une controverse prenait place entre marchands et producteurs de soie pour la livraison et le prix du produit: Stefano Lucisano, Domenico Spataro, Domenico Solaro,

²² ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 9/801, Reggio 8 agosto 1801; b. 6/1632, Reggio 1° ottobre 1802.

²³ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 6/768, Reggio 14 giugno 1802; b. 9/935, Reggio 18 settembre 1802; b. 6/767, Grotteria 24 maggio 1802; GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 224.

²⁴ LUCIANO (éd.), *Domenico Grimaldi e la Calabria*, 95 sgg.; PLACANICA, *I caratteri originali*, dans PIERO BEVILACQUA et AUGUSTO PLACANICA (éd.), *La Calabria* [Storia d'Italia. Le regioni dall'Unità ad oggi] (Torino, 1985), 88 sgg.; PIERO BEVILACQUA et AUGUSTO PLACANICA, *Storia della Calabria dall'antichità ai giorni nostri* (Roma 1999), 228 sgg.; FRANCESCO BATTISTINI, *L'industria della seta in Italia nell'età moderna* (Bologna 2003), 39-40.

²⁵ CORRADINA POLTO, "L'industria della seta nel territorio di Reggio Calabria tra XVIII e XIX secolo", *Civiltà moderna* (Messina 2000), 205; MIRELLA MAFRICI, "Chiesa e Stato a Reggio Calabria tra Seicento e Settecento. Giovanni Andrea Monreal e il balzello sulla seta", dans PIERO BEVILACQUA et PIETRO TINO (éd.), *Natura e società. Studi in memoria di Augusto Placanica* (Roma 2005), 289.

Carlo Giordano, Francesco Plutino e Vincenzo Lofaro avaient acquis, à nomme d'autres marchands, la soie au prix «alla voce», que était de 24 carlins à livre le 13 août 1753, et protestaient contre le retard de cette livraison, fixée à la fin de quel mois²⁶. Johann Hermann von Riedesel, baron de Einsembarch, visitant la Calabre en 1767, note que

la maggior parte della seta che la Calabria produce si coltiva in questi posti. A Reggio se ne producono 80.000 libbre all'anno, ma se ne coltivrebbe il doppio se le tasse di cui queste sete sono state gravate dal marchese di Squillace, già ministro a Napoli e poi ministro in Spagna, non fossero così esorbitanti e non avessero rovinato questa coltivazione e il relativo commercio. Il proprietario deve pagare al re prima una tassa per il terreno, poi per ogni albero di gelso, e a prodotto finito deve pagare un'ulteriore tassa di cinque carlini a libbra, né gli è consentito vendere il proprio prodotto in nessun altro luogo all'infuori di Napoli²⁷.

À côté du marché de la soie à Reggio le marché des peaux d'agneaux, de chevreaux et de chat sauvage était également développé. En 1791 le notaire Domenico Andrea Nava stipulait une obligation pour telle vente entre Gaetano Emmanuele et le commerçant grec Cristofaro Teodoro de Messine. De 1767 date une liste de marchands débiteurs d'un commerçant de cuir, Giuseppe Camarda de Messine, certainement pas le seul représentant d'une activité rentable pour la présence de magasins de peaux et cuir, récepteurs de l'exportation de Reggio à Messine, centre de jonction du commerce des peaux avec le marché étranger²⁸. Et non par hasard, la diminution de la production de la soie avait déterminé la progressive substitution du mûrier avec l'olivier: ce que soutient Galanti, qui annote la réduction de l'exportation vers la France de couverture ordinaire de coton de 25 à 30 carlins, «da che sono cominciate le rivoluzioni di Francia. Se ne sono spedite fino in America da Marsiglia»: couverture de telle valeur qu'on l'exportait même à Livourne, Gênes, Marseille, Trieste, Venise, par les marchands de Parghelia, qui confiaient leurs trafics aux marins regroupés dans une société corporative, il *Monte delli marinari di Parghelia*, fondée en 1692²⁹.

²⁶ ASRC, Inv. 64, Regia Corte di Reggio, b. 1/19, Reggio 17 settembre 1753.

²⁷ Brian Hill, qui visite la Calabre en 1791, note la réduite production de la soie. BRIAN HILL, *Curiosità di un viaggio in Calabria e in Sicilia nel 1791*, éd. R. ALBANI BERLINGIERI (Reggio Calabria 1974), 76; *Viaggio in Sicilia del Signor Barone di Riedesel diretto dall'autore al celebre Signor Winkelmann*, éd. G. SCLAFANI (Palermo 1821), 179.

²⁸ ASRC, Notaio Oliva, fasc. 81, 466/254; Inv. 64, Regia Corte di Reggio, b. 3/79, Reggio 1^o luglio 1767; MARRA AMADDEO, *L'attività commerciale reggina*, 97.

²⁹ GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 233; LORENZO GIUSTINIANI, *Dizionario geografico ragionato del Regno di Napoli*, IX (Napoli 1805), 267; GIUSEPPE GALASSO et FRANCESCO CAMPENNI, "L'età moderna: la città aristocratica", dans FULVIO MAZZA (éd.), *Tropea. Storia, cultura, economia* (Soveria Mannelli 2000), 131.

En effet, seulement Parghelia exerçait le commerce «sulle coste di Francia e della Spagna; il suo stato di coltura, di attività e di industria è diventato un prodigio in tutta la Calabria e alcuni degli abitanti han fatto ancora il viaggio dell'America»³⁰. Ce qui est confirmé par Francesco Sacco, d'après lequel au centre «erano addetti quasi tutti al commercio marittimo di tutte le piazze d'Europa», et par le célèbre géologue et minéralogiste Dèodat de Dolomieu qui visite la Calabre en 1784: les habitants de Parghelia, d'après le savant, «partono la primavera, e si spargono per la Lombardia, per la Francia, per la Spagna, per la Germania. Vi trafficano non il prodotto delle loro terre [...] ma mercanzie d'un trasporto facile, essenze, sete, coperte di cotone»³¹. À Marseille arrivait la plus grande partie de l'huile pour la fabrication de savon par les felouques qui, au retour, transportaient meubles et outils ménagers: les échanges culturels étaient intenses entre les ports français et Parghelia, Monteleone (l'actuel Vibo Valentia), Catanzaro, où les enseignements franc-maçonniques suivaient les routes de l'huile, et surtout Parghelia, patrie de l'abbé Antonio Jerocades³².

L'importance du commerce et de la navigation des calabrais est démontrée par l'exercice du «cambio marittimo», une particulière forme de prêt à intérêt accordé à celui qui s'occupait de déterminés trafics: c'étaient simples le contrat et la fixation de l'intérêt sur le capital employé, mais le profit du «patron» et des marins variait d'après la valeur de la marchandise transportée et vendue, et surtout la route. Par exemple, en 1798 Francesco Corigliano de Catona donnait sa parole à Rocco Celeste de Villa de faire un voyage avec sa felouque de Villa à Trieste, avec un arrêt à Rossano pour le chargement de «250 cantara in casse di liquirizia»: le fret était de 600 ducats et les obligations établissaient le «sopraccarico», la «stallia» et la «soprastallia». Corigliano s'obligeait de donner «franco il nolo», et de transporter au retour «cantara 50 in 60» de marchandises, d'avoir de «stallia» 7 jours «unito il giorno del suo salvo arrivo all'imbarco in Rossano e nel disbarco a Trieste unito il giorno effettivo del salvo arrivo giorni 15». Pour la «soprastallia», une fois «passati li medesimi stallie delli altri giorni di più si debba stare alli periti del mestiere di mare», mais la dernière obligation constituait une nouveauté absolue: «esso Patron e marinai si possano fare il fuori parti d'alcuni generi senza pregiudizio del mercante, e sua mercanzia». Enfin, ils pouvaient transporter des

³⁰ GALANTI, *Della descrizione geografica*, 187.

³¹ FRANCESCO SACCO, *Dizionario geografico-istorico-fisico del Regno di Napoli*, III (Napoli 1796), 42; DÉODAT DE DOLOMIEU, *Memoria sopra i tremuoti della Calabria nell'anno 1783* (Roma 1784), 28-29; UMBERTO CALDORA, *Calabria napoleonica* (Napoli 1959), 326.

³² PLACANICA, *Storia della Calabria*, 229-230; PLACANICA, *Storia dell'olio d'oliva in Calabria dall'antichità ai giorni nostri* (Catanzaro 2000), 45 sgg.

autres marchandises pour propre compte, sans causer du dommage au marchand³³.

Le «cambio marittimo», qui était en relation au dynamisme des trafics et de la navigation, s'appliquait pour tous les voyages, dans un enchaînement qui tenait en compte le placement du capital, le transport et la commercialisation des produits. Le prêt à intérêt pour le transport maritime était réglé en raison de la distance: 9-10% pour Marseille, 7-8% pour Livourne ou Gênes, 7-8% pour Trieste, 6% pour Rome, 6-7% pour Malte et Naples, 6-7% pour la Sicile (4% seulement la route Messine ou Scylla, Bagnara – Palerme)³⁴. En 1803 Paolo Crinato de Gallico transportait à Malte un chargement de marronnier et s'obligeait à la restitution de 150 ducats à Fabrizio Tomasini au retour en patrie «al corrispondente cambio marittimo». Et de 1801 date le contrat entre Antonino Focà de Catona et Bruno Capogreco de Gerace, qui décidait de tronquer un chênaie pour le réduire en charbon, en payant «carlini cinque il cantaro alla carboniera, o sia luogo dove si faceva, non molto distante dal lido di mare»: 26 charbonnières de Serra S. Bruno préparaient le charbon et Focà devait consigner la moitié de l'argent à Capogreco à Gioiosa, où il venait pour le chargement de l'huile. Mais il ne voulait pas le charbon et Capogreco

ha dovuto fare la spesa di trasportarlo ne' magazzini, e dopo varie ricerche ha contrattato, e trovò di vendere detto carbone in cantara 1200 al lido di mare a carlini cinque e mezzo di rotola cento al 33, onde l'interesse dee tutto correre a danno di detto Focà, per cui dee astringersi al pagamento [...] secondo il contratto da lui fatto, ed andare a prendersi il carbone suddetto, altrimenti decretarsi essere lecito di venderlo [...]³⁵.

En effet, l'activité maritime intéressait des milliers de gens et emblématique de l'esprit aventureux et de la conscience mercantile, qui aimait le risque en employant peu de capitaux accumulés avec peine, c'est le cas de Scylla: en 1793 bien 194 personnes participaient à l'expédition d'une felouque en route vers Venise chargée de «bombasine» – foulards et couvertures de coton –: la valeur de la marchandise était de 24.327 ducats avec participations individuelles de ces habitants – quelqu'un était de Messine, de Matera et de Monopoli – et de différente extraction sociale, oscillant entre 25 et 1.800 ducats. Certes, on reste perplexe si on pense qu'un capital de 25 ducats à l'intérêt de 12% d'après le «cambio marittimo» rap-

³³ ASRC, Notaio Marra, Reggio, fasc. 862, 1798, 5-6; CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1013-1014.

³⁴ D'après Galanti à Parghelia le «cambio marittimo» était établi en chacun voyage: 10% pour la France, 6% pour Rome, 4% pour Naples, 2% pour la Sicile. Galanti, *Giornale di viaggio*, 234; CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento*, 31 sgg.

³⁵ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 9/1106, Reggio 2 gennaio 1803; b. 5/641, Reggio 23 giugno 1801 e Gerace 18 giugno 1801.

portait, une fois l'opération accomplie, seulement un ducat. Mais le trafic attendait une telle importance que le Sénat vénitien essayait de toute façon de tronquer la concurrence des tissus calabrais qui mettaient en difficulté l'artisanat local: un dépêche du consul français à Naples prouvait, en 1772, que les habitants de Scylla

étaient au point d'en débiter en gros une bien grande quantité au [pré-judice] des manufactures du pays, en sorte que les fabriquans vénitiens se virent forcés de recourir au Sénat pour mettre des bornes à un commerce qui les minoit³⁶.

Les marins du centre, comme les marins de Parghelia, étaient habitués de la foire de Beaucaire, et pratiquaient le «cambio marittimo», comme les sources documentaires démontrent: certains patrons de felouques assumaient le rôle d'opérateurs pour propre compte ou d'intermédiaires de sociétés commerciales de Messine ou de Venise, de Trieste. Une fois arrivés en port, ils vendaient leurs marchandises à Udine, Padoue, Innsbruck, en Tyrol et en l'Istrie et en achetaient des autres pour le voyage de retour, employant en ce trafic même 150.000 ducats, prêtés «a cambio marittimo»: l'intérêt requis, 12% allée et retour pour chaque voyage, qui durait beaucoup de mois et engageait 20-24 hommes à felouque, augmentait au 14% après le 1797 pour les graves risques à cause de la situation internationale. En 1782 à Bagnara Luca et Vincenzo Antonio Morello, Vincenzo Vitetta, constituaient une société «di negozj in compere, e vendite, di cerchi, legname, salume ed altro». De 1760 date la controverse pour un contrat de prêt «a cambio marittimo», rédigé en 1757: Giovanbattista Costa de Parghelia prenait 25 ducats «all'uso marittimo» pour l'acquisition des marchandises, devant aller à Naples avec la felouque de Giuseppe Antonio Naso «sopra della quale era imbarcato per marinaro»: au retour il devait faire «lucido conto» du placement et restituer au prêteur le capital «e il giusto guadagno che gli spetta». Mais ce capital, ou

detti ducati 25 andarono a risico sopra detta filuca per più tempo, la medesima poi resasi in navigabile si scassò a terra [...] si che con la mutuante si convenne che fussero andati a risico [...] sopra qualsivoglia altra filuca dove si imbarcava esso comparente per marinaro³⁷.

³⁶ Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV), Archivio del Console di Sua Maestà Siciliana, I, 5 ottobre 1793; Archives Nationales de Paris (ANP), Affaires Étrangères, B¹, 895; RUGGIERO ROMANO, *Napoli dal Vicereame al Regno. Storia economica* (Torino 1976), 156-157; CINGARI, *Scylla nel Settecento*, 19.

³⁷ Le contrat de prêt «a cambio marittimo» date 8 avril 1757. Archivio di Stato di Catanzaro (ASCZ), R. Udienza, cart. F., fasc. IX, 1760; ASRC, Notaio Fedele, Bagnara, fasc. 147, 20 marzo 1782; GALANTI, *Della descrizione geografica*, 187; CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1018 sgg.

Les prêts étaient indispensables pour les longs voyages, 1.000 ducats pour destinations comme Malte, Gênes, Venise, Trieste; une fois le voyage terminé, l'intérêt permettait la massive participation aux activités commerciales avec quotes-parts libres. Mais dans les dernières décennies du XVIII^e siècle l'absence de scrupules de beaucoup de participants, habitués à ravitailler les marchés de l'Adriatique, et surtout de l'Istrie et de la Dalmatie, était retenue par l'intensification du phénomène de la piraterie et par les risques de la navigation en mer avec la perte du chargement, si pas même par les naufrages dolosives afin de frauder les compagnies commerciales et d'assurances³⁸. C'est le cas de la felouque de Giuseppe Caminiti de Gallico, prise en 1802 par les turcs alors qu'elle faisait voile chargée d'huile vers Messine; et, en 1796, de la felouque nommée *Santa Maria di Portosalvo* qui, maîtrisée par Giuseppe di Gaetano de Gallico et appareillée de Roccella, transportait à Malte un chargement de «maiali negri», pour la plupart perdu ensuite à la tempête déchaînée au large de Syracuse: «la mortalità nacque per essere li medesimi di grossezza smisurata e che nel cattivo tempo incontrato venivano a cadere l'un sopra l'altro»³⁹. En 1792 le «pinco» nommé *S. Giovanni e San Luigi*, maîtrisé par Prospero Valenzano de Vico Equense, faisait naufrage au bord de Amendolea alors que, provenant de Monopoli chargé d'huile, était dirigé à Marseille: Giovanni Biasini de Messine avait assisté

allo recupero delli olj suddetti sollecitando, ed animando gli Uomini, et Maestri suddetti alla fatica, ed invigilando, e notte, e giorno pella conservazione di detti olj, ed affinché non seguissero delle frodi in pregiudizio dell'interessati in una spiaggia deserta, senza badare né à piogge né à freddo, né alla propria salute, e raccomandando alle guardie poste nella lunga stesa di detta spiaggia di star vigilanti alla custodia di detti olj, ed ogni altro di detto Pinco⁴⁰.

Mais une lecture *tout court* des sources permet de constater l'altération des chargements par les fluctuations climatiques: l'humidité excessive qui, en 1802, endommageait un chargement de blé provenant de la Sicile avec

³⁸ ASRC, Notaio Macri, Reggio, fasc. 81, Obblighi 1791, 173/1266; ROMANO, *Napoli dal Vicereame al Regno*, 132; MARRA AMADDEO, *L'attività commerciale reggina*, 97. Sur la piraterie dans le Royaume de Naples, MIRELLA MAFRICI, *Mezzogiorno e pirateria nell'età moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII)* (Napoli 1995); MIRELLA MAFRICI, "L'antica angoscia delle coste calabresi: la pirateria turca e barbaresca tra Cinque e Settecento", dans AUGUSTO PLACANICA (éd.), *Storia della Calabria moderna e contemporanea*, II, *Età presente - Approfondimenti* (Roma - Reggio Calabria 1997), 314 sgg.

³⁹ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 6/978, Reggio 27 febbraio 1802; b. 2/198, Reggio 15 settembre 1796.

⁴⁰ Le naufrage était advenu le 23 décembre 1792. ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 1/10, Reggio 18 febbraio 1793.

une embarcation abordée à la rade Giunchi⁴¹, pouvait causer des dommages même au bois, exporté de l'Aspromonte à Messine et en Sicile, à Malte, à Trieste et dans le littoral de l'Adriatique en quantité telle que, en 1799, on constituait à Bagnara une société pour l'acquisition de plus importants profits issus de la vente du produit. En 1802 Bartolomeo Pedaci exportait bois et autres marchandises en Angleterre et Hollande mais à son commerce était étranger le prélat Pasquale Ielo: la négociation était interdite aux ecclésiastiques⁴². Dans la même année Antonio Fulco de S. Roberto requérait 250 ducats à Giuseppe Cotroneo de Messine pour «un negoziato di legname»; et en 1801 Giovanbattista Cafasso de Gênes mais habitant à Reggio référait de l'attaque l'année passée, «nella spiaggia romana» par les corsaires français, d'un chargement de «cedri all'ebrea ad uso di nolo» dirigé à Gênes ou Livourne: les 12 marins qui étaient sur l'imbarcation

presero la fuga, e rimase il Comparente [...] che poi per casualità, ed elassi giorni quattro circa di tale assalto per mera provvidenza divina fu [...] liberato, ed indi proseguì il viaggio dietro la quarantena fatta. Ogni ragione vuole che si liquidassero tra il Comparente, e marinari accennati un tal conto, affinché quindi venghi il Comparente rimborsato di ciò che ha soccorso a' medesimi⁴³.

Le bois, les douves et les cerceaux, préparés en grande quantité par les artisans du Bagnara pour la croissante demande de ces produits, favorisaient les trafics pour la Sicile et Malte et n'empêchaient pas l'initiative locale, malgré la présence en la Tyrrhénienne des navires marchands de Procida et de Sorrente⁴⁴. De Sicile c'était utile emporter en Calabre sal, fromage, poisson salé, et droguerie. À ce propos de 1805 date un charge-

⁴¹ Francesco Suraci, Paolo Filocamo et Fabio Polimeni, députés du *Monte Frumentario* de Reggio, avaient acquis par Placido Finocchio de Messine du blé «ad uso e comodo dell'Annona di quella Popolazione» - l'anticipation était de 2000 ducats - : le blé par l'humidité n'était pas «mercantibile e ricettibile». ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 6/720, Reggio 5 maggio 1802.

⁴² ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 4/529, Bagnara 27 maggio 1799; b. 6/703, Reggio 25 gennaio 1802; MARRA AMADDEO, *L'attività commerciale reggina*, 97. Sur les trafics entre Calabre, Sicile et Malte, MICHELA D'ANGELO, "Alle origini dei Florio. Commercio marittimo tra Bagnara e la Sicilia occidentale alla fine del Settecento", *Nuovi quaderni del Meridione*, 64, 1978, 381-394; CARMEL VASSALLO, "Commercial Relations between Hospitaller Malta and Sicily and Southern Italy in the mid-eighteenth century", dans MIRELLA MAFRICI (éd.), *Rapporti diplomatici e scambi commerciali nel Mediterraneo moderno* (Soveria Mannelli 2005), 445-459.

⁴³ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 9/784, Reggio 16 luglio 1802; b. 5/662, Reggio 13 ottobre 1801.

⁴⁴ GIUSEPPE DI TARANTO, *Procida nei secoli XVII-XIX* (Ginevra 1985); FRANCA ASSANTE, *Amalfi e la sua costiera nel Settecento. Uomini e cose* (Napoli 1994); GIUSEPPE CIRILLO, "Trafici amalfitani nel Mediterraneo moderno: merci e flussi commerciali", dans MAFRICI (éd.), *Rapporti diplomatici*, 217-235.

ment de fromage – 130 «cantara» – dirigé de Crotona à Naples d'ordre de Nicola Accardi de Torre del Greco avec le «paranzello» nommé *L'anima del Purgatorio* de Vincenzo Siano salernitain: l'attaque des corsaires barbaresques à Castella causait la perte du chargement mais non du fromage, commissionné par le baron Andrea Barberio Toscano de S. Giovanni in Fiore mais habitant à Naples. En 1790 Basilio Caraffa de Bagnara demandait à Consolato Giuseppe Cesareo la restitution du 20% qu'avait payé «de cambj» pour l'acquis en 1788 de «tanti droghi» au prix de 280 ducats, monnaie de Gênes: en effet, d'après Caraffa «i droghi non furono [...] raggiunti ai prezzi di Genova ma a' quelli prezzi che qui vendea», c'est à dire non «carlini due ma grana sedici e mezzo». C'est emblématique dans le XVIII^e siècle l'augmentation de la vie des «droghe» à Bagnara, où «speciali» et «aromatari» avaient rapports commerciaux non seulement avec la Sicile mais aussi avec Gênes, Livourne, Malte et Rome: par exemple on rappelle les Florio, et surtout Paolo, qui se transférait en Sicile fondant au XIX^e siècle un grand empire économique⁴⁵.

La circulation de petits navires calabrais était entravée même «dalle conseguenze impeditive del commercio così interiore come esteriore» – ainsi Giovan Battista Maria Jannucci, depuis 1763 Président du suprême Magistrat du Commerce –, dérivant du système fiscal et des droits en vigueur⁴⁶. Quant aux denrées exportées du Royaume, le droit de traite lié, sujet à la permission de la *Sommaria*, concernait les céréales, le droit de traite libre intéressait les autres produits (soie, agrumes, vins, bois, raisin passé, figues séchés). Le droit du blé, nommé *jus salmarium*, variait de 80 à 150 «grana per tomolo»; pour l'huile on payait 1 ducat «a soma». Le contrôle sur les opérations commerciales et sur le recouvrement des droits était confié à deux maîtres portulans, l'un pour la Calabre septentrionale avec siège à Amantea et l'autre pour la Calabre méridionale avec siège à Monteleone et Reggio⁴⁷. Mais c'est significatif que les deux maîtres portulans résidaient sur le littoral tyrrhénien, avec grande perte de temps pour rejoindre le siège du maître portulan et obtenir le permis d'extraction par les marchands qui trafiquaient sur le littoral ionien. Là, dans le port de Crotona, le commerce du blé était considérable; ceux-ci provenant du vaste territoire à

⁴⁵ De 1788 date une liste de droguerie transportée de Gênes à Bagnara par une «polacca» nommée *Nostra Signora Assunta* du patron Bernardo Biale espagnol. ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 9/1118, Reggio 29 luglio 1805; b. 1/1, Bagnara 5 aprile 1788; b. 1/663, Reggio 11 gennaio 1790; D'ANGELO, «Alle origini dei Florio», 383 sgg.

⁴⁶ GIOVAN BATTISTA MARIA JANNUCCI, *Economia del commercio del Regno di Napoli*, éd. F. ASSANTE, I (Napoli 1981), 80-81; ANNA MARIA RAO, *La Calabria nel Settecento*, dans PLACANICA (éd.), *Storia della Calabria moderna e contemporanea*, I. *Il lungo periodo* (Roma-Reggio Calabria 1992), 336-337.

⁴⁷ GALANTI, *Della descrizione geografica*, 465-468.

blé du Marchesato étaient acheminés vers Naples, en éternel état de besoin soit pour la distance des lieux de production (au-delà du Marchesato, la Sicile, les Pouilles), soit pour la consommation journalière élevée, dérivant de la densité de la population et de la présence massive d'étrangers⁴⁸.

Parmi autant de difficultés ce n'est pas étonnant la diffusion du contrebande, visant à soustraire les commerces calabrais aux lourdes contributions et aux contrôles bureaucratiques. Ce qui est confirmé par Ferdinando Galiani: d'après lui

finché feluche ci saranno, vi sarà contrabbando e nel Regno, e negli Stati altrui, perché il contrabbando è consustanziale alla filuca che rade la terra, sbarca da per tutto, scende la gente senza sospetto sempre a terra, finge a sua volta sempre timore di Turchi e di tempeste⁴⁹.

Les grosses rentrées qui assuraient le commerce illicite alimentaient une florissante activité à l'expansion de laquelle le baronnage et le clergé ne surent résister, surtout dans la période 1784-1796. En effet, grâce à l'institution du port franc de Messine en 1784, les fraudes et les abus assumèrent des aspects alarmants, jusqu'à pousser le gouvernement napolitain à promulguer deux dépêches dans les années 1795-96, visant à empêcher l'accès dans ce port aux embarcations dépourvues des autorisations douanières nécessaires. En 1802, par exemple, un commerçant d'étoffes de Reggio attestait, dans un acte public, l'observance de la défense de commerce avec des religieux ou avec les places de Londres et Amsterdam comme sanctionné par le canon de l'Écriture Sainte; et en 1805 un «paranzello» chargé d'huile, provenant de Gioia et dirigé à Marseille, était bloqué au bord de Pietrenere à cause d'observations douanières⁵⁰.

La plus grande expansion des commerces calabrais s'enregistrait dans la période précédente à la paix de Campoformio et à la proclamation de la République napolitaine: en 1798 Rocco Tuzzo, un des plus importants propriétaires de felouques de Scylla, déclarait d'avoir acquis par le commerçant Pietro Malliani de Bergame des différentes marchandises pour 1.105 ducats et d'avoir «sofferto delle pendenze [...] per l'invasione de' Francesi fatta da dette parti d'Italia, e Venezia»⁵¹. Dans telle période la pé-

⁴⁸ PAOLO MACRY, *Mercato e società nel regno di Napoli. Commercio del grano e politica economica del '700* (Napoli 1974), 215 sgg.; PLACANICA, *I caratteri originali*, 78 sgg.

⁴⁹ AUGUSTO BAZZONI (éd.), *Lettere di Ferdinando Galiani al marchese Bernardo Tanucci* (Firenze 1880), 72; CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento*, 23.

⁵⁰ ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 6/703, Reggio 25 gennaio 1802, et b. 9/1118, Reggio 20 maggio 1805; GIUSEPPE CASTELLANO, *Porto franco, fiere, manifatture e dazi doganali nelle Due Sicilie*, dans *Studi in onore di Riccardo Filangieri*, III (Napoli 1959), 216-217.

⁵¹ ASRC, Notaio D'Amico, Scilla, fasc. 138, 16-17v; CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1015-1016; CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento*, 34.

che était une activité bien pratiquée dans la Calabre, surtout tyrrhénienne: la pêche du thon à Pizzo et Bivona était florissante, ainsi que celle de l'espadon entre Scylla et Bagnara, d'anchois et de sardines. De 1797 c'est l'acte notarié à Palmi pour la mauvaise qualité des sardines salées, achetées à prix élevé: Carmine Cosentino e Antonio La Spina avaient acquis à crédit par Gregorio Cardona «due barili di sarde salate di Spagna di stipa grossa», mais au dessous de la première strate il y avait «sardella salata a manata a guisa di un pezzo di fango tutta teste e spine»; le produit n'était pas à vendre avec grande protestation des acheteurs. De 1785 date l'acte rédigé à Reggio pour l'achat de sardines et d'anchois qui seront pêchées par Antonino Caminiti de Gallico dans la saison future: il recevait 40 ducats par Antonino Barreca de Reggio, à garantie de la pêche

di tutti quelli barili di sarde e di alici, ben salati e mercantibili, e ricettibili di buon odore e sapore, che vorrà esso di Barreca e che ricaverà esso di Caminiti con la sua Barca pescareccia nella ventura stagione e propriamente per tutto il mese di giugno del corrente anno 1785⁵².

À Crotone la population ne pratiquait pas la pêche «per mancanza di gente», malgré la mer produisait «ottimi pesci, fra le quali eccellenti acciughe e sardine», mais à Parghelia la pêche «non basta pel mantenimento del territorio»: les anchois étaient salés «par uso de' particolari ma non per commercio». C'est un ahuri Galanti à remarquer, dans son détaillé *Giornale di viaggio*, que de Palmi à Bagnara, de Scylla à Pezzo, la pêche de l'espadon se faisait de mars à juin et était «soggetta ad annua oppressione feudale». En effet, «i calli del pesce, che è la parte più delicata sopra la coda, è di diritto del barone di Scilla, che esige anche il terzo della pesca. In Bagnara il terzo della pesca totale si esigeva dal barone, ma è stata soppressa»⁵³. Non seulement l'économiste, originaire du Molise, rappelle la controverse entre Fulco Antonio Ruffo, feudataire de Scylla et comte de Sinopoli, et les habitants pour la question des entrées, mais aussi Friedrich Leopold Stolberg, ambassadeur de Danemark à la cour de Berlin et venu en Calabre à la fin du XVIII^e siècle, note que

i principi di Scilla costringono i loro sudditi a consegnare le parti migliori di ogni pesce spada catturato e la decima parte di tutta la pesca. Per questo abuso da molti anni pende una querela contro di lui. Una volta venne nominata una commissione che avrebbe dovuto esaminare le ragioni di di-

⁵² ASRC, Inv. 62, Regio Consolato di Mare e Terra, b. 1/1574, Reggio 11 marzo 1785 et b. 3/287, Palmi 10 settembre 1797; MARRA AMADDEO, *L'attività commerciale reggina*, 97.

⁵³ «Anche sulla pesca il barone ha i suoi diritti, un terzo gli appartiene e in più ha diritto di scelta»: le rappelle von Salis von Marschlins. GALANTI, *Giornale di viaggio*, 130, 230-231, 221; GERDA HOMEYER (éd.), *Il Sud nelle lettere di viaggio de Carl Ulysses von Salis von Marschlins* (Chiaravalle Centrale 1981), 34.

ritto riguardante questa imposizione così iniqua, ma venne sciolta rapidamente. L'attuale principe fa valere le sue pretese sui poveri pescatori, nonostante vari soprusi di questo genere siano stati aboliti dal re⁵⁴.

La controverse, comme le sources documentaires démontrent⁵⁵, avait énorme résonance en Calabre, dans le Royaume des Deux-Siciles et en dehors de ce Royaume. Surtout la «gabella del guadagno» causait du dommage à «felucari» et «venturieri» de Scylla, forcés à payer pour leurs trafics maritimes: ils, appuyés par le dominicain Antonio Minasi, trouvaient la force et le courage de dénoncer à Ferdinand IV en 1775 la conduite du feudataire, en demandant «di non dover pagare il dieci per cento sopra il cambio marittimo, che cacciavano sopra del loro guadagno, ed il dieci per cento del netto profitto, all'Università di questa Città». Les entrées excessives déterminaient des vivaces réactions par les patrons des felouques et les marins habitués à éviter la taxation forestière en Adriatique et à mal tolérer le payement au feudataire «di grani diciotto ad oncia» pour la négociation des denrées et «di grani dieci sull'olio a salma», auxquelles les marchands forestiers n'étaient pas obligés⁵⁶. Le rappelle l'anglais Henry Swinburne dans son *Viaggio in Calabria* de 1777:

Il principe di Scilla [...] fu accusato di esercitare la più terribile tirannia sui suoi vassalli [...]. La persistenza di questo barbaro trattamento spinse costoro ad un tentativo piuttosto insolito in una regione in cui il dominio aristocratico è tanto saldo. Essi formarono un comitato e lo inviarono via mare a deporre le loro lagnanze ai piedi del trono e ad implorare la protezione del re [...]. Nella lotta ebbero un abile sostenitore fra i cittadini, Padre Antonio Minasi, al cui zelo e alla cui intelligenza essi probabilmente devono la vittoria che alla fine riportarono sul loro avversario⁵⁷.

Les activités maritimes constituaient la grande ressource de Scylla comme des autres centres de la Calabre tyrrhénienne, et l'intensité du ce mou-

⁵⁴ FRIEDRICH LEOPOLD VON STOLBERG, *Viaggio in Calabria*, éd. S. DE LAURA (Soveria Mannelli 1986), 31.

⁵⁵ MICHELE DI JORIO, *Nuove lagnanze degli Scillitani esposte alla Suprema Giunta di Scilla* (Napoli, 1777); *Le XX Novelle o siano Favole scillitane esposte alla Suprema Giunta di Scilla*. Vincenzo S. T. al signor D. Michele Jorio (Napoli, 1777); *La lingua di Scilla ululante e reclamante* (Napoli 1792); *Per l'Università di Scilla nella Suprema Giunta di Corrispondenza* (Napoli 1792).

⁵⁶ GIOVANNI MINASI, *Notizie storiche della città di Scilla* (Reggio Calabria, 1971), 212 sgg.; MAFRICI, «La lingua di Scilla ululante». La costruzione del mito negativo dei Ruffo di Scilla e del cardinal Fabrizio», dans AUGUSTO PLACANICA et MARIA ROSARIA PELIZZARI (éd.), *Novantanove in idea. Viaggi miti memorie* (Napoli 2002), 455 sgg.; CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento*, 56 sgg.

⁵⁷ HENRY SWINBURNE, *Viaggio in Calabria (1777-1778)*, éd. S. COMI (Chiaravalle Centrale 1977), 135-136.

vement créait de nouvelles places pour l'initiative locale, non seulement pour la demande d'hommes et de moyens aptes aux opérations de chargement et déchargement des produits mais même aux opérations de cabotage. Le commerce maritime autour des côtes calabraises révélait l'audace de cette marine qui pouvait alimenter fortunes locales même considérables: chaque voyage était certes une aventure, durait plusieurs mois et démontrait l'habileté des marins d'éviter les risques des naufrages et des corsaires, dans un contexte comme celui-là de la Méditerranée dominé par Messine, place financière et commerciale internationale⁵⁸: une Méditerranée qui voyait entre les dernières années du XVIII^e siècle et les premières années du XIX^e siècle la route de levant (Venise, Trieste), préférée par les marines de Scylla, par rapport à celle de ponant (Livourne, Gênes, Marseille), préférée par les marines de Parghelia, de Bagnara.

⁵⁸ GALANTI, *Della descrizione geografica*, 187; CINGARI, "Uomini e navi", 1020 sgg.

Biagio Passaro

Mobilità delle popolazioni costiere del Mediterraneo.
Il caso di una famiglia sorrentina a Corfù
nella prima metà del XIX secolo

Una lettera da Corfù

In uno dei Libri dei Battesimi della parrocchia S. Maria del Lauro di Meta è conservata la copia di una lettera dell'autunno 1844, proveniente da Corfù. Il parroco dell'epoca ritenne opportuno trascriverla integralmente nel registro, perché forniva le fedeli di battesimo e le date di nascita dei sette figli di Tommaso Astarita († 1843: d'ora in poi 'senior') e di Emilia Prebois, nati e battezzati nell'isola ionica¹.

Nel 1843 l'Astarita, capitano mercantile originario della penisola sorrentina, ma sposato e residente a Corfù, era scomparso in Atlantico insieme al suo brigantino, il *Salvatore*. La moglie assieme ai figli si era trasferita a Meta, il paese nativo del marito, nel golfo di Napoli, ed era andata a vivere nella casa degli avi a Casa Starita, il casale collinare, il cui nome deriva proprio dall'antico ceppo familiare che vi abita da secoli.

Sono già note le vicende dei discendenti di questa famiglia, in particolare quelle dei nipoti, Tommaso (Meta 1862-Napoli 1923: d'ora in poi 'junior') e Giovanni Astarita (Meta 1871-Napoli 1936), figli di Gioacchino († 1878; d'ora in poi 'junior') ed il ruolo di rilievo che hanno avuto nelle atti-

* Questo lavoro è frutto dello scambio di idee e di informazioni avuto con Gerassimos Pagratis (Università di Atene) nell'ambito del progetto *Greek maritime history of the 18th century: 1700-1821*, diretto da Gelina Harlaftis. Colgo qui l'occasione per ringraziarlo di avermi gentilmente permesso di usare i dati da lui trovati nell'Archivio di Stato di Corfù.

¹ La presenza del documento, custodito nell'Archivio della Parrocchia S. Maria del Lauro di Meta, mi è stata segnalata da Giovanni Castellano, capitano della marina mercantile, appassionato e preciso cultore delle memorie della sua città e tra i soci fondatori - assieme a chi scrive - della "Associazione di Studi, Ricerca e Documentazione sulla Marineria della Penisola Sorrentina". Il dibattito e lo scambio di idee e informazioni all'interno di questo sodalizio possono senza dubbio essere considerati il retroterra che ha permesso di precisare non poche delle considerazioni che seguono.

vità economiche ed armatoriali del Mezzogiorno d'Italia tra fine Ottocento e primo Novecento². Ora le informazioni contenute nella lettera consentono di delineare meglio la storia di questo casato armatoriale sorrentino da sempre coinvolto nell'attività marinara e abituato agli scambi con le genti e i popoli delle località costiere del Mediterraneo.

Rispetto a quanto si conosceva sinora, queste informazioni ci permettono di anticipare di una generazione la presenza degli Astarita a Corfù e forniscono nuovi elementi relativi al ruolo da essi svolto sull'isola e ai contatti che essi avevano stabilito con la comunità locale, con le autorità politiche e con i mercanti ed i naviganti stranieri ivi presenti. Si delinea in tal modo un quadro inaspettatamente ricco e articolato delle relazioni e della mobilità di questi operatori del mare. La notorietà ed il successo della famiglia Astarita e gli esiti delle loro attività economiche appaiono più comprensibili alla luce dell'esperienza fatta nell'isola greca dello Ionio e dei contatti lì avuti.

Corfù e la costiera sorrentina

L'isola e la città di Corfù, dove si era stabilita questa famiglia sorrentina, erano state per secoli uno dei più importanti centri del dominio amministrativo e marittimo della Repubblica di Venezia. Nel 1797, in seguito al Trattato di Campoformio, erano passate sotto l'influenza diretta della Francia, che le considerava la porta d'accesso dell'Adriatico. Nel 1800 era stata costituita la Repubblica delle Sette Isole (Eptànisis Politéia), primo Stato neogreco formalmente indipendente, anche se tributario dell'Impero Ottomano e posto, dagli accordi tra le potenze, sotto protettorato russo.

La città di Corfù era la capitale di questo piccolo stato che comprendeva, oltre l'isola maggiore, quelle di Passo (Paxi), Santa Maura (Lefkada), Cefalonia (Kefalonía), Zante (Zakynthos), Itaca (Itháki), Cerigo (Kythira) e le isolette di Antipasso (Antípaxi), Cerigotto (Antikythira), Curzolari (Echinades).

Le autorità veneziane, sino ad allora, non avevano mai incoraggiato l'approdo di navi mercantili napoletane, fatta eccezione per il naviglio piccolo, proveniente dalle vicine coste pugliesi con prodotti per i bisogni quotidiani della popolazione. Le ragioni addotte si riferiscono alla neces-

² La vita e le molteplici attività di Tommaso Astarita, importante imprenditore meridionale finora sfuggito all'attenzione degli studiosi, sono delineate in *Tommaso Astarita (1862-1923). L'orizzonte europeo di un imprenditore metese*, a cura di ROSSANO ASTARITA e FRANCESCO D'ESPOSITO, Napoli 2003; in particolare, per gli argomenti qui trattati, mi permetto di rimandare al mio contributo *Tommaso Astarita: armatore, banchiere e industriale*, 9-36. Per Giovanni Astarita si veda, invece, MARIA GABRIELLA RIENZO, *Banchieri-imprenditori nel Mezzogiorno. La Banca di Calabria: 1910-39*, Roma 2004.

sità di contrastare la pratica del contrabbando, cui gli equipaggi napoletani erano particolarmente dediti³.

Comunque le crescenti aspirazioni marittime e commerciali del Regno di Napoli, che nel 1734 dopo oltre due secoli era tornato indipendente e rivendicava un ruolo più adeguato alla sua posizione centrale nel Mediterraneo, e gli innegabili progressi conseguiti nel settore della navigazione commerciale dagli imprenditori meridionali, confliggevano certamente con i declinanti traffici dei veneziani. Il governo napoletano, nonostante un lungo iter diplomatico, non riuscì a concludere un vero e proprio trattato commerciale con Venezia; in pratica, però, il livello e la quantità degli scambi tra i due Stati non ne ebbe mai a soffrirne molto⁴.

L'azione diplomatica del governo di Carlo di Borbone a sostegno di un'intensificazione degli scambi commerciali e marittimi con il Levante mediterraneo, si concretizzò già intorno alla metà del Settecento con l'inse-diamento di agenti e consoli napoletani nelle città e nei porti dello Ionio e dell'Egeo, sia in quelli ancora sotto controllo veneziano, come Zante, Corfù, Santa Maura e Cefalonia, che in quelli appartenenti alla Porta ottomana, come Patrasso, Atene, Scio, Cipro, Smirne, Salonicco e Costantinopoli⁵.

Con la fine del dominio della Repubblica Veneta i napoletani poterono frequentare più facilmente Corfù; in particolare il quadro delle relazioni tra il golfo di Napoli e le isole dello Ionio si modificò di colpo grazie agli eventi quasi paralleli che coinvolsero entrambe le aree in seguito alle guerre napoleoniche. Nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia, dopo la breve esperienza della Repubblica Partenopea (1799), per un intero decennio s'affermò l'influenza francese (1806-1815) con il regno di Giuseppe Bonaparte prima e di Gioacchino Murat poi. Quasi negli stessi anni a Corfù, in seguito al

³ Queste misure vanno messe in relazione con l'alternante andamento delle relazioni politiche e commerciali intrattenute lungo tutto il XVIII secolo da Napoli con l'antica Repubblica regina dell'Adriatico. Nei primi decenni del Settecento (1706-1734) il Vice-regno austriaco di Napoli, in accordo con la corte di Vienna, persegue una politica commerciale intesa ad avvantaggiare il porto di Trieste nei rapporti con il Mezzogiorno a svantaggio dell'antica repubblica marinara. Sull'argomento si fa riferimento al fondamentale studio di ANTONIO DI VITTORIO, *Gli Austriaci e il Regno di Napoli 1707-1734. Ideologia e politica di sviluppo*, Napoli 1973; in particolare sulla politica commerciale del regno con Venezia, 278-286. In seguito, la riacquistata indipendenza politica del regno permise al nuovo sovrano, Carlo di Borbone, di riequilibrare i rapporti con le potenze nel Mediterraneo, sia ad Occidente che ad Oriente, per cui con la Serenissima seguirono anni di migliori relazioni commerciali. Per i rapporti commerciali e marittimi del Regno meridionale con l'Impero ottomano si è fatto riferimento all'altro saggio di DI VITTORIO, *Il commercio tra Levante ottomano e Napoli nel secolo XVIII*, Napoli 1979, in particolare 18-22 e 47-68.

⁴ DI VITTORIO, *Il commercio*, 20-25.

⁵ NICOLA FORTUNATO, *Riflessioni intorno al commercio antico e moderno del Regno di Napoli, sue finanze marittime, ed antica loro polizia, navigazione mercantile e da guerra*, Napoli MDCCLX, 88.

Trattato di Tilsit del 1807, venne soppressa la Repubblica indipendente e le isole dello Ionio furono assegnate alla sfera d'influenza politico-militare francese e, dopo il 1815, a quella britannica; solo nel 1864 sarà permessa la loro unificazione alla Grecia.

Quando gli Astarita fossero giunti a Corfù e perché si fossero lì stabiliti, non è ancora chiaro. La documentazione consultata conferma che già nella seconda metà del XVIII secolo gli intraprendenti equipaggi sorrentini frequentavano i porti greci dello Ionio e che, viceversa, imbarcazioni greche, sia con bandiera veneziana che ottomana, si spingessero oltre lo Stretto di Messina nei porti del Tirreno⁶ ed anche a Napoli, dove viveva da secoli una notevole comunità greca⁷.

A questo punto occorre dire qualcosa sulla terra d'origine di questa famiglia. Meta è un paese della costiera sorrentina che con Piano e Sant'Agnello faceva parte del circondario dell'antica città di Sorrento; fino ai primi decenni del XIX tutto il territorio di questi tre centri è denominato "il Piano". Inoltre questi paesi, assieme a Vico Equense, possono in qualche modo essere considerati eredi degli antichi centri della vicina costiera amalfitana e della loro fama marinara.

La Penisola sorrentina, per la mancanza di strade rotabili che la collegassero all'entroterra napoletano, fino a metà Ottocento si configurava piuttosto come un'isola e i suoi abitanti, stretti tra il mare del Golfo e la catena dei monti Lattari, trovavano nella navigazione un'integrazione alle loro limitate risorse agricole, ma anche uno sbocco per le loro capacità imprenditoriali. Durante il XVIII secolo questi piccoli centri costieri sono segnalati come luogo di intensa attività cantieristica, marinara e commerciale, tra i più dinamici del Mezzogiorno d'Italia: vi si costruivano imbarcazioni solide e capaci che non solo assicuravano – assieme a quelle non meno numerose di Procida – i massicci rifornimenti alimentari di cui abbisognava la Capitale, ma ottemperavano alle crescenti richieste di servizi da parte della Regia Corte, come il trasporto delle truppe e i rifornimenti di materie prime per il regio Arsenale, soprattutto legnami⁸.

⁶ Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Espedienti di marina, Giornale del porto di Napoli, 265-282, anni 1749-1795.

⁷ Sull'argomento vedi i lavori di CAROLINA BELLI, *La comunità greca a Napoli. Una cerniera nel Mediterraneo fra Oriente e Occidente*, in *Integrazione ed emarginazione. Circuiti e modelli: Italia e Spagna nei secoli XV-XVIII*, Atti del Convegno di studi (1999), a cura di LAURA BARLETTA, Napoli 2002, 453-483, e di HELENI PORFYRIOU, *La diaspora greca in Italia dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli: Ancona, Napoli, Livorno e Genova*, in *I Greci a Venezia*, Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studio (Venezia, 5-7 novembre 1998), a cura di MARIA FRANCESCA TIEPOLO e EURIGIA TONETTI, Venezia 2002, 151-184, in particolare su Napoli, 157-165.

⁸ Vale la pena leggere direttamente le parole dell'abate Giuseppe Maria Galanti scritte nel 1786 nella sua *Della descrizione geografica e politica delle Sicilie*, vol. 2, Napoli 1793-1794, ristampata a cura di FRANCA ASSANTE e DOMENICO DEMARCO, Napoli 1969, 187-188:

Gli esponenti più in vista delle famiglie locali – un diffuso ceto di borghesia provinciale contrapposto alle famiglie nobili che controllavano la città di Sorrento – univano al possesso della terra l'attività armatoriale e marinara; non erano affatto rari, poi, coloro i quali si dedicavano all'esercizio delle professioni liberali e all'attività mercantile su vasta scala⁹.

La perizia dei piloti e la preparazione dei capitani, istruiti nelle antiche scuole nautiche che fanno da modello a tutto il regno¹⁰, assicurano loro la fama di «una vera e propria aristocrazia della marina, abili a navigazioni mediterranee e oceaniche»¹¹. A metà del Settecento, non appena le condizioni militari e diplomatiche lo permetteranno, li si troverà su tutte le rotte del Mediterraneo e più volte si avventureranno anche oltre Gibilterra, sia verso i porti del Nord Europa che verso le Antille¹².

«Il golfo di Napoli co' suoi contorni, forma lo stato più florido della nostra marina. I luoghi dove si esercita, sono Napoli, Procida, Ischia, Torre del Greco, Castello a mare, Sorrento, Vico-Equense, Pasitano [Positano], Conca e Vietri. Le polacche sorrentine sono le più riputate del regno, perché essendo costrutte come quelle del Nord, hanno più celere corso, e sono capaci di un carico maggiore delle altre: portano per l'ordinario fino a 8.000 tomoli di grano. I marinai sorrentini hanno ancora una manovra più spedita: in buona parte le loro polacche fanno il commercio interno del regno: alcune di esse vanno alle costiere di Genova, di Francia e di Spagna; altre passano lo Stretto e vanno in Portogallo, in Inghilterra ed in America. Se la pirateria degli Algerini, e le soverchierie degli armatori non avesse arrestato il coraggio de' Sorrentini, essi avrebbero fatto il commercio dell'Oceano. Oggi la maggior parte delle polacche sorrentine viene noleggiata dagli Anconetani, per trasportare i generi di Sicilia ad Ancona, a Venezia, a Trieste».

⁹ Come prototipo si ricorda l'ascesa tra XVII e XVIII secolo della famiglia Maresca di Piano, studiata da AGNESE SINISI, *Una famiglia mercantile napoletana del XVIII secolo: i Maresca di Serracapriola*, in "Economia e storia. Rivista italiana di storia economica e sociale", III, 2 (aprile-giugno 1982), 139-203.

¹⁰ MARIA SIRAGO, *La tradizione marinara e la scuola nautica di Piano di Sorrento*, Sorrento 1989.

¹¹ EUGENIO LO SARDO, *Napoli e Londra nel XVIII secolo. Le relazioni economiche*, Napoli 1991, 13. L'autore utilizza le relazioni di lord William Hamilton al governo inglese, nelle quali l'ambasciatore, in più occasioni, esprime giudizi lusinghieri sulla marineria del Regno di Napoli, e precisa che essa era quasi completamente fornita dai centri del circondario di Amalfi (cioè Positano, Conca, Vietri), di Sorrento (Meta, Piano, S. Agnello, Vico Equense), Procida e Gaeta e che si componeva di circa 500 navi, tutte costruite lungo le coste di queste cittadine.

¹² Sul ruolo, la consistenza e lo sviluppo nel Settecento della marina mercantile sorrentina non vi sono studi specifici, paragonabili, ad esempio, all'ampio lavoro di GIUSEPPE DI TARANTO, *Procida nei secoli XVII-XIX. Economia e popolazione*, Genève 1986. Un'avvio significativo, anche se relativo ad altri periodi, è possibile ora trovarlo nei saggi di MARIA CASTELLANO, *Sorrento e il mare: un rapporto difficile. Alcune considerazioni sulle attività marinare della Penisola sorrentina tra il secolo XIII e il XIV*, in "Rassegna del Centro di cultura e storia amalfitana" 1996, 11/12, 149-180; di FRANCESCO D'ESPOSITO, *Un servizio offerto dalla popolazione della penisola sorrentina: i trasporti marittimi nel golfo di Napoli per l'approvvigionamento della Capitale all'inizio dell'età moderna*, in *Tra vecchi e nuovi equilibri. Domanda e offerta di servizi in Italia in età moderna e contemporanea*. Atti del V Convegno Nazionale della Società Italiana Storici dell'Economia, Torino 12-13 Novembre 2004 a cura di IGINIA LOPANE, Prato 2006; e di ANNUNZIATA BERRINO, *I sorrentini e il ma-*

Il mare che unisce: sorrentini a Corfù

Un più accurato esame della lettera spedita da Corfù aiuta a comprendere parecchie cose: don Carlo Rivelli, parroco della chiesa latina di Corfù, nel 1844 scrive al suo corrispondente di Meta su richiesta di Giovanni Astarita, «da molti anni in questa città domiciliato», per fornire ai sette figli del fratello Tommaso, nati nell'isola ionica, l'attestato di nascita e la certificazione del battesimo. Dopo il trasferimento a Meta per la morte del padre, hanno bisogno di una documentazione per l'iscrizione all'anagrafe della cittadina della Costiera. L'intento della lettera è di far risparmiare alla vedova «una grave spesa, che certo diverrebbe sensibile a quegli orfani».

La lettera non è stata ritrovata, ma il diligente parroco sorrentino trascrisse integralmente il contenuto della missiva nel registro dei battezzati; in questo modo poteva anche fungere da documento sostitutivo per la registrazione all'anagrafe. Nel caso che la sua documentazione non fosse stata ritenuta sufficiente – precisava il parroco corfiota – l'eventuale “grave spesa” da pagare non riguardava i diritti parrocchiali, ma i diritti dovuti all'amministrazione inglese e al console napoletano, qualora avessero dovuto rilasciare una documentazione ufficiale con i dati relativi alla nascita dei sette Astarita, ritornati nel luogo di origine del padre.

Per dare valore legale al documento lo scrivente, don Carlo Rivelli, aveva fatto autenticare la propria firma in calce al documento a Pietro Antonio, Arcivescovo dei Latini e la firma di quest'ultimo, a sua volta, era stata autenticata dal cav. Balsamo, console del Regno di Napoli.

Lo scarno e schematico elenco degli atti di battesimo fornisce un gran numero di informazioni, da cui è possibile ricavare gli elementi essenziali per ricostruire la vicenda e comprenderne il contesto: i genitori sono indicati con il patronimico e con il luogo di origine, mentre per i bambini battezzati viene indicata la data di nascita e quella di battesimo, il primo nome, seguito da un secondo, un terzo e, perfino, un quarto nome – come è ammesso nella tradizione latina – elementi utili questi ultimi per delineare le strategie parentali e di relazione e le devozioni religiose; infine ci sono padrini e madrine, sempre indicati con patronimico e luogo di origine, cosa che permette di intravedere l'ambiente e i contatti coltivati da questa famiglia sorrentina negli anni della sua permanenza all'estero.

Si tratta dei battesimi dei primi sette figli di Tommaso Astarita senior e Emilia Prebois, nati a Corfù in un arco di tempo che va dal marzo 1826 all'agosto 1837, in 12 anni di matrimonio. In ordine essi sono Maria Teresa (2 marzo 1826), Olimpia (22 gennaio 1828), Adelaide (27 settembre 1829),

Gioacchino junior (26 giugno 1831), Spiridione (23 settembre 1833), Carmela (6 marzo 1835), Penelope (26 agosto 1837). L'ottavo, Salvatore, nascerà postumo a Meta nel 1844¹³.

Tommaso senior, figlio di Gioacchino, era nato a Meta, prima che il padre si trasferisse con tutta la famiglia a Corfù¹⁴. Moglie di Tommaso e madre di questa lunga serie di figli è Emilia Prebois, figlia di Francesco, indicata nel documento come originaria di Ancona; il cognome invece è di chiara origine francese¹⁵.

Anche se non è detto esplicitamente, Giovanni, che ha chiesto al parroco Rivelli di adoperarsi a favore dei suoi nipoti, è un altro figlio di Gioacchino (senior) e, come Tommaso non era nativo del posto, ma sorrentino. Angela Astarita, vedova Lamagna, del «signor Gioacchino, da Sorrento», quindi un'altra figlia di Gioacchino, madrina di Olimpia la seconda figlia di Tommaso, anche lei è nata nel territorio di Sorrento; in occasione del battesimo, però, nel febbraio del 1828, non è presente alla cerimonia ed è sostituita da sua madre, Maria Giuseppa Castellano maritata Astarita, nativa di Sorrento, cioè la moglie di Gioacchino, nonna della battezzata. La stessa Angela, invece è presente a Corfù nel 1831, quando fa da madrina a Gioacchino (junior), primo nipote maschio, che porterà il nome del nonno: a celebrare il battesimo è l'autorità religiosa più importante della chiesa latina della città, «S[ua] E[ccellenza] R[everendissima] Pietro Antonio, Nostrano Arcivescovo», che in questa occasione con la sua presenza rimarca l'importanza dell'evento e la considerazione di cui gode la famiglia nella comunità locale. Ancora più interessante è la sfilza di padrini e madrine accuratamente indicati per ogni battesimo. Oltre alla nonna, Maria Giuseppa Castellano, e la zia paterna, Angela Astarita, gli altri padrini e madrine non sono sorrentini. Fino al 1831, quando nasce Gioacchino, l'erede maschio, essi sono siciliani di Messina: Antonio Pirrone, ben due volte padrino delle prime due figlie; Maria Teresa Labrisi ed il marito Antonio Salemi, anch'essi di Messina.

A partire dal 1833, anno della nascita di Spiridione, cui intanto viene imposto il nome greco del santo patrono della città, muta in parte lo scenario

¹³ Gli viene imposto lo stesso nome del brigantino con il quale il padre è scomparso.

¹⁴ Nel documento reca "da Sorrento"; infatti Meta, assieme a Piano e S. Agnello, da un punto di vista amministrativo dipendeva dall'Università di Sorrento. Quindi negli atti ufficiali l'indicazione del luogo d'origine per i nati nella costiera sorrentina è sempre "Sorrento" fino alla data del 1808, anno della costituzione di un'amministrazione autonoma che comprendeva i paesi del Piano di Sorrento. Meta a sua volta se ne distaccherà, costituendosi in comune autonomo, nel 1818; S. Agnello nel 1866.

¹⁵ Che i bastimenti sorrentini frequentassero il porto e gli ambienti mercantili di Ancona è confermato dall'abate Galanti: «Oggi la maggior parte delle polacche sorrentine viene noleggiata dagli Anconetani, per trasportare i generi di Sicilia ad Ancona, a Venezia, a Trieste» (*Della descrizione*, 188).

dei rapporti della famiglia Astarita con la comunità locale. Padrini e madrine non sono più solamente scelti tra il gruppo di immigrati dalla Sicilia, come è ancora nel caso di Maria Ferrara di Messina maritata Turrini, ma troviamo l'esponente di una nobile famiglia, Francesco Scarpa, nato a Corfù, anche se di ascendenza veneziana, come rivela il cognome. A conferma di legami sempre più forti degli Astarita con le famiglie importanti del posto, sia quelle originarie dell'isola, sia quelle immigrate da altre zone del Mediterraneo, il padrino di Carmela, la sesta figlia, è Andrea, sempre un nobile della famiglia Scarpa, ma nato a Venezia, mentre la madrina è una corfiota, Stella Sigsoreo. Come pure corfiota e greco è Antonio da Coron fu Stelio padrino, unico questa volta, di Penelope ultima della famiglia nata in terra greca, alla quale viene imposto un nome decisamente greco.

Emigranti di successo o imprenditori del mare?

Tra le informazioni provenienti dall'Archivio di Stato di Corfù, gentilmente fornite da Gerassimos Pagratis, una riguarda direttamente il nostro caso: nella documentazione relativa al periodo inglese risulta che Gioacchino Astarita (senior) era inserito nella burocrazia militare ionica, con il grado di «tenente della real flotta» e che nel 1816 aveva fatto carriera; infatti ricopriva l'incarico di «assistente dell'Ispettore Generale dei Porti e delle Corti Ionie». Non si è appurato con precisione in che anno si fosse trasferito lì, né come e perché vi fosse andato, ma è chiaro che il suo trasferimento deve essere avvenuto dopo la nascita dei tre figli di cui abbiamo notizie, Tommaso, Angela e Giovanni, tutti nati a Meta. La moglie di Gioacchino senior è Maria Giuseppa Castellano, anche lei nata in costiera da un casato di uomini di mare.

Inoltre si può legittimamente supporre che gli Astarita si siano trasferiti solo dopo il 1796, quando erano venuti meno gli ostacoli che scoraggiavano le imbarcazioni napoletane a frequentare il porto di Corfù. Non è un caso che, sempre dall'archivio greco, è segnalato un Gennaro Astarita, al comando del pinco *Gesù, Maria e Giuseppe*, battente bandiera napoletana, con 18 uomini di equipaggio, che nel settembre del 1799 riceve la visita di sanità nel porto di Corfù. Proviene da Manfredonia ed ha la stiva vuota; quindi viene per caricare merci. Non è possibile sapere se vi sia una relazione tra questi fatti, ma è certo che la reciproca frequentazione, tra i rispettivi porti, di imbarcazioni ed equipaggi napoletani e corfioti aumenta proprio dopo la nascita dell'Eptaneso: ad esempio dalle informazioni fornite da Pagratis risulta che nel periodo 1802-1806 nel porto di Napoli erano entrate ed uscite 32 navi ioniche¹⁶. Inoltre sin dalla costituzione dell'Eptaneso indipen-

¹⁶ GERASSIMOS PAGRATIS, *La marina mercantile delle Isole Ionie dalla caduta della Serenissima*

dente e nei decenni successivi le autorità pubbliche (anche quelle francesi ed inglesi) incontrarono difficoltà a trovare tra i residenti persone in grado di lavorare in un'amministrazione fondata e diretta sempre dai veneziani, in quanto la documentazione era tutta in lingua italiana; pertanto veniva favorito in ogni modo il trasferimento nell'isola di personale esperto di lingua italiana, da assumere negli uffici pubblici¹⁷.

Potrebbe essere stato senz'altro questo il motivo del trasferimento a Corfù di Gioacchino Astarita senior. Resta incerto se ciò sia avvenuto durante il periodo francese o inglese; ma è probabile che l'importante incarico di assistente all'Ispettore Generale dei Porti lo abbia avuto all'arrivo degli inglesi. Il documento dell'archivio metese testimonia senza ombra di dubbio che per tutti gli anni Venti e Trenta le relazioni della famiglia Astarita non si limitavano agli ambienti mercantili e marinari, presenti in città, ma si estendevano anche ai nativi altolocati, di origine veneziana e greca. Soprattutto colpisce che quando nel 1831 a Tommaso ed Emilia nasce il primo figlio maschio e, come è tradizione, gli si pone il nome del prestigioso nonno paterno, sia intervenuto personalmente a celebrare il battesimo l'arcivescovo della comunità cristiana di rito latino.

Per quanto riguarda la sua carriera militare, d'altronde, è facile riscontrare che proprio con i Borboni il mondo della marineria sorrentina abbia cominciato a fornire alla marina militare dell'Italia meridionale piloti e ufficiali e che ci sia stata un'osmosi continua tra Regia Marina e marina mercantile. Inoltre nel corso del Settecento e nel primo decennio del secolo successivo non è raro trovare tra gli esponenti delle famiglie della borghesia marinara sorrentina chi avesse ricevuto encomi e riconoscimenti dai sovrani, spesso con il diritto di fregiarsi del titolo di "capitano", con tutte le esenzioni e i privilegi riconosciuti a tale titolo. In genere si trattava di meriti acquisiti per azioni militari in mare durante il servizio sulle navi della regia flotta, ma spesso era un riconoscimento per i molti servizi che questi comandanti mercantili prestavano con i loro bastimenti alla Regia Corte¹⁸.

all'arrivo degli Inglesi (1797-1815), relazione al convegno *Venezia e il Mediterraneo*, Fondazione Querini Stampalia, Università di Venezia e Università di Pescara, Venezia, 24 Marzo 2003 (atti in corso di stampa). Nel periodo 1802-1806 nel porto di Napoli sono entrate ed uscite 32 navi ioniche, la metà delle quali nel solo anno 1802 (11 alzavano la bandiera russa), poi 3 nel 1803; 4 nel 1804; 9 nel 1805 ed una sola nel 1806.

¹⁷ PAGRATIS, *La marina mercantile*.

¹⁸ RICCARDO CISTERNINO e GIUSEPPE PORCARO, *La marina mercantile napoletana del XIV al XIX secolo. Capitani in alto mare (Cronache)*, Napoli 1954, 74-75. Vedi pure UMBERTO BROCCOLI, *Cronache militari e marittime del Golfo di Napoli e delle isole Pontine durante il decennio francese (1806-1815)*, Roma 1963. Uno dei tanti casi è quello del metese Ambrogio Castellano (1781-1877), pilota della marina napoletana, insignito di una Sciabola d'Abbordaggio per il comportamento tenuto durante la guerra nei mari siciliani contro gli inglesi: Archivio (privato) Alberto Lieto, Napoli, Decreto del Ministro della Guerra e Marina, del 22 settembre 1810.

Di Gioacchino Astarita senior non sappiamo altro: nella documentazione relativa ai battesimi dei nipoti viene citato come padre vivente di Tommaso, antepo-ndendo al suo nome l'appellativo "signore", certamente per indicare il ruolo di prestigio ricoperto. Non viene più ricordato in seguito, ma non dovrebbe essere deceduto, neanche nel 1844, perché i suoi figli non compaiono con il consueto "quondam". Ma è solo una supposizione. Neanche della moglie e della figlia Angela, si hanno altre informazioni; solo di Giovanni dalla lettera sappiamo che è «da molti anni in questa città domiciliato» e deve essere preoccupato per i numerosi nipoti, figli del fratello morto tragicamente, tornati al paese d'origine della famiglia.

Di Tommaso senior, scomparso in mare assieme al suo bastimento nel 1843, vi sono poche notizie. Sempre dall'archivio di Corfù viene l'informazione che nel gennaio del 1831 egli, proveniente dall'isola e di passaggio per Otranto con la goletta (*schooner*) *Diana*, aveva consegnato personalmente al segretario di S. E. Lord Alto Commisionario delle Isole Ionie un plico di corrispondenza diplomatica. Non si conoscono le dimensioni del legno, nè dove fosse diretto: infatti Otranto è un porto più di passaggio che di carico. Nel 1839, invece, parte dal porto di Messina al comando del brigantino *Salvatore*, di 271.25 t.s.l., per Amburgo con un carico di prodotti mediterranei¹⁹; con ogni probabilità è lo stesso sul quale qualche anno dopo, nel 1843, scomparve nell'oceano. La diversità delle imbarcazioni fa pensare che proprio in quegli anni si sia verificato un allargamento degli spazi nei quali si muovevano questi equipaggi mediterranei, sempre più proiettati verso le rotte atlantiche²⁰. Per farsi un'idea precisa sarebbe necessario avere più dati: per esempio, il *Diana* era solo una goletta, che gli inglesi chiamano appunto *schooner* (due alberi e solo vele auriche), o non piuttosto un *brik schooner*, cioè un brigantino goletta, sempre un due alberi, ma con uno armato con vele quadre? L'Astarita ne era solo il comandante o anche l'armatore? Dove erano state costruite le due imbarca-

¹⁹ Il brigantino *Salvatore* è iscritto nel comprensorio marittimo di Piano di Sorrento ed è diretto ad Amburgo con un carico di «cremor di tartaro, vino, zaffranone, olio, agrumi, manna e mandorle». L'informazione è in *Statistica commerciale di Messina per l'anno 1839*, ristampa anastatica dell'edizione del 1840 a cura di ROSARIO BATTAGLIA e GIOVANNI MOLONIA, Messina 2005, 27.

²⁰ La vicenda di questi capitani-armatori sorrentini insediati a Corfù pone in evidenza la questione di come e quando le marine del Mediterraneo (in particolare quella dei regni borbonici dell'Italia meridionale e quella greca) dalla navigazione di cabotaggio nel mare interno passarono stabilmente alla navigazione oceanica. Riflessioni interessanti si possono trovare in MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo: Messina (1795-1805)*, in *Atti dell'Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti*, CCXLIX (1979), 212-214 e 247, e in PIERO BEVILACQUA, *Il Mezzogiorno nel mercato internazionale (secoli XVIII-XX)*, in "Meridiana", I (settembre 1987), 19-31. Il loro contributo mette in evidenza l'importanza per la marineria meridionale del passaggio dalla sfera d'influenza francese a quella inglese.

zioni? È mai possibile che accettasse di navigare con bastimenti non costruiti nei cantieri della sua costa? Comunque è molto improbabile che, pur vivendo all'estero, nell'esercitare la sua impresa non avesse continuato a mantenere relazioni con gli ambienti armatoriali e marittimi della Penisola sorrentina.

Specificità dell'imprenditorialità marittima delle popolazioni del Mediterraneo

Che cosa resterà agli Astarita dell'esperienza corfiota?

Nell'isola dello Ionio dovrebbe essere rimasto sicuramente Giovanni, come testimonia la lettera. Non si conosce nient'altro di lui, dell'attività che svolgeva o dei suoi discendenti. C'è un solo indizio che ci rimanda ad una possibile sua discendenza: un Luigi Giovanni Astarita negli anni Novanta dell'Ottocento è agente del Registro Italiano Navale proprio a Corfù.

La Prebois, invece, dopo la disgrazia si trasferisce a Meta con i sette figli, mentre è incinta dell'ottavo, Salvatore, che nascerà a Meta. La più grande delle figlie ha 17 anni e il primo figlio maschio, Gioacchino, solo 12. La perdita del padre e della nave toglieva alla famiglia ogni sostegno materiale ed è probabile che il ritorno al paese d'origine sia stato dovuto a considerazioni di carattere economico, perché a Casa Starita, la frazione sul vallone di Lavinola, almeno c'era la casa degli avi da cui il nonno Gioacchino era partito: un po' di terreno coltivato a vite e ulivo, un paio di abitazioni nel casale; il tutto appena sufficiente a mantenere una famiglia così numerosa. Da un atto notarile del 1901 si evince che l'eredità sorrentina di Tommaso (senior), scomparso in mare nel 1843, era rimasta indivisa e che, cominciando a venir meno anche i suoi numerosi figli e figlie, il nipote, Tommaso (junior), aveva acquistato tutte le quote degli altri eredi, il cui valore complessivo nel 1887 non superava le 12.560 lire²¹. Quindi gli Astarita tornati da Corfù non sono ricchi e certamente avranno dovuto ricorrere alla proverbiale parsimonia metese per mantenersi in maniera dignitosa e consona al casato cui appartenevano.

Lì a Casa Starita c'erano altri parenti e tra questi un don Giuseppe Astarita fu Tommaso, che potrebbe essere un fratello di Gioacchino (senior): è un signore benestante e rispettato; risulta tra gli azionisti sia della prima che della seconda *Compagnia di Assicurazione e Cambi marittimi*, costituite rispettivamente nel 1826 e nel 1831²². Per tutti gli anni dal 1844 al 1862 non

²¹ Archivio privato Alberto Lieto, Copia strumento di cessione di diritti immobiliari quietanza e discarico di conto di tutela, notaio avv. Giuseppe de Martino, Piano di Sorrento, 10 ottobre 1901.

²² Museo Mario Maresca di Meta, Atti costitutivi della Compagnia di Assicurazione e Cambi marittimi 1826 e della Seconda Compagnia Metese di Assicurazioni e Cambi

sono emerse altre notizie su questa famiglia. Sono, invece, note le vicende che riguardano i nipoti. Seguiamo ancora per qualche anno questa generazione nata a Corfù e vissuta e affermatasi nella costiera sorrentina.

Innanzitutto la madre, Emilia Prebois, nata ad Ancona e sposata a Corfù: i discendenti sono concordi nel sostenere che fosse francese o che lo fossero i suoi genitori²³. Emilia Prebois era una donna istruita, parlava come prima lingua il francese: visse molto a lungo e scomparve intorno al 1886-87. Di lei resta una fotografia del 1862, mentre tiene in braccio Tommaso, il primo nipote nato da suo figlio Gioacchino²⁴. Abbiamo, poi, due libri in italiano: uno di precettistica, tradotto dal francese; l'altro, invece, è un'edizione napoletana del 1834 delle *Confessioni* di S. Agostino, con scritto a mano nell'interno della copertina: «Ad uso di me. Emilia Prebois. Anno 1856»²⁵. Infine un biglietto di saluti del 1883, di suo pugno su un foglio di quaderno, indirizzato al nipote Tommaso che cominciava la sua carriera in banca²⁶. Custode delle memoria degli anni trascorsi a Corfù – e prima chissà dove – deve avere avuto una certa influenza sui discendenti almeno per quanto riguarda l'apprendimento delle lingue (inglese e francese) e l'interesse per la lettura. Delle cinque figlie, invece, rimaste nubili e vissute tutte nella loro abitazione di Casa Starita, sappiamo solo che erano ancora viventi alla fine del secolo, tranne Adelaide deceduta a dicembre del 1898. La più giovane, Penelope (nel registro parrocchiale è ormai solo Maria Giuseppa), è deceduta a Meta nel 1919.

Diverso il percorso seguito dei tre figli maschi i quali, a distanza di una o due generazioni, sembrano ripetere l'esperienza degli avi, la stessa loro capacità di cercare occasioni di guadagno muovendosi sul mare. Solo che ora

Marittimi 1831, entrambe costituite a Meta. Giuseppe Astarita fu Tommaso nella prima risulta titolare di un'azione, nella seconda di 2 (in entrambi i casi il valore di ogni singola azione è di 300 ducati).

²³ La trasmissione di queste memorie agli attuali discendenti, ai cui ricordi si fa riferimento, è avvenuta grazie ai racconti della loro nonna, Emilia Astarita (Meta 1875-1955), figlia di Gioacchino (junior), maritata Longobardo. Si tratta della nipote che è vissuta più a lungo degli altri con la nonna Prebois e con le zie paterne nate a Corfù.

²⁴ Archivio privato Alberto Lieto.

²⁵ I due libri fanno parte dell'Archivio privato Gioacchino Longobardo, Piano di Sorrento: il primo si intitola *Condotta per passare santamente le feste e Ottave della Pentecoste e del Ss. Sacramento*, del P.R. Aurillon, Napoli 1853; il secondo *Delle Confessioni di S. Aurelio Agostino, Libri XIII, dal latino in volgar lingua tradotti*, Napoli 1834.

²⁶ Archivio privato Alberto Lieto, *Lettera di Emilia Prebois a Tommaso Astarita* del 27 marzo 1883: «Meta, 27 marzo 1883. Mio Carissimo nipote. Per mezzo del vostro marinaio vi rimetto un Boccaccio con Ulive Verde (sic), e se più quantità ne avessi volentieri più ve ne avrei rimesse; unitto (sic) a queste ricevete Aranci n° 53 e Limoni n° 12 con un Caggiocavallo (sic). Gradite queste inezie da la Nonna che vi ama svisceratamente. Tanti saluti alla vostra Mamma da parte mia e delle zie Adelaide Peppina Marietta con Giuditta. Tanti baci a voi da me unito (sic) Giovannino e il piccolo Nipote. Vi benedico mille volte. La V.ra affez.ma Nonna, Emilia Prebois Ved.a Astarita».

lo fanno con un raggio di azione più ampio, che esce dal Mediterraneo e si allarga a paesi e mari più lontani.

Cominciamo dal più piccolo, Salvatore: poco più che ventenne, si era trasferito in Inghilterra a Newcastle on Tyne, un porto molto frequentato dai bastimenti sorrentini che vi portavano i loro carichi di agrumi, di olio da Gallipoli o di grano dal Mar Nero e vi imbarcavano carbone per le Americhe. Di lui restano solo due fotografie e qualche notizia nella corrispondenza e negli atti notarili, ma sufficienti per sapere che aveva sposato una donna inglese e che si occupava di commercio marittimo (agente o forse *broker*), in costanti rapporti di affari con gli armatori sorrentini e con le agenzie marittime e commerciali napoletane; muore nel 1886 e lascia una figlia nata nel 1876, Emilia, che resterà con la madre in Gran Bretagna²⁷.

Spiridione, invece, dopo aver fatto studi nautici, seguirà la carriera ecclesiastica; era tenuto in grande considerazione negli ambienti degli ufficiali della marina mercantile, anche perché insegnava inglese e francese a quelli che dovevano preparare l'esame per la patente di capitano di lungo corso. Nel 1894 fu eletto parroco della Chiesa di S. Maria del Lauro di Meta e in questo ufficio, che esercitò fino alla morte avvenuta nel 1906, si distinse dai predecessori perché più incline al dialogo con gli esponenti patriottici e liberali che reggevano l'amministrazione comunale²⁸.

Infine Gioacchino: lo ritroviamo a Meta già adulto, capitano e armatore, come il padre Tommaso. Ha sposato Agnese Cafiero anch'essa appartenente ad un'importante famiglia di capitani e armatori metesi. In società con Guglielmo Castellano, un lontano parente, arma bastimenti in grado di fare le rotte oceaniche: il barco (brigantino a palo) *Roberto*, di 380 tonnellate di stazza lorda, costruito ad Alimuri da Francesco Saverio Mauro e varato nel 1861, di cui avrà il comando per tutti gli anni Sessanta; il brigantino *Guglielmo Tommasino*, di 353 tonnellate s.l., costruito a Castellammare di Stabia da Aniello Bonifacio e varato nel 1862, che porta il nome del socio e del suo primogenito.

Formatosi tra Corfù e la costiera sorrentina, questo comandante, discendente da un casato profondamente radicato nell'impresa marittima, riprende con successo l'attività del padre; ma porta in essa tutta la ricchezza di relazioni e di acquisizioni culturali e professionali che la sua famiglia ha ricavato da quest'esperienza di mobilità, dalla madre un po' corfiota e un po' francese, dai contatti con mercanti e naviganti veneziani, greci, francesi e inglesi.

L'orizzonte mentale e lo spazio dell'attività marinara e commerciale si

²⁷ Archivio privato Alberto Lieto; in una foto è da solo ed in un'altra con la moglie e la figlia assieme alla famiglia del suocero. Nell'atto notarile del 1901 vi sono notizie della famiglia dopo la sua morte; cfr. nota 16.

²⁸ FRANCESCO LIGUORI, *Clarorum metensium virorum elogium*, Neapoli MCMX, 70-73.

sono ampliati e questi Astarita vi si inseriscono con successo. Lo dimostra con chiarezza una lettera alla moglie Agnese inviata da Gioacchino nel febbraio del 1878. Egli al comando del brik *Guglielmo Tommasino* è di ritorno dagli Stati Uniti e sta scaricando a Costantinopoli una partita di petrolio. Nel breve testo rende partecipe la moglie delle soddisfazioni e dei timori della sua attività e l'informa dei progetti circa i nuovi viaggi da intraprendere. Il ruolo di Agnese, considerato l'ambiente familiare da cui proviene, non è solo quella di una moglie che condivide le preoccupazioni del marito, ma sembra avere una parte più attiva: effettua pagamenti per conto del marito e segue l'ampio giro di danaro tra il marito, il socio metese, gli agenti e le case commerciali, insomma i contatti tra Odessa e Castellammare di Stabia, fino a Newcastle, dove c'è il fratello del marito, Salvatore²⁹.

Nel giro di una generazione questi sorrentini sono passati da un tipo di mobilità solo interna al Mediterraneo, ad un'altro che spazia dal Mar Nero al Nord Atlantico. Gioacchino, dopo la consegna dell'ultima parte del carico ad Odessa conta di caricare grano per Castellammare o per Marsiglia; poi farà rotta nell'oceano per l'Inghilterra o l'America. Promette di fermarsi a Castellammare e invita la moglie a fargli visita a bordo con i diletti figli. Quando nell'autunno dello stesso anno scompare con il brigantino e tutto l'equipaggio, proprio come il padre 35 anni prima, lascia la moglie con tre figli piccoli, più un altro che nascerà postumo (porterà lo stesso nome del padre). Agnese, per tenere lontano dal mare il figlio maggiore, lo manda a studiare in Inghilterra presso lo zio. Riuscirà nell'intento. I tre figli maschi, sfruttando abilità e relazioni acquisite, diventeranno banchieri e imprenditori di successo; ma Tommaso, il maggiore, ben presto tornerà ad occuparsi delle attività marittime: costituirà una società di navigazione a vela e nell'ambiente armatoriale napoletano svolgerà un ruolo decisivo nel passaggio alla navigazione a vapore³⁰.

Nella vicenda di questa famiglia tra Corfù e la costiera sorrentina, in un arco di tempo di oltre mezzo secolo, si delinea il percorso di ambienti e gruppi sociali ricchi di professionalità marinara e mercantile acquisita grazie ai contatti all'interno dell'area mediterranea, in grado di inserirsi con successo nelle rotte e negli affari già da tempo tenuti dalle ben più agguerrite marinerie del Nord Atlantico.

²⁹ Archivio privato Alberto Lieto, Lettera di Gioacchino Astarita alla moglie Agnese ed al figlio Giovanni, 1878.

³⁰ PASSARO, *Tommaso Astarita: armatore, banchiere, industriale*, 11-38.

Massimo Maresca

Il Museo “Mario Maresca” a Meta.
Una testimonianza delle attività marittime
nella penisola sorrentina nel XIX secolo

Il museo “Mario Maresca”, allestito in una casa settecentesca del centro storico di Meta, è un museo piccolo ma, nel suo genere, originale ed esauriente; raccoglie reperti e testimonianze della navigazione a vela in Penisola sorrentina dagli anni Venti dell’Ottocento alla prima guerra mondiale. La società ed il territorio, in cui è nato, sono stati profondamente segnati dalle attività marittime, ricche - in quest’area - di una tradizione lunga almeno tre secoli¹.

¹ Una prima valutazione della marina mercantile sorrentina è già nei numerosi lavori di GENNARO MARIA MONTI, tra cui *La marina mercantile borbonica e il commercio marittimo*, Roma 1930, e *La marina mercantile e il commercio marittimo napoletano nel secondo periodo borbonico*, Trani 1939, nei quali la mariniera del golfo di Napoli viene presentata come la più vivace e sviluppata del Regno, ed i sorrentini indicati come i più audaci naviganti per l’ampiezza, anche oceanica, delle loro rotte. Una conferma viene da RICCARDO CISTERMINO e GIUSEPPE PORCARO, *La marina mercantile napoletana del XIV al XIX secolo. Capitani in alto mare (Cronache)*, Napoli 1954, i quali attraverso l’esame di un nutrito numero di testimoniali marittimi, quasi tutti relativi al XVIII secolo, sostengono che la marina mercantile meridionale grazie alle riforme caroline abbia posto le basi del suo futuro sviluppo; un esame di questi testimoniali permette di stabilire che, su 123 casi presentati, 68 volte si tratta di comandanti ed imbarcazioni sorrentine. Anche negli studi di ANTONIO DI VITTORIO, *Gli Austriaci e il Regno di Napoli 1707-1734. Ideologia e politica di sviluppo*, Napoli 1973, 398-409 e *Il commercio tra Levante ottomano e Napoli nel secolo XVIII*, Napoli 1979, 68-72, si trovano dati che avvalorano l’ipotesi che il maggior numero di imbarcazioni in grado di affrontare le più impegnative rotte del Mediterraneo provenissero dagli ambienti della costiera sorrentina e amalfitana. Per il XIX secolo, invece, mancano ricerche estese e approfondite, ma al momento si può ricorrere ad opere di carattere celebrativo, ma non per questo prive di riferimenti a fonti, spesso di prima mano: elementi preziosi per valutare il ruolo della mariniera sorrentina si possono trovare in TOMMASO GROPALLO, *Il romanzo della vela. Storia della Marina mercantile a vela italiana nel secolo XIX*, Milano 1973; MARIO STARITA e AGOSTINO AVERSA, *Il Piano di Sorrento e la sua mariniera*, Napoli 1979; LAMBERTO RADOGNA, *Storia della marina mercantile delle due Sicilie (1734-1860)*, Milano 1982; quest’ultimo presenta in appendice il capitolo *L’armamento velico e a vapore della regione campana (1860-1940)*. Un primo contributo storiografico è venuto recente-

Meta è una cittadina di circa 8.000 abitanti, che assieme a Sorrento, Sant'Agello e Piano di Sorrento è situata nella Penisola sorrentina, a Sud del golfo di Napoli, su di una piana tufacea di origine vulcanica, sovrastante le strette spiagge adibite un tempo ad operosi cantieri navali. Questi centri, con Vico Equense e Castellammare di Stabia², a metà del XIX secolo erano all'apice dello sviluppo per quanto riguardava l'armamento e la cantieristica navale.

Il museo è stato costituito negli anni Sessanta del Novecento da mio padre, Mario Maresca (Meta 1917-2003), un ingegnere civile. Pur discendendo da una famiglia di gente di mare, era il primo a esercitare un'attività professionale non legata al mondo marittimo ed il dedicarsi a questa raccolta è stato il suo modo di "onorare" le proprie origini. Un breve excursus sui suoi antenati può aiutare, pertanto, a comprendere l'ambiente marittimo sorrentino e chiarire le ragioni della nascita del museo.

1. Una famiglia di gente di mare

I genitori di Mario furono Gaetano Maresca (1887-1953) e Luisa Pesce (1890-1978), il primo capitano della marina mercantile, poi pilota del porto di Napoli³, la seconda discendente da una importante famiglia di armatori e capitani.

Il padre di Gaetano era Antonino (1852-1930), di Piano di Sorrento, professore di disegno tecnico presso l'Istituto Nautico "Nino Bixio", ritrattista e autore di ex-voto marinari, proprietario di uno studio fotografico e fotografo professionista; la madre, Carolina, era figlia di Luigi Trapani (1811-1892), capitano marittimo e armatore di un brigantino di 309 tonnellate, varato nella marina di Cassano nel 1855, a cui aveva dato il nome della figlia.

Anche i nonni materni di Mario appartenevano a famiglie legate al mare: Luigi Pesce (1840-1930), capitano marittimo, navigherà al comando del-

mente dal volume *A vela e a vapore. Economie, culture e istituzioni del mare nell'Italia dell'Ottocento*, a cura di PAOLO FRASCANI, Roma 2001, in particolare nel saggio di ANNUNZIATA BERRINO, *I sorrentini e il mare*, 29-53.

² Le relazioni tra Castellammare di Stabia e la realtà propriamente sorrentina sono stati sempre strettissimi. I casati armatoriali delle due aree erano fortemente legati. Inoltre gli armatori acquistavano parte del legname e delle attrezzature metalliche, per la costruzione delle navi, a Castellammare presso l'arsenale e dai fornitori navali della città. Dopo il trasferimento dei cantieri mercantili al di fuori dell'area del cantiere militare, nel 1841, le costruzioni navali civili ebbero un fortissimo sviluppo anche nella cittadina stabiese. Vedi CATELLO VANACORE, *Il cantiere navale di Castellammare di Stabia 1870-1983*, Napoli 1987, 21.

³ Dopo i primi viaggi come mozzo sul *Sava*, un brigantino a palo di ferro dell'armatore Tommaso Astarita, navigò sempre, fino al comando, su navi che collegavano la Sardegna e la Sicilia al continente.

le navi del suocero⁴; i suoi figli maschi, Ferdinando, Gaetano, Salvatore e Giuseppe Pesce, diplomati presso l'Istituto Nautico "Nino Bixio", furono tutti avviati alla carriera di mare. Salvatore (1891-1961) divenne ammiraglio della Marina Militare italiana. Ferdinando (1876-1956) percorse una lunga carriera di mare coronata da un rilevante successo professionale, che può considerarsi un esempio tipico della vita marittima dei sorrentini: si imbarcò la prima volta come mozzo a 16 anni sul brigantino a palo *Leopoldo* del nonno Petrelluzzi, poi sui piroscafi affidati al comando del padre Luigi; divenne ufficiale a 23 anni sulla goletta a palo *Emilia*, e comandante nel 1911 del piroscavo da carico *Iniziativa*, entrambi dell'armatore metese Tommaso Astarita⁵; in seguito comandò i piroscafi passeggeri *Mendoza* e *Cordova* del Lloyd Italiano sulla rotta del Sud America, l'*Orazio* ed il *Virgilio* della Navigazione Generale Italiana per il Venezuela, il *Duilio*, fino ad ottenere il comando del *Roma* e dell'*Augustus*, i prestigiosi transatlantici impiegati sulla linea Genova-New York⁶.

La nonna Rosalia (1854-1925) apparteneva alla famiglia Petrelluzzi, uno dei casati armatoriali più prestigiosi di Meta tra Settecento e Ottocento. Il padre di Rosalia, Ferdinando Petrelluzzi (1827-1897)⁷, insieme al fratello Gaetano, fu armatore di numerosi bastimenti a vela⁸ e tra i fondatori nel 1862 dell'Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione della Marina Mercantile Sorrentina.

⁴ Museo Mario Maresca, Meta (d'ora in poi Museo Maresca), Libretto di matricolazione di Luigi Pesce.

⁵ Sul ruolo di quest'imprenditore meridionale vedi il contributo di BIAGIO PASSARO, *Tommaso Astarita: armatore, banchiere e industriale*, in *Tommaso Astarita (1862-1923). L'orizzonte europeo di un imprenditore metese*, a cura di ROSSANO ASTARITA e FRANCESCO D'ESPOSITO, Napoli 2003, 23-34.

⁶ Museo Maresca, Libretti di matricolazione di Ferdinando Pesce.

⁷ Anche il padre di Ferdinando e Gaetano, Leopoldo Petrelluzzi (1793-1862), era capitano ed armatore, come pure i suoi fratelli, Ferdinando, Luigi e Francesco. Ferdinando (1786-1819) morì a Port au Prince, nell'isola di Santo Domingo, di febbre tropicale il 15 gennaio 1819 insieme ad undici uomini dell'equipaggio, a bordo del brigantino *La Madonna del Rosario* di 294 tonnellate, che in quell'anno aveva attraversato l'Atlantico proveniente da Le Havre carico di merci varie e stava stivando zucchero, caffè e legname, cfr. Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN), Tribunale di Commercio, Testimoniali marittimi, 305, 20 novembre 1819. Luigi e Francesco nel 1839 li troviamo al comando rispettivamente dei brigantini *Fortunato* e *Immacolata*; cfr. *Statistica commerciale di Messina per l'anno 1839*, ristampa anastatica dell'edizione del 1840, a cura di ROSARIO BATTAGLIA e GIOVANNI MOLONIA, Messina 2005, 34 e 39.

⁸ Le navi sono i brigantini *Mariannina* di 176 tonnellate, costruito nel cantiere di Alimuri a Meta nel 1853, *Veloce*, costruito a Castellammare nel 1855 di 236 tonnellate, *Armida* di 370 tonnellate, costruito ad Alimuri nel 1867, il brigantino-polacca *Leopoldo*, varato a Castellammare nel 1858 di 263 tonnellate, i brigantini a palo *Rosalia* di 490 tonnellate, varato a Castellammare nel 1866 e *Leopoldo* costruito nella marina di Cassano nel 1878, di 708 tonnellate di stazza; cfr. gli annuari del *Registro Italiano* del 1870-71 e del 1903.

Il legame con l'ambiente familiare, l'amore delle proprie radici, l'interesse a comprendere la propria storia, l'orgoglio di testimoniarla, la curiosità per i reperti e le testimonianze di mondi diversi e lontani nello spazio o nel tempo, sono state le motivazioni che hanno stimolato il fondatore del Museo a raccogliere oggetti e documenti del periodo d'oro della navigazione a vela in penisola sorrentina⁹. Questa collezione di oggetti e documenti, spesso dimenticati in soffitte polverose, è il frutto di un'appassionata ricerca presso le famiglie di tradizione marinara o di acquisti mirati presso piccoli antiquari specializzati.

2. Il Museo

La collezione è formata da quattro sezioni principali. Nella prima vi sono modelli e disegni navali. La seconda raccoglie oggetti di "arte marinara": gli ornamenti delle navi e le loro rappresentazioni. La terza espone strumenti nautici e utensili. La quarta è costituita da un archivio di documenti e fotografie.

a) Modelli e disegni navali.

La raccolta di modelli e disegni navali documenta la storia dell'armamento navale e dei cantieri in Penisola tra gli anni Cinquanta dell'Ottocento e la prima guerra mondiale. Queste attività, già importanti e rinate nel Settecento¹⁰, raggiungono nel quarto di secolo successivo all'Unità d'Italia i vertici della loro capacità produttiva¹¹. I cantieri, che varava-

⁹ Un aspetto non secondario dell'attività di Mario Maresca, strettamente collegato alla salvaguardia della memoria della marineria sorrentina, è stato quello da lui svolto in qualità di presidente della locale sezione di "Italia Nostra", l'Associazione nazionale per la tutela del patrimonio storico, artistico e naturale. In particolare sono da ricordare qui le sue battaglie contro la speculazione edilizia e l'abusivismo che in maniera massiccia dagli anni Sessanta del secondo dopoguerra hanno aggredito, mettendone in forse l'integrità, i centri storici di Meta, Piano e Sant'Agello, abitati nei quali la struttura urbanistica e la tipologia delle abitazioni si sono evoluti e sviluppati in maniera strettamente connessa agli stili di vita ed ai successi dei casati armatoriali. Sulla tipologia della "casa palaziata" e sulla struttura dei centri storici sorrentini e sul loro legame con l'attività marittima: MARIO RUSSO, *Meta, mura e volte*, Sorrento 2005, 20; anche BERRINO, *I sorrentini*, 42; sulle trasformazioni urbanistiche in Costiera nell'età repubblicana: BIAGIO PASSARO, *La penisola sorrentina (1946-1985)*, in *Società, elezioni e governo locale in Campania*, a cura di GUIDO D'AGOSTINO, Napoli 1990, 103-151.

¹⁰ GIUSEPPE MARIA GALANTI, *Della descrizione geografica e politica delle Sicilia*, a cura di FRANCA ASSANTE e DOMENICO DEMARCO, Napoli 1969, 177-178; vedi pure GIUSEPPE DI TARANTO, *La marina mercantile del Mezzogiorno nel Mediterraneo*, in *La Penisola italiana e il mare*, a cura di TOMMASO FANFANI, Napoli 1993, 308.

¹¹ Nei cantieri di Alimuri, Cassano ed Equa nel 1863 furono varate 7 bastimenti per un tonnellaggio complessivo di 2.657 t., 7 nel 1864 per 3.565 t., 12 nel 1865 per 4.017 t., ben 22 nel 1866 per 9.792 t., cfr. UGO LEONE, *Industria metalmeccanica e cantieri navali nel periodo*

no bastimenti di legno, sorgevano sugli angusti arenili delle marine di Equa, Alimuri e Cassano, rispettivamente nelle cittadine di Vico Equense, Meta e Piano di Sorrento.

Un opuscolo stampato in occasione della Esposizione universale di Parigi del 1867, per «far risaltare in siffatta Mostra l'arte specialissima di questa popolazione nella costruzione Navale Mercantile» riporta i dati relativi alla consistenza dei cantieri¹². Alimuri, il più antico, aveva una superficie di 8928 mq, otto scali e vi lavoravano 240 operai; Cassano 3850 mq., sei scali e 120 operai; il cantiere di Equa 962 mq, due scali e 40 operai. Sono maestri d'ascia, segatori, carpentieri, calafati e la cosiddetta "maestria di mare", cioè i marinai addetti all'assemblaggio delle "manovre"¹³. Oltre alle maestranze impiegate direttamente nella costruzione navale, operavano sul territorio numerosi altri artigiani impegnati nella produzione delle vele, delle cime e delle botti.

A testimoniare questa formidabile attività produttiva sono conservati nel Museo 11 "mezzi" modelli¹⁴: di un brigantino e di quattro brigantini a palo di metà Ottocento; poi quello di una feluca sorrentina¹⁵, di un cutter e di una goletta da pesca di poco posteriori ed infine tre "mezzi" modelli di lance.

Vi sono poi undici "modelli di cantiere" di scafi di bastimenti a vela (seconda metà del XIX secolo), un modello da esposizione¹⁶ con gli elementi

post-unitario, in *La fabbrica delle navi*, a cura di ARTURO FRATTA, Napoli 1990, 170. Nel Registro Italiano del 1870-71 sono annotate 233 navi in legno costruite nei cantieri della penisola sorrentina: Marina di Cassano, Marina di Alimuri, Marina di Equa. Di queste 173 sono di armatori sorrentini, le altre sono state commissionate da armatori di altre zone d'Italia, procidani, livornesi, siciliani, o loro rivendute di seconda mano.

¹² *Atlante statistico della marina mercantile del compartimento marittimo di Castellammare di Stabia*, Castellammare 1867, 15. In aiuto degli espositori versano un contributo il deputato di Sorrento de Martino e quello di Castellammare d'Amico.

¹³ Le manovre sono l'insieme dei cavi e delle cime necessarie all'armamento ed al governo della attrezzatura velica.

¹⁴ Il mezzo modello raffigura solo una metà dello scafo. Serviva per definire le linee dello scafo che successivamente venivano rilevate con listelli flessibili per passare al disegno di costruzione. MARIO MARZARI, *Evolution of shipbuilding techniques and methodologies in Adriatic and Tyrrhenian traditional shipyards*, in "Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances", XIII, n. 1 (1998), 192-197.

¹⁵ Nelle marine della costiera, oltre alle navi per il lungo corso, si costruivano anche imbarcazioni minori destinate al cabotaggio costiero lungo le coste tirreniche e alla pesca. La feluca sorrentina, nella sua versione ottocentesca, veniva usata soprattutto per trasportare merci dalla Penisola a Napoli, in particolare gli agrumi che, destinati al mercato americano, venivano imbarcati per lo più sui piroscafi. Cfr. MASSIMO MARESCA, *La feluca sorrentina del XIX secolo*, in *Navi di legno. Evoluzione e sviluppo della cantieristica nel Mediterraneo dal XVI secolo a oggi*, a cura di MARIO MARZARI, Grado 1998, 305-308.

¹⁶ I costruttori navali sorrentini Aniello Castellano, Francesco de Rosa e Michele Paturzo parteciparono con i loro modelli alla Esposizione universale di Parigi nel 1867; cfr. *Atlante statistico*, 6.

strutturali a vista, un modello di brigantino costruito in Inghilterra acquistato da un armatore di Piano¹⁷.

I “modelli di cantiere”, composti da tavole sagomate sovrapposte, venivano utilizzati per il controllo ed il bilanciamento delle linee d’acqua tracciate nel piano di costruzione. Terminata la nave, i modelli venivano spesso rifiniti con elementi aggiuntivi, inutili alla progettazione, ma che davano la percezione più completa dello scafo, quali la chiglia, il dritto di prua e di poppa, la serpa, un segmento di bompresso, il timone, il capodibanda. Così completati, entravano a far parte del catalogo del costruttore oppure l’armatore li usava come elementi decorativi, documento e orgoglio della propria attività.

La tipologia navale più rappresentata è il brigantino a palo, nave di maggiore tonnellaggio che si afferma nel periodo postunitario, come diretta conseguenza delle esigenze scaturite dalla navigazione transoceanica intrapresa da qualche decennio. Si trattava di un veliero a tre alberi, già diffuso nei cantieri scozzesi negli anni trenta del secolo, che misurava tra i quaranta e i cinquanta metri di lunghezza in coperta e che aveva una stazza tra le 400 e le 600 tonnellate. Rappresentava un ottimo compromesso tra l’aumento delle dimensioni e le rotte; infatti le campagne di navigazione dei sorrentini ormai stabilmente collegavano l’Atlantico e il Mediterraneo, e prevedevano perciò condizioni di vento assai diverse: dagli alisei costanti in oceano alle brezze variabili del *Mare nostrum*. Il “palo”, l’albero di mezzana in più rispetto al brigantino, non portava vele quadre come nelle navi inglesi e statunitensi, ma una grande randa aurica con controranda, a cui si aggiungevano rilevanti vele di strallo e fiocchi. Questa attrezzatura nello stesso tempo consentiva un aumento della superficie velica, un equipaggio quanto più possibile ridotto e una grande adattabilità alle condizioni di vento. Nei decenni successivi si diffusero anche altri due tipi di bastimenti simili fra loro: la nave goletta e la goletta a palo. La prima aveva vele quadre al trinchetto e auriche all’albero maestro e alla mezzana, la seconda vele auriche a tutti e tre gli alberi e alcune quadre al trinchetto.

Le navi sorrentine avevano un equipaggio composto mediamente di due ufficiali, un nostromo, sei o sette marinai, due o tre mozzi, solitamente provenienti dalla Penisola¹⁸. L’Atlante Statistico già citato riporta la presenza di 6691 tra marinai e mozzi nei paesi di Meta, Piano di Sorrento e Vico Equense.

Oltre agli originali d’epoca, il museo espone un gruppo di modelli navali, commissionati da Mario Maresca negli anni Sessanta del Novecento ad

¹⁷ La nave è la *Rebecca* di Gaspare Califano.

¹⁸ Sull’omogeneità degli equipaggi e sui sistemi di arruolamento: PAOLO FRASCANI, *Una comunità in viaggio: dal racconto dei giornali di bordo delle navi napoletane (1861-1900)*, in *A vela e a vapore*, a cura di PAOLO FRASCANI, 109-137.

un maestro d'ascia di Meta, Giovanni Esposito (1888-1971), che era stato carpentiere a bordo degli ultimi velieri oceanici. Furono realizzati utilizzando piani di costruzione originali del secolo precedente, conservati nel museo. I modelli, completamente attrezzati ed involati, di grande qualità e suggestione, rappresentano il brigantino a palo *Carmela C.* varato dal cantiere di Alimuri a Meta nel 1879, la goletta a palo *Emilial*, costruita ad Alimuri nel 1899, ambedue in scala 1:40; un cutter; una feluca sorrentina ed una tartana. In scala minore, 1:100, il modello del *Cavaliere Ciampa*, veliero in acciaio costruito nel cantiere Ansaldo di Sestri Ponente per l'armatore Francesco Saverio Ciampa¹⁹.

Il fondo di disegni navali è composto per la maggior parte da opere del costruttore di prima classe Giuseppe Starita (Meta, 1851-1944). Egli progettò e realizzò numerosi brigantini a palo oceanici nei cantieri di Alimuri e Cassano²⁰; fu professore di disegno al tracciato all'Istituto Nautico Nino Bixio di Piano di Sorrento, perito del Registro Navale presso l'agenzia di Meta, nonché a più riprese sindaco della cittadina natale. Si tratta di ottanta progetti, dell'ultimo quarto del XIX secolo e dell'inizio del XX, che comprendono piani di costruzione²¹ di brigantini a palo, navi goletta, golette a palo con motore ausiliario; il fondo comprende, inoltre, piani velici, piani di lance, di motobarche e rappresentazioni di alcuni particolari delle attrezzature. Molto interessante è la documentazione relativa al piroscampo *Sorrento* costruito in legno ad Alimuri nel 1879; essa comprende anche i disegni per la disposizione della caldaia e della macchina, costruita quest'ultima nelle officine Pattison di Napoli. Vi sono ancora disegni degli alunni dell'Istituto Nautico "Nino Bixio", tra cui il piano di velatura di nave a quattro alberi, frutto delle esercitazioni del corso di costruzioni navali²².

¹⁹ Francesco Saverio Ciampa fu il maggiore armatore della Penisola dell'Ottocento; vedi BERRINO *I sorrentini*, 45. Dalla fine degli anni ottanta l'attività dei cantieri navali diminuì progressivamente in quanto gli armatori sorrentini preferirono comprare navi di ferro e d'acciaio, usate sul mercato nordeuropeo sia per la maggiore capacità di carico, sia per i contenuti costi di gestione. Alcuni come Francesco Saverio Ciampa e Salvatore Maresca commissionarono navi d'acciaio nuove ai cantieri Ansaldo di Sestri o a cantieri inglesi; sull'argomento cfr. PASSARO, *Tommaso Astarita*, 26. Il periodo dell'"ultima vela", in concorrenza con i vapori, ormai sempre più competitivi, anche sulle rotte secondarie, durò fino all'inizio della prima guerra mondiale; TOMMASO GROPALLO, *L'ultima vela*, Bogliasco 1969.

²⁰ Il primo fu il brigantino a palo *Roma* varato ad Alimuri nel 1878, di 516 tonnellate di stazza, metri 42,2 di lunghezza in coperta, m. 9,32 di larghezza fuori ossatura, m. 6,04 di puntale.

²¹ Il piano di costruzione è il tracciato dello scafo, rappresentato da linee che ne determinano geometricamente la forma esterna. È composto dal piano longitudinale, che contiene il profilo della nave, il piano trasversale, che attraversa lo scafo nell'ordinata maestra, ed il piano orizzontale, ossia la vista in pianta con disegnate le linee d'acqua.

²² La Scuola Nautica di Piano di Sorrento viene dichiarata Istituto Reale di Marina

Completa il materiale sulle costruzioni navali un manoscritto del costruttore Aniello Castellano²³. Attivo nel cantiere della marina di Cassano a Piano, fu il più importante tra i sorrentini per numero di navi e per esperienza. In questo brogliaccio egli registrava i rilevati delle cinquantatre navi da lui costruite tra il 1851 ed il 1877, con l'indicazione degli armatori committenti. Castellano costruì otto navi per l'armatore Arcangelo Cacace, cinque per i Paturzo di Sant' Agnello, dodici per i Ciampa. Una tabella del manoscritto, in cui sono registrati i materiali ed i costi per la costruzione quasi in contemporanea di tre navi, tutte varate nel 1871, può dare un'idea del fervore che animava il cantiere di Aniello Castellano²⁴.

b) *Arte marinara.*

Il fondo di arte marinara mostra gli ornamenti delle navi e le loro rappresentazioni colte (*ship-portraits*) e popolari (*ex-voto*). Comprende sei polene di varie dimensioni, fra cui una "Anima del Purgatorio", fregi di prua di una tartana, due specchi di poppa di feluche. Questi ultimi elementi di forma trapezoidale sono un esempio di scultura navale caratteristico della penisola sorrentina. Chiamati "schiocche" servivano a chiudere a prua ed a poppa l'alta frisata delle imbarcazioni. Gli specchi poppi erano finemente scolpiti in bassorilievo e accuratamente dipinti da ambedue i lati da abili artigiani locali. In genere il lato esterno raffigurava una scena che rievocava il nome della feluca, mentre la parte interna era dedicata alla rappresentazione del Santo protettore.

Vi è poi una piccola collezione di *ship portraits* di velieri ed *ex-voto* mari-

Mercantile nel 1866, insieme alla Scuola Nautica di Savona e agli Istituti Superiori di Marina Mercantile di Genova, Livorno e Palermo. Per la storia dell'istruzione nautica in Penisola cfr. MARIA SIRAGO, *La tradizione marinara e la scuola nautica di Piano di Sorrento*, Sorrento 1989.

²³ MASSIMO MARESCA, *Cantieri navali in Penisola sorrentina nell'Ottocento. Il costruttore Aniello Castellano*, in "Navis. Rassegna di studi di archeologia, etnologia e storia navale", n. 3, 2006. I rilevati sono la descrizione di una nave per mezzo delle misure delle semilarghezze delle parti strutturali rispetto al piano intersecante l'asse longitudinale dello scafo. Nel manoscritto sono registrate le dimensioni di tutte le componenti dell'alberatura e delle strutture della coperta, nonché i nomi delle navi e degli armatori committenti.

²⁴ I velieri erano il brigantino a palo *Ercole* di Arcangelo Cacace, varato a marzo del 1871 e costruito in 9 mesi e 18 giorni, di 634,33 tonnellate di stazza, 42,70 metri di lunghezza, 9,30 di larghezza, 6,07 di altezza di costruzione, per il quale occorsero 41 operai per 1808 giornate di lavoro, con una spesa complessiva per le paghe di 32.000 lire; il valore complessivo del bastimento, scafo e attrezzatura, è stimato in 153.000 lire; il brigantino *San Prisco* di Arcangelo Paturzo, varato il 3 settembre 1872 e costruito in 6 mesi e 15 giorni, di 448, 88 tonnellate, lungo 34,84 metri, largo 8,50, alto 5,76, per 6900 giornate di lavoro di 40 operai costate 20.000 lire, valore complessivo 110.000 lire; il brigantino *Candidizza Lauro* dell'armatore Felice Lauro, varato il 7 settembre 1872 e costruito in 6 mesi e 24 giorni, di 450,83 tonnellate, lungo 34,95 metri, largo 8,51, alto 5,76, per 7000 giornate di lavoro di 40 operai costate 20.500 lire, valore complessivo 110.500 lire.

nari²⁵. Negli ex-voto due elementi si intrecciano tra loro: la religiosità, soprattutto come devozione al Santo Patrono del proprio paese, e la nave, luogo di vita e di lavoro. I patroni in penisola sorrentina sono S. Antonino a Sorrento, S. Prisco e S. Agnello nell'omonimo paese, San Michele Arcangelo a Piano di Sorrento, la Madonna del Lauro a Meta, S. Maria delle Grazie a Seiano (Equa). Nelle chiese di Meta, Sorrento, Sant'Agnesello e Seiano dedicate ai rispettivi patroni sono conservati alcune centinaia di ex voto marinari, un grande patrimonio di cultura ed arte. Gli ex voto sono una delle poche testimonianze iconografiche rilevanti della vita di mare sui velieri nell'800, infatti sono molto rare le documentazioni fotografiche. In alcuni di essi, a seconda della qualità del pittore e delle richieste del committente, sono descritte minuziosamente le condizioni avverse della navigazione, e si mettono in risalto le capacità nautiche del capitano e dell'equipaggio nel condurre la nave ed affrontare l'evento straordinario. In altri, di fattura più semplice, è messa al centro la furia degli elementi naturali e l'intervento soprannaturale.

Tra gli autori di ex voto sorrentini ci sono anche pittori marinisti affermati, quali Domenico Gavarrone, Luigi Roberto, che provengono dal mondo degli *ship portraits*. Questa rappresentazione della nave ha uno scopo diverso: una descrizione pittorica accurata della nave per il suo armatore, sia per soddisfare l'orgoglio di proprietario, sia per mostrare, nell'ufficio o nella casa, la propria capacità imprenditoriale. I dipinti hanno una impostazione convenzionale, piuttosto statica, per permettere la visione completa della velatura, tutta a riva, dell'attrezzatura e dei particolari dello scafo. I pittori di *ship portraits* dell'area napoletana, tipici per lo sfondo in cui molto spesso si staglia il Vesuvio, furono i De Simone, Luigi Roberto, Luca Papaluca, con una produzione vasta, spesso di *gouaches*, che hanno caratterizzato una vera e propria scuola.

Tra i quadri del museo sono presenti alcuni acquerelli di Eduardo de Martino²⁶. Questi fu significativo pittore marinista a cavallo tra 800 e 900,

²⁵ Su questi ultimi manca una ricognizione esauriente; per un esame parziale si possono consultare: CALOGERO TAGLIARENI, *Ex voto religiosi marinari della penisola sorrentina*, Napoli 1956; *Storie di tempeste e di fede. Gli ex voto nel Santuario di S. Maria del Lauro*, a cura di GIOSUÈ FUCITO e ANIELLO RUSSO, Castellammare di Stabia 1998; GIOVANNI GUGG e ANIELLO PANE, *Gli ex voto marinari dedicati a S. Antonino Abate Patrono di Sorrento*, tesina in Storia delle Tradizioni popolari, Università di Napoli "Federico II", Facoltà di Sociologia, 1998-99.

²⁶ ROBERTO VITTORIO ROMANO, *Eduardo de Martino*, Roma 1994. Nacque a Meta nel 1838, fu iscritto a Napoli all'Accademia Navale. Durante gli studi frequentò corsi liberi all'Istituto di Belle Arti e gli studi di Giacinto Gigante e Domenico Morelli, dedicandosi anche all'approfondimento dell'architettura navale ed alla costruzione di modelli. Nel 1868, lasciata la Marina, si stabilì in Sudamerica, prima a Montevideo, poi in Brasile, presso l'Imperatore Dom Pedro II, dove esercitò la sua attività artistica con una grande

divenendo “Marine Painter in Ordinary to the Queen” alla corte della regina Vittoria d’Inghilterra.

Di questa sezione fanno parte anche oggetti di artigianato che i marinai realizzavano nel tempo libero a bordo o durante i periodi a terra: diorami che riproducono le navi su cui erano imbarcati, navi in bottiglia, raffigurazioni della crocifissione di Cristo con gli strumenti della Passione, anche queste in bottiglia.

c) Strumenti nautici e attrezzi.

Del fondo di strumenti nautici ottocenteschi, databili tra la fine del XVII secolo e l’inizio del XX, fanno parte ottanti, sestanti, bussole a secco, cannocchiali e binocoli, barometri, un cronometro di marina. Dei 12 ottanti e sestanti raccolti, in dotazione ai capitani sorrentini, solo uno è di produzione italiana, della Ditta Moltedo di Genova. Gli altri sono inglesi, come anche la maggior parte dei 14 tra cannocchiali e binocoli²⁷. Due delle bussole a secco esposte sono fabbricate a Castellammare di Stabia.

Vi è anche conservata una piccola biblioteca di libri nautici per il calcolo della posizione, manuali di navigazione con carte dei venti, delle correnti e delle tempeste, tavole logaritmiche, manuali di attrezzatura navale, portolani, carte nautiche.

Vi sono gli attrezzi tipici del lavoro dei marinai e degli operai a terra: gli strumenti dei calafati, quelli dei velai, un calibro per misurare lo spessore delle cime. Inoltre sono esposti nel museo parti dell’equipaggiamento delle navi, come fanali, bozzelli, bigotte, chiodi, caviglie, chiodi, perni, filtri a carbone per l’acqua. Finemente scolpita, vi è poi la barra del timone di un *brick schooner*. Infine una cassa in legno da marinaio, intera, ed il coperchio di un’altra, che ricordano la dura vita di bordo: nella cassa si riponeva il modesto corredo necessario per le lunghe navigazioni; sui due coperchi sono dipinte le immagine delle navi sulle quali i proprietari avevano navigato.

d) L’archivio.

L’archivio è costituito da documenti a stampa e manoscritti relative all’organizzazione economica e alla navigazione della marineria sorrentina

produzione di quadri di soggetto marinaro, tra cui molti di genere commemorativo. Trasferitosi a Londra nel 1876, divenne famoso, amico di Giorgio V e dell’imperatore tedesco Guglielmo II, ed i suoi quadri navali furono esposti nei palazzi più prestigiosi, quali Buckingham Palace (le sette tele che ritraggono la battaglia di Trafalgar), nel palazzo imperiale di Tokio, nelle sedi dell’Ammiraglio inglese. Tra la sua vasta produzione, un posto rilevante hanno gli acquerelli, in cui con pochi tratti fluidi inconfondibili si descrivono scene di mare. Morì a Londra nel 1912, ma era sempre rimasto legatissimo alla terra natale: al Comune di Meta regalò alcune sue opere, tra cui il bel *Notturmo con goletta*, oggi nella sala del Consiglio comunale.

²⁷ Il costo degli strumenti nautici nell’armamento di una nave era infatti una voce rilevante.

nell'Ottocento. Tra le testimonianze più antiche una polizza di carico del 1755 della tartana "Immacolata Concezione e S. Giuseppe" del Padrone Pietro Maresca che carica sale a Trapani per Venezia, ed un Albarano del 1798 del "Monte per la redenzione dei cattivi" di Meta per il riscatto del capitano Catello Cacace²⁸.

Uno spaccato delle attività finanziarie ed assicurative è delineato dai contratti di società delle tre Compagnie di Assicurazioni e Cambi Marittimi²⁹ preunitarie; i contratti contengono gli statuti e l'elenco dei soci con il numero delle azioni detenute da ciascuno; completano la documentazione polizze assicurative e cedole di azioni. Le Compagnie sono il primo tentativo di organizzare su base locale una protezione dai rischi rilevanti della navigazione, nonché di finanziare l'attività marittima. Il prestito a cambio marittimo veniva utilizzato prevalentemente per affrontare le spese delle campagne commerciali³⁰. Tra i 246 soci compaiono tutti i casati amatoriali della Penisola: i Cacace, i Cafiero, i Lauro e i Castellano, i Ciampa, i Maresca, i Paturzo e gli Iaccarino, gli Astarita, i de Martino e i Longobardo, gli Scarpati, i Petrelluzzi, e i Savarese, ma tra gli azionisti figurano anche farmacisti, sacerdoti, medici, impiegati, ufficiali della marina militare, possidenti tra cui due donne, a riprova del profondo coinvolgimento della società locale nell'impresa marittima.

Dell'Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione della Marina Mercantile Sorrentina, fondata nel 1862, sono conservati lo Statuto approvato nel 1879, documenti e lettere riguardanti le ispezioni dei periti alle navi che dichiaravano un'avarìa o un incidente e la lista dei bastimenti iscritti fino al 1877, in cui sono annotate 435 navi di armatori sorrentini, siciliani, livornesi, gaetani, procidani³¹. La Mutua, riservata ai soli armatori e basata sulla ripartizione dei rischi, fu la più grande istituzione di questo tipo del Mezzogiorno³².

Numerosi telegrammi e bollettini a stampa (*freight report*), inviati ai capitani e agli armatori dagli agenti marittimi, soprattutto statunitensi, for-

²⁸ Per le numerose istituzioni nate a Meta per il riscatto dei prigionieri dei pirati nel XVIII secolo vedi LAURO GARGIULO, *I Monti di maritaggio e di riscatto dalla schiavitù turca*, Meta 1997.

²⁹ Museo Maresca, *Contratto di Società della Compagnia di Assicurazioni e cambi marittimi del Piano di Sorrento*, 1826; *Contratti di Società per la Compagnia Metese di Assicurazioni e Cambi marittimi*, 1827; *Contratto di Società per la seconda Compagnia Metese di Assicurazioni e Cambi marittimi*, 1831. Erano dotate di un capitale rispettivamente di 30.600 ducati diviso in 153 azioni di 200 ducati ciascuna, 29.100 ducati con 97 azioni da 300, 47.100 ducati diviso in 157 azioni da 300.

³⁰ LUCIANA GATTI, *Navi e cantieri della Repubblica di Genova*, Genova 1999, 107-112.

³¹ Museo Maresca, *Lista dei bastimenti portanti bandiera di segnale col numero d'ordine iscritti all'Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione della marina mercantile residente in Meta*, Napoli 1877.

³² BERRINO, *I sorrentini*, 46.

niscono un'idea della complessa rete delle relazioni commerciali e del traffico marittimo di questi operatori; essi segnalano i carichi e relativi noli possibili nei vari porti ed il movimento delle navi e delle merci.

Di grande interesse è la collezione di libri di contabilità delle spese di navigazione di diciannove navi. Questi registri permettono di ricostruire accuratamente i viaggi delle navi, i porti toccati, le spese per il vettovagliamento, le paghe dell'equipaggio, i compensi degli spedizionieri e dei sensali marittimi, i costi di dogana, le spese di manutenzione della nave. In quasi tutti sono annotati anche i rendiconti dei noli per ogni carico e viaggio e la divisione degli utili tra i caratisti. Di alcune navi sono conservate le ricevute delle spese sostenute, le polizze di carico, le lettere dei noleggiatori. Appare un quadro significativo, anche se parziale, del commercio marittimo dell'epoca: i velieri sorrentini dopo il varo partivano alla ricerca dei noli sulle rotte atlantiche compiendo campagne che duravano mediamente due anni, prima di tornare in un porto vicino, Castellammare o Napoli, talvolta Marsiglia, per effettuare i lavori di manutenzione e sostituire eventualmente l'equipaggio. Il primo carico, per avvicinarsi alle rotte oceaniche su cui poi operavano, era spesso stivato in Sicilia, zolfo o sale, per il mercato americano o nord-europeo. Poi le navi si inserivano in rotte di traffico abbastanza costanti. I carichi trasportati più frequentemente erano di grano e di petrolio, in cassette o barili, dal Nord America per l'Europa. Nei viaggi di ritorno verso gli Stati Uniti i bastimenti stivavano carbone in Inghilterra o merci varie in Mediterraneo. Tra molti altri documenti sparsi vanno segnalati tre incartamenti riguardanti altrettante famiglie di armatori di velieri: i Cafiero di Piano di Sorrento, i Cacace di Meta e i Coppola di Castellammare di Stabia.

Infine c'è la documentazione fotografica, molto rara e comunque relativa solo agli ultimi decenni dell'Ottocento. Per lo più raccoglie immagini di navi, ma anche quelle dei cantieri navali della Costiera, almeno le poche esistenti, e degli uomini protagonisti di quella stagione.

Queste foto degli armatori, dei capitani e dei loro equipaggi hanno la capacità di rendere l'atmosfera di un'epoca particolarmente intensa per le attività marittime nella Penisola sorrentina, le cui caratteristiche, come le capacità imprenditoriali, la specializzazione di competenze, l'occupazione diffusa, sono state sinora poco studiate. La sua memoria è ancora affidata ai cimeli che le famiglie conservano ed ai ricordi tramandati di generazione in generazione. In questo senso il museo "Mario Maresca" costituisce una testimonianza forte ed un riferimento per la ricostruzione di un periodo storico in cui il mare è stata una risorsa fondamentale.



Museo "Mario Maresca", Meta


Museo Maresca: polena raffigurante
un'anima del Purgatorio, fine XVIII secolo



Museo Maresca: mezzo modello di feluca sorrentina, fine XIX secolo



Museo Maresca: modello in scala 1/40 del brigantino a palo *Carmela C.*, armatore Francesco Saverio Cacace, Meta; anni Sessanta del XX secolo



Museo Maresca: De Simone, dipinto del brigantino a palo *Il Vero*, armatore Giuseppe de Martino, Meta 1882

Mario Ellul

'Seek Perfection'. A Future with the Admiralty H.M. Dockyard School, Malta, 1900-1939

'Seek Perfection'

The Dockyard School was set up in Malta in 1858, and throughout its existence it primarily catered for the training of dockyard apprentices once they had signed their indentures with the Admiralty. The school instructed apprentices for a maximum of six years in the fundamental skills required by the navy. In the collective memory of many ex-dockyard hands and people who have come in contact with it, the Dockyard School, throughout its existence, was considered as the best educational institution of its kind on the island and as the best guarantor of a secure future in the employ of the Admiralty. This paper will portray the impact which this institution had on its students and the working class community in the Grand Harbour area, especially in the Three Cities of the Cottonera. In addition, it will seek to establish a profile of the Dockyard apprentice. The paper also raises a number of questions which, hopefully, can serve as a starting point for further discussion and research that will enable us to put this important aspect of the history of the naval dockyard and the general history of education in Malta in its proper perspective¹.

Background

The British Admiralty had been under pressure to improve the education of dockyard apprentices since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Repeated efforts were made at the major Home Yards² to institute for-

¹ 'Seek Perfection', from the motto of H.M. Dockyard School, Malta. The interviews referred to in this paper were carried out during the course of the author's research for a thesis submitted to the University of Malta as a requirement for the award of a Master's Degree in History. The original transcripts are held by the author and may be viewed on request.

² The Admiralty distinguished between the Royal Dockyards on mainland Britain

mal schooling for prospective dockyard employees. However, a parsimonious Board of the Admiralty frequently poured cold water over these attempts to set dockyard schools on a sound footing. It was only in the 1840s that these efforts finally bore fruit with the establishment of various schools throughout the network of dockyards, both at the Home Yards and at the dockyards in the colonies.

The Dockyard School was set up in Malta in 1858, a mere decade after the establishment of similar institutions at the major Home Yards at Chatham, Sheerness, Portsmouth, Devonport and Pembroke³. In time, this institution developed into a highly specialised technical college and right up to the privatisation of the dockyard, it turned out highly competent craftsmen and technicians who were engaged on servicing the naval units which made up the Mediterranean Fleet of the Royal Navy. In direct contrast, the civil government lagged far behind in the provision of a formal educational system and the evidence from the greater part of the nineteenth century paints a picture of general neglect in the field of education⁴. A modicum of progress was achieved during the early decades of the twentieth century.

However, on the eve of the granting of the first self-government constitution to Malta in 1921, commentators were still expressing their alarm at the general lack of interest in education and condemning as inadequate the existing provisions for technical and general vocational education⁵.

and Ireland (the Home Yards) and the Naval Dockyards in the colonies (known up to 1935 as Foreign Yards).

³ For a history of the dockyard schools in Britain, N. CASEY, 'Class Rule: The Hegemonic Role of the Royal Dockyard Schools, 1840-1914', in K. LUNN and A. DAY (eds.), *History of Work and Labour Relations in the Royal Dockyards* (London, 1999), 66-86; and J.M. HAAS, 'The Best Investment Ever Made: The Royal Dockyard Schools, Technical Education, and the British Shipbuilding Industry, 1800-1914', *The Mariner's Mirror*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (The International Journal of the Society of Nautical Research, November 1990), 325-335. Though it goes beyond the scope of this short contribution, the ideas proposed in both papers, especially the salient issues regarding hegemony discussed by Casey in relation to the dockyard schools at the home yards, ought to provide an interesting contrast with the dockyard school in Malta. Dockyard education in Malta had many peculiar characteristics which distinguish it from its counterparts in mainland Britain. Some of these issues were raised by the author in one of the chapters in a thesis for the award of a Master's degree in history which was submitted to the University of Malta in 2004. These issues are being further investigated by the author and will feature in a forthcoming study.

⁴ See for example Mrs Sarah Austin's unofficial contribution to the report of the Royal Commission which was sent to investigate the affairs of the colony in 1836. Mrs Austin, who was accompanying her husband – an official member of the commission – remarked that there were no schools in the villages and 'no tolerable education for the middle class.' See also B. BLOUET, *The Story of Malta* (Malta, 1997), 175; and P. BIANCHI, P. SERRACINO INGLOTT (eds.), 'Sarah Austin', in *Encounters with Malta* (Malta, 2000), 254.

⁵ W.N. BRUCE, *Report on the Organization of Education in Malta* (Malta, 1921), 4.

In the early years of the twentieth century, state-directed technical education was mainly confined to the workshops of the Malta Railway which had been taken over by the imperial government in 1890. Various employers provided training at their workshops, where the level of instruction left much to be desired⁶. This state of affairs caused well-informed commentators to view the Maltese craftsman as:

A jack of all trades and master of none... so impracticable are the methods of teaching adopted that responsible officials have reached a stage of complacency in face of ever present evidence that the machinery of education is too complicated and unwieldy ... and with no relation to the objective or the quality of the output⁷.

Evidence suggests that this state of affairs survived well into the twentieth century and the Waterfield Commission, set up in 1958 to investigate the 'Immediate and Future Prospects for the Maltese Economy', reported that the technical education offered by the state could not compete with the training of students at the dockyard and that Maltese industry was on too small a scale to offer a system of apprenticeship⁸.

Mainstream primary education, which in a context that lacked an obligatory secondary education was providing most of the personnel for Maltese industry, trailed even further behind. Commissions of enquiry painted a bleak picture of the state primary school network. The majority of parents took 'scarce interest in the school and its doings' and most of the children were removed from school at the age of ten. One confidential report, which was never published by what one presumes to have been a very much embarrassed succession of Ministers for Public Instruction, painted a quasi-Dickensian scenario, in which only the most meagre of resources were allocated to schools. Equipment and accommodation were of a sub-standard quality and the teaching staff was very poorly trained⁹.

In the period under review, the Dockyard School features as an important exception to this pattern and is acknowledged by many sources to have been at the forefront of vocational education in the island for many years¹⁰.

⁶ For a more detailed overview of the development of vocational education in Malta, R.G. SULTANA, *Education and National Development. Historical and Critical Perspectives on Vocational Schooling in Malta* (Malta, 1992).

⁷ *The Times of Malta*, 10 October 1939, 5.

⁸ National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (NAUK), Admiralty Files (ADM) 1/26988, Report on the Immediate and Future Prospects for the Maltese Economy, 25 September 1958. Comment by Mr. O. Paris, the Economic Secretary to the Commission.

⁹ National Archives of Malta (NAM), Lieutenant Governor's Office files (LGO), 1376/1936, F. Melton, Unpublished Confidential Report about Elementary Education in Malta, 1928.

¹⁰ K. ELLUL GALEA, *L-Istorja tat-Tarzna* (Malta, 1973); SULTANA, *Education and National De-*

The school catered for dockyard apprentices on their entry into the yard and supplied them with skills which were to be important in their careers as skilled technicians at H.M. Dockyard.

In the Beginning

The birth of a system of apprenticeship at the dockyard in Malta predates the formal establishment of the Dockyard School itself. In fact, a scheme for the training of youths on the job can be traced back to 1804 when the dockyard estimates made provision for an allowance for a number of young men who featured on the yard's muster rolls as apprentice shipwrights, careeners, carpenters, sail-makers and rope-makers¹¹. Admiralty funds also supported a school for the general academic education of children in the pre-apprenticeship stage¹². Though the impact of British institutions on Maltese society in the first years of British rule was relatively scant (mainly owing to the fear of Protestantism in an island heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic clergy), correspondence from the period suggests that this school was steadily gaining in popularity. The pressure exerted on the resources of this school increased to such an extent that by the mid-1840s, the naval authorities at the dockyard were lobbying the Admiralty for the establishment of a more formal institution on a sounder basis¹³. These efforts bore fruit in 1858, when Mr. Sullivan, a naval schoolmaster newly arrived from England, was appointed to set up a school 'for the use of children of all persons employed in Her Majesty's Dockyard ... and an afternoon school for apprentices'¹⁴.

The school opened its doors for the intake of students on 1 November 1858. The Admiral Superintendent¹⁵ was appointed 'visitor' at the head of a managing committee which consisted of the Master Shipwright, the Superintending Engineer and the Chaplain. The latter was entrusted with the immediate superintendence of the school and the appointment of

velopment; P. CAMENZULI, *Reforms in Local Education. With Special Reference to Maltese, Malta 1900-1940* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Malta, 1971); R. MIFSUD, *The Malta Drydocks and Education* (B.Ed Hons Dissertation, University of Malta, 1997).

¹¹ D. DEGIORGIO, 'L-Apprendisti tat-Tarzna', in *L-Ideal* (Malta), October 1970, 15.

¹² *Ibidem*, 20.

¹³ Correspondence featuring in W.A. GRIFFITHS, *A Brief Outline of the Foundation and Development of HM Naval Establishments at Malta* (Typewritten manuscript held at the National Library, Malta [BO-4-45], 1917), Appendix X.

¹⁴ *The Malta Times and United Services Gazette*, 19 October 1858.

¹⁵ The Admiral Superintendent was the executive head of the Dockyard. In the early years of British rule in Malta, the officer was designated as the Naval Commissioner. The nomenclature was changed to Admiral Superintendent in 1832 and remained thus until the appointment of the last officer to hold the title in 1957.

masters and instructors. The method of education was that adopted by the National Society in Britain and it was modelled on the schools which had just been recently established at Her Majesty's Dockyards at home.

The school acquired a sound reputation, especially when set against the limited educational facilities which were available to the majority of working class children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The methods of the local village schools, where they existed, appeared quite primitive when compared with those in operation at H.M. Dockyard School.

The staff at the latter was fully accountable to the naval authorities both at the local level and at Whitehall. Academic progress was strictly monitored by the visitor committee and the Naval Instructor from the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet who had to draw up an annual report about the school and its activities for transmission to the Admiralty Inspector of Schools in England¹⁶.

In time, the dockyard educational system developed into an ideal vehicle for the dissemination and consolidation of British education and popular culture on the island¹⁷. In a context where social and racial barriers between the colonizer and the colonized abounded, it was the only institution where Maltese children sat side by side with British pupils, acquiring not only a more proficient level in the English language but also a 'distinct taste and attraction for all that is English'¹⁸. Sporting events were encouraged as a regular part of the school's curriculum and the dockyard school masters were instrumental in the introduction and dissemination of cricket and scouting¹⁹. Dockyard school children were very prominent in the welcome accorded to visiting royalty and to this end, the children were treated to regular music lessons, during which they were drilled in the performance of traditional British patriotic airs²⁰.

¹⁶ From the 'Regulations for the Running of H.M Dockyard School', Malta. Featuring in *The Malta Times and United Services Gazette*, 19 October 1858.

¹⁷ ELLUL GALEA, *L-iStorja tat-Tarzna*, 165, 167.

¹⁸ NAM, LGO 1119/ 1936, Letter from the President of the Dockyard and Imperial Workers' Union to the Admiralty, 23 August 1938, 2.

¹⁹ J.A. MIZZI, *Scouting in Malta* (Malta, 1989). Cf. M. ELLUL, *The Making of an Imperialist. The Process of Imperial Assimilation in the Cottonera 1920-1939* (Unpublished B.A (Hons) History Dissertation, University of Malta, 1996). The importance of the informal curriculum and 'popular imperialism' in the dissemination of imperial propaganda, as demonstrated in J.A. MANGAN, *Making Imperial Mentalities. Socialisation and British Imperialism* (Manchester, 1990); JOHN M. MACKENZIE, *Propaganda and Empire. The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1860* (Manchester, 1986); J.A. MANGAN (ed.), *The Cultural Bond: Sport, Empire and Society* (London, 1992); M. ROSENTHAL, *The Character Factory. Baden Powell's Boy Scouts and the Imperatives of Empire* (New York, 1986); J. WILLINSKY, *Learning to Divide the World. Education at Empire's End* (Minnapolis, 1998). In Malta is still awaiting an academic multi-disciplinary, cross-cultural study.

²⁰ L. HARRIS-CANDEY, 'Memories of Malta,' in http://www.verdala.com/harris_candy.html. 'We were present at the laying of the foundation stone of the breakwater by

The Infant School (catering for children in the pre- apprenticeship stage) closed its doors to Maltese children in 1917 for 'reasons of accommodation' and its facilities became restricted exclusively to the children of Royal Navy personnel and British contract workers engaged by the dockyard²¹. Various requests were made in the local press and in official correspondence soliciting Whitehall to reconsider the decision to bar Maltese pupils from the infant school. However, the Admiralty pronounced that it 'could hardly be expected to substitute the Maltese Government in the provision of general educational facilities'²². The newly styled Royal Navy Children School was moved to newer and larger premises in the early years following the end of the First World War and the Dockyard School came to be linked exclusively with the preparation of skilled artisans for employment in H.M. Dockyard.

Throughout the period in which it was under naval administration, the Dockyard required a constant supply of unskilled labour. However, the workman who entered the yard as a semi-skilled, unskilled or casual labourer, lived under the shadow of recurring lay offs, shoaling and other processes which frequently weeded out surplus manpower²³. The posts which carried the guarantee of steady employment were the ones which were deemed as essential for the smooth running of the naval base and the servicing of the units of the Royal Navy. Progress in shipping, especially in the new technology of electrical engineering, had led to a corresponding need for highly trained and specialised workers and the Dockyard School was the only institution in the island which could provide the latest in the field of technical instruction.

'In fact, even in the context of the massive dismissal of workmen which came in the wake of the economic slump that followed the First World War and the periodic pruning which took place in subsequent years, the intake of apprentices did not diminish to any extent'²⁴.

King Edward, where the school children went over to sing under my father's baton (he was also the music master). Once the dear old Duke of Connaught had his birthday here. The dockyard school children were all invited to the palace for tea. On leaving, we had to pass along in front of the Duke and Princess Pat, who gave the girls each a doll and the boys a sailing boat.' [Ms Harris-Candey arrived in Malta in 1902. Her father served as Headmaster of H.M. Dockyard School Malta until 1918].

²¹ *The Dockyard Worker*, April 1937. This monthly paper was the official organ of the Union of Dockyard Employees. It was edited by Karmenu Zammit, a Dockyard hand and trade union activist.

²² NAM, LGO 1119/1936, Letter from the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary at the Admiralty to the Dockyard and Imperial Workers' Union, 20 July 1938, 5.

²³ *The Dockyard Worker*, May 1937, 4.

²⁴ NAUK, ADM 116/3660. Malta. Pay of Locally Entered Dockyard and Industrial Workpeople, see also figure in Appendix I.

The prestige of belonging to the select core of 'ex-apprentices' was an asset which gave a distinct head start to a career in the naval dockyard. In the memories of the ex-apprentices who have been interviewed for the purpose of this research, gaining admission as an apprentice in the dockyard marked a significant landmark in one's life and assumed all the significance of a rite of passage, with some interviewees claiming that a pass in the Dockyard Entrance Examination was marked by general jubilation²⁵. This event marked the life of the young man and its impact must have generated a wealth of emotions. In one striking case which has come to the attention of the author, a young man who had just entered his teens jotted down 'Lest I forget! You were born to work, so you'd better be patient!!!' on the first page of his first notebook of his engineering class at the Dockyard School²⁶. These young men were all too conscious of the fact that upon finishing their course of instruction, they would be taken into the dockyard or one of its ancillary establishments and in practical terms be guaranteed a job for life – for the first time in the history of general education for the masses in Malta, a direct structural link was being forged between school and financial security.

This link would have been long in the making in the mind of many a young man, not just in the harbour towns, but also in various other communities across the length and breadth of the island. The dockyard – by virtue of its status as the mainstay of the Maltese economy, would have worked its way into a young man's psyche long before his apprenticeship.

For the largest concentration of apprentices who lived in the harbour towns of Senglea, Cospicua and Vittoriosa, the dockyard could not possibly be closer and all their senses were under constant attack by the yard. The windows in their houses overlooked the docks themselves and their day was punctuated by the everyday noises prevalent in the yard – the chorus of sledgehammers beating on the riveted hulls, the hissing of the heavy steam machinery and the countless blasts on the ships' horns²⁷.

²⁵ Interview with Dr. J. Saliba, M'Scala, 24 October 1995, quoted in ELLUL, *The Making of an Imperialist*. Jekk xi Hadd kien ikun daħal apprendist id-dockyard kulhadd kien imur jifraħ lil ommu. Qisu sar xi professur. Anke t-ffajliet lil dak kienu jkellmu, għax dak kellek futur miegħu. [Trans.: When somebody made it successfully into the dockyard as an apprentice, all the neighbours would flock to his house to congratulate his mother – just as if he had become a professor. Even the marriageable girls were more likely to date the future apprentice because with him they had the guarantee of a better future].

²⁶ Notebook belonging to Mr. E. L. Bonnici, in possession of the author.

²⁷ Interview with Mr. J. Brincat, Cospicua, 27 February 2004. Quote from transcript: Konna noqogħdu Strada San Giovanni fuq il-baċiri l-kbar. Meta kienet tid.ol xi aircraft carrier jew xi bastiment tan-navy konna naraw il-baħrin jilagħbu l-futbol u l-fizzjali jilagħbu t-tennis fuq id-deck. Konna qisna nistgħu mmissuhom. [Trans.: Our windows in Strada San Giovanni (St. John's Street, Cospicua) overlooked the docks in French

Crowds of hawkers, beggars and children would have gathered every day around the dockyard gates to witness the entry and exit of dockyard employees with a regularity bordering on ritual. The memories of the clerks in their hats, stiff starched collars and walking sticks and the skilled artisans sporting middle class symbols left an indelible image in the minds of the up and coming generations who came to equate employment in H.M. Dockyard with a privileged existence²⁸.

An up and coming class of workers who boasted the benefit of 'dockyard education' was being assimilated to the conservatism and respectability of the middle class and skilled craftsmen took to wearing bowler hats and to carrying walking sticks as a sign of their superior status²⁹. The area was rife with rumours that the marriageable women preferred to date dockyard apprentices. Occasionally, this must have provoked the scorn of the less fortunate workmen who gave vent to their frustration in anonymous satirical comments about the pretentious airs of this class. The satirical paper *Il Hmar* poked fun at 'Dockyard Specialities' and targeted the 'dark hats' and 'the aristocratic bearing and elegance' of the young Recorders and the intimating 'good mornings' reserved by all and sundry for the officers of the yard³⁰.

The Dockyard School was also providing a highly controlled environment which had a strong influence in moulding the artisan class into a homogenous group. By the inter war period, apprentices originated all over Malta, and this had the effect of spreading, albeit in small doses, the

Creek. When an aircraft carrier or some other big ship used to be moored there, we used to look out and see the sailors playing football or the officers playing tennis on the decks. They seemed really close to touch].

²⁸ Interview with Mr. V. Esposito, Valletta, 29 August 2003. Quote from transcript: *Ħafna mill-ħaddiema kienu jgħaddu minn quddiemna kull filgħodu. Uħud minnhom, speċjalment l-iskrivana, lebsin l-aħjar ilbies, bis-suits, u bin-nofs tomna u bl-ispats maż-żarbun. Kull wiegħed minna kellu tiegħu - naħseb deep down konna ngħiru xi ftit għalihom. Konna anke nagħtuhom laqam u konna noqogħdu nistennewh die.el u ngħajtu lil xulxin - "Ara wasal tiegħek!" meta jduru l-kantuniera. [Trans.: Most of the workmen would walk past our house in Cospicua. Some of them, especially the clerical staff would be dressed to the nines in their best suits, bowler hats and spats on their shoes. All the children in the neighbourhood would gather around. Each one of us had 'adopted' one of them. We aspired to be one of them! We had even made up pet names for them and we would wait for him and call to the others, 'Here comes yours!' when they turned the corner].*

²⁹ ELLUL GALEA, *L-iStorja tat-Tarzna*, 147. Quote from text: 'Ħafna nies tas-sengħa kienu jużaw it-tmiem u gieli anki l-bastun bil-boċċa tad-deheb fir-ras'.

³⁰ *Speċjalitajiet tat-Tarzna*, *Il Hmar*, 12 July 1919, 3. Quote in the original: *Il-kappell skur tar-Recorder iż-zgħair, l-aristokrazija u l-eleganza tar-Recorder, l-intimazzjoni ma' l-uffiċjali u il-good morning ta' dak iż-żajjar skriwan. Throughout its history under naval management, the managerial class, in its higher, middle and lower levels was exclusively made up of British naval officers or civilians.*

culture of the dockyard apprentice across the island. However, the largest number still came from the harbour district of the Cottonera³¹, and it was the culture of this group which became the prevailing feature of the yard's social fabric – dominating to a large extent language, lifestyle, leisure and political allegiances³². Even the dietary habits of the Maltese worker were being transformed by the contact with the dockyard and the thousands of naval servicemen serving in the fleet – with the higher income group of exapprentices expressing a partiality for what was then perceived of as the healthy wholesome diet of the Englishman with beef, fried eggs, bacon, beer and tea whilst shunning the traditional workman's staple diet of bread, pasta and wine³³.

The skilled artisans who had served their term at the Dockyard School, formed a very distinct and closely knit group. The presence of boys whose father or other close members of the family were also in Admiralty employ was a common occurrence. Thus, in one typical example, Emmanuel Pulis was admitted to the Dockyard School as an apprentice, following in the footsteps of his father, a chargeman at the Victualling Yard, an older brother in the same department and two uncles in the Engineering Department³⁴. The majority of the apprentices were from a social background which was sufficiently respectable to have encouraged the development of literacy and numeracy. More significantly perhaps, considering the period which each prospective apprentice would have spent at his studies in the pre-apprenticeship stage, the young men came from families that could afford to forego the potential ability of their sons to supplement the family income in the stage where they could have started being useful on the job market³⁵. In this context, one can safely hypothe-

³¹ In the sample year 1920, 46% of the apprentices hailed from the harbour towns of the Cottonera.

³² Interview with Mr. F. Grech, Valletta, 29 August 2003. Quote from Transcript: Żwieten u Żrieraq, mill-ewwel kont taġġrfu l-bniedem, liebes il-beritta u s-sidrija tar-ra.al, bir-rispett kollu lejhom, ħafna minnhom jitkellmu bl-img.awweg, b' maktur b'xi kisra ħobż u forsi tadama u biċċa basla fih u fix-xita tarah għaddej b'xi xkora fuq rasu. [Trans.: The labourers from the villages of Żejtun or Żurrieq could be easily distinguished. Most of them would be wearing caps and worsted waistcoats as was typical in the country. Their accents distinguished them from the rest and they would have a loaf of bread, a tomato and an onion wrapped in a bundle for their lunches. Their only covering on a rainy day would be a piece of sackcloth]. This phenomenon certainly deserves a deeper study.

³³ *The Dockyard Worker*, February 1937.

³⁴ Interview with Mr. E. Pulis, Żabbar, 22 December 2001. Similar cases feature in interviews with Messrs. K. Ellul Galea, J. Brincat, E. Corso, T. Briffa, J. Camilleri.

³⁵ Interview with Mr. G. Agius, Valletta 5 September 2003. Quote from transcript: Ommi kienet tieġu ħsieb li meta naslu biex nagħlqu s-sitt snin tiktibna l-iskola. Missieri kien businessman żgħir. Kien jaġġmel l-inbid u jdawwar ir-rotta b'hekk. Konna daqsxejn afjar minn familji ofrajn madwarna fis-sens li missieri kellu qliegħ fiss. In-nuqqas ta'

size that the school was designed to admit boys of a given social status, especially from the upper reaches of the working class – preparing them for work positions appropriate to their class in a process of self-perpetuation – all guarded by a system of checks and controls which provided for a highly streamlined process of selection and weeding.

This process started with the Examination for the Entry of Apprentices in H.M. Dockyard (referred to hereafter as the Dockyard Examination). This examination was open to all males who were not less than thirteen and a half and not more than sixteen years of age³⁶.

It was the cause of great interest in all dockyard communities throughout the British Empire and it frequently provoked discussion at the highest levels in various departments of the service, as well as in the press, legislative assemblies and other opinion makers within the colonies that hosted a naval dockyard. The toughest bone of contention seems to have been the fact that the different conditions prevailing in the various colonies which hosted a Royal Dockyard, worked against a system where a common examination was set at a distant centre of power³⁷. In a typical case, the Admiral Superintendent of Gibraltar Dockyard condemned the setting and the marking of the examination papers in London, ‘where the examiners naturally base their questions on their experience of the English educational system and cannot be expected to appreciate the limitations of the local system’³⁸.

The attitudes of the Board of the Admiralty about the exam are very indicative of various undercurrents and developments within the colonies. In 1938, for example, the dockyard entrance examination common to Malta, Gibraltar and Bermuda, was ‘replaced at Gibraltar and Bermuda by a local examination of a simpler nature’³⁹. This change was not considered suitable for Malta, nor was it considered practical for the staff of the local Dockyard School to mark the papers in the island on account of the large number of papers arising out of the severe competition associated with the exam⁴⁰. The exception of Malta from this provision is very indicative

ċertezza minn fejn għeġja l-paga mil-lum għall-għada kienet biċċa wgieg. ta’ ras għal ħafna familji. Minn daqshekk, id-dar tagħna ir- rota kienet b’xi mod dejjem tibqa’ ddur. [Trans.: My mother never neglected our education. My father owned a small business, he made and sold wine. We could make ends meet. Our standard of living was a bit better than most of our neighbours’ as we had the luxury of a stable income. Most families had to make a living with unstable employment and poor wages. We were very lucky that in one way or another, we could make ends meet].

³⁶ NAUK, ADM 116/4235, Regulations of HM Yards (section dealing with Malta), Chapter XIV, 10.

³⁷ NAUK, ADM 116/5157, Gibraltar. Recruitment of Workmen and Apprentices, 1938.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ *Ibidem*. Minute from the Director Education Department, 5 July 1938.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

of the rising educational standards of the prospective candidates for dockyard apprenticeships. In fact, the Admiralty noted that Maltese schools were turning out a 'more suitable type of candidate... for the Dockyard Apprenticeships'⁴¹. It is also possible that the Admiralty was intent on preventing abuse such as the leakage of the content of exam papers and the corruption of examiners which had occurred in the years preceding the Second World War⁴².

A cursory look at the content of the Dockyard Examination ought to give the reader a more comprehensive picture of the corpus of knowledge which the candidates were supposed to internalize before sitting for one of its yearly sessions. As shown in the syllabus in Appendix II, the Maltese candidates were tested in Arithmetic, Dictation, Composition, Elementary Maths and the Geography of the British Empire⁴³. On a national scale, the Dockyard Examination and its content had a strong influence on the general educational system in the colony, and for a long time the items featuring in the syllabus for entry into H.M. Dockyard were the standard fare in the elementary school network across the island⁴⁴. Official correspondence held at the Maltese National Archives, confirms that the Headmaster of the Dockyard School held strong sway over the Director of Elementary Education and a number of educational provisions taken by the Civil Government were clearly dictated by the needs of the naval establishment and the standards set by the Dockyard Entrance Examination. Indeed, for as long as it was held, the Dockyard Examination was the ultimate target and the measure by which the quality of the teaching imparted in many schools, especially in the Cottonera area was judged⁴⁵. The high point in any school's track record would have been to earn the Admiralty's encomium and turning out a 'more suitable type of candidate ... for the Dockyard Apprenticeships' came to be the driving force behind a good

⁴¹ NAUK, ADM 116/ 3660, Report on the Pay of Locally Entered Industrial Workpeople, 18.

⁴² Information supplied by Brother Charles Buhagiar F.S.C., De La Salle College, Birgu, Malta.

⁴³ NAM, LGO NAV 4122/21.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*. Admiral Superintendent J. Luce to Governor Lord Plumer, 13 Jan 1922. The Director of Elementary Schools and the Headmaster of the Dockyard School were in direct contact to discuss amendments and improvements to the Dockyard Exam syllabus before the final draft was made public. When in 1921, the Admiral Superintendent thought it fit to raise the standard of examination for the entry of apprentices into the dockyard, the new syllabus was forwarded to the Governor for communication to the Lyceum (the public grammar school for boys which offered a strictly academic fare) and the Elementary Schools. The Department of Education within the Civil Government had to amend its syllabi.

⁴⁵ A definite precursor of the Junior Lyceum and the Common Entrance 11+ examinations held in contemporary Malta.

number of public and private institutions⁴⁶. The schools with the highest number of passes in the examination became a magnet for prospective dockyard exam candidates and by the turn of the twentieth century, newspapers became rife with advertisements for private schools attentive to the requirements of the naval dockyard⁴⁷. In common with most schools of the period, the type of instruction at these establishments fits Paulo Freire's 'Banking Concept' of education, where 'the educator regulates the way the world "enters into" the students'⁴⁸.

The students received a corpus of knowledge as passive uncritical entities and in the process they were acclimatised to the world of a paternalistic overlord. Classes often hosted an excess of fifty students, all at different age levels and different levels of attainment⁴⁹. The effects of drilling and rote work which aided in the memorisation of facts, may be felt even at present. Ex-apprentices still remember passages memorised at their preapprenticeship schools in preparation for the examination, with one interviewee, long since retired, reciting verbatim and almost in a single breath the text book definition of Ohm's Law of Resistance⁵⁰. Candidates who had a photographic memory were particularly envied and were certainly a step ahead in the rat race which was the Dockyard Apprentices Examination⁵¹. Students spent long hours copying endless pages of notes in a neat cursive hand on ledgers which were to be produced regularly

⁴⁶ NAUK, ADM 116/3660, Report on the Pay of Locally Entered Industrial Workpeople, 18.

⁴⁷ In one of the most prominent and frequent adverts, Signor Carlo Luigi Borg of The Educational Institute, Senglea, drew the attention of the readers of the *Malta Times and United Services Gazette* to the 'exceptional advantages of education'. In what seems to be a blatant exercise of self-publicity, a 'Grateful Parent', praised the Indefatigable Principal of the Educ. Institute Senglea ... [on whom] reflects the highest credit ... that the candidates prepared by him for the dockyard examination for apprentices, the greater number invariably succeed to pass, which obviously shows that the instruction imparted at the above mentioned institute is of a very satisfactory character. *The Malta Times and United Services Gazette*, 16 May 1902.

⁴⁸ P. FREIRE, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (London, 1996), 57.

⁴⁹ Information supplied by Brother Edward Galea F.S.C., De La Salle College, Birgu, Malta.

⁵⁰ Interview with Mr. J. Camilleri, Żabbar, 17 March 2002.

⁵¹ Interview with Mr. E. Corso, Cospicua, 13 May 2002. Quote from transcript: Trid titgħallem kollox bl-ammunt. Kellna ħafna general knowledge. Hekk kienet. Kien jagħtina n-noti u l-għada kif tidħol isaqsik. Kellna wieħed konna ngħir u għalih. Qatt ma kien jistudja, pero kif iħares lejn ktieb, kien jidħollu u jibqa' jiftakru f'moħħu. Meta da.al id-dockyard, fl-eħami, it-total ma kienx inqas minn erba' jew ħames marki mill-maximum. [Trans.: We had to memorise a lot of facts, most of it general knowledge. That was the way we used to learn. The teacher would give us the notes and then, the following morning we would be tested on the content of those notes. We were really jealous of one student in our course. He could do without a lot of studying, just one glance at the notes

for inspection⁵². Additional personal sacrifice was required from the potential candidate. Thus, the student did not just sweat it out at his regular studies, but he also attended a high proportion of classes outside normal school hours⁵³. *The Dockyard Worker* claimed that in the industrial districts, workmen preferred to supplement the inadequate educational services provided by the government with private tuition to secure a pass in the Dockyard Apprentices Examination⁵⁴.

The amount of cramming which went into the preparation of prospective dockyard apprentices did not go unnoticed by the powers that be at the Admiralty, leading the Director of Naval Educational Services (D.N.E.S) to comment that 'in Malta, the candidates are crammed for the entry examination' and that, 'in spite of the high rates of passes in the Dockyard Apprentices Examination, there was a large number of successful candidates who later prove to be quite unable to cope'⁵⁵. However, in spite of the difficulties associated with securing a place at the Dockyard School, the lack of alternatives and the potential security of a dockyard post, led to a continued interest in the Dockyard Entrance Examination. An average of 1,000 youngsters sat for the annual sessions⁵⁶ and the interest continued unabated right up to the winding down of the Naval Dockyard - in 1953 for example there were well over 900 candidates to fill 200 posts⁵⁷. The preliminary oral examination was very effective at whittling down the numbers to a more manageable figure and only those

and they would be imprinted in his brains. When he sat for the dockyard apprentices' examination his total aggregate was only four or five marks short of the maximum].

⁵² Work from the notebooks supplied by Messrs. E. Corso and E. Bonnici ex-Shipwright Apprentices, H.M. Dockyard, Malta in possession of the author.

⁵³ In a typical example, *The Times of Malta* reported that the Group Scout Master of the Senglea Scout Group, started a free course of lessons in the evening 'for members of his group ... who are planning to sit for the forthcoming examination for entry of apprentices in HM Dockyard'. *The Times of Malta*, 8 October 1938. The situation is mirrored in the present in the alarming amount of private lessons which candidates for examinations in contemporary Malta are willing to pay for to secure good grades. The situation was most aptly summed up in an editorial from the *Sunday Times* (Malta), 26 February 1995, 14: '[the students] home in on five or six subjects, priming themselves up with extra doses of private lessons aided and abetted by parents who are willing to pay what is necessary for their offspring to collect as many passes ... and the highest marks possible'. Cf. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001247/124790e.pdf, RONALD G. SULTANA, *The Secondary Education Certificate and Matriculation Examinations in Malta: A Case Study* (UNESCO International Bureau of Education, 1999).

⁵⁴ *The Dockyard Worker*, July 1937, 4.

⁵⁵ NAUK, ADM 1/24662, Report of the Financial Committee on Dual Scheme Entry of Apprentices, 15 April 1957.

⁵⁶ NAUK, ADM 116/5157, Report on the Manning Situation and the Entry of Apprentices, 17 June 1938.

⁵⁷ NAUK, ADM 1/24662, Report of the Financial Committee on Dual Scheme Entry of Apprentices.

youths who satisfied the examiners of their proficiency in the English language were allowed to sit for the written part of the examination. In the Maltese context this oral exam assumed particular significance since one of the major battles over the loyalties of the population was fought over the primacy of English – or the language of the imperial masters – over Italian, the language of choice of the most active and vociferous opponents of the colonial regime⁵⁸.

Prospective dockyard hands who were sitting for the oral exam were fully conscious of the fact that the naval authorities were out to sound their loyalties⁵⁹. Conformity was the prelude to success and the prospective dockyard apprentice had to be ‘a well conducted man’⁶⁰. A clean criminal record had to be also complimented with an unshaken loyalty to the British Crown. The latter was never far removed from the educational priorities of Whitehall and exam papers required candidates to be fully conversant with the history of the evolution of the British flag, details of coronation celebrations, the composition of the Mediterranean fleet and other items laden with overt messages of imperial significance. The allegiances of the prospective apprentices were also sounded, albeit crudely, by means of discussion of topics such as ‘Why I want to become an Indentured Apprentice’⁶¹. Security was of paramount importance in an industrial establishment which throughout its history serviced the naval units of Britain’s premier fleet. According to confidential correspondence, which was marked ‘Most Secret’ and ‘Not to go to the Public Records Office’, Admiral Superintendent Ford claimed that the naval authorities in Malta had adopted painstaking measures to protect against ‘the entry of undesirables’ into His Majesty’s Dockyard⁶².

It is not within the scope of this paper to go through a thorough examination of the course work and the details of the apprenticeships in the dif-

⁵⁸ For a more detailed overview of the ‘Language Question’ which was to dominate Maltese politics for well over a century, vide G. HULL, *The Malta Language Question. A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism* (Malta, 1993); H. FREND, *Party Politics in a Fortress Colony: The Maltese Experience* (Malta, 1991).

⁵⁹ Interview with Mr. E. Pulis, Ġabbar, 22 December 2001. Quote from transcript: *Il-fizzjal kien attent biex jara x’ħob. tiekol.* Trans. [The interviewing officer was out to check on which side you buttered your bread].

⁶⁰ Applications to sit for the examination had to be accompanied by a recommendation, certifying the good conduct of the prospective apprentice, frequently signed and attested by the Parish Priest of the locality the candidate hailed from. Information supplied by various interviewees.

⁶¹ NAUK, ADM 116/5157 and Examination for the Entry of Apprentices set by the War Department, Malta, held at De La Salle College, Birgu and copies of the originals held by the author.

⁶² NAUK, ADM 178/193, Secret memo, from Vice Admiral Malta to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 26 August 1939; ‘The names of all persons for entry into the Dockyard

ferent trades offered by the Naval Dockyard. However, it is interesting to consider some of the finer details, especially of the hidden curriculum, as essential components of the educational set-up of H.M. Dockyard. Once he had got over the examination hurdle and had signed his indentures with the Admiralty, the apprentice was absorbed into a system which set out not just to prepare him for his future work but also to foster character traits such as 'good behaviour', 'industriousness', 'obedience', 'honesty', 'punctuality' and 'diligence'⁶³ – basic requisites for workmen at the nerve centre of a first class naval base. Schooling provided the ideal medium through which the value system of the imperial master could be transmitted to the subject population and dockyard school students were imbued with a code of ethics which was to come in useful later on in their working life as Admiralty employees. The encouragement of initiative seems to have been one of the most prized virtues that was perfectly in tune with Admiralty regulations which laid down that 'when circumstances occur for which no instructions can be prepared beforehand, everyone is to promote the welfare of the service to the utmost of his power'⁶⁴. Employees who were prepared to put in a degree of self-sacrifice for the interests of the establishment were highly prized. An ex-dockyard hand still remembers the key question in his interview which was held in 1929: He was asked to explain the meaning of the term 'volunteer'⁶⁵. Another ex-employee claims that he managed to build a very good reputation with the English officers in the yard mainly because he was always one of the first to volunteer for various jobs⁶⁶.

In many of its different aspects, the highly controlled environment of the Dockyard School is worthy of a study in its own right as a microcosm of colonial Malta. Even within the limits of this paper, it is interesting to speculate that the rigid hierarchical structure, personified by the teachers clad in naval uniform, went a long way towards the fostering of attitudes of se-

were forwarded to the Defence Security Officer for vetting ... All names are passed through the security card index, which contains the names and particulars of all persons in the island known to be suspect from a security point of view' [From the correspondence it transpires that this practice had been instituted in the wake of the Abyssinian Crisis].

⁶³ *vide* student report cards, Dockyard preparation class, De La Salle College, copies in possession of the author.

⁶⁴ NAUK, ADM 116/4235, Admiralty Regulations for Dockyards.

⁶⁵ Interview with Mr. K. Ellul Galea, Paola, 16 February, 2002.

⁶⁶ Interview with Mr. E. Bonnici, Paola, 1 November 1995. Quote from transcript: Kont nie.u .afna inizjattiva u nuri .afna interest f'xogħli. Ma kontx niddejaq noffri ruħi meta jgħajtu għal xi volontier u na.seb minħabba hekk kont mighjub għafna minn ta' fuqi [Trans.: I had a lot of personal initiative. I used to show a lot of keen interest in my work and when a call for volunteers was issued, I was always one of the first to offer myself for the job. This frequently landed me into the good books of my superiors].

mi-military obedience, which from the evidence available, seems to have been encouraged as part of the school's ethos⁶⁷. One gets several interesting snapshots both from published material and from oral evidence of ex-students of the dockyard school, which throw some interesting light on the interaction between the colonizer and the colonized. A great deal must have depended on the individual character of the teacher, who through his influence and methods must have exerted a great deal of influence on the students. Thus some ex-pupils speak in almost reverential terms of teachers who left a strong imprint on their lives and helped to improve the students' chances for a better career at the dockyard. Others did not set such a good example to their wards. For example, the October 1937 issue of *The Dockyard Worker* carried a report that one of the Dockyard School teachers, who was a keen collector of seashells, was exchanging school stationery (which usually was distributed free) for new specimens for his collection. The report caused quite a stir and eventually the class frequented by the student who was on the staff of *The Dockyard Worker* was singled out and lectured at length by the Headmaster on the concept of loyalty and the proper code of conduct of pupils towards their masters⁶⁸. One cannot help but draw parallels between this and the general attitudes towards authority in colonial Malta, where basic necessities were frequently acquired in a shady exchange with a patron who controlled a scarce resource. What the Maltese would describe as *Bi pjac.ir u mhux bi dritt*—or an inverted morality of sorts where favouritism supplanted what in an ideal context would have been considered as theirs by right. One can also detect a degree of intimidation which many a time characterised the relationship between the dockyard worker and the British officers at the yard⁶⁹.

In the Maltese colonial context, the population at large considered employment in the dockyard as a lifelong sinecure and there were no lengths to which the employees were not prepared to go to secure their position⁷⁰. The management was all too conscious of this frame of mind and in a

⁶⁷ All the ex-apprentices interviewed in the course of this research concur in the view that 'military' or in this case 'naval' style discipline was an integral part of what in technical jargon would be defined as the school's 'hidden curriculum'.

⁶⁸ *The Dockyard Worker*, October and November 1937.

⁶⁹ See for example *The Dockyard Worker*, April 1937.

⁷⁰ *The Dockyard Worker*, July and November 1937. In various editions, *The Dockyard Worker* condemned a state of affairs in the dockyard where the dockyard workers paid out an aggregate sum of around £10,000 a year for 'presents and souvenirs'. All with the intent of currying favour with a class that had the power to make or break in the yard. The casual labourer, who could barely afford to buy a new pair of boots for his children, had to dig in his pockets, sometimes for a sum of 'not less than five shillings' to contribute for presents to the head of section or the charginman. The penalty for failing to do so was victimisation, exclusion from the overtime roster or the list of workers selected for work in confined spaces (for which special allowances were paid).

memorandum submitted to the Governor of Malta, the Admiral Superintendent made much of the continued popularity of employment in the dockyard. The naval authorities acknowledged the existence of individuals who 'diverged from the mainstream' and were considered 'a threat to the status quo'. However, the heads of the dockyard departments felt safe in allaying the Governor's fears about anti-British sentiment in the yard by claiming that by virtue of its training, the workforce in His Majesty's Dockyard was in its greater majority loyal to its employer⁷¹.

The value of dockyard education as a mainstay of pro-British propaganda in the island was acknowledged also by the colonial administration. When Governor Sir David Campbell submitted a series of proposals to his superiors in the Colonial Office, with a view to strengthening the British position against subversive elements, he advocated the setting up of a new school, based on the model of the Dockyard School to re-enforce the loyalties of the rising generation in the face of the inroads being made by Italian propaganda in the 1930s⁷².

In spite of the obvious value of the Dockyard School the naval authorities had to keep a weather eye on other by-products of its apprentice scheme. The Director of Labour at the Admiralty scorned an educational set-up which had led to the creation of an elite core of workers, a fact which in certain quarters was frowned upon as dangerous. The Admiralty by its methods of training (and notably by its system of apprenticeship, which has no counterpart in outside industry in the island), has produced a type of workman worth very much more than many bearing the same labels in outside industry in Malta. The ex-apprentice at the yard is better paid than most workers outside the yard. The Admiralty, in setting up the existing system of wages in Malta, has departed from the usual economic basis of supply and demand, which is followed everywhere else. In so doing, we are treading dangerous ground, inasmuch as having once departed from local standards, it is somewhat difficult to define the limits to the improvement which is taking place⁷³.

By making an adolescent apprenticeship a necessary qualification for becoming a qualified technician, the Admiralty had given a most effective weapon to the trade unions in 'their fight to secure better wages and conditions'⁷⁴. The Dockyard School was creating a set of standards which

⁷¹ NAM, LGO 1119/1936, Vice-Admiral Best to Sir D. Campbell, 21 November 1931, vol. 1. My emphasis.

⁷² NAM, Despatch from Governor Sir David Campbell to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 March 1933.

⁷³ NAUK, ADM 116/3660, Memo from the Labour Branch, Pay of Locally Entered Dockyard and Industrial Workpeople, Malta.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*.

were becoming common to an ever-increasing group of workers in the Royal Dockyards—a group with a common identity, common aspirations and common grievances. Moreover, through the apprenticeship scheme and dockyard education, workers in Malta could claim parity with their counterparts in the Home Yards. Though these claims were always summarily dismissed by the Admiralty, they proved to be a strong incentive for the men to unite in their quest for improving their working conditions. Thanks to a superior standard of education, the workers were also becoming more articulate in voicing their grievances and in presenting their cases to the authorities.

Concluding Remarks

A thorough analysis of the educational set-up at the Dockyards is long overdue. A full scale evaluation of the effects and impact of the Dockyard School on various aspects such as work practices, industrial relations and society as a whole awaits a more systematic evaluation and the wide brush strokes of this paper have only been modest attempts at putting the dockyard school and some of the many facets of its curriculum—both in its official and hidden form—in a fuller historical perspective.

In the variety of accounts about the Dockyard School, be it in printed secondary sources, or in the reminiscences of its ex-students, the school enjoys an impeccable reputation and its ex-students evoke with a certain amount of pride, both its standard and ‘the first class facilities’ which it offered. However, it remains to be established how much of this can be attributed to fact and how much of it is the result of the comparisons made with its dreary counterparts, with which, more often than not, the Dockyard’s School’s standards were measured.

The influence of the Dockyard School has proven to be so strong as to transcend the political processes which transformed a naval base into a sovereign independent state. To date, the main characteristics which typified the dockyard school curriculum – both official and hidden – can still be detected in the essential features which make up the Maltese educational set up. To name but a few of the most conspicuous traits, one can mention the over-reliance on a centralised authority, many a time detached from the realities influencing the life of each community; the striking, quasi-exclusive reliance on a single examination marking the passage from childhood to youth to determine the future of an individual child within the state school system and the cramming which goes on in the junior classes to prepare for this examination.

In nearly all its aspects, the Dockyard School is a very conspicuous exception in the laissez-faire policies adopted in relation to education by the British colonial authorities in Malta. The essential driving force behind the

creation of dockyard education was the need for a highly trained workforce capable of supporting a powerful naval presence in the Mediterranean. However, one cannot discount the value of this institution as a useful medium in the process of imperial acculturation. More significantly, in the context of a naval establishment of prime significance, the school and all it stood for legitimised the strategies of control. The job security offered by the privilege of belonging to the core of ex-apprentices, encouraged the dockyard hand to remain loyal to ‘the hand that fed him’.

APPENDIX I

Fig. 1. Number of Apprentice Tradesmen in 1908 compared with 1933⁷⁵

| | 1908 | 1933 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|
| <i>Constructive Department</i> | | |
| Fitters | 72 | 79 |
| <i>Engineering Department</i> | | |
| Fitters | 152 | 452 |
| Founders | 8 | 11 |
| Pattern-makers | 14 | 16 |
| Coppersmiths | 20 | 31 |
| Boilersmiths | 5 | 4 |
| Boilermakers | 18 | 66 |
| <i>Electrical Department</i> | | |
| Fitters | 26 | 177 |
| TOTAL | 315 | 836 |

APPENDIX II

Fig. 2. Syllabus of the Examination for the Entry of Apprentices
H.M. Dockyard, Malta. January 1922⁷⁶

| Subject | Remarks |
|---|--|
| 1. English | |
| a. Oral Examination (Maximum marks 100) To be able to understand and to give simple answers to common every day questions in colloquial English. To read an elementary passage in English and show proficiency in the meaning of the passage read. | <p>*Technical questions to be avoided.</p> <p>*Marks to be awarded in three grades (50, 75, 100).</p> <p>*Three days A.M. and P.M. to be allotted for this important part of the examination in order to give the candidates every opportunity to do themselves justice.</p> <p>*50% required for a pass.</p> <p>* Marks obtained in the oral examination by the candidates who qualify to be carried forward to the final written examination</p> |

⁷⁵ NAUK, ADM 116/3660, Memo by the Head of Labour Branch, 22 December 1934.

⁷⁶ NAM, LGO Nav. 4122/21, Letter from Rear Admiral Superintendent Luce to the Director of Education, 10 January 1925.

| | |
|--|---|
| <p>b. Dictation (Maximum marks 100) A passage not previously seen of difficulty corresponding to that of Standard V Reader.</p> <p>c. Composition (Maximum marks 100) Reproduction of a short story read over and explained, or to write a short letter or essay on a given easy subject. Not a failing subject.</p> | <p>*50% required for a pass in this section.</p> <p>Not a failing subject.</p> |
| <p>2. Arithmetic</p> <p>H.C.F., L.C.M. Vulgar and Decimal Fractions, Proportions - simple and compound; Percentages, Profit and Loss; Averages; Simple Interest, including finding of Rate per cent, Time, Principal and Amount; Practice; Proportional Parts; Square Root. Easy problems on the above, on times of doing joint tasks, on times taken for filling or emptying tanks by varying numbers of inlets and outlets the individual or joint times of which are given, etc.</p> | <p>Candidates will be required to reach a qualifying standard of 40%</p> |
| <p>3. Elementary Mathematics</p> <p>a. Mensuration - Area and length of diagonal of square and rectangle. Area of triangle, given base and perpendicular height. Circumference and area of circle, volumes of rectangular solids. Easy problems thereon.</p> <p>b. Algebra - Algebraical symbols - substitution. Addition, subtraction, easy multiplication and division.</p> <p>c. Arithmetic - More difficult questions and problems on the rules, etc. given under 2; also the Metric System.</p> | <p>Paper 3 (a, b, c) is voluntary. Marks obtained are to be added to those in other subjects to determine the order of merit.</p> |
| <p>4. General Geography of the British Empire</p> <p>On the lines followed in a modern Upper Standard Geography Reader, such as: The British World Stage IV - Macmillan The British Empire - McDougall</p> <p>N.B. Handwriting to be taken into consideration throughout the examination.</p> | <p>Questions to be set requiring short answer only. Geography is not a failing subject but the marks obtained are to be added to those on other subjects to determine the order of merit.</p> |

GREEK MARITIME HISTORY

Cristina E. Papakosta

Consoli dei mercanti nel Levante veneziano

Al capitano della mia vita

Fin dal XIII secolo, Venezia per tutelare i propri interessi, innanzi tutto, commerciali¹ e, in secondo luogo, politici aveva designato dei consoli dei mercanti in altri paesi². Un esempio caratteristico era il bailo che inizialmente aveva la funzione di rappresentante dei mercanti veneziani a Costantinopoli³. Lo spazio greco, trovandosi quasi in mezzo alle vie commerciali che iniziavano a Brindisi e Otranto e terminavano a Costantinopoli, divenne il luogo che ospitò tre diverse categorie di consoli dei mercanti: quella dei potenti paesi europei quali l'Inghilterra e la Francia; quella di alcuni gruppi di mercanti dalle città-stato dell'Italia quale Genova; quella dei mercanti greci e ebrei che erano sudditi dell'impero ottomano. Cinque Isole Ionie - Corfù, Zante, Cefalonia, Santa Maura (Leucada), Cerigo -, porti e città importanti della penisola greca, quali Giannina, Prevesa, Arta, Lepanto, Patrasso, Nauplia, Atene, Salonicco, diventarono sedi di consolati, mentre isole più piccole dello Ionio e dell'Egeo e città più piccole dell'Epiro e del Peloponneso ospitarono dei viceconsoli⁴.

¹ Una prima, più ampia versione della ricerca è stata presentata in greco, con il titolo "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά: ανάγκη και σκοπιμότητα", al VII Congresso Panionio (Leucada 26-30 maggio, 2006) ed è stata pubblicata nel secondo volume degli atti *Πρακτικά Ζ' Πανιόνιο Συνέδριο, Λευκάδα 26-30 Μαΐου 2002*, Atene 2004, 577-593.

² Sui consoli dei mercanti, in generale, si veda MARCO FERRO, *Dizionario del diritto comune e veneto*, Venezia 1843², 492-495; ΜΙΤΣΑ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, "Οψεις της ελληνικής εμπορικής ναυτιλίας κατά το 17^ο αιώνα. Ο θεσμός του εμπορικού προξένου και το προξενείο των Ελλήνων Οθωμανών υπηκόων στο Χάνδακα", *Παρουσία*, 10 (1994), 388-390. Sull'istituzione dei consoli dei mercanti nello stato veneto si veda VETTOR SANDI, *Principi di storia civile della Repubblica di Venezia dalla sua fondazione sino all'anno di S.N. 1700*, parte II, libro V, Venezia 1755, 243-259 e SANDI, *Principi di storia civile della Repubblica di Venezia dall'anno di N.S. sino all'anno 1767*, vol. II, Venezia 1771, 399-411, 476-479.

³ Sul bailo a Costantinopoli e la sua funzione fino al Quattrocento CHRYSSEA A. MALTEZOU, *Ο θεσμός του εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Βενετού Βαΐλου (1268-1453)*, Atene 1970.

⁴ Sull'istituzione dei consoli dei mercanti nella Grecia sotto il dominio veneto e turco, dal Cinquecento, si veda SPIRIDON LAMPROS, "Το εν Θεσσαλονίκη βενετικών προξενείον

Sulle origini della istituzione dei consolati i Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia⁵ citano “il necessar bisogno, che sogliono haver li mercanti per la diffentione delli loro negotii con l’autorità di persona, che possa espedir le loro mercantie et procurare con il mezo della giustizia, che non siano indebitamente travagliati”⁶.

La prima testimonianza relativa all’insediamento di consoli nello Ionio di dominio veneziano data alla metà del secolo XVI. È il secolo che segue quello della scoperta delle vie commerciali verso il Nuovo Mondo e il Capo di Buona Speranza. Venezia perde in modo lento ma costante il monopolio del mercato nel bacino del Mediterraneo e concede il suo posto alle nuove potenze mercantili che emergono in quell’epoca, l’Inghilterra, la Francia e l’Olanda⁷. Nel 1584 Giacomo Spezzieri (Ιάκωβος Σπετζιέρης), proveniente da Corfù, fu il primo ad assumere la carica di console nelle Isole Ionie, pur non rappresentando una potenza europea ma un gruppo di mercanti dell’isola di Mitilene che erano sudditi ottomani⁸.

και το μετά της Μακεδονίας εμπόριο των Βενετών”, *Νέος Ελληνομνήμων*, 8 (1911), 206-228; ERRIKOS MOATSOS, “Το βενετικόν προξενείον Κρήτης επί Τουρκοκρατίας. Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα (1672-1682)”, *Θησαυρίσματα*, 6 (1969), 237-256; GEORGHIOS A. SIOROKAS, *Το Γαλλικό προξενείο της Άρτας (1702-1789)*, Ioannina 1981; GIOLANDA TRIANTAFILLIDOU-BALADIÉ, *Το εμπόριο και η οικονομία της Κρήτης (1669-1795)*, Iraklio 1988; ΜΙΤΣΑ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου των Ελλήνων εμπόρων κατά την περίοδο της Τουρκοκρατίας. Το εμπόριο του Αρχιπελάγους και το Ελληνικό προξενείο της Βενετίας*, tesi di dottorato, Atene 1990; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, “Το προξενείο του Αρχιπελάγους στο βενετοκρατούμενο Ναύπλιο”, *Παρουσία*, 7 (1991), 433-481; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, “Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπορικής ναυτιλίας κατά το 17^ο αιώνα. Ο θεσμός του εμπορικού προξένου και το προξενείο των Ελλήνων Οθωμανών υπηκόων στο Χάνδακα”, *Παρουσία*, 10 (1994), 363-438; KONSTANTINA GAVRILIADI, “Οι σχέσεις των Ελλήνων εμπόρων με τα προξενεία της Βενετίας 1720-1767”, *Ηπειρωτικά Χρονικά*, 33 (1998-1999), 331-346; ΜΙΡΣΙΝΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΔΟΥ, *Εμπορικές σχέσεις Θεσσαλονίκης-Βενετίας κατά τον 18^ο αιώνα*, Katerini 2006; CRISTINA PAPAKOSTA, “Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στη Δυτική Στερεά και Ήπειρο: το βενετικό προξενείο της Άρτας (1720-1797)”, *Θησαυρίσματα*, 32 (2002), 251-298; ELEFTHERIOS VETSIOS, *Η διπλωματική και οικονομική παρουσία των Βενετών στην περιοχή της Άρτας κατά τον 18^ο αιώνα*, Salonicco 2007.

⁵ Sull’organo amministrativo dei Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia si veda ANDREA DA MOSTO, *L’Archivio di Stato di Venezia*, vol. 1, Roma 1937, 196-197, e MARIA FRANCESCA TIEPOLO, *Archivio di Stato di Venezia*, in *Guida Generale degli Archivi di Stato Italiani*, vol. 4, Roma 1994, 980-982. Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVE), Dispacci dei Provveditori da Terra e da Mar ed altre cariche (ora e poi PTM), filza 990, allegato senza numero al dispaccio N° 28 sotto la data 24 ottobre 1745: indice compilato dal Provveditor General da Mar Daniel Dolfin dei consolati e viceconsolati nello Ionio e nelle terre continentali; ASVE, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, Prima serie, b. 398, fasc. 125, *Inserte vice consoli esteri*, 14 febbraio 1787.

⁶ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου*, 15.

⁷ FERNAND BRAUDEL, *Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II*, vol. I, Torino 1976, 664-689; MASSIMO COSTANTINI, “Η εμπορική πολιτική της Βενετίας έναντι των κητήσεων της στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο”, *Κέρκυρα, μία μεσογειακή σύνθεση: νησιωπισμός, διασυνδέσεις, ανθρώπινο περιβάλλον, 16^{ος}-19^{ος} αι.*, *Πρακτικά Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου, Κέρκυρα*, 22-25 Μαΐου 1996, επιμ. Αλίκη Νικηφόρου, Corfù 1998, 71-79.

⁸ GERASSIMOS PAGRATIS, “Το Κονσουλάτον των Μυτιληναίων στην Κέρκυρα (1548-1549)”, *Εώα και Εσπέρια*, 4 (1999-2000), 22-45; PAGRATIS, “Το Κονσουλάτον των Μυτιληναίων στην

Tre decenni più tardi furono istituiti il *Consolato de Greci sudditi Turcheschi* e il *Consolato de mercanti Greci di Santa Maura, di Lepanto, Rumelia et altri luochi Turcheschi* rispettivamente a Corfù e a Zante⁹. L'esistenza di quei tre consolati è una indicazione che fin dal secolo XVI cominciano a svilupparsi gradualmente e autonomamente rapporti commerciali fra i greci e i paesi dell'Europa occidentale.

Passando al secolo successivo l'esempio dei mercanti greci fu seguito dai mercanti ebrei, sudditi dell'impero ottomano, con la fondazione nelle due isole del *Consolato degli Ebrei di Lepanto, Patrasso e luochi della Morea*¹⁰.

La scelta di queste due isole per la fondazione di consolati pare scontata poiché dal 1501 in poi ogni nave di capacità maggiore di 185 tonnellate che viaggiava verso Venezia, era obbligata a fermarsi in una delle due isole in modo che si effettuasse l'obbligatorio controllo doganale e portuario¹¹. Da parte sua, Venezia favoriva la istituzione di questo tipo di consolati perché in questo modo facilitava le importazioni di cereali da diverse parti dell'impero ottomano a prezzi bassi, in un'epoca in cui la richiesta di cereali cresceva continuamente sia a Venezia stessa che in tutta l'Europa occidentale. L'impero ottomano fu utile per la Serenissima anche ad un altro livello: costituiva, infatti, il luogo da cui Venezia si approvvigionava di materie prime a prezzi bassi per coprire le esigenze della propria industria crescente e nello stesso tempo rappresentava la meta per una gran parte della sua produzione industriale.

Κέρκυρα (1548-1549)", *Πρακτικά Στ' Διεθνούς Πανιονίου Συνεδρίου, Ζάκυνθος, 23-27 Σεπτεμβρίου 1997*, vol. 2, Atene 2001, 89-92. È molto probabile che Giacomo Spezieri agisse come agente commerciale dei mercanti dell'isola di Mitilene e non come console dei mercanti; sulla differenza tra questi due qualità si veda ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, "Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπορικής ναυτιλίας", 375.

⁹ Sui consolati dei mercanti greci, sudditi dell'impero ottomano, ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου*, 12, 14, 237; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, "Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπορικής ναυτιλίας", 379-381; MARIA PIA PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for Ottoman subjects", in *IXth International Congress of Economic and Social History of Turkey, Dubrovnik-Croatia, 20-23 August 2002*, Ankara 2005, 213-219. Sul consolato a Corfù si veda ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, b. 44, fasc. N° 102: *Memoria mercantile. Console de Greci sudditi Turcheschi à Corfù*. La prima testimonianza di questo consolato è data nel 1601, quando era eletto console il corfiotto *Teofilo quondam Giacomo*: ASVE, Cinque Savi, b. 44, fasc. N° 102: *Memoria mercantile. Parte prima. Console al Zante de mercanti Greci di Santa Maura, di Lepanto, Rumelia, Morea et altri luochi Turcheschi*, 19 dicembre 1601. Sul consolato a Zante si veda ASVE, Cinque Savi, 44, 102, *Parte prima*; fasc. N° 102: *Memoria mercantile. Parte seconda. Console al Zante de mercanti Greci di Santa Maura, di Lepanto, Rumelia, Morea et altri luochi Turcheschi*; fasc.: *Memoria mercantile. Parte terza. Console al Zante de mercanti Greci di Santa Maura, di Lepanto, Rumelia, Morea et altri luochi Turcheschi*.

¹⁰ Il consolato degli Ebrei fu fondato a Zante nel 1603: ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102, *Parte prima*, 10 settembre 1636 e fasc. 101: *Console degli Ebrei di Lepanto, Patrasso e luochi della Morea*.

¹¹ GERASSIMOS PAGRATIS, *Θαλάσσιο εμπόριο στη βενετοκρατούμενη Κέρκυρα (1496-1538)*, tesi di dottorato, Corfù 2001, 1-2.

Inoltre, non va dimenticato che alla metà del secolo XVI un decreto del Senato concesse il transito esente da imposte alle merci provenienti dalle aree greche dell'impero ottomano e destinate a Venezia con scali intermedi a Corfù e a Zante. Lo stesso valeva anche per i prodotti dal percorso inverso, da Venezia verso l'impero ottomano¹². Le Isole Ionie erano la porta verso i grandi mercati dell'Europa occidentale. Vi si concentrava la stragrande maggioranza dei prodotti provenienti dalle coste ottomane dirimpetto, dall'Epiro, dalla Rumelia e dalla Morea, e con navi che appartenevano ad abitanti dell'Eptaneso, dell'Epiro ma anche di Missolungi¹³ queste merci arrivavano nel Settecento a Marsiglia, ad Amsterdam e a Londra.

Un consolato analogo a quelli di Zante e di Corfù fu fondato nel secolo XVII anche a Cefalonia dai mercanti di Santa Maura, di Dragomestre, di Lepanto e del Peloponneso¹⁴. È il periodo in cui si sviluppava speditamente l'attività marittima e mercantile di Santa Maura e, siccome si era placato il fenomeno della pirateria nelle acque dello Ionio, gli abitanti dell'isola con le loro venti navi dominavano il trasporto di merci dal litorale ottomano dirimpetto verso lo Ionio e viceversa¹⁵.

Il secolo XVII segna una svolta importante con la fondazione dei consolati dei paesi europei all'Eptaneso. Venezia con la sua adesione alla Sacra Liga affronta nuovamente l'impero ottomano, il che indebolisce se stessa – alla fine del secolo i suoi territori in Oriente si limitano alle isole Ionie – e potenzia i suoi antagonisti. Il commercio passerà in mani altrui. Nel terzo decennio del secolo si erano già costituiti i consolati dei francesi, degli inglesi, degli olandesi, degli spagnoli¹⁶.

Alla fine del secolo XVII il numero dei consolati europei cresce. I mercanti genovesi nel loro tentativo di procurarsi cereali dall'impero ottomano fondano a Zante un consolato la cui giurisdizione si estende fino a Corfù, a Cefalonia e il litorale dirimpetto del Peloponneso¹⁷.

Nel secolo XVIII la concorrenza commerciale nel Mediterraneo orienta-

¹² PAGRATIS, *Θαλάσσιο εμπόριο*, 62.

¹³ ASVE, PTM, filza 998, dispaccio N° 86, 30 marzo 1755. Sulla storia marittima di Missolungi si veda SERAFEIM MAXIMOS, *Το ελληνικό εμπορικό ναυτικό κατά τον XVIII αιώνα*, Atene 1976, 11-12, 47-55; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου*, 192-194; VASSILIS VL. SFIROERAS, "Η εμπορική ναυτιλία στα βενετοκρατούμενα Επτάνησα. Προβλήματα έρευνας και διαπιστώσεις", *Πρακτικά Β' Συνεδρίου Επτανησιακού Πολιτισμού, Λευκάδα 3-8 Σεπτεμβρίου 1984, Πολιτισμικές επαφές στα Επτάνησα και αναμεταδόσεις στον υπόλοιπο ελληνικό χώρο, 16^{ος}-20^{ος} αι*, Atene 1991, 126-127.

¹⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102, Parte prima, 16 aprile 1674; ed anche ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου*, 237.

¹⁵ GEORGHIOS PLOUMIDIS, "Ναυτιλία και εμπόριο στη Λευκάδα (1783, 1818)", *Δωδώνη*, 13 (1984), 399-418; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, "Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπορικής ναυτιλίας", 395-396.

¹⁶ PΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 582-584.

¹⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, b. 22, fasc.: *Memoriale mercantile. N° 104. Console genovese al Zante*, 7 settembre 1696.

le è al culmine. Emerge un nuovo attore economico importante dopo il trattato di Passarovitz: l'Austria. Nel 1719 l'Austria proclama porti franchi Fiume e Trieste e nello stesso tempo cerca di penetrare i grandi mercati ottomani per mezzo di due vie: attraverso Salonico, per le vie terrestri, e attraverso l'Eptaneso. Istituì un consolato generale a Zante con due viceconsoli a Cefalonia e a Corfù e riuscì ad attrarre i mercanti greci dell'impero ottomano che volevano espandere le proprie attività commerciali nell'Europa centrale¹⁸.

Dopo la metà del secolo al già lungo elenco di consoli si aggiungeranno i consoli di Ragusa, della Sicilia e di Napoli, della Danimarca, di Malta e certamente i consoli della Russia. Questi ultimi probabilmente poco si saranno interessati del commercio. Come consoli dei mercanti avevano un doppio ruolo: come agenti, da una parte, avevano la possibilità di raccogliere informazioni sul grande rivale, la Sublime Porta, ma anche su tutte le potenze europee, e avevano dall'altra parte l'opportunità di reclutare di nascosto uomini che si sarebbero arruolati nell'esercito e nella marina militare russa in vista delle imminenti guerre russoturche¹⁹.

Il sistema di elezione non era lo stesso per i consoli dei paesi europei come per i consoli dei sudditi ottomani. I mercanti e i proprietari di navi in ogni paese, come anche i loro connazionali che probabilmente vivevano nei territori greci di dominio veneziano, indicavano al loro governo la persona da loro considerata più adatta a rappresentare i loro interessi. Quando non c'era nell'isola una comunità di connazionali, si sceglieva di solito una persona del luogo di prestigio sociale, e con esperienza commerciale e in sintonia con lo Stato che doveva rappresentare. Il capo supremo di ogni stato ratificava questa elezione e in seguito il suo ambasciatore a Venezia era tenuto a presentare il nuovo console al Pien Collegio per ottenere anche il consenso dell'amministrazione veneziana. Poiché la carica del console era una carica pubblica, il Senato di Venezia con l'opinione conforme dei Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia rilasciava per ogni console una *patenta* consolare nella quale si definivano in dettaglio i diritti, i doveri ma anche i privilegi che talvolta la Serenissima concedeva a certe persone o stati²⁰.

Per quanto riguarda i consoli dei mercanti greci che erano sudditi ottomani le cose si differenziano un poco²¹. Nei secoli XVI e XVII i mercanti

¹⁸ ΠΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 584.

¹⁹ ΠΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 584-585.

²⁰ In generale sul sistema di elezione dei consoli si veda ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102, Parte seconda, 29 luglio 1701. Si veda anche ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του πρόξενου*, 14, e ΠΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 585-586.

²¹ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, "Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπορικής ναυτιλίας", 385; ΠΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 586-588; ΠΕΔΑΝΙ, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 216-217.

scelgono e nominano loro stessi, con un atto notarile, la persona che secondo loro è più adatta a rappresentarli. Nella maggior parte dei casi si trattava di una persona del luogo, suddito di Venezia²². In seguito, con una petizione rivolta ai Cinque Savi comunicavano la loro volontà e chiedevano la ratifica dell'elezione, che sarebbe avvenuta con il rilascio della *patenta consolare* dal Senato.

Alla fine del secolo XVII viene modificata la procedura di elezione e i veneziani intervengono ormai nel merito dell'elezione del console.²³ L'amministrazione veneziana tramite i Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia bandiva ogni volta l'elezione di nuovi consoli, controllava i documenti presentati dai candidati e designava il più adatto senza che partecipassero più direttamente all'elezione i soggetti rappresentati dal console. Nel caso in cui, tuttavia, i mercanti giudicassero che il soggetto eletto non serviva i loro interessi, potevano avviare la procedura affinché venisse sostituito e fosse indetta una nuova elezione²⁴. Vale la pena notare che l'impero ottomano non intervenne mai nella procedura di elezione malgrado i rappresentanti fossero suoi sudditi. Avvenuta l'elezione e dopo aver ricevuto *la patenta* (decreto di nomina) e *la commissione* (regolamento di funzionamento del consolato), il console si recava nella propria sede ove sarebbe rimasto per cinque anni²⁵.

Dallo studio di questi documenti si constata che tutti i consoli erano uguali indipendentemente se rappresentavano un gruppo di mercanti o una comunità commerciale oppure uno stato sovrano. "Con tutte le utilità, emolumenti e prerogative degli altri consoli" scrive quasi ogni *patenta* per definire lo status dei consoli²⁶.

Oltre ai doveri ufficiali registrati nelle patenti consolari²⁷, i consoli avevano un obbligo in più: lo spionaggio. I documenti studiati non fanno riferimento specifico a questo obbligo. Si sa comunque che lo spionaggio è un tratto comune sia dei consoli dei paesi europei che dei consoli dei mercanti greci dell'impero ottomano²⁸.

²² "...come per deliberazione dell'eccellentissimo Senato del marzo 1586 fù statuito in materia della elezione de consoli, che sempre fossero preferiti li suoi cittadini, sudditi, et poi li forestieri...": ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102, Parte prima, 7 marzo 1605.

²³ PΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 587-588.

²⁴ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου*, 240.

²⁵ Fino al 1714 i consoli degli Ebrei a Zante e Corfù potevano rimanere nella propria sede per sette anni (ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda Serie, 44, fasc. N° 101: *Console degli Ebrei di Lepanto, Patrasso e luochi della Morea*, 19 settembre 1636). Dopo il 1714 tutti i consoli restavano in carica per cinque anni (ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 101, 11 febbraio 1714 e 2 marzo 1719).

²⁶ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, "Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπορικής ναυτιλίας", 390-391.

²⁷ PΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 588-590; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 217-218.

²⁸ PΑΡΑΚΟΣΤΑ, "Οι εμπορικοί πρόξενοι στα Ιόνια νησιά", 590.

I consoli erano chiamati ad esercitare loro stessi e non tramite un sostituto i propri doveri assistiti dal segretario e dal viceconsole.

I consoli dei mercanti greci, sudditi dell'impero ottomano, venivano remunerati non dall'erario veneziano ma dai mercanti che rappresentavano in base al volume delle merci trafficate. Il diritto consolare (*cottimo*) si calcolava in base alle dimensioni delle confezioni delle merci.

Riguardo ai consoli dei paesi europei, nelle fonti studiate non si fa riferimento né all'entità del compenso né a chi dovesse versarlo (i mercanti o lo stato). Si sa però dalla bibliografia generale che i consoli ricevevano come compenso consolare una percentuale che spaziava fra il 3 e il 6% del valore delle merci trafficate²⁹.

Studiando i nomi delle persone che servirono come consoli dei mercanti nello spazio greco sotto dominio veneziano siamo giunti alla conclusione che per la maggior parte provenivano da famiglie insigni o erano nobili. Assumendo la carica del console godevano di benefici economici, ma anche politici.

Un esempio caratteristico è la famiglia Siguros a Zante³⁰, nelle mani della quale si trovava il consolato dei mercanti greci del Peloponneso nel XVII secolo. I Siguros riuscirono a trasformare il consolato dell'isola in una grandiosa impresa commerciale con enormi profitti per loro stessi. L'enorme forza economica e il potere derivante dalla funzione consolare diedero ad essi la possibilità di essere attivi anche in politica. I rappresentanti commerciali insediati in diverse parti dal Peloponneso sino a Venezia, oltre alle loro attività commerciali, avevano anche la funzione di spie, che raccoglievano informazioni sugli ottomani e sulle altre potenze europee e nel contempo svolgevano propaganda a favore dei veneziani.

²⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102, Parte prima, 26 agosto 1699; ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, b. 22, fasc. N° 100, *Parte Prima. Corfù*, 12 maggio 1711 (si riferisce al compenso dei consoli francesi nel Levante).

³⁰ ΝΙΚΟΣ ΣΤ. ΒΛΑΣΣΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, *Ιόνιοι έμποροι και καταβακύρηδες στη Μεσόγειο 16^{ος}-18^{ος} αιώνας*, Atene (s.d.), 43-44; ΔΙΜΙΤΡΙΣ Δ. ΑΡΒΑΝΙΤΑΚΗΣ, *Κοινωνικές αντιθέσεις στη πόλη της Ζακύνθου. Το ρεμπελιό των ποπολάρων (1628)*, Atene 2001, *passim*.

APPENDICE

CORFÙ

| Data ³¹ | Nome del console ³² | Titolo ³³ |
|--------------------------------|--|---|
| 1548-1549 ³⁴ | Γάκωβος Σπετζιέρης (Giacomo Spezzieri) | Console dei mercanti dell'isola di Mitilene |
| 23 luglio 1583 ³⁵ | Bortollo di Lotti, corfiotto | Console francese |
| 19 dicembre 1601 ³⁶ | Theofilo quondam Giacomo da Corfù | <i>Console per la Nazione di Santa Maura</i> |
| dopo 1602 ³⁷ | Giovanni Stagner | Console dei mercanti sudditi ottomani |
| 24 novembre 1603 ³⁸ | | Console inglese |
| 2 luglio 1608 ³⁹ | Giovanni Andrea Liprovati | Console spagnolo |
| 1609 ⁴⁰ | Donato d'Abram, ebreo | <i>Console de Hebrei levantini in Corfù</i> |
| 1609 ⁴¹ | Zorzi Giolma | <i>Console de mercanti Greci levantini</i> |
| 1609 ⁴² | Nicolò Petriti detto Protocaravo | <i>Console de mercanti Greci levantini</i> |
| 14 luglio 1623 ⁴³ | Antonio Voliardo, francese di Lione, abitante à Corfù | Console francese |
| 27 ottobre 1623 ⁴⁴ | domino Lino Vervizotti, Priore dell'Ospitale di Santa Giustina à Corfù | <i>Console della Nazione fiamegna nell'isola di Corfù</i> |
| 1623 ⁴⁵ | | Console spagnolo |
| prima del 1627 ⁴⁶ | Menachen Cohen | <i>Console della Nazione Ebra in Corfù</i> |
| 20 luglio 1627 ⁴⁷ | Cain Cohen, figliolo di Menachen | <i>Console della Nazione Ebra in Corfù</i> |
| 17 novembre 1629 ⁴⁸ | Zorzi Ocça quondam Andriolo | <i>Console della nazione di Santa Maura</i> |

³¹ Sono riportate le date in cui abbiamo notizia dell'esistenza dei consoli e dei consolati.

³² I nomi dei consoli sono stati trascritti dai documenti rispettando la grafia originale.

³³ I titoli in corsivo sono quelli riportati dai documenti.

³⁴ PAGRATIS, "Το κοινοσουλάτον των Μυτιληναίων", 24-45.

³⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

³⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

³⁷ PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

³⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

³⁹ ASVE, Senato Secreta, Dispacci rettori-Corfù, filza 6.

⁴⁰ ASVE, Dispacci rettori-Corfù, 6.

⁴¹ ASVE, Dispacci rettori-Corfù, 6.

⁴² ASVE, Dispacci rettori-Corfù, 6.

⁴³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

⁴⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, b. 24, fasc. N° 107: *Console Olandese al Zante, Corfù, Ceffalonia.*

⁴⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

⁴⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

⁴⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

⁴⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|--|---|--|
| 16 dicembre 1634 ⁴⁹ | Siderin (o Thoderin) Rali, greco | Console francese |
| 11 luglio 1648 ⁵⁰ | Francesco Dascoli, mercante, abitante nella città di Corfù | Console francese |
| 1676 ⁵¹ | Prospero Martin | Console dei mercanti sudditi ottomani |
| 3 agosto 1682 ⁵² | kavalier Marini | <i>Console in Corfù delle Nationi di Santa Maura, e Prevesa et altri Levantini</i> |
| 8 ottobre 1689 ⁵³ | Bartolomeo D'Ascoli | Console francese |
| 1704, 13 maggio 1705 ⁵⁴ | Nicolò Petronico, abitante e negoziante in Corfù | <i>Console dell'isola di Santa Maura e delli negozianti Levantini</i> ⁵⁵ |
| 20 maggio 1711 ⁵⁶ | | Console francese |
| 1 luglio 1713- 14 luglio 1747 ⁵⁷ | Hean Marin | Console francese |
| 10 marzo 1717 ⁵⁸ | | <i>Console francese al Zante con esser console anche à Ceffalonia</i> |
| 1718-1745 ⁵⁹ | Giovanni Marin | Console francese |
| 4 aprile 1720 ⁶⁰ | Zorzi Venetando da Candia & Pietro Combici da Candia | <i>Console in Corfù ad assistere al ricapito delle mercanzie e corrispondenze da Janina, Arta et altri luochi Turchi</i> |
| 30 giugno 1728 ⁶¹ | signor Marin ⁶² | Vice console francese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ⁶³ | Antonio Costantini | Console di Spagna e di Napoli |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ⁶⁴ | Piero Schiavoni | Console genovese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ⁶⁵ | Nicolò Dilotti | Console olandese |
| 14 ottobre 1745 ⁶⁶ | Zuane Verviziotti | Console maltese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ⁶⁷ | Zorzi Bozzi | Console agente dei Turchi |
| 1748 ⁶⁸ | Louis Marin de Thorigny | Console francese |

⁴⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

⁵⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

⁵¹ PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

⁵² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

⁵³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

⁵⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου*, 22; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

⁵⁵ Nella stessa epoca Nicolò Petronico rappresentava anche l'Austria.

⁵⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

⁵⁷ DEMETRIOS ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance des consuls français à Corfou de 1713 à 1901*, Corfù 1993, X.

⁵⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

⁵⁹ SIOKOKAS, *To γαλλικό προξενείο*, 208.

⁶⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

⁶¹ SIOKOKAS, *To γαλλικό προξενείο*, 131.

⁶² Probabilmente era Giovanni, che era console negli anni precedenti.

⁶³ ASVE, PTM, filza 990, dispaccio N° 78.

⁶⁴ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

⁶⁵ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

⁶⁶ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

⁶⁷ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

⁶⁸ SIOKOKAS, *To γαλλικό προξενείο*, 208.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---|--|--|
| 25 maggio 1748- 15 agosto 1768 ⁶⁹ | | Console francese |
| 19 luglio 1749 ⁷⁰ | Demetrio Nicazza, greco | Console siciliano |
| 19 luglio 1749 ⁷¹ | Spiro Milidoni, greco | Console Genovese in Corfù, Zante, Cefalonia |
| 2 giugno 1757 ⁷² | Giovanni Battista Bonfandini, nativo de respetivo luogo | Vice console austriaco |
| 12 luglio 1764 ⁷³ | Spiridion Caramondani detto Tramontana ⁷⁴ | <i>Agente de Turchi e sudditi Turchi in città et Isola di Corfù</i> |
| 30 gennaio 1767 ⁷⁵ | Alvise Verviziotti | Console maltese |
| 25 marzo 1767 ⁷⁶ | Giovanni Battista Bonafin | Vice console inglese |
| 13 luglio 1767 ⁷⁷ | Santo Milioni | Console genovese |
| 28 gennaio 1772 ⁷⁸ | Giorgio Dado, dal Peloponneso | Vice console francese |
| 12 luglio 1775 ⁷⁹ | Demetrio Nicaza | Console delle due Sicilie |
| 12 luglio 1775 ⁸⁰ | Nicolò Chiessari, corfioto | Vice console siciliano |
| 12 dicembre 1776 ⁸¹ | | |
| 8 gennaio 1778 ⁸² | Antonio (o Arsenio) Conomo | Vice console francese |
| 4 ottobre 1786 ⁸³ | | Console russo |
| prima del 1787 fino al 1787 ⁸⁴ | Michiel Veglianiti | <i>Vice console della nazione francese nell'isola di Corfù, Paxò, Antipaxo e Pargue</i> |
| 1787 ⁸⁵ | Stelio Calogera | <i>Vice console della nazione Francese ne Porti dell'Isole di Corfù, Paxò, Antipaxo, Parga e loro dipendenze</i> |
| 1788 ⁸⁶ | Liberale Benacchi | Console generale di Sua Maestà l'Imperatrice di tutte le Russie |
| 8 ottobre 1789 ⁸⁷ | | |

⁶⁹ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, X.

⁷⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, Diversorum, b. 398.

⁷¹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

⁷² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

⁷³ ASVE, PTM, filza 1031, inserto N° 3 col dispaccio N° 110.

⁷⁴ Il precedente console dei mercanti turchi era Demetrio Vassallo.

⁷⁵ ASVE, Prima serie, 398.

⁷⁶ ASVE, PTM, filza 1013, dispaccio N° 112.

⁷⁷ ASVE, PTM, 1013, inserto col dispaccio N° 126.

⁷⁸ ΣΙΟΡΟΚΑΣ, *Το γαλλικό προξενείο*, 209.

⁷⁹ ASVE, PTM, 1026, N° 108.

⁸⁰ ASVE, PTM, 1026, 108.

⁸¹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

⁸² ASVE, PTM, 1031 inserto N° 12 col dispaccio N° 106.

⁸³ Archivio dei documenti della "Istoriki kai Ethnologiki Etaireia Ellados", N° 16904, f. 24r.

⁸⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

⁸⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398, fasc. N° 125.

⁸⁶ ΕΜΜΑΝΟΥΙΛ Γ. ΠΡΟΤΟΠΣΑΛΤΙΣ, "Η επαναστατική κίνησης των Ελλήνων κατά τον δεύτερον επί Αικατερίνης Β' ρωσοτουρκικόν πόλεμον (1787-1792). Λουδοβίκος Σωτήρης", *Δελτίον Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας της Ελλάδος*, 14 (1960), 53, 68; ΗΕΛΕΝΙ Κ. ΓΙΑΝΝΑΚΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Γαλλοελληνική εκμετάλλευση δασών στη δυτική Ελλάδα (1710-1792)*, Atene 1987, 261.

⁸⁷ ASVE, PTM, 1047, dispaccio N° 41.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---|---|--|
| 1790 ⁸⁸ | Nicola Baccino | Console napoletano |
| 8 ottobre 1791 - 10 gennaio 1791 ⁸⁹ | cavaliere Buccino | Console napoletano |
| 23 aprile 1793 - 5 aprile 1795 ⁹⁰ | André Grasset Saint-Sauveur (figlio) | <i>Vice console incaricato degli affari del consolato della Repubblica francese</i> |
| 5 giugno 1795 ⁹¹ | Panagiotti Papadopoli | <i>Uffizial russo, con equal carattere scortato alla carica da questo incaricato del consolato di Sua Maestà Imperatrice di Moscovia</i> |
| 1796 ⁹² | Salvatore Grasset | Console francese |

ZANTE

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---|---|---|
| prima del 1596 ⁹³ | Lorenzo Castellano | <i>Console della nazione di Santa Maura, Natolico, Lepanto e Patrasso</i> |
| 16 aprile 1596 ⁹⁴ | Giorgio Castellano | <i>Console della nazione di Santa Maura, Natolico, Lepanto e Patrasso</i> |
| 16 dicembre 1596 ⁹⁵ | | Console spagnolo |
| prima del 1602 ⁹⁶ | Zuanne Catalano (o Castellano) | <i>Console della Nazione di Santa Maura, Natolico, Lepanto, Patrasso et altri luoghi et vascelli Panomeriti</i> |
| 18 settembre 1602-1605 ⁹⁷ | Nuzzo, figliolo di Todorin, Tomopulo | <i>Console della Nazione di Santa Maura, Natolico, Lepanto, Patrasso et altri luoghi et vascelli Panomeriti</i> |
| 1603 ⁹⁸ | | <i>Corrispodente et assistente degli mercanti Ebrei da Peloponneso</i> |
| 1604 ⁹⁹ | Francesco de Heriedi | <i>Console della nacion Atenese</i> |
| 1605 ¹⁰⁰ | Paolo degli Eredi | Console dei mercanti sudditi ottomani |

⁸⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, b. 400, fasc. N° 94.

⁸⁹ ASVE, PTM, filza 1049, dispaccio N° 13, e Inquisitori di Stato, b. 41, lettera N° 669. Probabilmente è Nicola Baccino, console napoletano a Corfù, menzionato nel 1790.

⁹⁰ ASVE, Inquisitori, b. 408; ΑΝΟΥΑΤΙΣ-PELÈ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, X; Carlo Aurelio Widmann *Provveditore generale da Mar. Dispacci da Corfù 1794-1797*, a cura e con una premessa di FILIPPO MARIA PALADINI, v. I, Venezia 1997, 23.

⁹¹ PALADINI, *Carlo Aurelio Widmann*, vol. I, 182.

⁹² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, b. 403, fasc. N° 71.

⁹³ ASVE, Senato Mar, reg. 56, f. 32v.

⁹⁴ ASVE, Senato Mar, 56, f. 32v.

⁹⁵ DIMITRIS ARVANITAKIS (ed.), *Οι αναφορές των βενετών προβλεπτόν της Ζακύνθου (16^{ος}-18^{ος} αι.)*, Venezia 2000, 136-137.

⁹⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

⁹⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

⁹⁸ Fondazione del consolato degli mercanti Ebrei da Peloponneso a Zante; ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

⁹⁹ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, "Όψεις της ελληνικής ναυτιλίας", 384-385.

¹⁰⁰ PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---|--|---|
| 1610 ¹⁰¹ | Giacob Levi | Console degli Ebrei della Morea |
| 7 marzo 1605-1614 ¹⁰² | Paulo di Eredi di Francesco | <i>Console della Nazione di Santa Maura, Natolico, Lepanto, Patrasso et altri luoghi et vascelli Panomeriti</i> |
| 1606 ¹⁰³ | Bortolo Defarana | Console francese |
| 2 luglio 1608 ¹⁰⁴ | Giovanni Lunardo Latino | Console spagnolo |
| prima di 1613 ¹⁰⁵ | dottor Samuel Cirore | <i>Console per li mercanti Hebrei di Lepanto, Patrasso et altri luochi di Morea</i> |
| 8 dicembre 1613-1636 ¹⁰⁶ | rabi Jacob de Casa Levita (Giacomo Levi) | <i>Console de Hebrei della Morea al Zante</i> |
| 2 agosto 1614 ¹⁰⁷ | | Console spagnolo |
| 1614 ¹⁰⁸ | Mauro Themopoulo | <i>Console de Santa Maura, Natolico, Lepanto e luochi circonvicini et de tutti i vassali Panomeriti</i> |
| 14 maggio 1616 ¹⁰⁹ | (o Tomopulo) | |
| 20 luglio 1616 ¹¹⁰ | Manoli Chrisolora | Console dei mercanti della Santa Maura, Romeli e Morea |
| 9 agosto 1616 ¹¹¹ | domino Egidio Ovens ¹¹² | <i>Console de Signori stati de paesi Bassi Confederati (Consolato del Zante e Cefalonia)</i> |
| 7 luglio 1617 ¹¹³ | domino Erasmo Benson de Sassonia | <i>Console della Nazione Fiamengna</i> |
| 9 luglio 1618 ¹¹⁴ | Agésilao Seguro | <i>Console per i mercanti di Morea, Santa Maura et altri paesi sudditi del Gran Turco</i> |
| 23 novembre 1622 ¹¹⁵ | Giacob Levi | Console degli Ebrei e mercanti Turchi dalla Morea |
| 8 novembre 1623 ¹¹⁶ | Leonardo Steffano Enghelbrunner | <i>Console della Nation Fiamegnna nell' Isole del Zante e Ceffalonia</i> |
| 7 agosto 1624, 1628, 19 ottobre 1637, marzo 1644 ¹¹⁷ | Giorgio Latino quondam Zuan-Lunardo | Console spagnolo |

¹⁰¹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

¹⁰² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

¹⁰³ ST. ΚΑΚΛΑΜΑΝΙΣ, "Μάρκος Δεφαράνας (1503-1575). Ζακύνθιος στιχουργός του 16^{ου} αιώνα", *Θησαυρίσματα*, 21 (1991), 210-315.

¹⁰⁴ ASVE, Dispacci rettori-Corfù, 6.

¹⁰⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, fasc. *Consoli degli Ebrei in Patrasso 1613-1719*.

¹⁰⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, *Consoli degli Ebrei*.

¹⁰⁷ ARVANITAKIS, *Αναφορές*, 193.

¹⁰⁸ PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

¹⁰⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

¹¹⁰ ASVE, Senato Mar, reg. 74, f. 211r; ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΥ, *Ο θεσμός του προξένου*, 243; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

¹¹¹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

¹¹² Come suo sostituto era eletto Zorzi Balsamo.

¹¹³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

¹¹⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

¹¹⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, *Consoli degli Ebrei*.

¹¹⁶ ASVE, Cinque savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

¹¹⁷ ARVANITAKIS, *Αναφορές*, 270, 296; ARVANITAKIS, *Κοινωνικές αντιθέσεις στην πόλη της Ζακύνθου. Το ρεμπελιό των ποπολάρων*, Atene 2001, 154, 300.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
| 29 settembre 1629 ¹¹⁸ | Giulio Bon | <i>Console delle Nazion Fiamenga nell'Isole del Zante e Ceffalonia</i> |
| 22 maggio 1632 ¹¹⁹ | Daniel Neel | Console francese |
| 12 agosto 1632 ¹²⁰ | Agesialo Seguro | Console inglese |
| 10 settembre 1636 ¹²¹ | Agesilao Siguro e Filippo Carrer | <i>Corrispondenti della Morea, Lepanto, Patrasso et altri luochi</i> |
| 8 giugno 1635 ¹²² | Nicollà Villana | Console francese di Zante e Cefalonia |
| 17 settembre 1636 ¹²³ | | <i>Console per la Nazione Hebrea</i> |
| 10 maggio 1639-1640 ¹²⁴ | Tomaso Simons | Console inglese |
| 20 luglio 1639 ¹²⁵ 1642 ¹²⁶ | Nicolò Seguro ¹²⁷ | <i>Console della Nazione di Santa Maura, Natolicò, Lepanto et altri luochi circonvicini et di tutti li vascalli Metelini et altri sudditi del Signor Turco</i> |
| 1645-1651(?) ¹²⁸ | Crisostomo Pisilla | <i>Console degli Stati Generali delle Provincie unite dei Paesi Bassi al Zante e Ceffalonia</i> |
| 10 gennaio 1649 ¹²⁹ | Henrico Hyde | <i>Capo ò Agente della Nazione Inglese nelle Isole del Zante e Ceffalonia</i> |
| 1650-1655 ¹³⁰ | Nicolò Villana | Console francese di Zante e Cefalonia |
| 4 aprile 1651 ¹³¹ | Mattio Grilli | <i>Console della Nazion Fiamenga al Zante e Ceffalonia</i> |
| 30 giugno 1655 ¹³² | Giovanni Taulignano | <i>Console francese di Zante et Ceffalonia</i> |
| 12 maggio 1666 ¹³³ | Antonio Rus di Marsilia | <i>Console per la Nazione Francese della città del Zante</i> |
| 27 luglio 1669 ¹³⁴ | Giovanni Tullinian | Console francese di Zante e Cefalonia |
| 26 aprile 1670 ¹³⁵ | | Cefalonia |
| 20 luglio 1670 ¹³⁶ | Clemente Harbii | Console inglese |

¹¹⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

¹¹⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100 (fondazione del consolato).

¹²⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 23, fasc. N° 105 *Console Inglese al Zante*.

¹²¹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

¹²² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

¹²³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, *Consoli degli Ebrei*.

¹²⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 23, 105, e MARIA FUSARO, *Uva passa, una guerra commerciale tra Venezia e l'Inghilterra (1540-1640)*, Venezia 1996, 173.

¹²⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

¹²⁶ PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

¹²⁷ Dal 1639 al 1642 servivano come consoli Agesilao e suo figlio Nicolò. Nel 1650 Nicolò era rieleto "console della Nazione di Santa Maura, Natolicò, Lepanto et altri luochi circonvicini et di tutti li vascalli Metelini et altri sudditi del Signor Turco" a Zante.

¹²⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

¹²⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 23, 105.

¹³⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

¹³¹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

¹³² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

¹³³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

¹³⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104, e Senato, Rettori, filza 74, decreto stampato in data 27 luglio 1669.

¹³⁵ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹³⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 23, 105.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---|--|---|
| 1671, 1678 1688-1697 ¹³⁷ | Agésilao Sicuro (nipote) | <i>Console de Mercanti Greci sudditi del Gran Turco della Morea, Grecia e luochi circonvicini</i> |
| 16 aprile 1674 ¹³⁸ | Dissilachi Sicuro ¹³⁹ | <i>Console delli sudditi di Turchia delle Parti de Santa Maura, Dragomestre, Lepanto, Morea e loro territorii</i> |
| 18 maggio 1684 ¹⁴⁰ | Crisostomo Pisillia | <i>Console della Nazione Fiamegna al Zante e Ceffalonia</i> |
| 1684 | Cristoforo Vaches, fiamegno | Vice console olandese |
| 17 aprile 1688 ¹⁴¹ | Simon Blanc | Console francese di Zante e di Cefalonia |
| luglio 1694 ¹⁴² | Jean Caner | Console francese di Zante e di Cefalonia |
| 1696 ¹⁴³ | Carlo Teodorin | <i>Console di Genova al Zante con l'estensione dell'altre Isole e di Morea</i> |
| 3 dicembre 1699 ¹⁴⁴ | Antonio Rossi | Vice console di Morea e Romelia |
| 13 febbraio 1699 ¹⁴⁵ | Alberto Rossi | Vice console dei mercanti di Morea e Romelia |
| 15 maggio 1700 ¹⁴⁶ | Giacomo Paul | <i>Console in Regno della Morea e nelle Isole adiacenti della Nazione Inglese destinato dalla Maestà Britannica</i> |
| giugno 1700- 13 aprile 1752 ¹⁴⁷ | Victor Tauglinian | Console francese |
| 8 aprile 1702 ¹⁴⁸ | conte Tomaso Mocenigo quondam Michiel | <i>Console al Zante de Mercanti greci sudditi del Gran Signore unito alla soprintendenza delle mercantie che dalla Morea passassero di transitio al Zante</i> |
| 20 maggio 1711 ¹⁴⁹ | | <i>Console francese al Zante e à Ceffalonia</i> |
| 1712, 24 marzo 1713- -1730 ¹⁵⁰ | Angelo Foscardi quondam Ludovico ¹⁵¹ | <i>Console del Zante intitolato della Rumelia</i> |

¹³⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

¹³⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102.

¹³⁹ Probabilmente si riferisce ad Agésilao Sicuro (nipote).

¹⁴⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

¹⁴¹ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁴² ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁴³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

¹⁴⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

Non era eletto dai mercanti ma era nominato alla carica consolare da Daniel Dolfin, provveditore straordinario d'Armata.

¹⁴⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

¹⁴⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 23, 105.

¹⁴⁷ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁴⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

¹⁴⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

¹⁵⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

¹⁵¹ Eletto console *vita sua durante*, ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 23r, 28 giugno 1717.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---|------------------------|--|
| 1728 ¹⁵² | Francesco Russo | Console dei mercanti sudditi ottomani |
| 16 febbraio 1744 ¹⁵³ | Vettor Taulignan | Console francese |
| 1 dicembre 1744– 1759 ¹⁵⁴ | Zorzi Crissoplevri | <i>Console al Zante de mercanti Greci della Morea e sudditi del Gran Signore</i> |
| fino 30 giugno 1745 ¹⁵⁵ | Francesco Roma | <i>Vice Console dei sudditi Ottomani del Sangiacato di Carlele</i> |
| dopo 30 giugno 1745 ¹⁵⁶ | Anastasi Boloni | <i>Vice Console dei sudditi Ottomani del Sangiacato di Carlele per tutti gli abitanti delle ville di Missolonghi et Anatolicae del Cadilaggio d' Angelo Castro nel Sangiacato di Carlili</i> |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ¹⁵⁷ | Samuel Hayvard | Console inglese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ¹⁵⁸ | Antonio Kachni | Vice console inglese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ¹⁵⁹ | Riccardo Jefferies | Console olandese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ¹⁶⁰ | Moisè Trevese, ebreo | Vice console olandese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ¹⁶¹ | Giorgio Andrizzi | Console maltese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ¹⁶² | Nicolò Cazino | Console fiorentino |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ¹⁶³ | Giacomo Antonio Latini | Console napoletano |
| 9 settembre 1746 | Giovanni Ferrendino | Console maltese |
| 31 agosto 1754 ¹⁶⁴ | | |
| 4 giugno 1750, 1758, 12 agosto 1766 ¹⁶⁵ | Giovanni Sargint | Inglese residente a Zante, Console generale d'Inghilterra, Console Brittanico |
| aprile 1752 ¹⁶⁶ | ... Peyrouzet | Cancelliere del consolato francese che amministrava come console |
| ottobre 1753 ¹⁶⁷ | Louis Joseph Reinaud | Console francese |
| 26 giugno 1753 ¹⁶⁸ | ... Latino | Console napoletano |

¹⁵² PEDANI, "Venetian consuls for ottoman subjects", 213-219.

¹⁵³ SIOROKAS, *To γαλλικό προξενείο*, 131.

¹⁵⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102 e PTM, filza 1001, inserto N° 5 col dispaccio N° 36; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

¹⁵⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

¹⁵⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

¹⁵⁷ ASVE, PTM, 990, dispaccio N° 78.

¹⁵⁸ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

¹⁵⁹ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

¹⁶⁰ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

¹⁶¹ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

¹⁶² ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

¹⁶³ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

¹⁶⁴ VICTOR MALLIA-MILANES, "Il consolato maltese a Zante e i rapporti tra Venezia e l'Ordine di San Giovanni", in *Il Mediterraneo centro-orientale tra vecchie e nuove egemonie*, a cura di MASSIMO COSTANTINI, Roma 1998, 173.

¹⁶⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398; ASVE, PTM, filza 1000, dispaccio N° 85 e 1013, dispaccio N° 112.

¹⁶⁶ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁶⁷ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II; MALLIA-MILANES, "Il consolato maltese a Zante", 174.

¹⁶⁸ ASVE, PTM, filza 996, dispaccio N° 31.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|--|---|---|
| 17 settembre 1758 ¹⁶⁹ | Pietro Balsamo | Console siciliano |
| prima marzo 1759 ¹⁷⁰ | Zorzi Crissoplevri | <i>Console de' sudditi Ottomani</i> |
| 13 marzo 1759 ¹⁷¹ | conte Zorzi Candian Roma ¹⁷² | <i>Console de' sudditi Ottomani</i> |
| 12 gennaio 1759 ¹⁷³ | Nicolò Sicuro ¹⁷⁴ | <i>Console austriaco al Zante, Corfù, Ceffalonia ed altre Isole del Levante</i> |
| 30 aprile 1762 ¹⁷⁵ | Giovanni Sefferies | <i>Console Olandese al Zante e Ceffalonia, Corfù e dipendenze</i> |
| 28 gennaio 1763 ¹⁷⁶ | Athanasio Vuzzanese | Console raguseo |
| 5 maggio 1768 ¹⁷⁷ | Costantin Macri | Console genovese |
| 4 febbraio 1774-1780 ¹⁷⁸ | monsignor cavalier, Francese ¹⁷⁹ | <i>Console francese nell'Isole del Levante residente al Zante</i> |
| 9 aprile 1777 ¹⁸⁰ | conte Candian Roma | <i>Console de' sudditi Ottomani</i> |
| 29 settembre 1778, 1779 ¹⁸¹ | signor Visconti | <i>Incaricato degl'Offici del Consolato di Francia</i> |
| 10 novembre 1778 ¹⁸² | Giovanni Sargint | Console inglese |
| 3 giugno 1779 ¹⁸³ | Costantin Carter | Console de Turchi al Zante |
| agosto-settembre 1780 ¹⁸⁴ | ... Ferandino | Console generale francese |
| marzo 1781 ¹⁸⁵ | Andrea Grasset de Saint-Sauveur | Console generale francese |
| 23 marzo 1782 ¹⁸⁶ | Pietro Sargint | Console inglese |
| 3 luglio 1784 ¹⁸⁷ | | Vice console russo |
| 1786 ¹⁸⁸ | Giovanni Villica | Vice console danese nelle isole di Zante e Cefalonia |
| 20 maggio 1786 ¹⁸⁹ | | Vice console danese |

¹⁶⁹ ASVE, Prima serie, 398.

¹⁷⁰ ASVE, PTM, 1001, inserto N° 5 col dispaccio N° 36.

¹⁷¹ ASVE, PTM, 1001, inserto N° 5 col dispaccio N° 36 e filza 1030, inserto N° 10 col dispaccio N° 98.

¹⁷² Anche suo padre, Francesco Roma, aveva servito come "console dei sudditi Ottomani" nell'isola di Zante.

¹⁷³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

¹⁷⁴ Era sostituito dall'inglese Giovanni Cutter.

¹⁷⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

¹⁷⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, b. 367, fasc. N° 147 e b. 398.

¹⁷⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

¹⁷⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398; ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁷⁹ ASVE, PTM, filza 1026, N° 112 : *All'arrivo, che fece al Zante la persona del signor cavalier destinato in Console General della Nazione Francese in luogo del Console Rainaud.*

¹⁸⁰ ASVE, PTM, filza 1028, dispaccio N° 34.

¹⁸¹ ASVE, PTM, 1030, inserto N° 10 col dispaccio N° 99, e 1031, inserto N° 4 col dispaccio N° 119.

¹⁸² ASVE, PTM, 1030 inserto N° 6 col dispaccio N° 101.

¹⁸³ ASVE, PTM, 1032, inserto N° 1 col dispaccio N° 127.

¹⁸⁴ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁸⁵ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁸⁶ ASVE, PTM, filza 1040, inserto N° 3 col dispaccio N° 157.

¹⁸⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

¹⁸⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, b. 397, fasc. N° 185.

¹⁸⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| 1 novembre 1787 ¹⁹⁰ | Andre Grasset de Saint- Sauveur | Console Generale di Francia nell' Isole Venete residente al Zante (consigliere del re) |
| 18 aprile 1788 ¹⁹¹ | Damiano Sagurischi | Vice console russo |
| 1789 ¹⁹² | Spiridione Foresti | Console britannico in Zante, Corfù ed isole |
| 1793 | Costantino Carrer | Console dei mercanti sudditi ottomani |
| 12 ottobre 1793 ¹⁹³ | Andre Grasset de Saint-Sauveur | Vice console francese |
| 6 settembre 1794 ¹⁹⁴ | Damiano Sagurischi | Vice console russo |
| 1795 ¹⁹⁵ | Pietro Boro | Console svizzero |
| 12 ottobre 1795 ¹⁹⁶ | Costantin Guys | Vice console francese |
| 8 aprile 1797 ¹⁹⁷ | | |
| 5 aprile 1795 ¹⁹⁸ | Spiridion Foresti | Console inglese |
| 5 aprile 1795 ¹⁹⁹ | conte Giovanni Crissoplevri | Console austriaco |

CEFALONIA

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|--|
| 7 luglio 1617 ²⁰⁰ | Zorzi Balsamo | Vice console della Nazion Fiamenga |
| 1621 ²⁰¹ | | Console |
| 16 aprile 1674 ²⁰² | Anzolo della Decima | Console degli sudditi di Turchia delle parti de Santa Maura, Dragomestre, Lepanto, Morea e loro territorii |
| 10 marzo 1717 ²⁰³ | | Console francese a Zante e Cefalonia |
| 5 settembre 1745 ²⁰⁴ | Petro Crassan | Console dei Perastini (mercanti dalla Dalmazia) |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁰⁵ | Pandasin Carididi | Vice console francese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁰⁶ | Alvise Inchiostro | Vice console inglese |

¹⁹⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398, fasc. N° 125.

¹⁹¹ ASVE, PTM, 1045, documento s.n. allegato all'inserto N° 3 col dispaccio N° 5.

¹⁹² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 400, fasc. N° 43.

¹⁹³ ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, II.

¹⁹⁴ PALADINI, *Carlo Aurelio Widmann*, vol. I, 17, 22.

¹⁹⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, b. 402, fasc. N° 82.

¹⁹⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 403, fasc. N° 71; ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire*, III.

¹⁹⁷ ASVE, PTM, filza 1058, inserto N° 1 col dispaccio s.n. (consecutivo al N° 170).

¹⁹⁸ ASVE, Inquisitori di Stato, 408.

¹⁹⁹ ASVE, Inquisitori di Stato, 408.

²⁰⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 24, 107.

²⁰¹ ΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΣ ΦΟΚΑΣ-ΚΟΣΜΕΤΑΤΟΣ, "Η καλλιέργεια της σταφίδος εν Κεφαλληνία", *Παρνασσός*, 14 (1972), 281.

²⁰² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 44, 102; PEDANI, "Venetian consuls", 213-219.

²⁰³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

²⁰⁴ ASVE, PTM, 990, dispaccio N° 72.

²⁰⁵ ASVE, PTM, 990, dispaccio N° 78.

²⁰⁶ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---|--------------------------------|---|
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁰⁷ | Vettor Carididi | Vice console olandese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁰⁸ | Zuane Lizzardopulo | Console-agente degli mercanti sudditi Turchi |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁰⁹ | Andrea Caruso | Console siciliano |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²¹⁰ | Stefano Caruso | Console |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²¹¹ | Anastasio Votrontò | Vice console imperiale |
| 27 luglio 1753 ²¹² | (Francesco) Salomon | Console di Napoli |
| 2 giugno 1757 ²¹³ | Paolo Pilicca, nativo di luogo | Vice console austriaco |
| 17 dicembre 1768 ²¹⁴ | Paolo Pilucca | Console siciliano |
| 1 settembre 1781 ²¹⁵ | Antonio Liguri | Vice console francese |
| 3 agosto 1782 ²¹⁶ | Antonio Filicca | Console napoletano |
| 15 aprile 1783 ²¹⁷ | Spiridione Caruso | Vice console raguseo |
| 3 luglio 1784 ²¹⁸ | | Console russo |
| 1785-1790 ²¹⁹ | Gica Becilli | Console russo |
| 26 giugno 1787 ²²⁰ | | |
| 24 febbraio 1790 (1789 m.v.) ²²¹ | | |
| 1786 ²²² | Giovanni Pillica | Vice console danese nelle isole di Zante e Cefalonia ²²³ |
| 1790 ²²⁴ | Spiridione Pillica | Vice console (...) |
| 1791 ²²⁵ | Vettore Caridi | Vice console inglese |
| 1791 ²²⁶ | conte Anastasio Lunzi | Console danese |
| 1791 ²²⁷ | Riccardo Sarguit | Console olandese in Zante e Cefalonia |
| 11 febbraio 1792 (1791 m.v.) ²²⁸ | Dionissio Pilarino | <i>Console della nazione Ottomana</i> |
| 9 febbraio 1792 (1791 m.v.) ²²⁹ | | |

²⁰⁷ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²⁰⁸ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²⁰⁹ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²¹⁰ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²¹¹ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²¹² ASVE, PTM, 996, dispaccio N° 34.

²¹³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²¹⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²¹⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²¹⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²¹⁷ ASVE, PTM, filza 1044, dispaccio senza numero.

²¹⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²¹⁹ Archivio dei documenti della "Istoriki kai Ethnologiki Etairieia Ellados", N° 16904.

²²⁰ ASVE, PTM, filza 1189, dispaccio senza numero.

²²¹ ASVE, PTM, 1047, dispaccio N° 51.

²²² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 397, fasc. N° 185.

²²³ Probabilmente la sua sede era a Zante.

²²⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 400, fasc. N° 38.

²²⁵ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 400, fasc. N° 72.

²²⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 400, fasc. N° 75.

²²⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 400, fasc. N° 92.

²²⁸ ASVE, PTM, 1049, dispaccio N° 22.

²²⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, b. 401, fasc. N° 20.

SANTA MAURA

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| 28 agosto 1705 ²³⁰ | | Vice console francese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²³¹ | Giovanni Maria Cassiano | Console napoletano |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²³² | Policroni Asprogeraca | Console genovese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²³³ | Francesco Bollini | Vice console dell'Inghilterra ed Olanda |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²³⁴ | Demetrio Petrizopulo | Vice console francese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²³⁵ | Pandasin Psomà | Vice console austriaco |
| 2 giugno 1752 ²³⁶ | Francesco Bollini | Vice console austriaco |
| 12 settembre 1772 ²³⁷ | Giovanni Cacciani | Console siciliano in Santa Maura e Prevesa |

CERIGO

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|-----------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| 1625-1641 ²³⁸ | | Console francese |
| 23 agosto 1641 ²³⁹ | Alvise Milani | Console francese |
| 1648 ²⁴⁰ | | <i>Console deputato da Francesi</i> |
| 26 marzo 1689 ²⁴¹ | Andrea Armario | Console francese |
| 20 maggio 1711 ²⁴² | "Un tal Livori" | Console francese |
| 10 marzo 1717 ²⁴³ | | Console francese |
| 6 agosto 1724-1744 ²⁴⁴ | Giorgio Liuvry | Console francese |
| 1745-1769 ²⁴⁵ | Antonio Liuvry | Console francese |
| 2 giugno 1757 ²⁴⁶ | Zorzi Caluci Macheriotti | Vice console austriaco |
| 1 giugno 1758 ²⁴⁷ | | Vice console inglese |
| 1 settembre 1781 ²⁴⁸ | Antonio Caraffa | Vice console francese |
| 10 marzo 1768 ²⁴⁹ | Giorgio Lecconi | Console siciliano |
| ottobre 1769 ²⁵⁰ | Felix Cary, negoziante francese a Cerigo | Console francese |

²³⁰ SIOROKAS, *To γαλλικό προξενείο*, 61.

²³¹ ASVE, PTM, 990, dispaccio N° 78.

²³² ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²³³ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²³⁴ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78; ANOYATIS-PELÉ, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, 28.

²³⁵ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²³⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²³⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²³⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

²³⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 104.

²⁴⁰ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

²⁴¹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

²⁴² ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

²⁴³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Seconda serie, 22, 100.

²⁴⁴ ANOYATIS-PELE, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, III.

²⁴⁵ ANOYATIS-PELE, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, III.

²⁴⁶ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²⁴⁷ ASVE, PTM, 1000, dispaccio N° 85, f. 5r.

²⁴⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²⁴⁹ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²⁵⁰ ANOYATIS-PELE, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, III.

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| gennaio 1774 ²⁵¹ | Giorgio Liuvry ²⁵² | Console francese |
| 18 settembre 1778 ²⁵³ | Zorzi Livuni | Vice console francese |
| 1 aprile 1780 ²⁵⁴ | | |
| 24 agosto 1780 ²⁵⁵ | | Console francese |
| 2 novembre 1778 ²⁵⁶ | Costantin Facea | Console (o vice console) inglese |
| Tra 1780 e 1803 ²⁵⁷ | E. Caluci | Vice console inglese e danese |
| 1 marzo 1781 ²⁵⁸ | Demetrio Levuni | Vice console napoletano |
| 1797 ²⁵⁹ | Giorgio Levuni | Console francese |

PAXÒ

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|--------------------------------|--|------------------------|
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁶⁰ | Spiro Macri | Vice console francese |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁶¹ | Gianacchi Veglianiti | Console napoletano |
| 24 ottobre 1745 ²⁶² | Steganin Veglianiti | Vice console genovese |
| 27 aprile 1752 ²⁶³ | Giovanni Vaglianiti (o Veglianiti), greco suddito veneto | Vice console siciliano |

TEACHI

| Data | Nome del console | Titolo |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 24 agosto 1754, | Giovanni Battista | Vice console siciliano |
| 24 gennaio 1755 ²⁶⁴ | Salamon, suddito veneto | |
| 5 settembre 1777 ²⁶⁵ | Costantin Petalà Sarò quondam Vettor | Console inglese ²⁶⁶ |
| 9 agosto 1784 ²⁶⁷ | | Vice console francese |
| 1791 ²⁶⁸ | Costantino Petalà Sarò | Vice console ²⁶⁹ |

²⁵¹ ANOYATIS-PELE, *Inventaire de la correspondance*, III.

²⁵² Dal 1771 al 1774 la carica di console francese a Cerigo rimaneva vacante.

²⁵³ ASVE, PTM, 1030, inserto N° 3 col dispaccio N° 99.

²⁵⁴ ASVE, PTM, 1033, dispaccio N° 36.

²⁵⁵ ASVE, PTM, filza 1036, inserto N° 1 col dispaccio N° 105.

²⁵⁶ ASVE, PTM, 1030, inserto N° 7 col dispaccio N° 101.

²⁵⁷ GEORGE N. LEONTSINIS, *The island of Kythera: a social history (1700-1863)*, Athens 1987, 112, 153.

²⁵⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²⁵⁹ LEONTSINIS, *The island of Kythera*, 114, 153.

²⁶⁰ ASVE, PTM, 990, dispaccio N° 78.

²⁶¹ ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²⁶² ASVE, PTM, 990, 78.

²⁶³ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²⁶⁴ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²⁶⁵ ASVE, PTM, filza 1029, inserto N° 4 col dispaccio N° 62.

²⁶⁶ La sua elezione era fatta da *Noi Giovanni Sargint per sua Maestà Britanica Giorgio Terzo Console dell'Isole del Zante, Cefalonia, Santa Maura, Teachi, Cerigo, Provincia di Carlali in Turchia.*

²⁶⁷ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 398.

²⁶⁸ ASVE, Cinque Savi, Prima serie, 400, fasc. N° 72.

²⁶⁹ Nel documento non è definito lo stato che rappresentava, forse era l'Inghilterra.

Katerina Papakonstantinou

Malta and the rise of the Greek-owned fleet in the XVIIIth century

This article addresses the rise of the Greek-owned fleet in the eighteenth century as can be assessed from the registers of the quarantine authorities in Malta. The material has been collected as part of a wider research project carried out at the Ionian University in Corfu. The analysis of the Maltese archival material studied here enables us to have a better picture of the history of Greek-owned shipping in the eighteenth century. This article centres on the period from 1723 to 1810, a decade before the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 that was fought by seafarers active in the waters of the western Mediterranean in the period under examination¹.

The Greek-owned Fleet

In his 1862 *Memorandum on the Island of Psara*, Constantinos Nicodimos notes that in 1770 the inhabitants of Psara in the northeast Aegean possessed thirty-six small ships, of a type called *saccoléva*, and that after 1774 they built forty-five large ships of twenty-five metres in length. The inhabitants of Psara were well-known for their piratical activity and their island was indeed known as 'Küçük Malta', or Small Malta. Information concerning the size of the fleet of each island of the Aegean and Ionian Seas is to be found in the texts of a number of authors. Jassaud in 1808² and Pouqueville in 1813³ and 1816⁴, for example, give somewhat different

¹ The paper is based on data collected by Katerina Papakonstantinou and Frank Theuma with the assistance of Katerina Vourkatioti. This research project in the Maltese archives was carried out under the guidance of Professor Carmel Vassallo. I take this opportunity to thank him for his invaluable assistance.

² AUGUSTE DE JASSAUD, *Mémoire sur l'état physique et politique des isles d'Hydra, Spécie, Poro et Ipséra en l'année 1808*, ed. by CONSTANTIN SVOLOPOULOS (Athens, 1978), 94-95.

³ F.C.H.L. POUQUEVILLE, *Voyage de la Grèce* (6 vols, Paris 1826-1827), VI, 294-297.

⁴ CONSTANTINOS SVOLOPOULOS, 'Ο ελληνικός εμπορικός στόλος κατά τας παραμονάς του αγονος τής ανεξαρτίας. Ανεκδοτος πιναξ του F. Pouqueville' [The Greek Merchant Fleet

figures for the three most important islands as can be seen in Table 1 with the average size of the crew per ship in brackets.

Table 1. Numbers of Ships and Average Crew Size in Hydra and Spetses in the SW Aegean, and Psara in the NE Aegean, 1808-1816

| Source | Hydra | Spetses | Psara |
|------------------|----------|---------|----------|
| Jassaud 1808 | 110 (60) | 90 (60) | 100 (48) |
| Pouqueville 1813 | 120 (45) | 60 (45) | 60 (30) |
| Pouqueville 1816 | 100 (60) | 60 (60) | 40 (30) |

Source: AUGUSTE DE JASSAUD, *Mémoire sur l'état physique et politique des isle d'Hydra, Spécie, Poro et Ipséra en l'année 1808*, ed. by CONSTANTIN SVOLOPOULOS (Athens, 1978), 94-95; F.C.H.L. POUQUEVILLE, *Voyage de la Grèce* (6 vols, Paris 1826-1827), VI, 294-297; CONSTANTINOS SVOLOPOULOS, 'O ellinikos emporikos stolos kata tas paramonas tou agonos tis anexartiasias. Anekdotos pinax tou F. Pouqueville' [The Greek Merchant Fleet on the Eve of the War of Independence. Unpublished Table by F. Pouqueville], *O Eranistis*, X (1973), 187-207.

Researchers have had recourse to French, Italian and Austrian archives in an effort to get a better idea of the situation of Greek⁵ mercantile shipping in the eighteenth century, in the period prior to Greek independence⁶. The picture that has emerged so far would seem to indicate that the Greek fleet was going through a particularly dynamic phase. The Greek historian B. Kremmydas has argued that at the end of the eighteenth century the bulk of the Greek trading fleet was restricted to the eastern Mediterranean⁷. Towards the end of the eighteenth century and in the beginning of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, it was able to take advantage of the political and economic situation created in the Mediterranean by the wars between Great Britain and France, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire and Venice or Russia on the other, to consolidate its presence in the eastern Mediterranean and establish a presence at the western end.

This paper is part of a wide-ranging research project concerning Greek maritime history in the eighteenth century which has been financed by

on the Eve of the War of Independence. Unpublished Table by F. Pouqueville], *O Eranistis*, X (1973), 187-207.

⁵ The use of the term 'Greek' throughout the text clearly refers not to vessels flying the flag of the Greek state, which only came into existence after the War of Independence in 1821-1830, but to those vessels which we have established as being manned and/or captained by Greeks, albeit flying Ottoman or other flags.

⁶ For example SVOLOPOULOS, 'O ellinikos emporikos stolos', 187-207, VASSILIS KREMMYDAS, *Elliniki nautilia 1776-1835* [Greek Shipping 1776-1835] (Athens, 1986); OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING, 'I austriaki politiki kai I elliniki nausploia (1750-1800 peripou)' [Austrian Politics and Greek Navigation (around 1750-1800)] *Parousia* V (1987), 445-537; GEORGIOS LEONTARITIS, *Elliniki emporiki nautilia (1453-1850)* [Greek Merchant Shipping (1453-1850)] (Athens, 1987); DESPINA VLAMI, *To fiorini, to sitari kai I odos tou Kipou. Ellines emporoi sto Livorno 1750-1868* [Florin, Wheat and Garden Street. Greek Merchants in Leghorn 1750-1868] (Athens, 2000).

⁷ KREMMYDAS, *Elliniki nautilia*, 110.

the European Union and the Greek Ministry of Education⁸. The scope of the project was to record the presence of Greek ships and seafarers encountered in quarantine and other archival sources in a number of Mediterranean ports. Under the supervision of Professor Gelina Harlaftis at the Ionian University, a team of twenty researchers have worked in archives in Istanbul, Thessalonica, Athens, Corfu, Malta, Messina, Naples, Leghorn, Genoa, Venice and Marseilles. This paper is an analysis of the findings as regards Malta.

The Island of Malta

The island of Malta is located to the south of Sicily on the route from the eastern to the western Mediterranean and vice-versa. Corsairing was one of the island's main economic activities during the course of the seventeenth century but towards the end of that century and during the course of the eighteenth century, corsairing was no longer as feasible as it had been⁹.

France and England were increasingly prominent in the commerce of the Levant and the vessels of the two nations were starting to crowd out the smaller maritime powers. In addition, from the sixteenth century onwards, there had been a strengthening of Papal power on the island: as a religious order the island's Order of St. John fell under the jurisdiction of the Pope, who in 1574 appointed an Inquisitor who answered directly to him. This led to increasing conflicts between the island's three authorities, namely, the Grand Master, the Archbishop and the Inquisitor. Maltese corsairs, in particular, faced increasing difficulties in this regard after a 1738 Papal Bull forbade corsairing against all Christian ships including Orthodox ones¹⁰.

To further complicate matters, an additional judicial authority was created on the island in the shape of the Consolato del Mare, a popular merchant court, different from that of the Orders' court, the Magistrato degli Armamenti established in 1605, and the Inquisitors' court¹¹. It was a com-

⁸ GELINA HARLAFTIS, KATERINA PAPAKONSTANTINOY, 'On the Sea-Routes of the Nereids: Formation of Maritime History Databases from the 18th to the 20th Century', *Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of Maritime History, Corfu 22-27 June 2004* (Corfu, 2005) (on CD).

⁹ DOMINIC CUTAJAR, 'The Malta Quarantine Shipping and Trade 1654-1694', *Mid-Med Bank Limited Report and Accounts 1987* (Malta, 1988), 37.

¹⁰ Pope Clement XII's Bulla Clementina. Refer to AGNES CAMILLERI, *The Greek Merchant Marine in Malta. A Study of Greek Shipping in Malta (1761-1780)* (Unpublished BA, University of Malta, 1987), 65.

¹¹ The cases of the court known as *Tribunale dell'Udienza* were judged at a second level by the Papal courts with the intervention of the Inquisitor of Malta.

mercial court in which four, later six, merchants decided on mercantile and maritime matters including claims on ships and prizes, but also disputes involving local and foreign merchants¹². Appeals to the court of the Pope in Rome were forbidden. Other developments during the eighteenth century meant that corsairs returning to Malta had to release all sailors taken as hostages while the captain of the prize ship had the right to claim the ship, the cargo and financial recompense for the damage he had suffered¹³.

Faced with a decline in the lucrative corsairing business, the Grand Masters of the Order of St. John undertook infrastructure work in the harbour of Valletta in an effort to strengthen trade and convert Malta into the commercial centre of the Mediterranean. New wharfs and grain and other store-houses were built, as well as lodges for brokers and a custom-house. These infrastructure investments paid off and Valletta became a centre of trade between East and West.

In the port of Marsamxett, merchandise was placed in quarantine in the large lazaretto that had been built on a small island in the harbour known as Isoletto (later Manoel Island). It provided shelter for sailors, travellers, cargo and beasts. It was more comfortable than the lazaretto of Marseilles, and more profitable. There was also a second lazaretto in the Grand Harbour. In the island's dockyards all ships could be repaired quickly and efficiently while the *Sacra Infermeria*, the Order's hospital, offered free and high quality medical care to travellers and seafarers. The low duties and anchorage fees made Malta a very attractive port for ships travelling between the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean¹⁴. Another crucial factor in the commercial development of Malta was the neutral stance of the Order during periods of war.

Quarantine

The Malta quarantine office was established in 1593 and the lazaretto building was erected in 1643 in an effort to avoid the serious outbreaks of plague that had occurred in previous years. The quarantine office was responsible for keeping all serious epidemics off the island, especially bubonic plague. All ships entering the Grand Harbour coming from areas that were suspect had to spend time in the lazaretto. Areas in the eastern Mediterranean, especially ports in the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian-

¹² VICTOR MALLIA-MILANES, 'Introduction to Hospitaller Malta', in V. MALLIA-MILANES, *Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798. Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order of St John of Jerusalem* (Malta, 1993), 30; SEBASTIAN VELLA, *The Consolato del Mare of Malta. A Study of an Institution (1697-1725)* (unpublished B.A. (Hons) History Malta, 1998), 9-14.

¹³ CAMILLERI, *The Greek Merchant Marine*, 63-64.

¹⁴ MALLIA-MILANES, 'Introduction to Hospitaller Malta', 26-30.

ruled Ionian Islands were all considered suspect¹⁵. As a consequence, the data from the archives of the quarantine authorities in Malta refers mainly to the traffic with the Eastern Mediterranean and as a general rule cannot be used to establish an overall picture of the island's maritime and trade network. We have relatively little information concerning commercial contacts with the West, which were by far the most important, but we do, on the other hand, have considerable information on contacts with the East. In the National Library and the National Archives of Malta, a full archival series is preserved that covers the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The quarantine office continued to operate during the French occupation of 1798–1799 and during the English presence after 1800¹⁶.

Entries in the quarantine registers are fairly standardized and contain information on the arrival of the ship in the port, its name, type and flag; the name of the captain and his origin; the size of the crew; the nature and quantity of the cargo; and finally the owner or recipient of the cargo¹⁷. For the purposes of this project a database of just under a century has been created covering the period from 1723, when the registers start in earnest, until 1810.

Greek Ships arriving in Malta

In the normal course of events, at least until the beginning of the eighteenth century, Greek ships from the Ionian Islands would have sailed to the neighbouring Italian mainland directly¹⁸. As a consequence, the first Greek ships to appear in Maltese quarantine registers in our epoch were, in fact, prizes, but we also find other Greek ships arriving from the Ionian Seas as can be seen in Figure 1.

A total of 2,886 Greek ship arrivals are to be found in the quarantine registers for the period 1723–1810. The evolution of this flow may be seen in Figure 2.

The remarkable increase in the number of Greek ship entries in the quarantine registers during the eighteenth century is very evident. In contrast

¹⁵ CUTAJAR, *The Malta Quarantine*, 45.

¹⁶ PAUL CASSAR, *Malta's Role in Maritime Health under the Auspices of the Order of St John in the 18th Century* (Malta, 1990), 21.

¹⁷ National Library of Malta, Archives of the Order of St John, Commissarii di Sanità, Registro degli arrivi di Bastimenti in Quarantena 6527, 6528, 6529, 6530, 6531, 6532, 6533. Repertorio Library Manoscritti 818, 820, 639. All tables are based on material from these archival sources and are extracted from the database, *Amphitrete, 1700–1821*, financed by Pythagoras I Project, Ionian University/Ministry of Education, 2006.

¹⁸ GERASSIMOS PAGRATIS, *Thalassio emporio sti venetokratoumeni Kerkyra (1496–1538)* [Maritime Trade in Corfu under Venetian Rule (1496–1538)] (unpublished PhD, Corfu 2001), 88–90.

to just three in 1723, entries went up to 374 in 1809. The increasing number of Greek ships in Malta reflects the overall picture of the island's maritime traffic. This increased considerably, albeit with not inconsiderable fluctuations, during the eighteenth century and reached a peak during the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as can be seen in Figure 3.



Fig. 1. Entries of Greek Ships and Ship-Prizes in the Malta Lazaretto, 1723-1760
Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 2. Entries of Greek Ships in the Malta Lazaretto, 1723-1810
Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 3. Greek and Total Entries in Quarantine in Malta, 1754-1800
Source: Based on JOHN DEBONO, *Trade and Port Activity in Malta 1750-1800* (Malta 2000), 148-149
Refer also to note 17

The percentage of Greek ships arriving in Malta in comparison to the total can be seen in more detail in Table 2¹⁹. Like shipping in general, the number of Greek ships arriving in Malta fluctuated dramatically.

Table 2. Greek Ship Entries in Quarantine as a % of the Total in Selected Years

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1754 | 1759 | 1765 | 1774 | 1779 | 1784 | 1789 | 1794 | 1797 | 1800 |
| 5% | 18% | 30% | 4% | 6% | 19% | 14% | 11% | 27% | 6% |

During the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774 there was a sharp drop in the number of Greek arrivals probably due to the existence of hostilities in the Aegean. It is possible that both Greek ships and sailors were involved in them or that they took advantage of the opportunities created by the war to trade in the Aegean itself. Similar opportunities would seem to have arisen during the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the Continental Blockade, leading to a constant increase in Greek ship arrivals during the 1790s.

A study of the presence of Greek ships in the quarantine registers of Malta would seem to suggest that the advent of the last quarter of the century constituted some sort of watershed. As can be seen in Figure 2, during the last two decades of the eighteenth century and the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the number of Greek vessels arriving in Malta is so much bigger that it places it on an altogether different plane. It also had different characteristics.

1723-1780

During this period the Ionian Seas and the Gulf of Patras and the Gulf of Corinth were the point of origin of most of the flow. Figure 4 shows the distribution of Greek shipping arriving in Malta in 1723-1780 according to their point of departure. The ports and harbours of the Ionian Seas, the areas of Prevesa and Arta on the west coast of Epirus, were the most important because they functioned as points of exit for the products of the hinterland. The thirty-one small and large ports are grouped in Figure 5.

The most important single points of departure were Prevesa, on the west coast of Epirus, Messolonghi, on the northern coast of Gulf of Patras, and Cephalonia in the Ionian Islands.

1781-1810

During the second period, namely, between 1781 and 1810, a quite different picture emerges. The Aegean Sea becomes by far the most impor-

¹⁹ Data on total arrivals in Malta are from JOHN DEBONO, *Trade and Port Activity in Malta 1750-1800* (Malta, 2000), 148-149.




Fig. 4. Areas of Departure of Greek Ships arriving in Malta, 1723-1780

Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 5. Ionian Areas of Departure of Greek Ships arriving in Malta 1723-1780

Source: Refer to note 17

tant point of origin, as can be seen in Figure 6, involving ships from the islands of Hydra and Spetses in the southwest Aegean, and Psara in the northeast Aegean.

The fifty-one Aegean ports and the eleven southeast Mediterranean ports mentioned in the documentation are grouped in Figure 7.

In the northeast Aegean the main ports were situated on the island of Psara and on the coasts of Asia Minor, especially Smyrna. In the southwest Aegean the most important ports were Hydra and Spetses, while in the northwest Aegean, Volos was the most prominent.

Cargo transported to Malta in Greek ships

The merchandise carried during the first phase we have referred to was very different from that carried during the second phase. During 1723-1780, Greek ships arriving in Malta carried mostly timber, leather and cereals, as well as dairy products. The Ionian area was particularly active in the export of timber and cereals to Malta. The purchaser in the latter cases was either the Treasury of the Order of St. John or the Università, or town council, of the city of Valletta. In Figures 8 and 9, the vertical axis represents the number of mentions in the quarantine registers of Malta as opposed to the actual quantities.




Fig. 6. Departure Areas of Greek Ships arriving in Malta 1781-1810
Source: See to note 17




Fig. 7. Aegean Areas of Departure of Greek Ships arriving in Malta, 1781-1810
Source: Refer to note 1




Fig. 8. Products Exported to Malta from the Ionian Area, 1723-1780
Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 9. Products Exported to Malta from the Aegean, 1781-1810
Source: Referto to note 17

The regions of Arta and Prevesa, on the western coast of Epirus, provided timber for France, Malta and Venice from the beginning of the eighteenth century. Starting in the early 1720s, the Order of St John established strong trading ties with these areas for the purchase of timber, long before the French started to exploit the forests there²⁰. Messolonghi, on the northern coast of Gulf of Patras, exported cereals while the port of Patras in the Gulf of Patras exported dairy products.

During this second period the turmoil caused by the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the Anglo-French Wars, heightened Western European demand for cereals which dominated trade, as can be seen in Figure 9. Volos was the main export centre for cereals from the plain of Thessaly while Psara, Hydra and Spetses were ports of transshipment for cargos of cereals arriving from the Black Sea.

Greek Captains

It is probable that, in most cases at least, the place of origin of the captain in this epoch coincided with the ship's home port or place of registration. Until the end of the 1770s, Messolonghi and Cephalonia in the Ionian Seas were the most common places of origin for the majority of the captains. (Refer Figure 10).

During the second period, namely 1781-1810, a somewhat different picture emerges as regards the places of origin of the captains. The Ionian Seas and the gulfs of Patras and Corinth continue to be important. Messolonghi and Cephalonia, in particular, continue to feature frequently as places of origin, but new places come to the fore, such as Galaxidi, in the Gulf of Corinth. This second phase marks the period of maritime flourishing of the Aegean: the majority of captains in this period originated from Hydra, Spetses and Psara. They were to become the ancestors of the protagonists of the 1821 Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire that led to the creation of the independent Greek State. The first captain hailing from Hydra appears in the Malta quarantine registers in the year 1762 but it was not until 1780 that the next one appeared. Captains who were natives of Spetses and Psara appear in 1780 and 1785 respectively. (Refer Figure 11).

Volos would seem to have had a remarkable level of maritime traffic but only a few captains originated in that area. By way of contrast, captains from Hydra and Spetses were frequent in the port of Volos and usually traded in the cereals from that area.

²⁰ ELENI K. YANNAKOPOULOU, *Galloelliniki ekmetalleusi dason sti Dytiki Ellada (1710-1792)* [French-Greek Forest Exploitation in Western Greece (1710-1792)] (Athens, 1987), 74-77.




Fig. 10. Place of Origin of Captains on Greek Ships arriving in Malta, 1723-1780
Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 11. Place of Origin of Captains on Greek Ships arriving in Malta, 1781-1810
Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 12. Home Ports of Captains from Hydra in 1781-1810
Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 13. Home Ports of Captains from Galaxidi, 1781-1810
Source: Refer to note 17

If we take a look at the ports from which the ships with captains from Hydra depart, we can see that Volos, in the northwest Aegean, was the port with the highest traffic (Figure 12).

It is interesting to note that captains from Hydra did not trade in Spetses while captains from Spetses did not frequent Hydra. Hydra, Spetses and Psara were important Aegean ports. Messolonghi had also had the same role in the first phase and captains from Messolonghi exported cereals from its port.

For the period after 1781, we cannot say the same thing regarding Galaxidi which was the place of origin for a large number of captains; it did not function as a port for the export of the agricultural products of its hinterland as was the case for Messolonghi or nearby Etoliko in the Gulf of Patras. Captains from Galaxidi traded in the port of Patras, especially in timber and currants but they did not frequent Cephalonia where captains from Messolonghi were active (Figure 13).

The Flags of the Greek Ships

In 1723-1780, the majority of Greek ships (82% of the total) are listed in the Malta quarantine registers as 'Greco'. Under this name we come across ships from the Ionian as well as from the Aegean Seas. In the first case the captains were either Venetian or Ottoman subjects for whom 'Greco' was a common denomination. It would seem that the Greeks were a specific and clearly identifiable group of seafarers different from other Venetian or Ottomans subjects, as were the people from Ragusa (Dubrovnik). The name 'Greco' for a Greek vessel appears even though it was sailing under the Venetian flag. In fact, Greek vessels are also to be encountered sailing under Russian, Minorcan, British, French and other flags in this period (Figure 14).

In the quarantine registers of Malta, Greek ships are, in fact, often listed as flying a 'Greek' flag (82% of the total), although no such flag existed: strictly speaking these would have been Ottoman subjects. Specific mention of an Ottoman flag is only made in a very small number of cases (1% of the total). Out of the 453 Greek ships sailing under the 'Greek' flag, 432 had captains originating in the Ionian area; with the majority, namely 341, originating specifically in Messolonghi. The rest were natives of the Venetian-ruled Ionian Islands (45) or of Ottoman-controlled parts of the Ionian Seas (26). The captains of 59 vessels listed as 'Venetian' also had their origin in the Ionian Islands, including 33 from Cephalonia. As far as ships sailing under the Venetian flag are concerned, only one captain from Preveza is listed as originating in an Ottoman area. Greek-Ottoman and Greek-Venetian captains sailed under Ottoman flags for financial and bureaucratic reasons as the Venetian flag was restricted to Venetian subjects.




Fig. 14. Flags of Greek Ships Arriving in Malta, 1723–1780

Source: Refer to note 17




Fig. 15. Flags of Greek Ships Arriving in Malta, 1781–1810

Source: Refer to note 17

In the period 1781–1810, 43% of the Greek ships are registered as ‘Greek’, as can be seen in Figure 15; the number of Greek ships specifically listed as flying the Ottoman flag increased to 21% and the two groups thus constituted 64% of all Greek vessels. Entries of ships sailing under the Venetian flag decline after the fall of the Republic of Venice to Napoleon in 1798. Ships from the Ionian Islands sailed under the flag of the Septinsular Republic during the brief period of existence of the semi-independent state (1800–1807), while the flag of Jerusalem appears as a flag of convenience after 1800. The Russian flag was flown by 7% of ships, especially after the Russo-Ottoman treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 that permitted Ottoman Christian subjects to sail under the Russian flag in Ottoman waters.

In the period 1723–1780, captains from Messolonghi are to be found on ‘Greek’ ships but after 1801 are also listed as flying the flag of Jerusalem. The case of captains from Cephalonia is a very interesting one. In the period 1747–1760 their ships are listed as ‘Greek’; between 1760 and 1800 they sailed under a Venetian flag; and after 1800 they use the flag of Jerusalem. This change of flags, especially by Venetian subjects, was done in response to the financial measures taken by the Serenissima to protect Venice as the main maritime and trading centre of the Empire and to get round the restrictions imposed by the Venetians on the local population of the Ionian Islands to control the development of shipping activities²¹.

The flag of Jerusalem appears to have been a flag of convenience of the King of the Two Sicilies²² and captains from various ports also seem to have opted for it. As can be seen in Figure 15, vessels sailing under the flag of Jerusalem constitute 20% of the total. Table 3 indicates the place of origin of the captains of the ships sailing under the flag of Jerusalem.

Table 3. Place of Origin of Captains of Greek Vessels Sailing under the Flag of Jerusalem, 1781-1810

| <i>Origin of Captain</i> | <i>Number of ships</i> |
|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Spetses | 76 |
| Hydra | 62 |
| Psara | 58 |
| Galaxidi | 42 |
| Messolonghi | 29 |
| Patras | 25 |
| Myconos | 23 |
| Tinos | 19 |
| Cephalonia | 13 |

Ships sailing under the flag of Jerusalem equal the number of ships sailing under the Ottoman flag and it is a sign of the opportunities created by the rapidly changing political situation in the Mediterranean at the end of the eighteenth century which Greek seafarers exploited.

Conclusion

Until the middle of the eighteenth century Malta was the outer limit of Greek shipping activity. The needs of the island's population for food-stuffs, raw materials, and manufactured products resulted in the strengthening of commercial ties between Malta and the Ionian Seas, Western Epirus and the Western Peloponnese.

In order to study this phenomenon we have used the collection of quarantine registers held at the National Archives and the National Library of Malta. The picture provided by these sources is, admittedly, a partial one,

²¹ According to CONSTANTINOS SATHAS, 'Eidiseis tines peri emporiou kai forologias en Elladi epi Tourkokratias' [Some News on Trade and Taxation in Greece under Ottoman Rule], *Oikonomiki Epitheorisis*, LXX (December 1878), 504-505, sailors and traders from Cephalonia went to Messolonghi and contributed to an increase in the size of the local fleet as a result of increased restrictions imposed under Venetian rule at the beginning of the eighteenth century. See also GEORGIOS LEONTARITIS, *Elliniki Emporiki Nautilia* (1453-1850) [Greek Mercantile Shipping (1453-1850)] (Athens, 1987), 41-42, and PAGRATIS, *Thalassio emporio*, 287-288.

²² VASSILIS KREMMYDAS, *To emporio tis Peloponnissou ston 18o aiona (1715-1792) (me vasi ta gallika arheia)* [Trade in the Peloponnese during the 18th Century (1715-1792) (according to French archives)] (Athens, 1972), 244.

because the registers ordinarily only list the ships coming from areas suspected of being the source of contagious disease to the South and East. Because of this very fact, and because of the paucity of other sources, the Malta quarantine registers are an invaluable resource for the study of the history of Greek shipping because most if not all of the latter came from areas suspected of contagion.

The sources would seem to point towards the existence of two quite distinct phases in the evolution of Greek shipping in Malta. In the first period, namely 1723-1780, the Ionian Islands, and ports of different sizes in the gulfs of Patras and Corinth, in Western Epirus and in the Western Peloponnese would seem to have had the most active contact with Malta. Local products were transported to the island mainly to attend to its domestic needs. During that period the captains originated mainly in Cephalonia and Messolonghi, the two largest maritime centres of the area. Ships departing from the Ionian area typically sailed under the Ottoman or the Venetian flag.

During the second phase, namely 1781-1810, the Ionian area continued to play an important maritime and commercial role but the Aegean Seas became an increasingly important source of goods for Malta. During this period the Anglo-French wars that followed the French Revolution created a considerable demand for foodstuffs and especially for cereals; at the same time, French and British ships withdrew from the Mediterranean and thus created a window of opportunity for maritime trade carried on by Greek ships. Captains from Hydra, Spetses and Psara, transporting mostly cereals, arrived in Malta with increasing frequency, with the latter becoming a redistributor of cereals of some importance in the Mediterranean. Confirmation of this is to be found in an 1817 *Memoranda on the present state of the Trade of Malta, on some of the causes of its decline, and on the means of reviving it in some degree*, by a number of Malta-based English merchants, which claimed that:


This Island was for many years a regular place of call for an immense number of Greek vessels, which are constantly employed in the Corn Trade, few of which passed our Island without touching to enquire the state of our Market. This Circumstance brought many vessels here from various parts but particularly from the Coast of Spain to look for Corn and in some years not less than one hundred Spaniards have been laden here with Wheat, Corn and Pulse of various descriptions, chiefly imported by the Greeks: as it is a great advantage to the Speculator on many occasions to be able to procure his Cargo of Grain and to return home in a few weeks in free pratique, instead of subjecting himself to a longer voyage and a long quarantine by going to the Levant to load²³.

During the course of the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the

²³ Cited in MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi a Malta 1800-1825* (Milano, 1990), 264.

opening years of the nineteenth century Malta's commercial condition was transformed from that of a small island with a vigorous, albeit limited, local demand for a range of products, to a leading trading centre at the heart of the Mediterranean. It was this specific geographical location combined with the efforts made by the Grand Masters that permitted the island to take advantage of the changing political and economic environment.

Maltese quarantine registers also confirm that the nature of Greek mar-



itime activity changed considerably during this period. Greeks became important suppliers of cereals for consumption by Western Mediterranean nations as many Greeks took advantage of the enormous opportunities created by the many wars in this period. New centres of Greek maritime activity came to the fore and the number of Greek vessels arriving in Malta multiplied. It was this flourishing milieu of Greek merchants and mariners that provided the backdrop for the 1821 Greek War of Independence.

Fabio P. Di Vita

Navi greche in Sicilia durante il XVIII secolo. Pratiche sanitarie e relazioni commerciali

1. *Premessa*

L'obiettivo prioritario della presente ricerca, condotta nell'ambito del progetto *Greek Maritime History, 1700-1821*, promosso dalla Ionian University, è quello di accertare la rilevanza del traffico mercantile greco nei porti di Palermo e Messina nel periodo compreso tra gli inizi del secolo XVIII ed il primo ventennio del secolo XIX.

Allo scopo di individuare documentazione utile a fornire i dovuti riscontri in merito sono state condotte ricerche presso gli Archivi di Stato delle due città siciliane consultando i fondi *Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica*, depositati presso l'Archivio di Stato di Palermo, e *Deputazione della Salute, Regia Udienza e Consolato del Mare*, conservati presso l'Archivio di Stato di Messina.

Attraverso l'analisi dei documenti relativi al funzionamento del sistema di sanità marittima nell'area palermitana e messinese è stato possibile rilevare la presenza in dette zone di imbarcazioni greche, ricavando utili elementi quali il nome, la tipologia e la bandiera della nave, il nome del proprietario e del capitano, informazioni riguardanti l'equipaggio, l'origine e le merci trasportate. Tali informazioni, opportunamente rielaborate, hanno permesso di accertare, tra l'altro, le rotte seguite da queste navi ed il tipo di commerci esercitati dai greci in queste aree.

Tutto ciò è stato fatto non dimenticando di evidenziare gli aspetti più rilevanti dell'evoluzione e del funzionamento del sistema di sanità marittima isolana in età moderna ossia i sistemi di intervento e di tutela adottati, i soggetti coinvolti e le risorse finanziarie impiegate nell'amministrazione delle deputazioni, i costi del servizio offerto ed il trattamento ricevuto dalle imbarcazioni provenienti da *luoghi sospetti*.

2. *Il sistema di controllo sanitario siciliano in età moderna*

Nell'ambito delle politiche sanitarie adottate dagli stati d'antico regime per far fronte ai danni prodotti dalla diffusione delle malattie epidemiche,

in special modo la peste, vennero realizzate in Italia, tra il XIV ed il XV secolo, quelle magistrature di sanità il cui insediamento pose la penisola in una posizione d'avanguardia rispetto al contesto europeo¹.

In tale ambito anche il meridione d'Italia, seppur con modalità e tempi differenti rispetto al quadro nazionale, si dotò di sistemi di controllo sanitario a carattere permanente, costituendo il 1656 ed il 1691 per Napoli ed il 1743 per la Sicilia le date cardine per la produzione legislativa in materia². Alla pestilenza napoletana del 1656 si deve infatti la nascita della Soprintendenza della generale salute e la riorganizzazione delle preesistenti deputazioni cittadine, mentre, a chiusura del ciclo delle emergenze seicentesche³, la peste di Conversano del 1691 segna la trasformazione della Deputazione della Salute da istituzione temporanea legata all'insorgere delle emergenze a ente permanente⁴. In Sicilia elemento risolutivo per la formazione di una magistratura sanitaria permanente risulta essere la peste scoppiata a Messina nel 1743 il cui incalzare permette la creazione della Deputazione Generale della Salute, vero e proprio organismo centrale con competenza su tutta l'isola e con giurisdizione sulle Deputazioni locali di sanità⁵.

Appare dunque evidente come anche nel meridione fossero le ondate epidemiche ad accelerare lo sviluppo di una legislazione che potesse tutelare la salute pubblica in un contesto di progressiva assunzione da parte dello Stato di competenze tradizionalmente gravitanti nell'area dell'associazionismo, della beneficenza privata e della Chiesa⁶. Sin dal 1575 in effetti fu costituito nell'isola ad opera del Senato di Palermo, anche qui per

¹ A tal proposito si vedano C.M. CIPOLLA, *La città di fronte alle crisi di mortalità*, in AA.VV., *La demografia storica delle città italiane*, Bologna 1982, 193-204; CIPOLLA, *Cristofano e la peste. Un caso di storia del sistema sanitario in Toscana nell'età di Galileo*, Bologna 1976; CIPOLLA, *Chi ruppe i rastelli a Montelupo?*, Bologna 1977; CIPOLLA, *I pidocchi e il Granduca: crisi economica e problemi sanitari nella Firenze del '600*, Bologna 1979; CIPOLLA, *Contro un nemico invisibile. Epidemie e strutture sanitarie nell'Italia del Rinascimento*, Bologna 1986; CIPOLLA, *Miasmi ed umori. Ecologia e condizioni sanitarie in Toscana nel Seicento*, Bologna 1989; P. PRETO, *Peste e società a Venezia, 1576*, Vicenza 1978; PRETO, *Epidemia, paura e politica nell'Italia moderna*, Roma-Bari 1987.

² S. RAFFAELE, *Dalla beneficenza all'assistenza. Momenti di politica assistenziale nella Sicilia moderna*, Catania 1990, 45.

³ Si pensi alla peste scoppiata in Sardegna nel 1638, a Zante nel 1646, a Marsiglia nel 1654. Per una cronologia delle epidemie scoppiate in Italia cfr. A. CORRADI, *Annali delle epidemie occorse in Italia dalle prime memorie fino al 1850*, Bologna 1973; L. DAL PANTA, *Le epidemie nella storia demografica italiana (secc. XIV-XIX)*, Torino 1980.

⁴ B. SALVEMINI, *Le pratiche di sanità marittima nel Regno di Napoli nella seconda metà del Settecento*, in *Ricchezza del mare. Ricchezza dal mare. Secc. XIII-XVIII*, a cura di SIMONETTA CAVACIOCCHI, Firenze 2006.

⁵ S. SAMBITO PIOMBO, *Fonti archivistiche per lo studio delle istituzioni sanitarie siciliane*, in *Malattie terapie e istituzioni sanitarie in Sicilia*, a cura di C. VALENTI, Palermo 1985, 18.

⁶ RAFFAELE, *Dalla beneficenza all'assistenza*, 42.

effetto di una pandemia di peste che nella sola Messina mieté 40.000 vittime⁷, una magistratura sanitaria che, pur essendo formalmente indipendente dallo stesso vicere⁸ e pur godendo di ampia giurisdizione, era in effetti soggetto ad un controllo statale ad opera del Tribunale del Real Patrimonio⁹. Fu poi un'altra emergenza epidemica, e cioè la terribile pestilenza di Messina del 1743, a condurre all'emanazione dei regolamenti circa il rilascio delle patenti di salute, delle istruzioni politico-mediche da osservarsi nei luoghi appestati, delle regole per il governo ecclesiastico da praticarsi nei paesi infetti¹⁰, dei privilegi delle persone impiegate per la custodia della sanità¹¹, susseguendosi bandi circa i cordoni sanitari, disposizioni da osservarsi lungo i litorali e nei lazzaretti e regolamenti sui rapporti tra deputazione centrale e deputazioni locali.

L'epidemia di peste che indusse all'emanazione delle suddette disposizioni in campo sanitario venne determinata dall'approdo in porto di un mercantile genovese proveniente dalla Morea e arrivato nel marzo di quell'anno a Messina dopo aver fatto scalo a Patrasso, luogo in cui imperversava il morbo¹². In effetti sull'imbarcazione in navigazione erano morti alcuni marinai, ma il fatto fu abilmente occultato dal capitano; fatale fu altresì la negligenza dei deputati di sanità messinesi che ammisero nel lazzaretto cittadino la tartana genovese nonostante corresse loro l'obbligo di negarle l'accesso procedendo l'imbarcazione da Levante. Morti pochi giorni dopo tanto il capitano quanto un altro membro dell'equipaggio, la nave venne posta sotto stretta vigilanza provvedendosi altresì ad informare lo stesso

⁷ M. BARRANCO, *Strutture ospedaliere a Messina tra '700 e '800. L'ospedale Santa Maria la Pietà*, in *Malattie terapie e istituzioni sanitarie in Sicilia*, a cura di VALENTI, 91.

⁸ *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia, e Istruzioni del Lazzaretto della Città di Messina*, Palermo 1749, IV.

⁹ Il Tribunale del Real Patrimonio era chiamato a sovrintendere sulla salute del Regno dovendo comunque operare con l'obbligo "di udire in ogni occorrenza i sentimenti del Senato, e Diputazione della capitale, e di non allontanarsi punto dagli stessi". Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, V.

¹⁰ *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 59-63.

¹¹ Con disposizione viceregia del 19 febbraio 1744 venne stabilito che "durante il contagio di Messina, tutte le persone applicate alle attinenze della pubblica salute essere non potessero molestate di persona per cause civili; e che per le criminali, trattandosi di delitti in ofizio, e di trasgressioni alle leggi di Sanità, ne fosse riservato il conoscimento alla stessa Diputazione; e per gli altri delitti comuni, restar dovessero i rei soggetti alla giurisdizione ordinaria; conchè non potesse il Giudice divenire alla loro cattura; ma bensì debba la Diputazione ad istanza del Fisco, farli consegnare all'ordinaria giurisdizione, surrogando altre persone al servizio della medesima". Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, XIII e XIV.

¹² Sulla peste messinese del 1743 cfr. G. RESTIFO, *Peste al confine: l'epidemia di Messina del 1743*, Palermo 1984; RESTIFO, *La peste a Messina nell'anno 1743, e oltre*, in *Malattie terapie e istituzioni sanitarie in Sicilia*, a cura di VALENTI, 183-188; C. VALENTI, *La peste a Messina nel 1743*, in *Sanità e Società. Sicilia e Sardegna, Secoli XVI-XX*, a cura di C. VALENTI - G. TORE, Udine 1988, 111-129.

vicerè. Nonostante le dure opposizioni della Deputazione di sanità palermitana, che insisteva affinché fosse da subito interrotto il commercio con Messina, il Supremo Magistrato di Commercio¹³, cui nel 1740 era stato trasferito il controllo sulla salute pubblica del Regno¹⁴, diede il solo ordine di bruciare la nave e le merci trattenendo le persone coinvolte evitando dunque di adottare quelle tempestive misure che avrebbero permesso quantomeno di arginare il dilagare della peste¹⁵. Lo stesso vicerè Corsini, pur emanando il 26 maggio un ordine circolare col quale vietava l'approdo nei porti isolani delle imbarcazioni provenienti da Messina, attese sino al successivo mese di luglio per emanare quei provvedimenti necessari a proteggere la popolazione dalla ormai inevitabile pandemia¹⁶. La scrupolosa osservanza delle norme di polizia sanitaria permisero invece a Palermo di restare immune dal contagio tanto che lo stesso Carlo III di Borbone, riconoscendo la funzionalità ed efficienza della Deputazione di sanità palermitana, volle attribuirle la sovrintendenza della sanità dell'isola rendendola altresì indipendente da ogni altra magistratura siciliana¹⁷.

I documenti relativi all'istituzione del Magistrato di salute, i regolamenti e i provvedimenti relativi alla peste di Messina, gli statuti generali per i magistrati di pubblica salute del regno di Sicilia e le istruzioni del lazzeretto di Messina vennero pubblicati nel 1749 in una raccolta dal titolo *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia e Istruzioni del Lazzeretto della città di Messina*.

Di essa vanno rilevate, in primo luogo, le disposizioni imposte ai Magistrati della Pubblica Salute del Regno di Sicilia sul trattamento da riser-

¹³ Su tale magistratura, istituita nel 1739, cfr. V. SCIUTI RUSSI, *Il supremo magistrato del commercio in Sicilia*, Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale, anno LXIV (1968), 253-300; G. RAFFIOTTA, *Il supremo magistrato del commercio in Sicilia*, Palermo 1953; G. FALZONE, *Il regno di Carlo di Borbone in Sicilia (1734-1759)*, Bologna 1964; F. ATTAGUILE, *Primi tentativi di riforme in Sicilia: la politica legislativa di Carlo Borbone fra il 1734 e il 1740*, Catania 1974.

¹⁴ *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, VI.

¹⁵ Rileva Restifo che "le difese sanitarie dai contagi esterni, reputate affidabili per lungo tempo, nella sutura fra la primavera e l'estate del '43, risultano improvvisamente messe in mora. Il condizionamento fondamentale che ne limita l'efficienza nella salvaguardia della salute pubblica è costituito dall'interesse delle classi dominanti messinesi nel non far dichiarare infetta la città". In effetti, pur se in declino, l'esportazione della seta grezza siciliana costituiva ancora un'attività monopolizzata dai patrizi messinesi i quali per non danneggiare le proprie attività commerciali indussero la stessa Deputazione di Salute di Messina, con dichiarazione sottoscritta da 18 medici, a negare che si trattasse di un'epidemia di peste. Appare poi evidente l'atteggiamento quantomeno negligente di don Francesco Ventura, presidente del Supremo Magistrato di Commercio e sovrintendente generale della Salute, che tardò sino al 18 giugno per emettere il bando col quale proibiva ogni forma di commercio con la città appestata. Cfr. RESTIFO, *La peste a Messina nell'anno 1743, e oltre*, 185; C. VALENTI, *La peste a Messina nel 1743*, 113.

¹⁶ Su tali disposizioni cfr. VALENTI, *La peste a Messina nel 1743*, 122-124.

¹⁷ *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, X-XIII.

varsi alle navi provenienti da *fuori Regno*. A ciascun padrone di queste, così come ai membri dell'equipaggio distintamente, andavano chieste, all'arrivo in qualunque porto del Regno ed a cura del custode di sanità, le generalità, la provenienza e notizie circa il viaggio affrontato, il carico, la consistenza e lo stato di salute dei marinai imbarcati. Riscontrata la conformità delle risposte acquisite con la patente di salute dell'imbarcazione¹⁸ andava informato il capo della magistratura sanitaria locale, e ciò per ottenere la licenza di dar pratica alla nave. Fatto questo l'imbarcazione era sottoposta ad esame accurato accertando la rispondenza dei controlli effettuati con le dichiarazioni rese: se positive la nave era ammessa a *libera pratica*, se negative venivano adottati gli opportuni provvedimenti¹⁹. Nel caso in cui l'imbarcazione provenisse da luogo per sua natura sospetto²⁰ o dichiarato tale dalla Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica occorreva immediatamente avvisare il capo della magistratura locale e porre a guardia della suddetta un'imbarcazione. Qualora fosse stato accertato un qualunque difetto nella patente di salute la nave andava sfrattata, altrimenti occorreva imporre a merci ed equipaggio l'opportuna quarantena da consumarsi nel lazzaretto di Messina²¹.

In merito alle disposizioni volte ad eliminare i vizi e le mancanze che le patenti di salute rilasciate alle imbarcazioni avevano manifestato in passato va sottolineato come non potessero essere ammesse a *libera pratica*, se non dopo sette giorni di contumacia, le navi che disponessero di una patente di salute in cui non fossero distinti i nomi dei membri dell'equipaggio e dei passeggeri, e ciò anche nel caso in cui la nave provenisse dal Regno stesso e/o avesse patente *netta e limpida*²². Allo scopo di disporre di patenti di salute che potessero servire allo scopo ne venne fatto circolare un nuovo modello²³ e si ordinò, per evitare gli inconvenienti connessi al

¹⁸ La patente di salute poteva essere sporca, postillata o netta.

¹⁹ Non essendo previsto per le navi da guerra esibire patente di salute, venne previsto per esse che fosse sufficiente una relazione del comandante in cui si assicurasse di essere partiti da luogo non sospetto, di non essere stati a contatto con navi sospette e di godere tutto l'equipaggio di ottima salute. Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 192 e 193.

²⁰ Erano considerati tali il continente africano ed il Levante turco.

²¹ Per la vicinanza col dominio ottomano venne altresì disposto che i legni provenienti da Corfù, Cefalonia, Zante e dalle isole venete, ancorché con patente netta, non potessero essere ammesse a libera pratica ma dovessero essere sottoposti ad alcuni giorni di contumacia. Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 193 e 194.

²² Il 10 gennaio 1746 il vicerè Corsini stabilì che non potessero essere ricevuti i legni che, da qualunque luogo provenissero, non disponessero di patente in cui fossero state annotate distintamente le generalità dei marinai e dei passeggeri, chiamando altresì gli ufficiali di sanità inadempienti a tali disposizioni a rispondere dei danni e delle spese causate alle imbarcazioni. Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 174-179.

²³ *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 179-181.

cambio di patente, che questo potesse essere fatto soltanto nel luogo in cui l'imbarcazione portasse a termine il proprio viaggio²⁴.

Nel caso in cui in qualsiasi delle coste del Regno fosse naufragata un'imbarcazione proveniente da luogo infetto o sospetto e si fossero riscontrati dei cadaveri in mare, essi avrebbero dovuto essere seppelliti in fosse profonde, da colmare con calce e terra, da parte degli stessi sopravvissuti alla sciagura. Questi, una volta provvisti delle vettovaglie e di ogni altra cosa necessaria, sarebbero stati muniti di un'imbarcazione ed allontanati dalle coste isolate senza che nel periodo intercorso tra il naufragio e lo sfratto venissero in contatto con la popolazione locale²⁵.

Qualora un'imbarcazione fosse stata ammessa a trascorrere un periodo di contumacia sarebbe stato necessario trascorrere il suddetto in luogo separato e distante non soltanto rispetto alle altre navi nella stessa condizione ma anche rispetto ai legni ammessi a *libera pratica*. Avendo bisogno di viveri tale imbarcazione avrebbe dovuto mandare le sue lance, opportunamente accompagnate dal personale di guardia, a terra e qui si sarebbe avuto lo scambio tra quanto necessario ed il denaro richiesto, avendo cura di immergere quest'ultimo in aceto o acqua di mare. Nel caso in cui la nave in contumacia avesse voluto scaricare a terra le proprie merci o caricarne a bordo altre prima della partenza sarebbe stato necessario l'assenso del magistrato di salute, opportunamente preceduto da parere medico positivo, allo scopo di accertare le merci indiziate d'infezione. Tutte queste operazioni avrebbero sempre dovuto svolgersi in luogo isolato e lontano da ogni attività commerciale, alla presenza di un deputato di salute, delle guardie e del personale di dogana. Volendo infine allontanarsi dal porto isolano avrebbe dovuto farlo a mezzogiorno in estate e all'alba d'inverno, avendo in entrambi i casi cura di farlo senza venire in contatto con alcuno e senza lasciare a terra *roba capace d'infezione*²⁶.

Giunta in porto una nave proveniente da luogo infetto, che avesse avuto contatti con legni provenienti da aree contagiate oppure che disponesse di

²⁴ Per non rendere estremamente difficoltosa se non impossibile la ricostruzione della rotta seguita dall'imbarcazione venne stabilito che alla nave in arrivo in qualunque porto del Regno venisse cambiata la patente di salute soltanto nel caso in cui fosse stato portato a termine proprio in quel porto il viaggio, scaricando a terra la totalità delle merci e dell'equipaggio. Solo in tal caso dunque sarebbe stato legittimo trattenere la vecchia e dare una nuova patente di salute, in cui fare espressa menzione del contenuto della precedente. Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 181-183.

²⁵ Qualora gli abitanti della città coinvolta e delle terre vicine fossero venuti incautamente a contatto con i naufraghi e con le merci trasportate fu disposto che venissero immediatamente interrotti i traffici commerciali con detti luoghi. Nel caso in cui invece la nave provenisse da luoghi di *sospetto remoto* sarebbe stato sufficiente porre in contumacia le persone che con essa fossero venute a contatto. Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 197 e 198.

²⁶ *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 198 e 199.

un carico di persone e/o merci di origine suddetta, sarebbe stato necessario imporre ad essa lo sfratto, e ciò anche nel caso in cui l'equipaggio godesse di buona salute. Non doveva altresì procedersi a sbarcare il carico, essendo cura dei magistrati sanitari di esporre nella patente di salute, una volta che questa fosse stata preventivamente posta in aceto e profumata con alloro e zolfo, i motivi per i quali a detta imbarcazione non fosse stata concessa *libera pratica*. In ogni caso andava accordata al legno da allontanare la possibilità di rifornirsi di alimenti e di quant'altro necessario²⁷.

Nel 1751, sulla scia della pubblicazione siciliana di due anni precedente e a testimonianza di una vera e propria interdipendenza tra i due corpi di leggi²⁸, il governo borbonico del regno di Napoli varò le *Istruzioni da osservarsi da' deputati della salute di Napoli e del Regno* affrontando tematiche di rilievo quali la nomina dei deputati, le pratiche di sanità, il funzionamento del lazzeretto di Nisida, le tariffe per i servizi offerti alle navi in quarantena²⁹.

Dopo la Restaurazione, e precisamente nel giugno 1819, venne istituita a Palermo la Soprintendenza generale di salute pubblica mentre coi successivi decreti regi del 20 ottobre 1819 e 1 gennaio 1820 venne regolamentato il servizio sanitario nelle provincie, nelle quali il controllo sulle Deputazioni locali fu affidato agli intendenti³⁰.

3. *Il traffico mercantile greco nei porti siciliani tra la peste di Messina e la fine del secolo XVIII*

Negli anni in cui la peste messinese faceva sentire i propri tragici effetti sono stati rinvenuti sette documenti che attestano l'arrivo sulle sponde messinesi di legni greci. Il primo, datato 16 giugno 1744, è una testimonianza inviata dalla Deputazione della Salute di Messina alla Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica di Palermo con la quale si avviava quest'ultima che il 7 dello stesso mese era approdata sulla spiaggia del Ringo una *chieggia* greca ad un albero con dodici persone d'equipaggio compreso il proprietario Anastasio Coc³¹. Nello stesso mese di giugno, e precisamente giorno 16, giunsero sul litorale messinese, località "la

²⁷ Ciò andava fatto in luogo appartato e lontano da ogni attività commerciale alla presenza di un senatore, di un deputato di salute e del personale di dogana, curando che nelle attività di imbarco e sbarco non venissero lasciate corde, fili, pezze di tela, o "altra cosa capace d'infezione". Cfr. *Governo Generale di Sanità del Regno di Sicilia*, 199.

²⁸ RAFFAELE, *Dalla beneficenza all'assistenza*, 45.

²⁹ SALVEMINI, *Le pratiche di sanità marittima nel Regno di Napoli*.

³⁰ SAMBITO PIOMBO, *Fonti archivistiche per lo studio delle istituzioni sanitarie siciliane*, 18.

³¹ La suddetta imbarcazione, carica di frumento, risultava provenire da Missolongi ed era fornita di patente netta. Cfr. Archivio di Stato di Palermo (ASP), Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 125.

Grotta" (Grotte), due bastimenti greci provenienti da Missolongi, località "poco distante da Padrasso luogo infetto". Entrambi, carichi di frumento, risultarono l'uno "padronizzato dal capitano Giorgio Mauvrito procedente da detta città di Missolongi in sedici giorni con tredici persone di suo equipaggio, esso Padrone compreso", e l'altro "padronizzato da Capitano Demetrio della stessa nazione greca, con numero undeci persone incirca"³². Altri due bastimenti³³, sempre provenienti da Missolongi, approdarono il 24 giugno nella Riviera del Ringo col loro carico di frumento, "tre casse di presciutti, ed altri viveri di regalo ad alcuni mercadanti della stessa nazione" residenti a Messina³⁴. Da rilevare infine, sempre per l'anno 1744, il rinvenimento di un memoriale inviato il 13 agosto da Don Nicolò Balsamo, senatore della città di Messina, al Principe della Pantelleria³⁵. In esso il suddetto senatore espone il caso della "martigana nominata Santa Maria di Bosco" a cui, provenendo "dall'isola di Paxù stato della Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia ch'è parte sospetta del Levante, ma non infetta", era stato intimato lo sfratto dal porto di Messina. Avendo il suddetto Balsamo acquistato un "rocchetto"³⁶ ed essendo questo compreso nel carico del suddetto legno, il senatore messinese si rivolgeva al Principe della Pantelleria affinché facesse accedere alla rada peloritana, prendendo tutte le precauzioni del caso, l'imbarcazione greca permettendogli così di poter disporre del suo acquisto³⁷.

Nel 1745 si è rilevata un'unica presenza nel messinese, ossia il bastimen-

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Il primo legno imbarcava tredici persone, compreso il proprietario Anastasio Diplani; il secondo undici marinai ed il proprietario Spiridon Cucumel. *Ibidem*.

³⁴ Rileva Liliana Iaria come i greci vantassero una lunga tradizione commerciale in città. In effetti, sottolinea Carmelo Trasselli, attraverso negozianti di nazionalità ellenica residenti in città, compravano stoffe di seta e vendevano lana e cotone. Cfr. L. IARIA, *Il porto di Messina tra Austriaci e Borboni*, Acireale 1983, 33-34; C. TRASELLI, *Mercanti forestieri nell'età moderna*, in *Storia della Sicilia*, vol. VII, Palermo 1978, 176-178.

³⁵ Il suddetto era a capo della Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica.

³⁶ Col termine *rucchèddu* si intende "uno strumento piccolo di legno forato per lo lungo, di figura cilindrica, a uso per lo più d'incannare". Cfr. V. MORTILLARO, *Nuovo dizionario siciliano-italiano*, Palermo 1876, 948.

³⁷ Riporto qui la trascrizione integrale del suddetto memoriale datato 13 agosto 1744: *Ecc. Sig., Don Nicolò Balsamo uno dei senatori della città di Messina rappresenta a V.E. che avendo data da più tempo commissione per la compra d'un Ricellino detto Rocchetto, o Durachetto, le fu questo rimesso sopra la martigana nominata Santa Maria di Bosco patronizzata da Padron Zafiri Dogovanni di nazione greco proveniente dall'isola di Paxù stato della Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia ch'è parte sospetta del Levante, ma non infetta, e de fatto la patente del bastimento sudetto è netta. Ma come che per ordine di V.E. per via della Gen. Deputazione di Salute viene intimato lo sfratto a tutti li bastimenti provenienti dal Levante, per ciò non è stato ammesso detto bastimento in Messina, e desiderando il Superiore d'aver detto Ricellino supplica la bontà dell'Ecc. Vostra a compiacersi dare gl'ordini convenendosi acciò con tutte quelle cautele che stima esigere V.E. o sia con tuffarsi in aceto, o di assegnarli altre disposizioni per riguardo alla pubblica salute se li dasse libero detto Ricello, et ita ...* ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 128.

to greco nominato *S. Caterina* del padron Gioan Cuccumel che all'inizio del mese di ottobre, a causa di condizioni metereologiche avverse, era giunto nella Riviera del Ringo. Proveniente da Missolongi, da cui era partito undici giorni prima, il suddetto Cuccumel affermò di aver toccato lungo il suo viaggio Tripoli, in cui "prese pratica", e di avere quindici marinai a bordo. La notte del 2 ottobre detto legno venne sfrattato dal litorale messinese giacché, pur avendo patente "netta", proveniva da luoghi sospetti³⁸. Stesso destino nel maggio dell'anno successivo spettò alla marticana *SS.mo Crocifisso e la Madonna di Cassopoli* proveniente da Cefalonia e di proprietà del greco Nicolò Plerinò³⁹.

Nel febbraio 1762 un *checcio* proveniente da Salonicco, ove aveva caricato "cottoni, balli di cappotti" ed altri generi destinati al porto di Livorno, venne sfrattato dal porto di Lipari, ove aveva cercato riparo dal maltempo. La nave, il cui equipaggio era composto da undici unità compreso il proprietario Costad. Francesco Missolongiotto, nel suo viaggio aveva altresì toccato Missolongi e Malta, nel cui porto era giunto il 31 gennaio⁴⁰. Nel giugno dello stesso anno si dispose poi lo sfratto del *S. Michele Arcangelo* di padron Pidaco qualora questo, proveniente da Giannina con un carico di grano e cappotti, avesse toccato un qualsiasi porto del Regno⁴¹.

La documentazione archivistica, sin qui utile ad accertare, seppur in modo estremamente frammentario, la presenza di navi greche nei porti siciliani, risulta più abbondante ed analitica dagli anni ottanta del secolo XVIII giacché alla fonte della Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica si unisce la documentazione proveniente dalla Deputazione locale di Messina⁴², il cui fondo archivistico si compone purtroppo di sole nove unità.

Il 16 maggio 1788 risulta posto in contumacia nel Regio Lazzaretto di Messina il frumento scaricato dalla tartanella ottomana del capitano Anagoste d'Antonio Chiose⁴³, mentre nel mese di luglio due polacche greche, l'una di capitano Panaita Duria proveniente da Zante e l'altra di Michele Cefalà da Candia, vennero "custodite" per quattro giorni e poi sfrattate⁴⁴. Nell'ottobre 1789 due imbarcazioni greche, l'una di capitano Pietro Verigri

³⁸ ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 123 e 129.

³⁹ Detta imbarcazione infatti venne anch'essa sfrattata dal litorale messinese in quanto proveniente dal Levante. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 130.

⁴⁰ ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 28.

⁴¹ ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 300.

⁴² La Deputazione di Salute di Messina aveva competenza sul territorio da Patti sino a Catania.

⁴³ In tale data vennero pagate 0.12 onze ciascuno a Carmelo Viglia e Giovanni Micciari e ciò per le operazioni di peso e scarico, durate quattro giorni, del suddetto frumento. Archivio di Stato di Messina (ASM), Deputazione della Salute, 1.

⁴⁴ Ciò si evince dal pagamento di 0.24 onze effettuato il 23 luglio a Giuseppe Ferro che con propria barca e marinai custodi le suddette imbarcazioni. *Ibidem*.

e l'altra di Teodoro d'Antonio, vennero "guardate a vista" e poi sfrattate così come nel successivo mese di dicembre accadde al legno di padron Marco Itrioti⁴⁵. Nel 1790 risultano tre arrivi: a marzo la polacca ottomana di Nicola Lurcheri, proveniente da Patrasso, a luglio un bastimento ellenico proveniente da Salonico e ad ottobre la tartana greca di capitano Pietro Nunifori⁴⁶.

Nel 1791 risultano due viaggi effettuati dal capitano Giovanni Inglese che a distanza di un mese l'uno dall'altro condusse dapprima un bastimento che faceva rotta da Patrasso e Missolongi⁴⁷ e poi una polacca proveniente anch'essa da Missolongi⁴⁸. Dalla stessa Missolongi risulta provenire la polacca ottomana *S. Giorgio* di capitano Patitò Siveri⁴⁹, mentre non si evince la rotta dell'imbarcazione di capitano Lorenzo Lorcarì⁵⁰ e delle due polacche di capitano Zanegotti Itrari⁵¹ e di padron Stefano Canonopolo, quest'ultima "guardata a vista" tra il 12 ed il 23 novembre dal guardiano Antonio d'Amico cui vennero corrisposti tre tari al giorno per il servizio reso⁵². Nel febbraio 1792 risultano contemporaneamente presenti nelle acque messinesi la tartanella di capitano Antonio Denitri proveniente da Cefalonia e la polacchetta capitanata dal greco ottomano Giovanni Pedacco proveniente da Missolongi. Dalla stessa Missolongi giunse nel giugno dello stesso anno la polacca *S. Giorgio* del greco ottomano Nicola Lurcheri che, "custodita" nei giorni 13, 14 e 15 del suddetto mese, venne poi accompagnata sino alla Torre del Faro; stesso trattamento era stato riservato nei giorni 11 e 12 alla polacca *Madonna di Caligata* del capitano greco veneto Pietro Caligà proveniente da Livadia, Cefalonia e Zante con patente postillata⁵³.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ Detta imbarcazione venne custodita dal 12 al 17 settembre attraverso l'ausilio del guardiano a vista Angelo Lentini, remunerato 3 tari al giorno dal 14 al 17 del mese, e della barca di Vincenzo Ferro, cui vennero corrisposti 6 tari giornalieri dal 12 al 17. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 2.

⁴⁸ In quest'ultimo caso l'imbarcazione, avente patente *tocca*, venne custodito dal 17 al 21 ottobre dal già citato Carlo Silipigni cui vennero corrisposti 6 tari al giorno. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 1 e 2.

⁴⁹ Il 12 luglio 1791 risulta un pagamento di 24 tari a Carlo Silipigni che custodì con la propria imbarcazione dall'8 all'11 del detto mese la polacca *S. Giorgio*, approdata a Messina con patente *tocca* e conseguentemente sfrattata. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 1.

⁵⁰ L'11 settembre Francesco Scarfi fu impiegato quale guardiano a vista della suddetta imbarcazione e remunerato 3 tari al giorno. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 2.

⁵¹ In merito alla suddetta imbarcazione si evince il pagamento di 0.12 onze effettuato il 1° marzo da Don Giacomo Galatti, coadiutore del Soprintendente delle Guardie di Sanità, al proprietario della barca di cui si servì per accompagnare sin alla Torre del Faro la detta polacca, proveniente da luoghi sospetti e quindi sfrattata. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 1.

⁵² ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 2.

⁵³ *Ibidem*.

Al di là dei transiti rilevati nelle acque messinesi nel corso del 1792 si è poi accertata la presenza di un legno greco con bandiera ottomana, che il 20 aprile fece il suo ingresso nel porto di Augusta “per cagion de’ venti contrari” carico di 230 salme di grano destinato all’isola di Malta, e della polacca ottomana del capitano Nicola Dimitri proveniente da Idra col suo carico di frumento destinato a Lisbona. Per quest’ultima imbarcazione, con un documento datato 15 novembre, fu lo stesso console ottomano Don Antonino Genzardi a chiedere che potesse consumare contumacia nel porto di Palermo per rendere possibili le cure ad un membro dell’equipaggio che aveva riportato “qualche frattura d’osso”⁵⁴.

Nell’anno 1793, infine, si ritrova a Messina l’imbarcazione del greco Giovanni Inglese⁵⁵, mentre l’anno dopo la polacca di Giovanni Pandeli, proveniente da Costantinopoli e “guardata a vista” da Domenico Lamberti tra il 22 ed il 26 gennaio del 1794⁵⁶.

Oltre alle navi sfrattate dal litorale messinese, nel periodo 1789-1794, ad alcune imbarcazioni provenienti da Levante venne permesso di purgare la contumacia nel Regio lazzeretto di Messina e di scaricare a terra le proprie mercanzie. Tra esse l’imbarcazione ottomana di Giovanni Pedacco⁵⁷, il S. *Demetrio* di Panay Dadaria⁵⁸, le due tartanelle di Andrea e Giorgio di Nicolò, il *chirlanghiz* di Anagoste di Vasili⁵⁹ e la polacca di Ciriaco Brusco di Demetrio⁶⁰. Al di là del pinco di capitano Zaffri d’Antonio, di bandiera ignota ed ammesso nel marzo 1791 a purgare la contumacia nel suddetto lazzeretto⁶¹, sono numerose in questo periodo le navi russe,

⁵⁴ ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 133.

⁵⁵ Il suddetto era già transitato nelle acque messinesi una prima volta nel settembre ed una seconda nell’ottobre 1791.

⁵⁶ ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 2.

⁵⁷ La suddetta imbarcazione, la cui origine è ignota, risulta approdata a Messina tra il 24 ed il 26 marzo 1792. Il suo carico di *granone* venne scaricato dalla nave e posto in contumacia nel Regio Lazzeretto. Cfr. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 1 e 2.

⁵⁸ Un documento datato 29 gennaio 1793 contiene un ordine di pagamento della Deputazione messinese a favore del *profumiere* Don Placido Sicuro per aver dato due *profumi* ai quattro passeggeri provenienti da Napoli di Romania a bordo della polacca ottomana di capitano Dadaria ed altri due ai dodici marinai provenienti col proprio legno dal golfo di Prevesa dopo essere stati predati dai turchi. Detti *profumi*, ascendenti a rotoli due di droghe, vennero somministrati l’uno a metà e l’altro alla fine delle rispettive contumacie, per un importo totale di 1.2 onze. Essendo i poveri e gli scampati dai turchi esentati dalle spese di contumacia fu lo stesso lazzeretto a pagare detta somma. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 2.

⁵⁹ Tanto le due tartane quanto il *chirlanghiz* depositarono nel settembre 1793 il proprio carico di frumento nel Regio Lazzeretto di Messina. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 2.

⁶⁰ Nel marzo 1794 la suddetta nave scaricò ben 558 salme di *granone* per l’opportuna contumacia. *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

provenienti principalmente da Calamo⁶², a cui venne riservato lo stesso trattamento e che presentano un capitano il cui nome richiama chiare origini elleniche (tabella 1).

4. *Navi e marinai greci in Sicilia nel primo ventennio dell'Ottocento*

Agli inizi del secolo XIX le uniche presenze di capitani di origine greca sulle coste messinesi sono quelle di Hals Tompasso, Tomopolo, Gerasimo Carcavallo e Cristofalo Leondorj. In merito ai primi due si trattava di comandanti di imbarcazioni che facevano rotta da Livorno verso Messina con carichi di indaco e china⁶³; Gerasimo Carcavallo, invece, fece naufragio in acque messinesi con un brigantino gerosolimitano proveniente da Patrasso. Gli uomini dell'equipaggio, sedici unità compreso il suddetto capitano, "purgarono" dunque la contumacia nella città peloritana dal 18 settembre sino al 12 ottobre 1808 ma furono esentati dalle relative spese in quanto naufraghi⁶⁴. Nel maggio 1809 si evidenzia invece la presenza in zona della nave di capitano Cristofalo Leondorj con un carico di ferro ma se ne ignora l'origine e la destinazione⁶⁵.

Nel secondo decennio del secolo XIX è stato possibile rilevare l'ammontare delle spese di contumacia e dei diritti pretesi dalla Deputazione di salute di Messina attraverso l'analisi di alcuni volumi sui quali gli ufficiali della suddetta Deputazione annotavano nome del capitano, merce, durata della contumacia ed importo da versare. Ciò ha permesso dunque di fare luce, seppur per un periodo limitato, sui costi del servizio offerto nel trattamento delle imbarcazioni provenienti da "luoghi sospetti".

Dal luglio al dicembre 1811 risultano transitare a Messina sette imbarcazioni con capitani di chiare origini greche. Ai suddetti viene chiesto di pagare a titolo di spese per la contumacia effettuata una somma compresa tra le 5.20 e le 11 onze, oltre ad ulteriori importi per diritti sulle merci trasportate⁶⁶ (tabella 2). Nel corso del 1812 invece purgarono la contumacia

⁶² Isola del Levante veneto.

⁶³ L'unico volume rimasto del fondo Consolato del mare, magistratura istituita alla fine del secolo XIII e competente su tutte le controversie di carattere commerciale, ha permesso di accertare che nel maggio 1806 il capitano Hals Tompasso trasportò un carico di indaco che Giuliano Berardi di Livorno inviò a Domenico Peria di Messina, mentre il 28 luglio ed il 31 ottobre capitano Tomopolo trasportò sulla stessa rotta e sempre allo stesso committente due casse di china. Il 28 luglio il trasporto di una cassa di china fina di cento libbre di peso venne effettuato sulla polacca *S. Spiridione*. ASM, Consolato del mare, 1.

⁶⁴ Fu pertanto lo stesso lazzeretto a pagare a Don Placido Sicuro l'importo di sedici tari per i due *profumi* forniti ai suddetti. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 3.

⁶⁵ Il carico venne sbarcato con l'ausilio di sei uomini ai quali per complessive sedici giornate di lavoro vennero corrisposte 1.18 onze. *Ibidem*.

⁶⁶ Si evidenziano in proposito le 2.4.15 onze richieste al capitano Anaganosti Mexi per diritti di 1/3 per cento sopra il suo carico di frumento. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 4.

a Messina dieci navi con comandanti ellenici tra i quali ricorrono per due volte i nomi di Costantino Chiparis e di Argirio di Demetrio (tabella 3). Anche in questo caso alle spese di contumacia si sommarono i diritti pagati alla Deputazione sopra il frumento⁶⁷ ed il riso trasportato⁶⁸.

Tabella 1. Navi da guerra russe che purgarono la contumacia nel Regio Lazzaretto di Messina 1790-1794

| Tipo di nave | Nome della nave | Armatore | Nome del Capitano | Origine | Equipaggio | Data |
|--------------|-------------------------|----------|------------------------------|---------|------------|----------------------------|
| Fregata | | - | Basilio Casimi | Calamo | 120 | 20 giorni a novembre 1790 |
| Corvetta | - | - | Lettieri Seguri | Calamo | 42 | 20 giorni a novembre 1790 |
| Galeotta | - | - | Lettieri Ricchiardopolo | Calamo | 20 | 20 giorni a novembre 1790 |
| Galeotta | - | - | Strati Nicoforati | Calamo | 21 | 20 giorni a novembre 1790 |
| Chirlanghiz | - | - | Andrea Ricciardopolo | Calamo | 65 | 20 giorni a novembre 1790 |
| Galeotta | - | - | Lettieri Ricchiardopolo | Calamo | - | 5 dicembre 1791 |
| Galeotta | - | - | Strajti Nicoforoto | Calamo | - | 5 dicembre 1791 |
| Pachebotto | L'aquila di Russia | - | Don Cristofalo Sassunsossolo | Calamo | 66 | 4-23 febbraio 1792 |
| Chirlanghiz | Il Gran Duca Alessandro | - | Gabriello Caravia | Calamo | 46 | 27 maggio - 23 giugno 1792 |
| Galeotta | Dafne | - | Strati Nicoforati | Zante | - | 20 giorni a luglio 1792 |

Fonte: ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 1 e 2

⁶⁷ Il 6 aprile 1812 risulta un pagamento di 48 onze effettuato dal capitano Argirio di Demetrio per diritti di grana 18 a salma sopra il frumento trasportato; il 19 aprile risultano pagate 38.16.8 onze da parte di Giovanni Spiridione sempre per un carico di frumento; il 22 maggio Anastasio Alibrandi pagò 23.17.8 sul granone da lui condotto; il 10, 16 e 25 giugno risultano poi i pagamenti di 35.15.2, 12.18.11 e 28.9.17 onze da parte rispettivamente di Costantino Sacchilopolo, di Leftieri di Giovanni e di Antonio Milaiti sui propri carichi di frumento; il 30 giugno infine Costantino Chiaparis pagò 6.11.3 onze per diritto di 1/3 per cento sopra "frumenti murgati il 23 giugno". *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ Il 21 agosto 1812 il capitano Teodori Costantino pagò 6.25.16 onze per diritti di 1/3 per cento sopra il carico di riso da lui portato. *Ibidem*.

Tabella 2. Pagamenti effettuati per spese di contumacia nel 1811

| Nome del Capitano | Inizio contumacia | Fine contumacia | Pagamento in onze |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Giorgio Apostolo | 20 luglio | 4 agosto | 11 |
| Giovanni Spiridione | 7 agosto | 26 agosto | 11 |
| Demetrio di Cristofalo | 18 agosto | 6 settembre | 5.20 |
| Anaganosti D'Andrea | 15 settembre | 4 ottobre | 5.20 |
| Costantino Marojanni | 1 ottobre | 20 ottobre | 5.20 |
| Anaganosti Mexi | 15 novembre | 4 dicembre | 5.20 |
| Gio. Pandelio | 12 dicembre | 31 dicembre | 5.20 |

Tabella 3. Pagamenti effettuati per spese di contumacia nel 1812

| Nome del Capitano | Inizio contumacia | Fine contumacia | Pagamento in onze |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Costantino Chiparis | 29 gennaio | 17 febbraio | 5.20 |
| Giovanni Spiridione | 3 aprile | 22 aprile | 5.20 |
| Anastasio Alibrandi | 7 maggio | 26 maggio | 5.20 |
| Costantino Sacchilopolo | 22 maggio | 10 giugno | 5.20 |
| Costantino Chiparis | 9 giugno | 3 luglio | 7.2.10 |
| Antonio Milaiti | 7 giugno | 25 giugno | 5.20 |
| Caralambi Cosma | 1 luglio | 28 luglio | 7.28 |
| Teodori Costantino | 22 luglio | 30 agosto | 11.10 |
| Argirio di Demetrio | 18 marzo | 6 aprile | 8.10 |
| Argirio di Demetrio | 9 maggio | 30 maggio | 7.25 |

Fonte: ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 6

Relativamente al biennio 1813-1814 vanno evidenziate le spese per i trattamenti cui le imbarcazioni sospette erano soggette⁶⁹ ed i pagamenti al personale di guardia⁷⁰. In merito a quest'ultimi si notino le 2.4 onze pagate il 12 maggio 1813 per la sorveglianza della cannoniera di capitano Spiro Pandeli proveniente da Itaca e poi Napoli⁷¹, le 12.12 onze pagate ai tre guardiani straordinari per aver custodito in contumacia tra l'aprile ed il maggio 1814 ufficiali albanesi e truppe inglesi sbarcate dal brigantino ottomano di capitano Pandeli⁷² e le 6.12 onze corrisposte a Raffaele Di Matteo e Litterio Gentile per sedici giorni di contumacia tra il 4 ed il 19 giugno 1814 dello schooner reale siciliano di capitano Angelo Pottamiano proveniente da Zante⁷³. Tra settembre e novembre 1814 vennero poi registrati due approdi della nave inglese *S. Elena* di capitano Spiridione Nosco; nel primo caso risultano erogate 7.6 onze ai guardiani straordinari che custodirono a vista la suddetta imbarcazione tra il 7 settembre e l'8 ottobre, nel secondo al già citato Litterio Gentile vennero pagate 6 onze per essersi occupato dal 3 ottobre al 1 novembre dei sei individui sbarcati dal detto legno inglese⁷⁴.

Come già sottolineato, a fronte dei servizi resi la Deputazione di Salute di Messina imponeva alle navi che approdavano sulle spiagge di sua appartenenza il pagamento di somme variabili a seconda della durata della contumacia imposta e di diritti sopra le merci sbarcate. Da rilevare negli anni 1814-1815 la presenza di ben 36 capitani di origine ellenica⁷⁵ (tabelle

⁶⁹ Il 17 febbraio 1813 si è riscontrato il pagamento di 8.16 onze al *profumiere* Don Placido Sicuro "per aver dato li soliti profumi allo Scuner comandato dall'Alfiere Don Gio. Torini, ed al Gutter dell'Alfiere Don Angelo Patamiani, ed alli 3 Trasporti di suo convoglio, ed alli 203 Albanesi venuti da Zante, che consumarono la contumacia di giorni 35 in questo Regio Lazzaretto a tutti li 31 Gennaio scorso, come pure ad un Paranzello francese, che consumò la contumacia di giorni 21 a tutti li 8 corrente febraro" [...]. *Ibidem*.

⁷⁰ Si noti come la liquidazione delle suddette spese fosse sempre accompagnata dalla formula: *Governatori della Tavola Pecuniaria della città di Messina per conto dell'Erario e per esso l'Illustre Deputazione alla Salute pagate onze. Ibidem*.

⁷¹ 12 tari ciascuno vennero corrisposti a Santo Console e Mario Russo per aver "guardato a vista" dal 24 al 26 aprile la suddetta imbarcazione; 28 e 12 tari vennero pagati rispettivamente a Rosario Inferrera, per il lavoro di custodia svolto dal 24 al 30 del suddetto mese, e a Camillo Stranieri, guardiano dal 29 aprile al 1 maggio. Cfr. *Ibidem*.

⁷² A Domenico Rotante vennero corrisposti 6 tari al giorno per trentuno giorni di contumacia dei suddetti ufficiali albanesi; a Michele Spinelli e Lorenzo Casapolo rispettivamente 3.6 e 3 onze per 16 e 15 giorni di contumacia delle truppe inglesi. *Ibidem*.

⁷³ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁴ La suddetta imbarcazione, proveniente da Corfù, risulta guardata a vista anche nei giorni 2 e 3 novembre. Cfr. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 4; ASM, Regia udienza, 534.

⁷⁵ Tra essi ricorrono più volte i nomi di Angelo Parascandalo, Gio. Teodoropolo, Marco Grammaticopolo, Panajotti Panà, Gerasimo Calicchia, Andrea Dimandopolo, Giorgio Sparopolo, Giovanni Spiridione, Costantino Caricotti, Marco Mauromati e Spiridione Dovin.

4 e 5) e l'approdo di imbarcazioni con carichi di frumento⁷⁶, cocciniglia⁷⁷, pelli di lepre, pelo di cammello, lana, bestiame, tabacco⁷⁸ e formaggi di Morea⁷⁹. Ulteriori introiti vennero poi acquisiti attraverso la contumacia effettuata da un passeggero e dal carico della polacca inglese di capitano Spiridione Ronchi tra il 13 ed il 26 giugno e dalla contumacia resa da un passeggero e da un marinaio sbarcati rispettivamente dall'imbarcazione di capitano Ananghiro Petrà e dalla polacca ottomana di capitano Andrea Manuni⁸⁰. Nel corso del biennio suddetto si segnala infine la presenza nel golfo di Palermo del brigantino ottomano del capitano Panajotti Pascanicola⁸¹, il probabile arrivo a Messina del bastimento greco di capitano Domenico di Giorgio proveniente da Salonicco con "patente sporca"⁸² e l'ingresso nel porto di Augusta, a causa delle cattive condizioni meteorologiche, della polacca russa di capitano Giorgio Spanopolo proveniente da Malta e diretta a Messina⁸³.

Per gli anni seguenti la documentazione archivistica torna ad essere estremamente frammentaria cosicché per il 1817 si evince la presenza a Messina dei brigantini ottomani *S. Spiridione* di capitano Anacanosti Pajotti Castrulli⁸⁴ e *Madonna d'Idra* di capitano Policroni di Giovanni Luzzumi, quest'ultima sorvegliata dal 27 marzo al 10 maggio⁸⁵. Nel giugno dello

⁷⁶ In data 18 maggio e 18 agosto 1815 capitano Costantino Caracotti effettuò due pagamenti di 7.2 onze ciascuno in relazione al diritto di 1/3 per cento spettante alla Deputazione di salute sopra il suo carico di frumento. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 7 e 8.

⁷⁷ In data 10 aprile 1815 capitano Gio. Spiridione pagò 5.7.14 onze per il diritto di 1/3 per cento spettante alla Deputazione di salute sopra il suo carico di cocciniglia. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 8.

⁷⁸ Le suddette mercanzie, di cui si ignora l'origine, vennero sbarcate dall'imbarcazione di capitano Panajotti Bogdano e poste in contumacia dal 30 giugno all'8 agosto. *Ibidem*.

⁷⁹ Da due documenti del 26 agosto si evince che sul carico di 370 cantara di formaggio di Morea, valutato alla ragione di 2 onze il cantaro, si pagarono 2.14 onze per *real diritto di 1/3 per cento* ed onze 2.19 per *diritto di spurgo e peso* del suddetto trasporto. *Ibidem*.

⁸⁰ Il 6 luglio 1815 a fronte di 28 giorni di contumacia effettuata dal 13 giugno al 10 luglio dal detto passeggero e dal detto marinaio risulta un pagamento di 13.10 onze. *Ibidem*.

⁸¹ Il 21 aprile 1814 la nave spagnola capitanata da Michele Tarraul predò nel golfo di Palermo la suddetta nave greca. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 196.

⁸² Nel giugno 1814 infatti la Deputazione di salute di Messina informò quella di Palermo dell'allontanamento dalle coste calabresi di due legni, uno proveniente da Smirne, "senza carte e con alcuni uomini del suo equipaggio morti per viaggio", e l'altro, cioè il suddetto bastimento greco, "precedente da Salonicco con patente sporca". Proprio quest'ultimo fece rotta per la Sicilia. *Ibidem*.

⁸³ Il documento è datato 12 febbraio 1815. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 203.

⁸⁴ Il capitano della suddetta imbarcazione, guardata a vista nei giorni 8 e 9 maggio, non fornì la propria patente e partì improvvisamente senza aver pagato i diritti di custodia. ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 5.

⁸⁵ All'arrivo in porto del detto brigantino, proveniente da Salonicco, Idra e Zante, il

Tabella 4. Pagamenti effettuati per spese di contumacia e diritti sopra merci nel 1814

| Data documento | Nome del Capitano | Spese di contumacia | Diritti su merci | Durata contumacia |
|----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 13 settembre | Angelo Parascandalo | 11.10 | - | 40 giorni |
| 1 ottobre | Gio. Teodoropolo | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 10 ottobre | Nicolò Potamiani | 8.15 | - | 30 giorni |
| 18 ottobre | Marco Gramaticopolo | 19.0.10 | 3.9.7 | 40 giorni |
| 18 ottobre | Panai Panà | - | 3.8.4 | - |
| 18 ottobre | Criscenzio Carciotolo | 10.4.10 | 32.21.14 | - |
| 18 ottobre | Caralambro Dimetri | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 5-12 novembre | Giuseppe Panajotti | 7.28 | 0.10.6 | 28 giorni |
| 22 novembre | Gerasmo Calichia | 17.3.10 | 1.16.2 | 25 giorni |
| 5 dicembre | Spiropolo | - | 14.5 | - |
| 6 dicembre | Chiriaco Pandeli | 7.28 | - | 28 giorni |
| 6 dicembre | Attanasio Paniotti | 10.4.10 | 2.25.2 | 21 giorni |
| 9 dicembre | Francesco Maurianni | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 13 dicembre | Caralambro Sclavo | 7.28 | - | 28 giorni |
| 13 dicembre | Gerasimo Calvecchia | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 17 dicembre | Basilio Teodoro Chini | - | 9.24.10 | - |
| 22 dicembre | Nicolò Panajotti | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |

Fonte: ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 7 e 8

stesso anno si è accertato inoltre che parte degli equipaggi dei tre bastimenti greci provenienti da ponente sbarcarono a Fondachello purgando ivi la propria contumacia⁸⁶.

Relativamente al triennio 1818-1821 l'analisi sistematica dei registri in cui venivano annotati giornalmente gli approdi e le partenze dal porto di Palermo⁸⁷ ha permesso di accertare l'estrema rarità degli arrivi di naviglio el-

capitano Policroni venne tratto in arresto per cause ignote e liberato soltanto nella notte tra il 10 e l'11 maggio. *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶ Per la trascrizione delle spese affrontate in occasione del suddetto sbarco vedi tabella 6.

⁸⁷ Trattasi dei rapporti resi dall'ufficio del custode di Sanità sui legni entrati nel porto di Palermo.

Tabella 5. Pagamenti effettuati per spese di contumacia e diritti sopra merci nel 1815

| Data documento | Nome del Capitano | Spese di contumacia | Diritti su merci | Durata contumacia |
|----------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 1 gennaio | Angelo Parascandalo | 3.29 | - | 14 giorni |
| 25 gennaio | Andrea Dimandopolo | 7.28 | - | 28 giorni |
| 21 febbraio | Gio. Caliga | 3.11.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 28 febbraio | Giorgio Sparopolo | 3.29 | - | 14 giorni |
| 1 marzo | Andrea Dimandopolo | - | 15.28.4 | - |
| 7 marzo | Gio. Cristri | 3.29 | - | 14 giorni |
| 14 marzo | Gio. Teodoropolo | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 31 marzo | Giorgio Sparopolo | - | 20.23.11 | 28 giorni |
| 4 aprile | Panajotti Panà | - | 17.6.13 | 28 giorni |
| 10 aprile | Gio. Spiridione | - | 5.7.14 | - |
| 11 aprile | Antonio Spiropolo | 14.5 | | 50 giorni |
| 18 maggio | Costantino Caricotti | - | 7.2 | - |
| 21 maggio | Marco Mauromati | 3.11.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 23 maggio | Hamati Pandeli | 3.11.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 23 maggio | Nicolò Milonopulo | 6.23 | - | 14 giorni |
| 16 giugno | Angelo Parascandalo | 3.29 | - | 14 giorni |
| 23 giugno | Andrea Dimandopolo | 7.28 | - | 28 giorni |
| 27 giugno | Giorgio Sparopolo | 3.29 | - | 14 giorni |
| 3 luglio | Marco Grammaticopolo | 3.11.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 4 luglio | Marco Grammaticopolo | 3.29 | - | 14 giorni |
| 7 luglio | Panajotti Panà | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 11 luglio | Giorgio Sparopolo | 20.23.11 | | 28 giorni |
| 11 luglio | Panajotti Panà | 17.6.13 | - | 28 giorni |
| 11 luglio | Caralambro Messuri | 6.23 | - | 14 giorni |
| 11 luglio | Giovanni Spiridione | - | 5.7.14 | - |
| 11 luglio | Gerasimo Spirato | 3.29 | 1.4.18 | 14 giorni |
| 11 luglio | Spiridione Lain | 6.23 | - | 14 giorni |
| 30 luglio | Basilio Doncopilo | 3.11.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 8 agosto | Gio. Calamani | - | 0.15.19 | - |
| 10-11 agosto | Spiridione Dovin | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 16 agosto | Andrea Drimopolo | 19.10 | - | 40 giorni |
| 18 agosto | Costantino Caracotti | 7.2 | - | - |
| 18 agosto | Marco Mauromati | 3.11.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 18 agosto | Stamati Paudali | 3.11.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 21 agosto | Panajotti Bogdano | - | 20.15.3 | 40 giorni |
| 23 agosto | Pandeli Stati | 1.29.10 | - | 7 giorni |
| 26 agosto | Andrea Dimitropolo | - | 5.3 | - |

Fonte: ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 7 e 8

Tabella 6. Nota di spese occorse al Soprintendente alle Guardie di questo Ecc.mo Magistrato alla Salute D. Placido Galatti in occasione del sbarco eseguito in Fondachello li 20 Giugno prossimo passato di porzione degl'equipaggi de' tre Bastimenti Greci provenienti da Ponente come s'asserì cioè...

| CAUSALE | ONZE |
|--|---------|
| <i>A Natale Casabianca per cortesia straordinaria determinata da questa per Palermo d'ordine del Magistrato li 21 Giugno suddetto</i> | 8 |
| <i>Per affitto di numero 4 vetture per servizio d'esso Soprintendente e guardie assegnategli dal prelodato Magistrato per andata, e ritorno</i> | 2.20 |
| <i>Al locandiere di Spadafora per affitto d'un materazzo per uso del guardiano Barbera, mentre per altri materazzi per servizio d'esso Soprintendente, e del guardiano Giardina si procurarono da' medesimi</i> | 0.6 |
| <i>Olio per lumi per 38 notti a tt. 1 per notte</i> | 1.8 |
| <i>Legno dal 5 Luglio a tutti li 29 detto</i> | 0.6 |
| <i>Sussidi dati da esso Soprintendente a numero 16 contumacianti poveri in Fondachello per essersi negati li Magistrati Municipali di Valdina, e Spadafora a di cui comuni appartenevano essi contumacianti miserabili</i> | 5.15.6 |
| <i>A numero 7 uomini che fecero la guardia in Fondachello li 14 Luglio per non aver mandato il Magistrato Municipale di Monforte le guardie in detto giorno</i> | 0.21 |
| <i>Per affitto di diverse vetture per servizio d'esso Soprintendente per andare in detto Fondachello</i> | 0.18 |
| <i>Al guardiano straordinario Litterio Gentile che portò l'ordine della pratica per li contumacianti di Fondachello</i> | 0.8 |
| <i>Gratificazione per il Soprintendente per li giorni da lui impiegati in detto Fondachello dalli 21 Giugno alli 29 Luglio</i> | 30 |
| TOTALE | 49.12.6 |

Fonte: ASM, Deputazione della Salute, 5

lenico giacchè in detti anni solamente dodici imbarcazioni ottomane arrivarono in città. A gennaio 1819 il brigantino *S. Nicolò* di capitano Paolo Anarcirio⁸⁸, a marzo il brigantino *Aristide* di capitano Litterio di Giovanni⁸⁹; tra marzo e novembre cinque viaggi della goletta *Sultana* di capitano Giorgio di Giovanni Chioni⁹⁰. Quest'ultimo torna a Palermo anche nel

⁸⁸ Il suddetto brigantino, senza alcun carico, arrivò il 16 gennaio nel porto di Palermo proveniente da Malaga ed Alicante in trentuno giorni. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 1140.

⁸⁹ Nave di bandiera ottomana, giunse a Palermo il 12 marzo proveniente da Malaga in quaranta giorni, Genova e Santo Stefano in ventidue giorni. Al suo arrivo capitano Litterio di Giovanni dichiarò che partendo da Malaga imbarcò tredici marinai fuggiti da altri legni greci che si trovavano ivi. *Ibidem*.

⁹⁰ Il primo arrivo nel porto di Palermo della goletta *Sultana*, proveniente da Napoli e

1820⁹¹, anno in cui si rileva altresì la presenza dei capitani Giorgio Demetrio⁹², Giorgio di Nicola⁹³, Basilio di Nicola⁹⁴ e Costantino Chiriaco⁹⁵.

Nel suddetto periodo la presenza di navi elleniche risulta estremamente rara anche negli altri porti isolani: il 28 dicembre 1818, con rapporto dell'Intendente di Catania, la Commissione di Sanità di Palermo venne informata del naufragio nelle acque di Acicastello della polacca greca *La Mauritana* proveniente col suo carico di grano da Prevesa⁹⁶; nel dicembre successivo venne invece rilevato l'avvicinamento nell'isola di Lipari di un legno mercantile greco proveniente da Missolongi⁹⁷. Relativamente al porto di Messina, infine, nel settembre 1819 purgarono la contumacia nel lazzeretto cittadino tre passeggeri sbarcati dall'imbarcazione ottomana *S. Spiridione* proveniente da Itaca mentre l'anno successivo le navi di capitano Attanasio Glichi e di capitano Marojanni vennero guardate a vista rispettivamente dal guardiano Letterio Bonaventura tra il 13 ed il 18 gennaio e da Andrea La Rosa tra il 29 febbraio e l'11 marzo⁹⁸.

5. Conclusioni

Il pericolo della diffusione di malattie epidemiche rappresentò anche nel meridione d'Italia un potente stimolo alla creazione di strutture sanitarie aventi carattere permanente. In effetti, la terribile pestilenza di Mes-

senza carico, risale al 31 marzo, il secondo al 14 giugno, anche se questa volta la nave proviene da Malta con un carico di lino, cotone e manifatture non meglio specificate; da Malta anche nel terzo, quarto e quinto viaggio, datati rispettivamente 31 luglio, 13 agosto e 20 novembre, con carichi di lino, lana, manifatture, uva passa e zucchero. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 1141.

⁹¹ A bordo dello schooner ottomano, proveniente da Napoli e con un carico di mobili, vi erano oltre al suddetto capitano sette uomini d'equipaggio e diciannove passeggeri. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 1142.

⁹² Trattasi del brigantino ottomano con diciassette uomini d'equipaggio proveniente dal continente americano in trentasette giorni e da Alessandria d'Egitto in diciotto giorni. Detta imbarcazione, il cui carico era costituito da favetta, venne sfrattata dal porto di Palermo in cui arrivò il 26 ottobre. *Ibidem*.

⁹³ Arrivato il 21 novembre a bordo del brigantino *S. Michele*, proveniente da Idra e da Napoli. Alla suddetta imbarcazione, carica di grano e con ventinove uomini d'equipaggio, venne intimato lo sfratto. *Ibidem*.

⁹⁴ Arrivato il 2 dicembre da Spezia con un carico di grano, il brigantino *S. Nicolò* venne sfrattato dal porto siciliano. *Ibidem*.

⁹⁵ Anche in tal caso trattasi del *S. Nicolò* che, proveniente da Spezia, si era diretto verso Palermo per ragioni meteorologiche e per rifornirsi di viveri. *Ibidem*.

⁹⁶ Dell'equipaggio, composto da 24 persone, si salvarono soltanto in otto che, sbarcati a terra, vennero condotti lontano dall'abitato e custoditi dalle guardie sanitarie. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 225.

⁹⁷ Ignoto le cause di tale avvicinamento. ASP, Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, 216.

⁹⁸ ASM, *Deputazione della Salute*, 9.

sina del 1743 va considerata elemento risolutivo per la costituzione nell'isola della Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica, organo centrale con competenza su tutta la Sicilia, con giurisdizione sulle Deputazioni locali ed indipendente da ogni altra magistratura del Regno.

La consultazione e l'analisi della documentazione afferente il sistema sanitario isolano, volto a mediare, come tutti i simili organismi di controllo sanitario nel Mediterraneo, tra le esigenze commerciali del Regno e gli interessi della popolazione isolana alla tutela della propria salute⁹⁹, ha reso possibile la ricostruzione del movimento di navi e passeggeri di origine greca nei porti del Regno di Sicilia tra il XVIII ed il XIX secolo. Lo studio delle disposizioni volte a disciplinare il trattamento da riservarsi alle imbarcazioni provenienti da *fuori Regno*, ad eliminare le anomalie nelle patenti di salute presentate dalle navi in arrivo ed in partenza dai porti isolani, ad operare correttamente sia nei confronti delle navi ammesse a di contumacia che riguardo ai legni sospetti o infetti da allontanare ha permesso di analizzare opportunamente la documentazione archivistica necessaria ad effettuare una ricerca che ha presentato difficoltà legate sia all'identificazione del naviglio greco¹⁰⁰ che alla frammentarietà dello stesso materiale consultato¹⁰¹.

A partire dalla metà del secolo XVIII è stato accertato come l'arrivo di bastimenti ellenici sulle coste isolate, a causa della propria provenienza levantina, dava origine prevalentemente alla procedura di sfratto dai porti del Regno, procedimento che spesso era preceduto dalla custodia a vista dell'imbarcazione sospetta per evitare ogni tentativo di avvicinamento alla costa. Tra gli scali siciliani è sicuramente il porto messinese a rilevare la maggior quantità di bastimenti e marinai greci, mentre pochi sono i transiti su Palermo e ancor più sporadici e spesso legati a fattori meteorologici quelli sugli altri porti isolani. Quanto ai carichi trasportati si è rilevata in prevalenza la presenza di cereali, in alcuni casi ammessi ad effettuare la necessaria contumacia pagando gli opportuni diritti, mentre più sporadica è la presenza di pellame, materie e prodotti tessili, sostanze coloranti, bestiame, ferro e prodotti alimentari.

⁹⁹ SALVEMINI, *Le pratiche di sanità marittima nel Regno di Napoli*.

¹⁰⁰ Sui problemi metodologici della storia marittima ellenica cfr. G. D. PAGRATIS, *Sources for the Maritime History of Greece (Fifteenth to Seventeenth Century)*, in G. HARLAFTIS - C. VASSALLO, *New directions in Mediterranean Maritime History*, in (ed. by) HARLAFTIS and VASSALLO "Research in Maritime History" 28 (2004), 146.

¹⁰¹ Il riferimento è alle gravi mancanze nei fondi archivistici messinesi: il fondo Deputazione della Salute è infatti costituito da soli nove volumi per il periodo 1786-1820 mentre del fondo Secrezia l'unico volume superstite è dell'anno 1587. Su quest'ultimo cfr. C. TRASSELLI, *Sul movimento del porto di Messina nel 1587*, in "Economia e Storia (1955)", 453.

Katerina Galani

Foreigners in an unfamiliar market:
European business practices and culture
in the Eastern Mediterranean in the XVIIIth century

The sea-borne trade of the Eastern Mediterranean and especially the external commerce of the Ottoman Empire with Western Europe reached a point of maturity in the 18th century. During this time, special economic, military and political circumstances disturbed the long-established economic and social equilibrium and led to the reduction of the Ottoman Empire to a peripheral state¹.

During their long-lasting 'invasion' from the North, Europeans and predominantly French, Dutch and British merchants had settled in various Mediterranean ports, while in the Eastern parts, they competed over the vast and vibrant market of the Ottoman Empire². The Mediterranean was at the time a significant market of staples within a network of international markets accessible to Western Europeans³. The 18th century was an era of worldwide mercantile expansion and rivalry: Europeans were gradually consolidating their dominance in their Atlantic and Indian colonies, which supplied them with cheap labour and raw materials to boost European industrial input. However, intra-European trade was still the most significant in terms of value and volume. As Patrick O'Brien stressed, 76% of European exports were directed within Europe during the 1790's, leaving only a small share in total economic activity to the

¹ HALIL INALCIK, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge, 1994), 4; NECLA GEYIKDAGI, *Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire: International Trade and Relations, 1857-1914* (London, 2011), 5-17.

² FERNAND BRAUDEL, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II*, vol. 1 (New York, 1972), 615-642. For a revisionist approach see M. GREENE, "Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century", *The Past and Present*, 174 (2002), 42-71.

³ VICTORIA BATEMAN, "The Evolution of Markets in Early Modern Europe, 1350-1800: a Study of Wheat Prices", *Economic History Review*, 64/2 (2011), 447-471.

trade with the periphery⁴. Proximity to the great European ports, which ensured briefer and less dangerous voyages, along with the untapped potential of the Ottoman market made the Levantine trade particularly enticing for Western merchants. European cloth was widely traded in the Ottoman Empire in exchange for the Mediterranean products and the riches of Anatolia: grain, oil, spices, silk, along with cotton and wool from the hinterland.

Around the turn of the 19th century the Western European group of traders, who had dominated the Mediterranean since the 16th century, had to confront a local contender: the upcoming maritime power of Greek merchants and seafarers. Emerging organically from Ottoman society, and thus accustomed to its economic and cultural practices, they exploited this comparative advantage over their rivals⁵. In the following century the Greeks would acquire a powerful merchant fleet and Greek commercial houses would prosper in the Mediterranean ports.

The above-mentioned ethnic groups shared the same trade, transporting goods between West and East. Despite their commercial co-existence and interaction in the Levant and their pursuit of economic maximization in a common field of action, they followed relatively differentiated patterns of entrepreneurial organization, revealing a flexible entrepreneurial mentality. In fact, monopolistic chartered companies operated in the Levant simultaneously with free traders, personal firms and joint-capital partnerships. The diversity in business practices took into account the idiosyncrasy of the Mediterranean Sea and the particular needs and entrepreneurial culture of the respective groups. Institutions, such as the firm, which evolved over time to serve the interests of the mercantile communities, business practices including formal and informal incorporations, partnerships, agency networks and cross-cultural ties among contracting parties formed the everyday economic reality in the Levant⁶.

⁴ PATRICK KARL O'BRIEN, "European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery", *Economic History Review*, 35/1 (1982), 4, 16.

⁵ GELINA HARLAFTIS, "The 'Eastern Invasion': Greeks in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries", in M. FUSARO, C. HEYWOOD, M.S. OMRI (eds.), *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel's Maritime Legacy* (London, 2010), 223-252; GELINA HARLAFTIS, SOFIA LAIOU, "Ottoman State policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-c.1820: The Rise of the Greek-owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet", in M. MAZOWER (ed.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece* (London, 2008), 1-44.

⁶ Indicatively see CHARLES CARRIERE, *Négoçiants Marseillais au XVIII^e siècle: contribution à l'étude des économies maritimes* (Marseille, 1973); ALFRED C. WOOD, *The History of the Levant Company* (London, 1964); RALPH DAVIS, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square* (London, 1967), 174-188; MURAT CIZAKCA, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe* (Leiden, 1996); FRANCESCA TRIVELLATO, *The Familiarity of Strangers* (New Haven, 2009), 10-16, chapters 5,7,8; GEOFFREY HEWINGS, MICHAEL SONIS and DAVID

Drawing on the Braudelian paradigm, the proper nature of the Sea played an important role in the political and economic activities of its residents and sojourners. One of the distinctive characteristics of the Mediterranean throughout its history and especially in the 18th century was the political fragmentation of its coastline. The sea simultaneously separated and connected a number of states with diverse cultural and political features. In spite of a topography of micro-regions and micro-economies along the coasts, the relative ease of navigation in the Mediterranean has fostered the development of communication and integration in the cloistered seaborne environment⁷. Although during the intermittent conflicts of the long 18th century islands and coasts swiftly passed from one power to another, it would be accurate to say that during the second half of the 18th century the Mediterranean was surrounded by nascent, waning and long-standing Empires: In its northern coast Spain, France, the Hapsburg Empire, reaching out to the sea through the annexation of Tuscany and the Dalmatian coast, and the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, subordinated to the Spanish Crown. The Republic of Venice controlled large areas along the north-eastern coast until 1797, when its littoral territories were divided between the French and Austrian Empire under the treaty of Campo Formio. In addition, Imperial Russia -briefly- sought an exit to the Mediterranean through the Italian peninsula and the Ionian Islands⁸. The Ottoman Empire spread on the east and southern coast in the Levant and its allies, Barbary States. The Barbary States, the Regencies of Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers in the North African coast, owed allegiance to the Sublime Porte fighting at the side of the Sultan. In exchange, they enjoyed a state of autonomy. Despite shifting borders and political diversity, all countries shared an outlet to the Middle Sea and strove to expand it.

The different polities that surrounded the Mediterranean created a jigsaw with uneven and unique pieces, ranging from Western nation-states to multiethnic empires, with branches extending to Northern Europe, such as the case of the Kingdom of Holland, and Russia. This complicated political environment influenced Western business policy regarding shipping and trade in the Mediterranean. It required flexibility and adaptability to exploit the conditions of trade while tailored to the particularities, preferences and interests of each contracting party.

BOYCE (eds.), *Trade, Networks and Hierarchies: Modelling Regional and Interregional Economies* (Berlin, 2002) .

⁷ PEREGRINE HORDEN, NICHOLAS PURCELL, *The Corrupting Sea: a Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford, 2000), 9-25, 123-172; MARIO APOSTOLOV, *The Christian-Muslim Frontier: a Zone of Contact, Conflict or Cooperation* (New York, 2004), chapters 1, 5.

⁸ NORMAN EUGENE SAUL, *Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807* (Chicago, 1970), 65-67, 183-187.

The legal framework which regulated commercial activity in the Eastern Mediterranean was defined by the capitulatory regime. Since the early 16th century the Sublime Porte had signed commercial agreements first with French and subsequently with British and Dutch merchants. The treaties were bestowed by each Sultan individually and had to be renewed by his successor, giving the chance to renegotiate their terms with the grantees. In the early years of this practice, the treaties were considered as unilateral and the Sultan had the right to revoke them at will. With the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and its increasing economic dependence on Western Europe the agreements were acknowledged as bilateral⁹.

This system of Capitulations facilitated the commercial activities of the Westerners in the Ottoman market with the grant of trade and fiscal privileges¹⁰. In specific terms, European merchants were entitled to a reduced 3% customs duty instead of 5%, as was the rule for the Ottoman subjects, and were exempted from any additional customs on goods in transit. The Sultan recognised the freedom of navigation and trade to Western merchants, who were able to extract the surplus in agricultural production of the Anatolian hinterland by offering profitable terms and the means for its exportation.

In addition to the purely economic dimension, the Capitulations designated the rights and conditions of residence of the foreign communities who could not be regarded as direct subjects of the Sultan, and defined legally their place in Ottoman society¹¹. They were thus acknowledged as a *millet*, an autonomous group distinguished primarily by religion from their Muslim environment, and officially represented by their ambassador and by consuls scattered in the ports of the Mediterranean. As a consequence legal and religious immunity was granted to these mercantile communities together with the right to settle disputes between their members according to the laws of their nation¹².

Contrary to the direct and unhindered exploitation of colonies in South and East Asia by the Europeans, the existence of a central power as the second contracting party regulated these commercial agreements according to the established institutions, legal and bureaucratic procedures of the Ottoman Empire. The Western merchants had to abide by the laws

⁹ INALCIK, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 190.

¹⁰ MAURITS VAN DEN BOOGERT, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman legal system: qadis, consuls and beraths in the 18th century* (Leiden, 2005).

¹¹ ALEXANDER DE GROOT, "The organization of western European trade in the Levant", in LEONARD BLUSSÉ, FEMME GAASTRA (eds.), *Companies and Trade: Essays on overseas trading companies during the Ancien Regime* (Leiden, 1981), 238-239.

¹² PETER SUGAR, *Southern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804* (Washington, 1996), 31-49.

and customs of the host society in their attempt to maximize profit. The Ottomans did not permit Europeans to establish independent colonies or acquire territorial rights as had been the case in India. They gained mainly from the imported manufactured products that were scarce and popular in the Turkish market, and the customs payments, which filled the Ottoman treasury, as well as from ascertaining European political friendship and co-operation.

In this context, the Ottoman Empire since the early 16th century had associated its economic relationship with Europe with its political external affairs and therefore sought among commercial partners for political alliances and vice versa¹³. The treaties of Capitulations were considered by the Ottoman state principally as diplomatic agreements, which ensured allegiance and co-operation against mutual enemies such as Russia and the Hapsburg Empire. This fact accounts for the meticulous selection of the second contracting party; Austrians and Russians were never granted analogous trade and fiscal privileges because of their rivalry with the Ottomans over territory and trade in Eastern Europe and on the Black Sea. Hence the commercial implications of these pacts, which were fundamental for the western countries, were considered by the Ottomans to be secondary¹⁴.

From the early days of their settlement, the Ottoman Empire was an alien and unfamiliar environment for Western European traders and it was only reasonable that the latter sought natural allies among the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects such as the Greeks, Armenians and Jews. The distance between the European capitals and the outports of the Levant and the consequently long sea journeys increased the danger in shipping and transporting commodities, especially in the hostile Mediterranean, where ships regularly confronted privateers and pirates. At the other end of the journey, the markets of the Ottoman Empire, as outlets to the Asian hinterland, formed a unique cultural and economic sphere. Spatial remoteness was coupled by the cultural alienation between the West and the East. These profound differences were manifested in the everyday economic practices and entrepreneurial culture. The suspicious "Levantine ways" of business striking a balance between speculation and corruption, the habitual bribery (*avantias*) of state officials to maintain fiscal and mercantile privileges, issues of commercial credit and trust built on networks of kinship and ethnicity, linguistic difficulties, particular market preferences all complicated European trade business in the Levant. The two contracting parties were equally lacking in these regards, and faced

¹³ DANIEL GOFFMAN, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2002), 183-188.

¹⁴ ELDHAM ELDEM, *French Trade in Istanbul in the 18th century*, 5-6.

equal challenges of obtaining information about mercantile mentalities, price fluctuation, demand of goods and competition.

Therefore, although Western merchants had traded for centuries with the Ottoman state, the unfamiliarity of the far-off Levantine market and the precarious endeavour of establishing and managing trade from a distance increased what Hymer called the liability of foreignness¹⁵. The term was originally introduced in business studies to examine the managerial weaknesses embedded in the branching out of multinationals, where distance impeded the successful organisation and operation of the branches. The term could also apply in the establishment of commercial factories and agents in the Ottoman Empire on behalf of their principles settled in the European capitals. The liability of foreignness describes the cost of conducting business in an alien environment, where the newcomer, in this case the factor or agent in the Levant, is often at a competitive disadvantage due to distance, asymmetric information and limited know-how of the local market. Distance took on more than one dimension and included the geographical remoteness between the agent and the principal, as well as the cultural discrepancies, the different political status and agendas between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire. These were mirrored in the renegotiation and renewal of the Capitulations throughout their history. Although the treaties designated the contracting terms between the two parties, in several cases Western merchants were arbitrarily disfavoured by the local Ottoman authorities, who demanded unreasonable levies or seized European ships and cargoes under trivial pretext.

Foreignness was also perceived in economics terms, in differences in the structure and function of the markets in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. A typical example is that of supply and demand chains and consumer preferences¹⁶. In the British case, the economic distance was further aggravated by the rigid policy of the Levant Company to barter instead of transacting in specie with the Ottoman Empire, often creating imbalance in imports and exports. If we take into account the discrepancies in values and volumes of the exchanged commodities, e.g. cottons versus silk, one can understand the impediment that bartering had on British trade, especially on the composition of export cargoes from the Levant.

¹⁵ STEPHEN HYMER, *The International Operation of National Firms. A Study of Direct Investment* (Cambridge MA, 1976); S. ZAHEER, "Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness", *The Academy of Management Journal*, 38/2 (1995), 341-363; B. PETERSEN, T. PEDERSEN, "Coping with Liability of Foreignness: Different learning Engagements of Entrant Firms", *Journal of International Management*, 8 (2002), 339-350. Also see, G. JONES, *Multinationals and Global Capitalism from the Nineteenth to the Twenty First Century* (Oxford, 2004), 5-6.

¹⁶ PANKAJ GHEMAWAT, "Distance Still Matters; The Hard Reality of Global Expansion", *Harvard Business Review*, 79/8 (2001), 137-147.

Economic distance also involved, in a broader sense, the clash and osmosis of two different economic and political systems. The exchange of cargoes in the Mediterranean was mirrored by an exchange in ideas, such as the Ottoman conceptions of autarky in consumption, of the economy of plenty and tax accumulation interrelating with the globalising money economy and the spirit of capitalism of the West¹⁷.

The empire-building of the Ottomans throughout history was embedded in the Islamic state tradition of fiscalism and military imperialism. Military expansion was considered to be the main generator for wealth accumulation and economic growth and accounted for the sparse investment in industrial and mercantile infrastructure and technological innovation¹⁸. The Ottoman economy in the 18th century remained largely agricultural and on the whole it preserved the pre-capitalistic relations of production¹⁹. The emphasis was on territorial conquest and capital was gathered through land ownership and tax farming while the contemporary Western economies were steadily heading towards a capitalistic system of monetized, intertwined global markets²⁰.

In order to approach and understand the Ottoman economy as a coherent system, its cultural dimension must be taken into account, since it dictates a specific economic behaviour beyond the conventional assumptions on rational decision-making²¹. One of the main concerns of the Ottoman Empire was the sufficient supply of the market and the maintenance of affordable prices, which fitted the profile of both the Islamic welfare state along with that of the Sultan as a benevolent monarch²². The protection of consumers, the control over agricultural and manufactured production that would ensure autarky in the market, state intervention through guild regulation and control of exports were all aspects of the Ottoman economy of plenty²³. The Ottoman economy of protection and command can be thus acknowledged as a "moral economy", where the state held the sole responsibility for the allocation of goods and the provisioning of markets preventing in this way popular unrest²⁴. This closed

¹⁷ İNALCIK, *An Economic and Social History*, 44-52.

¹⁸ GEYIKDAGI, *Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire*, 8-17

¹⁹ ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)*, (Athens, 1992), 7

²⁰ C.A. BAYLY, *The Birth of the Modern World* (Oxford, 2004), 59-63,

²¹ JOHN DROBAK, JOHN NYE, *The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics*, xix.

²² SUGAR, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, 31-33.

²³ BRUCE MCGOWAN, *Economic Life in the Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land* (Cambridge, 1981), 9-11; TRAIAN STOIANOVICH, "Cities, Capital Accumulation and the Ottoman Balkan Command Economy", in CHARLES TILLY, WIM BLOCKMANS (eds.) *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe AD. 1000 to 1800* (Oxford, 1994), 60-99.

²⁴ E. P. THOMPSON, "The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth centu-

system was not in par with the capitalistic notion that wealth accumulation was founded in the continuous growth of home industry and exports. The Ottoman state made minor provision to exploit the largely unprocessed surpluses, support the industrial production, and turn their products competitive in the world market.

On the other hand, the Western European countries in the 18th century were characterised by the dominance of mercantile and industrial capitalism²⁵. Western economic policy was dependent on the concept of a national economy, which aimed at an aggregated balance of trade in favour of the country while transacting in an ever-integrated world economy. Their main interest was to secure cheap labour and raw material to maximize industrial output and export goods in competitive prices in the international market. For that reason the European countries emphasized on long-scale long-distance trade to support their industries and create new markets for the diffusion of their industrial output²⁶. As a consequence, commodities entered the Ottoman market as surplus for consumption and, in the contrary, the European market as “generators of productive value”²⁷.

European merchants brought in, among other commodities, specie which was scarce in the Ottoman market. The shortage of money in the Ottoman Empire had been acute during the 18th century and was attributed to the increasing military expenses, the deficient and conservative system of taxes in conjunction with a large and corrupt body of bureaucrats, who were remunerated on wage. The continuous depreciation and debasement of the currency was a provisional measure which did not resolve the problem and thus made the imports of money necessary²⁸. European specie circulated alongside with Ottoman coins and was actually considered more reliable. The Ottoman coin was acknowledged as an auditing unit, “ghost money”, according to which bills were calculated although transactions were made in European currency²⁹. Therefore the *piastre*, the currency in all transactions, was in fact four different coins; the Spanish, Dutch, Austrian and Ottoman currency was concurrently used in the market throughout the 18th century with fluctuating exchange rates³⁰.

ry”, *Past and Present* 50/1 (1971), 76-136; STOIANOVICH, “Cities, Capital Accumulation and the Ottoman Balkan Command Economy”, 64, 74.

²⁵ BAYLY, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 172-177.

²⁶ JAMES FOREMAN-PECK, “Foreign Trade and Economic Growth”, in DEREK ALDCROFT, SIMON VILLE (eds.), *The European Economy, 1750-1914: A Thematic Approach* (Manchester, 1994), 216-249.

²⁷ FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 10.

²⁸ SEVKET PAMUK, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), 188-199.

²⁹ ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑ ΛΙΑΤΑ, Φλωρία δεκατεσσερα στένουν γρόσια σαράντα. Η κυκλοφορία των νομισμάτων στον βενετοκρατούμενο και τουρκοκρατούμενο ελληνικό χώρο, (Athens, 1996), 20.

³⁰ İNALCIK, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 724-725.

Furthermore, money circulated in the Levant in the form of bills of exchange, issued in the biggest European markets of Amsterdam, Marseille, Livorno, Paris and London³¹. The circulation of foreign currency provided ample scope for usury and money speculation. By controlling the flow of a certain European currency through bills of exchange merchants could increase its demand and maximize their profits from the high exchange rate with the Ottoman currency³².

All European traders, despite their individual differences in entrepreneurial structure, had to overcome the liability of foreignness caused by the long-distance trading activities. This common organizational problem was alleviated either by dispatching agents to the distant location or recruiting them on the spot from a local pool of personnel. The latter inter-economy type of association was proven to be more profitable, efficient and flexible in the long run than the former intra-economy agency relations³³. The agents in both cases represented the principal, provided information about market trends, conducted trade on his behalf and defended his interests³⁴. Agents were responsible for collecting market information and, primarily, for handling commodities, storing and preserving them till the moment they would be disposed in the market or exported to the principal. In a "horizontal" social structure, as was that of the French and Greek free traders, the individual could act as an agent *and* a merchant providing and receiving agency services especially in the early years of the establishment of a commercial house. Conversely, in the "vertical" business structure of the British trade, where the class system pervaded every social and economic activity, the sedentary merchants from London, who had invested their capital in far-off trade, hardly ever visited the Levant and hired apprentice traders as their agents³⁵.

Encountering a series of obstacles in setting a cross-cultural network, the Western Europeans in the Ottoman market had to come up with a viable managerial strategy to mitigate the difficulties deriving from the lack of knowledge of the local networks and the cultural alienation. As M. Casson has stressed, cultural differences entailed different understandings of cooperative trust as well as of contractual relations³⁶. Precisely for

³¹ KATE FLEET, *European and Islamic in the Early Ottoman State: the merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge, 1999), 18-21; PAMUK, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, 165-169.

³² FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 12-13.

³³ GREIF, "On the Interrelations and Economic Implications", 68.

³⁴ GORDON BOYCE, *Co-operative structures in global Business: Communicating, Transferring Knowledge and learning across the Corporate Frontier* (London, 2001), 1-23.

³⁵ GREIF, "On the Interrelations", 71-72.

³⁶ MARK CASSON, *Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs and Economic Performance* (Oxford, 1991), 3-28.

that reason, in order to optimize their position in the foreign market, the Westerners cooperated with non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, such as Jews, Armenians and Greeks, who were more akin to the Western cultural and value system. The employment of local factors as agents, translators and business partners was ever increasing in the late 18th century. It is reasonable to assume that locals were well aware of the Ottoman economic system as members of the Ottoman society. In practice, their appointment saved the principal the fixed cost of establishing and running a branch of the commercial firm abroad³⁷. Furthermore as indigenous seafarers, and particularly the Greeks, became gradually more involved in the commerce and shipping of the Ottoman Empire, co-operation with Western merchants expanded and diversified. In the history of the Levant Company, Jews acted mostly as financial mediators, as brokers and lenders, while the Armenians and especially the Greeks worked with the British as their translators (*dragomans*) to the Ottoman officials, trade partners and shipowners³⁸.

Within the Capitulations regime, the European communities had the right to bestow *berats* to indigenes i.e. patents of protection, which entitled the possessor to all the economic and political benefits of the foreign merchants such as immunity, religious liberty, fiscal and trade privileges. These intermediaries between the foreign mercantile groups and the Ottoman state and society, namely *barrataires* or *protégés*, were the Christians, Armenians, and Jews who acted as local agents for the European merchants/principals³⁹. *Berats* could be sold by the Ambassadors of the foreign communities to the higher-bidder and the constant revenue from their purchase was collected and spent for the purposes of the factory⁴⁰. Since protection could be bought by those Ottoman subjects who were upcoming traders and wished to profit from the Capitulation status this practice was in due course abused and led to a dramatic increase in the number of indigenous agents.

In a game theoretic framework, the agency system in the Levant can be approached in a simplified albeit effective way⁴¹. Game theory emphasizes on the problems of cooperation, on the strategies and decision-mak-

³⁷ BOYCE, VILLE, *The Development of Modern Business*, 271.

³⁸ ELIEZER BASHAN, "Contacts between Jews in Smyrna and the Levant Company of London in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries", *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, 29 (1982-6), 53-73; KATERINA GALANI, *British Shipping and Trade in the Mediterranean in the Age of War (1770-1815)*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oxford (2011), ch. 7.

³⁹ WOOD, *The History of the Levant Company*, 135, 154-155, 191.

⁴⁰ National Archives (UK), FO 261/4, 22 February 1782, Letter of Lord Ainslie to John Abbott at Aleppo.

⁴¹ AVNER GREIF, *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy* (Cambridge, 2006), 407-420.

ing procedures that dictate the pay-offs and explores the probability distribution of the possible combinations between players. The point of equilibrium represents the optimal, self-enforcing behaviour of the contracting parties in recurrent situations in which individuals interact over time. Maximising individuals tend to cooperate with others in transactions, when the play is repeated, when the number of players is limited and controlled, and when relative information about the performance and behaviour of the players is available to all participants in the market⁴². The above mentioned conditions were met in the Ottoman Empire, given that the legal framework of Capitulations imposed a homogenising platform for the conduct of trade. In regard to the number of merchants engaged in the Mediterranean it remained limited, under the policy of granting privileges only to the members of the European Communities. Additionally, antagonism for optimizing one's share in a market naturally imposed a limitation on the number of the participants even within the same ethnic group. Information was a fundamental asset and challenge of the agency networks, which acted as channels for cash, products and market intelligence.

This model encapsulates the reality in the Ottoman market, where the equilibrium was set at the mutual co-operation between principals and agents. They abided by the contractual terms, even though each party could profit from the distant trade in the Levant and had the option and the opportunity to default and increase his share to the detriment of the other party. In conjunction with the benefits that derive from the agency system and primarily the reduction in the transaction cost of trading abroad, this type of co-operative link brings up the issue of the principal's control over the agent⁴³. The problem is embedded in incomplete and asymmetric information since the agent knows more about the market than the principal and can be tempted by distance and loose supervision to pursue personal profit in the expense of his employer⁴⁴.

In order to deal with this drawback the mercantile groups in the Levant applied a number of preventive and punitive mechanisms. In the absence of formal institutions established by the Ottoman Empire, such as an effi-

⁴² DOUGLAS NORTH, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge, 1990), 12-15.

⁴³ On the agency theory see indicatively, ADOLF BERLE, GARDINER MEANS, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932); EUGENE F. FAMA, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", *The Journal of Political Economy*, 88/2 (1980), 288-307; KATHLEEN EISENHARDT, "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review", *The Academy of Management Review* 14/1 (1989), 57-74.

⁴⁴ OLIVER WESTALL, "Invisible, Visible and 'Direct' Hand: An Institutional Interpretation of Organisational Structure and Change in British General Insurance", MARK CASSON, MARY ROSE (eds.), *Institutions and the Evolution of Modern Business* (London, 1998), 48-54.

cient judicial system to regulate contractual relations, the European communities had to institutionalise for their best interest the monitoring of their agents in the Mediterranean. Consequently all European groups promoted the establishment of a network of state officials, headed by an Ambassador in Constantinople and consuls in the major Ottoman port-cities. The British community in the Ottoman Empire had gone a step forward in enforcing the agreed terms between principals and agents. The Levant Company had issued ordinances, which defined the level of the commissions entitled by the agents, the price of factorage, and the cost of all the collateral services provided by the agents. Furthermore the Company's charter designated the imposition of fines, imprisonment or disgraceful dismissal from the factories in the Levant for the misbehaving members⁴⁵.

In supplement to the few and insufficient formal means of ensuring the agent's loyalty European traders and especially the French and Greeks based their business organization on kinship, ethnicity and religious networks⁴⁶. It was trust, interpersonal relations and mutual interest among relatives, compatriots or members of the same sect that secured control over long-scale long-distance trade⁴⁷. Loyalty to one's social group and respect to its members guaranteed social approbation and integration⁴⁸. In such a collectivist society as was the Ottoman, where contractual relations are repeated and the number of players is limited, *reputation* emerges as a controlling factor for the selection of commercial associates and agents. Social networks acted as informal information channels and reputation served as the means of implementing the terms of business agreements⁴⁹. Primarily it complied with a self-enforced preventive mechanism. It was in the agent's best interest to remain honest and abide by the contractual terms, in order to sustain his position in the market⁵⁰. Within the small number of traders in the Levant, an untrustworthy agent was to be debarred from the market and his bad reputation could deter any prospective associations with other principals.

Regardless of the difficulties and the implications of being acknowledged as a reputable and respectable agent, the agency in the Levant was considered as a rewarding career prospect for young men with no prior fortune wishing to engage in trade. After all, merchants were gradually

⁴⁵ WOOD, *The History of the Levant Company*, 216-219.

⁴⁶ Y. BEN-PORATH, "The F-connection: Families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange", *Population and Development Review* 6/1 (1980), 1-30.

⁴⁷ BOYCE, VILLE, *The Development*, 38.

AVNER OFFER, "Between the Gift and the Market: the Economy of Regard", *Economic History Review* 50/3 (1997), 450-476

⁴⁸ RINO FALCONE, *Trust, Reputation and Security: Theories and Practice* (Berlin, 2003), 62-70.

⁴⁹ GREIF, "On the Interrelations", 61.

⁵⁰ WOOD, *The History of the Levant Company*, 66.

emerging as a powerful social group, destined to play an important role in the political and economic scene of Europe. Young agents were sent to learn the special skills of trade in the factories in the Ottoman Empire, where they would work from seven to ten years before returning back home. During this time, they were able to accumulate a respectable capital enough to set up a personal mercantile business, by exploiting their experience and connections in the local market. Agency proved to be such a profitable employment that potential apprentices competed over the acquisition of a post and were even willing to purchase it.⁵¹ Furthermore, partnerships among agents were a common practice. Agents, who were hired by different commercial houses across the Ottoman ports, would agree to exchange information and assume factorage services on each other's behalf in order to reduce the transaction cost of establishing agencies in every port.

The 'Northern invasion' in the Mediterranean and the establishment of European merchants in the ports and emporia of the Ottoman Empire took place under the strictly-defined system of the Capitulations, which dictated the rules of European settlement in the Levant along with the contractual terms for trade and shipping. French, British and Dutch merchants adopted a variety of business practices to maximise their share in the market and conduct trade in the most profitable way for their nation. Despite the variations, all European merchants trading with the Ottoman Empire had to confront a common organizational problem, the unfamiliarity of the distant and alien market. Drawing upon the tools and concepts of contemporary business studies, liability of foreignness in the European agencies and factories in the Ottoman port-cities explores the increase in transaction costs of trading in the Levant. Agents, dispatched from the European capitals or hired locally, proved to be the most efficient solution to foreignness, as they represented the principal on the spot and conducted trade on his behalf. However, the agency system was in itself vulnerable due to the loose supervision and moral hazard due to the long distance and incomplete information between agents and principals. Nevertheless, in practice, informal institutions and predominantly social networks secured the contractual relations within the merchant communities of the Levant.

Theoharis Petrou

Cases of espionage in the area
of Eastern Mediterranean at the end of XVIIIth
and the beginning of XIXth century

With the term espionage we usually mean the gathering of information that concerns confidential government owned affairs, politically, militarily and diplomatic secrets of a rival country. However, since espionage itself is a phenomenon subject to the changes caused by the time, it, too, had to adjust to the circumstances and the needs of each historical era. As a result, in contemporary history the term “espionage” has taken on a wider meaning including even technology. More often than not, there have been cases of purloined secret projects and of technological, scientific knowledge of companies and industries, which never had the chance to publish what they had managed to invent.

However, the appearance of espionage is tightly interwoven with the history of wars. The earliest traces of espionage that emanates from the Greek history are already dated in the years of Trojan War¹, thus showing that espionage is a phenomenon of any age. The need of knowledge, from one hand, and evaluation, from the other, particularly of the military organisation and the staff plans of the opponent, led to the eventual violation of the confidentiality of those plans. The use of underhanded means and the employment of individuals that acted as secret agents mainly achieved the undermining of this secrecy². Therefore, espionage was a result of specific war needs and, when it used successfully, gave predominance over

* I would like to thank Professor J. C. Alexandropoulos (Alexander) of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece, who patiently and generously shared his knowledge and his time with me for the writing of this project. I would also wish to thank Mrs. Sofia Tamalalidou for her patience and priceless help during the writing of that article. Needless to say, all failings herein are mine.

¹ D. DROSOS, “Espionage”, in *Great Greek Encyclopaedia*, Vol. XIV, 83 (in Greek).

² K. VRYONIS, *Espionage as a legal stratagem of war and as a criminal mean against the National Defense of the State* (Athens, 1960), 5 (in Greek).

the enemy. Being in a position to know the exact number of the enemy forces and the conditions which these forces were in as well as their military tactics before a battle, certainly contributed to victory on the field.

The use of certain stratagems, such as espionage, clearly renders the need for military leaders to have at their disposal both the necessary information about the capability and the moves of the enemy and the means to confront and stifle them.

The intelligence needs of the Ottoman Empire were no exception, since her history, as known, abounds in warfare. We can not be entirely sure that there was a special intelligence service which gathered and then evaluated the reports sent by various secret agents of the Ottoman Empire, and this because the documents that we have at our disposal – at least those coming from the island of Hydra – were addressed to Ottoman dignitaries. However, judging by historical facts, the demands of the times and the well-run function of the Empire, we can come to the conclusion that there was such a service. What comes in support of this is the fact that we know for sure that there was a special service entrusted with keeping a close eye on what was happening inside the Palace itself, as well as in key administrative positions³. The aim of this project limits us to dealing with maritime espionage which was conducted on behalf of the Ottoman Fleet, and in effect the Ottoman State, by certain coastal cities and mainly islands, such as Hydra.

The case of Hydra, when it comes to its spying capacity as a maritime settlement is by no means unique. Another indicative example is that of Ragusa (Dubrovnik), which, despite taking up only a small stretch of land south to the city of Konavli, on the Dalmatian coast, became an important commercial port. Its importance was fully appreciated, long before the Ottomans, by the kings of Hungary and of course the great naval power of that region, the Serenissima (Venice). Ragusa, finding itself on the borderland of two competitive powers, took advantage of lax control and the privileges granted by the Ottomans and managed to serve both powers ensuring in this way privileges and profits by both⁴. Furthermore, her powerful fleet, which was present and active on a wide scale, combined with the remarkable maritime and diplomatic skills of local Ragusans kept the city up to date in the international affairs. This fact, as some documents reveal, made the Ottomans turn to them to obtain information and most importantly to know the moves of their international enemies in the

³ CARTER V. FINDLEY, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte 1789-1922* (Princeton-New Jersey, 1980), 253.

⁴ NICOLAAS H. BIEGMAN, "Ragusan spying for the Ottoman Empire. Some 16th century documents from the State Archive at Dubrovnik", *Bellethen XXVII*, No 105-108 (1963), 237-238.

region, the Venetians⁵. Another important fact is the choice the Ottomans made regarding first the people of Ragusa then those of Hydra, to have them spy for their own benefit, was not a random choice since spying could well be conducted on the pretext of commercial transactions⁶.

What led me to choose Hydra as my study case was the archive of the island's community which was preserved thanks to the interest and the efforts made by Antonios Lignos. The archive predominantly includes the official correspondence between the local authorities with the Ottoman ones in Istanbul as well as each Kapudan Pasha⁷ (Grand Admiral) and Dragoman⁸ of the Ottoman Fleet. A reading of this archival material illustrates the privileged treatment that the island enjoyed from the Ottomans, since apparently no Ottoman official ever lay foot on the island and consequently there were no Ottoman settlements there. Moreover, there are numerous reports on "facilitations" provided by the Dragomans of the Ottoman fleet to Hydriots and cases of "tolerant" treatment by the Ottoman authorities towards minor offences.

A possible interpretation of this privileged treatment emanates from the significant offer of the island, in terms of both people and materials, to the Ottoman Fleet. In point of fact, the Ottomans discerned quite early the abilities of Hydriot seamen and they sought to make good use of them. This becomes clear when in several documents the Ottomans ask for seamen originating from Hydra in specific to be dispatched to the Ottoman Fleet. They also ask for ships belonging to Hydriots to transport goods and provisions in all corners of the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea for the Ottoman Empire. Thus, this kind of multifaceted naval offer of Hydra was balanced by the Ottoman authorities by providing the island with a special set of administrative facilitations in a lot of sectors.

Although the Ottomans granted certain exemptions to the Hydriots, this did not entail that the islanders were free from all their obligations to the Ottoman State. These obligations of the island toward the Ottoman ad-

⁵ BIEGMAN, "Ragusan spying", 238.

⁶ HELEN AN. KARIDI, "Suspicious movement of espionage (1825) against the fighting Greece", *Peloponnesiaka* 13 (1978-1979), 271: "Here there are many betrayers and spies under the cover of being merchants" (in Greek).

⁷ For the office of Kapudan Pasha see GUSTAV BAYERLE, *Pashas, Beys and Effendis. A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire* (Instabul, 1997), 102; S. ÖZBARANAN, "Kapudan Pasha (Kapitan Pasha, Kapudan - ı Derya)", *Encyclopaedia of Islam (E.I.)*, (Leiden, 1978), Vol. IV, 571-572; *The Kapudan Pasha, his Office and his Domain*, Halcyon Days in Crete IV, A Symposium Held in Rethymnon 7-9 January 2000, edited by ELIZABETH ZACHARIADOU (Rethymnon, 2002).

⁸ English spelling for tercüman (interpreter). For the office of Dragoman see BAYERLE, *Pashas*, 48; VASILIOS SFYROERAS, *The Dragomans of the Ottoman Fleet. The Institution and the Servants of this Office* (Athens, 1965) (in Greek).

ministration were realized by means of the local notables, who were the ones to account for any oversights, while being at the same time responsible for the administration of the island. In this way, next to the long established tax, administration and judiciary responsibilities of the local authorities there was also an additional obligation. This obligation is described in a number of documents found in the community archive. These documents refer to the obligation of local authorities to provide information about the moves and the exact positions of the enemies of the Ottoman Fleet.

Specifically, the oldest document is dated on March 10th, 1790 and was drafted in Nauplion⁹. It is a *buyuruldu* (command) sent by “his highness our master Mustafa pasha, *serasker*¹⁰ (Commander-in-chief of a military campaign) of the royal fleet of White Sea (Aegean Sea)” to the “elders and notables of the island Hydra”. In this document Mustafa pasha notifies the local authorities of his appointment by the Sultan as “*serasker* of the White Sea” and orders them to send one of their ships to pick him up from Nauplion. Among others what makes an impression is the point which refers to the obligation of Hydriots to inform Mustafa pasha on the moves and the number of certain pirate boats. To wit, the Ottoman official declares that “...I command you [...] to also report me about the pirate ships, where exactly they are in the island of Gia (Kea), what has become of them, where the rest are and how many they are in total and their kind. I want all this to be written in detail, as I command you above [...]”.

Further on in the analysis of the information that derive from this document, we realize that the pirate ships in question are those which made up the flotilla of Lambros Katsonis as well as those of the Corsican pirate William Lorezzo, a great helper to Katsonis’ enterprises. The latter’s action had turned out to be a real plague for the commercial ships sailing within the region of his action. It is very interesting to notice that Katsonis did not exclude either Hydriot ships¹¹, or Hydra itself from his action¹², as many documents of our archive show. Mustafa pasha, just before the annual sailing of the Ottoman Fleet into the Aegean Sea, decided to take action against the threat posed by Lambros Katsonis in order to avert any further pirate activities. On that account, he ordered the Hydriots to locate the flotilla of Lampros Katsonis. According to his own sources it had harbored

⁹ ANTONIOS LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive of the Community of Hydra 1778-1832*, Vol. I (1778-1802), Second Edition (Athens, 1978), 8-9 (in Greek).

¹⁰ BAYERLE, *Pashas*, 144.

¹¹ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 246-247.

¹² LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 28. Regarding the opinions about the pirate attacks conducted by Lambros Katsonis and William Lorezzo against the island of Hydra see ANTONIOS LIGNOS, *History of the island of Hydra, Vol. I: from the Ancient Times until the Greek Revolution of 1821* (Athens, 1946), 34-35 (in Greek).

in Gia (Kea). Furthermore, he ordered them to gather information on the number of boats that composed his flotilla, as well as for their types, so that he could have the best possible picture of his rival's power and capability. There should be a continuous flow of information throughout his presence in the Aegean Sea, as we can conclude from the point he makes in his order: "[...] I repeat that whatever knowledge you have about the pirate ships [...] as long as I am here, I want to be informed of it".

The next document is also about the action of pirate ships. It was addressed by the "notables of Hydra" to Kostaki Hatzeri, Dragoman of the Ottoman fleet, in Constantinople on the February the 7th, 1794¹³. In this document, the local authorities of the island make known to the Dragoman of the Ottoman fleet the attack launched on the 17th of January 1794 against two Hydriot "*kayiks*" (kind of boat¹⁴) by a pirate ship sailing under Savoian flag, on the small island of Proti, near Coron (Peloponnese). Apart from this incident, the Hydriot local authorities, according to the narrations of the victims of the pirates, go on to give a detailed description of size, the strength and fire capacity of the pirate ship. They went on to inform the Dragoman of the Ottoman Fleet that it was "[...] a pirate ship, according to what the victims say, under Savoian flag. On the ship there were 85 people, 7 cannons in each side, in total 24 cannons [sic]".

In the same context of informing the Ottoman authorities about the danger from the action of the pirate ships under Savoian flag, the local authorities of the island addressed another letter to Kostaki Hatzeri, Dragoman of the Ottoman Fleet on March 20th, 1795¹⁵. In that letter they report that "[...] people from our island who were in Zakynthos (Zante) inform us that ships under the same flag (Savoian) chase our ships because they think that we are under the protection of France [...]".

Finally, the last document that has to do with the danger which emerges in the Levant from the action of pirates is one addressed by the local authorities of the island to Kostaki Hatzeri, again, also in 1795¹⁶. In this the authorities of the island report that "[...] three ships from the island of Psara that harbored in our port coming from Nice, Genoa and Livorno informed us that seven pirate ships departed from the port of Malta on the 9th of March, consisting of five ships and two galleys [...]". This is not the only piece of information that derives from that document since we read below that "[...] four of the ships mentioned above, one ship, two galleys

¹³ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 51-52

¹⁴ For the kinds of ships sailing in the Aegean Sea during the Ottoman era see EKA-TERINI BEKIAROGLOU-EXADAKTYLOU, *Ottoman Shipyards in the Traditional Greek Territory* (Athens, 1994), 154-163. In specific, for the kind of *kayik* see 157.

¹⁵ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 55-56.

¹⁶ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 77.

and one schooner, sailing in the area of Cavo Malea (in southern Peloponnese) [...] and we are afraid for the forthcoming return of our ships that harboured in the port of Nice [...]”.

There is no doubt that this information was meant to apprise the Ottoman authorities of the new danger, which appeared in the sea constituency of Ottoman Empire. It also aimed at activating the state machinery to take measures against that danger which directly threatened Hydriot ships, since some of them had already been victims of pirates' action. This ascertainment becomes more clear from the extract of the same document in which it is reported that “[...] We do not know exactly where the pirate is right now, but as soon as we found out we gave you the news [...]”.

The information the Ottomans had from the Hydriots was not limited to the presence and the action of pirate ships in the waters of the Ottoman Empire. It extended, quite understandably for the interests of the Ottoman Empire, to other fields, of greater importance. This ensues from a series of documents, which are about the official information given by the local authorities of the island to the Ottoman authorities and refer to the military operations in Egypt during the Napoleonic Wars.

The first relevant document is a command issued by “Mustafa effendi, *kadı* (judge) of Nauplion” on August 26th, 1798, in which he orders the local authorities of the island “...to report to him every piece of information which has to do with France, as well as with Alexandria and Constantinople, in order to inform the *Vali* (governor) of the Peloponnese...”¹⁷. This command aimed to forewarn the Ottoman authorities in Peloponnese of the danger that derives from the French and the actions that have to be made in the organization of the defensive system of the Peloponnese in order to confront the enemy.

The second letter was sent by the local authorities of Hydra on May 16th, 1801 to the Ottoman local authorities in Nauplion¹⁸. This document, judging by its content, can be divided into two parts closely related to each other. The local authorities of the island, being informed from letters received “by people serving under the command of his Highness Kapudan Pasha” write about the clash, which took place in “Apokeria” (Abukir, Egypt). In the first part they give certain information about the battle between the British and the French, after the landing of the British army in the place named “Apokeria” (Abukir) of Egypt on March 4th, 1801, the number of their forces, the losses that each side had and the development of the operations after the French defeat and their following siege in Alexandria¹⁹.

¹⁷ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 160.

¹⁸ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 257

¹⁹ For more details concerning the naval conflicts that took place during the Na-

The second part of the letter mainly focuses on the participation of the Ottoman military forces in these operations, on the British side²⁰. We are informed that “[...] on March 26th, (1801) Kapudan pasha arrived in Apokeria with all his mighty fleet, 12 thousand soldiers disembarked [...]”. What comes next in the letter is the description of the conflicts conducted against the French and the losses of the enemies.

It is worth mentioning, at this point, that Hydriots also took part in the operation conducted by the Ottoman military forces, under the leadership of Georgios (George) Vulgari, who later on will become *baş koçabası* (head notable) of the island. As we have seen above, the local authorities of the island received this information from “the people serving under the command of his Highness, Kapudan Pasha”. These people were, of course, the sailors the island offered within the framework of the annual recruitment to the Ottoman fleet, or sailors who had been specially recruited just before the operations took place in Egypt. Whatever the case may be, what is worth mentioning is that Hydriots did serve in the flagship of the Ottoman fleet. We can come to that conclusion from an extract of our document, in which it is reported that “...then our master (Kapudan Pasha) with his crew, George Vulgari, captain of *üçambarlı* (ship with three masts) went back to the ship...”. That ship was one of the biggest ships that Ottoman Fleet has at its disposal, both in term of size and fire force. Its crew was usually made up of Greek seamen and the Kapudan Pasha himself usually sailed in it²¹. Therefore, this document proves the importance the Ottoman authorities attached to Hydriots, since they selected them to man the most precious ship of their fleet.

A few days later, on May 25th, 1801, the local authorities of the island addressed another letter to “Hasan Bey, Vali of Rhodes”²². In that letter they inform him that they were ordered to send a Hydriot ship to him, in order to report to him about the move of a flotilla of the French navy, consisting of seven war ships and other ships for the transport of military forces and provisions, from the port of Livorno to the region of Messina. Moreover, they requested from him to hasten and forward that letter as soon as possible, because of the importance of the information.

The provision of information on behalf of Hydriots to the Ottoman authorities went on, as we can see in the next document, which is a report to “Mehmet Pasha Reis (Captain)” issued by the local authorities of the is-

poleonic Wars see ROGER C. ANDERSON, *Naval Wars in the Levant 1559-1853* (Liverpool, 1952), 348-392.

²⁰ ANDERSON, *Naval Wars*, 389-390.

²¹ For that kind of ship see BEKIAROGLU-EXADAKTYLOU, *Ottoman Shipyards*, 162.

²² LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 258.

land on September 13th, 1801²³. In that report the Hydriots relate to the high rank Ottoman officer that they don't have any clue about the six British ships which, according to the Ottoman authorities, were about to sail to the Levant, besides the territory of Egypt. Furthermore, they underlined the fact that providing information to the Ottoman authorities is not something new to them, since they had provided information for similar incidents many times in the past and they considered it their duty in the context of their obedience to them.

The next, in a row, document which has to do with information provided to the Ottomans on behalf of the Hydriots is a letter of report that the local authorities of the island addressed to Panagiotaki Mourouzi, new Dragoman of the Ottoman Fleet, on February 16th, 1804²⁴. In this letter, having been informed by a Hydriot ship which reached the harbor of the island from Livorno, they reported that the French fleet left the harbor of Toulon and went to Livorno about a month before. The fleet was composed of 32 ships, among them eight frigates and unknown number of brigs. They also mentioned that they had no idea where that fleet headed and only assumptions could be made about the final destination, since they thought possible that it was sailing to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as to Egypt and southern Balkan peninsula. It is worth mentioning that the local authorities also stressed that it was their duty to also inform the Ottoman authorities directly by sending two reports, one by land, the other by sea. In addition, they did not neglect to assure him that they would continue to provide information.

However, this piece of intelligence turned out to be false, since the French fleet never left the port of Toulon at that time. This corroborated from a letter that the notables of Hydra addressed to "Panagiotaki Mourouzi, Dragoman of the Ottoman Fleet in Constantinople" on March 16th, 1804, in which they apologize and promise to be more careful in providing information from then on²⁵.

Indeed, this failure in giving right information to the Ottoman authorities made Hydriots more careful, judging from another document of the archive. It is a report sent again to "Panagiotaki Mourouzi, Dragoman of the Ottoman Fleet, in Constantinople" on March 13th, 1805²⁶. In this the local authorities of the island make known to the Ottomans that the information they have about the moves of the British and the French Fleet in the region of Egypt are wrong and they provide them with the right infor-

²³ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 266-267.

²⁴ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, II, 133.

²⁵ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, II, 145-146.

²⁶ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, II, 228-229.

mation, in order to take the necessary measures. These documents, to name but a few, give us only a partial picture of the services and the information the Hydriots provided the Ottoman authorities. We could well suppose that the information was not insignificant, while its validity can not be questioned, since it was gathered at first hand and not feint hearsay. Moreover, their claimed spying services must have proved really valuable not only to the Ottomans, but to themselves, too. To be more precise, each piece of information coming from any intelligence procedure is valuable for the state which orders such activities. In this context, providing information about the size, the number and the kind of the ships which made up pirate flotillas, as well as their moves, did not serve only the Ottomans, who were the ones charged with the burden of elimination all pirate activity from their waters, but also the Hydriots themselves. We should not forget that pirate ships were a major threat to their own ships and their elimination by the Ottoman authorities was justifiable, since only in this way could they go on unhindered conducting their trade which was highly profitable for the island.

Finally, it could be supported that the conduct of espionage for the Ottoman Empire may have targeted at balancing other services that the island was asked to provide but somehow failed to do so. In fact, if we pay attention to the actions of pirate ships, we can draw the information that Hydriots went on to arm some of their own ships on the pretext of protection against several pirate ships which plagued certain Mediterranean regions. The first information we have in relation to the arming of a Hydriot ship with firearms dates back to 1774. That was when a Hydriot ship was armed in order to go after Greek pirates in the island of Kythnos (in Aegean Sea)²⁷. Another piece of information regarding the armament of a ship by Hydriot ship owners to pursue pirate ships, which had plundered Hydriot ships in the island of Kimolos (also in the Aegean Sea), comes from 1775²⁸. These cases may involve ship owners who had co-operated with the Russians, during the Russian-Ottoman Wars, and tried to arm their ships with firearms²⁹ on the advice and the urging of the Russians who made sure that the Hydriots would be provided with artillery by them. However, in general, the armament of the ships was allowed when the Ottoman authorities granted permission.

That permission was given even on special cases, like those mentioned above, since the right of armament of Hydriot ships with firearms, in or-

²⁷ ALEXANDRA KRADONELLI, *Greek Piracy and Corsair in XVIII century till the Greek Revolution (based on Greek and French archives)*, (Athens, 1998), 106 (in Greek).

²⁸ VASILIOS KREMMYDAS, *The commerce of Peloponnese in the XVIII century 1715-1792 (based on French archives)*, (Athens, 1972), 106 (in Greek).

²⁹ KRADONELLI, *Greek Piracy*, 116-117.

der to repel pirate attacks, was officially granted by the Ottomans in 1788³⁰. In the context of eliminating the phenomenon of piracy the *Vali* of the Peloponnese sent a letter of appeal, on March 3rd, 1795, to the local authorities of Hydra and the nearby islands of Spetses and Poros. In this letter he demanded the arrest of Hydriot pirate Andrea Tzakoni, who plagued the area from Kranidi to Kyparissia, making, in this way, access to Nauplion very difficult³¹. The action of that pirate and the way he ambushed for his victims, as well as the partners he used in his raids are described in other letters addressed to Kostaki Hatzeri.³² In their effort to respond to that appeal, Hydriots had armed a frigate and they chased him after letting Ottoman military forces participate in their operation, since, as it is mentioned in the document, the operation was realised with the help of “Bekir, *reis* (captain) of a pasha *kırlangıç* (kind of ship³³) and his escort”. The chase was fruitless, though, as we are informed by a document of March 7th, 1795 sent by the “commissioners and the notables of Hydra” to the *Vali* of Peloponnese³⁴.

The local authorities of the island may have found the offer of information to the Ottomans much preferable to the services of any other kind, as for example the use of their ships in the chase of pirates instead of their profitable trade operations. In this way, their help was considered valuable anyway, their obligations to the Ottoman authorities were met and at the same time they managed to see to their won interests and goals.

All the above render quite clear the nature of the Hydriot espionage for the Ottoman authorities. It would be far-fetched to ascribe “anti-hellenic” and actions to them. Indeed, they proved their mettle later on by their decisive participation in the struggle for national independence. In point of fact, theirs was a kind of service that the island had to provide to the Ottomans, in the context of its obligations to them, as did every other region. At the same time, these obligations served their own interests, too. Following this line of policy, the Hydriots managed to secure and even expand their commercial activities, which at that time had reached their peak, taking advantage of the prevailing international circumstances.

³⁰ KRADONELLI, *Greek Piracy*, 225.

³¹ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 80-81.

³² LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 84-85, 95.

³³ BEKIAROGLOU-EXADAKTYLOU, *Ottoman Shipyards*, 158.

³⁴ LIGNOS (ed.), *Archive*, I, 82-83, 86.

Gelina Harlaftis

The fleet 'dei Greci'. Ottoman and Venetian Greeks in the Mediterranean sea trade, XVIIIth century

The fleet 'dei Greci' was operational in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean ports from the early eighteenth century and consisted of Ottoman and Venetian subjects. It developed into the most dynamic Mediterranean local fleet and the main carrier of the Levante sea trade in the last third of the century¹. It was the international conjuncture at that time that instigated the great leap forward and the rise of the fleet of the 'Greci' as they are reported in the Western Mediterranean archives. The eighteenth century is characterised by the competition of the Great Powers for control of the Mediterranean, expansion to the East and penetration of the lands of the Ottoman Empire; the Hapsburgs and the Russians by land and the English and the French by sea. If the 1718 Treaty of Passarowitz in the Eastern Mediterranean and the concessions given to the Hapsburgs by the Ottomans opened up the Balkan land routes to central and Western Europe, the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht in the Western Mediterranean allocated the first Mediterranean colonies to the British, those of Gibraltar and Minorca.

Despite British penetration the French remained the main transporters of the Levant sea trade up until the 1780s. The British colonial expansion in the Mediterranean triggered the Anglo-French Wars and the continuous warfare between the two Great Powers left space for the rise of the commercial and maritime activities of the local Levant seafarers at the end of the century. So, although around 1780 50% of the European sea trade and transport with the Ottoman Empire was handled by the French (with the Dutch and Hapsburgs to follow), by the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the continental blockade, a significant part of this sea trade had

¹ The article written by George Leontaritis 35 years ago is the sole most successful attempt at an overall view of the Greek merchant marine during the time of the so-called Turkish conquest. GEORGE LEON (LEONTARITIS), "Greek Merchant Marine (1453-1850)", in STELIOS PAPADOPOULOS (ed.), *Greek Merchant Shipping (1453-1850)*, (Athens, 1972).

been taken over by the Greeks as we shall see in this paper. Greek captains and shipowners from the Ionian and Aegean seas arrived not only in Malta, Livorno, Genova and Marseilles, but also in Barcelona, Cadiz, Amsterdam and beyond in north, central and south America. The main cargoes carried from the Levant were grain, cotton and olive oil. The opening of the Black Sea market after the two Russo-Turkish wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792, the penetration of the Russians along the northern coast of the Black Sea combined with imperial Russian policy focused on attracting Greek settlers from the Greek archipelago to southern Russia increased the sea trade from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. This unprecedented commercial traffic stimulated the establishment of Greek diaspora communities from Odessa to Alexandria, Trieste, Tunis, Malta, Livorno, Marseille and Amsterdam involved in trade, shipping and finance. By 1821, and the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, an international entrepreneurial network of the Greek maritime and commercial diaspora had established in the main European port-cities which, along with the sailing ship owners based on the Aegean and Ionian islands carried the trade and shipping of the area². From the 1830s to the First World War Greek-owned ships sailing under the flag of the newly formed Greek State joined the British as the main trade carriers of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea³.

The current paper is based on a combination of primary archival material of Greek, Turkish, Italian, Maltese, French, English and Dutch archives and identifies quantitatively and qualitatively the rise of Greek-owned shipping in the Mediterranean during the eighteenth century and into the beginning of the nineteenth century. Collection of material has proved a somewhat complicated task considering that during the period under examination the Greeks were either Ottoman or Venetian subjects and sailed under the Ottoman, Venetian, Austrian, Maltese, Jerusalem and Russian flags⁴.

² INA BAGHDANTZ McCABE, GELINA HARLAFTIS and IOANNA MINOGLU (eds), *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks. Five Centuries of History* (Oxford, 2005), 147-172.

³ GELINA HARLAFTIS, *A History of Greek-owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day*, (London, 1996), chap. 1-3.

⁴ In order to trace the Greek-owned fleet in the main Mediterranean port-cities research was undertaken in the Department of History at the Ionian University during the period 2004-2006 that provided the data for this paper. The research project titled "Greek Maritime History in the Eighteenth Century" was funded by the E.U. and the Greek Ministry of Education. The research aimed to identify, chart and interpret the path of the fleet of Ottoman and Venetian Greek subjects in the trade and shipping of the Mediterranean Sea during the eighteenth century. The project was led by Gelina Harlaftis with Katerina Papakonstantinou (post-doctorate researcher); Sophia Laiou was in charge of the research carried out in the Istanbul Archives and Gerassimos Pargatis of that in the Italian Archives. The team consisted of 20 individuals including

The role of the Western European powers in the rise of the Greeks in Mediterranean sea trade

The increased participation of the Greeks in the Western Mediterranean sea-routes during the eighteenth century took place on four parallel axes. The first axis was the "Adriatic economy" that was reinforced by the Austrian expansionist policy. The Treaty of Passarowitz gave the Austrians the necessary concessions to strengthen commerce with the Ottoman Empire; Greeks were involved in the development of Balkan land trade⁵. In connection with the Balkan land trade, the sea trade of the port-cities of the Adriatic developed and brought the creation and prosperity of the "Adriatic economy"⁶. It was the combination of the land and sea trade to the West, trade of the western Balkans with the Italian cities of Trieste, Ancona, Messina to Livorno and Genova, that was developed. The growth of this trade in the maritime area of the Ionian Sea stimulated the growth of the fleets of the Greeks of Cephalonia and Ithaca, – which belonged to the Venetians –, and of Messolonghi, Aetoliko and Galaxidi, – which was a part of the Ottoman Empire –, and the formation of a unified market within the region of the Adriatic and Ionian seas: the "Adriatic economy". This was of course based on the pre-existing relations the Greeks had with the Italian cities. Greek communities of merchants involved in trade and shipping were established in Italian cities on both the Italian Adriatic coast, particularly Venice, Trieste, Ancona and Senigalia and the western Italian coast, in Messina, Napoli and Livorno⁷.

Greek, Turkish, Italian, Maltese and Dutch researchers who worked in the archives of Venice, Istanbul, Trieste, Malta, Messina, Napoli, Livorno, Genova, Marseille, London and Amsterdam, along with those of Athens, Corfu, Cephalonia, Hydra and Spetes. More than 20,000 ships were registered for the period 1700-1821 and the archives have provided important evidence on various issues. Ships were selected according to the name of the captain and/or shipowner or the name of the ship. Selection of ships was made by year, so there is repeated information concerning a single ship trading in the Western Mediterranean ports. So the 20,000 registries collected is in fact 14,634 voyages of Greek-owned vessels. They are included in the database named *Amphitrete 1700-1821* which will be available from the end of 2012 in the website www.marehist.gr. A volume is under publication from this research GELINA HARLAFTIS and KATERINA PAPA-KONSTANTINOY (eds), *Greek Shipping, 1700-1821*, Nefeli Publications, Athens 2011, forthcoming.

⁵ For the importance of the Ottoman Greeks in the Balkans see the seminal article by TRAIAN STOIANOVICH, "Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 20, 1960; OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING, "The Greek Diaspora: Geography and Typology", in SPYROS I. ASDRACHAS (ed.), *Greek Economic History 15th-18th c.*, Vol. 1, (Athens, 2003) (in Greek). For the importance of the Greeks in the fleet of the Hapsburg Empire see OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING, "Austrian Policy and Greek Navigation, 1750-1800", *Parousia*, Vol. 5, (1987), (in Greek).

⁶ KATSIARDI-HERING, "Austrian Policy and Greek Navigation, 1750-1800".

⁷ KRISTA PANAYOTOPOULOU, "Greek shipowners and seamen from the old financial

The second axis of expansion was along the routes of French trade in the Levant. If the Austrians controlled the northern Balkan trade, the French were the main traders of the external commerce of the Ottomans from southern Greece and the Aegean to the Western Mediterranean⁸. Marseille was the only significant French Mediterranean port and its Chamber of Commerce was the main administrative centre of the French fleet. In fact throughout the entire eighteenth century Marseille held a monopoly on the commerce to the Levant and it was prohibited for the French Atlantic ports and their shipowners to trade directly to the Levant. Despite various prohibitions and rules in general it had been a *porto franco* since 1669 in connection with the Levant trade⁹. The French Levant trade in the eighteenth century was organised in a wide network of *échelles* that covered all the main port-cities of the Ottoman Empire: Smyrna, Constantinople, Thessaloniki, Alexandria, along with the regions of the Aegean grouped generally under the name "Archipelago", southern Greece, known generally as "Morea", southeastern Mediterranean, referred to as "coast of Caramania", "Syrian coast" or "Palestinian coast". In 1784, the French handled 36% of the Ottoman external trade, the Austrians 24%, the Dutch 18%, the Venetians 12% and the English 9%¹⁰.

The French were collaborating with a large number of Ottoman Greeks, *beratlis*, appointed as vice-consuls in the Levant *échelles*, with the result that these Greeks became highly involved in the external trade of the area and

books of the Greek Fraternity of Venice, *Thesaurismata*, 11, (1974), 308-328, (in Greek); VASSILIS KREMMYDAS, "The history of the Greek merchant house of Venice Selekis and Saros. A statistical approach", *Thesaurismata*, 12, (1975), 171-199 (in Greek); DESPOINA VLASSI, "The colonisation of Aquilia by the Greeks in the eighteenth century and the Austro-Venetian competition. Unpublished documents", *Thesaurismata*, 15, (1978), 177-214, (in Greek); OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING, *The Greek Community in Trieste, 1751-1830*, 2 vols, (Athens, 1986), (in Greek); OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING, *Forgotten Horizons of Greek Merchants. The Fair of Senigallia (eighteenth century-beginning of nineteenth century)*, (Athens, 1989), (in Greek); MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina tra XVIII e XIX secolo*, (Messina, 1995), 19-20; DESPOINA VLAMI, *The fiorini, the grain and the Garden street. Greek merchants in Livorno, 1750-1868*, (Athens, 2000).

⁸ PAUL MASSON, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1911); CHARLES CARRIERE, *Négociants Marseillais au XVIII^e siècle*, 2 volumes, (Marseille, 1973); N.G. SVORONOS, *Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIII^e siècle*, (Paris, 1956); R. PARIS, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille. De 1600 à 1789. Le Levant*, (Paris, 1957); V. KREMMYDAS, *Conjecture and Trade in the Pre-revolutionary Peloponnisos 1793-1821*, (Athens, 1980), 189, 209-210 (in Greek); DANIEL PANZAC, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth Century", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24, (May 1992), 189-206.

⁹ MASSON, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIII^e siècle*, 97 and 106.

¹⁰ H. INALCIK and D. QUATAERT (eds.), *An Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, (Cambridge, 1994), 734; see also PANZAC, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade", 189-206.

even reached a point of competition with the French¹¹. However, the question remains as to whether the Ottoman Greeks were carriers of the goods in ships sailing under the Ottoman flag. According to the French historian Daniel Panzac Ottoman traders (Greek traders included) involved in both the external and internal trade of the Empire entrusted their goods mainly to French ships because they believed them to be more secure. His conclusion is based on research in French archives and particularly on charter parties between French captains and Ottoman subjects between the 1750s and 1780s¹². Although it is true that French ships did carry a substantial part of the Ottoman internal and external trade until the 1780s, the fact is that this evidence is based only on French archives and includes only French ships. In a recent work, Edhem Eldem stresses the absence of comparable data for ships sailing under the Ottoman flag¹³. Recent research indicates that Ottoman domestic trade was largely in the hands of the seafarers of the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks, and that a large portion of the external Ottoman trade was carried by vessels sailing under the Ottoman flag¹⁴. For the majority of the period of the Napoleonic Wars the Ottoman flag was a neutral flag and Ottoman ships replaced those of France which disappeared entirely from the Levant trade after the 1780s.

¹¹ For the *beratlis* and the re-examination of their status and their legal autonomy see M.H. VAN DEN BOOGERT, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System. Qadis, Consuls and Beratlis in the eighteenth Century*, (Leiden-Boston, 2005); for the presence of Greeks in the consulates and vice-consulates see NICOLAS SVORONOS, *Le commerce de Salonique au XVIII^e siècle*, (Paris, 1956), translated in Greek, (Athens, 1996), 175-186; ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, "Greek Mercantile Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1780-1820", *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 28/1, 1987; ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)*, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, 1992, *passim*.

¹² DANIEL PANZAC, "Négociants ottomans et activité maritime à Istanbul à la fin du XVIII^e siècle", *Mélanges Professeur Robert Mantran*, (Zaghouan (Tunisie), 1988), 187-199; DANIEL PANZAC, "Négociants ottomans et capitaines français: la caravane maritime en Crète au XVIII^e siècle", in *L'Empire ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France*, (Istanbul-Paris, 1986), 99-118; DANIEL PANZAC, "Affréteurs ottomans et capitaines français à Alexandrie: la caravane maritime en Méditerranée au milieu du XVIII^e siècle", *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, n. 34, 1982, 23-38. For the importance of Greek merchants in the Constantinople of the eighteenth century see EDHEM ELDEM, *French Trade in Istanbul in the eighteenth century*, (London, 1999), 62.

¹³ EDHEM ELDEM, "Strangers in their own seas? The Ottomans in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century", unpublished paper. I would like to thank Professor Eldhem for making this article available in English to me. This has recently been published in Turkish, EDHEM ELDEM, "Kontrolü Kaybetmek: 18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Doğu Akdeniz'de Osmanlı Varlığı," ÖZLEM KUMRULAR (ed.), *Türkler ve Deniz*, (Istanbul, 2007), 63-78.

¹⁴ GELINA HARLAFTIS and SOPHIA LAIOU, "Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-c.1820: The Rise of the Greek-Owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet", in MARK MAZOWER (ed.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece*, (London, 2008). HARLAFTIS, PAPA KONSTANTINOY, *The Rise of Greek Shipping*.

The third axis on which Greeks expanded into the Western Mediterranean was the English colonial policy which controlled the Western Mediterranean at that time on the Minorca-Livorno front and the Eastern Mediterranean with the Levant Company. Livorno formed the main commercial and maritime centre of the English in the Mediterranean while the English Levant Company held the monopoly on the Eastern Mediterranean trade with England¹⁵. The English, like the French, were collaborating with a large number of Ottoman Greeks, *beratlis*, appointed as vice-consuls and had established a wide information network from which they both profited. Ottoman subjects enjoyed privileges offered to the foreign merchants as stipulated in the capitulations, but also avoided payment of the capitation tax and enjoyed reduced rates on other taxes. The archives of the Levant Company and particularly the correspondence of the British Consul and Head of the Levant Company in Constantinople, Sir Robert Ainslie, during the period 1775-1794 brings the breadth of the network of consuls and vice-consuls in the Eastern Mediterranean to the fore, many of whom were Ottoman Greeks appointed on the islands and in small Aegean ports¹⁶.

The conquest of Minorca by the British and its transformation into the first British Mediterranean colony was of prime importance to the Greek-owned fleet and its expansion in the Western Mediterranean. The English established themselves just a few miles from the French coast and in an effort to penetrate the economy and society of the Catholic population of the island attempted to draw non-Catholic settlers by offering economic and religious concessions. Thus a Greek community formed in Minorca which flourished during the British dominion over the island (1709-1756 and 1763-1783)¹⁷. The British provided land for cultivation, permission to form the first salt mines on the island and to build a Greek Orthodox church in 1749. The result was that a substantial Greek community formed in Port-Mahon on Minorca.

¹⁵ VLAMI, *The fiorini, the grain*; A.C. WOOD, *History of the Levant Company*, (Oxford, 1935).

¹⁶ PRO, F.O. 261/3-6, Letter Books, Sir Robert Ainslie to British Ministers abroad, Consuls and Miscellaneous.

¹⁷ Evidence on the Greek community of Minorca is found in the General Archives in London, in Consejo de Estado of the Archivo Histórico Nacional of Madrid and in the Municipal Archive of Port Mahon. See also I.K. HASSIOTIS, "The Alexianos of Minorca. Contribution to the history of Greek diaspora in the eighteenth century", *Rodonia*, Vol. 2, (Rethymnon, 1994) 649-660; N.G. SVORONOS, "The Greek colony of Minorca. Contribution to the history of the Greek merchant shipping of the eighteenth century" in *Mélanges offerts à Octave et Melpo Merlier*, (Athens, 1956), 323-343. Apart from the aforementioned two articles known in the Greek bibliography, on the Spanish side there is the study of FRANCISCO HERNÁNDEZ SANZ, *La colonia griega establecida en Mahón durante el siglo XVIII* (Mahon, 1925).

The first small group of Greek settlers in Port-Mahon were all seamen and can be traced back to as early as 1733. The community grew in the 1740s and 1750s and despite the fact that they fled during the Seven Years' War they returned to the island in 1763. In the next twenty years the Greek community reached a population of approximately 250-300 individuals and demonstrated significant economic strength. There were around 40 families amongst which were the following six most prosperous: the Alexianos family from Monemvasia, the Sifantos family from Patmos and the Ladicos, Paleologos and Antypas families from Cephalonia. The first Greeks to be drawn to Minorca came from Gibraltar, Cadiz, Algiers, Livorno and Corsica and originated from the Ionian Islands, Peloponnese, Crete and the islands of the southeast Aegean¹⁸. The 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish war triggered another wave of immigrants to the island's Greek community.

Most Greeks established in Minorca were experienced seafarers involved in the sea trade and in privateering; they became known to the French as *Angli-Grecs* providing the British with a small, but effective privateering fleet that was active from the French to the Ottoman coast¹⁹. They also linked the economy of the island with the Eastern Mediterranean and with their compatriots in the Ottoman market. Edhem Eldem reveals two highly interesting documents of the business transacted between the Greco-Mahonians and the Ottoman Greeks approximately covering the years 1775-1785. The Ottoman Greek Anastassios Psaros from Mykonos and fellow-islander, Giorgio Dokin, son of Lorenzo, decided to purchase an "English-built" ship from the owner of the vessel Nikolaos Alexianos, also described as an Ottoman Greek, and go to an "island in the Inner Sea belonging to the English, called Port Mahon"²⁰.

¹⁸ The Greeks from Corsica who settled in Minorca have a rather interesting story. They originally came from Mani; the "pirate den" of southern Peloponnese, a wild place ridden with vendettas between the region's clans, and solved major clan conflicts in the late 17th century at the time of the Veneto-Ottoman Wars culminating in the fall of Crete in 1669. One of the clans that left, the Stepahonopoli clan headed for Genova where the settlers renounced Orthodoxy and became Greek unionites and established themselves in Corsica where they were recruited into its armed forces. During the years of the conflict of Corsica with Genova that started in 1729 and lasted until 1768 when the island was annexed to France, a number of Greeks abandoned the island to settle in Minorca, Tuscany, Sicily, Sardinia, Naples etc. What is remarkable is that the Greeks that remained in Corsica were all concentrated in the village of Cargese where they continue to retain the memories of their Greek origin to this day. See NICK NICHOLAS, "A History of the Greek Colony of Corsica", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 31.1 (2005), 33-78.

¹⁹ The famous Corsair Panayotis who was active in the north Aegean as a British privateer against the French, mentioned by N.G. SVORONOS in his *Le commerce de Salonique au XVIII^e siècle*, (Paris, 1956), 158-159, was in fact Panayotis Alexianos from Port Mahon. See HASSIOTIS, "The Alexianos of Minorca", 649-660.

²⁰ EDHEM ELDEM, "Kontrolü Kaybetmek", 63-78.

Greeks were permitted to fly the British flag along with a Minorcan flag called the “Mahonian”; one of the “flags of convenience” used in the Mediterranean. They collaborated closely with the prosperous Greek community of Livorno. Greek merchants of Livorno provided capital for the building or the purchase of ships; the Greeks of Port Mahon sailing under the British or Mahonian flag provided available and flexible transport in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. In 1749 they appear to have been carrying cargoes as part of the British convoys from Livorno sailing under the flags of Tuscany and Minorca. They clearly built their own ships being identified by the British as “Mahonian” due to their make.

The maritime and commercial activities of Port Mahon increased with the establishment of the British, the Greeks, the Jews and the Italians. Port Mahon became a transit centre of grain from North Africa, Sardinia, Sicily and the Ottoman Empire. A “triangular” trade was formed: the Mahonians bought French cloth which they sold to the Barbary States and the Ottoman Empire in return for grain which they sold at the Spanish ports. The grain there was paid for in Spanish silver tallers that financed the next circuit of this trading²¹.

It was not easy to survive in this new foreign environment. The problems encountered in the commerce and their close connections with the Greeks of Livorno are clearly evident in the interrogation of Nikolaos Alexianos in 1765 concerning Andreas Ladikos’ use of a British Mediterranean pass. The English were trying to control the extensive use of British Mediterranean passes by Greeks and others not resident in Port Mahon, but who exploited the protection of the British:

“4th (question) Say if you know Andrew Ladico, if he ever resided in Minorca before it was restored to Great Britain and if he did not come from Leghorn after the late war-where he has lived many years and if both him and his brother George are poor men and of no capital.

[Answer] I know Andrew Ladico and that he lived some time at Minorca before the last war, but I don’t know if he had a residence here but only that his family lived in Leghorn who came with him to this island after it was restored to the British Crown. I don’t know that Andrew Ladicos or his brother George are men of substance”.

6th (question): Say if you know or have heard say that the vessel commanded by Andrew Ladico for which he obtained a Mediterranean pass

²¹ MIQUEL ÀNGEL CASASNOVAS CAMPS, “The British presence in Minorca during the XVI-II century” in International Maritime Economic History Association, Proceedings, 4th International Congress of Maritime History, CD, (Corfu, 21-27 June 2004) and in CARMEL VASSALLO and MICHELA D’ANGELO (eds.), *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean. Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XX centuries)*, (Malta, 2007). See also MIQUEL ÀNGEL CASASNOVAS CAMPS, *Història Econòmica de Menorca*, (Mallorca, 2006), 91-152.

did belong to foreigners in whole or in part and who are the concerned specifying them individually and from whom you heard it.

[Answer] I have heard say I can't recollect from whom that the ship commanded by Andrew Ladico is not his own but that it belongs to foreign merchants wherefore Lord Gov. Johnston had not granted him a pass, but afterwards through the means of Mr Forbes he had a passport granted to him to bring a cargo of corn from Genova."²²

Indeed Greeks resided in a religiously hostile environment and were referred to as "schismatic Christians" unwelcome in this entirely Catholic population. The building of the Greek Orthodox Church in Port Mahon, which is a unique sample of an Orthodox church in the Balearic islands, incited a strong reaction from the island's Catholic clergy. The Greeks close connection with the British meant that they were forced to leave the island in 1756 though a large number returned in 1763. The restoration of the Spanish regime dealt a fatal blow for the Greek community in Minorca. Despite their involvement in privateering the Greeks of Minorca had developed important agricultural, manufacturing and real estate activities. In the Spanish evaluation of their assets, the wealth of the Alexianos family was calculated at 260,350 reals; the Alexianos family left the island for Crimea in the 1780s. The most important Greek family on the island to remain was the Ladicos family, most probably from Cephalonia, who eventually converted to Catholicism to survive, and during the nineteenth century became one of the richest families on the island²³.

The fourth axis on which Greeks expanded to the West, on a minor scale, but equally important, was the influence of the Dutch on the Ottoman Greek merchants and shipowners. Perhaps the two most important ways that the Dutch affected the Ottoman Empire's economy was the way they allowed local, that is Ottoman, entrepreneurs to enter their commercial and financial networks. They exported manufactured and colonial goods to Smyrna and imported from there raw materials for their textile sectors in addition to agricultural goods. Although the British Levant trade was monopolised by the Levant Company, in the Netherlands trade to the Levant was open to all²⁴.

²² PRO, CO 174/1, "Interrogation for the following witness before the commander Nicola Alexiano", 15th November 1765, 98.

²³ CASASNOVAS CAMPS, "The British presence in Minorca". In 1843 Jordi Teodor Ladico was appointed Senator of the Kingdom of Spain. His son Teodor Antypas was deputy for Minorca. He became the only Minorcan Minister in a Spanish government in 1873 during the First Spanish Democracy. The author mentions that Ladikos comes from Corfu, but as there is no such indigenous name in Corfu, the family probably comes from Cephalonia.

²⁴ ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, "Commercial practices and competition in the Levant: The British and the Dutch in Eighteenth-Century Izmir", in ALASTAIR HAMILTON, ALEXAN-

According to Elena Frangakis during the 1770s, half of the Dutch commerce in Smyrna, the largest exporting port of the Ottoman Empire, was in the hands of the Greeks, particularly Chiot²⁵. It was probably in relation to the Smyrna-Amsterdam trade that the first important community of Greek merchants was established. Members of the Mavrogordato family had been established in Amsterdam since the 1750s²⁶, while Adamantios Korais appears in early September 1771 as merchant-agent in "...Amsterdam" where "for six years [he] was involved in trade"²⁷. The family company for which Korais was working had offices in Smyrna, Chios and Istanbul and traded cotton and thread for Dutch textiles and spices²⁸. From Dutch archives evidence also reveals that a number of Ottoman Greek vessels travelled on the Smyrna-Amsterdam route such as, for example, that of Captain Nikolis Apostolis from Psara²⁹. It seems that many Chiot families that were involved in the external trade of Smyrna in the last third of the eighteenth century were part of the Greek commercial and maritime network that expanded to Trieste, Messina, Livorno, Genova, Marseille and northern European ports³⁰.

The sea trade of the Levant in the eighteenth century

The importance of Ottoman Greek sailing shipowners was not obvious in the trade of the major port-cities like Constantinople, Smyrna, Thessaloniki or Alexandria; the largest part of the trade they were involved in took place in the small *échelles* of the "Archipelago" and "Morea" from the small deserted bays and islands and the port-towns of the Aegean and Ionian seas. The transfer of importance from the big ports and particularly

DER H. DE GROOT and MAURITS H. VAN DEN BOOGERT, *Friends and Rivals in the East. Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century*, (Leiden, 2000), 135-158.

²⁵ FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 100.

²⁶ INALCIK, QUATAERT (eds.), *An Economic History*, 147.

²⁷ *The Life of Adamantios Korais. Autobiography*, (Paris, 1833), (in Greek). Adamantios Korais later established himself in Paris where he went on to become a major figure in Greek Enlightenment and an intellectual leader in the re-birth of the Greek Letters of the modern Greek State.

²⁸ STAMATIS PETROU, *Letters from Amsterdam*, edited by PHILIPPOS ILLIOU (Athens, 1976).

²⁹ See footnote 40.

³⁰ See FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 110. If one compares the names Frangakis publishes in her Appendix (255), one finds merchants with family names like Petrocchino, Mavrogordato, Kondostavlo in the Smyrna-Amsterdam trade as early as 1762, and for 1787 merchants with family names like Vouros, Rodocanachi, Ralli, Vlastos, Anastassiou, Scaramanga, Schilizzi, Galati, Negroponte, Petrocchino, Ziffo, Avierino. These were all families that continued their commercial activities from the main European port-cities during the nineteenth century.

from southeast Mediterranean to the Greek *échelles* had already been noted towards the end of the 17th century by d'Ortières in his *Mémoire*³¹.

During the period 1771 to 1815 from a sample of 556 vessels arriving at Livorno from the Levante only 18% originated from the big port-cities (Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Smyrna and Alexandria), whereas 24% brought cargoes from uninhabited bays or islands (the bays of Volos, Piraeus, Livadia, Salona, and Arta, Catacolo and Chiarenza of Western Peloponnese, Sapienza and the bays of Mani, Maratonisi and Moschonisia), 15% originated from the Aegean Islands (mainly Hydra, Spetses, Psara and Mykonos) and the remainder originated from the small port-towns of the Western Greek mainland such as Preveza, Dragomesto, Messolongi, Patras and Vostizza³². Greek sailing ship owners and captains expanded their activities by collaborating with the big merchants of Livorno and Genova, the two main centres of transit Mediterranean trade housing grain depots that fed not only the northern Italian peninsula, but also France, through Marseille, and Spain, through Barcelona³³. In order to better understand the organisation of the sea trade of the Levant has been divided into three maritime areas: a) the northeastern Mediterranean including the Aegean and Ionian seas, b) the southeastern Mediterranean and c) the Black Sea (See Map 1).

Cargoes were collected and loaded on ships from all maritime regions mainly from the *échelles* of the Levant, ports and places in which the trade of the Ottoman Empire with the western Europeans took place³⁴; the *scali* in Italian, *échelles du Levant* in French, *schalen van de Levant* in Dutch³⁵. The *échelles* of the Levant were really places where the cargoes of wider maritime regions and their hinterland were collected and can be distinguished


³¹ "Memoire de sieur d'Ortières touchant le commerce du Levant, reçu le 20 août 1688", in MICHEL FONTENAY, "Le commerce des Occidentaux dans les échelles du Levant en 1686-87", in *Chrétiens et musulmans au temps de la Renaissance, XV^e-XVII^e siècles* (Paris, 1998), 337-370.

³² *Amphitrete*, sample of Greek ships derived from the Livorno Sanità for the years 1771-1774, 1785-1798, 1810 and 1814-15.

³³ For the Livorno grain trade see JEAN PIERRE FILIPPINI, "Il commercio del grano a Livorno nel Settecento" in FILIPPINI, *Il porto di Livorno*, Vol. 2, 318-371. For Marseille see CHARLES CARRIÈRE, *Négociants Marseillais*, Vol. 2, 57-67, and RUGGIERO ROMANO, *Commerce et prix du blé à Marseille au XVIII^e siècle*, (Paris, 1956). For Genova see LAURA CALOSCI, "Génova y la transformación del comercio Mediterráneo de Cataluña (1815-1840)", Departament d'Història i Institucions Econòmiques, Divisio de Ciències Jurídiques, Econòmiques i Socials, Universitat de Barcelona (2002-2003), 34-44.

³⁴ FONTENAY, "Le commerce des Occidentaux dans les échelles du Levant en 1686-87", 337-370.

³⁵ ALEXANDER H. DE GROOT, "Dragomans' Careers: The Change of Status in some Families connected with the British and Dutch Embassies at Istanbul, 1785-1829", in HAMILTON, DE GROOT and VAN DEN BOOGERT, *Friends and Rivals*, 223-246.




Map 1. The maritime regions of the eastern Mediterranean

in four categories: a) uninhabited bays or islands, *i.e.* places for concentrating the produce of the hinterland, b) islands that were transformed into grain depots along the trade route from the Black Sea and the Aegean to the Western Mediterranean, c) small port-towns, and d) major port-cities.

The way this system worked was that medium-sized vessels collected small cargoes from many *échelles* of a certain maritime region to fill the holds of a ship before proceeding on the long voyage to the Western Mediterranean ports. The other method of sea transport was that small coastal sailing vessels brought the produce from the areas nearby to certain islands-grain depots where larger vessels loaded the produce collected and transported it to the Western Mediterranean ports. In this way small vessels from Skopelos or Mykonos brought grain from the Bay of Volos or the Black Sea to Psara, from where larger Psariot vessels would transport it to Malta, Livorno or Genova.

The formation of a dense complementary grain carrying and loading network by coastal and deep-sea going craft of Ottoman and Venetian/Ionian Greeks in both the Aegean and Ionian seas shot up the grain exports by Greek-owned vessels. However, it should be taken into consideration that here were no ports, quays, warehouses, health authorities, state officials, insurance or shipping agents in the majority of such *échelles*. The



Map 2. The maritime sub-regions of north-eastern Mediterranean

loaded ship secured all necessary documents to the West either from the island of origin or from one of the small ports visited such as Messolonghi, Preveza or Patras, where the resident French or Venetian consuls, for example, provided them with health certificates. Thus captains from Messolonghi with Ottoman vessels took their "patente" from the French Vice-Consul in Messolonghi who wrote on the certificate that the captain and his crew, who came from the nearby town of Anatoliko and from Lepanto, both in the Corinthian Bay, were found in "perfetta salute senza sospetto di Contagio"³⁶.

To analyse the origin of cargoes in more detail the maritime area of northeastern Mediterranean is further sectionalised into four maritime regions as they appear in Map 2: the Ionian Sea, Western Aegean, Central Aegean and Eastern Aegean.

Table 1 indicates in detail all the islands, ports and areas from which Greek-owned vessels loaded their cargoes. From the northeastern Aegean Greek-owned ships originated from Ainos (present-day Enez) and various small ports of the Dardanelles, the uninhabited islands off the northern coast of Asia Minor, Ai-Stratis and Moschonissia, from the large in-

³⁶ *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project "Pythagoras", Ionian University / Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006.

Table 1. Ports and islands from which Greek-owned ships traded

| NORTHEASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | |
|---|--|
| NE Aegean | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uninhabited islands: Ai-Stratis, Moschonisia • Inhabited islands: Limnos, Tenedos, Lesbos, Chios, Ikaria, Samos, Psara • Small port-towns: Ainos (Enez), port cities and islands of Dardanelles, Kidonies (Ayvalik) • Major port cities: Constantinople, Smyrna |
| SE Aegean | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uninhabited bays: Coast of Caramania • Inhabited islands: Patmos, Symi, Kasos, Crete, Castello rosso (Castelorizo) • Small port-towns: Scalanuova (Kusadası), Antalya |
| NW Aegean | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uninhabited bays: bay of Volos, bay of Katerini, bay of Atalanti • Inhabited islands: Negroponte (Euboia), Scopelos • Major port city: Thessaloniki |
| SW Aegean | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uninhabited bays/islands: Piraeus, Mani, Eleos, Marathonisi • Inhabited islands: Poros, Spetses, Hydra • Small port-towns: Napoli di Romania (Nauplion) |
| Central Aegean | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inhabited islands: Mykonos, Naxos, Paros, Santorini, Syros, Kea, Serifos, Sifanto (Sifnos) Tinos, Paros |
| Ionian Sea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ionian Islands: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Inhabited islands: Corfu, Paxoi, Lefkas, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Zante, Kithira • Peloponnese: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Uninhabited bays/islands: Katakolo, Chiarentza, Sapienza, Navarino o Small port-towns: Vostizza, Kalamata, Koroni, Modon (Methoni), Patras o Corinthian Bay • Western Greek mainland: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Uninhabited bays/islands: Salaora, bay of Arta, Calamo o Small port-towns: Arta, Preveza, Anatoliko (Aetoliko), Messolongi Dragomesto (Astakos) o Uninhabited bays: Aspra Spitia, bay of Livadia, Perachora, bay of Salona, bay of Corinth, bay of Lepanto o Small port-towns: Galaxidi, Lepanto (Nafpaktos) |
| SOUTHEASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uninhabited bays/islands: Syrian Coast, coast of Palestine • Inhabited islands: Cyprus • Small port-towns: Damietta, Acre, Jaffa, Haifa • Major port city: Alexandria |
| BLACK SEA | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Port-cities: Odessa, Taganrog, Cherson, Sebastopol |
| WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN | |
| Cities of the Italian Peninsula and Malta | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small port-towns: Senigallia, Otranto, Cotrone • Major port cities/islands: Trieste, Fiume, Venice, Ancona, Messina, Palermo, Malta, Napoli, Livorno, Genova |
| French Cities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Port-cities: Nice, Toulon • Major port city: Marseilles |
| Spanish Cities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inhabited islands: Majorca, Minorca • Small port-towns: Gibraltar • Major port cities: Barcelona, Malaga, Alicante |
| Southwestern Mediterranean | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Port-cities: Tunis, Algiers, Bengaz, Sfax, Jerba, Tripoli |
| NORTHERN EUROPE | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major port city: Amsterdam |
| ATLANTIC SEA | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inhabited islands: Martinica • Major port cities: Lisbon, Cadiz, Seville, Buenos Aires, Monte Video |

Source: *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

habited islands of the area like Limnos, Mytilene (Lesbos), Chios, Psara, Ikaria and Samos, from the port-towns of Cesme and Kidonies (Ayvalik) and from the largest port in the whole area, Smyrna. The main grain depot in this maritime region was the island of Psara. During the period 1786-1815, 104 ships full of grain (out of a total 317) that arrived at Malta from the northeastern Aegean came from this barren and tiny island. From the southeastern Aegean ships originated not from the large islands of this maritime region, but from the small maritime islands of Patmos, Symi, Kasos and Castellorizo, while from the Asian Minor coast they mainly originated from Scala Nuova (Kusadasi), the main grain exporting port of the area along with Antalya³⁷.

The coastline of the Western Aegean includes the maritime area from Thessaloniki to Mani. Within this area, the main grain export areas of the maritime region of northwestern Aegean were the Bay of Thessaloniki, the Bay of Katerini, the Bay of Volos, the Bay of Atalanti, the coast of northern Euboia and Scopelos. They mainly exported grain from the Plain of Thessaly. The southwestern Aegean includes the area of the coastline from Attica to the southern Peloponnese.

The uninhabited Bay of Piraeus and the small town of Athens are reported as an exporting area along with the inhabited islands of Poros, Hydra and Spetses, the port-town Nauplion (Napoli di Romania), the uninhabited Bays of Mani and the island of Marathonissi. The main grain exporting areas for ships arriving at Malta and Genova from southwestern Aegean loaded with grain originated from Spetses and Hydra; between the years 1786 and 1815 166 ships from southwestern Aegean originated from these two islands (Table 4). The central Aegean proved an infrequent origin for cargoes headed for Malta, Genova and Marseille. A few ships loaded cargoes at the ports of Mykonos, Naxos, Paros, Santorini, Syros, Kea and Tinos. Crete is included in the central Aegean region, although geographically it does not really fit here; archives reveal that Crete's minimal contribution to the sea trade with the Western Mediterranean does not blur the overall picture.

The maritime area of the Ionian Sea is divided into four regions: the Ionian islands, the coast of the Western Peloponnese, the coast of west mainland Greece and the Corinthian Bay. The Ionian islands consist of the seven islands on the north-south axis: Corfu, Paxoi, Lefkas, Ithaca, Cephalonia, Zante and Kithira. The main produce of the area was olive oil and currants; Zante and Corfu were also used as transit points or ports of call. Various uninhabited bays along the coastline of the western Pello-

³⁷ More detailed analysis of the trade and shipping of this area is available in MARIA EFTHIMIOU HADZILACOU, *Rhodes et sa région élargie au 18^{ème} siècle: les activités portuaires* (Athens, 1988), *passim*.

ponnese included the main grain export areas, like Katacolo, Chiarentza and the Bay of Navarino, or the uninhabited island of Sapientza. Patras, Kalamata, Koroni and Methoni were the small port-towns used for loading cargoes. This area was the outlet for the Peloponnesian hinterland.

In the western Greek mainland, the small port-town of Preveza was the main outlet for the hinterland of Epirus, and in the large Bay of Amvrakikos home to Preveza, various uninhabited places, like Salaora on the delta of the Louros River, or the outlet of the inland town of Arta were loading places for cargoes for the Western Mediterranean. Further south, Dragomesto (Astakos), Messolongi, Anatoliko (Aitoliko) were also small port-towns where ships loaded cargoes of grain produced in the hinterland and throughout the entire western Greek mainland. Most of the produce from the hinterland of the southeastern Greek mainland was not gathered in the known small port-town of Nafpaktos (Lepanto), but in deserted bays along the northern coast of the Corinthian Bay; grain and cotton were gathered from the fertile plains of Livadia in Perachora, or in the "Bay of Livadia", or in Aspra Spitia in the "Bay of Salona", and from the plains of Salona (Amfissa) in the "Bay of Salona".

From the southeastern Mediterranean Greek-owned ships came from the coast of Syria loading in uninhabited bays, or in Alexandretta and Tripoli, and in the coast of Palestine loading in uninhabited bays or in Acre and Jaffa. There were also a limited number of Greek-owned ships that loaded in Alexandria and Cyprus for the Western Mediterranean. The sea trade from the Black Sea was still limited at that time and ships loaded mainly at Odessa, Cherson and Sebastopol in Crimea or in Taganrog in the Azov. Greek-owned ships that unloaded cargoes in Genova or Marseille continued to trade between the Spanish ports of Alicante, Barcelona and Malaga, the French ports of Marseille, Toulon and Nice, and the ports of the Italian peninsula, Trieste, Ancona, Fiume, Venice, Otranto, Napoli, as well as the Sicilian ports of Messina and Palermo. A significant number of Greek-owned ships were also found to have traded with north-African Barbary states and more specifically with Bengaz, Tripoli, Tunis, Sfax, Jerba and Algiers.

The expansion of Greek-owned ships in the Atlantic ports is also indicative: Greek-owned ships arrived at Malta, Livorno, Genova and Marseille from the ports of Lisbon and Seville and beyond the Atlantic. For example, from Dutch insurance companies we have evidence that Captain Dimitrios Michali Tsamados from Hydra sailed on his ship *Madonna di Idra* from Buenos Aires and Monte Video to Barcelona in December 1799³⁸;

³⁸ Amsterdam Municipal Archives (AMA), Archives of Insurance Companies (IC), no. 562, file no. 167.

from the Malta archives we learn that captain Dimitri Filinis from Psara arrived after a voyage of three months and twenty days from Martinica and Malaga to Malta, on the 30th of January 1805 with his ship *St. Nicolas* under Ottoman flag heading for Livorno and from Spanish archives we learn that Ottoman Greek ships travelled to the Antilles and South America³⁹. There was also important sea trade with northern European ports, and particularly Amsterdam. For example from Dutch archives we have evidence that captain Nikolis Apostolis from Psara made consecutive trips with his ship *St. Giorgio* on the route Smyrna-Amsterdam during the years 1798, 1804, 1806 and 1814⁴⁰.

The participation of the Greeks in the activities of the ports of Western Mediterranean at the end of the eighteenth century is clearly evident. As a general overview it can be said that ships that traded with Livorno and Malta mainly came from the maritime region of the Ionian Sea along a route that was followed for most of the eighteenth century, whereas ships trading to Genova and Marseille came from the Aegean Sea mainly during the Napoleonic Wars.

Greek shipping in the Western Mediterranean, 1714-1791

It was the grain trade that brought Greek-owned ships to the Western Mediterranean on a more massive scale. The itinerary of the grain being traded to the Western Mediterranean followed the known routes of the main port-cities, Livorno, Genova and Marseille that were part of the chain of the grain transit centres; during the continental blockade this route went through Malta and Messina⁴¹. Livorno became a *porto franco* in 1676 following the model of Marseille that had been a *porto franco* since 1669. In their attempt to ensure an important portion of the Mediterranean sea trade, the Italian port-cities competed with each other and one after the other became *porto francos* promulgating a tacit "quarantine war"

³⁹ Archives of Malta, Reportorio Library Manuscritti, 818 Registri arrivi, V4/14; ELOY MARTÍN CORRALES, "Greek-Ottoman Captains in the Service of Spanish Commerce in the Late Eighteenth Century", in MARIA FUSARO, COLIN HEYWOOD and MOHAMED-SALAH OMRI (eds), *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Braudel's Maritime Legacy*, (London, 2010), 203-222.

⁴⁰ In J.G. NANNINGA, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van de Levantsch Handel*, Vol. IV, (Gravenhage, 1964), 1579-80; National Archives (formerly called General State Archives, Algemeene Rijksarchief), Levantine Trade file no. 269.

⁴¹ Concerning the transit trade of the "chain" of islands of Central Mediterranean during the Continental Blockade see MICHELA D'ANGELO, "The Mid-Mediterranean as an Alternative Market: British Merchants, Ships and Merchandises during the Napoleonic Wars", in *Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of Maritime History*, (Corfu, 23-27 June 2004), International Maritime Economic History Association and in VASSALLO, D'ANGELO (eds.), *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean*.

(guerra sanitaria) against Livorno which was the emporium of Western Mediterranean international trade. Each Italian State tried to substitute Livorno with its own "national" port as the most important port for the transit and deposit trade of the Italian peninsula. In this way Genova became in 1714 *porto franco* closing its port to the transit trade via Livorno. In 1719 the Emperor (Austria) created the *porto francos* of Trieste and Naples. In 1728 Messina also became a *porto franco*⁴². In 1732 the Pope made Ancona a *porto franco*. All ports acquired their own lazarettos and warehouses⁴³.

Greek-owned vessels have been traced, that is vessels owned by Greeks that were mainly Ottoman and Venetian subjects sailing under various flags in Venice, Trieste, Ancona, Messina, Malta, Livorno, Genova and Marseilles. In all ports, apart from Venice, Sanità archives have survived for most or all the eighteenth century and up to the mid-nineteenth century. All the Sanità archives include valuable detailed information, as the ships were registered by the quarantine officials, according to the declaration of their captains, concerning name and type of ship, name of captain, place of origin, nationality of vessel, number of seamen, port(s) at which cargoes were loaded, type and weight of cargo, length of journey, ports docked at and merchants to which cargoes were destined.

In Malta the Sanità archives were found in the National Library of Malta in Valletta under the title "Archives of the Order of St. John, Commissarii di Sanità, 639, Registri arrivi di quarantena", 818, volumes 1-14 and covering the entire eighteenth century up to 1816. For the port of Livorno most researchers have looked for the Ufficiali di Sanità in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze as the Livorno officials would send such documentation to the central government. The documents of the Ufficiali di Sanità archives after 1778 in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze, were destroyed in the 1877 Florence flood, and it has been stated more than once that the documentation of the Livorno Sanità archives does not exist after 1778. In the Archivio di Stato di Livorno, however, all the Sanità register books for the port have been found intact in the series 33, "Magistrato poi Dipartimento di Sanità marittima (1606-1860)", volumes 621-626 and 696-706 in which complete information concerning the daily arrival of ships from Levante and the Barbary States are registered in the port with all their details from 1767 to 1860⁴⁴. In Genova evidence of arrivals of ships from various areas are found in the Archivio di Stato di Genova, "Ufficio di Sanità.

⁴² See MICHELA D'ANGELO, "Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo: Messina (1795-1805)", in *Atti della Accademia Peloritana, Classe di Lettere Filosofia e Belle Arti*, Vol. LV, (Messina, 1979).

⁴³ See FILIPPINI, *Il porto di Livorno*, V. 1, 39-73.

⁴⁴ Jean Pierre Filippini in his opus on Livorno trade and shipping clearly refers to these archives which he has used extensively. See FILIPPINI, *Il porto di Livorno*, Vol. 2, 100-101.

Arrivi di Capitani e Padroni and in the Registro di Spedizioni dei Capitani e Patenti" for the period 1780-1819. Furthermore, daily arrivals at the port of Genova from all destinations are published in the valuable weekly maritime and commercial journal of Genova which ran from 1778 to 1797 under the title *Avvisi*; the journal was discovered in microfilms in the Biblioteca Universitaria of the University of Genova⁴⁵. All the Italian archives include evidence indicating vessels that travelled beyond their States with the exception of the small coastal craft. Data for Messina was very limited and was found in *Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica*, kept in the Archivio di Stato di Palermo and *Deputazione della Salute, Regia Udienza* and *Consolato del Mare*, conserved in the Archivio di Stato di Messina⁴⁶.

In Marseille the evidence was collected from the Archives Departementales des Bouches du Rhône, Serie 200 E 474-604, "Depositions et Arrivages. Déclarations faites par les capitaines de bâtiments a leur arrivée". The problem with these French archives is that the volumes include all arrivals even small coastal craft as little as five tons resulting in enormous volumes of about 1000 pages each. Data for Trieste and Ancona was found in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia, in the series "Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia" and generally for Greek-owned shipping in the Russian Consul in Venice and in the reports of the Venetian Consuls in the Ottoman port-towns. In Venice no Sanità has survived and valuable data concerning Greek-owned ships sailing under the Venetian flag was drawn from the Archivio di Stato di Venezia from the series "Scuole piccole e suffragi, san Nicolo dei marinieri" which is the guild of the Venetian seamen. This series is complete for the whole of the eighteenth century and contains details on all the crews of vessels sailing under the Venetian flag.

The first maritime area in which the shipping of the Ottoman and Venetian Greeks developed was the Adriatic. It is in the involvement in the sea trade of Trieste, Venice, Ancona and Senigallia and of the coastline of Puglia, Ionian Calabria and Sicily that the first noteworthy merchant fleet of Greeks developed based in the Ionian Islands and on the coastline of the western Greek mainland⁴⁷.

Figure 1 indicates the arrivals of Greek-owned ships in the ports of Malta, Ancona, Venice and Trieste in the first half of the eighteenth century, and more specifically during the period from the Treaty of Utrecht to the

⁴⁵ I would like to thank Elisabetta Tonizzi for indicating and making this source available to us.

⁴⁶ FABIO P. DI VITA, "Navi greche in Sicilia durante il XVIII secolo", in this volume.

⁴⁷ For a fully rounded and thorough analysis of the cabotage of Calabria, the lack of port infrastructure and large ships to carry the long distance trade of the area see MIRELLA MAFRICI, "Ports et lieux d'abordage calabrais entre le XVIII^e et le XIX^e siècle", in this volume.

Fig. 1. Arrivals of Greek ships in the ports of Malta, Ancona, Venice and Trieste, 1714-1756




Fig. 2. Origin of Greek captains that trade in Malta, 1725-1755





Fig. 3. Arrivals of Greek ships at the ports of Malta, Livorno, Venice, Trieste and Ancona, 1756-1791



Source: Figures 1, 2, 3, *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

beginning of the Seven Years' War. From 1714 to the beginning of 1740 there is evidence of about five to ten Greek-owned ships that traded in these four ports with the exception of 1726 when there was a peak of 16 ships in Malta and Venice. From the mid-1740s the amount of Venetian and Ottoman Greek-ship movements doubled to 15-20 ships. The period 1749-1756 between the end of the War for the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War was one of the rare periods of peace in the Mediterranean. The number of Greek-owned ships that travelled in these four ports increased to over 30; the sailing shipowners engaged in this kind of trade originated almost entirely from the Ionian Seas (Figure 2).

The most important fleet in the maritime region of the Ionian Sea seems to be the fleet of Messolonghi (see Figure 2) located on the mainland of Western Greece at the entrance to the Corinthian Bay opposite Patras. Data from the Malta Health Authorities provides valuable evidence on the ships and sailing shipowners of Messolonghi. Seventy four percent of the ships that arrived in Malta during the first half of the eighteenth century, or 102 ships, belong to Messolonghi sailing ship owners. This evidence reveals that the Messolonghi fleet made its presence felt in the "Adriatic economy" much earlier than the known bibliography indicates. It is interesting to note that in 1713 there is evidence of trade relations between Patmos and Ancona; nine Patmian sailing ship owners are reported to have arrived at Ancona during that year. The first sailing ship owner from Messolonghi who is registered in the Malta Health Authorities is the "greco" captain Frangiscos Papazogli of Voulgari with his *londra* named *Agios Spyridon* who came to Malta on 11 October 1725 sailing from Cephalonia⁴⁸. The origin of the captains/sailing ship owners, (Figure 2), the remaining one third of Greek ships that arrived in Malta were from Cephalonia, Ithaca, Zante and Port Mahon; there were also some captains from the Aegean seas and particularly from the islands of Patmos, Mykonos and Tinos amounting to less than 1% of the total.

According to the database *Amphitrete*, in the first half of the eighteenth century Ancona seems to have developed more transactions with the Eastern Aegean and to a lesser extent with the Ionian Sea and the central Aegean, (see Table 2). During the years 1713-1748, about eighty Greek-owned ships arrived at Ancona of which the highest percentage came from the Eastern Aegean (50 ships) and particularly from Patmos (36

⁴⁸ Sathas places the start of the Messolonghi fleet in 1740. See KONSTANTINOS SATHAS, *Some news about commerce and taxation in Greece during the Turkish Conquest*, reprint from *Oikonomiki Epitheorisis*, 1878-1879, (reprint Athens, 1977). This view is supported by Maximos and Leontaritis. See SERAPHIM MAXIMOS (VOREIOS), *Greek Merchant Shipping during the XVIII century* (Athens, 1940), 29; GEORGE LEON (LEONTARITIS), "Greek Merchant Marine (1453-1850)", in PAPADOPOULOS (ed.), *Greek Merchant Shipping*, 29.

ships) and Smyrna. The second maritime region which had developed trade relations with Ancona was the Ionian Sea, from which twelve ships arrived from Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Messolonghi and Parga. Only eight ships arrived from the central Aegean (Paros, Mykonos and Tinos) and Crete and only one from Western Aegean (Thessaloniki and Peloponnese). Seven ships were reported to have travelled to Ancona from the Italian cities of Venice and Naples. The first ship to arrive at Ancona from Messolonghi is recorded on May 1714 and is Nikolaos Kountouris' *tartana Archangelos Michael*.

Table 2. Arrivals of Greek ships to Ancona 1713-1748 and Malta 1717-1756

| Arrivals from | to Ancona 1713-1748 (no of ships) | % Total | to Malta 1717-1756 (no of ships) | % Total |
|----------------------------|---|------------|--|------------|
| EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 72 | 91% | 167 | 94% |
| Eastern Aegean | 50 | 63% | 6 | 3% |
| NE Aegean | | | (1) | |
| SE Aegean | | | (5) | |
| Western Aegean | 2 | 3% | 11 | 7% |
| NW Aegean | | | (1) | |
| SW Aegean | | | (10) | |
| Central Aegean | 8 | 10% | - | - |
| Ionian | 12 | 15% | 146 | 82% |
| Southeastern Mediterranean | - | - | 4 | 2% |
| WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 7 | 9% | 11 | 6% |
| NW Mediterranean | - | - | 2 | |
| SW Mediterranean | - | - | 9 | |
| TOTAL | 79 | 100% | 178 | 100% |

Source: *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

While Ancona developed commercial relations with the Eastern Aegean, Malta maintained trade transactions with the maritime region of the Ionian Sea. From the 167 ships that arrived in Malta in the first half of the eighteenth century, 82% arrived loaded with cargoes from the Ionian seas. From the Ionian maritime region, cargoes came from the Ionian Islands, (Corfu, Paxoi, Lefkas, Cephalonia and Zante), the western coast of the Peloponnese (Methoni, Koroni, Katakolo, Chiarentza and Patras), from the western coast of the Greek mainland (Preveza, Arta, Dragomesto and Messolonghi) and from the Corinthian Bay (Corinth and Nafpaktos). A small percentage of Greeks that travelled to Malta came from southeastern Mediterranean, Alexandria and Cyprus, from the southeastern Aegean, (Kasos and Crete), from southwestern Aegean (Mani, Eleos and Nauplion) as well as from the Barbary States (Jerba, Tripoli and Sfax), (see Table 1 and Map 2).

The period from the beginning of the Seven Years War to the Napoleonic Wars marked a significant growth in the movement of Greek ships partic-

ularly to the ports of Malta and Livorno and to a lesser degree to the ports of Trieste, Venice and Ancona, see Figure 3. The French Levant trade was constrained to the convoy system and thus the terrain was opened to the neutral flags of the Greeks and the Raguzans⁴⁹. The outcome of the continuous Anglo-French Wars (Seven Years War, 1756-1763, and during the American Revolution, 1776-1783), and of privateering attacks on French merchant ships in the Mediterranean affected the structure of the Mediterranean and Black Sea trade. The French ships that had been the main carriers of the Levant trade until the 1780s had stopped travelling by the end of the decade and were replaced by neutral local carriers of the Levant, like the Greeks, the Raguzans and the Americans and determined the sea routes of ships and seamen to the West⁵⁰. During this period the importance of the "Adriatic economy" declined and this marked the beginning of the expansion and the establishment of the Greek-owned fleet in the Western Mediterranean.

Malta and Livorno were the main recipient ports of the Greek-owned fleet with two thirds of the cargoes from the Ionian maritime region and the rest from the Aegean and southeastern Mediterranean being re-exported to Italian, French and Spanish ports. During the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) and up until the first Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774) Greek-owned ships in the ports of Venice, Trieste, Ancona, Malta and Livorno tripled and quadrupled (see Figure 3). The 20-30 Greek-owned ships that entered the ports of the "Adriatic Economy" in the first half of the eighteenth century, multiplied to 40-60 ships from 1756 to 1769, with a peak during the years 1764 to 1765; it was Ancona and Trieste that led the way. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 there was a clear drop in the frequency of voyages in 1775 to 10-20 ships. After 1777 there was a gradual but significant increase that led to the quadrupling of the ships arriving at the port of Malta (159 ships) and to a doubling of those arriving at the port of Livorno (46 ships). In 1783 we find the first archival evidence of Greek-owned ships in Genova: in 1783 twenty Greek-owned ships arrived at the port of Genova loaded with grain. It was the beginning of a commercial and maritime relationship: Genova became one of the main centres of Greek-owned ships to

⁴⁹ See XAVIER LABAT SAINT VINCENT, *Malte, une escale du commerce français en Méditerranée au XVIII^e siècle*, Presses Universitaires de Paris Sorbonne, forthcoming, Part I, chapter III, Part II, chapter II, section I.5c.

⁵⁰ For the use of Ottoman Greek and Raguzan ships as neutral shipping see FILIPPINI, *Il porto di Livorno*, Vol. 2, 49-72. For the use of the American ships by the Livornese merchants see SILVIA MARZAGALLI, "Les boulevards de la fraude". *Le négoce maritime et le Blocus continental, 1806-1813* (1999), 91-93; see also SILVIA MARZAGALLI, "Establishing Transatlantic trade networks in time of war: Bordeaux and the United States, 1793-1815", *Business History Review*, 79, (Winter, 2005), 811-844.

the West for the next thirty years, and particularly of the captains from Hydra, Spetses and Psara. In 1786 more than 200 Greek vessels entered all five ports (Figure 3). The second Russo-Turkish War (1787-1792) that was fought mainly in the Black Sea had very little effect on the movement of Greek-owned ships to Malta, Trieste and Venice; it was most likely mainly the French Revolution that brought a temporary decrease in 1789.

Figure 4 clearly indicates that as in the first half of the eighteenth century, the sailing ship owners from Messolongi led the way for the Greek-owned fleet from the 1750s to 1790s. This contradicts the belief held thus far. Historical literature has followed the analysis by Constantine Sathas who in 1878 wrote that the people of Messolonghi were punished for their involvement in the first Russo-Turkish War and “the ships of Messolonghi, eighty in total, after defending themselves bravely for a whole week against the pirates of Dulcina and Skodra were conquered by fraud and were burned with the city without mercy on 10 April 1770... And so, this new merchant fleet was destroyed by Albanians”⁵¹. It seems, however, that the Messolonghi fleet was reborn from its ashes and continued to trade dynamically with Malta and Livorno until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

According to the data furnished by the Venetian Consul in Lepanto on 12 November 1762, Messolonghi had 79 ships of an average tonnage of 135 tons and must have been without a doubt the largest deep-sea going Greek-owned fleet⁵². This is also reinforced by the data gathered from the arrivals of Messolonghi ships in the Italian port-cities and Malta. During the period 1756-1791, 48% of the total number of Greek-owned ships that arrived in Malta, or 437 ships were owned by sailing ship owners and captains from Messolonghi. With the fleet of Cephalonians (8%), of Zakynthians (3%) and of Galaxidiots (2%) to follow, the captains from the Ionian seas handled two thirds of the maritime trade of the Greeks with Malta during the period under consideration.

The Greek-owned vessels from the Aegean consisted of the remaining third of the total arrivals in Malta. Furthermore this fleet showed remarkable growth during the Napoleonic Wars. The rising importance of Greek captains from Spetses and Hydra in Malta is reported after 1780. The Spetsiots traded to the West before the Hydriots and formed the second most important fleet after Messolonghi. The first Spetsiot to be found in the Sanità Archives of Malta is Lambros Miroforis with *St. Nicolaos* in

⁵¹ KONSTANTINOS SATHAS, *Some news about commerce and taxation in Greece during the Turkish Conquest*, reprint from *Oikonomiki Epitheorisis*, 1878-1879, (Athens, 1977), 52.

⁵² Data from Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, Nuova Seria, lettere, Busta 728, 12 November 1762. This information written in the Report of Consul Ioannis Lappos, to the Cinque Savi alla Mercanzie has been published by Constantinos Sathas and has been wrongly referred to as 12 November 1764.

April 1748, who followed the Nauplion-Mani-Cephalonia-Mani-Cephalonia-Malta route in 68 days. During the next three decades only another 3-4 Spetsiot ships were registered. The great leap forward took place in the 1780s when the arrivals of Spetsiot ships in Malta were calculated at about 198, 22% of the total. The fleet of Hydra followed with 118 arrivals, 13% of the total. The first Hydriot to appear as having entered the port of Malta was Nikolos Koulouris who arrived from Nauplion on July 1762 with his "Iondra" named *La Madonna di Idra* with a crew of ten. The next Hydriot ship was registered on 1779, the rest of the arrivals were compiled in the 1780s. Very few captains came from the other Aegean maritime centres like Tinos, Santorini, Naxos, Trikeri and Patmos.

Table 3. Arrivals of Greek-owned ships to Malta 1757-1791 and Trieste 1752-1791

| Arrivals from | to Malta 1757-1791 (no of ships) | % Total | to Trieste 1752-1791 (no of ships) | % Total |
|-----------------------|--|------------|--|------------|
| EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 954 | 99% | 531 | 88% |
| Eastern Aegean | 70 | 7% | 183 | 30% |
| NE Aegean | 25 | | 148 | |
| SE Aegean | 45 | | 35 | |
| Western Aegean | 184 | 19% | 71 | 12% |
| NW Aegean | 123 | | 8 | |
| SW Aegean | 61 | | 63 | |
| Central Aegean | - | - | 15 | 3% |
| Ionian | 649 | 67% | 262 | 43% |
| SE Aegean | 43 | 5% | - | - |
| Black Sea | 8 | 1% | - | - |
| WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 8 | 1% | 73 | 12% |
| SW Mediterranean | 8 | 1% | 73 | 12% |
| TOTAL | 962 | 100% | 604 | 100% |

Source: *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

The cargoes brought by the ships from Malta and Trieste came mainly from the Ionian maritime region (see Table 3), *i.e.* the Ionian Islands, the western coast of the Peloponnese, the Corinthian Bay and the western coast of mainland Greece. The second most important origin of the cargoes to Malta was the Western Aegean coast, from which there were imports of grain and for Trieste the Eastern Aegean where Smyrna, Chios, and the whole area provided cotton, vallonea etc. The southeastern Mediterranean was important for Livorno which retained close commercial relations with Alexandria, the Syrian and Palestinian coast.

The apogee of the Greek-owned fleet during the Napoleonic Wars

This period was characterised by the apogee of the Greek-owned fleet and the continuous flow of Greek-owned ships to the main ports of West-

Fig. 4. Origin of Greek captains in Malta, 1756-1791




Fig. 5. Arrivals of Greek ships at the ports of Malta, Livorno, Genova, Marseille, Messina, Venice and Trieste





Fig. 6. Indices of grain prices in the port of Genova and of freight rates of British imports



Source: Figures 4, 5, *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006; Figure 6. Douglas North, "Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development, 1750-1913", *Journal of Economic History*, vol. XVIII, 1958, Appendix, Table 1, Giuseppe Felloni, *Scritti di Storia Economica*, 2 vols, (Genova, 1998), 497-510, Table 1

ern Mediterranean for the provision in grain of the western coast of the Italian peninsula, France and Spain. During this time the Greek-owned fleet established itself in Mediterranean trade, and the penetration of Greek ships into northern Europe and the Atlantic routes.

Figure 5 indicates the important growth of Greek vessels in the Western Mediterranean ports during the period under consideration. From the 120 Greek-owned ships arriving annually at the ports of Western Mediterranean shown in Figure 3 the figure quadrupled to more than 500 ships in 1796 and 350 in 1808, just to mention the two peaks. Main destinations beyond Malta were firstly Livorno and Genova and secondly Barcelona, Cadiz and Lisbon. The arrivals to Livorno indicated a reasonably steady growth, whereas the arrivals in Genova showed an erratic impressive trend. The percentage of Greek-owned vessels in the total ship movements of Genova and Livorno from 1792 to 1805 was highly significant. During the years 1796-1798 and in 1801 they formed up to 30% of Genova's entire ship movements and 25% of Livorno; in the years between they represented 5-10% of the total number of ships entering these two ports⁵³. During the last decade of the eighteenth century the presence of Greek-owned vessels in Marseille and Malta (see Figure 5) was equally important. In the first decade of the nineteenth century the continental blockade led Malta to become the most frequented transit centre of the area.

Between 1792 and 1801 the so-called French Revolutionary Wars or the First Napoleonic Wars took place. Grain prices, freight rates and entries to the port of Genova all showed an upward trend during this period. The declaration of war of the First Alliance against France led to a dramatic rise in the prices of grain. In May 1803 the second Napoleonic Wars broke out and lasted until 1815. Spain allied with France, while in 1805 a Third Alliance was formed with Britain, Russia and Austria. In November 1806 Napoleon imposed the Continental System, an economic embargo really, to destroy British trade and products, with high penalties for the nations under his command that disobeyed. However, throughout Europe, merchants whose business was threatened by the blockade managed to find ways around the system with all kinds of fake documents and flags, whereas the British turned Malta and Gibraltar into their main transit trade points. In May 1808 the Spanish revolt against the French and the Spanish Revolution opened up a gap in the Continental System of France exposing the Spanish/Portuguese trade to the English. The Continental System had no real success and ended with the defeat of Napoleon in Russia in 1812.

⁵³ GELINA HARLAFTIS, SOPHIA LAIOU, "Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-c.1820: The Rise of the Greek-Owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet", in MARK MAZOWER (ed.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece*, (London, 2008), Figure 2.

Usually demand for transport and increase in shipping follows an increase in demand. It was of course the Napoleonic Wars that shot up the grain prices and freight rates. Figure 6 combines two sets of information that confirm the two peak years, 1795-96, and 1801-1802 and the general boom in shipping trade in the port; it is interesting to compare the information of Figure 6 with the variations of arrivals of ships as shown in Figure 5. The peaks in the grain prices, the freight rates and the arrivals of Greek-owned ships verify the peak years 1796, 1802, 1808. Both indices that appear in Figure 6 are made by different researchers in different periods and for different areas. The first set of information shows the grain prices at the port of Genova by Giuseppe Felloni, the second set of information is given by Douglass North in his classic study "Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development, 1750-1913", published in the *Journal of Economic History* in 1958 and it indicates the fluctuations of freight rates of British imports. The grain prices at the port of Genova where there was dense traffic of Greek-owned ships during the period under examination are used as an indication of the fluctuation of demand in the Western Mediterranean ports; the peaks during the promulgation of the First Napoleonic War, of the First and Third Alliances and the continental blockade are evident. Fluctuations in trade demand triggers dramatic effects on the fluctuations of freight rates also depicted in Figure 6. What is highly interesting to note is the comparability of the trends of both indices, a clear indication of the integration of European markets at the beginning of nineteenth century.

The increasing demand for grain during the wars that took place mainly in the Western Mediterranean opened up an important source of grain, that of the Black Sea. In the Black Sea the most important grain producing regions in Novorossia or New Russia, were those of the Azov and Odessa. Odessa, the new port-city established by the Russians on the Ottoman site Haçabey in 1794 became the main exporting centre of the Black Sea. The commercial success of Russian grain lay in its abundance, good quality and low price: the new port of Odessa provided excellent infrastructure for the incoming ships⁵⁴.

For Malta and Livorno, however, the Ionian Sea remained highly important as a place of origin of the cargoes ships brought to its ports. For the period under examination 34% of all cargoes that arrived at Malta originated from the Ionian Sea and 547 ships arrived from this area. Apart from the Aegean and Ionian Seas, Greek-owned ships loaded in the southeastern Mediterranean ports and the Black Sea. According to Table 4, 5% of Greek-owned ships that arrived in Malta and 9% of those arrived in Genova came from these areas. A limited number of Greek-owned ships that traded with

⁵⁴ PATRICIA HERLIHY, *Odessa: A History* (Cambridge, 1986).

Malta (8%) continued to trade to other Western European Mediterranean or North African ports, a figure that is much higher in the case of the ships that traded with Genova (39%) and Marseille (34%) (see Table 4)⁵⁵.

Table 4. Arrivals of Greek-owned ships to Genova 1786-1814, Malta 1792-1815 and Marseille 1790-1810

| Arrivals from | to Malta | % | to Genova | % | to Marseille | % |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|
| | 1792-1815 (no ships) | Total | 1786-1814 (no ships) | Total | 1790-1810 (no ships) | Total |
| EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 1462 | 91% | 590 | 59% | 130 | 66% |
| Eastern Aegean | 385 | 24% | 203 | 20% | 49 | 25% |
| NE Aegean | 317 | | 137 | | 43 | |
| SE Aegean | 68 | | 66 | | 6 | |
| Western Aegean | 385 | 22% | 272 | 12% | 49 | 25% |
| NW Aegean | 192 | | 159 | | 13 | |
| SW Aegean | 166 | | 113 | | 36 | |
| Central Aegean | 58 | 4% | 6 | 1% | 2 | 1% |
| Ionian | 547 | 34% | 20 | 2% | 18 | 9% |
| Southeastern Mediterranean | 81 | 5% | 89 | 9% | 12 | 6% |
| Black Sea | 33 | 2% | 9 | 1% | - | |
| WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 124 | 8% | 388 | 39% | 68 | 34% |
| SW Mediterranean | 34 | 2% | 388 | | 68 | |
| Italian ports | | | 274 | | | |
| French ports | | | 101 | | | |
| Spanish ports | | | 13 | | | |
| SW Mediterranean | 90 | | - | - | - | - |
| ATLANTIC OCEAN | 12 | 1% | 19 | 2% | - | - |
| TOTAL | 1598 | 100% | 997 | 100% | 198 | 100% |

Source: *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

As Figure 5 indicates, there was a continuous presence of Greek ships in the ports of Malta and Livorno that rose after the 1780s. Greek-owned ships did not trade in the ports of Genova and Marseille before that date; in fact the presence of Greek ships is much lower in Marseille than in any of the other ports contrary to the belief of Greek traditional historiography that claims that Greek ships broke the “continental embargo and carried grain to the French ports”⁵⁶. According to Table 4 only 198 Greek-owned ships arrived at Marseille during the period under examination. Two thirds of the ships arrived loaded with grain from the Aegean, while

⁵⁵ Table 4 presents data for Malta, Genova and Marseille. Only recently has it been possible to acquire all the data from the Livorno Sanità Archives and as yet it is still being processed so Livorno is not included in the table. Evidence clearly indicates, however, that most of the cargoes and ships for Livorno originated from the maritime region of the Ionian Sea.

⁵⁶ ELIAS P. GEORGIU, *The Grain Supply of France by Greek Merchant Shipping (1789-1815)*, (Athens, 1969).

the other third came to Marseille from Spanish and Italian ports. It seems that throughout the Napoleonic Wars, Greek-owned ships traded mainly at Italian and Spanish ports and not at French ports.

In addition to Malta and Livorno, Genova was the other main destination of Greek-owned ships. During this period Genova developed its entrepôt trade and appears to have attracted the Mediterranean neutral shipping, which apart from the Greeks, included the Raguzans and the Maltese⁵⁷. During the period under examination Genova received the impressive number of 997 Greek-owned ships; 50% of these arrivals came from the Aegean loaded with grain; from the northeastern Aegean most of the grain came from Psara, the island depot of this area. Almost all ships that arrived from the southwestern Aegean originated from the islands of Spetses and Hydra. Of all the ships that arrived in Genova 9% came from the southeastern Mediterranean and 1% from the Black Sea. The rest of the Greek-owned ships that arrived at Genova, 39%, came from the Western Mediterranean; these were ships that after bringing grain from the Levant stayed in the Western Mediterranean to trade between the Italian, French and Spanish ports.

The grain trade from Levant was valuable not only for the population of Italy and France but also for Spain. The grain trade was particularly important for Barcelona and Tarragona that imported grain and exported wine and other colonial goods from America and the Indies. Cadiz and Lisbon were the ports of colonial goods, cargo centres of sugar, cacao, coffee, cinnamon, brazilian wood, etc. The Catalanian market was entirely dependent on grain imports, as the agricultural production of the area was specialised in the production of wine. Hence, Barcelona became one of the main grain importing ports of the Western Mediterranean. Grain traditionally came to Spain to the eastern coast of the Iberian Peninsula from the Spanish conquered Sicily, but from the end of eighteenth century it came increasingly from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. It was the Greeks who transported the Levant grain. Figure 7 indicates the importance of the Greek-owned ships in the Spanish ports during the Napoleonic Wars and particularly during the years 1804 and 1805 when 140 Greek-owned vessels entered the Spanish ports.

The sea-routes from Genova led to Barcelona, Alicante, Malaga, Cadiz and Lisbon. Greek-owned ships followed the routes and during the Napoleonic Wars became the grain carriers of the Levant grain to the Iberian Peninsula, where they remained for some time to run the Spanish cabotage with their neutral ships before returning East⁵⁸. Spanish, British,

⁵⁷ See CARMEL VASSALLO, *Corsairing to Commerce. Maltese Merchants in XVIII Century Spain*, (Malta, 1997), 95-97.

⁵⁸ For detailed information on Greek shipping in the Spanish ports see ELOY MARTIN

French, Scandinavian and Greek-owned ships sailing under the Ottoman or Russian flag carried the imports of Barcelona as data of Table 5 indicates. In 1815, 115 British, 82 Swedish, 44 French and 23 Greek-owned vessels arrived at the port of Barcelona. It is interesting to note that the Greek ships were the biggest in the port with an average of 200 tons followed by Swedish and English. The French ships were of smaller tonnage, 80 tons, while the Spanish were really simply coastal vessels of an average 50 tons.

Table 5. Arrivals at the port of Barcelona in 1815

| <i>Flag</i> | <i>Number of ships</i> | <i>Average tonnage</i> |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Spanish | 283 | 48,28 |
| British | 115 | 148,05 |
| Swedish | 82 | 175,28 |
| French | 44 | 80,66 |
| Greek-owned (Ottoman and Russian) | 23 | 210,04 |
| Danish | 18 | 139,5 |
| Sardinian | 13 | |
| Other | 31 | |
| TOTAL | 609 | |

Source: LAURA CALOSCI, «Génova y la transformación del comercio Mediterráneo de Cataluña (1815-1840)», Departament d'Història i Institucions Econòmiques, Divisio de Ciències Jurídiques, Econòmiques i Socials, Universitat de Barcelona, (2002-2003) Table 9

The Greek-owned fleet that travelled to the Western Mediterranean ports mainly sailed under the Ottoman flag. The growth of the Ottoman Greek fleet was supported and facilitated by the Ottoman State particularly during the period of Selim III⁵⁹. Table 6 indicates the proportion of the Ottoman flag used during the period 1780 to 1810 as recorded in almost 5,000 Greek-owned ships. More than 80% of the Greek-owned ships that traded to Malta, Livorno and Genova, that is on the long routes of the Mediterranean sailed under the Ottoman flag. As far as the Russian flag is concerned during the period 1767-1815, there is an extensive Greek bibliography stressing the impetus posed by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarji in 1774, as shown below⁶⁰. Archival evidence indicates that the use of the

CORRALES, "La flotta greco-otomana en Cadiz a fines del siglo XVIII" in *Actas del II Congreso de Historia de Andalucía, Andalucía Moderna (II)*, (Cordoba, 1995), 389-400 and ELOY MARTIN CORRALES, "Cereales y capitanes greco-otomanos en la Malaga de fines del siglo XVIII", *Estudis d'Història Econòmica*, Vol. 1989/2, 87-114.

⁵⁹ HARLAFTIS, LAIOU, "Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-c.1820".

⁶⁰ "After 1776 the majority of ships of 'Greek ownership' carried the Russian flag", wrote GEORGE DERTILIS, *A History of the Greek State, 1830-1920*, (Athens, 2005), 196 (in Greek). On the other hand, Vassilis Kremmydas who has written the only important work on pre-revolutionary Greek shipping is somewhat skeptical of this argument: "what is generally believed, that the Russian flag acted as a panacea for Greek ship-

Russian flag by the Greek-owned vessels trading in Western Europe was indeed very limited. In fact in Genova there was almost no use noted while in Malta 6% of the Greek-owned vessels carried the Russian flag and 9% in Livorno. For the entire period in the three ports only 6% of the vessels that traded west sailed under the Russian flag. The use of the Russian flag was minimal before the 1800s and there were just a few vessels that carried the flag during the two Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792. There was an increase in the use of the Russian flag between 1800-1808, but the figure never exceeded 30 ships or 20% of the Greek-owned vessels trading with Livorno or Malta.

Table 6. Greek-owned ships under various flags, 1780-1810

| Port | Ottoman flag | Venetian flag | Russian flag | Ionian | Other* | Total number of ships |
|---------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| Malta | 64% | 3% | 6% | 4% | 23% | 2352 |
| Livorno | 83% | 6% | 9% | 2% | 0% | 1604 |
| Genoa | 98% | 1% | 0.2% | 0% | 0,8% | 1024 |
| | 83% | 3% | 6% | 2% | 8% | 4980 |

* Jerusalem, Prussian, Austrian, British, French

Source: Processed data from the data base *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University / Greek Ministry of Education, 2006

After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarja the Ottoman State provided navigation permits to sail through the Dardanelles for the transport of grain to the Western Mediterranean⁶¹. A portion of the Black Sea grain along with that from the Plain of Thessaly was either brought to be stored on the Aegean islands of Psara, Hydra and Spetses, where it was kept either in improvised wooden sheds on land or in the holds of ships, or it was immediately trans-shipped to larger deep sea-going vessels that transported it to the West. This important commercial and maritime network developed in close collaboration with the big merchants (*negozzianti*) of the Western Mediterranean ports equipped with large and specially built grain warehouses for the Levant grain⁶².

ping, or as a catalyst for its development is a non-academic exaggeration. It seems that its use took a long time to spread...". KREMMYDAS, *Greek Shipping*, Vol. 1, 22 fn. 2.

⁶¹ HARLAFTIS, LAIOU, "Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-c.1820".

⁶² *Ibid.* The information on Ottoman Greek vessels from the Ottoman sources is from five register books catalogued as "*Izn-i Sefine Defterleri*", located in the Prime Ministerial Archives of Istanbul, that include permissions for the ships sailing to and from the Black Sea during 1780-1821 and registration of all vessels that sailed in the Mediterranean from 1804-1821, following the new "system" which was implemented by the Ottoman State during the reign of Selim III. This kind of information includes name of

Fig. 7 - Greek-owned vessels in the Spanish ports of Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz




Fig. 8. Place of origin of sailing shipowners trading with Genova, 1783-1814





Fig. 9. Place of origin of sailing shipowners that trade in Malta, 1792-1815



Source: Figure 7, for Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz data is derived from the *Diario de Barcelona, 1792-1801*, in ELOY MARTIN CORRALES, "La flotta greco-otomana en Cadiz a fines del siglo XVIII", in *Actas del II Congreso de Historia de Andalucía, Andalucía Moderna (II)* (Cordoba, 1995), 389-400; Figures 8, 9, *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project «Pythagoras», Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

This Mediterranean commercial and maritime network started from the islands and ports of the Ionian and Aegean seas. Although it was the Ionian fleet that started first, during this period the fleets of Hydra, Spetses and Psara grew at an impressive pace. The sailing ship owners of these three islands developed close links with the big Genovese merchants and particularly Carlo Gerhardi and carried the grain trade of Genova almost exclusively. Of the ships that arrived in Genova during the period under examination 50% belonged to the Hydriots, 23% to the Spetsiots and 18% to the Psariots (Figure 8). The remaining 9% belonged to Cephalonians and Messolongians. The same is true of the arrivals to Marseille. The importance of the sailing ship owners of Hydra, Spetses and Psara to Genova and Marseille, however, is not indicative of their importance in the total fleet owned by Greeks.

In Malta and Livorno the presence of sailing ship owners from the Ionian maritime region remains more important. Strong trade links formulated from the second third of the eighteenth century existed between Ionian sailing ship owners and important Greek Livorno merchants. Figure 9 reveals the place of origin of Greek sailing ship owners arriving in Malta during the Napoleonic Wars. More than 40% belonged to sailing ship owners from Messolonghi, Cephalonia, Galaxidi, Zante, Preveza and Patra; 41% belonged to ship owners from Hydra and Spetses and 8% to the small Aegean fleet of Mykonos (4%), Tinos (3%) and Santorini (1%). The remaining 10% belonged to sailing ship owners from Syros, Crete, Poros, Kranidi, Ithaca, Chios, Patmos, Kasos, Scopelos, Trikeri etc.

In the late eighteenth century Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean, Ottoman or Venetian subjects sailing under various flags, but mainly under the Ottoman flag and based on islands and port-towns of the Aegean and Ionian seas developed an important fleet. They emerged as the most dynamic neutral fleet in the Mediterranean and took advantage of the turbulent times of the European rivalry for the economic and political control of the Levant. They competed with the other important western European fleets that traded in the Mediterranean, such as the British, the French, the Dutch and the Scandinavians. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars and under the Ottoman flag they had more than doubled their fleet. After the 1820s, Greeks sailing under the flag of the Greek State, along with the British became the main carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea for the rest of the nineteenth century.

captain and place of origin, type of ship, port of destination, and in some of the books, the armament of the vessel. Archival research in this valuable material provided a harvest of 2,104 registrations of Ottoman Greek vessels.

Gerassimos D. Pagratis

I Consolati della Repubblica Settinsulare in Sicilia (1800-1807)

Le Isole Ionie fanno parte di quelle zone marittime da sempre aperte al mondo esterno. La loro posizione geografica, sull'asse mercantile che collegava Mediterraneo orientale e Mediterraneo occidentale, la loro vicinanza al territorio ottomano, ma anche le necessità tecniche della navigazione a vela, hanno conferito loro una particolare importanza strategica ed hanno definito il loro carattere di mercati di transito.

L'avanzata dell'esercito napoleonico, nel 1797, pose fine al dominio veneziano nel Levante, un dominio che era durato quattro secoli. Nel 1800, quando gli sviluppi internazionali permisero la fondazione della Repubblica Settinsulare, questo territorio acquisì, per la prima volta nell'età moderna, unità politica. La fondazione di questo Stato fu possibile grazie alla provvisoria identità d'interessi tra la Russia e l'Impero Ottomano, che garantirono la sua esistenza, con l'assenso anche della Gran Bretagna.

Il piccolo stato settinsulare costituì, per i suoi contemporanei, un esperimento pilota di sovranità nazionale, precursore dell'indipendenza nazionale greca. L'efficiente funzionamento delle istituzioni che coprivano tutti i settori della vita quotidiana dello stato, ma anche la partecipazione attiva degli abitanti alla cosa pubblica, contribuirono alla formazione di quadri politico-amministrativi che avrebbero giocato un ruolo importante negli anni precedenti all'Unione con la Grecia (1864)¹.

La nascita della Repubblica Settinsulare fu un evento decisivo per la marina mercantile ionica, per tre motivi:

1. I cittadini delle Sette Isole avevano in tal modo assicurato la loro difesa e la loro integrità nazionale.
2. I russi e gli ottomani assunsero la protezione della marina mercantile

* Vorrei qui ringraziare Michela D'Angelo e Rosario Lentini per le preziose informazioni che mi hanno fornito sulla storia economica e politica di Messina e Palermo.

¹ SPIROS ASDRACAS, *Repubblica Settinsulare (1800-1807)*, in *Repubblica Settinsulare (1800-1807)*. *Catalogo della Mostra*, a cura di ALIKI NIKIFOROU, Corfù 2000, 6 (in greco).

ionia in vari modi. La Russia già dal 1774 aveva concesso ai greci l'uso della bandiera russa e l'accesso ai porti settentrionali del Mar Nero da dove avveniva l'esportazione di cereali, e dove si erano stabilite numerose comunità greche. I greci dell'Eptaneso potevano contare sul sostegno e sui servizi delle autorità consolari russe ove non avessero una propria rappresentanza, grazie ad un ordine inviato dallo Zar nel 1803 alle rappresentanze consolari del suo paese, con cui esse venivano invitate a proteggere gli interessi mercantili dell'Eptaneso².

Gli ottomani si erano impegnati a proteggere le navi e i mercanti delle Isole Ionie che erano attivi in porti di loro competenza territoriale e soprattutto negli stati barbareschi (Africa). La concessione alle navi settinsulari, oltre che della Regia Patente, anche di un firmano sultaniale, mirava alla protezione degli armatori dello Ionio dai corsari barbareschi.

3. Il terzo vantaggio della marina ionica, rispetto ad altre flotte, fu la neutralità della Repubblica Settinsulare nei conflitti internazionali dell'epoca. Ci riferiamo alle guerre tra l'Inghilterra e la Francia (1803) e tra la Francia e la Russia (1806).

La situazione generale era dunque particolarmente favorevole ai cittadini delle Sette Isole, perché applicassero tutto quello che avevano imparato durante la dominazione veneziana, cioè lo sviluppo di imprese mercantili marittime in un regime rigidamente protezionista. Prepararono dunque un quadro istituzionale adatto, entro il quale la marina mercantile avrebbe operato senza impedimenti. In seguito istituirono una fitta rete consolare, basata sulla rete già esistente durante la dominazione veneta.

Così, nel 1803 furono redatti due regolamenti: uno per l'organizzazione della marina mercantile ionica, ed un altro riguardante i diritti dei rappresentanti all'estero della Repubblica Settinsulare. Questi fatti assumono un significato particolare, se si pensa che per la prima volta nella storia neogreca mercanti, armatori e marittimi greci divennero padroni nel loro spazio e godettero apertamente di protezione e incoraggiamento da parte della politica statale. In questo quadro generale favorevole le Isole Ionie svilupparono rapidamente una flotta mercantile che assunse dimensioni mai viste prima nella zona.

Le nostre ricerche negli archivi della Repubblica Settinsulare ci hanno fornito dati impressionanti. Per il periodo 1801-1807 vengono registrate 441 navi, di 56.959 tonnellate di stazza totale con una media di 132 tonnellate per nave. Si tratta per lo più di navi di media o piccola stazza. Più in particolare il 41,95% di esse era di stazza compresa tra 20 e 100 t., il 43,7% di 101-200 t., il 12,2% di 201-300 t., mentre il 2% apparteneva alla categoria delle 301-450 t.

² Archivio di Stato di Corfù, Repubblica Settinsulare [da ora ASC, RS], busta 235, f. 2r.

Nella presente relazione, che fa parte di una ricerca più ampia riguardante la storia della marina mercantile ionica durante le guerre napoleoniche, verranno esaminati alcuni aspetti del funzionamento dei consolati settinsulari in Sicilia. Questi consolati appartenevano ad una estesa rete di rappresentanze delle Isole Ionie, che si estendeva in quasi tutto il Mediterraneo e non solo. Oltre agli inviati straordinari della Repubblica Settinsulare a Costantinopoli, Parigi e Pietroburgo esistevano:

- Consolati Generali a Smirne, Palermo, Lecce, Patraso, Arta, etc.
- Consolati a Trieste, Napoli, Venezia, Livorno, Genova, Otranto, Malta, Barletta, Missolungi, Salonico, Abido di Misia in Asia Minore, Chiparissia, Creta, Prevesa, Chios, Samos, Santorini, Cipro, Tunisi, Odessa, Cherson, Aleppo, Atene, etc.

A Palermo il Consolato Generale della Repubblica Settinsulare iniziò la sua attività nel 1801. Non è chiaro per quale motivo in Sicilia fu scelta come sua sede Palermo e non Messina, dove avevano la loro rappresentanza consolare anche altre potenze (l'Impero Ottomano, la Russia, l'Austria, etc.)³. Supponiamo che i motivi fossero amministrativi, collegati forse alla presenza della corte borbonica che si era rifugiata a Palermo nel 1799.

Ufficialmente, il Re di Sicilia riconobbe la Repubblica Settinsulare nel 1802. Nello stesso anno (il 7 settembre 1802) dette il Regio *Exequatur* alla Patente del barone Antonino Genzardi, nella carica di Console Generale della Repubblica Settinsulare in Sicilia⁴. Su Antonino Genzardi disponiamo di poche informazioni, che non solo attestano la sua costante attività nel campo delle imprese marittime, ma anche il rapporto particolare che mantenne con mercanti e marinai greci. Nel 1792 era Console ottomano a Palermo⁵. Mentre era Console Generale della Repubblica Settinsulare a Palermo, fu nominato console provvisorio della Russia nello stesso porto, funzioni che furono confermate il 30 ottobre 1808⁶. Dopo aver prestato

³ L'incarico di Console dell'Impero Ottomano a Messina fu ricoperto dal 1801 al 1804 da Giacomo Curzola [MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo: Messina (1795-1805)*, in "Atti della Accademia Peloritana", vol. LV (1979), 214 n. 52] e dal 1805 al 1813 da Lambros Varvessis di Costantino, fratello di Nicola, Console della Repubblica Settinsulare nella stessa città (MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina tra XVIII e XIX secolo*, Messina 1995, 19). A Messina un altro greco, Giorgio Caglia, fu Console Generale d'Austria dal 1784 al 1813 (D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina*, 210). Nel 1792, pochi anni prima di essere nominato Console generale della Repubblica Settinsulare, Antonino Genzardi operava come Console ottomano a Palermo. Infine a Trapani, nel 1802, Antonino Greco prestò servizio parallelamente come viceconsole degli ottomani e della Repubblica Settinsulare (ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 115).

⁴ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 115.

⁵ FABIO DI VITA, *Navi greche in Sicilia durante il XVIII secolo. Pratiche sanitarie e relazioni commerciali*, nel presente volume.

⁶ MARIA LUISA CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento. Le relazioni commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli e la Russia (1777-1815)*, Genève 1979, 245 e nota 103.

servizio come Console Generale dell'Eptaneso in Sicilia, nel 1809 lo rincontriamo come proprietario di due navi che praticavano incursioni per conto della marina siciliana⁷.

Al Console Generale spettava la responsabilità di nominare viceconsoli ed agenti per agevolare i cittadini della Repubblica Settinsulare, e specialmente i capitani e i marinai che si sarebbero trovati per motivi vari nel territorio di sua giurisdizione⁸. Con queste premesse, la mappa della rete consolare settinsulare si delineò così:

1) a Palermo, già dall'inizio del 1802, Genzardi nominò viceconsole Luciano Greco, figlio di Antonino Greco⁹. All'inizio del 1803 nello stesso porto scelse come viceconsole Costantino Adamo¹⁰. Si trattava di uno dei mercanti greci più attivi della Sicilia, con sede a Palermo¹¹.

2) nel porto di Messina nello stesso periodo scelse per la carica di viceconsole ed agente Nicolaos Varvessis, "un benestante di richieste capacità"¹².

3) a Trapani, dietro ordine della Repubblica Settinsulare datato 17 aprile 1802, nominò viceconsole Antonino Greco, padre del viceconsole di Palermo¹³. Lo stesso personaggio ricopriva nello stesso porto la carica di viceconsole dell'Impero Ottomano.

4) all'inizio del 1803 nominò viceconsole a Marina di Tusa e dintorni Giuseppe Tantillo, nativo del luogo¹⁴.

5) nell'agosto del 1803 nominò viceconsole a Milazzo Pasquale Riolo, membro di una delle famiglie locali più in vista ("uno de' naturali di quella città di tutta la distinzione ed una delle primarie famiglie di quel paese")¹⁵.

⁷ Il 28 ottobre 1809 al largo di Ischia vittima di queste incursioni fu lo *schooner* americano *La Libertà*, partito da Napoli per Boston. La nave fu guidata al porto di Palermo, dove il mercante-banchiere inglese Abraham Gibbs, console degli USA a Palermo, dopo trattative con Genzardi, ottenne la liberazione dell'equipaggio, depositando varie somme in denaro, sia a Genzardi stesso, che agli uffici pubblici che rivendicavano la loro parte da questa transazione (Archivio di Stato di Palermo, notaio F.M. Leone, 24360, cc. 729r-730v, 28 agosto 1809). Queste informazioni sono state messe a nostra disposizione dal Dott. Rosario Lentini, che ringraziamo. Per Abraham Gibbs vedi ROSARIO LENTINI, *Note su un operatore commerciale in Sicilia: Abraham Gibbs (1799-1802)*, in "Nuovi Quaderni del Meridione", vol. 56 (1976), 387-394.

⁸ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 115.

⁹ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 115.

¹⁰ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 24.

¹¹ Nel biennio 1801-1802 era il secondo esportatore di olio dal porto di Messina (D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari*, 229). Nello stesso periodo (1796-1808) Carmelo Maria Adamo iniziava la sua attività a Palermo, commerciando in cereali, olio e zolfo. Egli era inoltre assicuratore e negoziatore di lettere di cambio. Non è provata una sua parentela con Costantino Adamo (informazioni del Dott. Lentini).

¹² ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 158.

¹³ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 10.

¹⁴ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 24.



¹⁵ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 33.

6) nel settembre del 1803 nominò viceconsole della zona costiera di Sciacca (“caricatore e spiaggia”) Giuseppe Friscia¹⁶.

7) nella città e nelle coste di Terranova nominò viceconsole Gaspare Tedesco, nell’ottobre del 1803¹⁷.

8) nel 1804 nominò viceconsole ad Acireale Francesco Trinomi¹⁸.

9) e a Catania, Giovanni Danielo¹⁹.



La bandiera della Repubblica Settinsulare (1800-1807)

¹⁶ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 35, 37.

¹⁷ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 38.

¹⁸ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 46.

¹⁹ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 45.

Il 28 ottobre del 1803 Genzardi manifestò l'intenzione di nominare viceconsoli a Siracusa, ad Augusta e a Girgenti, ma dalle fonti non si può verificare se abbia poi realizzato i suoi propositi²⁰.

La mappa dei viceconsolati ci fa capire che Genzardi tentò di coprire con i suoi collaboratori tutti gli scali più importanti della Sicilia, nei quali sarebbe stato probabile l'approdo di navi ioniche. Osservando nel suo insieme il movimento delle navi ioniche nei porti siciliani²¹, potremmo dedurre che il solo consolato di Messina sarebbe stato sufficiente, visto che questo porto attirava quasi tutto il traffico delle navi ioniche. Dei rimanenti porti della Sicilia le navi ioniche avrebbero utilizzato due volte quello di Palermo ed una volta sola quelli di Terranova (Gela), Falconara, Trapani, Catania e Fiume di Naro. Questa situazione, associata ad altri fattori, può forse spiegare le tensioni nei rapporti tra il Console Generale ed il viceconsole a Messina Nicolaos Varvessis, formalmente suo sottoposto, tensioni che attraversano la maggior parte del carteggio consolare.

L'occasione che rese pubblica la controversia giudiziaria tra Genzardi e Varvessis fu l'adozione, da parte di quest'ultimo, del titolo di Console, ma anche la sua corrispondenza diretta con le autorità della Repubblica Settinsulare, fatto che il Console Generale interpretò come volontà di emancipazione del viceconsole da lui²². Genzardi informò di ciò le autorità settinsulari, le quali il 27 agosto 1803 devono aver richiamato all'ordine Varvessis²³. Quest'ultimo nella sua autodifesa scrisse che avrebbe rispettato la pretesa della Repubblica Settinsulare di non utilizzare il titolo di console, tuttavia dichiarò che non lo avrebbe mai utilizzato, se non lo avessero utilizzato per prime le autorità della Repubblica Settinsulare nei documenti che avevano inviato l'11 ed il 16 aprile 1803. Per quanto riguarda la sua corrispondenza diretta con Corfù, sostenne che essa aveva lo scopo di facilitare l'opera degli uffici statali, grazie alla minore distanza di Messina, rispetto a Palermo, dalla capitale delle Isole Ionie.

Promise inoltre che in futuro avrebbe inoltrato per conoscenza anche al Console Generale almeno le relazioni trimestrali da inviare a Corfù²⁴. In pratica Varvessis mantenne soltanto la sua promessa di inviare a Genzardi le relazioni trimestrali sul traffico delle navi. Per quanto riguarda invece la prima questione che aveva infastidito Genzardi, la situazione non cambiò, visto che Varvessis nella sua corrispondenza con Corfù, continuò

²⁰ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 37.

²¹ Dal 1802 al 1807 nei porti della Sicilia, secondo le nostre fonti, vi furono in tutto 67 arrivi e partenze di navi ioniche. Sul traffico delle navi ioniche nei porti della Sicilia stiamo lavorando a una ricerca specifica.

²² ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 38.

²³ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/12, n. 10.

²⁴ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/12, n. 10.

a firmarsi come Console, e le autorità della Repubblica Settinsulare non smisero di chiamarlo con tale titolo.

Il ruolo di mediatore per la normalizzazione della controversia Genzardi-Varvessis fu svolto anche dall'Incaricato d'Affari della Repubblica Settinsulare a Napoli Nicolò Manzo, il quale fu encomiato dalle autorità per questa sua mediazione²⁵. Manzo dal 1803, anno in cui fu assegnato a questo ufficio, assunse praticamente il ruolo di autorità preposta a tutti i consoli della Repubblica Settinsulare in Sicilia, i quali dovettero riconoscerne il grado superiore e "dipendere dai di lui consigli e suggerimenti..., corrispondere con esso per gli affari"²⁶. Tra le sue responsabilità c'era quella di sorvegliare e impedire qualsiasi eventuale danno per la Repubblica Settinsulare ed i suoi cittadini, guidando in maniera appropriata i consoli sulle questioni relative al commercio. Doveva inoltre controllare l'operato e la condotta dei consoli stessi e fare attenzione che questi ultimi non compissero abusi.

Il 3 febbraio del 1804 la Repubblica Settinsulare gli affidò anche incarichi diplomatici presso la Corte Reale di Napoli²⁷. Manzo, non essendo cittadino ionico²⁸, conosceva probabilmente poco della Repubblica Settinsulare, al punto che fu ritenuto necessario inviargli un catalogo nominativo di tutte le isole che costituivano lo Stato, del quale aveva la responsabilità di tutelare gli interessi. Nelle istruzioni che gli furono inviate all'atto della sua nomina, gli veniva indicato, per questioni particolarmente importanti che riguardavano la sicurezza e il prestigio della Repubblica Settinsulare, di collaborare con il suo collega, Console di Russia a Napoli. Sottolineamo qui il fatto che Manzo prestava servizio anche come Console di Russia a Napoli²⁹, mentre dal 1807 assunse il titolo di Console Generale di Russia in Sicilia, sostituendo il deceduto Becker³⁰. Quest'ultima informazione, insieme a molte altre, rafforza la convinzione comune che la Repubblica Settinsulare nella sua politica estera fosse legata al carro russo, e che si fosse ben presto emancipata in buona parte dal controllo della Sublime Porta. Basta pensare che Genzardi aveva l'obbligo di presentare il documento della sua nomina per la convalida all'Incaricato d'Affari russo a Napoli³¹. D'altra

²⁵ ASC, RS, busta 235, fasc. 7, f. 6v.

²⁶ ASC, RS, busta 235, fasc. 7, ff. 1r-1v.

²⁷ ASC, RS, busta 235, fasc. 7, f. 8r.

²⁸ Secondo CAVALCANTI, *Le relazioni commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli e la Russia*, 241 nota 88, Nicola Manzo fu nominato console nel 1802, succedendo al defunto Anastasio Manzo, suo zio. I Manzo erano ricchi negozianti di Napoli.

²⁹ ASC, RS, busta 235, fasc. 7, ff. 1r-v. Vedi anche CAVALCANTI, *Le relazioni commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli e la Russia*, 5-6.

³⁰ ASC, RS, busta 235, fasc. 8, f. 6v. CAVALCANTI, *Le relazioni commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli e la Russia*, 224 nota 28.

³¹ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 144.

parte, molti consoli della Repubblica Settinsulare prestavano servizio parallelamente come consoli di Russia, o dipendevano per altre vie da questo Paese: ad esempio, Giorgio Palatino, il Console Generale della Repubblica Settinsulare in Puglia (con sede consolare a Lecce), era stato ufficiale dell'Esercito russo³².

Per quanto riguarda i personaggi che occuparono le cariche consolari ioniche, i criteri per la loro nomina dovettero probabilmente essere collegati ai rapporti personali e all'amicizia dello stesso barone Genzardi. È da notare che tutti coloro che furono nominati da lui, appartenevano, secondo quanto attestato dai suoi stessi scritti, a famiglie in vista delle loro città, alle quali evidentemente apparteneva lo stesso Console Generale. Il titolo di Console, anche se solo sulla carta (visto che per la maggior parte di loro non fu necessaria alcuna azione, data l'assenza di cittadini ionici nelle zone di competenza), conferiva maggiore prestigio a personaggi che, data la loro posizione sociale, erano particolarmente interessati a cose del genere. I simboli con cui la Repubblica Settinsulare si era curata di circondare questo prestigio sociale si riferiscono all'uso di una uniforme d'onore, identica per tutti i consoli, e al diritto di una guardia armata davanti alle loro abitazioni³³.

Genzardi si era preoccupato di prevenire la probabile reazione dei suoi "datori di lavoro", sostenendo che in Sicilia non c'erano cittadini ionici in possesso dei requisiti necessari a ricoprire la carica³⁴. È vero anche che in quegli anni la presenza di una comunità compatta di cittadini della Repubblica Settinsulare è testimoniata solo a Messina. Alla fine del XVIII secolo la comunità mercantile greca di Messina era la più numerosa della città. Secondo Michela D'Angelo, era anche la meglio inserita nella società locale, in quanto stabilitasi nella città già nel XV secolo, si era ampliata tra la fine del XVII e gli inizi del XVIII secolo, quando si ebbe una vera e propria migrazione di mercanti greci e delle loro famiglie in Sicilia. Uno di questi era Nicolaos Varvessis, figlio di Constantinos Varvessis, e, molto probabilmente, fratello di Lambros Varvessis, Console degli Ottomani nella stessa città (1805-1813)³⁵.

Del console non sappiamo altro. A giudicare soltanto dal suo cognome, possiamo ipotizzare che traesse origine da Ioannina, nella montuosa Grecia occidentale, da dove proveniva una importante diaspora di mercanti, che si irradiò nei più importanti centri commerciali europei³⁶.

³² ASC, RS, busta 235, fasc. 7, f. 19v.

³³ ASC, RS, busta 46/47, n. 12, 55, 56.

³⁴ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 158.

³⁵ D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina*, 19 e ss.

³⁶ Dal 1550 fino al 1559 Michalis Varvessis di Demetrio e suo figlio Nicolaos, mercanti provenienti da Ioannina, furono attivi a Venezia. Vedi GERASSIMOS PAGRATIS, *Mercanti di*

Le mansioni dei consoli della Repubblica Settinsulare, secondo la consuetudine diffusa nell'ambiente internazionale, erano stabilite nelle "istruzioni" che venivano loro date all'atto della nomina. In generale essi dovevano:

- A) prestare assistenza alla marina mercantile ionica;
- B) prestare assistenza ai cittadini ionici sia in rapporto alle autorità locali che per loro questioni personali;
- C) raccogliere e inviare notizie di carattere politico, commerciale ed economico ed in generale informazioni che potessero interessare lo stato che rappresentavano.

* * *

A) Per quanto riguarda il primo tipo di mansioni, i consoli della Repubblica Settinsulare in Sicilia (ci riferiamo esclusivamente al Console Generale Antonio Genzardi ed al viceconsole a Messina Nicolaos Varvessis) si occuparono soprattutto del rilascio dei documenti marittimi necessari alle navi ioniche di passaggio. Più precisamente: il Console Generale rilasciava documenti provvisori di nazionalità (passavanti) a capitani che non disponevano di licenza per la navigazione, poiché era scaduta la validità del documento provvisorio di cittadinanza (comunque di validità limitata), o perché costoro avevano appena acquistato la nave in Sicilia o altrove e richiedevano di recarsi a Corfù, dove avrebbero presentato la domanda ufficiale per il rilascio della patente di navigazione. In questo caso il Console chiedeva a connazionali o a conterranei del proprietario della nave che si trovavano nel porto di comprovarne la cittadinanza, il luogo di residenza ed anche l'onestà³⁷.

Il rilascio di documenti provvisori di cittadinanza costituì un elemento di attrito tra le autorità settinsulari e i vari consoli, dato che la permissività nei criteri adottati per il loro rilascio e/o i secondi fini mettevano in pericolo la buona fama della Repubblica, il che aveva conseguenze immediate sia per la credibilità della marina mercantile ionica, che nei rapporti internazionali della Repubblica Settinsulare in un momento delicato e difficile della storia europea. Per questo la Segreteria degli Affari Esteri della Repubblica in varie circolari richiamava l'attenzione dei consoli sul controllo dei requisiti per il rilascio dei documenti temporanei di cittadinanza³⁸.

Uno dei fatti della scena internazionale che provocò problemi alla marina ionica fu lo scontro dei viceregni di Barberia con il Regno di Napoli e con Genova. I capitani dell'Eptaneso, secondo l'articolo 12 del Regola-

Giannina a Venezia (1550-1567), in "Thisavrismata", Istituto Ellenico di Venezia, vol. 28, 1998, 143, 147-149, 154 e 162 (in greco).

³⁷ Vedi i casi dei capitani Nicolaos Cunduris e Spiridon Valsamachis. ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 15 e 48/19.

³⁸ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 27, 124.

mento della Marina Ionica³⁹, non potevano assumere marinai di Napoli o Genova, né comprare navi costruite nei cantieri di quei territori. Ciò, per non permettere ai Barbareschi di sequestrare le navi ioniche con il pretesto della guerra tra loro e quei due stati. La Repubblica Settinsulare arrivò alla decisione di emettere un divieto speciale, in seguito a una serie di episodi, come per esempio, l'informazione che nel settembre del 1803 un corsaro algerino aveva sequestrato una nave ionica con equipaggio interamente costituito da genovesi. L'algerino aveva condotto la nave a Barcellona, dove aveva venduto sia la nave che i marinai come schiavi, con l'eccezione del capitano. È da notare il fatto che la nave in questione aveva ottenuto il documento provvisorio di nazionalità dal Console della Repubblica Settinsulare a Genova, Nicolaos Razis: questo fatto, insieme ad altre azioni di Razis, ne causò probabilmente la sostituzione⁴⁰.

La giustificazione più comune per l'assunzione di equipaggi stranieri da parte dei capitani era la mancanza di un numero sufficiente di marinai dell'Eptaneso sia nei Paesi dove venivano acquistate le navi, che nelle isole dello Ionio; fatto, quest'ultimo, plausibile, se si tiene conto delle loro popolazioni e di come fossero strutturate in campo professionale.

Non è da escludere, certo, la possibilità che avvenissero transazioni illegali tra capitani dell'Eptaneso e proprietari di navi stranieri. Una serie di episodi simili avvenuti in vari porti ci induce a sospettare delle loro reali intenzioni. È evidente che per gli armatori napoletani e genovesi sarebbe stata una buona soluzione quella di munire le loro navi di bandiera e documenti della Repubblica Settinsulare, per farle circolare indisturbate nel Mediterraneo, al sicuro dai corsari.

Un caso particolare è venuto a rafforzare i nostri sospetti. Il 24 gennaio del 1804 Nicolettos Inglessis, fu Cosmàs, da Cefalonia, approdò nel porto di Messina al comando della polacca *Santissima Annunciata*. Al console settinsulare dichiarò che alla fine dell'ottobre 1803 corsari algerini lo avevano catturato, perché la sua nave era stata costruita a Napoli e perché l'equipaggio era costituito interamente da marinai napoletani. Dichiarò inoltre di essere riuscito a liberarsi (non spiegò però come) e di essere tornato a Messina via Malta. Il viceconsole Varvessis, secondo gli ordini che aveva intanto ricevuto dalle autorità dello Ionio, bloccò la nave nel porto di Messina, in attesa di ricevere istruzioni dal Manzo. Quest'ultimo, con un documento del 18 febbraio 1804 vietò ad Inglessis di imbarcarsi nuovamente, se prima non avesse cambiato il suo equipaggio, assumendo marinai provenienti da Paesi amici ai Viceregni Barbareschi. In seguito lo obbligò a presentarsi alle autorità della Repubblica Settinsulare a Corfù per ulteriori

³⁹ *Regolamento della Marina Ionica*, Corfù 1805, 17.

⁴⁰ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 35.

chiarimenti. Pressato dagli avvenimenti Inglessis fu costretto ad ammettere di non essere il vero proprietario della nave, come aveva inizialmente dichiarato, presentando inoltre l'atto di compravendita della nave di Michele Massa di Procida⁴¹. Sia l'Inglessis che il Massa confermarono (con pubblica dichiarazione) coraggiosamente al viceconsole che Inglessis era soltanto capitano di bandiera, e che avevano redatto un contratto falso con l'evidente scopo di far circolare la nave indisturbata e al sicuro dai corsari. Così Massa fu costretto a riprendere il comando della sua nave, mentre l'Inglessis pagò il suo errore con il divieto di esercitare ulteriormente la professione di marittimo.

È evidente che i cittadini ionici adottavano le consuetudini vigenti nei porti dove commerciavano. Ed è noto che a Messina era diffuso tra i proprietari di navi sia l'impiego di capitani di bandiera provenienti da Malta, per poter ottenere il passavanti o la bandiera inglese, sia la redazione di falsi atti di vendita della propria nave a stranieri, di solito Maltesi⁴².

B) Il console, data la sua posizione, doveva procedere a vari atti nei confronti del Regno di Sicilia, per facilitare l'opera delle navi ioniche in transito nei porti dell'isola.

B/1. Per esempio, già dal 1801 il Console Generale tentò di registrare la bandiera della Repubblica Settinsulare tra le bandiere franche, nei porti del Regno di Napoli, il che avrebbe sollevato le navi ioniche dall'obbligo di esibire alla Regia Dogana il "manifesto" del loro carico e di sottoporsi al relativo controllo dei funzionari della dogana⁴³. Per riuscirci, chiese che le navi ioniche fossero trattate come le navi della Russia, dell'Impero Ottomano, dell'Inghilterra e della Francia, cioè dei Paesi che "protegevano" la Repubblica, e che avevano bandiere franche. Questo tentativo del console fallì, dato che qualche tempo dopo (il 13 aprile 1803) il Capitano Generale Acton sostenne che per il suo stato le navi ioniche venivano trattate allo stesso modo in cui in passato erano trattate le navi veneziane ("...che vengano assoggettati alle solite visite doganali conformi si praticava con i legni veneti nell'esistenza di quell'aristocrazia")⁴⁴.

B/2. Il Console Generale si battè molto anche per limitare il periodo di quarantena delle navi ioniche nei porti siciliani. Infatti la lunga permanenza in quarantena, che per le navi dello Ionio si aggirava tra i quaranta e i cinquanta giorni⁴⁵, ostacolava enormemente il movimento commercia-

⁴¹ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 4.

⁴² D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari*, 241-242.

⁴³ Alla stessa categoria della bandiera della Repubblica Settinsulare erano ascrivibili le bandiere di Ragusa, di Genova, degli Stati Uniti d'America, della Toscana, dello Stato Pontificio, della Danimarca, della Svezia, etc. ASC, RS, busta 46-47/12, n. 2.

⁴⁴ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 24 e busta 46-47/12, n. 5.

⁴⁵ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/12, n. 2, 49.

le e limitava i guadagni dei trasportatori. Per raggiungere i suoi scopi Genzardi, già nel 1801, aveva chiesto alle autorità sanitarie settinsulari che gli inviassero una certificazione (fede di sanità) della situazione sanitaria delle isole, che ricevette infatti nel giugno dello stesso anno⁴⁶. Con questo documento egli intendeva esercitare pressioni sulla Sanità di Messina, perché non trattasse le isole dello Ionio, riguardo alla situazione sanitaria, allo stesso modo degli altri territori dell'Oriente ottomano ("...voler assoggettare i legni della Settinsulare Repubblica con quel rigore di contumacia solito usarsi a legni ottomani")⁴⁷.

Il tentativo di Genzardi fu tuttavia vano, visto che nei porti italiani, ed in generale in ambito europeo, non si prestava molta fiducia alle misure sanitarie delle Isole Ionie. L'Eptaneso, pur essendo appartenuto fino al 1797 alla Repubblica Veneta che aveva organizzato in maniera soddisfacente le proprie difese sanitarie, era stato colpito diverse volte da epidemie di peste. La sua vicinanza con i territori ottomani, la sua dipendenza alimentare dall'entroterra ottomano con cui costituiva inevitabilmente una unità economica, ma anche il carattere errante del suo commercio, mettevano spesso l'Eptaneso in contatto con i più grandi porti dell'Oriente, dove si manifestavano spesso epidemie di peste (Costantinopoli, Smirne, etc.).

A Messina gli arrivi delle navi dallo Ionio erano temuti per motivi particolari. Si dice che la grande epidemia che colpì la città nel 1743 fu dovuta ad una nave genovese proveniente da Missolongi e Patrasso, territori dell'Impero Ottomano, ma facenti parte della zona ionica. Quindi ogni volta che si avevano notizie di epidemie nelle zone ottomane che si trovano di fronte alle isole, le misure di quarantena per le navi ioniche diventavano particolarmente severe. Nel 1797 la notizia dello scoppio di un'epidemia a Giannina costrinse il Regno di Napoli a chiudere il porto di Otranto alle navi provenienti da Corfù. Quando, nel 1800, si manifestò un'altra epidemia in un paese vicino a Durazzo, le navi ioniche che arrivavano in Sicilia vennero trattate con diffidenza ancora maggiore⁴⁸.

C) Il terzo dovere fondamentale dei consoli era quello di informare e tutelare in generale i capitani dell'Eptaneso dai problemi dovuti alla situazione politica internazionale piuttosto fluida del tempo.

I consoli dovevano essere aggiornati sugli sviluppi della politica internazionale nelle aree di loro competenza, dai quali potevano trarre vantaggio o essere danneggiati gli interessi del Paese da loro rappresentato. In questo periodo uno dei pericoli più seri che le navi ioniche dovevano affrontare era la guerra tra Francia e Russia. La Repubblica Settinsulare era

⁴⁶ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 2.

⁴⁷ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 154.

⁴⁸ GIUSEPPE RESTIFO, *I porti della peste. Epidemie mediterranee fra Sette e Ottocento*, Messina 2005, 21-34, 99-151.

senza dubbio strettamente legata alla Russia. Per questo si temeva che le navi ioniche avrebbero subito gli attacchi della flotta francese.

La Segreteria di Stato degli Affari Esteri, agendo preventivamente, con una circolare datata 13 ottobre 1805, dava a tutte le sedi consolari dello Stato chiare istruzioni su come dovevano comportarsi le navi ioniche in vista dell'imminente guerra tra la Francia e la Russia⁴⁹.

La stessa previdenza dovevano mostrare i consoli, non soltanto attraverso un severo controllo dei requisiti per il rilascio dei vari documenti marittimi alle navi ioniche, ma anche vietandone la partenza dai porti, se ritenevano che vi fossero seri motivi per farlo. Così, quando il 27 giugno 1806 la nave *Madonna di Gardelachi* battente bandiera ionica e guidata dal capitano Spiros Zavòs, proveniente da Rodi e Cefalonia, arrivò al porto di Messina carica di ghiande, spugne, vino ed olio da Storace e con destinazione Livorno, Varvessis non permise alla nave di continuare il viaggio. E ciò a causa delle voci che circolavano su una possibile revoca della neutralità della Repubblica Settinsulare nella guerra tra Francia e Russia a favore di quest'ultima, e del pericolo che la nave venisse sequestrata da incrociatori francesi. Di questa voce Varvessis fu informato da un decreto delle autorità siciliane (12 settembre 1806) che riguardava principalmente i mercanti siciliani⁵⁰.

La Repubblica Settinsulare, a sua volta, il 9 giugno 1806 informò il suo inviato a Napoli, Nicolò Manzo, di aver revocato la neutralità verso la Francia. Come scriveva il Segretario degli Affari Esteri, si era arrivati a questa decisione a causa del cambiamento dell'atteggiamento dei francesi nei confronti della Repubblica Settinsulare a partire dall'aprile dello stesso anno, quando questi ultimi avevano iniziato a procurare seri problemi alla marina ionica. I francesi avevano assunto un atteggiamento più duro nei confronti dei cittadini dell'Eptaneso, poiché trovarono conferma i loro sospetti sull'attivo appoggio da parte della Repubblica Settinsulare alla Russia. Bonaparte rifiutava di accettare la neutralità dello Ionio, pensando che il blocco commerciale dei porti di dominio francese da parte dei Russi nel Mediterraneo avesse come base Corfù, dove era ferma la flotta russa. Così dal 1806 in poi aveva dato ordine di sequestrare le navi che si trovassero nei porti francesi o italiani, se battevano bandiera settinsulare, di arrestare i comandanti delle navi da guerra ioniche, di espellere da Venezia e da altri porti italiani tutti gli agenti commerciali dell'Eptaneso, e di ispezionare i libri dei commercianti di Venezia allo scopo di scoraggiare le ordinazioni commerciali da parte di russi o ionici. Inoltre, fu disposta la chiusura del consolato ionico a Venezia⁵¹.

⁴⁹ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/11, n. 60.

⁵⁰ Le autorità siciliane avevano pubblicato questo decreto sulla base di informazioni del console siciliano a Corfù Leonardo Grattagliano. ASC, RS, busta 46-47/12, n. 27.

⁵¹ GERASSIMOS MAVROGIANNIS, *Storia delle Isole Ionie dal 1797 al 1815*, Atene 1889, vol. I,

Tutto ciò, insieme alle pesanti pressioni esercitate dai russi, indusse gli ionici a revocare la dichiarazione di neutralità del 27 giugno 1803, che fino al 1806 aveva permesso loro di non essere coinvolti nelle controversie tra Inghilterra e Francia e tra Russia e Francia⁵².

Nella situazione che si venne a creare la Repubblica Settinsulare emanò almeno due circolari (9 giugno e 29 settembre 1806) con le quali chiamava i consoli a svolgere severi controlli nelle navi ioniche, allo scopo di evitare gli attacchi francesi. Inoltre, invitava i capitani ed i mercanti dello stato ad adottare precauzioni per proteggere i propri interessi; soprattutto raccomandava di non avvicinarsi a zone marittime che si trovavano sotto il controllo dei francesi, come diversi porti dell'Adriatico⁵³.

La decisione di revoca della neutralità a favore della Russia da parte degli ionici, dovuta al fatto che non erano riusciti a svincolarsi dall'influenza dei russi, i quali spesso intervenivano in varie questioni di politica interna ed estera della Repubblica Settinsulare, avrebbe trascinato il piccolo stato nel vortice delle controversie internazionali e alla perdita finale della sua indipendenza.

Nell'agosto del 1807, dopo la pace di Tilsit, le isole furono occupate dal generale Berthier, e si inaugurò così il secondo periodo di dominio francese nello Ionio, che fu breve per la maggior parte delle isole. L'annessione dell'Eptaneso all'Impero francese portò inevitabilmente all'estensione del blocco commerciale da parte degli inglesi anche in questa zona, facendo aumentare le difficoltà nell'importazione di grano, colpendo il traffico commerciale e marittimo della zona e causando una grave carenza di alimenti per gli abitanti. Nell'autunno del 1809 le quattro isole più meridionali (Citera, Cefalonia, Zante, Itaca) caddero nelle mani degli inglesi. Nel 1810 lo stesso destino ebbe Leucade. L'occupazione francese a Corfù e nelle zone continentali dipendenti dall'isola durò fino al 1814. L'anno seguente le isole dello Ionio sarebbero diventate un protettorato della Gran Bretagna con il nome di "Regno Unito delle Isole Ionie" fino al 1864, anno della loro annessione allo Stato greco.

128 e ss. (in greco). Vedi ELENI KOUKOU, *Storia delle Isole Ionie dal 1797 al 1864*, Atene 1985², 145-149 (in greco).

⁵² ASC, RS, busta 235, fasc. 8, f. 1.

⁵³ ASC, RS, busta 46-47/12, n. 28 e busta 235, fasc. 8, f. 1 r.

MERCHANTS, GOODS, IDEAS

Seven Ağır

Empires looking Seawards: The benefits and costs of foreign seaborne trade

Background and Methodology

In both Oriental and European historiographies, port cities have been one of the key variables in the theoretical debate regarding the relationship between political power and economic development. In European historiography, the idea of 'port city' resonates with the notion of mercantilism, whereas in non-European historiography it reflects the discourse of the 'rise of Europe'.

Even though in both historiographies port cities are depicted as the 'doors' of international trade, these doors opened with the rise of political power and economic prosperity in the former case, whereas in the case of the latter they led to the incorporation of the domestic economy into the world-system and subsequent economic dependence in the latter¹.

In the European context, it was supposedly mercantilism² that gave im-

¹ Representative studies concerning the role of port cities as the conduits through which European influence and values penetrated into the Asian continent, include FRANK BROEZE (ed.), *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from 16th–20th Centuries* (Honolulu, 1989); DILIP K. BASU (ed.), *The Rise and Growth of the Colonial Port Cities in Asia* (Lanham, Md., 1985); SINNAPAH ARASARATNAM, *Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1650–1740* (New Delhi, 1986); ATIYA HABEEB KIDWAI, *Gateway Cities of Asia: Calcutta, 1800–1981* (New Delhi, 1987); K. DHARMASENA, *The Port of Colombo, 1860–1939* (Colombo, 1980); RHOADS MURPHEY, *China Meets the West: The Treaty Ports* (New York, 1975).

² For an early discussion on 'mercantilism,' see HERBERT HEATON, 'Heckscher on Mercantilism', *The Journal of Political Economy*, No. 45 (1937), 370-393; for a recent discussion see ROBERT EKELUND and ROBERT F. HEIBERT (eds.), *A History of Economic Theory and Method* (New York, 1990). The problem with the concept of mercantilism, as Heaton convincingly argued, was to string 'all sorts of disconnected tendencies' in governmental policy during several centuries together and to call the result an ism. One indicator of a 'mercantile' position did not necessarily coincide with another in all so-called 'mercantilist' countries and throughout the whole period hypothetically labeled as 'mercantilist'. In

petus to European expansion; whereas in the Asian context, it was the alleged breach between political objectives and commercial affairs that lay beneath the indifference of the political elite towards commercial agents. Defined as such, the difference between European and non-European trajectories has been explained either by cultural elements or by institutional factors³. It has been argued that some institutions, or cultural values, or both, in some way inhibited the development of the East along the lines of the West.

This dichotomy between Asian and European historiographies of economic development corresponds with the conventional paradigm in Ottoman historiography that juxtaposes the 'Ottoman economic mind' with the supposedly 'European' one. Historians of Ottoman economic thought who looked into the texts written by the political elite of the times compared what they found with 'European' economic principles. They pointed to moral discourse which glorified revenues from war, or booty, while looking on revenues from trade and profit in general with disdain, as evidence of the distinctive character of the Ottoman economic mind⁴. Similarly, the appeals for military victory in these texts came to be regarded as the proof of the 'anti-mercantilist' spirit of Ottoman economic thinking⁵. In view of the consistent emphasis on war,

the literature concerning European expansion, mercantilism has usually been defined as the subordination of military, naval and political power to commercial objectives.

³ The notion of 'oriental despotism' was used to indicate the distinctive nature of the Empire's political and religious culture in the conventional historiography. For a general discussion on the oriental despotism paradigm in Middle Eastern studies see PETER GRAN, 'Modern Middle East History beyond Oriental Despotism, World History beyond Hegel: An Agenda Article', in ENID HILL (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Social History of the Middle East* (Cairo, 2001), 162-198. Revisionist historiography, on the other hand, presented the difference between 'European' and the rest as one of a mode of production and revenue collection. Here I mean models such as the world-system theory introduced by Wallerstein, the model of Asiatic mode of production proposed by Amin, and its modified version as presented by Wolf. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays* (New York, 1979); SAMIR AMIN, *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism* (New York, 1976) and ERIC R. WOLF, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, 1982). Although there are serious differences between these models, I do not elaborate on these within the confines of this article. The important point is that all these models modified the Weberian ideal type of 'patrimonialism/prebendalism' with placing the ideological superstructure into a neo-Marxian perspective that prioritizes substructure.

⁴ See AHMED GÜNER SAYAR, *Osmanlı İktisat Düşüncesinin Çağdaşlaşması* (Istanbul, 1986). Sayar refers to the Ottoman elite such as Durmusoglu Hüseyin who, in their writings, deemed revenues raised from war against infidels as preferable to revenue from trade. He also mentions Kinalizade Ali and Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali who regarded the risks of seafaring for commercial gains as too high, as examples of the aversion of 'Ottoman man' to commercial gains.

⁵ See SABRI ÜLGENER, *İktisadi Çözülmenin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Dünyası* (Istanbul, 1981) and

the Ottoman economic mind was portrayed as a stagnant, inward-looking one that was unfavourable to capitalistic development, even to all manner of change⁶.

Furthermore, the policies of the Ottoman state were presented as a further proof of this type of mentality. Anti-mercantile policies, capitulations⁷, trade privileges and the dominance of foreign merchants in the economy were perceived as irrational policies which were the direct result of the ascetic nature of the Ottomans. These policies were 'irrational' in the sense that they were not based on the economic interests of the Ottoman state and such irrational behaviour was assumed to be derived from the ignorant attitude of the Ottomans towards economic activities.

It is obvious that behind these protective measures which were given to all national and ethnic groups, whether inside or outside the area of sovereignty, whether attached to the land or not, there did not lie the economic interest of the Ottomans. Behind this attitude, there may be the fact that Ottomans were belittling the economic activities outside the established normative economic situation. Also there was a non-economic material viewpoint, which went hand in hand with the belief that the order of the world (*nizam-i alem*) could be sustained by freedom and justice⁸.

The main actor of this mental world, the Ottoman man, was defined by Sayar as a kind of 'homo ottomanicus'⁹ who was characteristically obedient to the state, religion and customs and who consumed little¹⁰. According to him, mercantilist policies were too 'worldly' – a vague behavioural adjective – for such an Ottoman man. This and similar perceptions of the Ottoman economic mind emphasized that Ottoman and European ways of thinking were substantially different and presented this dichotomy as

SAYAR, *Osmanlı İktisatı*, for this type of commentary on the Ottoman texts. Both follow a Weberian methodology by assuming a strong interaction between religious and economic without implying a one-way causality.

⁶ Take note of the fact that the diagnosis as such does not only underscore the lack of a capitalistic rationale within the Ottoman attitudes, but also presupposes a kind integrity between rationality and capitalistic development.

⁷ Capitulations were provided by *ahdnames* which were unilateral and freely-made grants supplying foreigners with commercial privileges in exchange for certain political or military advantages. See 'İmtiyazat' in *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

⁸ SAYAR, *Osmanlı İktisatı Düşüncesinin Çağdaşlaşması*, 115.

⁹ This word was borrowed from Özveren referring to a characterization 'that deviated sharply from homo economicus' the rational profit-maximizing actor of neo-classical economic theory. See EYÜP ÖZVEREN, 'Ottoman Economic Thought and Economic Policy in Transition: Rethinking the Nineteenth Century', in MICHELE PSALIDPOULOS and MARIA EUGÉNIA MATA (eds), *Economic Thought and Policy in Less Developed Europe: The Nineteenth Century* (London, 2002), 139.

¹⁰ SAYAR, *Osmanlı İktisatı Düşüncesinin Çağdaşlaşması*, 62.

the main reason why the Ottoman economy did not develop alongside the European one.

The problem with this perception stems from the approach that prioritizes discourse¹¹ of primary texts without taking into account the complex and at times contradictory relationship between theory and practice in political economy. Accepting at face value the constant references to a moral and religious realm that these texts contain, such an approach neglects the gap that separates the realm of discourse and the realm of real political economy. To overcome this problem, one should place the theoretical writings on economic policy within the relevant historical context in order to be able to assess historical change through these texts.

My intention in this article is to reassess the above-mentioned views about the Ottoman economic mind by looking at the realm of political economy with a comparative focus and to suggest an alternative framework that will help us account for the differences and similarities among different trajectories of economic development. As a case study, I focus on two port cities – Izmir (Smyrna) and Seville – in order to investigate the interaction between the commercial interests of the various parties and political objectives of the states I compare. I do not suggest that Izmir was a typical Ottoman city; neither do I intend to present Seville as the European or Spanish prototype. However, I view these cities as suitable sites to explore the rationale behind the attitudes of political elites towards the economic sphere and hence permit an investigation of the political economy from a comparative perspective. I will conclude by assessing whether there are any common defining features of political economy in these two early-modern empires.

So Far, Yet So Close

At first glance, these two cities seem to have little in common. They emerged at a different pace and in a different geographical context. Izmir's rise from an obscure and small provincial town to an international entrepôt was sudden, whereas Seville was one of the largest cities in Castile even before turning into a cosmopolitan metropolis in the sixteenth century¹². Izmir, in its maturity, was the commercial and financial centre of the Levantine network; whereas Seville was the locus of Atlantic

¹¹ By discourse, I mean a common set of motifs and archetypes that these texts contain.

¹² As Goffman has shown, there was no mention of Izmir in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century travel accounts whereas in 1678, a French traveller asserted that for commerce, Smyrna was the premier city in all the Levant. See DANIEL GOFFMAN, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650* (Seattle, 1990), 53.

trade. Yet, the most important difference between these two cities, from our perspective, is the role played by central authority in the historical evolution of both cities.

Izmir rose to prominence at a time when the Ottoman state was in a difficult situation both in terms of political and economic power. The seventeenth-century crisis, with its impact on prices and production¹³, was only one of the many factors that deprived the Ottoman state of its sources of revenue. The fiscal practices that aimed at increasing revenues further undermined the classical fiscal and agricultural organization and brought about extensive political and financial decentralization¹⁴. It was during

¹³ See ÖMER LÜTFÜ BARKAN, 'The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975), 3-28. Barkan argues that in the 16th century the Ottoman state fell into 'a grave economic and social crisis which presaged a decisive turning point in its history'. According to him, 'the decline of the established Ottoman social and economic order began as the result of developments entirely outside the area dominated by the Porte, and in particular as a consequence of the establishment in Western Europe of an "Atlantic economy" of tremendous vitality and force' while 'toward the end of the 16th century the Ottoman Empire underwent a great inflationary price and trade movement which shook the foundations of its social and economic life'. See BARKAN, 'Price Revolution', 3 and 17. This explanation identifies price inflation as the primary cause of military degradation by producing a financial crisis in military 'fiefs'. In short, having examined the movements of prices and demography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Barkan concludes that economic factors as well as monetary problems originating outside the Empire resulted in the deterioration of the social and economic order of the Empire. However this general 'crisis' approach has been criticized by some scholars on the grounds that further research is required on the peculiarity of the Ottoman case to argue in favour of an explanation that integrates crisis with the decline framework. See LINDA T. DARLING, *Revenue-raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660*, (Leiden, 1996); SURAIYA FAROQHI, 'A Great Foundation in Difficulties: Or Some Evidence of Economic Contraction in the Ottoman Empire of the Seventeenth Century', *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine*, Nos. 47-48 (1987), 109-121; and HALIL INALCIK and DONALD QUATAERT (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 1994).

¹⁴ For the causes and consequences of financial and political transformation during the seventeenth century, see HALIL INALCIK, 'Military and fiscal transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. 6 (1980), 283-337 and YAVUZ ÇEZAR, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Degişim Dönemi: XVIII. yy'dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih* (Istanbul, 1986). Conventionally, decentralization was thought of as one of the main benchmarks of the so-called 'decline' of the Empire. Recently, Ottoman historiography has moved away from this 'decline' paradigm. The change Ottoman institutions went through during this period has been appreciated as a case of institutional flexibility and viability. For this literature, see ARIEL SALZMANN, 'An Ancien Regime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire', *Politics and Society*, vol. 21 (1993), 393-423 and KAREN BARKEY, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, 1994). For a brief elaboration of revisionist historiography, see RELLI SHECHTER, 'Market Welfare in the Early-Modern Ottoman Economy: A Historiographic Overview with Many Questions', *Journal of Eco-*

this period of relative weakness of Ottoman government that Izmir emerged as a prominent port city on the Aegean coast.

Seville, on the other hand, experienced its so-called 'Golden Age' in the sixteenth century when the Spanish state was relatively strong and prosperous. Although in Spanish historiography there is no consensus on the reality and timing of the so-called 'Golden-Age'¹⁵ scholars would agree that Spain was at the peak of its international power in the sixteenth century. Not only in the international sphere but in the domestic arena as well, the Spanish government was more powerful in the sixteenth century than it had been before or it has been since¹⁶. It was during this age of strong government that Seville emerged as the financial and commercial centre of the Atlantic trade.

One might interpret this contrast between two cities' historical evolutions with respect to the strength of central authority as a corollary of the disparity in the attitudes of central authority towards the potential of these two cities as international ports. According to the now widely accepted view first put forward by Goffman, Izmir rose to prominence not only without support from the Ottoman state, but in spite of its opposition¹⁷.

nomic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 48, no. 2 (2005), 253-276. Nevertheless, whether it is termed a 'decline' in the sense that central authority lost its direct control over provinces or a 'success' in the sense that the Empire survived by way of adopting its institutions to the necessities of the age, scholars have agreed on dividing Ottoman history into two periods on the basis of the nature of the relationship between the Empire's centre and its periphery.

¹⁵ Modern scholars attribute the so-called Golden Age of Spain to the great age of Habsburg imperial hegemony while early historians date it before the accession of the Habsburgs, to the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. See HENRY KAMEN, 'The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?', *Past and Present*, 81 (1978), 24-50. This difference grows out of the different understandings of 'success' and efforts of creating self-images by reconstructing the past. Besides the controversy over the timing of the 'golden age', some scholars totally reject the use of this notion. Kamen, whose definition of 'success' involves a degree of industrial development, has argued that Spain had never risen since it had never been an economically strong nation. See KAMEN, 'The Decline of Spain', 35. However, this view could be challenged on the ground that while mere imperial and military power would not account for the success of an imperial structure, economic criteria alone are also insufficient to measure the degree of success reached by a nation. According to Kamen, 'early modern Spain did not have a unified economy, and the most useful way in which we can try to understand its evolution is to recognize that it was a backward country with poor resources dependent on external markets and external suppliers' ('The Decline of Spain', 4).

¹⁶ According to Elliott, Spain's international power was related to the success of the central authority ability 'to overcome the unprecedented problems of time and space to the extent of preventing the centrifugal forces inherent in a worldwide empire from triumphing over the forces of control emanating from Madrid'. See JOHN H. ELLIOTT, *Spain and its World, 1500-1700: Selected Essays* (London, 1989), 14.

¹⁷ GOFFMANN, *Izmir*.

The Ottoman state, at least in the beginning, was reluctant to let this small town transform itself into an international entrepôt. That was probably one of the reasons why Izmir remained an obscure town in spite of its well-protected gulf connected by rivers to a rich hinterland and why it prospered during the seventeenth century when the Ottoman government was weak.

On the other hand, the Spanish Crown played an active role in the emergence of Seville as an outstanding port city by endowing it with the monopoly of the Atlantic trade. Seville emerged as the premiere port with the construction of the *Casa de la Contratación de las Indias* – House of Trade of the Indies – authorised by royal sanction in 1503¹⁸ and in spite of navigational problems¹⁹ it managed to become the most important port in Spain thanks to the efforts of the Spanish state.

At first glance, one can infer that this disparity in the historical evolution of the two cities indicates that different principles of political economy were guiding these empires. The Spanish state, acting on the basis of mercantilist premises, sought to control foreign trade in order to further its economic interests, whereas the Ottoman state was anti-mercantilist in the sense that it was against, or at best indifferent to, the commercial opportunities that would be provided by an international port. The scholarship on Ottoman economic history and the history of economic thought seems to corroborate such an impression. However, based on the recent research and looking through a comparative lense, I argue that the guiding principles lying beneath these seemingly different policies were much closer than what has, hitherto, been thought.

Mercantilism versus Provisionism: A Genuine Dichotomy?

The explanation as to why Ottoman state might have been indifferent to the commercial benefits of international trade has already been provided by various scholars. Genç defined ‘provisionism’ as one of the guiding principles of the Empire’s political economy. Provisionism, defined as the ‘the maintenance of a steady supply so that all goods and services in the

¹⁸ Until 1720, Seville was officially the single port through which all colonial trade was channelled. La *Casa de Contratación* was a maritime institution located in Seville, which licensed and administered all colonial trade, shipping and navigation. Its administrative counterpart was the Council of the Indies.

¹⁹ Seville lies on the left (east) bank of the Guadalquivir River at a point about eighty-seven kilometres north of the Atlantic and this presented some navigational problems. Izmir lies at the head of the sheltered Gulf of Izmir on the deeply indented coast of the Aegean Sea. The city stands on the small delta plain of the Kizilçullu (ancient Meles) River around the eastern end of the gulf.

country were cheap, plentiful and of good quality', was one of the priorities of the Ottoman state which gave shape to the distinctive nature of Ottoman attitudes towards international trade: '[W]ith the aim of providing [for the] needs of [the] internal market, the Ottomans pursued a foreign trade policy that was liberal towards imports while there was strict control of exports'²⁰.

The priority that the Ottoman state attributed to the needs of the internal market has understandably been considered as one of the reasons why the Ottoman state strove to prevent Izmir's growth: Izmir's emergence as an important international trading centre might have implied the disruption of the provisioning network in the eyes of Ottoman ruling elite. Goffman pointed to the decrees enacted by the Sublime Porte to keep Izmir in the provisioning network, in support of the argument that the city emerged as an international trading centre in spite of the central authorities' efforts to prevent it. According to him, concerns about the provisioning network were so strong that the state did not even welcome the bullion that such an entrepôt might bring²¹. For these reasons, it was only within the specific context of the seventeenth century that the Ottoman state got weaker and foreign powers could incorporate Izmir into a commercial network with the help of local powers (*ayans*) who enabled foreign merchants to reach Izmir's hinterland, and thus avoid the state's attempts to curtail this trade²².

On the other hand, monopolizing the overseas trade with the Americas and thus acquiring the riches accruing from this trade was the most essential motive in the Spanish Crown's designation of Seville as, what may be called, the Empire's financial and commercial capital. Unlike Izmir, whose growth is thought to have happened at the expense of Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Seville rose to prominence in conjugation with the creation of Madrid as the bureaucratic capital of the Spanish Empire.

From what I have set out so far, one could argue that the provisionism

²⁰ MEHMED GENÇ, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul, 2000), 69. See also his 'Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century: General Framework, Characteristics and Main Trends', in DONALD QUATAERT (ed.), *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1914* (Albany, 1994). Genç defines provisionism as 'the maintenance of a steady supply so that all goods and services in the country were cheap, plentiful and of good quality', *Ottoman Industry*, 1-2. According to Genç, the Ottoman state was unique with respect to the widespread and continuous application of provisionism in the regulation of economic relations among contemporary states, *Ottoman Industry*, 9.

²¹ As Goffman puts it 'the government neither encouraged commerce in Izmir nor welcomed the bullion that such an entrepôt might bring'. See Goffman's chapter on Izmir in *The Ottoman city between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul*, edited by EDHEM ELDEM, DANIEL GOFFMAN and BRUCE MASTERS (New York, 1999), 86.

²² GOFFMAN, *Izmir*, 90.

versus mercantilism dichotomy accounts for differences in the historical evolutions of these two cities. However, a closer look suggests a different picture. Even though the Ottoman state did not initiate the emergence of the city as an international entrepôt and tried to prevent its growth in the earlier stages, it did readjust its position in a very short time and tried to benefit from the city's commercial capacity to the fullest extent. As Frangakis-Syrett has pointed out, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman state contributed to the growth of Izmir by adopting 'a policy the aim of which was to make Smyrna the only port in Western Anatolia to trade with the international market'²³. What might have been the reasons behind this policy? Were the provisioning concerns not as important as we have thought?

First of all, the Ottoman state's concerns regarding the needs of the internal market were quite selective. It was the provision of basic consumer goods such as grains and fruits, scarcity of which might cause political disturbances in the capital that the Ottoman central government was first and foremost interested in²⁴. The selective nature of the provisioning concerns allowed the Ottoman central authorities not only to tolerate international trade but also to desire it. In some ways, Izmir's emergence as an international trade centre contributed to the needs of the internal market by attracting foreign merchants who brought with them certain luxury goods and raw materials that were previously not available within the Empire.

Second, a larger volume of trade came to mean higher revenues for the central treasury through an increase in the income and thereby the prices of the tax-farms over custom duties. In addition to this, with the arrival of foreign merchants who were willing to enter into tax farming, the demand for the sources that the state farmed out increased. Thus, a growing port city created new sources for the central treasury in various ways and this was probably the most important reason why the Sublime Porte encouraged the city's growth in spite of some restrictions that it retained over the city's economic and social life.

Izmir's significance for the Ottoman state, in this sense, was not very different from the significance of Seville to the Spanish crown. The monopoly on the Atlantic trade was, first and foremost, designed to control

²³ ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century: 1700-1820* (Athens, 1992), 26.

²⁴ This concern for provisions for the capital continued during the eighteenth century when new production and consumption patterns reshaped the priorities of the central government's policy. When coffee and tobacco turned into important consumption goods in the Empire, they were included in the imperial edicts that aimed to limit exports from Izmir. *Basbakanlik Osmanli Arxivleri (BOA), Cevdet Belediye* 3896, 1799; BOA, *Cevdet Iktisat* 1865, 1813; BOA, *Cevdet Iktisat* 525, 1763.

the bullion coming from the Americas. The main function of American bullion was to enable the Spanish state to borrow from the Fuggers and Genoese in order to permit the pursuit of its military policies. Furthermore, import and export duties (*almojarifazgos*) were the most important sources of revenue for the state²⁵. In both the Ottoman and Spanish cases, despite some drawbacks²⁶ both cities came to mean new fiscal resources for the central treasury.

Fiscal concerns clearly played an important role in the central authorities' attitudes towards international trade in general, and towards the growth of these cities, in particular. Besides this common characteristic, what united these two cities with seemingly opposite historical trajectories was their cosmopolitan nature and role of foreigners in their economic and social lives. After the opening of trade with the New World, Seville came to be known as 'the mother of foreigners'²⁷. The city attracted merchants and adventurers of all kind from the rest of Europe, especially from northern Spain and Italy. Likewise, Izmir attracted merchants from all over Europe. The social and architectural fabric of both cities was shaped by the increasing presence of foreigners²⁸. Although neither Izmir nor Seville was insulated from religious or racial strife²⁹, they were strikingly cosmopolitan cities, allowing the coexistence of various religions, races and ethnicities. What is striking is that in neither of these cities was the role of foreigners regulated so that the natives would make profits. This similarity in terms of tolerance towards foreigners' economic activities existed despite obvious institutional and cultural differences in the general socio-economic setting of these empires.

The political cultures in the Ottoman and Spanish Empires were different in terms of cultural and institutional orientation towards religious diversity. The Ottoman state tolerated religious minorities and made no attempt to change the religion and culture of subject populations. In contrast to the Ottoman state, the Spanish state tried to impose religious uni-

²⁵ Like in the Ottoman Empire, the urgent need for new fiscal sources compelled the Crown to farm out its revenues, 'In exchange for the periodic payment of lump sums, the Crown leased the right to collect import duties in the port of Seville'. ELIZABETH PERRY, *Crime and Society in Early Modern Seville*, The Library of Iberian Resources Online, <<http://libro.uca.edu/perry/seville.htm>, 9>.

²⁶ Smuggling and the contraband trade was present in these cities more than anywhere else.

²⁷ PERRY, *Crime and Society*, 1.

²⁸ In Izmir, the city's cosmopolitan atmosphere was best reflected in the district of the city called the 'Street of Franks'.

²⁹ The obsession with the cult of *limpieza de sangre* was more acute than anywhere else in Seville in sixteenth century Spain. See RUTH PIKE, *Enterprise and Adventure; the Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the New World* (Ithaca, New York, 1966).

ty over its territories. The gigantic machinery of the Inquisition and the expulsion of the Jews contributed to the image of the Spanish state as one of the least tolerant in Europe. The Ottomans, on the other hand, neither had recourse to the mechanism of expulsion nor did they try to impose religious or cultural uniformity. The *Millet* system regulated the community life of the non-Muslim religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire in a way that allowed them considerable administrative, fiscal, and legal autonomy under their own ecclesiastical and lay leaders³⁰. The ideology embedded in the *Millet* system was also evident in the system of capitulations which 'granted foreigners considerable latitude in legal and religious matters in Izmir and elsewhere in the empire'³¹. In the Spanish case, there was a legal-institutional framework in which state officials were able to levy fines on, and confiscate the properties of, merchants who acted as intermediaries for the enemy³². Nevertheless, foreign merchants were actively engaged in trade and finance in Seville due to the guarantees of protection granted to foreign merchants in international agreements. Neither the Inquisition nor the Spanish Crown's racial and religious policies had any substantial impact on the activities of foreign merchants within this institutional framework³³.

In both cases, the central authorities granted concessions to foreign merchant communities which enabled them to engage in business with relative ease on imperial territory. The motives behind granting these

³⁰ For a brief description of the Millet system which regulated the community life of the non-Muslim religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire, see AVIGDOR LEVY, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, 1994), 42-70.

³¹ See GOFFMAN, *Ottoman City*, 93. Similar to the *millets* (communities formed by Ottoman subjects of same religious confessions), Ottoman state created *musta'min* communities (foreigners who received certain privileges through *ahdnames*) enabling a group of foreign merchants who 'would choose for themselves a representative to act for them in dealings with the authorities as an officially recognized group'. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 'Imtiyazat'.

³² Regarding the judicial structure for commercial cases which enabled the Spanish state to control the activities of foreign merchants with direct legal interference, see JONATHAN ISRAEL, *Empires and Entrepreneurs: the Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1713* (London, 1990), 18. In 1624, the Admiralty Court of Commerce (*Almirantazgo de Comercio*) was set up in Seville and aimed at using embargoes against the Dutch in order to curtail their political power. It had the right to seize ships and cargoes violating embargo decrees.

³³ As Croft has pointed out, even at times when Anglo-Spanish relations were quite fragile, the Inquisition and the Spanish Crown did not try to harass English trading communities in the peninsula: 'Reconciled to their existence, acknowledging the broad guarantees of protection agreed on in 1604, secular and religious authorities evinced little concern over the private opinions of English seamen and merchants.' See PAULINE CROFT, 'Englishmen and the Spanish Inquisition: 1558-1625', *The English Historical Review*, vol. 87, no. 343 (1972), 268.

concessions were similar: both the Ottoman and the Spanish state used the reallocation of mercantile privileges as a political weapon³⁴. In addition, these concessions were granted for reasons that we have mentioned above. The urgent fiscal needs of the state and the demand for some goods that foreign merchants could supply made foreign trade acceptable and desirable in spite of some problems associated with it. At times other considerations, such as the encouragement of domestic employment, were influential in determining the sort of treatment given to foreign merchants by the authorities³⁵. All in all, the state seems to have benefited from foreign trade in a variety of ways. But the question remains unanswered: Why did neither the Ottoman nor the Spanish state seek to regulate the trade so that natives would make profits? Was there a trade-off between political/fiscal objectives and the foreign presence in the commercial networks on the one hand and the wealth of the country's residents on the other?

Benefits of Trade: A Question of Division of Labour

Like other non-European historians, Ottoman historians have traditionally argued that it was the profit motive which brought about the expansion of European trade in areas where non-European participants tended to play a passive role. Recently, this Eurocentric view has been challenged by various historians of Asian economic development³⁶. Likewise, some scholars of Ottoman history have refuted the idea that foreign powers imposed a commercial network on domestic agents. Izmir, as the centre of the Levantine commercial network, has been the focus of one of these revisionist works. Frangakis-Syrett has pointed out the significant role

³⁴ For instance, when Spain was at war with the Dutch, it was 'the Flemish and Hanseatic merchant colonies of Andalusia and their partners and associates in the Spanish Netherlands and in Germany who were given the monopoly over all trade between Andalusia and northern Europe and they thrived at the expense of the Dutch', ISRAEL, *Empires and Entrepôts*, 218. Another instance is the increasing prosperity of English commerce with Spain until 1647 when embargoes against the Dutch were lifted.

³⁵ For instance, see BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye* 4653, 1791, a petition to request permission for a French merchant to travel in Anatolia on the basis of his service to the economy by way of employing six hundred Ottoman subjects in his cotton factory.

³⁶ John E. Wills in his review article, discusses the transformation of the 'history of European expansion' to what he calls 'interactive history of maritime Asia' over the past few decades with the contributions of the studies which revealed the role of Asian participants – navigators, merchants, pirates, investors, and merchant-princes – in the emergence of European domination. See WILLS, 'Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domination', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 98, no. 1 (1993), 83-105.

played by both Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects in the development of the financial and commercial network³⁷.

Frangakis-Syrett's work has shown that by pursuing their own interests, local agents did, in fact, contribute to the functioning of the commercial network. Most of the time, conflict in the city was not between foreigners and local inhabitants. In fact, it was the other way around. A group of foreigners cooperating with a group of local inhabitants confronted another group of foreigners cooperating with another group of locals. While Europeans played the *ayans* off against each other, *ayans* also benefited from the rivalry among different European groups. Intense competition among foreign merchants (inter- and intra-national conflict) also improved the negotiating power of the local inhabitants³⁸.

A similar socio-economic pattern in which cooperation and conflict cut across the native-foreign divide was also discernible in Seville. Local nobles and merchants took advantage of large scale foreign commerce in various ways. Magnates who had their own vessels engaged in American trade directly³⁹. Although most of the mariners were foreigners and the goods they carried came from Northern Europe, local actors reaped a good share of the total profits through selling their monopoly right over commerce. As the foreigners dominated the export-side of the international trade more and more, Spaniards switched to being middlemen and captured the revenues accruing to that position⁴⁰.

The important point is that the division of labour was cutting across national, religious and ethnic lines. This did not preclude conflict, but it demonstrates that conflict was not defined at the national level. The competition of various interests at a cross-national level helps us understand why neither the Ottoman state nor the Spanish state tried to regulate trade so that natives could make profits.

The extensive role of foreigners in both port cities in spite of intense efforts to control international trade routes⁴¹ indicates that there was no no-

³⁷ FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*.

³⁸ GOFFMAN, *Izmir*, 98.

³⁹ PIKE, *Enterprise and Adventure*, 447.

⁴⁰ Despite the importance of foreign merchants, 'Spaniards had not been driven from the wool trade and even when they were not independent exporters they continued to be the principal intermediaries between flock owners in the interior and exporters.' See 794 in CARLA RAHN-PHILIPS, 'The Spanish Wool Trade: 1500-1780', *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 42, no. 4 (1982), 775-795. Merchants formed 'guilds, regulating trade, settling legal disputes, claiming social privileges, and doing everything in their power to protect the interest of their power'. LADISLAS REITZER, 'Some Observations on Castilian Commerce and Finance in the Sixteenth Century', *Journal of Modern History*, 32 (1960), 213-223.

⁴¹ Both Spanish and Ottoman state were well aware of the benefits of commerce. Spanish rulers aspired to create a Dutch-style joint-stock company to be modelled on the Dutch East and West India companies. The *Almirantazgo*, in the beginning, was de-

tion of economic interests that might be viewed as superior to the various conflicting interests among the subjects of the Empire. The lack of a national consciousness with respect to economic interests was not peculiar to the political culture of these empires – Asian or European; neither was it related to a type of loyalty and identity that we might associate with imperial cultures in general. It was simply that, 'in a period before the voracious demands for loyalty of the nation-state were in effect'⁴², the foreign presence in the economy was not considered as a menace to national well-being.

The Costs of Trade: A Question of Economic Development

Although at the synchronic level international trade meant a cost for only certain interest groups rather than a cost to the national economy; from a diachronic standpoint it caused harm to what we may call the 'development base' of the country, a cost that resulted from the long-term and unanticipated consequences of the international division of labour.

In the Spanish Empire, international trade and the international division of labour which accompanied it had a negative impact on some sectors. The growth of the Atlantic economy which gave impetus to Seville's growth affected other cities in Castile in a different manner. The city of Ciudad Real, for example, which had been the centre of a local subsistence network with a high number of wage labourers, turned into an importing city after the imports of cheap Portuguese cloth undermined local textile manufacturing⁴³. In a similar manner, Toledo, which was part of an urban network which had Valencia, Murcia and Granada as its peripheries, lost its competitive edge in the export industry after the opening of the trade with the New World.

These negative impacts of the deepening international division of labour on various sectors in particular and on the industrial base of the country in general were acknowledged by many contemporary Spaniards. Seven-

signed for this purpose, but failed to fulfil this promise. On the Ottoman side, it has been convincingly argued that the Ottoman political class, like its European counterpart, was well aware of the economic advantages of the trade and the threat posed to it by rivals. Brummett points to the 'economic intentionality' of the Ottoman state and the Ottoman notable classes in their involvement in the naval warfare. Nevertheless, in both cases the aim to control international trade routes did not overlap with the objective to limit the activity of foreign merchants. See PALMIRA BRUMMETT, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany, 1994).

⁴² MICHAEL N. PEARSON, 'Merchants and States', in *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires* edited by JAMES D. TRACY (New York, 1991), 53.

⁴³ The city of Ciudad Real and the surrounding rural area were highly interdependent and the city produced many industrial goods for its own needs. See RAHN-PHILIPS, *Spanish Wool Trade*.

teenth century political economists, the so-called *arbitristas*, were strongly protectionist and critical of the presence of foreigners in the economy⁴⁴. These writers proposed the use of various protective measures to save the domestic economy from the negative influences of international trade. However, their advice were never taken seriously. Was it the clash of different interest groups that determined the final shape of foreign and trade policy or was it that the state had no means of exerting power in this realm due to the limitations imposed by international agreements? The answer to this question will require further research; nevertheless, what concerns us here is the fact that there was no consensus on what the national policy ought to be, although for some sectors of society the disastrous affects of international trade and the state's aversion to protectionism were obvious.

The trend towards dependence was discernible in Izmir only in the latter stage of the city's growth. In the earlier phase, Ottoman trade with Europe did not undermine domestic production or upset local interest groups in any meaningful way. In the eighteenth century, '[the] exports of Smyrna were almost exclusively goods requiring no manufacturing and special treatment' and 'the wool purchased from the Levant was used to make cloth that in turn was sold at profit back to the Levant'⁴⁵. International trade undermined the self-sufficiency of the domestic economy in the Ottoman case much later than it did in the Spanish Empire and it was only then that some writers of political economy in the Empire defended protectionism⁴⁶. However, again for various reasons, protectionism was not embraced as a national policy even after this acknowledgement. The fact that, as in Seville, local merchants and land-owners took part in the domestic part of international trade where they reaped profits from commerce primarily by participating as intermediaries between domestic producers and international agents, was one of the most important reasons why there was no collective concern about the negative impact of a deepening division of labour.

Conclusion

On the basis of our discussion, it is difficult to maintain that the Ottoman state or the Spanish state could not follow the path of North-West-

⁴⁴ For the views of the *arbitristas* on economic policy see MARJORIE GRICE-HUTCHINSON, *Early Economic Thought in Spain, 1177-1740* (London, 1978).

⁴⁵ FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 215.

⁴⁶ Emmanuel states that '[as] the integration of the world economy increases and becomes complete, awareness of the existence of structural connections and of mechanisms of the transfer of wealth also progresses'. See ARGHIRI EMMANUEL, *Unequal Exchange. A Study of the Imperialism of Trade* (New York, 1972), 263.

ern Europe because they did not act on mercantilist premises. At the synchronic level, the benefits of trade accrued to various parties on a cross-national basis and it was not a specific type of economic mentality that determined the roles taken up by the participants in the division of labour. The division of labour provided mutual benefits for various parties; yet it was the nature of the same division of labour that created 'uneven long-term effects for participating economies'⁴⁷. In other words; at the diachronic level, the division of labour created some costs that were not immediately evident at the synchronic level. The changing division of labour which initially favoured various parties created a path towards dependency through unequal exchange and it was only later that this dependency was perceived as a 'national' problem. The attitude of the states towards their port cities shows us that the gap between the synchronic and diachronic levels of the impact of international trade meant that neither the Ottoman state nor the Spanish state viewed the international division of labour as an issue of national well-being.

⁴⁷ I borrow this term from FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*. By this term, I refer to the notion of 'unequal development'. This notion, contrary to the argument of comparative advantage, maintains that free trade of goods can induce transfer of wealth between countries. Arghiri Emmanuel who popularized the concept as an elementary transfer mechanism which 'enables the advanced countries to begin and regularly to give new impetus that unevenness of development that sets in motion all the other mechanisms of exploitation and fully explains the way that wealth is distributed', *Unequal Exchange*, 265. The Singer-Prebisch thesis which maintains that the terms of trade between primary goods and manufactured goods tend to deteriorate over time justifies protection in order to break free from this process of 'unequal development'. Similar theories 'accepted the possibility that custom duties may affect the foreign partner in trade through a movement of the terms of trade, especially connected with the elasticity of the demand for the product that is subject to the tariff'. See again *Unequal Exchange*, 265.

Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis

Northern Europe and the Mediterranean System in the 'Long XVIIth century'

The actual historiography is revaluating the oceans and the lands around them: the Atlantic, the Pacific area, etc.¹.

The Mediterranean sea, also called the 'Inland Sea', can be considered as an accessory of the Atlantic Ocean. There is a revaluation of the Mediterranean area going on at present, above all in the period which can be called the 'Long Seventeenth Century', going from about the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the eighteenth².

It is my aim to stress this actual trend and prove that in the 'Long Seventeenth Century' the commercial conquest of the Mediterranean area was a necessary step for the Northern European Powers, above all for England, then Britain from the beginning of the eighteenth century, to form from the 1760s onwards the commercial network around the globe, which was the basis of the British Empire and the Industrial Revolution.

The most relevant characteristic of the Medieval and Early Modern Europe was her bipolarism; that is Europe had two centres of economic growth: the North and the South, the North Sea and the Mediterranean.

These two worlds were different and complementary at the same time; they were linked by sea by the Genoese at the end of the XIII century and by the Venetians at the beginning of the XIV century³.

Until about 1600 the Mediterranean area dominated the Northern Euro-

¹ For example for the Atlantic see JACK P. GREENE, "Beyond Power: Paradigm Subversion and Reformulation and the Re-creation of the Early Atlantic World", in *Interpreting Early America: Historiographical Essays* (Charlottesville, 1996), 40; CAROLE SHAMMAS, *Introduction*, in ELIZABETH MANCKE and CAROLE SHAMMAS (eds.), *The Creation of the British Atlantic World* (Baltimore and London, 2004), 1-16.

² For example see LINDA COLLEY, *Captives. Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850* (London, 2002) and *The Ordeal of Elisabeth Marsh. A Woman in World History* (London, 2007). The classical study of the Mediterranean is: FERNAND BRAUDEL, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1949; 1966).

³ FERNAND BRAUDEL, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme. XV^e-XVIII^e siècles. Les temps du monde* (Paris, 1979), vol. III, 78-79.

pean one with his men and boats, which were usually different following the cargoes they transported: the Venetian and Florentine *galere*, smaller, expensive, but more secure, had on board spices and luxury goods; the Genoese *cocche*, and later the *caravelle*, carried the southern raw materials used above all in manufacturing the northern textiles⁴. A large variety of goods was landed by the Mediterranean ships during their voyages towards North Europe, which contrasted with the simplicity of their cargoes back. This characteristic was kept also by the northern ships until about 1660, when their goods out were integrated by the re-exportation of others coming from the New World and Asia⁵. From the qualities of the cargoes it can be assumed the advanced technology of the southern area, while Northern Europe shows a growing culture and richness⁶.

The merchants, the financiers, the boats, the goods, etc., were Mediterranean, coming prevalently from the north and the centre of the Italian peninsula. After the turn of the seventeenth century the balance changed and slowly became favourable to the powers lying around the North Sea, in particular England.

Between 1590 and 1593, years during which the whole Mediterranean area suffered a serious grain shortage, almost 600 Northern European ships landed cargoes of cereals only in ports of the Italian peninsula, such as Genoa, Leghorn and Venice. These arrivals at the end of the XVI century, managed mostly by Ferdinand I Medici, Great Duke of Tuscany as well as merchant and middleman, emphasized the entrance of the Northern Powers in the Mediterranean, especially of the Dutch⁷.

The English seemed to have a minor rôle in this event, though they controlled the Channel and all the sea routes from the North Sea to the 'Inland Sea'. Their main aim had always been to reach the oriental shores of the Mediterranean, in order to break the Italian Sea Republics monopoly, above all that of Genoa and Venice, importing and distributing spices and luxury goods, as well as industrial raw materials, and to get the large profits deriving from these trades. From the beginning of XV century there is evidence that English ships ploughed the Mediterranean waters⁸.

⁴ See GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, "Galere e fondachi in Europa e fuori d'Europa", in *Storia d'Italia. L'Italia come modello*, a cura di RUGGIERO ROMANO (Milano, 1989), V, 1-24; MORTIMER EPSTEIN, *The Early History of the Levant Company* (New York, 1908; 1968).

⁵ See BRIAN DIETZ, "Overseas trade and metropolitan growth", in A.L. BEIER, ROGER FINLAY (eds.), *The making of the metropolis. London, 1500-1700* (London-New York, 1986), 115-140.

⁶ See ALWYN A. RUDDOCK, *Italian Merchants and Shipping in Southampton, 1270-1600* (Southampton, 1951).

⁷ See GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, "Economia e cultura tra Mediterraneo e Mare del Nord", in GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, *Verso i mari del Nord. Mediterraneo ed Europa settentrionale in età moderna* (Roma, 2005), 3-29.

⁸ In 1412 Drew Barentyn, William Waldern and Walter Cotton sent ships with clothes

Braudel writes that from 1511 and 1534 the English had a very favourable period in the Mediterranean, in fact their ships, leaving mainly from London, Bristol and Southampton (such as: the *Cristopher Campion*, the *Mary George*, the *Mary Grace*, the *Trinity*, the *Matthew*) landed regularly in Sicily, Chios, Crete and sometimes in Cyprus, Beyrut and Tripoli in Syria. These vessels on their voyage out had a cargo of woollen clothes, above all kerseys, which the merchants exchanged with pepper, spices, raw and thrown silk, silken and camel hair cloths, malmsey, sweet wines, olive oil, raw cotton, carpets, etc. The last English ship, the *Aucher*, is remembered to reach the 'Inland Sea' by Hakluyt in 1550.

Afterwards there was an interruption, probably due to the growing importance of Antwerp, to the competition by the Mediterranean ships and by the land routes, which did not make the voyages towards south profitable, besides there were various home problems⁹.

Braudel and Romano asserted that the English ships re-entered definitively the Mediterranean after the 23rd of June 1573, when the *Swallow*, John Scott master, landed in the new Tuscan port of Leghorn from Southampton and London, with a cargo of woollen cloths, among which there were some kerseys, raw wool, tin and bells¹⁰.

The Mediterranean of William Shakespeare was not so different from that of Geoffrey Chaucer, who lived about two hundred years before. In both there was the western, the eastern and the central part of that area¹¹.

In the second half of the XVI century the Levant had grown in importance as a source of spices and luxury goods and a collecting point of Far

and wool from England. In the following year Brown, Sutton and other seven London merchants forwarded other cargoes of raw wool of the value of £ 24,000, probably in order to buy some pepper. Again in 1446 and 1457 Robert Sturmy from Bristol sent some of his ships into the Mediterranean, which were lost either for atmospheric events or because they were stopped by the Genoese. In 1466 Richard Bushbury, John Ward, John and Richard Walzer, all London merchants, got a licence to send from Southampton directly on the Mediterranean markets 400 "broadcloths" every year. Perhaps for the same reason Richard Walzer received by sea from the English capital town to Southampton woollen clothes and together with John Ward sent on the London market 80 sterling of sugar and raisins. RUDDOCK, *Italian Merchants and Shipping in Southampton*, 58-59; ELIZABETH M. CARUS-WILSON (ed.), *The Overseas Trade of Bristol in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1937; 1967), 83-86 and 101-102; PAMELA NIGHTINGALE, *A Medieval Mercantile Community. The Grocers' Company & the Politics & Trade of London 1000-1484* (New Haven-London, 1995), 382, 507-508, 532.

⁹ BRAUDEL, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen*, 554-562. See also *The voyage of Master Roger Bodenham with the great bark "Aucher" to Candia and Chios, in the year 1550. (Written by himself)*, in RICHARD DAVID (ed.), *Hakluyt's Voyages* (London, 1981), 122-125.

¹⁰ FERNAND BRAUDEL, RUGGIERO ROMANO, *Navires et Merchandises à l'entrée du Port de Livourne (1547-1611)* (Paris, 1951), 49.

¹¹ DAVID DAICHES, JOHN FLOWER, *Literary Landscapes of the British Isles. A Narrative Atlas* (New York, 1979).

Eastern goods, and in fact the 'Levant Company' got a charter from Queen Elisabeth in 1581 and part of its members formed also the 'East India Company', founded in 1600¹².

The central part of the Mediterranean area was occupied by the Italian peninsula, which was important not only for its position but also because it was the principal place visited during the *Grand Tour*, in fact there travelers could see examples of the Roman and the Renaissance culture and their artifacts, it was there popular authors like Baldassarre Castiglione, whose *Cortegiano* had been translated in 1561 by Sir Thomas Hoby, and Niccolò Machiavelli were born; it was also the main reference point for the people following the Catholic religion and for the Holy Roman Empire.

Shakespeare had a little geographical knowledge, but all the people to whom he addressed his plays, and who were made up of all the London social classes had an idea of the southern area, though they had never been there and probably will never see it. They knew that the Mediterranean was far from where they lived, that it was the principal source of the luxury goods they desired, the place where technical innovations were devised, and the birthplace of that culture to which the ruling and richest classes of their country more and more referred to.

The Mediterranean and the Italian peninsula were very important to Shakespeare; who used them as settings to give to his plays an exotic flavour and to criticize freely both England and the southern world, of which he was diffident and by which he was at the same time attracted, just as his contemporaries were. In fact in 1559 William Cecil, Elizabeth I's Secretary of State, told his fellow-countrymen to beware of the Italians, who were everywhere and could quickly and easily move large capitals for sovereigns with great profits for themselves. They could get what they wanted thanks to their perfumed gloves, their rich presents and their money. Cecil envied, as his contemporaries did, the Southerners, whom he knew well and who had great qualities: they were very elegant, well mannered, rich and generous and ready also to corrupt people; they could adjust themselves easily to any situations and were persistent in obtaining what they wanted¹³.

The English people felt that the Mediterranean was his own at the end of the XVI and at the start of the XVII centuries, as Shakespeare himself testifies; the same situation can be found in England at the beginning of the following hundred years. In fact in 1729 as George II Hannover processed through London to open Parliament, the crowd roared: '*Long live the King*

¹² See ALFRED C. WOOD, *A history of the Levant Company* (London, 1935; 1964).

¹³ *Considerations delivered to Parliament (1559)*, in *Tudor Economic Documents*, edited by RICHARD H. TAWNEY and EILEEN E. POWER (London, 1924), vol. I, 327.

and let Gibraltar and Minorca stay English for ever¹⁴. For the great majority the Mediterranean was an area of great commercial and strategic activity; those two Mediterranean places were important above all as military bases, as they were surrounded by territories which were so narrow that they could not be considered sufficient for English colonists and they were not thought commercially attractive. It has been measured that in the middle of the eighteenth century there were more soldiers in Gibraltar and Port Mahon than in the whole North America. In fact both the Iberian promontory and the Mediterranean island had been preceded and followed by other naval bases, such as Tanger, Malta, the Ionian Islands and by the English commercial presence at Cadix, Leghorn and Messina. For most of the British the Mediterranean was an area of great strategic and commercial activity, which was essential for the imperial claims of their country and for the improvements of their profits, in fact in 1756 Admiral Byng was executed for his short surrender of Minorca to the French¹⁵.

For these reasons it is not wrong to talk for the "Long Seventeenth Century" and of a "Mediterranean British Empire"¹⁶. That southern area was also commercially very important for the whole North Sea, which Fernand Braudel called *that small Mediterranean surrounded by the low and sandy lands of Northern Europe*¹⁷, because it was a large market for the northern woollen manufactures usually transported by sea, the "new draperies"¹⁸, the ballast of the ships, such as the cured fish or the raisins, and the re-exported goods, that were not consumed at home and were sold elsewhere, especially in the south.

This can be seen also by the laws which were passed since the half of the XVII century, such as the "Navigation Acts"¹⁹, which tended to exclude the English islands from the Dutch competition in the carrying trade, and by the passage from the system of the *defensible ships* to that of the *protected areas*²⁰.

¹⁴ COLLEY, *Captives*, 70.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ See RICHARD T. RAPP, "The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution", *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. XXXV, n. 3, September 1975, 499-525.

¹⁷ FERNAND BRAUDEL, *L'Italia fuori d'Italia. Due secoli e tre Italie*, in RUGGIERO ROMANO (editor), *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 2: *Dalla caduta dell'Impero romano al secolo XVIII* (Torino, 1974), 2089-2248 (2138).

¹⁸ See ERIC KERRIDGE, *Textile Manufactures in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 1985).

¹⁹ See LAWRENCE A. HARPER, *The English Navigation Laws - A Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Social Engineering* (New York, 1939).

²⁰ See GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, *Mercanti Inglesi nell'Italia del Seicento. Navi, traffici, egemonie* (Venezia, 1990), 51-91; GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, *English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy* (Cambridge, 1995), 36-75; SARI HORNSTEIN, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688* (Aldershot (England) and Brookfield (USA), 1991).

Furthermore the Mediterranean for its geographical form was a perfect *buyer's market*²¹ for olive oil²², silk²³, raisins²⁴, etc., the growing sale of which in Northern Europe is a sign of the expansion of manufactures and incomes.

In this period in Northern Europe, as also in England, it grew a middling sort of people, who desired imported luxuries, but they could not pay for them. For this reason it was necessary to diminish their prices, producing them at home; giving birth to new manufactures was a way to tackle also social peace, which was one of the greatest problems the governments of the pre-industrial period had²⁵.

After 1600, and above all after 1660, the value of English commerce in the Mediterranean started to change and began to have a favourable trend both thanks to the re-exportations and to the new born manufactures at home. The Northern system in the Mediterranean was working and this was confirmed by the long crisis of Leghorn, which was the strategic centre of the Northern Powers in the southern area²⁶.

The Mediterranean became a *semiperipheric* area²⁷. The Tuscan free port was left by the international commerce²⁸ which slowly was transferred on the Atlantic and on the Asian seas, while the centre for the XVIII and the XIX century stayed around the Northern Sea, and principally in Britain, to become the basis of the British Empire and the Industrial Revolution.

²¹ MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, "Il commercio dei porti pugliesi nel Settecento. Ipotesi di ricerca", in *Economia e classi sociali nella Puglia moderna*, a cura di PASQUALE VILLANI (Napoli, 1974), 187-220; MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, "Commercio e mercato in Terra d'Otranto nella seconda metà del XVIII secolo", *Quaderni Storici*, n. 28, anno X, aprile 1975, 151-198.

²² GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, *Mercanti inglesi*, 163-174 (*English Merchants*, 143-152).

²³ *Ivi*, 152-161 (133-141).

²⁴ GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, "English Imports of Raisins from the Mediterranean in the XVII Century", in *Atti del 6th International Panionian Congress, Zakynthos (Greece) 23-27 September 1997* (Athens, 2001), II, 111-132; GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, "Importazioni inglesi di uva passa Mediterraneo nel XVII secolo", in *Rapporti diplomatici e scambi commerciali nel Mediterraneo moderno*, a cura di MIRELLA MAFRICI (Soveria Manneli, 2004), 351-378.

²⁵ See JOAN THIRSK, *Economic Policy and Projects. The Development of a Consumer Society in Early Modern England* (Oxford, 1978).

²⁶ See, among the other works, CARLO MANGIO, "Commercio marittimo e Reggenza Lorenese in Toscana. Provvedimenti legislativi e dibattiti", *Rivista Storica Italiana*, anno XC, 1978, fasc. IV, 898-938, and "Livorno nel Granducato: un'identità inconfondibile e mutevole", *Rassegna Storica Toscana*, anno XLVIII, n. 1, gennaio-giugno 2002, 7-39; DANIELE BAGGIANI, "Tra crisi commerciali e interventi istituzionali. Le vicende del porto di Livorno in età tardo medicea (1714-1730)", *Rivista Storica Italiana*, anno CIV, fasc. III, dicembre 1992.

²⁷ See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *The Modern World-System* (New York-San Francisco-London, 1974-1989), 3 vols.

²⁸ See GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, "Porti italiani e traffici mediterranei nel Seicento", in *La popolazione italiana nel Seicento* (Bologna, 1999), 357-385.

Ivan Grech

Percezioni di isolamento nel Mediterraneo.
Malta nel '600: canali di comunicazione
e circolazione di notizie

Le isole hanno da sempre attirato l'interesse della storiografia marittima a prescindere dalla loro dimensione, posizione geografica o rilevanza storica. Il loro ruolo, la loro condizione, la loro importanza per il flusso delle merci e la diffusione delle culture e, soprattutto, il loro presunto isolamento esercitano tuttora un fascino particolare sugli studiosi delle scienze sociali. Per Braudel il mare che le circonda unisce e divide allo stesso tempo, mentre viceversa alcune zone montagnose sono addirittura più isolate di certe isole nel Mediterraneo¹. Horden e Purcell bacchettano senza tanti mezzi termini quelli che le considerano dei mondi isolati e dimenticati². Per Matvejević sono dei 'luoghi particolari' le cui caratteristiche sono fortemente condizionate dalla loro distanza dalla costa³. Per Mollat du Jourdin sono soprattutto il frutto di fenomeni sismici⁴. Du Jourdin si sofferma sulle ispirazioni mitiche che le isole hanno da sempre evocato – per l'uomo, nelle sue divagazioni oniriche, l'isola rappresentava un mondo idealizzato, il paradiso perduto, la tanta sospirata Itaca⁵.

* * *

Giacendo sul confine cristiano-musulmano, in mezzo a delle trafficatissime rotte commerciali ed a meno di un giorno di viaggio dalla Sicilia, granaio del Mediterraneo, l'arcipelago maltese in età moderna non era certo un mondo sperduto. Nessuna tesi, dunque, sul presunto isolamento di un

¹ FERNAND BRAUDEL, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, London 1986-87, 276.

² PEREGRINE HOLDEN and NICHOLAS PURCELL, *The Corrupting Sea. A Study of Mediterranean History*, Oxford 2001, 225.

³ PREDRAG MATVEJEVIĆ, *Mediterraneo. Un nuovo breviario*, Milano 1999, 27.

⁴ MICHEL MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, *L'Europa e il mare dall'antichità a oggi*, Bari 2001, 19.

⁵ MOLLAT DU JOURDIN, *L'Europa e il mare*, 277.

luogo come questo potrebbe reggere o essere scientificamente sostenuta. Comunque il punto di vista dello studioso è inevitabilmente soggettivo, non foss'altro per il fatto che si trova nella condizione privilegiata di attingere a molteplici fonti che gli permettono di avere una visione più ampia, anche se inevitabilmente parziale, di una determinata situazione storica. Lo scopo di questo studio, infatti, non è quello di valutare l'effettivo isolamento o meno di un gruppo di isole come quelle maltesi, ma piuttosto di cercare di documentare la percezione d'isolamento che si poteva provare vivendo in un contesto isolano nel Mediterraneo del Seicento.

Gli isolani da sempre mostrano delle caratteristiche particolari. La separazione dalla terraferma influisce sul loro rapporto con il mondo esterno. Tendenzialmente sono più schivi di carattere, ma allo stesso tempo mostrano un'ospitalità maggiore verso gli stranieri. Parlano una lingua diversa da quella della costa più vicina⁶. Spesso, come la gente che vive nelle zone costiere, sono dei protagonisti passivi della storia. Passano buona parte della loro esistenza ad aspettare. Aspettare diventa per loro una specie di "condizione esistenziale"⁷ - aspettavano il ritorno di un vascello, l'arrivo di forestieri e di varie mercanzie; aspettavano i viveri, soprattutto in tempo di magra e di carestia; aspettavano con ansia l'avvistamento di navi nemiche o corsare, scongiurando il loro arrivo; aspettavano la calma dopo la tempesta per poter raggiungere la terraferma e, in modo particolare, aspettavano notizie, informazioni e novità dal mondo Mediterraneo e oltre⁸.

* * *

Come dei naufraghi in seguito ad una tempesta, i Cavalieri dell'Ordine di San Giovanni di Gerusalemme si stabilirono a Malta nel 1530 alla fine di un'odissea durata otto anni dopo la perdita di Rodi nell'assedio del 1522. Tracce di ostilità verso la terra maltese, espressa nel rapporto della commissione dei Cavalieri che fecero un sopralluogo dettagliato nel 1524⁹, si possono ancora riscontrare nei documenti lasciati ai posteri da quell'efficiente macchina burocratica che era l'amministrazione dell'Ordine. Nella corrispondenza ufficiale con l'estero, fonte ispiratrice di questo saggio, i vari Gran Maestri non si riferivano quasi mai all'isola con il suo nome. Uno dei termini che usavano maggiormente, a parte isola o dominio, era "scoglio". Le parole adoperate dalla gerarchia dell'Ordine sistematicamente mostrano un evidente disaffetto verso il feudo affidato loro da Carlo V. La pochezza delle risorse dell'isola, la povertà della sua terra,

⁶ MATVEJEVIĆ, *Mediterraneo*, 30-31.

⁷ MOLLAT DU JORDIN, *L'Europa e il mare*, 277.

⁸ MATVEJEVIĆ, *Mediterraneo*, 30.

⁹ LOUIS DE BOISGELIN, *Ancient and Modern Malta*, vol. II, book 1, London 1804, 15-19.

la sua geografia così pericolosamente vicina alla Barberia¹⁰ erano aspetti che venivano ossessivamente sottolineati, e spesso esagerati, a papi, monarchi, principi e, soprattutto, ai vari emissari e agenti dell'Ordine all'estero, quasi per ricordare loro il dovere cardine che avevano di sopperire alle necessità dell'arcipelago.

Al tempo del loro arrivo a Malta i Cavalieri erano già abituati da secoli a vivere in un contesto isolano, con quel senso di precarietà che ne derivava, grazie al soggiorno a Cipro seguito da due secoli e mezzo di permanenza a Rodi. L'ansia di isolamento e la paura di avere interruzioni nelle linee di comunicazione con il continente furono solamente accentuate dagli assedi del 1522 e del 1565. Se ci fu una lezione imparata dall'Ordine nell'assedio di Malta questa era che le priorità politico-militari degli Asburgo risiedevano altrove, primariamente nelle province protestanti del nord Europa, e dunque erano ben altre che quelle di soccorrere e difendere una piccola isola a sud della Sicilia¹¹. I ritardi e la procrastinazione che caratterizzarono la saga del soccorso di Don Garçia de Toledo, tema che suscitò tante polemiche tra gli studiosi del ramo ma che fu contestualizzata con maestria da Braudel¹², indussero l'Ordine a comprendere che nell'eventualità di guai futuri l'isola avrebbe dovuto cavarsela da sola un'altra volta.

La paura di un possibile isolamento militare, strettamente legata alla paura di subire un altro assedio – una paura che accompagnò l'Ordine per buona parte della sua esistenza¹³ – era simultanea all'ansietà di approvvigionare l'arcipelago maltese. In età moderna Malta non era certo isolata, ma lo storico non può ignorare la palpabile preoccupazione da parte dei vertici dell'Ordine di avere i canali di comunicazione con il continente interrotti¹⁴. Per i Cavalieri cercare di tenersi aggiornati sugli even-

¹⁰ Per alcune osservazioni sulla geografia e topografia delle isole maltesi in età moderna si veda, per esempio, GIOVANNI SEMPRINI, *Malta nella seconda metà del Seicento (Da un manoscritto del tempo)*, "Archivio Storico di Malta", IV (1933), 97-112.

¹¹ BRAUDEL, *The Mediterranean*, 1014-1026.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ Per un'analisi sull'autenticità della minaccia ottomana nell'era post-1565 si veda ALEXANDER H. DE GROOT, *The Ottoman Threat to Europe, 1571-1800: Historical Fact or Fancy?*, in VICTOR MALLIA-MILANES (ed.), *Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798*, Malta 1993, 199-254. Per alcune altre considerazioni sullo stesso tema si veda IVAN GRECH, *Flow of Capital in the Mediterranean: Financial Connections between Genoa and Hospitaller Malta in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, in "International Journal of Maritime History", XVII, No. 2 (December 2005), 193-210.

¹⁴ Gli esempi di episodi per sostenere questa tesi sono molto numerosi nella corrispondenza verso l'estero dei successivi Gran Maestri. I seguenti sono alcuni casi sporadici ma allo stesso tempo tipici. Nel maggio 1658 il Gran Maestro Martin de Redin si mostrò preoccupato per l'interruzione - causa il sospetto del contagio - del traffico lungo la rotta Napoli-Messina, così vitale per il flusso di viveri, merci varie ed informazioni

ti del mondo circostante, dal Mare del Nord fino al Levante, era assolutamente necessario nella continua lotta contro l'isolamento. La sete di notizie era paragonabile alla fame per il grano e la rete di ambasciatori, agenti diplomatici e rappresentanti di vario genere sparsi nei principali centri politici dell'Europa cristiana non era certamente sufficiente per soddisfarla. Si cercava di attingere a tutte le potenziali fonti di informazione, sia quelle ufficiali che quelle occasionali. La casuale entrata in porto di una nave di mercanzia poteva fornire delle notizie tanto rilevanti quanto quelle portate dalla squadra delle galee dell'Ordine che faceva rientro dopo una delle sue periodiche missioni in Levante. L'Ordine era molto sensibile a qualsiasi eco proveniente dall'Est e da Costantinopoli in modo particolare. Là c'era la flotta del Sultano, fonte di tanta trepidazione per il Convento. Voci sulla preparazione – reale o possibile – della flotta ottomana erano in grado di scombussolare l'ordine del giorno del Gran Maestro.

Il sistema di contatti con l'estero messo su dall'Ordine era imperniato su una gerarchia ben definita. Si tenevano degli ambasciatori nelle corti europee più importanti, come quella di Parigi, e soprattutto a Roma¹⁵, guida imprescindibile per qualsiasi istituzione religiosa e sede diplomatica più consultata che condizionava in maniera notevole l'attività dell'Ordine. Roma non significava solamente il Papa, il leader spirituale e temporale la cui approvazione paterna in questioni di rilevanza internazionale era cercata e ambita dall'Ordine. Significava anche una rete intricata di rappresentanti, di solito nelle vesti di cardinali, la cui attività lobbistica nella corte pontificia era mirata ad ottenere favori e vantaggi per l'Ordine in diverse questioni¹⁶.

Venezia, signora dell'Adriatico e fautrice di una politica internazionale tutta sua, spesso distaccata dalle necessità asburgiche e aliena alle posi-

per l'isola. Archives of the Order, Malta (AOM), de Redin a Resa, f. 83v, 10 maggio 1658. Le lettere nel manoscritto AOM 1445 sono piene di lamentele di Nicolas Cotoner, preoccupato per la difficoltà di mantenere i contatti con il continente durante l'epidemia di peste che colpì l'isola nel 1676. Nel dicembre del 1678 lo stesso Cotoner tirò un sospiro di sollievo con l'entrata in porto di alcune navi francesi cariche di grano dal Levante, dopo essersi lamentato che l'importazione del grano dalla Sicilia quell'anno fosse particolarmente ridotta. AOM 1446, Nicholas Cotoner a Rondinelli, f. 214r, 30 dicembre 1678.

¹⁵ Non esiste negli archivi dell'Ordine a Malta corrispondenza da ambasciatori ospedalieri all'estero oltre quella dalle corti di Roma e Parigi. Comunque vari registri di corrispondenza mostrano che era usuale per l'Ordine tenere ambasciatori presso altre corti, tipo quella di Napoli per esempio. AOM, *Repertorio*, f. 41. Sulla rete di ambasciatori tenuta dall'Ordine Boisgelin dice: "(l'Ordine) usava spedire ambasciatori per tutta l'Europa". BOISGELIN, *Ancient and Modern Malta*, vol. I, libro 2, 194.

¹⁶ Per alcuni commenti sull'attività lobbistica dell'Ordine a Roma si veda IVAN GRECH, *Il prezzo dell'onore nel Mediterraneo. Rapporti e dissidi diplomatici tra Genova e l'Ordine di Malta nel Seicento*, in *Cavalieri di San Giovanni in Liguria e nell'Italia settentrionale. Quadri regionali, uomini e documenti. Atti del Convegno, Genova, Commenda di San Giovanni di Pré, 30 settembre-2 ottobre 2004*, a cura di JOSEPH COSTA RESTAGNO, Genova-Albenga 2009, 587-609.

zioni cattoliche, merita un discorso a parte¹⁷. La sua geografia, i suoi rapporti privilegiati con il mondo ottomano, la sua rete diplomatica ed il suo celebre servizio postale la rendevano il nodo principale in Occidente per ricevere (ed anche manipolare) le informazioni dall'Oriente¹⁸.

Anche se la Repubblica non aveva un ambasciatore residente dell'Ordine, la sua capacità unica di fornire notizie era essenziale per tenere in allerta un'isola mediterranea in guerra con l'Islam e, durante il suo soggiorno a Malta, l'Ordine cercò costantemente di attingere alle fonti di informazioni e di *intelligence* di Venezia¹⁹. Gli agenti ospedalieri residenti a Venezia periodicamente fornivano il Convento a Malta con quelli che venivano chiamati 'avvisi' o 'novità del mondo', le cronache scritte a mano o stampate che venivano spedite con la normale corrispondenza, con l'intento di tenere aggiornato la comunità ospedaliera sugli eventi principali di Venezia e dell'Europa²⁰. Questi 'avvisi' erano il frutto del clima sociopolitico di quell'epoca. A volte erano spediti stampati da porti come Livorno²¹ o dalla stessa Venezia, che era diventata uno dei maggiori centri tipografici d'Europa. L'invenzione della stampa aveva alimentato l'ambizione di pubblicare e grazie ad essa l'uomo comune stava lentamente cambiando ed ampliando la sua percezione del mondo circostante. Basti pensare che verso la fine del '500 i missionari gesuiti stavano spedendo in Europa per farli pubblicare i resoconti e le cronache che riguardavano la loro missione in Cina e Giappone²². Il '600, in particolare, vide quello che Villari

¹⁷ Per un quadro generale sulla storia della Repubblica di Venezia si veda JOHN J. NORWICH, *A History of Venice*, London 1983; DAVID CHAMBERS and BRIAN PULLAN (eds.), *Venice. A Documentary History 1450-1630*, Oxford 1992.

¹⁸ ERIC DURSTELER, "Power and Information: The Venetian Postal System in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean", in *From Florence to the Mediterranean: Studies in Honor of Anthony Molho*, ed. by ERIC DURSTELER, DIEGO CURTO, JULES KIRSHNER and FRANCESCA TRIVELLATO, Firenze 2009, 601-623.

¹⁹ Per un quadro generale dei rapporti e dissidi tra Malta dei Cavalieri e la Repubblica di Venezia si veda VICTOR MALLIA-MILANES, *Venice and Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798. Aspects of a Relationship*, Malta 1992.

²⁰ Alcuni esempi. Nel marzo del 1695 l'ambasciatore veneto a Roma diede delle assicurazioni che l'Ordine sarebbe stato tenuto aggiornato sull'imminente campagna in Levante con la spedizione dei *soliti avvisi*; AOM 1460, Wignacourt all'ambasciatore Sacchetti (Roma), f. 30, 18 marzo 1695. Nel giugno del 1701, Marino, il ricevitore (un rappresentante finanziario) dell'Ordine a Venezia ricevette degli apprezzamenti ufficiali per aver spedito al Convento i "soliti fogli degli avvisi"; AOM 1462, Perellos y Rocaful a Marino (Venezia), ff. 79v-80r, 5 giugno 1701. Nell'agosto del 1707 Marino spedì le "nuove del mondo" al Convento; AOM 1468, Perellos y Rocaful a Marino (Venezia), f. 113v, 19 agosto 1707.

²¹ Per esempio, AOM 1463, Perellos y Rocaful all'agente Bussotti (Livorno), f. 101r, 31 maggio 1702.

²² FRANCESCO ZANETTI (cur.), *Avvisi del Giappone degli anni MDLXXXII, LXXXIII et LXXXIV, con alcuni altri della Cina dell'LXXXIII et LXXXIV. Cavati dalle lettere della Compagnia di Gesù (Ricevute il mese di Dicembre MDLXXXV)*, Roma 1586 [National Library of Malta].

chiama il 'boom' dell'informazione, risultato della crescita generale del livello di coscienza politica, mentre le monarchie europee suscitavano reazioni antiassolutistiche in varie pubblicazioni di contenuto politico²³.

Comunque, il canale di comunicazione con cui Malta teneva i contatti più frequenti era probabilmente il versante tirrenico dell'Italia. I Cavalieri facevano leva quasi quotidianamente sull'asse formato da Genova, Livorno, Napoli, Messina e Palermo. *In primis*, c'era la Sicilia. I suoi granai e la stretta vicinanza all'arcipelago maltese imponevano un legame secolare tra le due isole che l'Ordine non poteva permettersi di non sfruttare. I dispacci da Malta all'Italia, quando non venivano spediti direttamente via mare, erano solitamente inviati via Palermo e Messina. Un sistema di corrieri veniva poi impiegato per portare questi dispacci a Napoli, Roma o più a Nord. Questi corrieri possono essere paragonati ai 'corrieri umani' che venivano usati in Oriente, come i "facchini" cinesi che erano in grado di portare notizie ancora più in fretta dei cavalli tartari, oppure i "chatirs" della Persia, capaci di trasportare lettere urgenti o beni preziosi per ore senza sosta, sfruttando sapientemente le scorciatoie ed evitando le arterie principali²⁴. Per i dispacci più urgenti da trasportare via terra l'Ordine di solito noleggiava un "corriero a cavallo", anche se contro voglia per i costi maggiori che richiedeva²⁵.

Nonostante i suoi limiti, il sistema di comunicazioni di Malta era in grado di fare imprese notevoli. Smascherare un impostore poteva essere una di queste²⁶. Rintracciare un prigioniero evaso, un cavaliere errante o un criminale in fuga era un'altra. In casi come questi, le prime "stazioni" ad essere allertate erano gli uffici dei ricevitori o gli agenti in Sicilia o nei porti lungo la costa tirrenica dell'Italia, cioè i rifugi più probabili per un cristiano in fuga da Malta. Gli agenti dell'Ordine venivano allertati ad agire nel caso in cui il fuggiasco dovesse arrivare nei paraggi dei loro distretti. Nel marzo 1705, per esempio, l'Ordine diede la notizia della fuga del cavaliere Luigi de Rousset, che era scappato da Malta con due casse

²³ ROSARIO VILLARI, *Introduzione*, in *L'uomo barocco*, a cura di R. VILLARI, Roma-Bari 1991, X.

²⁴ FERNAND BRAUDEL, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century*. Vol. I: *The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible*, London 1985, 429-430.

²⁵ Ad esempio, nel febbraio del 1666 due pacchi urgenti dovevano raggiungere Napoli e Roma dal Convento tramite la Sicilia. Le istruzioni erano di assumere un "corriero volante à cavallo con il quale patteggiarete il prezzo che converrà dargli, procurando che sarà il meno possibile". AOM 1442, Nicholas Cotoner a Barone, f. 17v, 24 febbraio 1666.

²⁶ Nell'agosto del 1658, per esempio, i ricevitori di Milano e Venezia riceverono ordini dal Convento di rintracciare un certo Paolo Grimaldi di Palermo che si spacciava per un cavaliere dell'Ordine su una missione diplomatica. AOM 1434, de Redin ai ricevitori di Milano e Venezia, f. 136v, 18 agosto 1658.

d'argento affidategli alcuni giorni prima da alcuni creditori²⁷. Due mesi dopo de Rousset fu rintracciato e imprigionato a Napoli²⁸.

La Sicilia era anche punto di incontro per la flotta dell'Ordine. Di solito, infatti, le galee della squadra si riunivano sulla costa siciliana per fare una sosta durante i loro viaggi per il Mediterraneo. E la vicina costa siciliana era anche la prima destinazione delle feluche, saiche e speronare mandate da Gran Maestri ansiosi di ristabilire i contatti con la squadra navale quando da troppo tempo non se ne avevano notizie²⁹.

La Sicilia era il terminale di quell'asse tirrenico che svolgeva due funzioni principali per l'Ordine. La prima era il trasferimento dei fondi raccolti dalle proprietà sparse nell'Europa occidentale. Il denaro dell'Ordine dalla Francia e dalla penisola iberica era di solito depositato a Genova, da dove veniva poi trasportato direttamente oppure "versato", tramite lettere di cambio, in Sicilia o Malta³⁰. La seconda era lo scambio di informazioni con il resto d'Europa. Anche qui Genova aveva un ruolo cardine, perlomeno fino alla metà del '600. Per l'Ordine, Genova era nel Tirreno l'equivalente di Venezia nella spedizione degli "avvisi del mondo" al Convento³¹ e fungeva anche da anello principale nella catena di comunicazioni tra Malta e la penisola iberica³². Questo schema di rapporti cambiò drasticamente dopo il 1655, quando una disputa secolare tra l'Ordine e la Repubblica genovese sulla questione della precedenza in ambito marittimo deteriorò drammaticamente e causò l'interruzione dei rapporti ufficiali tra le due parti fino alla fine del secolo³³. Il risultato di questa rottura diplomatica non solo cambiò le abitudini finanziarie dell'Ordine, con Genova che finì per essere più spesso sostituita dalle piazza tirreniche più a sud per il trasferimento dei fondi ospedalieri dall'Europa³⁴, ma alla lunga alterò anche le rotte lungo le quali veniva trasportata la corrispondenza ufficiale dell'Ordine. Livorno,

²⁷ AOM 1466, Perellos y Rocaful al Duca della Bagnara, f. 40v, 16 marzo 1705.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, Perellos y Rocaful al procuratore di Giovanni (Messina), f. 69v, 5 maggio 1705.

²⁹ Un episodio per illustrare una situazione simile: nell'ottobre del 1703 una speronara fu spedita a Scicli (Sicilia) per cercare di rintracciare la squadra delle galee dell'Ordine e rassicurare il Gran Maestro. Giduatto, l'agente dell'Ordine a Scicli, doveva rispedire immediatamente la speronara con qualsiasi informazione recepita. In caso contrario, la barca doveva continuare il suo viaggio lungo la costa meridionale o tornare a Malta solo verso la fine della settimana con la posta da Palermo. AOM 1464, Segretario Cacherani a Giduatto (Scicli), ff. 136v-137r, 18 ottobre 1703.

³⁰ GRECH, *Flow of Capital*, *passim*.

³¹ A volte all'Ordine venivano spedite anche delle "gazzette". Si veda per esempio, AOM 1425, Lascaris Castellar a Giorgio Latino, f. 26, 18 marzo 1647.

³² Tre esempi da tre decenni diversi: AOM 1414, de Paule a Cebà (Genova), f. 98v, 23 luglio 1635; AOM 1421, Lascaris Castellar a Spinola (Genova), f.102v, 18 maggio 1643; AOM 1429, Lascaris Castellar a Spinola (Genova), f. 73r, 21 maggio 1651.

³³ GRECH, *Il prezzo dell'onore nel Mediterraneo*, *passim*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

per esempio, cominciò a fornire l'Ordine con più frequenza con gli "avvisi"³⁵ e Napoli, col tempo, oltre a fornire l'Ordine con gli "avvisi pubblici", divenne la piazza principale di collegamento con la Spagna³⁶.

I porti tirrenici, insieme a Venezia, permettevano all'Ordine di avere un sistema di informazioni abbastanza esteso con più fonti che assicuravano una copertura maggiore dei fatti di rilevanza internazionale. Oltre che nella penisola italiana – linea diretta con il continente europeo – Malta cercava di estendere soprattutto verso Levante la sua rete di informazioni. La minaccia ottomana, sia che fosse reale, imminente, virtuale o semplicemente il frutto di uno stato continuo di guerra e di ricordi di aspri scontri passati, era uno spettro con cui le comunità dei Cavalieri e dei maltesi dovevano convivere. Nell'isola l'attesa di notizie dal Levante era spesso maggiore che da altri luoghi. Il ritorno della flotta delle galee dalle sue missioni stagionali nel Levante costituiva la fonte "ufficiale" e più affidabile per l'Ordine per quanto riguardava gli aggiornamenti sui movimenti e sulle intenzioni del Turco. Una volta in porto, i capitani della squadra venivano chiamati a rapporto dal Gran Maestro per dare un resoconto della loro missione e per verificare, smentire o confermare qualsiasi voce arrivata a Malta mentre la missione della flotta era in corso. La verifica delle notizie veniva presa molto sul serio. Quando un vascello straniero, una nave mercantile o una nave corsara con la sua preda entravano in porto, gli ufficiali dell'Ordine erano pronti a carpire tutte le notizie possibili da rispettivi equipaggi. Anche i prigionieri venivano interrogati nella speranza di "raschiare" ogni possibile particolare sulla situazione del Levante³⁷. Ovviamente, queste informazioni venivano poi verificate attraverso altre fonti. Le voci ed i pettegolezzi, infatti, erano abbastanza comuni anche negli ambienti diplomatici³⁸.

L'arcipelago greco spesso fungeva come canale attraverso il quale il clima politico-militare del versante orientale del Mediterraneo raggiungeva quello occidentale. Le isole fornivano informazioni alle altre isole. Il console maltese a Corfù e l'agente dell'Ordine a Zante – o qualche altro inviato europeo – aggiornavano i Cavalieri con le notizie più importanti che filtravano dai quartieri ottomani³⁹. Questi contatti con il Levante, abbinati

³⁵ Un esempio: AOM 1441, Nicholas Cotoner al procuratore Barone, f. 81r, 15 ottobre 1665.

³⁶ Due esempi: AOM 1464, Perellos y Rocaful a Gallucci (Napoli), f. 37r, 25 febbraio 1703; AOM 1468, Perellos y Rocaful a Marullo (Napoli), f.113r, 19 agosto 1707.

³⁷ Si veda, per esempio, *infra*, nota 40.

³⁸ Si veda, per esempio, AOM 1414, de Paule al Luogotenente del Priorato della Lombardia, f.2 5r, 23 febbraio 1635.

³⁹ Alcuni esempi: AOM 1449, Carafa a [Talignau], console francese in Zante, f. 89v, 8 maggio 1682; AOM 1463, Perellos y Rocaful al console Verdizotti (Corfu), ff. 183v-184r, 11 novembre 1702; una nave da Cefalonia portò notizie che il Turco aveva spedito delle

ti alla posizione di frontiera di Malta e alla sua vicinanza alla Barberia, permettevano all'isola di agire da sentinella per il resto del mondo cristiano contro il pericolo ottomano. Le notizie che giungevano qui sui movimenti della flotta del Sultano o sugli avvistamenti nelle acque maltesi o altrove di flotte nemiche erano comunicate con celerità al mondo cattolico tramite la Sicilia e altri porti italiani⁴⁰.

Malta era una sentinella per la cristianità non soltanto in ambito militare. Semplici voci o notizie accertate sul pericolo di peste erano comunicate in Europa con un'urgenza ancora maggiore. Secondo Mallia-Milanes, il rigore del sistema sanitario imposto dall'Ordine a Malta e le sue rigide misure di quarantena rendevano l'isola un "baluardo" contro il contagio⁴¹. Se la fobia di subire un altro assedio non era per niente giustificata, come affermato da alcuni storici, la stessa cosa non si può certo dire riguardo alla diffusa paura della peste nel Mediterraneo. Le strette misure adottate da uno stato come Malta per scongiurare il contagio nel proprio territorio erano pienamente giustificate dalle devastazioni di dimensioni bibliche causate periodicamente nel mondo di allora da questa epidemia contro la quale una medicina ancora rudimentale era impotente.

L'unica difesa era la prevenzione. Solidarietà, collaborazione reciproca e accordi speciali tra stati e città erano usuali. Genova e Ragusa (Dubrovnik), per esempio, stabilirono di scambiarsi reciprocamente informazioni politiche e sanitarie, oltre che allarmi su eventuali pericoli del contagio. Ragusa aggiornava Genova sulla situazione nei Balcani, a Costantinopoli e nel Levante, mentre i genovesi dovevano allertare il porto adriatico sull'esistenza di possibili epidemie nel Mediterraneo occidentale e nel Nord Africa⁴².

navi da guerra ad affrontare una grossa flotta veneta in Andros. AOM 1460, Adrian de Wignacourt all'ambasciatore Sacchetti (Roma), ff. 182v-183r, 18 settembre 1696.

⁴⁰ Nel maggio del 1664 alcuni cristiani giunti a Malta dopo essere scappati da Sousse (Tunisia) riferirono che tre galee dalla Tunisia dovevano unirsi con altre da Algeri su una missione corsara "terminate la luna della loro Pasqua". La flotta dell'Ordine, che si presumeva fosse a Trapani o qualche altro porto siciliano, doveva essere immediatamente allertata insieme alle coste nelle vicinanze: 'sarà bene che facciate correre tal'avviso per coteste spiagge, acciò possino meglio ripararsi da ogni danno che potesse loro capitare'. AOM 1440, Nicholas Cotoner a Perello, f. 51v, 7 maggio 1664. A luglio del 1707 l'Ordine informò Roma dell'avvistamento nelle acque maltesi di un numero di navi ottomane. AOM 1468, Perellos y Rocaful all'ambasciatore Sacchetti (Roma), ff. 93v-94r, 17 luglio 1707.

⁴¹ VICTOR MALLIA-MILANES, 'Entre el arcaismo y la innovacion. La contribucion de los Hospitalarios de Malta a la navegacion en la alta edad moderna', in *Islas y Sistemas de Navegación durante las Edades Media y Moderna*, a cura di ADELA FABREGAS GARCIA, Granada 2010, 509-544.

⁴² DRAGOLJUB ŽIVOJNOVIĆ, *Genoa and the Ragusan Merchant Marine during the Eighteenth Century*, in *Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale di studi storici. Rapporti Genova - Mediterraneo - Atlantico nell'età moderna*, a cura di RAFFAELE BELVEDERI, Genova 1990, 65.

Vere o no, le voci su una possibile epidemia potevano mettere in ginocchio uno stato e in particolare un'isola. Le autorità facevano di tutto per tranquillizzare la comunità internazionale e smentire eventuali voci sulla diffusione dell'epidemia nel loro territorio. Potenzialmente tali voci viaggiavano più velocemente della stessa pestilenza e la prima precauzione di qualsiasi stato era quella di tagliare le linee di comunicazione con il territorio sospettato di essere contagiato. Nel 1676, quando i primi avvisi di un 'mal contagioso' a Malta si stavano spargendo per l'Europa, il Gran Maestro cercò ripetutamente di rassicurare il resto della Cristianità sostenendo con forza che i casi isolati di morte occorsi fino ad allora erano attribuibili ad un semplicissimo "mal di stagione", cioè un normale raffreddore o influenza stagionale⁴³. I suoi sforzi furono inutili. Era una vera e propria epidemia di peste che alla fine causò oltre undicimila morti⁴⁴. Inevitabilmente, la prima ad interrompere i suoi contatti fu la Sicilia, dove fu ordinato di rifiutare anche la corrispondenza proveniente da Malta⁴⁵. Comprensibilmente questo mise in allarme l'Ordine, poiché l'interruzione dei contatti di qualsiasi tipo con la Sicilia non solo significava dover trovare fonti alternative di approvvigionamento, ma potenzialmente era anche il primo passo verso l'interruzione di tutte le comunicazioni con la rotta tirrenica su cui si faceva tanto affidamento. Comunque l'Ordine, da parte sua, si mostrò abbastanza maturo e sensibile nel 1705 quando rifiutò di interrompere i contatti con Pantelleria non dando credito a delle voci che volevano contagiati gli abitanti della piccola isola siciliana⁴⁶.

* * *

Quando l'Ordine si stabilì a Malta nel 1530 l'isola era ancora una remota realtà medievale. I contatti con l'esterno erano limitati soprattutto alla Sicilia, dominio dei Viceré, signori feudali dell'arcipelago maltese⁴⁷. Il mondo oltre la Sicilia era spesso irraggiungibile, troppo distante ed alieno alla comunità maltese. Con l'arrivo dei Cavalieri di San Giovanni il rapporto dell'isola con la geografia circostante subì un cambiamento graduale ma drammatico. I ruoli sanitari e militari dell'Ordine, le sue proprietà sparse

⁴³ AOM 1445, la corrispondenza del Gran Maestro Nicholas Cottoner, soprattutto con la Sicilia e con Roma, per i primi tre mesi del 1676.

⁴⁴ JOSEPH MICALLEF, *The Plague of 1676: 11,300 Deaths*, Malta 1985, *passim*.

⁴⁵ AOM 1445, Nicholas Cottoner a Patrimoniali (Sicilia), f. 128, 28 marzo 1676.

⁴⁶ "Non si è mai pensato di levare il commercio à codest isola, poiche quantunque si fusse sparsa la voce che si fusse costì scoperto il mal contagioso, è stato puro equivoco, ne da me l'è stato prestato quell credito che voi supponete". AOM 1466, Perellos y Rocaful ai Giurati di Pantelleria, f. 134r, 18 settembre 1705.

⁴⁷ Per un'analisi molto erudita di Malta nel Medioevo si veda CHARLES DALLI, *Iż-Zmien Nofsani Malti*, Malta 2002.

per tutto il territorio europeo ed il suo impatto traumatico sull'economia dell'isola contribuirono sensibilmente ad aumentare, migliorare ed intensificare i contatti con l'estero, e specialmente con il continente: aumentarono i contatti commerciali, diplomatici, finanziari, mercantili, informativi ecc.⁴⁸. Con l'Ordine, Malta non solo fu trasformata in una fortezza militare contro l'avanzata dell'Islam ed in un'*enclave* sanitaria contro lo spargimento della peste bubbonica, ma divenne la sentinella più meridionale della Cristianità, una stazione di avvistamento in prima linea nel dare l'allarme all'Europa occidentale sulle intenzioni di guerra dell'Islam. Nonostante le sue scarse risorse, Malta ai tempi dell'Ordine, grazie alla sua posizione di frontiera e ad i suoi sforzi per mantenere vivi i canali di comunicazione con il Mediterraneo ed oltre, riuscì a ribaltare, almeno in parte, il rapporto di quasi totale dipendenza dai territori cattolici e di ritagliarsi un ruolo di un certo rilievo in un Mediterraneo diviso, continuando sempre a combattere una battaglia tutta sua contro l'isolamento.

⁴⁸ Sui graduali cambiamenti subiti dalle isole maltesi con l'avvento dell'Ordine di San Giovanni si veda MALLIA-MILANES, *Between Archaism and Innovation, passim*.

Elena Frangakis-Syrett

The Mediterranean commercial world of the XVIIIth century: Ottoman and Italian ports

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the ports of Livorno¹, Genoa, Messina, Trieste, Ancona, and Venice², which were geographically placed at the center of most of the international commercial traffic of the time, played a key role not only in Ottoman-European trade, but in world trade, too³. As part of this process, these ports became important entrepôts and came to command some of the most competitive and efficient market networks within the eighteenth-century world economy and particularly within the Mediterranean⁴. This enabled them to match supply to demand efficiently and cost-effectively and thus to provision a number of markets, simultaneously, both within the Mediterranean region and outside of it. Through a business network, that extended throughout these ports, merchants relayed information to their associates, or 'friends'⁵, and with whom they transacted business, which could either

¹ On the long-standing commercial relations between London, Livorno and the Levant, see MICHELA D'ANGELO, "In the 'English' Mediterranean (1511-1815)", *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, Vol. 12/2 (2002), 273-275.

² E.g., Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia series, Vol. 749, Consul Cortazzi, Izmir, 5 Nov. 1776, 14 July 1777, 19 April 1785, 17 March 1791. Hereafter this archive will be cited as ASV, V Savii.

³ E.g., Archives Nationales de France, Marine B/7, 446, Consul Benincasa, Ancona, 30 July 1782 in Commerce des ports de l'Europe, 1 Feb. 1783. Thereafter this archive will be cited as ANF, AE Bi 859, Consul L'Allement, Messina, 20 March 1784 and 3 Sept. 1785 to Minister, Paris; ASV, V Savii, Vol. 749, Consul Cortazzi, Izmir, 14 Feb. 1788, 16 Sept. 1789, 8 March 1793.

⁴ For more details on the commercial history of Italian port-cities, see e.g., MICHELA D'ANGELO and M. ELISABETTA TONIZZI, "Recent Maritime Historiography on Italy", GELINA HARLAFTIS and CARMEL VASSALLO (eds.), *New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime History* (St. John's, Newfoundland, 2004), 55-82.

⁵ They were thus called in the *parlance* current at least since the middle of the seventeenth century and possibly earlier. The National Archives of the United Kingdom: SP

be commercial, shipping or merchant banking operations. These 'friends' could be established in any of the Italian ports; however, they could also themselves be, or have other associates who might be established in other markets in Europe and/or the Ottoman Empire. In the course of their activities, merchants based in the Italian ports, in particular, by being privileged through an on-going flow of information primarily concerning the Ottoman and other European Mediterranean markets, were in a position to assess, in a relatively timely and accurate manner, the volume of trade that went or had the potential of passing through their markets, the scale and type of transactions that were taking place, and the price levels that commodities could be best traded in those markets, as they sought buyers for their associates' goods or commodities for the latter to invest in or, at times, as they sought for credit with which to finance an operation on behalf of their associates and/or employers. Of course, such close watch of the markets was not unique to merchants in the Italian ports. Merchants elsewhere in Europe and to a lesser extent in the Ottoman Empire, too, who traded internationally, had similar concerns and they, too, sought to collect and partake of market information to, and realize business opportunities for, their associates. The extensive network of agents of the Marseillaise house of Frères Roux, which operated world-wide including the Ottoman Empire, offered the firm an in-house knowledge of the global commodities market as well as access to credit, insurance and transportation networks that were truly remarkable in scale and scope⁶. However, what is important about the Italian networks is that they did not concern a single market, but a multiplicity of markets and merchant houses, whose networks registered a constant flow of commercial activity, which included almost in equal measure trade in commodities, specie or commercial paper, and which in turn generated information, contacts and further opportunities in trade, insurance, transportation, as well as for credit and merchant banking operations.

Moreover, the market networks of the Italian ports did not only relay information effectively but also goods and funds as, for instance, the commercial activity between Salonica and the Italian ports demonstrate⁷.

110/11, Richard Lake, Aleppo, 3 August 1658 to Ralph Lee, London, in GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, "Il porto di Livorno nelle carte della Levant Company", *Economia e Storia* (1984), 405. Thereafter this archive will be cited as TNA. See also GWILYM AMBROSE "English Traders at Aleppo (1658-1756)", *Economic History Review*, III (1931-32), 248-253.

⁶ Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, Marseilles, LIX 738, Garavaque & Cusson, Izmir, 24 Nov. 1762 and 18 March 1764 to Frères Roux, Marseilles. Thereafter this archive will be cited as ACCM. ACCM, LIX 730, Cailhol Cusson & Cie, Izmir, 29 Dec. 1774 to Frères Roux, Marseilles.

⁷ E.g., ANF, AE Bi 996, Consul de Jonville, Salonica, 20 Feb. 1744 to Minister, Paris;

The endemic scarcity of money that was characteristic of the Ottoman markets in the eighteenth century enabled the Italian ports in their role as conduits not only of commodities but also of specie and commercial paper to further solidify their position in Ottoman-European commerce⁸.

By the end of the eighteenth century, Ottoman shippers based in Venice routinely carried Ottoman goods to Messina and sold them to Italian, French, and British merchants there, for distribution to Livorno, Malta, and Marseilles, from where the goods were sent onto other Central and Northern European markets⁹. They took back to the Empire western cloth and specie in the form of different European currencies, especially Sevillian piastres and Austrian thalers¹⁰. Indeed, all major Ottoman ports were recipients of bullion in the course of their trading activities with the Italian ports¹¹. The latter regularly received specie and bullion from the New World, for distribution to other markets in Europe, too, besides the Ottoman Empire. As a result, their business networks were fully integrated into the Europe-centered international payments system and together with London and Amsterdam constituted an important component in the functioning of the system. This system became, in time, the most effective medium for the transfer of funds, in order to make payments or balance accounts between merchants, as well as transfer funds for speculative purposes in the world economy. Within it, bills of exchange served as the principal instrument of payment whether it was for settlement of accounts, monetary speculation, or for short-term credit¹².

Livorno, in particular, played a pivotal role as a clearing house for the bills of exchange circulating within the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Fringe economies. As a result commercial paper going through Livornese

AE Bi 997, de Jonville, Salonica, 3 Jan. 1748 to Minister, Paris; AE Bi 998, de Jonville, Salonica, 20 Feb. 1750 to Minister, Paris.

⁸ Intermittent monetary scarcity was concurrent to growth in commercial activity that was being registered in the Ottoman markets and in this respect it was in part the result of it; in other words the volume of economic activity was straining the liquidity levels of the Ottoman markets. Inadequacy in the circulating medium could also exist in European markets intermittently, for some of the same reasons, although as a phenomenon it was not as prevalent in Europe as it was in the Ottoman Empire. For more details, see ŞEVKET PAMUK, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), 149-171, and ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, "Monetary Shortage and the Ottoman Economy: late 17th to the late 18th centuries", in WALID ARBID, *et al* (eds.), *Méditerranée, Moyen-Orient: deux siècles des relations internationales. Recherches en hommage à Jacques Thobie* (Paris, 2003), 109-131.

⁹ ANF, AE Bi 859, Consul L'Allement, Messina, 14 Jan. 1788 to Minister, Paris.

¹⁰ FERRÉOL REBUFAIT and MARCEL COURDURIÉ, *Marseille et le négoce monétaire international (1785-1790)* (Marseilles, 1966), 126-141.

¹¹ ANF, AE Bi 859, Consul L'Allement, Messina, 4 Feb. 1786 to Minister, Paris.

¹² ALEXANDER JUSTICE, *A General Treatise of Monies and Exchanges* (London, 1707), 8-23.

houses represented an important share in the overall volume of bills circulating within the world economy at the time.

* * *

Let us now look at the way commercial networks between the Italian and Ottoman ports functioned and how they were linked to the European Atlantic economies. Let us take the example of a London-based merchant who, in trading with the Levant, could adopt a number of different strategies¹³. He could choose to send his ship to an Ottoman port, such as Iskenderun, Alexandria, or Izmir, with full cargo; alternatively, he could send his ship, only half full, to his agents in Livorno, - who as it was usual practice were an independent commercial house -, for the latter to complete the cargo, load it on board and send the ship eastward¹⁴. The Ottoman market, to which the ship was actually destined, may have already been chosen by the London firm through its network of *factors*, or agents, in the Empire¹⁵. Alternatively, the London firm could assign to its Livornese agency to make this decision, since the latter was closer to the Ottoman Empire, and thus likely to be better informed as to recent developments affecting the markets. Up-to-date knowledge was especially important as market opportunities could have changed by the time the entire cargo had been purchased and was ready to be dispatched eastward. Whatever market the goods were finally destined for, there was a factor of the London house resident in that Ottoman center that would finally receive the goods so that he could proceed with their sale¹⁶. An elaborate network of agents with market contacts, professional expertise and access to funds and information covering a number of Italian and Ottoman ports for the British Levant trade was already in place in the first half of the eighteenth century, its origins being, indeed, traceable to the previous century¹⁷. With a well-placed network of agents, as far as the Ottoman markets were concerned¹⁸, it was possible for the final destination of a British consignment to the Empire to

¹³ TNA, SP 110/36, Thomas Lansdown, Aleppo, 17 Jan. 1760 to Captain C. Wilson, Iskenderun.

¹⁴ TNA, SP 110/37, Lansdown, Aleppo, 26 Oct. 1761 to William Bellamy, Livorno.

¹⁵ TNA, SP 110/37, Lansdown, Aleppo, 5 Feb. 1762 to Captain Stewart, Izmir.

¹⁶ TNA, SP 105/211, The Printed Orders of the Levant Company, London, 9-12 Oct. 1744.

¹⁷ D'ANGELO, "In the 'English' Mediterranean", 271-285; PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, "Il porto di Livorno", 397-415.

¹⁸ The French had an equally extensive network of representatives in the Empire. The Dutch who did not have an equivalent network of their own often used British houses. TNA, SP 105/187, Chancery, Istanbul, 15 Feb. and 30 April 1781.

be Izmir or Istanbul¹⁹, Salonica or Cyprus, or Aleppo through Iskenderun²⁰, the choice being made primarily on market criteria²¹.

When arranging cargo for the return journey westward, it was quite usual for the London firm to mobilize once more its entire network of factors based in different Ottoman markets, who coordinated amongst them for the purchase of goods and provisioning of funds for the same²²; they had also the task of ensuring transportation²³. Purchase of goods was a complex and potentially delicate operation since the goods selected had to answer the needs and price levels of the London, or the Dutch, or any of the Italian markets that they might be destined for and, ultimately sold in; accordingly, arrangements had to be made for their timely and secure arrival at any one of those markets. For it was usually not a good strategy to decide well ahead the actual market the goods were destined for, but as it was the case with the outward consignments, it was best to allow for as much flexibility as possible in order to stand the best chances for profit. For this purpose, freight on board the ship of a captain who might be in the vicinity, and who was also part of their circle of friends or associates, or who could be brought into that circle of friends through an intermediate contact, as well as whose route included the chosen market(s), had to be found²⁴. Now, a potentially more lucrative purchase could also be arranged through the agents in Livorno, or in another Italian market, which was better placed because a ship was in hand, or where prices were better. Indeed, the Italian markets, especially Livorno, could at times undercut

¹⁹ TNA, SP 105/207, *The Mary*, Izmir, 5 Feb. and 13 March 1721.

²⁰ TNA, SP 110/72, Pt II, *The Hawk*, Iskenderun, 6 Feb. 1760.

²¹ It would appear that whilst the port of Livorno enjoyed distinct prominence in the western Mediterranean within British commercial circles and activities, for most of the eighteenth century, this was not the case in the Ottoman Empire where British merchants were established and active in a number of ports and markets at the same time. One of the reasons that can account for this, apart of course from its status as a free port, would be the nature of the Ottoman economy and markets, the latter being more regionalized and compartmentalized than it was the case in the European economies.

²² E.g., Private Papers, Colville Bridger Correspondence, Colville Bridger, Aleppo, 30 May 1759 to B. and G. Barker, Istanbul, 30 May 1759. Thereafter this archive will be cited as PP, CBC. See also, PP, CBC, Bridger, Aleppo, 30 May 1759 to Joseph Chitty, Izmir.

²³ On British merchants arranging for shipping, see e.g., PP, CBC, Bridger, Aleppo, 10 March 1755 to Richard Stratton, London; *ibid*, Bridger, Aleppo, 30 May 1755 to E. and A. Radcliffe, London. On the dynamics of shipping in the Mediterranean for the French, see e.g., ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, "The coastal trade of the Ottoman Empire, from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries", in JOHN ARMSTRONG and ANDREAS KUNZ (eds.), *Coastal Shipping and the European Economy, 1750-1980* (Mainz, 2002), 131-150; GILBERT BUTI, "Aller en caravane: le cabotage lointain en Méditerranée, XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles", *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, Vol. 52/1 (2005), 7-38.

²⁴ TNA, SP 110/37, Lansdown, Aleppo, 28 Nov. 1761 to John Abbott, Tripoly.

Ottoman markets in the already highly competitive European Levant trade. Were this to be the case, the London firm would let his agent in Livorno to make the purchase of Ottoman goods, rather than the agents in the Ottoman ports do so. This could also occur at times with Ottoman goods reaching the market of Marseilles from Livorno rather than from an Ottoman port, as outlined below, much to the chagrin of the French *nation* in the Empire but much to the strengthening of Ottoman-Italian trading networks²⁵.

As it was the custom at the time to partner with other firms to spread risk, the commercial venture in question was not for the London firm alone, but for a number of other firms, too. The number of partners could vary from two people, the London firm and another merchant, who might be mostly trading on his own, to as many as three other merchant firms joining the London house. Equally, it was quite possible that each firm may already have multiple partners, in other ventures it was undertaking concurrently, and who may be also brought, indirectly, to the venture; for instance, as silent partners. Whatever the final number of participants, they would all have equal shares in the purchase; they would thus have a uniform 'concern' in the commercial venture²⁶.

Let us now look at the example of the olive oil trade, which illustrates well the fluidity and competitiveness of the Ottoman and European markets in the Mediterranean. If the agent in Livorno, referred to above, decided that price levels between the Mediterranean and London markets in olive oil were likely to give the best return for his British client to invest in, he applied the strategy of looking for the best market to make his purchase. Hence, if the market in Livorno did not offer the best terms²⁷ and most competitive prices, he could turn to *his* network of 'friends' or associates in other Italian ports. For instance, the agent may choose his 'friend' in Messina and commission him with the purchase taking into considera-

²⁵ ACCM, H/164, French merchants, Marseilles, 7 June 1737 to the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, Marseilles.

²⁶ On Greek Ottoman partnership networks and the Italian ports, see MARIA-CHRISTINA HATZIOANNOU, *Οικογενεϊακή Στρατηγική και Εμπορικός Ανταγωνισμός* (Family Strategy and Commercial Competition) (Athens, 2003), 26-43; see also, ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, "Networks of Friendship, Networks of Kinship: Eighteenth-Century Levant Merchants", *Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 1/2 (2002), 200-205.

²⁷ In the Ottoman markets, in particular, merchants' profits varied according not only to the prices of the goods but also to the terms upon which the transaction was realized. These were: firstly, the actual rate of exchange agreed to, or current in the market, for the specific currency that would be used for the purchase, where there was usually some room for negotiation; secondly, whether cash was going to be used in part, or fully to conclude the transaction; thirdly, whether credit were to be used in part, and if so of what duration, or not at all, and fourthly, whether barter were to be part of the overall transaction to any extent.

tion the overall state of the market there, besides level of prices. The merchant in Messina had, in turn, *his* own network of 'friends' in near-by markets, including Naples, besides his home market, that he could also turn to. The advantage that Naples offered to olive oil traders was that both Italian and Ottoman varieties of the commodity were routinely sold in its market. The Messina house could thus have access both to Neapolitan and Ottoman crops. This strengthened the commercial bonds between the Southern Italian markets and Britain, with Livorno being the crucial link²⁸. In making his purchase for his 'friend' in Messina, the Neapolitan merchant would also take into account the price at which Spanish olive oil was selling at the time in those Italian markets that carried it. He would also have to consider whether a new crop was expected soon from the Ottoman Empire, or from elsewhere within the Mediterranean, before the olive oil to be purchased could be sold in Britain which was going to affect supply and demand and thus price levels in the British market, too.

Ottoman olive oil exported primarily, although not exclusively, from Crete and Mitylene, and mostly used in the making of soap for the European textile industry, became an important component in the olive oil trade of the Mediterranean in the course of the eighteenth century²⁹. Olive oil was one of two commodities that were usually, though not always, sold to the Europeans in the Ottoman Empire for cash, the other being wheat; this was instead of either extending credit to the sellers, or bartering it against European cloth as it was the custom for other important Ottoman exports such as cotton, mohair yarn or silk³⁰. The Ottoman state understood well the potential of the olive oil export trade, as a source of revenue, not only for the local economy but for the state treasury, too, and thus encouraged its export and even an increase in production³¹. Moreover, by the second half of the eighteenth century, a high degree of complementarity had evolved between different places producing olive oil and their export markets, in the Ottoman Empire, too. For example, the quantity and quality of the crop yield produced in Mitylene directly affected prices and business in Crete³². The import trade in Euro-

²⁸ MICHELA D'ANGELO, "In the English Mediterranean", 279-281; see also, DAVID G. LOROMER, *Merchants and Reform in Livorno, 1814-1868* (Berkeley, CA, 1987), 15-22.

²⁹ PATRICK BOULANGER, "L'île de Mytilène et le négoce français au XVIII^e siècle", in DANIEL PANZAC (ed.), *Les villes dans l'empire ottoman: activités et sociétés* (Paris, 1991), vol. I, 273-298.

³⁰ ANF, AE Bi 1053, Consul Charles de Peyssonnel, Mémoire, Izmir, 22 Nov. 1751.

³¹ Being mostly a cash crop, local producers-cum-exporters could pay their dues to the state, in cash, from their proceeds. YOLANDE TRIANTAFYLLOU-BALADIÉ, "Le marché des produits agricoles de la Canée aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles", in PANZAC, *Les villes dans l'empire ottoman*, vol. I, 299-301.

³² ACCM, LIX 724, Boris, Guérin, Tinel & Cie, Izmir, 27 June 1735 to Frères Roux, Marseilles.

pean cloth, which was the single most important commodity brought into the Empire from the West, constitutes another example of the high degree of connectivity present amongst major eighteenth-century Ottoman markets and export centres, as they became better integrated into the international market³³. The result was the creation of very competitive and fluid commodities and money markets within the Mediterranean for trade, credit and the efficient circulation of instruments of payment³⁴. Ottoman economic centres led by Istanbul, Izmir, and Alexandria, and to a lesser extent Salonica and Aleppo, were part of such commercial and merchant banking networks³⁵.

The funds for the Neapolitan house to purchase the olive oil with were quite likely being provided by the Messina house. Such funds would be in cash since olive oil was one of the goods usually sold for cash in the Italian markets, too. The Messina house would be paid by the agent in Livorno, who had bills of exchange drawn upon him by the firm in Messina. The agent in Livorno would, in turn, reimburse himself by drawing bills upon the London firm through, for instance, Venice, Amsterdam or locally, that is, from other British or Italian merchants who on such occasions, acted as bankers for the London merchant house. The agent in Livorno would draw, usually at intervals, upon London as the Messina house drew, also at intervals, upon the house in Livorno³⁶. The London merchant, in whose name the purchase was being made and to whom the goods were ultimately consigned, may nevertheless be responsible for only his share and pay the bills of exchange drawn upon him for only his 'concern' in the purchase; in such a case separate bills of exchange would be drawn upon each

³³ Indeed, when bringing different types and qualities of cloth to Izmir, in order to set the range of prices at which they would sell it, the Dutch merchants had to take into account not only the prices that different qualities of their cloth, and corresponding qualities of British and French cloth, commanded in European commercial circles in Istanbul, Salonica, and Aleppo, besides Izmir, but also the prices that Ottoman Jewish, Armenian and Greek wholesale merchants and cloth retailers charged in Istanbul for the European cloth they brought from Izmir. ANF, AE Bi 1045, Consul Peléran, Izmir, 28 Feb. and 7 Oct. 1732 to Minister Paris; and AE Biii 415, Consul Amoureux, *Mémoire sur le commerce d'importation à Smyrne du produit des manufactures de plusieurs nations étrangères*, Izmir, 7 May 1781 and ACM, J 199-202, *Correspondance des députés, États des ventes des draps, 1740-1752*; see also, TNA, SP 105/213, Istanbul, 1 Apr. 1787 and SP 105/196, Istanbul, 10 Feb. 1819.

³⁴ On monetary issues in the Ottoman economy, see SEVKET PAMUK, "Interaction between the Monetary Regimes of Istanbul, Cairo and Tunis, 1700-1875", in NELLY HANNA (ed.), *Money, Land and Trade. An Economic History of the Muslim Mediterranean* (London, 2002), 177-205 and ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *Trade and Money. The Ottoman Economy in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Istanbul, 2007), 49-74.

³⁵ ANF, AE Bi 1054, Consul Charles de Peyssonnel, Izmir, 7 July 1754 to Minister, Paris.

³⁶ CHARLES CARRIÈRE *et al*, *Banque et capitalisme commercial* (Marseilles, 1976), 21-30.

of the other participants by the agent in Livorno. Alternatively, he may be responsible for the full amount and have all the bills of exchange drawn upon him. In the latter case, as the bills were coming in, he would most likely debit the accounts of the other partners for their share in the venture. The partners in the venture may be London firms or British firms established in any of the Ottoman or Italian ports. The London firm spearheading the whole process would keep accounts, in great detail, of all payments effected in its correspondence with them³⁷.

Should the agent in Naples decide that Neapolitan olive oil offered a higher profit margin than any other market in the Mediterranean, he then had the option of either sending the olive oil thus purchased to Messina where a British captain, having sailed there from the Empire, would load it and take it to Livorno; or, the agent may ask the captain to load the olive oil himself from the place of production, directly on the Italian coast. This was accepted practice in the Empire, too. French captains often loaded olive oil³⁸, destined for Marseilles, Livorno, Genoa or Venice, which were amongst the most likely destinations, directly from the place of production in Crete³⁹ or Mitylene⁴⁰. Once the captain had finally reached Livorno, his cargo may have to be completed by other Ottoman goods, such as silk, for which Livorno was a specialized market; any such purchase would be conducted by the agent. Only then would the captain be ready to head westward to London or quite possibly to Amsterdam. The latter was as a consequence of the openness and vibrancy of the Dutch market which strengthened the fluidity as well as cosmopolitanism of networks originating from, or destined for, Amsterdam and the Mediterranean. The importance of these networks increased further during times of war amongst the European powers, especially Anglo-French maritime conflicts, usually to the

³⁷ E.g., PP, CBC, Bridger, Aleppo, 11 Sept. 1759 to William Hammond, London; Bridger, Aleppo, 30 May 1759 to Chitty, Izmir; Bridger, Aleppo, 10 March 1755 to Richard Stratton, London; Bridger, Aleppo, 30 May 1759 to E. & A. Radcliffe, London.

³⁸ This did not only happen with olive oil. For instance, wheat was another produce, which was often loaded by European captains at the nearest port from the place of production on the western Anatolian coast. E.g., ANF, AE Bi 1054, Peyssonnel, Izmir, 7 July 1754 to Minister, Paris.

³⁹ ANF, AE Bi 345, Consul Valny, Crete, 7 Jan. 1738 to Minister, Paris; see also YOLANDE TRIANTAFYLIDOU-BALADIÉ, "Transports maritimes et concurrence en Méditerranée orientale au XVIII^e siècle: l'exemple de la Crète", *Actes du II^e colloque international d'histoire* (Athens, 1985), vol. II, 19-37 and DANIEL PANZAC, "Négociants ottomans et capitaines français: la caravane maritime en Crète au XVIII^e siècle", in H. BATU and JEAN LOUIS BACQUÉ-GRAMMONT (eds.), *L'Empire ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France* (Istanbul-Paris, 1986), 99-118 and PANZAC, *La caravane maritime: marins européens et marchands ottomans en Méditerranée (1680-1830)* (Paris, 2004).

⁴⁰ ACCM, LIX 732, Cazejus & Cie, Izmir, 22 Feb. 1772 to Frères Roux, Marseilles.

benefit of the Mediterranean at large, and of Ottoman-European commerce, in particular.

* * *

In the course of the second half of the eighteenth century, a group that becomes increasingly more prominent in the commercial relationship between Ottoman and Italian ports on the part of the Empire is the Ottoman Greeks. Without monopolizing the commercial relationship, of course, they nevertheless seem to overtake their fellow Ottomans – the Turks, Armenians and Jews. This takes place despite fierce competition amongst all groups, Ottomans and Europeans alike, which was so characteristic of the Mediterranean commercial world of the time, an integral part of which was Ottoman-European trade. By the late eighteenth century a share in the business of exporting specie from Messina, Ancona or Trieste to Izmir was in the hands of Ottoman Greeks, who were able to add such activities⁴¹ to their carrying trade⁴²; profits from both sectors in turn allowed them to set up at a swift pace commercial bases in the Italian ports⁴³. Although there was a steady rise of Ottoman-Greek shipping to the Italian ports from the Levant in the second half of the eighteenth century, in the last two decades especially, the number of Ottoman Greek ships entering the Italian ports not only of Livorno and Genoa but also of Messina, Trieste and Venice rose spectacularly.⁴⁴ We know from recent research that in the middle of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1801), the years 1796-1798 stand out as ‘bumper years’ for Ottoman Greek shipping. The latter accounted for 30% and 25% of all ships entering the ports of Genoa and Livorno from the Ottoman Empire respectively⁴⁵.

Overall, they were able to combine a growing participation in the carrying trade in the Ottoman-Italian routes, with an active trade in commodi-

⁴¹ A. IGGLESI, *Βορειοελλαδίτες έμποροι στο τέλος της Τουρκοκρατίας* (Northern-Greek Merchants in the late Ottoman Period) (Athens: Commercial Bank of Greece, 2004), 116-25; OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING, *Η ελληνική παροιμία της Τεργέστης (1751-1830)* (The Greek Community of Trieste, 1750-1830) (Athens, 1986), vol. II, 537-538.

⁴² ANF, AE Bi 859, Consul L’Allement, Messina, 3 Sept. 1785 and 14 Jan. 1788 to Minister, Paris.

⁴³ ANF, Marine, B/7, 446, Bertrand, 19 Oct. 1782 in Commerce des ports de l’Europe, 1 Feb. 1783; see also, AE Bi 168, Consul, Benincasa, Ancona, 13 Feb. 1784 and 3 Sept. 1785 to Minister, Paris.

⁴⁴ GELINA HARLAFTIS and SOPHIA LAIOU, “Ottoman state policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-c.1820: The Rise of the Greek-Ottoman Merchant Fleet” in MARK MAZOWER (ed.), *Networks of Power in Modern Greece* (London, 2008), 7-9, 31-33.

⁴⁵ This is a research project titled “Greek Maritime History in the Eighteenth Century” led by Gelina Harlaftis, in the course of which more than 15,000 ships were registered for the period 1700-1821.

ties⁴⁶ which they transported not only on their own ships, but also on board other carriers, such as the Dutch plying the Ottoman-European commercial routes. Moreover they chose strategically the goods they dealt in: from the West their associates would primarily send Dutch cloth to Izmir and Austrian cloth to Istanbul for the Anatolian market⁴⁷ and from the Empire they would send Ottoman cotton and cotton yarn to the western Mediterranean⁴⁸. At the turn of the century, as the European money markets were becoming very propitious for this type of activities, the Greeks also added merchant banking operations, including monetary speculation, to their portfolio of activities. In the process they became important actors in Ottoman-European commerce that went through the Italian ports. One group that took advantage of the benefits that the economic conditions of the time offered was the Chiot of Izmir. In some respects, this is not surprising given the fact that in the second half of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries the Ottoman city increasingly acquired the biggest share in the Empire's trade with Europe, which was itself growing⁴⁹. The presence of Greek⁵⁰ - often Chiot - firms in the Italian ports, which had already close connections with the Dutch Levant trade of Izmir allowed them to successfully incorporate their Ottoman-Italian trading networks into the Ottoman-Dutch ones and vice-versa⁵¹.

It is thus not surprising either that an Ottoman Greek, who came from the prosperous Chiot family of Petrocochino, - well-established in the commercial circles of Izmir since the mid-eighteenth century -, was serving as Ottoman Consul in Genoa in 1813⁵². There are many reasons that led to the success of the Greeks not least of all, it would appear to the pres-

⁴⁶ HATZIOANNOU, *Οικογενειακή Στρατηγική*, 138-170.

⁴⁷ Algemeen Rijkarschief, Rapport fait à M. le chargé d'affaires Testa sur les drapiers, par Hoschepied, Izmir, 19 Feb. 1818, in JAN G. NANNINGA (ed.), *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van de Levantschen Handel. Vierde deel: 1765-1826* ('S-Gravenhage, 1966), 950-951. Thereafter this archive will be cited as ARA.

⁴⁸ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, CCC, vol. 8, Consul Etienne David, Mémoire sur Scio, Chios, c.1823.

⁴⁹ ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century, 1700-1820* (Athens, 1992), 96-103, 168-169, 255-256.

⁵⁰ On the trade of the Greeks in Trieste, see KATSIARDI-HERING, *Η ελληνική παροικία της Τεργέστης*, vol. II, 507-564. On the trade of the Greeks in Livorno, see DESPINA VLAMI, *Το φιορίνι, το σιτάρι, και η οδος του κηπου. Έλληνες έμποροι στο Λιβόρνο, 1750-1868* (Florin, Wheat and the Garden Street. Greek Merchants in Livorno, 1750-1868) (Athens, 2000), 77-112, 133-143.

⁵¹ ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *Οι χιώτες έμποροι στις διεθνείς συναλλαγές (1750-1850), 1750-1850*] (Chiot Merchants in International Trade, 1750-1850) (Athens, 1995), *passim*. See also, GELINA HARLAFTIS, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping* (London, 1996), 39-69.

⁵² HARLAFTIS and LAIOU, "Ottoman state policy", 15. On the economic activities of the family in Izmir, see FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 109-111.

ent author, their ability to take advantage of the systemic changes that were taking place in international trade from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards and which were fundamentally altering the structure and functioning of this sector. As the world economy increasingly favored open competition some mercantile communities and governments, such as the French, were slower to react than others – the Greeks who displayed a tendency for risk-taking and speculative affairs, besides other assets that they brought to the arena of international long distance trade, did particularly well out of the new economic climate and conditions.

* * *

Although surpassed by the French and British in the eighteenth century, the Dutch who practiced a liberal economic regime remained nevertheless major players in Ottoman-European commerce⁵³. The centrality, on-going since the seventeenth century, of the Amsterdam commodities, credit and capital markets and of the Dutch banking system in global trade and transfer of funds, – operations in the latter sector were shared with London –, enabled them to continue commanding some of the most geographically-extensive and competitive trading and monetary networks in the world in the eighteenth century, too. As far as Ottoman-European commerce, in particular, was concerned, Dutch merchants and /or their associates, irrespective of whether they were in the Netherlands, or in any of the Italian ports, were willing to use the most competitive firms or individual merchants, as their agents, without any recourse to a specific nationality, or religion; they could be fellow-Dutch, British, or even Ottoman⁵⁴. As a result, and owing to the fact that in the course of the eighteenth century the British had developed more elaborate and better manned trading networks in the Empire than the Dutch, the former often acted as agents for Dutch companies that wished to trade with the eastern Mediterranean. The British agents had themselves a network of ‘friends’, who were based in different ports within the Empire, to whom they tur-

⁵³ On the Dutch trade in Izmir, see ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, “Commercial practices and competition in the Levant: the British and the Dutch in 18th-century Izmir”, in ALASTAIR HAMILTON, ALEXANDER H. DE GROOT and MAURITS H. VAN DEN BOOGERT (eds.), *Friends and Rivals in the East* (Leiden, 2000), 135-158; on Dutch trade in Aleppo, see MAURITS H. VAN DEN BOOGERT, “European Patronage in the Ottoman Empire: Anglo-Dutch Conflicts of Interest in Aleppo (1703-1755)”, in VAN DEN BOOGERT, *Friends and Rivals*, 187-222. On legal matters pertaining to Ottoman-European trade, see MAURITS H. VAN DEN BOOGERT, *The Capitulations and The Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and Beratlis* (Leiden, 2005).

⁵⁴ ARA, De Vogel, 19 Nov. 1762 to Bartholo Cardamici, Izmir. See also, ARA, De Vogel, 21 Dec. 1762 to Jean Boilley in J.G. NANNINGA (ed.), *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van de Levantschen Handel. Derde deel: 1727-1765* (S-Gravenhage, 1952), 475, 477-478.

ned to if they needed a specific sale or purchase to be made on behalf of their Dutch principals; these 'friends' could be other British, Dutch and occasionally Ottoman merchants⁵⁵. Besides the Ottoman Empire, firms based in the Netherlands – these firms were mostly Dutch but they could be British⁵⁶ and, by the latter part of the eighteenth century, Ottoman, too⁵⁷ – could also find agents for their Levant trade in any of the Italian ports, from whence the latter would carry out business on commission for their employers in Amsterdam.

In the eighteenth century, whilst the British could export goods from the Ottoman Empire to the Dutch markets directly Dutch ships could not, in peacetime, carry goods directly to British ports⁵⁸. However, there was a solution to this problem: the Dutch could trade with the British market indirectly through Livorno as well as through other Italian ports employing Dutch and non-Dutch agents or associates to do so. Using the Italian market networks, it would appear as extensively as they did the Ottoman ones, the Dutch, though be it mostly through their British representatives, increased their own trade with the Empire. As a by-product, but one which re-enforced their own position, too, they also strengthened the connectivity of the Anglo-Dutch Mediterranean trading networks as well as rendered them more efficient and competitive against the primary rival of both, in the Ottoman-European commerce, the French. Yet the latter were not far behind. To stay competitive vis-à-vis the British and Dutch as well as to take advantage of the fluidity of the Italian market networks, while remaining as much as possible, or officially at least, within the regulations of their state authorities, the French merchants, too, turned, primarily, although not exclusively, to Livorno⁵⁹.

It would appear that French ships originating from Marseilles with a cargo that could characteristically contain cloth, colonial goods and at times specie too, bound for the Ottoman markets, would stop at the Italian ports, Livorno⁶⁰ and later on Trieste or Ancona, too⁶¹, in order to sell part of their cargo and/or load more goods, before heading to their final destination at one of the Empire's ports. The reverse also took place; namely when a French ship left one of the Ottoman ports, bound for Marseilles, it would

⁵⁵ TNA, SP 105/187, Chancery, Istanbul, 15 Feb., 26 March and 28 Sept. 1781.

⁵⁶ FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, "Networks of Friendship", 189-192.

⁵⁷ FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *Οι χιώτες έμποροι*, 22-25, 34, 42-44.

⁵⁸ *Acts of Parliament, 1753: An Historical View of the Conduct and Proceedings of the Turkey Company.*

⁵⁹ ACCM, H/164, French Merchants, Marseilles, 7 June 1737 to Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles.

⁶⁰ MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi a Livorno 1537-1737* (Messina, 2004).

⁶¹ ANF, AE Biii 243, Miège, Renseignements sur le commerce du Levant, 13 May 1825.

often stop at an Italian port to unload and/or load more goods. It must have been a regular practice that moreover affected Ottoman ports across the board, not only Izmir but also Salonica and others, and which was reflected in the statistics recording trade and shipping movements between Marseilles and Ottoman ports that the French authorities painstakingly put together in the eighteenth century. In the course of such data gathering it became obvious to French officials at the time that goods leaving Izmir, for example, did not reach Marseilles, *the* port designated for the Levant trade by the authorities, and the reverse. Staying with the example of Izmir, and looking at the statistical data available, we see certain trends emerging⁶². In the first half of the eighteenth century, for instance, Marseilles was not absorbing all the goods that Izmir was sending to it annually; part of these goods were diffused to other markets in Europe through the Italian ports, and especially Livorno, acting as a distributive centre in this process. Equally in the second half of the century, for which we have available data, we find that Izmir was getting more goods in French ships which were arriving at its port than what Marseilles was reportedly sending to it. In other words French merchants were sending additional goods to Izmir from their 'friends' in the Italian ports, since the Ottoman market could absorb more goods than what Marseilles could offer, or do so at prices and terms of trade that were as competitive in the Levantine market as what the Italian networks could attain. Given the problems that French manufacture was facing in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and the tough competition it was experiencing from the British and Central European textile sectors, it would not have always been French cloth that was being sent in French ships to Izmir from the Italian markets.

Thus in Livorno, the most central of the Italian markets for most of the eighteenth century⁶³, both French and Dutch merchants, and British, too⁶⁴, could buy each other's cloth, basing their decision of which qualities and types of any one country's cloth to buy, according to what would fetch a better price and was in greater demand in the various Ottoman markets, and available in the Italian ports, and for which shipping could be found expeditiously to send it to the Empire. For their returns, they could procure commodities from the Ottomans, the French for Marseilles, the Anglo-Dutch partnerships for Amsterdam, or London, equally from Italian or Ot-

⁶² On statistics on the Izmir-Marseilles trade see FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 261-273.

⁶³ MICHELA D'ANGELO, "The British Factory at Leghorn: A Kind of Chamber of Commerce *cum* Consulate", in CARMEL VASSALLO (ed.), *Consolati di Mare and Chambers of Commerce* (Malta, 2000), 113-125.

⁶⁴ CLARENCE MATTERSON, *English Trade in the Levant, 1693-1753* (unpublished Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation, 1936), 196, 295.

toman ports, since Ottoman goods could be had in the Italian ports at times even at better prices compared to the price levels for goods available to the Europeans trading in the Empire⁶⁵. Given overall market conditions and sometimes political conditions too, the Italian ports had the potential of undercutting British or French merchants, if the latter used a direct route between London or Marseilles and the Ottoman port(s) they traded from or with, and excluded the Italian ports. British or French firms could equally thus find themselves undercut if they chose to follow their states' regulations, implemented in the British case through the Levant company, of not trading in each other's cloth, which they could otherwise indirectly do, irrespective of wartime or times of peace, if they chose to go through the Italian ports. In other words, with the help of French and British commercial interests, and the systemic changes that were taking place in the world economy, the Italian ports were 'punching holes' in the canvas of protectionism that the French and British authorities sought so diligently to establish in their Levant trade.

What motivated French and British merchants established in Ottoman ports at times to stay within their authorities' stipulations and even made it attractive for them to do so, were trading monopoly privileges conferred on them by their states. The latter authorities sought to give them exclusivity to the Ottoman markets and in return they tolerated the circulation of goods within all markets in the Mediterranean only at wartime. However, such stipulations were becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in the growing world economy of the second half of the eighteenth century. Increase in the volume of international trade, including the Mediterranean, as well as systemic changes taking place within the sector, resulted in calls in both France and Britain for Free Trade⁶⁶. The closing decades of the eighteenth century and even earlier witnessed discussions in France led by the Physiocrats for an end to mercantilism and debates in the Houses of Parliament in Britain calling for the relaxation of monopoly regulations⁶⁷.

* * *

In contrast to the protectionism of the British and French, at least as espoused by some of their commercial interests, we have the liberal regime

⁶⁵ FRANGAKIS-SYRETT, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 83-84, 123-127, 172-179, 274-275.

⁶⁶ Similar discussions amongst intellectuals and government administrators went on in other countries as the case of Naples shows. PATRICK CHORLEY, *Oil, Silk and Enlightenment. Economic problems in Eighteenth Century Naples* (Naples, 1965), 10-17.

⁶⁷ Although it was only in 1825 that the Levant Company was finally abolished, its hey day had been long since over. TNA, FO 78/136, Memorandum, Levant Company, 1825. An instance of this can be seen in the arrival of Ottoman Greek ships in the port of London already in 1798.

of the Dutch. This leads to similarities in certain respects in the way that Dutch and Italian networks impacted Ottoman-European trade. In both cases, there were quite few Italians or Dutch actually trading in the Empire, in the eighteenth century; there were always more French or British merchants doing so. Yet the economies and infrastructure of their ports – Livorno and Amsterdam being the biggest but not the only such examples – were open to all newcomers, irrespective of nationality or creed. As a result, besides European merchant communities, there were flourishing Ottoman merchant communities of Greeks, Jews and Armenians in the Dutch and Italian ports, especially in Amsterdam, Trieste and Ancona, besides Livorno, and to a lesser extent in Genoa, Messina and Venice, who traded with their co-religionists, or with other westerners in the Empire; this was especially so in the second half of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries as argued above. Despite the perhaps obvious importance and primacy of Amsterdam in international trade and the financial markets, in the eighteenth century, from which the Ottoman economy stood to gain, and did so, the Italian ports remained, it would appear, more significant overall for the Empire's European trade.

Geographical proximity and more significantly the manner that Italian markets answered the Empire's needs, and often the needs of the Empire's other European partners, too, as shown in the way trade was conducted and commodities traded, in the vibrancy of the transportation sector as well as in the active trade in money and in bills of exchange that went on between the two regions, resulted in a number of advantages being offered to the Empire through this commercial interaction that surpassed those of Amsterdam. Further, the importance that Ottoman trade held for the Italian ports' economies, too, which would appear to be greater when compared to the Dutch, ensured that the commercial links between the Italian and Ottoman ports would remain robust and continue growing throughout the eighteenth century, not only at times of inter-European conflicts but at peacetime, too. What aided further the development of such links were the growth and major changes taking place in the world economy and international trade at the time.

Rosario Lentini

British merchants and goods in Palermo (1797-1816)

One of the aims of the present research is to gain a more precise understanding of the gradual introduction of British, and more generally, foreign merchants into the economic structure of the city¹.

Though the project is still under way, I will present the results of preliminary research based on previously unexamined documentary source: the registers of the *Regia Dogana* of Palermo (the so-called *Secrezia*). The complete series of registers, housed in the State Archives of Palermo, covers the years from 1583 to 1824². These registers, called "*Responsali*," were compiled by the master "*Secreto*" or his delegate, who recorded the salient information regarding exports, boat trans-shipments and imports. The data for these registers was obtained from a document also called "*responsale*" which was issued at the embarkation point of the goods shipped to Palermo (*Tab. 1*).

This phase of the analysis was based on data from 5 of the 14 registers corresponding to the years 1797-1816, a period in which the English presence in Sicily was most evident³. The analysis of the "*Responsali*" not

¹ MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia 1806-1815* (Milano, 1988); RALEIGH TREVELYAN, *La storia dei Whitaker* (Palermo, 1988); FRANCESCO BRANCATO, *Benjamin Ingham e il suo impero economico* (Napoli, 1993); ORAZIO CANCELILA, *Storia dell'industria in Sicilia* (Roma-Bari, 1995); ANNA BASSO, "Prestito a cambio e assicurazioni marittime in Sicilia nella prima metà dell'Ottocento", *Annali di Storia moderna e contemporanea*, No. 8 (2002), 555-576; ROSARIO LENTINI, "Financial Activities of English Merchant-Bankers in Western Sicily between the 18th and 19th Centuries", in *Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of Maritime History* (Corfù, 23-27 June 2004, CD rom); ROSARIO LENTINI, "English Merchant-Bankers in Western Sicily in the early-nineteenth century", in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean. Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XIX Centuries)*, ed. by CARMEL VASSALLO and MICHELA D'ANGELO (Malta, 2007), 115-130.

² Archivio di Stato di Palermo (ASP), *Secrezia di Palermo*, from the register No. 1584 to the register No. 1774, years 1583-1824.

³ ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *Sicilia e Gran Bretagna. Le relazioni commerciali dalla Restaurazione all'Unità* (Milano, 1983); ROMUALDO GIUFFRIDA, "Rapporti economici tra Sicilia e Inghilterra nel primo Ottocento", in *Benjamin Ingham nella Sicilia dell'Ottocento* (Marsala, 1985), 27-35; MICHELA D'ANGELO, "Tra Sicilia e Gran Bretagna", in JOHN ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione britannica in Sicilia 1811-1814* (Palermo, 2002); SALVATORE

only reveals precise information about the presence of British merchants in Palermo in that period, but also about other equally active foreign and local merchants⁴.

The range and importance of this information, for the history of Sicilian commerce⁵, facilitate the chronological reappraisal of other sources available (notary records, the Commercial Court, the Ingham-Whitaker Archives, the *Real Segreteria*). This permits the comparisons necessary to identify the exact dates of arrival of all the principal actors and the beginning of activity for the foreign commercial houses. The data also helps to redesign the network of relationships with local merchants, in part already known, and among merchants of different cities⁶.

The annotations contained in the "*Responsali*" have the advantage of being relatively well-organized because of the need to regulate the collection of import and export duties on goods at the port of Palermo. This necessitated, among other things, the detailed description of these goods.

Along general lines, the structure of the "*Responsali*" is based on a sequence – not always in chronological order – of entries regarding four possible activities: besides "*Estrazioni*" and "*Immissioni*" which correspond to exports and imports, one finds operations called "*Imballo*" (packed goods) and "*Travazzo*" (trans-shipments). The "*Imballo*", on one hand, was considered an exportation category for items previously imported from "*Fuori Regno*" (outside the Kingdom) by the same or different merchants. This involved, in large part, wholesalers who redistributed these goods to the merchants of the Island. The "*Travazzo*", on the other hand, consisted of the transfer of cargo from one anchored ship to another. In other words, these were products in transit, not destined for the local market, but for which customs duties were still paid.

BOTTARI, "Economic and Cultural Relations between Sicily and Great Britain in the second Half of the Eighteenth Century", in *Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of Maritime History* (Corfù, 23-27 June 2004, CD rom); SALVATORE BOTTARI, "Relations between Sicily and Great Britain in 1750-1800: the Interplay of Culture and Economy", in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean*, 81-95; CARLO R. RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico nel Mediterraneo (1794-1818)* (Milano, 2005), 165-318.

⁴ ASP, Secrezia di Palermo 1745, 1797-98; 1746, 1800-1801; 1750, 1806-1807; 1757, 1814-1815; 1758, 1815-1816.

⁵ GIOVANNI ATTILIO ARNOLFINI, *Giornale di viaggio e quesiti sull'economia siciliana (1768)*, a cura di CARMELO TRASSELLI (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1962); LUDOVICO BIANCHINI, *Storia economico civile della Sicilia*, a cura di FRANCESCO BRANCATO (Napoli, 1971); PAOLO BALSAMO, *Memorie inedite di pubblica economia ed agricoltura*, a cura di GIUSEPPE GIARRIZZO (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1983); WILLIAM HENRY SMYTH, *Memoir descriptive of the resources, inhabitants, and hidrography of Sicily and its islands, interspersed with antiquarian and other notices*, (London, 1824).

⁶ CARMELO TRASSELLI, "Mercanti forestieri nell'età moderna", in *Storia della Sicilia* (Napoli, 1978), VII, 163-182; ORAZIO CANCELIA, "Commercio estero", in *Storia delle Sicilia*, VII, 121-161.

The following data for each of these four activities was transcribed by the official of the "*Secrezia*".

For the "*Immissioni*": the origin of the ship, but not the name; the name of the captain or owner of the ship; the date of the "*responsale*" document was issued at the departure from one of the ports of the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily; the type and quantity of the imported goods; the date of record of the operation in the customs register of Palermo.

For the "*Estrazioni*": the name of the exporter and the captain or owner of the ship; the goods embarked and their respective quantity; the destination, "*per Fuori*" or "*per Infra Regno*", sometimes with the precise indication of the city; the date of record in the registers of the *Secrezia*.

The information recorded for the "*Imballi*" and the "*Travazzi*" was essentially analogous. The names of merchants, regardless of the type of operation recorded, were sometimes accompanied by place of origin or, in the case of foreigners, by nationality. Besides the usual material errors, it was not uncommon to detect misleading attributions in which the same merchant (importer or exporter) was considered either English or German, without distinction, based on the nationality of the name of the foreign company. In this phase of the research, I will leave aside considerations regarding quantitative data of the arriving or departing goods which, it should be noted, present numerous difficulties; for instance, the information available is not always complete, legible and homogeneous, especially regarding the importation of fabric. I will limit myself to observations about commercial relations and contacts, the identity of the merchants, and some aspects of the goods. As we can see in *Table 1*, 4202 operations have been examined and divided by typology. The numerical sequence of the registers and the respective dates not only demonstrate the archival lacunae for the period Sept 1798-August 1800, but also show the reutilization of an earlier register (n.1757) for a large number of entries that should have been recorded in register n.1758⁷. Even if the number of entries for "*Imballi*" and "*Travazzi*" seems more or less equal, the respective trend for the two, at the end of the 20 year period, is divergent: the former decreases and the latter grows markedly, until the disappearance of both from the registers after 1814. In any case, as it has already been stated, the nature of the two operations is different; the "*Imballi*" were exports from Palermo "*via sea*" toward other island ports or "*overland*" toward the inland cities, and were, nonetheless, subject to customs duties. The origin of these goods was almost exclusively "*Fuori Regno*." At the end of the 18th century, "*Imballi*" in the port of Palermo were handled in large part by the merchants from Positano, rather than locals, and the percentage of the operations traceable to

⁷ All the data in the four tables are collected exclusively by the registers of the *Secrezia*, numbered 1745, 1746, 1750, 1757 and 1758.

foreigners did not exceed 7 %, with a clear prevalence of French merchants (specifically, the commercial house of Bouge & Caillol). Among the English were Abraham Gibbs, Carlo Maud and James Tough. There was also an essential similarity regarding the typology of the packed goods recorded: raw and finished fabric, plush, German and English wools, coypu fur from France and Germany to be used in Holland, cashmere, and printed, dyed or embroidered muslin. Out of a total of 267 operations only six dealt with Spanish sugar and ground or rappee tobacco.

The "*Travazzi*," which concerned products boarded on Sicilian or foreign ships that were not destined for the Palermo market, furnish an account quite unlike the "*Imballi*." In general, the figure of the ship captains (especially Dalmatian⁸, Danish and American), who handled this particular activity for themselves or for others (the difference is not always clear), emerged. Furthermore, the presence of foreigners – representing about 18% of the total activity – appeared noteworthy and differentiated: the English (Gibbs, Maud, Paterson, Tough, Vallin, Woodhouse), the Maltese (Attardi, Gatt and Mattei)⁹, the Austrians (Betz, Novatsky and Palme, Langer & Co.), the Danish (Rap), the Portuguese (Gropia and Casale), and the Savoyards (Gurliè). As opposed to the "*Imballi*", there was no French presence in the "*Travazzi*" entries and the different types of the goods noted were quite varied: sumac, manna, leather and dried skins, tobacco, sugar, spices, fabrics and clothing, wood, iron, copper, porcelain, etc. Regarding the countries and cities of origin, the information is not sufficiently exhaustive because the percentage of ships which lack provenience in the "*Travazzi*" is 62%; for each of the identified ships (the remaining 38%) that came from other Sicilian ports, however, there were about 10 ships arriving from outside the kingdom. The identity of the port of destination of the ships leaving Palermo with trans-shipped goods is more precise; 86% of the ships were headed toward coastal cities of the island,

Table 1. Operations recorded in the "Responsali" of the Secrezia in Palermo

| Register number | Years | <i>Imballi</i> or Packed Goods | <i>Travazzi</i> or Trans shipments | <i>Estrazioni</i> or Exports | <i>Immissioni</i> or Imports | Number of operations |
|-----------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1745 | 2.9.1797 - 31.8.1798 | 111 (10,6%) | 57 (5,4%) | 183 (17,4%) | 699 (66,6%) | 1050 (100%) |
| 1746 | 1.9.1800 - 31.8.1801 | 92 (7,4%) | 71 (5,7%) | 180 (14,5%) | 899 (72,4%) | 1242 (100%) |
| 1750 | 2.9.1806 - 26.8.1807 | 62 (6,8%) | 139 (15,2%) | 126 (13,8%) | 589 (64,3%) | 916 (100%) |
| 1757 | 3.9.1814 - 21.11.1815 | - | - | 5 (0,9%) | 554 (99,1%) | 559 (100%) |
| 1758 | 15.9.1815 - 23.8.1816 | - | 8 (1,8%) | - | 427 (98,2%) | 435 (100%) |
| TOTAL | | 265 (6,3%) | 275 (6,5%) | 494 (11,8%) | 3168 (75,4%) | 4202 (100%) |

⁸ ANTONIO DI VITTORIO, *Tra mare e terra. Aspetti economici e finanziari della Repubblica di Ragusa in età moderna* (Bari, 2001).

⁹ MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi a Malta 1800-1825* (Milano, 1990).

while only 6% went to other foreign ports or the peninsula. For the remaining 8%, no port of destination was specified.

As shown in *Table 1*, the majority of the registered operations in the period under examination had to do with imports (75,4% of the total), and even when reflecting lower levels, the imports predominated when compared to the activities described above. *Table 2* records, in decreasing order, the cities of origin of the imported goods and the number of operations per locality. Nevertheless, apart from the examination of data for each city, a comparison by area is also useful (*Table 3*). For the sake of convenience, the material has been divided into “*Intendenze*”, the administrative subdivision adopted by the Bourbon government in 1817, rather than the ancient tripartite division of Sicily, the “*Valli*”¹⁰. Such an aggregation makes the importance of the agro-industrial areas of Messina¹¹ and Trapani¹², the principal suppliers of consumer goods to the capital, immediately visible (Fig. 1).

Thus, for example, numerous shipments of wine destined for the Palermo market departed from Castellammare del Golfo or from the nearby




Fig. 1. Sicily 1817.
Administrative and territorial division (“*Intendenze*”)

¹⁰ *Città capovalli nell'Ottocento borbonico*, a cura di CLAUDIO TORRISI (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1995).

¹¹ ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, “Guglielmo Peirce da negoziante ad armatore”, in *I Whitaker e il capitale inglese tra l'Ottocento e il Novecento in Sicilia*, a cura di CLAUDIO D'ALEO e SALVATORE GIRGENTI, (Trapani, 1992), 131-146; MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniera a Messina tra XVIII e XIX secolo* (Messina, 1995); ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, “Attività commerciali nei porti della Sicilia tra Settecento e Ottocento”, in *Sopra i porti di mare. III: Sicilia e Malta*, a cura di GIORGIO SIMONCINI, (Firenze, 1997), 111-157; MICHELA D'ANGELO, “William Sanderson: uno dei «Principal British Merchants»”, in *Un luogo dell'anima. Villa Pace dai Sanderson ai Borsurgi all'Università*, a cura di LUCIANA CAMINITI, MICHELA D'ANGELO e LUIGI HYERACE, (Messina, 2003), 36-51; MAURIZIO GANGEMI, *Espostazioni calabresi nel XVIII secolo* (Napoli, 1991).

¹² ORAZIO CANCELILA, *Aspetti di un mercato siciliano. Trapani nei secoli XVII-XIX* (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1972); FRANCESCO BENIGNO, *Il porto di Trapani nel Settecento. Rotte, traffici, esportazioni (1674-1800)* (Trapani, 1982).

Table 2. Boarding places of goods and number of operations

| Goods imported from (<i>Immissioni</i>) | Area code | 1797-98 | 1800-01 | 1806-07 | 1814-15 | 1815-16 | Number of operations |
|--|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------------|
| Messina | ME | 39 | 357 | 183 | 43 | 20 | 642 (20,3%) |
| Castellammare del Golfo | TP | 123 | 97 | 99 | 198 | 78 | 595 (18,8%) |
| Napoli | - | 281 | 197 | 4 | - | 84 | 566 (17,9%) |
| Partinico | PA | - | - | - | 126 | 77 | 203 (6,4%) |
| Trapani | TP | 41 | 17 | 27 | 19 | 43 | 147 (4,6%) |
| Marsala | TP | 20 | 16 | 18 | 31 | 32 | 117 (3,7%) |
| Mistretta | ME | 16 | 24 | 25 | 4 | 3 | 72 (2,3%) |
| Brolo | ME | 23 | 25 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 66 (2,1%) |
| San Marco | ME | 23 | 14 | 14 | 6 | 3 | 60 (1,9%) |
| Acireale | CT | 14 | 7 | 29 | 4 | 3 | 57 (1,8%) |
| Patti | ME | 14 | 8 | 20 | 5 | 7 | 54 (1,7%) |
| Milazzo | ME | 6 | 9 | 16 | 14 | 8 | 53 (1,7%) |
| Cefalù | PA | 9 | 8 | 20 | 9 | 4 | 50 (1,6%) |
| Sant'Agata Militello | ME | 16 | 14 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 47 (1,5%) |
| Naso | ME | 7 | 4 | 20 | 9 | 3 | 43 (1,4%) |
| Augusta | NT | 10 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 12 | 41 (1,3%) |
| Mascali | CT | 3 | 1 | 17 | 10 | 6 | 37 (1,2%) |
| Termini Imerese | PA | 4 | 20 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 33 (1,0%) |
| Mazara del Vallo | TP | 3 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 11 | 31 (1,0%) |
| San Fratello | ME | 5 | 13 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 26 (0,8%) |
| Sciacca | AG | 4 | 2 | 17 | - | 1 | 24 (0,8%) |
| Caronia | ME | 11 | 9 | 3 | 1 | - | 24 (0,8%) |
| Siracusa | NT | 1 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 23 (0,7%) |
| Noto | NT | 3 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 2 | 22 (0,7%) |
| Vittoria | NT | 3 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 13 (0,4%) |
| Girgenti | AG | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 11 (0,3%) |
| Acì Sant'Antonio | CT | - | 4 | 4 | - | - | 8 (0,3%) |
| Catania | CT | 3 | 3 | 2 | - | - | 8 (0,3%) |
| Motta d'Affermo | ME | - | 1 | - | 5 | - | 6 (0,2%) |
| Terranova (Gela) | CL | 1 | - | - | 4 | 1 | 6 (0,2%) |
| Palma | AG | 2 | - | 3 | 1 | - | 6 (0,2%) |
| Licata | AG | - | 1 | - | 2 | 2 | 5 (0,2%) |
| Siculiana | AG | - | - | 2 | 3 | - | 5 (0,2%) |
| Taormina | ME | 5 | - | - | - | - | 5 (0,2%) |
| Santa Croce | NT | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 4 (0,1%) |
| Avola | NT | - | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 3 (0,1%) |
| Gioiosa | ME | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 3 (0,1%) |
| Piraino | ME | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 3 (0,1%) |
| Tusa | ME | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 3 (0,1%) |
| Gaeta | - | - | 2 | - | - | - | 2 (0,1%) |
| Scicli | NT | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | 2 (0,1%) |
| Pozzo di Gotto | ME | - | - | - | 2 | - | 2 (0,1%) |
| Castellammare di Stabia | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | 1 (0,0%) |
| Positano | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 (0,0%) |
| Castelvetrano | TP | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 (0,0%) |
| Favarotta | PA | - | 1 | - | - | - | 1 (0,0%) |
| Forza | ME | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 (0,0%) |
| Spaccaforno | NT | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 (0,0%) |
| Ragusa | NT | - | - | - | 1 | - | 1 (0,0%) |
| Fiumefreddo | CT | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 (0,0%) |
| Places not specified | - | 4 | 16 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 32 (1,0%) |
| TOTAL | | 699 | 883 | 582 | 550 | 426 | 3168 (100%) |

AG = Girgenti, CL = Caltanissetta, CT = Catania, ME = Messina, NT = Noto, PA = Palermo, TP = Trapani

Table 3. Areas of origin of goods and number of operations

| <i>Immissioni</i> (Imported from) | Area code | 1797-98 | 1800-01 | 1806-07 | 1814-15 | 1815-16 | Number of operations |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------------|
| Messina | ME | 39 | 357 | 183 | 43 | 20 | 642 |
| Mistretta | ME | 16 | 24 | 25 | 4 | 3 | 72 |
| Brolo | ME | 23 | 25 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 66 |
| San Marco | ME | 23 | 14 | 14 | 6 | 3 | 60 |
| Patti | ME | 14 | 8 | 20 | 5 | 7 | 54 |
| Milazzo | ME | 6 | 9 | 16 | 14 | 8 | 53 |
| Sant'Agata Militello | ME | 16 | 14 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 47 |
| Naso | ME | 7 | 4 | 20 | 9 | 3 | 43 |
| San Fratello | ME | 5 | 13 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 26 |
| Caronia | ME | 11 | 9 | 3 | 1 | - | 24 |
| Motta d'Affermo | ME | - | 1 | - | 5 | - | 6 |
| Taormina | ME | 5 | - | - | - | - | 5 |
| Gioiosa | ME | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Piraino | ME | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Tusa | ME | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 3 |
| Pozzo di Gotto | ME | - | - | - | 2 | - | 2 |
| Forza | ME | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| <i>Messina area</i> | | | | | | | 1110 (35,0%) |
| Castellammare del Golfo | TP | 123 | 97 | 99 | 198 | 78 | 595 |
| Trapani | TP | 41 | 17 | 27 | 19 | 43 | 147 |
| Marsala | TP | 20 | 16 | 18 | 31 | 32 | 117 |
| Mazara del Vallo | TP | 3 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 11 | 31 |
| Castelvetrano | TP | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| <i>Trapani area</i> | | | | | | | 891 (28,1%) |
| Napoli | - | 281 | 197 | 4 | - | 84 | 566 |
| Gaeta | - | - | 2 | - | - | - | 2 |
| Castellammare di Stabia | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | 1 |
| Positano | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| <i>Other Towns</i> | | | | | | | 570 (18,0%) |
| Partinico | PA | - | - | - | 126 | 77 | 203 |
| Cefalù | PA | 9 | 8 | 20 | 9 | 4 | 50 |
| Termini Imerese | PA | 4 | 20 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 33 |
| Favarotta | PA | - | 1 | - | - | - | 1 |
| <i>Palermo area</i> | | | | | | | 287 (9,1%) |
| Acireale | CT | 14 | 7 | 29 | 4 | 3 | 57 |
| Mascali | CT | 3 | 1 | 17 | 10 | 6 | 37 |
| Aci Sant'Antonio | CT | - | 4 | 4 | - | - | 8 |
| Catania | CT | 3 | 3 | 2 | - | - | 8 |
| Fiumefreddo | CT | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| <i>Catania area</i> | | | | | | | 111 (3,5%) |
| Augusta | NT | 10 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 12 | 41 |
| Siracusa | NT | 1 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 23 |
| Noto | NT | 3 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 2 | 22 |
| Vittoria | NT | 3 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 13 |
| Santa Croce | NT | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 4 |
| Avola | NT | - | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 3 |
| Scicli | NT | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | 2 |
| Spaccaforo | NT | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 |
| Ragusa | NT | - | - | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| <i>Noto area</i> | | | | | | | 110 (3,5%) |
| Sciacca | AG | 4 | 2 | 17 | - | 1 | 24 |
| Girgenti/Agrigento | AG | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 11 |
| Palma | AG | 2 | - | 3 | 1 | - | 6 |
| Licata | AG | - | 1 | - | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| Siculiana | AG | - | - | 2 | 3 | - | 5 |
| <i>Girgenti area</i> | | | | | | | 51 (1,6%) |
| Terranova (Gela) | CL | 1 | - | - | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| <i>Caltanissetta area</i> | | | | | | | 6 (0,2%) |
| Places not specified | | 4 | 16 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 32 (1,0%) |
| TOTAL | | 699 | 899 | 589 | 554 | 427 | 3168 (100%) |

Partinico, traditionally strong wine-growing areas. Marsala wine, however, was shipped outside the kingdom directly from the ports of Trapani and Marsala. Similarly, bales of raw and refined silk reached Palermo from towns in the Messina area (ME), Brolo, Patti, Sant'Agata, San Fratello, and San Marco. The overall supremacy of Messina in imports was nothing new, considering that the "free port" status, reintroduced in 1784, had attracted numerous merchants and foreign commercial houses and relaunched the city (after the earthquake of 1783) as the most important Sicilian marketplace.

An analysis of the trends in imports from Messina shows some particularly interesting aspects. In the years 1797-1798, the 39 "*Immissioni*" from Messina appear to be modest and fall almost entirely into the sphere of commercial activity run by local operators. This activity included refined silk imported by don Matteo Guli and iron in sheaves or rods from Northern Europe. The only operation traceable to foreigners was on behalf of the Swiss house of Federico Meuricoffre and his Neapolitan partner Sorvillo¹³ for whom the Palermitan don Bartolomeo Impallomeni e Giuliana imported wool and coyppu furs from Germany. Two years later – as it is clear from *Table 2* – imports from Messina had almost doubled: 357 operations compared to 197 from Naples which, until that moment, had maintained supremacy in commercial activity with Palermo. This activity was now cut back because of the political-military situation in Europe. Besides local raw and refined silk, products from German and Dutch textile industries, English fabric and muslins, Bohemian crystal, nails, iron and glass sheets, cacao, spices, tobacco, and lumber from Calabria also arrived from Messina. About 21% of these imports were now run by foreign residents of Palermo: these included the very active French merchants Bouge and Caillol (who operated through their agent Stefano Campo), the widow of Francesco Philip and Dursarques La Valle; the Germans Palme, Langer & C. and the Peratoner brothers; the Portuguese Claudio Rocques; and the Savoyard Gurlìè. The only English importer who appeared with frequency in the customs registers of that period was the previously cited Abraham Gibbs, partner in the Anglo-Swiss company Falconnet, Gibbs & C., with offices in Naples¹⁴. In any case – as discussed by Michela D'Angelo – only from 1806 we begin to see an increase in the presence of English merchants in Palermo. By 1811 a nucleus of 16 commercial houses had been established, against the 33 active in Messina at the time¹⁵.

¹³ JOHN DAVIS, *Società e imprenditori nel Regno borbonico 1815-1860* (Bari-Roma, 1979), 17-48; LORENZO ZICHICHI, *Il colonialismo felpato* (Palermo, 1988).

¹⁴ ROSARIO LENTINI, "Dal commercio alla finanza: i negozianti-banchieri inglesi nella Sicilia Occidentale tra XVIII e XIX secolo", *Mediterranea*, I, No. 2 (December 2004), 105-122.

¹⁵ D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia*, 60-74.

Table 4. Exports from Palermo:
 (a) Destinations, (b) Exported silver and gold coins in *onze*

| a) Destinations | 1797-98 | 1800-01 | 1806-07 | 1814-15 | 1815-16 |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|----------|---------|
| Out of the Kingdom (Fuori Regno) | 12 (6,5%) | 14 (18,9%) | 26 (20,7%) | - | - |
| In the Kingdom (Infra Regno) | 148 (80,9%) | 138 (76,7%) | 89 (70,6%) | 5 (100%) | - |
| [exclusively to Messina] | [66] | [77] | [45] | [0] | - |
| Not specified | 23 (12,6%) | 8 (4,4%) | 11 (8,7%) | - | - |
| TOTAL | 183 (100%) | 180 (100%) | 126 (100%) | 5 (100%) | - |

| b) Money (<i>onze</i>) sent to (<i>Estrazioni moneta</i>) | 1797-98 | 1800-01 | 1806-07 | 1814-15 | 1815-16 |
|--|----------------|--------------|--------------|---------|---------|
| Messina | 161041 (85,0%) | 7800 (85,7%) | 3300 (38,6%) | - | - |
| [number of operations] | [36] | [4] | [5] | - | - |
| Other towns | 28396 (15,0%) | 1300 (14,3%) | 5240 (61,4%) | - | - |
| [number of operations] | [26] | [1] | [6] | - | - |
| TOTAL | 189437 (100%) | 9100 (100%) | 8540 (100%) | - | - |
| [number of operations] | [62] | [5] | [11] | - | - |

Regarding exports (*Tab. 4*), it is possible to see the decreasing trend and their definitive decline in 1814, as well as the complete cessation of this activity by 1815. The analysis of the commercial flows leaving Palermo confirm the prevalence of the “*Infra Regno*” traffic (never inferior to 70.6% of the total, with peaks of 80.9%) especially toward Messina, which is proof of the subordinate position of the Palermo market. But there is another very significant fact which needs explaining (cf. *Tab. 4*); among the entries for exports from Palermo, the “*Responsali*” show the large amounts of cash transfers from one marketplace to another that French merchants like Bouge & Caillol or the Maltese, Calcedonio Gatt, were capable of. This also indicates how much liquidity was available, before the British occupation, for the imports from Messina and their respective payments. The strong contraction of cash transfers, that was already noted in 1800, may be explained by the reduction of activity of foreign and local merchants who had maintained, until that moment, control over the Palermo market. This change may also be understood as a consequence of the introduction of new means for the regulation of transactions, and of more secure financial instruments such as letters of exchange, whose marked development can be seen in notary minutes. In any case, the simultaneous presence in the principal Sicilian marketplaces of an increasing number of consuls, vice-consuls, and British merchants notably increased the margins of reciprocal financial “trust” and long-range compensation.

Laura Calosci

La transformation du commerce méditerranéen catalan en relation avec Gênes et Marseille durant la première moitié du XIX^e siècle

Introduction

Le cas de Barcelone montre une stratégie spécifique d'adaptation du capital commercial catalan à la transformation profonde du système international d'échanges, qui a eu lieu entre fin du siècle XVIII et la première moitié du siècle XIX, dans laquelle les intérêts commerciaux présents dans la place progressivement ont été déplacés pour le surgissement nouveaux et les forts intérêts en rapport avec le secteur industriel cotonnier¹. Dans une faute de temps relativement bref, entre 1815 et 1847 approximativement, l'activité économique dominante de Barcelone et ses alentours passe du commerce à la transformation industrielle textile.

Le port de Barcelone, deuxième port de l'Espagne après Cadix à la fin du siècle XVIII et premier dans le siècle XIX, reflète clairement cette transformation. En effet, le port de Barcelone, de centre de médiation des trafics entre les colonies espagnole d'Outre-mer et la Méditerranée Occidentale, se transforme en port presque exclusivement visant à l'importation matière première et biens d'équipement pour l'industrie. C'est-à-dire que dans quelques décennies, Barcelone perd les connotations de ville portuaire qu'elles lui étaient propres dans le siècle XVIII pour se transformer une ville avec port, où la spéculation commerciale finit par se subordonner aux nécessités de l'industrie.

Si la croissance du secteur industriel est un phénomène généralisé en Europe sous la Restauration, et le motif fondamental du retour au protectionnisme des politiques économiques des monarchies restaurées², il est vrai

¹ JOSEP MARIA FRADERA, *Indústria i mercat. Les bases comercials de la indústria catalana moderna 1814-1845* (Barcelona, 1987).

² PAUL BAIROCH, *Commerce extérieur et développement économique de l'Europe au XIX siècle* (Paris, 1976).

tout autant que les villes portuaires ont souffert de ce changement et se sont toujours montrées, à travers l'action des chambres de commerce, de combatifs partisans du libre-échange. C'est le cas de Gênes et de Marseille – qui ont été plus particulièrement l'objet de notre étude – mais aussi celui de Cadix, de Livorno, Trieste, etc. Au contraire, curieusement, la Junta de Comercio de Barcelona défend un modèle de croissance endogène, basé sur le nationalisme économique, l'isolationnisme et prohibitionnisme³. On pourrait synthétiser l'idéologie de la Junta de Comercio de Barcelona par la formule de "prohibitionnisme libéral", c'est-à-dire prohibitionnisme économique dans un État libéral. Quels raisons justifient l'anomalie catalane? Pour répondre à cette question, il faut se pencher sur les spécificités du commerce international catalan, ses relations avec le reste de l'Espagne, les effets de la perte des colonies espagnoles sur l'ensemble de l'économie nationale et se demander jusqu'à quel point la faiblesse intrinsèque de l'État espagnol, tant au niveau intérieur qu'extérieur, a limité le nombre d'alternatives dont disposait l'économie catalane pour se développer.

1. *Le modèle commercial libre-échangiste catalan du siècle XVIII*

Dans la seconde moitié du siècle XVIII le commerce catalan a subi une phase de croissance assez extraordinaire. L'historiographie, en accord avec le modèle dessiné par Pierre Vilar, place le début de cette étape dans le siècle précédent, au moment où une série de circonstances ont favorisé que se renforce le processus de spécialisation agricole de produits d'exportation: le vin et l'eau-de-vie fine⁴. L'intensification de la production agricole dans la zone côtière a enclenché aussi une spécialisation productive croissante dans les différents secteurs qui donna lieu à d'intenses échanges tant intérieurs qu'extérieurs. La fin du monopole du port de Cadix sur le commerce colonial, promulguée en 1778 par la publication du "Reglamente y Aranceles Reales"⁵, ainsi que l'élimination de la piraterie barbaresque, principal danger pour la navigation méditerranéenne, acquise grâce aux traités de paix et de commerce avec les pays de la Porte Sublime et La Régence - avec le Maroc en 1767, avec la Turquie en 1782,

³ LAURA CALOSCI, *Nacionalismo económico y comercio mediterráneo. Pensamiento y acción de la Junta de Comercio de Barcelona, 1763-1847* (Barcelona, 2007); ALEX SÁNCHEZ, *La formación de una política económica prohibicionista en Cataluña, 1760-1840* (Lleida, 1988).

⁴ PIER VILAR, *Catalunya dins l'Espanya moderna* (Barcelona, 1964); JAUME TORRAS ELIAS, "Especialización agrícola e industria rural en Cataluña en el siglo XVIII", *Revista de Historia Económica*, No. 3 (1984), 113-127; FRANCESC VALLS, *La Catalunya atlàntica. Aiguarden i teixits a l'arrancada industrial catalana* (Vic, 2003).

⁵ JOSEP MARIA DELGADO, "Conseqüències econòmiques dels decrets de comerç lliure (1765-1820)", *Revista Econòmica de Catalunya*, No. 4 (1987), 48-56.

avec la Libye et la Tunisie en 1784, puis en 1791 avec l'Algérie - ont initié une période de splendeur du commerce catalan. Le commerce catalan atteint ainsi à son apogée entre 1781 et 1807, quand l'occupation française en 1808 provoqua le blocus total du port par la flotte britannique jusqu'à l'année 1814.

L'augmentation des entrées au port de Barcelone permet de mesurer la croissance de l'activité commerciale catalanne:

Tableau 1. Entrées au port de Barcelone 1784-1786; 1789-1803

| AÑOS | TOT. Extr. | ESP | TOT |
|-------------|-------------------|------------|------------|
| 1784 | 425 | 409 | 834 |
| 1785 | 458 | 462 | 920 |
| 1786 | 428 | 646 | 1.074 |
| 1789 | 426 | 720 | 1.146 |
| 1790 | 432 | 916 | 1.348 |
| 1792 | 538 | 1.043 | 1.581 |
| 1793 | 388 | 1.225 | 1.613 |
| 1794 | 402 | 1.777 | 2.179 |
| 1795 | 291 | 2.475 | 2.766 |
| 1796 | 396 | 1.870 | 2.266 |
| 1797 | 459 | 1.205 | 1.664 |
| 1798 | 524 | 1.357 | 1.881 |
| 1799 | 422 | 1.241 | 1.663 |
| 1800 | 440 | 1.467 | 1.907 |
| 1801 | 305 | 1.238 | 1.543 |
| 1802 | 598 | 1.681 | 2.279 |
| 1803 | 406 | 1.511 | 1.917 |

Source: Vilar, *Catalunya dins l'Espanya*

On peut observer que l'accroissement de la navigation concerne seulement le pavillon national, effet imputable à l'exclusion des pavillons étranger du trafic colonial et à la contraction du commerce marseillais, ayant pour causes successives, la Révolution, puis la formation de la première coalition anti-française en 1792. Les données relatives à la collecte du droit de "periaje" pour ces années témoignent clairement du bénéfice que retira le commerce catalan de ces événements. Le droit de "periaje" est un impôt sur la valeur des biens entrés par "la puerta de mar" de Barcelone, et donc en fait un impôt à la consommation.

Tableau 2. Collecte droit de periaje 1788-1794 (dans reales vellón)

| AÑOS | INGRESOS |
|------------------|-----------------|
| 1788/1789 | 435.000 |
| 1789/1790 | 413.000 |
| 1790/1791 | 808.000 |
| 1791/1792 | 769.000 |
| 1792/1793 | 585.000 |
| 1793/1794 | 832.000 |

Source: Àngel Ruiz y Pablo, *Historia de la Real Junta Particular de Comercio de Barcelona (1758-1847)* (Barcelona, 1994)


Toutefois, la comparaison du mouvement portuaire en entrée de Barcelone avec celui de Gênes et Marseille pour les quatre années indice choisis nous permet de faire une pondération du poids du trafic barcelonais. Celui-ci, malgré son accroissement, on maintient assez par de faible des autres deux. La modestie de Barcelone en comparaison avec les grandes deux emporios de la Méditerranéennes est due principalement au manque d'un significatif commerce de transit et de commission, à la faible extension de son commerce, à l'exception des relations avec les colonies, phénomène qui est relativement récent.

La structure commerciale catalanne libre-échangiste était articulée sur quatre axes fondamentaux que nous pouvons synthétiser de la manière suivante: marché interne, basé l'échange manufactures textiles et produit alimentaires; marché américain, basé l'échange de produits vinicoles et tissés et imprimés en échange de produits coloniaux; le commerce morue, eau-de-vie fine, céréales et tissus, principalement de toile, avec le nord de l'Europe; et finalement, le marché méditerranéen, basé l'importation céréales et manufactures textiles en échange de vin, produits alimentaires, matières premières et produits coloniaux de réexportation. La croissante demande de céréales dans la place de Barcelone, mise en rapport avec l'augmentation démographique et la spécialisation vinicole de son agriculture, a promu une intensification des échanges avec le secteur méditerranéen au détriment des relations avec la Baltique. Il s'agissait d'un commerce de petit cabotage et visant presque exclusivement aux ports francs Gênes et de Marseille, ce qui est grands emporios de la Méditerranée, d'où apportaient des départs de types plusieurs destinés principalement à la consommation et à la réexportation: binteloterie, droguerie, tissés divers, spécialement toiles blanches imprimées à Barcelone et renvoyées aux colonies. À ceux-ci on ajoutait d'autres plus spécifiques, comme le coton Malte et blé de l'Est, de Berberia et de l'Italie du Sud. Ces derniers produits étaient fréquemment achetés par commission d'agents genoveses ou marseilleses dans les places d'origine et arrivaient à Barcelone, dans la majorité des cas, sous drapeau genovesa, français ou napolitain.

La balance commerciale de 1793, ce qui est seule disponible pour la période, nous permet d'entrer un peu plus en détail.

Nous remarquons que la balance commerciale de Barcelone est conjointement déficitaire, mais avec quelques importantes ombres. Dans le commerce avec les pays du secteur atlantique le déficit est très modeste grâce à la complémentarité des produits échangés, tandis qu'avec les pays méditerranéens, les traditionnels produits d'exportation catalans, très semblables à ceux de des autres pays, ne trouvaient pas la faveur de ces marchés, déterminant ainsi un fort déficit qui se en partie avec la réexportation de coloniaux mais surtout avec les monnaies or et argent de l'Amérique.

Figure 1. Comparaison du trafic portuaire en entrée de Gênes, Marseille et Barcelone (1785-1786; 1794; 1798; 1801-1802)



Source: Barcelone, Vilar, *Catalunya dins l'Espanya*; Gênes, Luigi Bulferetti, Claudio Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria nell'età del Risorgimento*, (Milano, 1966); Marseille, Claude Carrière, *Négociants marseillais au XVIII^e siècle* (Marseille, 1973); Jules Jullian, *Essai sur le commerce de Marseille* (Marseille-Paris, 1842); Paul Masson, *Les Bouches du Rhône. Encyclopédie départementale* (Paris-Marseille, 1922)

Tableau 3. Balance commerciale de Barcelone dans 1793 (Valeurs dans reales de vellón)

| PAISES | VALOR IMP | VALOR EXP |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| ATLÁNTICOS | 48.765.397 | 48.457.817 |
| INGLATERRA | 17.956.206 | 15.712.396 |
| HOLANDA | 8.233.201 | 10.240.079 |
| PRUSIA | 3.930.986 | 3.221.025 |
| HAMBURGO | 9.300.008 | 3.075.992 |
| DINAMARCA | 2.571.614 | 8.697.178 |
| SUECIA | 1.681.118 | 3.673.707 |
| RUSIA | 2.289.501 | 994.275 |
| OTROS | 2.802.763 | 2.843.165 |
| MEDITERRÁNEOS | 44.224.063 | 20.708.079 |
| REP. GÉNOVA | 17.081.044 | 6.910.644 |
| "ITALIA" | 6.350.830 | 1.664.997 |
| FRANCIA | 9.301.107 | 10.247.322 |
| MALTA | 8.267.833 | 1.698.770 |
| BERBERÍA | 2.580.334 | 157.535 |
| OTROS | 642.915 | 28.811 |
| ULTRAMAR | | |
| ESTADOS UNIDOS | 3.126.142 | 0 |
| TOTAL COM. EXT. | 96.115.602 | 69.165.896 |
| COMERCIO COLONIAL | 56.543.956 | 33.248.906 |
| monedas oro y plata | 35.057.225 | |

Source: Vilar, *Catalunya dins l'Espanya*

2. Formation du model commercial prohibitionniste: le nationalisme économique

Ce cercle vertueux a été mis en crise avec le début de l'émancipation des colonies espagnoles de la Métropole, un long processus commencé avec l'occupation française de l'Espagne dans 1808 et fini approximativement dans 1824⁶. A divise la gravité de la perte des marchés coloniaux, le commerce d'Outre-mer a été touché aussi par la propagation des corsaires colombiens, prédateurs redoutable de l'Atlantique qui menaçaient à la navigation espagnole et spécialement au transport de métaux précieux. Cette circonstance, avec la baisse du commerce d'eau-de-vie fine avec les pays nord-européens⁷, qui avaient orienté leur consommation vers des produits alcooliques de substitution et d'autres origines pendant le blocus continental, ont déterminé le déplacement des intérêts commerciaux catalans vers la Méditerranée, surtout en fonction du commerce de blé. En effet, si avant la guerre contre les français les céréales arrivées à Barcelone venaient 59 pour cent de l'Atlantique et 33 pour cent de la Méditerranée, après la guerre on a inversé complètement cette tendance, en sanctionnant la prédominance méditerranéenne dans ce trafic⁸, grâce aussi à l'ouverture du port franc d'Odessa: point de sortie des blés russes, polonais et ukrainiens, abondants, de bonne qualité et à bon prix⁹. Cet important commerce, comme le démontre le tableau suivant, a principalement profité à Gênes, Livorno et Marseille, qui disposaient d'entrepôts spécifiques pour la conservation du blé destiné à la réexportation. La relation avec Lisbonne est restée importante jusqu'en 1827 et était en rapport avec l'importation de coton brut du Brésil. En ce qui concerne les produits, la figure 2 montre que plus de la moitié des importations se basaient en blé et autres céréales - farine, riz et fèves - et en un autre produit appelé génériquement "généros", que Vilar a interprété comme un ensemble de produits finis pour la consommation - légers et de valeur - c'est à dire des produits textiles manufacturés¹⁰.

Toutefois, le maintien de ce commerce sans le soutien du commerce colonial et surtout des envois de métaux précieux, se transformait en quelque

⁶ Pour un bilan sur les effets de la perte des colonies sur l'économie espagnole cfr. JOSEP FONTANA, "Colapso y transformación del comercio exterior español entre 1792-1827", *Moneda y Crédito*, No. 155 (1970), 3-23; LEANDRO PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, "El comercio exterior de España, 1790-1830: una reconsideración", *Hacienda pública española*, No. 55 (1978), 339-348; LEANDRO PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, *De imperio a nación: crecimiento y atraso económico en España, 1780-1930* (Madrid, 1988).

⁷ VALLS, *La Catalunya atlàntica*.

⁸ VILAR, *Catalunya dins l'Espagna moderna*.

⁹ CHARLES KING, *Storia del Mar Nero dalle origini ai giorni nostri* (Roma, 2005); FERNAND BRAUDEL, *Civiltà materiale, economia e capitalismo (secoli XV-XVIII)*, vol. III, *I tempi del mondo* (Torino, 1982).

¹⁰ VILAR, *Catalunya dins l'Espanya moderna*, 93.

Tableau 4. Entrées dans le port de Barcelone par origine en 1815


| | Bandera EX | Bandera ES | Total |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Génova | 22 | 81 | 103 |
| Marsella | 6 | 42 | 48 |
| Lisboa | 23 | 19 | 42 |
| Liorna | 13 | 19 | 32 |
| Cette | | 29 | 29 |
| Gibraltar | 13 | 10 | 23 |
| Trieste | 9 | 11 | 20 |
| Civitavecchia | 11 | 5 | 16 |
| Novella | 15 | | 15 |
| Londres | 14 | | 14 |
| Terranova | 13 | | 13 |
| Nápoles | | 12 | 12 |
| Bergen | 11 | | 11 |
| Rotterdam | 9 | | 9 |
| Amérique | | 8 | 8 |
| Cerdeña (isla) | | 7 | 7 |
| Liverpool | 7 | | 7 |
| Dronteim | 6 | | 6 |
| Especie | 6 | | 6 |
| Ídra | 6 | | 6 |
| Vietri | 5 | | 5 |
| Agde | | 4 | 4 |
| Costantinopla | 4 | | 4 |
| Malta | | 4 | 4 |
| otros | | 23 | 23 |
| Total puertos extr | 193 | 251 | 467 |
| Total entradas | 326 | 283 | 609 |

Source: Biblioteca de Catalunya (BC), *Junta de Comerç*, XXXIX, 10, 46; 1816

chose d'insoutenable et, évidemment, motivait de grandes préoccupations. Par conséquent, une des premières mesures prises par le gouvernement constitutionnel a été justement d'interdire l'importation des deux produits majoritairement responsables du déficit de la balance commerciale espagnole: le blé et les tissus en coton. Le tarif de 1820, approuvé par les "Cortes" libérales, a été une tentative de mettre en pratique la création d'un marché intérieur libre, protégé de l'extérieur. La convergence momentanée des intérêts du secteur céréalier castillan avec ceux du secteur industriel cotonnier catalan, ont été la base pour le fonctionnement du système prohibitionniste¹¹. Ont été exclus de ce qu'on appelle généralement "accord de réciprocité" les intérêts du grand commerce, principalement de Cadiz mais aussi catalan. La Catalogne inaugurerait une nouvelle relation avec les autres provinces de l'Espagne, dont la base était le nationalisme économique dans

¹¹ ERNEST LLUCH, *El pensament econòmic a Catalunya, 1760-1840. Els orígens ideològics del proteccionisme, la presa de consciència de la burgesia catalana* (Barcelona, 1973); SÁNCHEZ, *La formación de una política económica prohibicionista*; FRADERA, *Indústria i mercat*; CALOSCI, *Nacionalismo económico*.

Fig. 2. Importations en 1815 (par quantité de chargements)



Source: Biblioteca de Catalunya (BC), *Junta de Comerç*, XXXIX, 10, 46; 1816

lequel l'intérêt de la Catalogne coïncidait avec l'intérêt de l'Espagne: manufactures catalanes en échange céréales castillanes.

Les conditions réelles du pays ont été un obstacle à la création d'un marché intérieur unifié et au fonctionnement du système prohibitionniste promu par les libéraux. Entre le manque d'excédent, tant agricole comme manufacturier, les mauvaises conditions des voies de communication et une certaine propension des fonctionnaires de douanes à la corruption, la période 1820-1827 s'est caractérisée par un manque de restriction. Le rétablissement de l'absolutisme fernandino par intervention française et la fin des hostilités avec les ex colonies, ont ouvert une brève parenthèse de stabilité dans laquelle le prohibitionnisme espagnol, réaffirmé par le tarif de 1825 de Luis López Ballesteros, a atteint son essor. La préoccupation budgétaire a été la directive du nouveau tarif qui a ratifié l'interdiction sur l'importation de tissus en coton et de céréales. En 1827, on a décrété, en outre, la discrimination de drapeau et l'exclusion de l'exercice de cabotage pour les pavillons étrangers. Finalement, la volonté de Fernando VII d'approcher la bourgeoisie catalane de la couronne a déterminé, pendant la même année, la concession de trois décrets importants réclamés par la Junta de Comercio de Barcelona. Le premier a été l'interdiction d'importer toute classe de cotons, filages inclus; le deuxième, la franchise sur l'importation de machines étrangères et le troisième, la concession du port d'entrepôt à Barcelone. On avait créé les bases pour la nationalisation des consommations.

Nous pouvons observer qu'à la baisse du commerce atlantique correspond l'accroissement du commerce méditerranéen, et qu'à la baisse du commerce colonial correspond l'accroissement du commerce de cabotage. Malgré le virage prohibitionniste et la perte du commerce légal du blé,

considéré comme une ressource principale, le commerce méditerranéen a conservé son importance pendant toutes les années vingt. Le principal effet du décret prohibitionniste a été alors de nationaliser le commerce des matières alimentaires, avec la grande exception de l'importation de morue d'Europe de nord, et de réorienter le commerce méditerranéen catalan vers l'importation de matières premières, - chanvre, coton, fil, fer, cuir, douves, etc.. - en échange de produits agricoles et extractifs. Dans ce nouveau contexte, le port de Marseille est devenu le principal partenaire commercial méditerranéen de Barcelone. Ceci est dû, en partie, au "Pacto de familia" qui reconnaissait (bien que pendant longtemps seulement de façon formelle) la pleine réciprocité entre l'Espagne et la France. Mais aussi, à la supériorité de Marseille sur les autres ports méditerranéens et à la croissance extraordinaire de son activité commerciale¹². La Balance commerciale de l'Espagne de 1827 confirme ce que venons de dire.

La concession d'Entrepôt à Barcelone à la fin de l'année 1827 doit être mise en relation avec les aspirations espagnoles d'expansion dans le Levant, après la signature, la même année, d'un nouveau traité commercial avec la Porte qui accordait au pavillon espagnol le libre passage par le détroit des Dardanelles¹³. Barcelone devait redevenir un port intermédiaire entre les colonies espagnoles d'Outre-mer, Cuba et Puerto Rico, et le Levant méditerranéen, en développant un commerce actif dans ces régions. L'Entrepôt a ouvert ses portes en février 1828 mais ses résultats économiques ont été, comme l'on peut vérifier dans le tableau suivant, assez modestes.

La disparité évidente entre les valeurs des marchandises entreposées et destinées à l'Amérique, par rapport aux étrangères, souligne la direction principalement coloniale du commerce de transit de l'Entrepôt de Barcelone. Entre les principaux produits qui viennent d'Amérique, les plus importants sont le sucre et le café, suivis dans une moindre mesure par le tabac, le cacao et les bois colorants, destinés tous aux ports de Marseille, Gênes et Trieste. Ces trois grands ports de transit acquéraient les produits appelés coloniaux à Barcelone, mais surtout directement d'Amérique, et ils les redistribuaient sur les marchés du Levant et d'Europe centrale¹⁴. Le commerce méditerranéen de Barcelone se limitait alors aux échanges avec ces trois villes intermédiaires. Entre les produits apportés de l'étranger, les plus importants sont la morue et le merlu, le fer et l'acier, les bougies

¹² PAUL MASSON, *Les Bouches du Rhône. Encyclopédie départementale* (Paris-Marseille, 1922).

¹³ BC, *Junta de Comerç*, imp/198, 1828. *Traducción del tratado con la Puerta otomana permitiendo el paso y el comercio del Mar Negro a nuestros buques mercantes* (Madrid, 1828); LEÓN DEL CASTILLO, *Observaciones sobre el comercio del Mar Negro, con especificación del que que los españoles pueden hacer allí* (Madrid, 1828).


¹⁴ MICHEL CEVASCO, *Statistique de la ville de Gênes*, tomo II (Genova, 1840).

Tableau 5. Structure de la balance commerciale de Barcelone en 1827
(% sur la valeur des importations et des exportations)

| | % IMPORT | % EXPORT |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| CABOTAGE | 24 | 28 |
| COLONIAL | 21 | 20 |
| MEDITERRÁNEO | 35 | 25 |
| ATLÁNTICO | 20 | 19 |
| ULTRAMAR* | 0 | 8 |
| TOTAL | 100 | 100 |
| *Brasil y Nueva Orleans | | |

Source: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris (AD-MAEP), *Correspondance consulaire et commerciale*, Barcelone, n 26, 1824-1831

Fig. 3. Importations et exportations espagnoles par ports méditerranéens en 1827
(% de la valeur en reales de vellón)



Source: BC, *Balanza del comercio de España con nuestras Américas y las potencias extranjeras en el año 1827* (Madrid, 1831)

Tableau 6. Valeurs des marchandises entrées et sorties de l'Entrepôt de Barcelone 1829-1840 (valeurs en reales de vellón)

| | De América | | Del Extranjero | | TOTAL | | Valores derechos | |
|-------------|------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------------|--------|
| | entrados | salidos | entrados | salido | entradas | salidas | entrada | salida |
| 1829 | 3.305.637 | 2.560.367 | 3.297.924 | 2.068.991 | 6.603.561 | 4.628.991 | 66.610 | 45.409 |
| 1830 | 8.055.558 | 6.476.921 | 932.628 | 2.444.259 | 8.988.186 | 8.921.180 | 91.314 | 91.930 |
| 1831 | 5.506.181 | 6.048.808 | 1.185.965 | 1.148.986 | 6.692.146 | 7.148.986 | 66.846 | 74.737 |
| 1832 | 4.407.870 | 6.261.584 | 425.902 | 915.869 | 4.833.772 | 7.177.453 | 49.415 | 74.628 |
| 1833 | 2.059.494 | 1.463.254 | 437.002 | 567.955 | 2.496.496 | 2.033.209 | 24.560 | 21.449 |
| 1834 | 2.102.531 | 2.654.844 | 1.538.316 | 1.130.803 | 3.640.848 | 1.130.803 | 36.863 | 38.428 |
| 1835 | 2.337.243 | 2.220.667 | 1.297.143 | 1.398.952 | 3.634.386 | 3.618.952 | 36.526 | 33.047 |
| 1836 | 1.760.679 | 1.663.142 | 948.658 | 1.084.727 | 2.709.337 | 2.747.869 | 27.097 | 27.471 |
| 1837 | 3.267.478 | 3.383.930 | 585.082 | 575.508 | 3.852.560 | 3.959.238 | 38.859 | 40.349 |
| 1838 | 5.163.180 | 5.176.612 | 476.326 | 482.746 | 5.639.506 | 5.659.358 | 56.303 | 58.772 |
| 1840 | 6.642.788 | 5.811.704 | 1.377.737 | 1.363.063 | 8.020.525 | 7.174.768 | 80.353 | 72.153 |

Source: BC, *Junta de Comerç*, IV, 6, 3, 1828-1840

de suif et les vins français. De tous ces produits, il est probable que seulement les deux derniers aient pu être destinés à la réexportation. Les bénéfices du commerce de transit sont basés dans la capacité d'échanger les marchandises au coût le plus bas, tant pour les frais de navigation, comme pour les frais de stock et d'offrir au commerce les meilleurs services d'assurance et de crédit. Dans tous ces aspects, Barcelone, en comparaison avec ses plus proches rivaux, Marseille, Gênes et Trieste, présentait de grands inconvénients¹⁵. À ces manques de base, s'ajoutaient les frais d'opportunité inhérents à l'ouverture d'une nouvelle voie commerciale dans le Levant. Frais qu'une sage politique de prime pourrait atténuer. Toutefois, la principale préoccupation de la politique fiscale de l'État espagnol de cette période était d'assurer les plus grandes recettes possibles à travers d'une prolifération de droits fantaisistes qui ne favorisaient évidemment pas le commerce. Le commerce catalan en Méditerranée, comme d'autres secteurs économiques, a souffert d'un manque de projet politique de croissance économique générale, planifié par le gouvernement central. La faiblesse de l'État espagnol était aussi démontrée, à un niveau extérieur, par le jeu de la diplomatie internationale. Reléguée à un rang de seconde catégorie, l'Espagne a été l'objet de la rivalité franco-britannique qui avait pour but d'étendre son influence et de s'assurer le marché espagnol et le contrôle des routes de la Méditerranée Occidentale. Comme nous le savons, c'est la France qui a obtenu cette victoire diplomatique¹⁶.

Tous ces facteurs ont servi à déterminer le tableau suivant qui montre l'accomplissement du projet prohibitionniste de nationalisation des consommations, commencé avec le gouvernement constitutionnel en 1820:

¹⁵ CALOSCI, *Nacionalismo económico*.

¹⁶ PIERRE RENOUVIN, *Il secolo XIX. 1815-1871. L'Europa delle nazionalità e il risveglio di nuovi mondi* (Firenze, 1960).

Tableau 7. Valeurs du commerce maritime de Barcelone, divisés en commerce de cabotage et en commerce avec l'étranger et l'Amérique (moyenne: années 1845-1847 en reales de vellón)


| 1845-1847 | Extranjero | | Cabotaje | |
|-----------|------------|--------|----------|---------|
| | Imp | Exp | Imp | Exp |
| | 155.212 | 44.052 | 136.085 | 133.161 |

Source: Laureà Figuerola, *Estadística de Barcelone en 1849* (Barcelona, 1849)

Barcelone recevait depuis le reste de la Péninsule des produits alimentaires - des céréales d'abord, puis des légumes, des caroubes, du poisson salé et du vin, de l'huile et de l'eau-de-vie - destinés à sa consommation, alors que de l'étranger, on apportait principalement des matières premières et des biens d'équipement - coton brut, fil de coton, étamine, chanvre, fil, peaux, gomme, machines et pièces en acier, autres métaux, charbon pierre, matières colorantes et produits chimiques. Le caractère manufacturier de l'économie catalane se reflète alors dans les importations depuis l'étranger et dans les exportations vers le reste de l'Espagne, composées de presque 70% par des tissus en coton. Au contraire, dans les exportations vers l'étranger, prédomine le caractère agricole-artisanal de son économie - vin et eau-de-vie, farine, huile, safran, riz; tannages, chaussures, douves, soie et papier.

Le commerce avec les colonies, Cuba et Puerto Rico, étant sûr et bien protégé, est devenu la principale branche du commerce catalan. Comme il ne requiert pas un haut degré de compétitivité, il représente un bon marché pour les produits catalans tant agricoles comme manufacturiers. Les produits coloniaux de retour, coton brut et sucre, étaient destinés principalement à la consommation intérieure. Comme nous l'avons déjà dit, la ré-exportation de produits coloniaux à travers l'entrepôt franc est devenue un échec. Le commerce avec l'Europe a fini par se concentrer dans la relation avec la France et l'Angleterre, et surtout avec la France. Cette relation a été fondamentale pour la transformation industrielle catalane. Le port de Marseille était le principal véhicule de ce commerce. Les navires sortis de Marseille se dirigeaient majoritairement à Barcelone, où ils débarquaient leur chargement et continuaient en direction de Cadix pour faire le chargement de retour qu'ils ne trouvaient pas à Barcelone. En effet, entre les produits importés depuis l'Espagne à Marseille, les produits catalans avaient peu de poids et se limitaient aux classiques vin et eau-de-vie, et à l'huile de Tortosa. Au contraire, les exportations vers l'Espagne étaient adressées principalement au marché catalan, outre l'importance des manufactures textiles, qui dans le cas du commerce maritime, consistaient en des tissus de commerce licite - chanvre, soie et laine - les plus importants étant les machines et les outils agricoles, les produits chimiques, les métaux employés dans les ateliers métallurgiques et une grande quantité de numérai-

Fig. 4. Pourcentage de la valeur des importations et des exportations du port de Barcelone avec les pays étrangers (en reales vellón)



Source: Figuerola, *Estadística de Barcelone en 1849*

re¹⁷. En ce qui concerne les importations de machines de fabrication française, la Catalogne représentait le second marché après l'Égypte¹⁸. Le régime tarifaire, spécialement libéral sur l'importation de machines étrangères en vigueur en Espagne depuis 1827, et les forts droits qui grevaient encore les exportations de machines anglaises offraient de grandes occasions pour la sortie de ces biens de fabrication alsaciens en transit par Marseille. Aussi, l'importation de machines anglaises, dans beaucoup de cas, arrivaient en Espagne par l'intermédiaire de Marseille. Selon les statistiques de Figuerola, des 135 machines employées dans les ateliers catalans vers le milieu des années quarante, 63 étaient de fabrication française, 55 de fabrication anglaise, 12 produites à Barcelone et de ces dernières, 2 d'origine inconnue.

Conclusions

Barcelone s'était transformée en un port principalement d'importation en renonçant à son ancienne fonction de port commercial et en concentrant ses efforts vers la production manufacturière pour le marché intérieur et colonial. L'incapacité de développer des relations directes avec les marchés du Levant méditerranéen et la forte dépendance de la médiation des ports de Gênes et de Marseille pour ce commerce, ont promu un retrait progressif de ce secteur où Barcelone pouvait seulement agir comme port passif, récepteur de biens fondamentaux pour son activité productive. Le

¹⁷ LAUREÀ FIGUEROLA, *Estadística de Barcelone en 1849* (Barcelone, 1849).

¹⁸ JULES JULLIANY, *Essai sur le commerce de Marseille* (Marseille-Paris, 1842).

nationalisme économique, fortement soutenu par la Junta de Comercio de Barcelona, peut être interprété, par conséquent, comme une défense face au manque de compétitivité des produits et des services catalans sur les marchés internationaux, mais à la fois reflète clairement un changement dans la stratégie de croissance future dans laquelle le secteur industriel textile, qui venait d'être développé en Catalogne, devenait le nouveau moteur de la croissance économique nationale.

Idamaria Fusco - Angelina Marcelli

La Calabria della seta: una regione del Mediterraneo

1. La "Calabria della terra" e la "Calabria del mare"

"La Calabria della seta: una regione del Mediterraneo". Questo il titolo del lavoro che qui si propone e da cui emergono tre parole chiave: Calabria, seta e Mediterraneo¹.

Collegare la Calabria alla seta e a tutto l'universo che essa sottende è quasi "scontato". Anche se ancora troppo poco si conosce della produzione serica calabrese, specie se si fa riferimento a secoli a noi più prossimi, quali l'Otto e il Novecento, è tuttavia convinzione comune che la Calabria sia sempre stata una grossa produttrice di seta².

Diversamente, mettere in relazione la Calabria con il Mediterraneo può far sorgere qualche dubbio: che rapporto esiste tra una regione "isolata", dotata fino a tempi relativamente recenti di coste malariche, prive di approdi sicuri, e di alte montagne a ridosso del litorale, e un mare da sempre culla di commerci e di civiltà? Come è stato notato emblematicamente, "la Calabria è un'isola senza mare"³.

Questa affermazione, che dipinge un territorio difficile, non sembra però valida per tutta la Calabria. Diventa, quindi, necessaria una precisazio-

¹ I paragrafi 1, 4 e 5 sono di Idamaria Fusco; i paragrafi 2 e 3 sono di Angelina Marcelli.

Si noti che 1 libbra = 0,32 chilogrammi, 1 ducato = 5 tari (1 tari = 20 grana) = 100 grana e 1 carlino = 10 grana. Cfr. DOMENICO DEMARCO, *Il crollo del regno delle Due Sicilie. La struttura sociale*, Napoli 2000 (elenco delle abbreviazioni).

² Sulla seta in Calabria nell'Ottocento, si ricorda qui solo il saggio di PIERO BEVILACQUA, *Uomini, terre, economie*, in *Storia d'Italia. Le regioni dall'Unità ad oggi. La Calabria*, a cura di PIERO BEVILACQUA e AUGUSTO PLACANICA, Torino 1985, 115-362. Per una bibliografia più completa, si rimanda a IDAMARIA FUSCO, *La trattura della seta in Calabria: rinnovamento tecnologico e crescita tra Sette e Ottocento*, in "Società e Storia", n. 109 (2005), 503-540, e IDAMARIA FUSCO, *Attività produttiva e fiscalità in Calabria tra XVI e XVIII secolo: il settore serico*, in *Scelte pubbliche, strategie private e sviluppo economico in Calabria. Conoscere per decidere*, a cura di GIOVANNI ANANIA, Soveria Mannelli (CZ) 2001, 181-216. Cfr. anche il lavoro di ANGELINA MARCELLI, *Luigi Alfonso Casella e la sericoltura calabrese tra Otto e Novecento*, Soveria Mannelli (CZ) 2005.

³ PEDRAG MATVEJEVIČ, *Mediterraneo. Un nuovo breviario*, Milano 1991, 33.

ne: non bisogna pensare alla Calabria come a una realtà unica, ma sembra più opportuno distinguere tra più Calabrie, almeno tre, volendo considerare la suddivisione storica tra la provincia Citeriore (il Cosentino), quella Ulteriore Prima (il Reggino) e quella Ulteriore Seconda (il Catanzarese)⁴. Delle tre Calabrie, l'area che a noi qui interessa maggiormente è quella del Reggino che, a differenza dalle altre due, può essere definita "la Calabria del mare", vale a dire la Calabria che, attraverso percorsi terrestri impervi, offre uno sbocco sul mare a tutta la regione.

È soprattutto nel Reggino che, nella prima metà dell'Ottocento, si verificò un aumento della produzione di un particolare tipo di seta, meglio noto come organzino, migliore di qualità e più ricercato sui mercati internazionali, e una notevole concentrazione delle relative strutture produttive, definite filande "alla piemontese", in grado di attrarre anche la materia prima proveniente dalle altre due province calabresi.

Come mai in quella che abbiamo definito la "Calabria del mare" nacque il polo più attivo della produzione serica calabrese? Forse è proprio nel mare che deve essere cercata una risposta a tale interrogativo. Infatti, un genere di lusso come la seta non avrebbe avuto un futuro se relegato all'interno della Calabria, una regione scarsamente urbanizzata, priva di grossi centri di consumo e abitata per lo più da una popolazione agricola, che della seta utilizzava solo gli scarti di produzione. La domanda di seta proveniva principalmente da fuori e giungeva in Calabria soprattutto attraverso il mare. Il territorio, infatti, prevalentemente montuoso, era sfornito di vie di comunicazioni terrestri efficienti e di coste facilmente raggiungibili.

Tuttavia, questi enormi limiti geografici e infrastrutturali non gravavano allo stesso modo sull'intero territorio calabrese. Il Reggino, in particolare, riuscì in parte a superarli e a compensare gli alti costi che doveva sopportare per reperire i bozzoli all'interno della regione grazie al vantaggio unico di cui godeva e che risultò vincente per il settore serico: la sua vicinanza alla punta orientale della Sicilia e a un porto attivo, quale era quello di Messina⁵. Attraverso il porto di Messina, la seta calabrese poté solcare i mari, giungendo in Francia, in Gran Bretagna, persino negli Stati Uniti d'America.

Alla luce di queste considerazioni si spiegano la crescita e la concentrazione, nel corso della prima metà dell'Ottocento, di strutture produttive di organzino in Calabria Ulteriore Prima, in particolare lungo l'area dello

⁴ Cfr. *infra*, figura 1.

⁵ Sul porto di Messina, cfr. ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *Porto e commercio a Messina nei rapporti dei consoli inglese, francese e piemontese (1840-1880)*, Reggio Calabria 1977; BATTAGLIA, *Il commercio della Calabria attraverso il porto di Messina (1839-1840)*, in "Archivio Storico per la Calabria e la Lucania", 1986, 81-121; BATTAGLIA, *Mercanti e imprenditori in una città marittima. Il caso di Messina. 1850-1900*, Milano 1992; MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo: Messina (1795-1805)*, in "Atti dell'Accademia Peloritana", LV, n. XVI n.s. (1979), 201-247.

Stretto, vale a dire lungo quella striscia di terra che si affaccia sullo Stretto di Messina, e la capacità di questa zona di attrarre anche la materia prima proveniente da altri territori della Calabria. La produzione di bozzoli e di seta filata aumentò proprio perché riuscì a trovare un proprio sbocco nel mare, attraverso il porto di Messina. Tale produzione non avrebbe potuto crescere senza il mare, senza il Mediterraneo.

Allora il cerchio si chiude: Calabria, e in particolare l'area di Reggio, seta e Mediterraneo presentano molti punti in comune.

In breve, in questo lavoro si intende analizzare l'aumento della produzione di bozzoli e di seta grezza e l'incremento delle filande di trattura, strutture destinate a "trarre" il filo di seta dai bozzoli, nella Calabria reggina nella prima metà dell'Ottocento; inoltre, si vuole sottolineare come questa zona si specializzi in un tipo di filato, l'organzino, particolarmente richiesto sui mercati internazionali. Per far questo, non si tralascerà di considerare anche la "Calabria della terra", vale a dire le restanti aree cosentina e catanzarese, anch'esse interessate a un incremento della produzione di bozzoli e di seta nel corso della prima metà dell'Ottocento. Col tempo, tuttavia, tali aree persero "visibilità" e la loro produzione di bozzoli tese sempre più a riversarsi nel Reggino, che si affermò quale zona leader della produzione serica. In tal senso il mare, il Mediterraneo, giocò un ruolo chiave, in questi cinquant'anni consentendo alla "Calabria della seta" di trovare una propria collocazione nell'ambito del mercato serico mondiale.

2. Alcune considerazioni metodologiche: organizzazione della sericoltura e territorio

Al fine di evidenziare le dinamiche economico-produttive della sericoltura nella prima metà dell'Ottocento, si è inteso segmentare l'analisi focalizzando l'attenzione per un verso sulla realtà rurale (quindi la gelsibachicoltura) e per altro su quella manifatturiera (la trattura)⁶. L'approccio di filiera si è rivelato particolarmente proficuo in virtù dei mutamenti subiti dall'organizzazione serica. Nel periodo considerato, infatti, si può constatare un progressivo ridimensionamento della tradizionale organizzazione produttiva della seta grezza in piccole aziende agrarie a conduzione familiare, a favore di una maggiore specializzazione. Una volta ottenuti i bozzoli in allevamenti dalle piccole dimensioni tenuti in prossimità dei gelsi, con sempre maggiore frequenza la lavorazione del filato tese a localizzarsi nei centri urbani, in opifici dalle dimensioni variabili in grado di ottenere un prodotto diversificato a seconda della tecnologia utilizzata.

⁶ Si precisa che le fasi successive della lavorazione serica, ovvero torcitura e tessitura, erano ormai praticate solo residualmente in Calabria, poiché la maggior parte della produzione consisteva in seta grezza da trasferire su altri mercati, dove veniva sottoposta a lavorazione.

I primi due anelli della catena di lavorazione – gelsibachicoltura e trattura – possono quindi essere analizzati separatamente, in quanto espressione di diverse componenti della struttura economica e sociale calabrese. In base a tali premesse, la ricerca si è indirizzata per un verso alla “Calabria della terra”, quell’area in cui il gelso rivestì un ruolo da protagonista, tanto nella piccola quanto nella grande proprietà; per altro verso si è concentrata sull’analisi delle dinamiche tecniche ed economiche che caratterizzarono la trattura. Interrogando le fonti, talvolta le medesime per entrambi i filoni di indagine, si sono ottenuti risultati apprezzabili ai fini della ricostruzione storica, ma ancora più rilevanti sembrano essere le nuove problematiche, che in questa sede si intendono approfondire, scaturite dal confronto dei singoli esiti. L’approccio di filiera, infatti, ha evidenziato come, a fronte di una produzione di bozzoli “polverizzata” sul territorio, sia riscontrabile un’accentuata concentrazione delle attività manifatturiere in alcune aree. Allora, sono sorti nuovi interrogativi. In che proporzioni le tre Calabrie si dedicavano alla bachicoltura? Chi assorbiva il raccolto di tutta la regione e da dove proveniva la domanda? Era possibile, ma soprattutto economicamente razionale, un commercio interno di bozzoli?

Rispondere a queste domande non sempre è agevole. Ad esempio, non è stato possibile, allo stato attuale delle ricerche, quantificare con esattezza l’incidenza dei costi di trasporto e il prezzo finale dei bozzoli, ma alcune caratteristiche del territorio forniscono elementi indiziari utili se non altro per la formulazione di ipotesi.

La “rivoluzione agraria meridionale”, così come definita da Piero Bevilacqua⁷, portata a compimento nel corso dell’Ottocento, implicò il potenziamento delle colture arboree e il gelso si diffuse ovunque, nelle terre asciutte e nelle aree irrigue, dalle alture fino alle marine, nei latifondi e nelle piccole proprietà, sia come coltura specializzata che promiscua. Così come il gelso, anche la produzione di bozzoli interessò pressappoco equamente le tre province. Diversamente, i centri più moderni di trattura si collocarono prevalentemente in Calabria Ulteriore Prima, dove era necessario disporre di quantità di bozzoli superiori a quelli prodotti in provincia.

Tale aspetto potrebbe indurre il lettore che non avesse ben presente le condizioni geografiche della Calabria a non riscontrare alcuna anomalia. Eppure, un commercio infra-provinciale di bozzoli appare, almeno in prima istanza, poco logico, giustificabile solo alla luce di rilevanti interessi economici, tali da far superare le difficoltà relative alla raccolta e al trasporto di una merce voluminosa per vie impervie, dal confine nord alla volta della “Calabria del mare”.

La Calabria, terra caratterizzata da una secolare tradizione agricola, presenta, per dirla con le parole di Augusto Placanica, dei “caratteri origina-

⁷ PIERO BEVILACQUA, *Clima, mercato e paesaggio agrario*, in *Storia dell’agricoltura italiana. Spazi e paesaggi*, a cura di P. BEVILACQUA, I, Venezia 1989, 650.

li”⁸. Clima, struttura orografica, insediamenti abitativi e infrastrutture sono tutti aspetti che costituiscono per la regione una ricca dotazione naturale, ma che, allo stesso tempo furono, e in parte ancora oggi sono, motivo di isolamento, nonostante gli oltre 700 chilometri di costa di cui dispone. Tuttavia, mentre la natura, come ebbe modo di sostenere un acuto osservatore coevo⁹, aveva “largamente concesso doni” a tutto il Regno, la fruibilità di tali risorse fu in gran parte condizionata dall’opera dell’uomo, o forse sarebbe meglio dire dello Stato.

A dispetto di tendenze generali in cui lo Stato si faceva promotore e finanziatore di strade, canali e porti che avrebbero potuto favorire l’integrazione, nel Mezzogiorno la politica governativa riguardante le infrastrutture seguì delle logiche estremamente lontane dal voler favorire lo sviluppo economico, soprattutto in aree periferiche¹⁰.

Sul finire del XVIII secolo soltanto intorno a Napoli si registrò un notevole incremento della rete stradale, mentre tutte le altre province del Regno erano sostanzialmente isolate¹¹. L’unica, peraltro spoglia, rete stradale consisteva nelle quattro strade “Consolari”, i cui tracciati risalivano all’epoca romana. Un rinnovato interesse per le condizioni infrastrutturali del Mezzogiorno si ebbe sotto la dominazione francese (1806-1815). Durante il Decennio, caratterizzato tra l’altro dal blocco dei traffici marittimi in conseguenza del Sistema Continentale, volto ad impedire il commercio britannico nel Mediterraneo, la questione viaria ritornò al vaglio del governo. Tuttavia, sia Giuseppe Bonaparte che Gioacchino Murat valutarono opportuni i soli finanziamenti di opere pubbliche che avrebbero favorito lo spostamento dell’esercito. Così, sul tracciato dell’antica via Popilia, a cui si aggiunsero nuovi tratti e alcune varianti, la Calabria fu dotata di una strada che rispondeva più a logiche amministrative e militari che economiche¹².

Tale aspetto non mutò neanche nel periodo della successiva Restaurazione borbonica, durante il quale, tuttavia, fu progettata la costruzione di

⁸ AUGUSTO PLACANICA, *I caratteri originali*, in *La Calabria*, a cura di BEVILACQUA e PLACANICA, 5-114.

⁹ CARLO AFAN DE RIVERA, *Memoria su i mezzi da restituire il valore proprio ai doni che la natura ha largamente concesso al Regno delle Due Sicilie del cav. Carlo Afan de Rivera*, Napoli 1844.

¹⁰ ALESSANDRA BULGARELLI LUKACS, *Le comunicazioni nel Mezzogiorno dall’arrivo di Carlo di Borbone al 1815*, in “Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane”, XV (1976); BULGARELLI LUKACS, *Rete stradale e opere pubbliche durante il Decennio francese in un inedito rapporto di Pietro Colletta*, in “Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane”, III s. (1979); VINCENZO GIURA, *Infrastrutture, manifatture, commercio*, in *Il Mezzogiorno preunitario. Economia, società e istituzioni*, a cura di ANGELO MASSAFRA, Bari 1988; NICOLA OSTUNI, *Le comunicazioni stradali nel Settecento meridionale*, Napoli 1991. Sul ruolo dello Stato nella costruzione delle infrastrutture nel Mezzogiorno cfr. COSTANZA D’ELIA, *Stato padre, stato demiurgo. I lavori pubblici nel Mezzogiorno (1815-1860)*, Bari 1996.

¹¹ GIURA, *Infrastrutture*, 230.

¹² *Ibidem*.

qualche breve e inefficiente tratto stradale locale quasi esclusivamente per garantire stabili livelli occupazionali in periodi di crisi agricole¹³.

Alla data dell'Unità d'Italia il territorio calabrese continuava a presentarsi privo di una rete viaria organica; infatti, come evidenziato nella figura 1, esisteva un unico tratto stradale interno, a cui si aggiungeva un confuso reticolo di strade comunali, molte delle quali inaccessibili per gran parte dell'anno. Non diversa si presentava la condizione delle infrastrutture portuali¹⁴. Tanto la costa ionica quanto quella tirrenica non godevano di un accesso stabile sul mare. Fatta eccezione per il porto settecentesco di Crotona, lungo i litorali calabresi non esistevano che pochi e mal dotati "caricati", spesso resi impraticabili dai forti venti.

Tutto ciò si ripercuoteva, ovviamente, sul commercio regionale. La mancanza di collegamenti terrestri non agevolava la specializzazione e l'integrazione a livello locale, e nel contempo, l'inesistenza di adeguate strutture portuali rendeva molto difficoltoso il traffico marittimo soprattutto dei beni, come la seta, destinati all'esportazione. Attraverso il cabotaggio, le merci seguivano rotte mediate per giungere infine, dopo una o più tappe intermedie, sui mercati di sbocco.

3. La produzione di bozzoli nella "Calabria della terra" e nella "Calabria del mare"

È verosimile ipotizzare che in presenza di un'ideale rete stradale e portuale, nella prima metà dell'Ottocento il settore serico calabrese avrebbe potuto raggiungere livelli di crescita superiori rispetto a quelli, pure considerevoli, rivelati dalle fonti.

Invero, sebbene la mancanza di rilevazioni quantitative non consenta di individuare con esattezza il volume della produzione calabrese prima dell'Unità, si possono rinvenire un insieme di informazioni che, anche se isolate, danno comunque un'idea delle grandezze.

Le testimonianze più attendibili sembrano essere quelle riconducibili alle attività svolte dalle Società Economiche¹⁵, istituite proprio per promuovere lo

¹³ Nelle annate di carestia, specialmente nel caso di scarso raccolto di cereali e succedanei, il Ministero dell'Interno suggeriva come rimedio la costruzione di strade provinciali, al fine di generare occupazione per i contadini "affamati". Cfr. Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN), Ministero dell'Interno, Inventario II, busta 1120, fasc. I, II e III. Cfr. anche BEVILACQUA, *Uomini*, 125; UMBERTO CALDORA, *Calabria napoleonica (1806-1815)*, Napoli 1960, 346; ANGELINA MARCELLI, *Sviluppo economico nella Cosenza ottocentesca attraverso gli atti della Società Economica di Calabria Citra*, Roma 2006, 119-139.

¹⁴ CLEMENTINA BARUCCI, *I porti delle Calabrie in periodo borbonico*, in *Sopra i porti di mare. Il Regno di Napoli*, a cura di GIORGIO SIMONCINI, Firenze 1993, 283.

¹⁵ Sulle Società Economiche calabresi cfr. ANTONIO ALLOCATI, *Le Società economiche in Calabria*, in *Atti del II Congresso storico calabrese*, Napoli 1961, 408-435; MAURIZIO GANGEMI, *Progetto illuministico e realtà ottocentesca: le società economiche calabresi*, in *Associazione economica e diffusione dell'economia politica nell'Italia dell'Ottocento. Dalle società*

sviluppo locale. In seno ad esse vi erano, infatti, i maggiori proprietari terrieri, nonché gli eruditi che, direttamente o indirettamente, si interessavano di sericoltura, settore ritenuto tra i più vitali dell'economia regionale dell'epoca.

Un elemento da tenere in considerazione è che nella prima metà dell'Ottocento le scarse rilevazioni statistiche privilegiavano la trattura della seta, inducendo a ritenere che i bozzoli si producessero direttamente su commissione dei filandieri, quasi che non vi fosse commercio di bozzoli o alcuna forma di utilizzo casalingo degli stessi. In realtà esisteva già un mercato di bozzoli infra-provinciale volto ad animare principalmente le filande del Reggino dove non si produceva sufficiente materia prima, così come esisteva anche una produzione orientata a sbocchi extra-regionali, via Messina o Napoli¹⁶.

Ritornando all'obiettivo principale, ovvero quello di ricostruire la consistenza quantitativa della bachicoltura, si precisa che sembra opportuno, per ragioni economico-analitiche, diversificare la riflessione seguendo la tradizionale suddivisione storico-politica delle Calabrie, evidenziata nella cartina (cfr. figura 1): Calabria Ulteriore Prima, Calabria Ulteriore Seconda e Calabria Citeriore. In base ai documenti analizzati, pare che la produzione delle 92 filande operanti nella provincia di Calabria Ulteriore Prima negli anni Quaranta fosse pari a 260.000 libbre di seta grezza¹⁷. Inoltre, utilizzando i bozzoli di seconda scelta si producevano altri filati, quali la seta "cucerina", ricavata dai doppioni, la "calama", ottenuta dai bozzoli macchiati e spuntati, e la "strusa", tratta dai residui di seta che rimanevano nelle caldaie dove venivano stufati i bozzoli¹⁸. Per produrre questa quantità di seta occorreavano 8.214,70 cantaja di bozzoli¹⁹, pari a 732.000 chilogrammi, la cui provenienza, però, non era tutta locale: il 33% proveniva, infatti, dalle altre due Calabrie e da Messina²⁰.

Nel Catanzarese, all'incirca a metà del secolo XIX, l'andamento del settore era valutato positivamente. Secondo Luigi Grimaldi, segretario della Società Economica della Calabria Ultra Seconda, dopo il Decennio Francese (1806-1815), la sericoltura locale aveva iniziato a riprendere quota,

economico-agrarie alle associazioni di economisti, a cura di MASSIMO M. AUGELLO e MARCO E.L. GUIDI, I, Milano 2000, 369-393; MARCELLI, *Sviluppo economico*; ALDO MONTAUDO, *Le Società Economiche calabresi*, in *Le società economiche alla prova della storia (secoli XVII-XIX)*, Rapallo 1996, 111-138.

¹⁶ PIETRO GRECO, *Sullo stato dell'industria della seta nella Calabria Ultra Prima*, s.l., [1845], 15.

¹⁷ GRECO, *Sullo stato*, 15 e 18.

¹⁸ GRECO, *Sullo stato*, 14-15.

¹⁹ GRECO, *Sullo stato*, 15. Pietro Greco, segretario della Società Economica reggina, indicava l'ammontare di bozzoli necessari alle filande in 141.768 "misure", convertendo in seguito tale cifra in cantaja. Il peso complessivo, poi, era indicato per bozzoli stufati, quindi la cifra andrebbe ritoccata al rialzo, considerando che diversi sistemi di stufatura potevano ridurre il peso anche sensibilmente.

²⁰ GRECO, *Sullo stato*, 15.

tant'è che più della metà del territorio provinciale era interessata alla gel-sicoltura²¹. Riguardo al volume di produzione, Grimaldi sosteneva che si attestasse intorno ad una media annua pari a 142.144 libbre di seta²². Avvertiva, però, che non tutto il raccolto di bozzoli veniva impiegato nelle filande locali, in quanto da alcuni anni aveva preso corpo un "grande spaccio di bozzoli" in direzione delle altre province calabresi e su Napoli per un ammontare medio di 360.000 libbre²³.

Dall'elaborazione di Grimaldi, emerge come per "produzione di seta catanzarese" si intendesse la produzione di bozzoli, indipendentemente da dove questi poi sarebbero stati sottoposti a trattura. Utilizzando come parametro la resa in seta indicata dallo stesso segretario (occorrevano 12 libbre di bozzoli per ottenerne una di seta), è evidente come nella provincia catanzarese la produzione stimata fosse di circa 1.700.000 libbre di bozzoli (pari a 550.000 chilogrammi). Di questo ammontare il 21,1% veniva venduto fuori provincia, mentre il resto veniva utilizzato nelle tratture catanzaresi²⁴. Il 7% della seta grezza tratta in provincia era utilizzata a Catanzaro, dove si producevano nastri, calze e tessuti leggeri, che venivano poi smerciati in altre piazze calabresi o, nella migliore delle ipotesi, a Napoli²⁵. Le sete grezze, poi, prendevano la via del mare, prevalentemente in direzione Messina, da dove con ogni probabilità erano spedite per destinazioni internazionali²⁶.

Per quanto riguarda la Calabria Citeriore, la Società Economica, che pure dedicava ampi spazi alla sericoltura, non forniva quasi mai informazioni di tipo quantitativo, limitandosi a segnalare una forte crescita soprattutto a partire dagli anni Trenta²⁷. Tali informazioni sono avvalorate anche da altri documenti che testimoniano apprezzabili incrementi delle aree destinate a gelso, ma soprattutto un rilevante perfezionamento delle filande della seta organzina. A tali informazioni, si aggiunga poi che dati ufficiali, comunque, indicavano la produzione cosentina pari a 708.740 chilogrammi di bozzoli annui negli anni Cinquanta²⁸.

²¹ LUIGI GRIMALDI, *Studii statistici sull'industria agricola e manifatturiera della Calabria Ultra II*, Napoli 1845, 51.

²² *Ibidem.*

²³ *Ibidem.*

²⁴ Più dettagliatamente 360.000 libbre di bozzoli venivano venduti in Calabria o a Napoli; il totale utilizzato in provincia dava come risultato 93.144 libbre di seta tratta "ad aspo grande" e 19.000 "ad aspo corto" (GRIMALDI, *Studii statistici*, 51-52). Sulla distinzione tra "aspo grande" e "aspo piccolo", cfr. il successivo par. 4.

²⁵ GRIMALDI, *Studii statistici*, 52.

²⁶ *Ibidem.*

²⁷ *Reddicono della Real Società Economica della provincia di Calabria Citeriore per l'anno 1851*, 30-31.

²⁸ Ministero di Agricoltura Industria e Commercio (MAIC), *Annali di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio*, II, Roma 1864, 138. Cfr. anche BRUNO BATTAGLIA, *Relazione dello stato agricolo-zootecnico della provincia di Calabria Citra scritta dal geometra Bruno Battaglia allievo veterinario*, Napoli 1870, 76.

Relativamente a questo stesso periodo è possibile usufruire di stime statistiche, seppure prodotte retrospettivamente. Infatti, i cambiamenti politici coincisero con un periodo di forte contrazione del settore serico, i cui effetti sono stati dettagliatamente presi in considerazione più oltre. In ragione della drastica riduzione degli allevamenti il nuovo Stato unitario si adoperò per raccogliere informazioni per valutare gli effetti reali della crisi; in base ad esse, si stima che la produzione calabrese di bozzoli, “prima dell’atrofia”²⁹, quindi i primi anni Cinquanta, fosse pari a 3.800.000 chilogrammi³⁰.

Riassumendo, sembra fondato poter affermare che nel corso dell’Ottocento il settore serico calabrese iniziò a risollevarsi dalla crisi tardo settecentesca e, così come era avvenuto in epoche precedenti, il gelso e la bachicoltura ripresero ad interessare tutta l’economia regionale. Per la precisione, dal grafico 1 emerge un peso relativamente maggiore della provincia Citeriore, collocata, è bene notarlo, all’estremo opposto rispetto a Reggio Calabria, nel cui circondario, come si è anticipato, si concentrava il principale polo di trattura regionale. Ciò non vuol dire che nelle altre due province fosse scomparsa la lavorazione della seta. Come è stato detto, e come si evince dal grafico 2, circa il 60% dei bozzoli prodotti in Calabria Citeriore e in Calabria Ulteriore Seconda veniva sottoposta localmente alla trattura negli opifici domestici o nelle filande più moderne, che pure stavano prendendo piede. La commercializzazione del filato così ottenuto, come è stato detto, partiva in cabotaggio dalle coste alla volta di mercati extra-regionali.

Nondimeno, dal grafico 2 si rafforza l’ipotesi che la “Calabria della seta”, sfidando i limiti infrastrutturali e i conseguenti costi di trasporto, rappresentasse comunque un’area in via di integrazione. La produzione di bozzoli prodotti a Cosenza e Catanzaro, per il residuo 40%, veniva venduto ai filandieri della “Calabria del mare”, che così, rielaborando le cifre, arrivavano a lavorare circa il 60% del totale regionale, proporzione destinata ad aumentare nel corso della seconda metà del secolo³¹.

4. La produzione di seta nella “Calabria della terra” e nella “Calabria del mare”

Per spiegare la capacità del Reggino di attrarre la materia prima proveniente dalle altre Calabrie bisogna comprendere il ruolo centrale svolto dalla domanda internazionale. Infatti, specie in quella che è stata da noi definita la “Calabria del mare”, in particolare nell’area dello Stretto, tale do-

²⁹ Per “atrofia” si intende la pebrina.

³⁰ I dati sono in MAIC, *Notizie e studi sull’agricoltura (1877)*, Roma 1879, 774. L’analisi critica della fonte e la stima della quota di produzione attribuita alla Calabria sono in ANGELINA MARCELLI, *Bachi, bozzoli e gelsi fra espansione e crisi (1850-1940). Il caso della Calabria: una storia nascosta*, tesi di dottorato (Arcavacata di Rende, 2002), 38-39.

³¹ ANGELINA MARCELLI, *Bozzoli freschi, bozzoli secchi. I cambiamenti del mercato di Cosenza (1865-1930)*, in “Società e Storia”, n. 114 (2006).




Grafico 1.
Distribuzione della produzione di bozzoli in Calabria nella prima metà dell'Ottocento




Grafico 2.
Le diverse forme di utilizzo dei bozzoli in Calabria




Grafico 3.
Filande "alla piemontese", bacinelle e produzione di organzino in Calabria (1820-1850)




Fig. 1. La Calabria




Fig. 2. Filande a Catona nel 1852

Fonte: ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati (Reggio, 11 giugno 1852)

manda determinò non solo un incremento della produzione di seta greggia e del numero delle relative strutture produttive, ma anche una vera e propria rivoluzione tecnologica: il tradizionale e più antiquato metodo di trattura "ad aspo grande" venne del tutto soppiantato dalla più innovativa tecnica di trattura "ad aspo piccolo" o "alla piemontese", in grado di produrre un filato di qualità superiore, più sottile e omogeneo, definito spesso dalle fonti organzino, richiesto dai mercati internazionali³².

L'incremento della trattura "alla piemontese" in Calabria Ulteriore Prima è evidente nel grafico 3³³. Come si può facilmente osservare, a partire dagli anni Trenta iniziò una fase di forte crescita per le filande "alla piemontese" nel Reggino. Anche il numero delle bacinelle, vale a dire delle vasche di acqua calda dove i bozzoli venivano immersi per poter essere dipanati, subì un notevole incremento, segno di un aumento delle postazioni presso le quali maestre e apprendiste lavoravano e, quindi, della produzione, come del resto si evince dal grafico stesso. Per quanto riguarda le dimensioni degli opifici di trattura, pur non disponendo di dati certi, è possibile azzardare qualche ipotesi calcolando il rapporto tra il numero delle bacinelle e quello delle filande. Tale rapporto presenta un andamento decrescente: si passa da 17,3 bacinelle per opificio nel 1836, a 16,7 nel 1837, 15 nel 1838-40, 13,5 nel 1841-44 e 12,8 nel 1847³⁴. A riprova del fatto che, almeno all'inizio, sotto la spinta delle possibilità di guadagno che il settore offriva, alle vecchie filande si andarono ad affiancare nuove strutture di dimensioni inferiori.

Il proliferare di piccoli opifici nella zona considerata è ancora più evidente negli anni Cinquanta del secolo. In questo periodo, infatti, molti individui si improvvisarono filandieri, erigendo le proprie strutture produttive vicino o persino all'interno delle proprie case, in modo da abbattere i costi³⁵. Reggio, Villa San Giovanni, Cannitello, Bagnara, Catona e numerose altre piccole località, specie del Reggino, si trasformarono in centri dotati di una discreta concentrazione di filande.

È così che, agli inizi degli anni Cinquanta, il paesaggio industriale dell'area dello Stretto cambia: nel Reggino la trattura era "generalizzata"³⁶ e gli opifici si accalcavano l'uno sull'altro. A Catona, per esempio, "ad ogni breve distanza vi [era] una filanda" e la maggior parte di queste strutture produttive era collocata all'interno del centro abitato (cfr. la figura 2)³⁷.

³² Più nei dettagli IDAMARIA FUSCO, *Trattura e tecnologia in Calabria nella prima metà dell'Ottocento*, in *La seta. E oltre...*, a cura di IDAMARIA FUSCO, Napoli 2004, 109-160. L'aspo o mangano era l'attrezzo intorno al quale veniva avvolto il filo una volta dipanato.

³³ Il grafico è stato elaborato utilizzando alcuni dati riportati in FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505.

³⁴ FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, 506.

³⁵ Archivio di Stato di Reggio Calabria (ASRC), *Intendenza*, Inventario 3, busta 251, fasc. 11486, ff. non numerati, 12 maggio 1845.

³⁶ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati, 23 giugno 1851.

³⁷ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati, 11 giugno 1852.

Nel 1851 a Catona già esistevano all'incirca 16 opifici di seta organzina³⁸, divenuti poi più di 20 l'anno successivo³⁹, mentre a Villa San Giovanni, nel 1853, si contavano 59 filande⁴⁰, destinate in seguito ad aumentare e a trasformare la piccola località nel principale centro della seta del distretto di Reggio⁴¹.

La concentrazione delle attività lavorative all'interno dei centri abitati creava seri problemi di convivenza tra le filande e la popolazione del luogo⁴². Tuttavia, tale concentrazione era spesso considerata dalle amministrazioni locali un male necessario in paesi che vivevano grazie alla trattura⁴³. Come dunque impedire, nell'ambito di un'economia locale povera, un'attività divenuta particolarmente redditizia?

Un'attività che vantava un'antica tradizione e che tese a radicarsi a tutti i livelli sociali. Commercianti e marinai, ma anche sacerdoti e amministratori locali manifestarono un forte interesse nel settore⁴⁴. L'interesse era legato ai possibili lauti guadagni che la seta offriva, in quanto genere fortemente richiesto sulla piazza di Messina e sui mercati internazionali. In questi anni, produrre ed esportare seta erano diventate forse le attività più vantaggiose nell'area dello Stretto. Non sorprende, quindi, sentire che i filandieri venissero definiti "speculatori"⁴⁵, in quanto "speculavano nei commerci", se non addirittura "contrabbandieri"⁴⁶ (e i contrabbandi di seta non dovevano essere rari!). Né stupisce trovare immischiati nel settore individui dalla provenienza più disparata, tra cui anche alcuni marinai che, probabilmente già dediti al commercio di seta tra la costa calabrese e quella siciliana, reputavano conveniente occuparsi anche di produzione⁴⁷.

A metà Ottocento, quindi, fu ancora la domanda internazionale a produrre un rialzo dei prezzi⁴⁸ e a stimolare la trattura dell'organzino. Una domanda che, maggiormente in questo periodo, subì un forte incremento grazie al ritardo con cui la pebrina, una grave malattia del baco da seta,

³⁸ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati, 20 e 26 giugno 1851.

³⁹ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati, 11 giugno 1852.

⁴⁰ *Nota precisa delle filande da seta formata dalla commissione di salute pubblica, che si tollerano nel comune di Villa San Giovanni distinte come segue*, in ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 16, fasc. 1, ff. non numerati, 1° giugno 1853.

⁴¹ Si tenga presente che ogni provincia era suddivisa in distretti. La Calabria Ulteriore Prima comprendeva i distretti di Reggio, Palmi e Gerace.

⁴² IDAMARIA FUSCO, *Centri urbani, manifatture e salute pubblica nella Calabria di metà Ottocento*, in "I Frutti di Demetra. Bollettino di Storia e Ambiente", n. 6 (2005), 23-26; FUSCO, *Industrie urbane, conflitti e salute nella Calabria dell'Ottocento*, in "Meridiana", 2007, 55.

⁴³ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati, 11 giugno 1852.

⁴⁴ FUSCO, *Industrie urbane*.

⁴⁵ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati, 11 giugno 1852.

⁴⁶ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 1, fasc. 20, ff. non numerati, 23 e 27 giugno 1851.

⁴⁷ ASRC, Inventario 50 bis, busta 37, fasc. 17, ff. non numerati, 12 marzo 1853.

⁴⁸ Infatti, l'organzino passò dai circa 3 ducati per libbra nel 1836 ai 4 ducati nel 1854, con un aumento del 25% (FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 4, 515).

attaccò il territorio calabrese⁴⁹. Tale male, che negli anni Cinquanta si diffuse in tutto il bacino del Mediterraneo, ridusse drasticamente la produzione europea di bozzoli e quindi di seta, indirizzando la domanda in espansione verso quei paesi ancora sani⁵⁰. La Calabria, colpita solo nel 1857-58, poté così trarre profitto da tale vantaggio relativo. La domanda europea di bozzoli e di filato "ad aspo piccolo", infatti, non potendo più essere completamente soddisfatta dai vecchi mercati, si diresse verso quei luoghi di produzione ancora sani, non ultimi gli stessi territori calabresi.

E in Calabria la domanda internazionale di organzino arrivava soprattutto tramite Messina. Allora si spiega la concentrazione di numerose filande "alla piemontese" nell'area dello Stretto e, al tempo stesso, si riesce meglio a comprendere come tali strutture fossero in grado di attrarre una buona percentuale dei bozzoli prodotti nella "Calabria della terra". Trasportare i bozzoli, un genere facilmente deperibile, da un territorio a un altro della Calabria, attraverso percorsi terrestri e marittimi difficili, si spiega solo alla luce dei maggiori profitti che era possibile ricavare vendendo la materia prima nel Reggino. Qui buona parte dei bozzoli veniva trasformata in organzino, per poi essere spedita quasi interamente all'estero⁵¹. In realtà, si può supporre che, specie a partire dagli anni Trenta, il filato reggino avesse come destinazione finale la Francia, in particolare la cittadina di Lione⁵², divenuta in questi anni un importante mercato intermedio per le sete tratte⁵³. La Gran Bretagna, in cambio, nel corso della prima metà del secolo ridusse l'importazione degli organzini siciliani⁵⁴, cui si mescolava buona parte del filato reggino, per indirizzare i propri investimenti nel Bengala, dove veniva prodotta seta grezza a costi più contenuti⁵⁵.

⁴⁹ MARCELLI, *Bachi, bozzoli*, e MARCELLI, *Gli effetti della pebrina sulla gelsibachicoltura calabrese (1850-1900)*, in *La seta*, a cura di I. FUSCO, 161-223.

⁵⁰ Sulla pebrina cfr. CLAUDIO ZANIER, *La sericoltura dell'Europa mediterranea dalla supremazia mondiale al tracollo: un capitolo della competizione economica tra Asia orientale ed Europa*, in "Quaderni Storici", n. 73 (a. XXV), fasc. I, 7-53, e ZANIER, *Alla ricerca del seme perduto*, Milano 1993.

⁵¹ Già nel 1836 tutto l'organzino di Cannitello, ad esempio, "si consuma[va] al di fuori" fatta eccezione per la seta di scarto, utilizzata nel comune e in provincia (*Quadro delle arti e manifatture*, in ASRC, *Intendenza*, Inventario 50 ter, busta 212, fasc. 108, ff. non numerati, 20 agosto 1836).

⁵² Tra il 1827 e il 1847 il Regno delle Due Sicilie e l'impero turco diventarono importanti fornitori di seta per il mercato di Lione. Cfr. PIERRE CAYEZ, *Le commerce Français des soies et soieries (XVIII^e-XX^e siècles)*, in *La seta in Europa. Sec. XIII-XX*, a cura di SIMONETTA CAVACIOCCHI, Atti della Ventiquattresima Settimana di Studi dell'Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica "F. Datini", Firenze 1993, 602.

⁵³ ANGELO MOIOLI, *Il commercio serico lombardo nella prima metà dell'Ottocento*, in *La seta in Europa*, a cura di S. CAVACIOCCHI, 727, e STEFANO ANGELI, *Proprietari, commercianti e filandieri a Milano nel primo Ottocento. Il mercato delle sete*, Milano 1982, 126, nota 18.

⁵⁴ SIMONA LAUDANI, *La Sicilia della seta. Economia, società e politica*, Catanzaro 1996, 167-168.

⁵⁵ ANGELI, *Proprietari*, 66-70.

In genere, i filati calabresi erano apprezzati all'estero per la loro "esattezza e solidità"⁵⁶ e "sosten[eva]no in Lione ed in Londra il paragone colle più belle sete di Santo Leucio e del Piemonte"⁵⁷. E questi filati provenivano per buona parte proprio dalla Calabria Ulteriore Prima.

Tuttavia, il fatto che la trattura "alla piemontese" si concentrasse soprattutto nell'area dello Stretto, fenomeno che tese ad accentuarsi nella seconda parte dell'Ottocento, non significa che altrove in Calabria non si producesse seta e, più in particolare, organzino. Anche il Cosentino e il Catanzarese furono coinvolti nel rinnovamento tecnologico che, nei primi cinquant'anni del secolo, portò i filandieri calabresi ad abbandonare forme più tradizionali di produzione (seta appalto, definita anche "ad aspo grande", costa e girella) in favore del filato "ad aspo piccolo". Ciò nonostante, queste aree continuarono a rispondere soprattutto ad altri mercati, principalmente a quello napoletano, interessato sì all'organzino, ma anche alla seta appalto calabrese, lavorata nella capitale e poi esportata all'estero.

Più in particolare, nella prima metà dell'Ottocento la Calabria Citeriore era una grossa produttrice di bozzoli e di seta. La trattura era un'attività sparsa, ampiamente diffusa nelle campagne e quasi sempre praticata dagli stessi allevatori dei bozzoli, intenti a trarre un filato non organzino per lo più di non ottima qualità⁵⁸. Infatti, tra il 1817 e il 1824, in occasione del regio decreto del 31 maggio del 1817, vennero spedite ben 581 patenti a individui di vari comuni della provincia, dediti alla trattura in strutture di modeste dimensioni e che probabilmente lavoravano soprattutto seta appalto, costa e girella⁵⁹. Solo a Cosenza, nel 1826, si fabbricava unicamente l'organzino⁶⁰, mentre ancora nel 1833 la Società Economica locale suggeriva di "universalizzare" la trattura delle sete appalto e girella, dato che

⁵⁶ De' saggi delle manifatture napolitane esposti nella solenne mostra del 1838, in "Annali Civili del Regno delle Due Sicilie" (ACRDS), fasc. XXXVII (gennaio-febbraio 1839), 65.

⁵⁷ DOMENICO MURATORI, *Discorso letto dal presidente nella tornata generale de' 30 maggio 1838*, in "Atti della Società Economica di Calabria Ulteriore Prima", vol. 1, fasc. 5 (Reggio, 1839), in ASN, MAIC, busta 210, fasc. non numerato, 114.

⁵⁸ Archivio di Stato di Cosenza (ASCS), *Società Economica*, busta 7, fasc. 50, ff. non numerati, 13 giugno 1826.

⁵⁹ Il decreto del re Ferdinando prevedeva che tutti potessero esercitare qualsiasi tecnica di trattura ma solo dopo essersi muniti di patente, spedita gratis dall'intendente provinciale a seguito di un esame atto ad accertare l'idoneità del filandiere. Gli unici che non erano tenuti a richiedere la patente erano i proprietari delle filande di organzino che, già presenti sul territorio, avessero almeno 20 mangani. In sostanza, si trattava di un tentativo della monarchia di controllare la qualità della seta, qualità che si presupponeva buona - e quindi inutile controllare - nel caso delle strutture "alla piemontese" di dimensioni maggiori (*Stato delle patenti spedite a' trattori di seta di questa provincia di Calabria Citra*, in ASCS, *Società Economica*, busta 7, fasc. 50, ff. non numerati). A proposito, cfr. anche FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, 536-537. L'intendenza era una struttura amministrativa provinciale con a capo un Consiglio d'Intendenza e al cui vertice era posto l'intendente.

⁶⁰ ASCS, *Società Economica*, busta 7, fasc. 50, ff. non numerati, 24 luglio 1826.

“l’esperienza ci ha dimostrato non potersi ottenere una seta organzina di sovrappina qualità” per la “tenacità” del filo dei bozzoli locali⁶¹.

Alcuni dati confermano la scarsa diffusione della trattura “alla piemontese” nell’area cosentina negli anni Trenta, proprio quando invece l’organzino aveva iniziato a radicarsi nel Reggino.

Nel 1835, in Calabria Citeriore la produzione serica era stata di 86.675,2 chilogrammi⁶², di cui solo 12.592 chilogrammi erano stati tratti “ad aspo piccolo”⁶³: vale a dire che solo poco più di 1/7 della seta prodotta nella provincia era stata lavorata utilizzando la nuova tecnica. Sempre nel 1835, poi, l’organzino ottenuto nella provincia Citeriore corrispondeva a meno di 1/3 di quello proveniente dal territorio reggino⁶⁴.

Inoltre, come risulta da alcune cifre relative all’anno successivo, le filande “alla piemontese” si concentravano soprattutto nel distretto di Cosenza e solo in minima parte in quello di Paola, mentre gli altri due distretti di Castrovillari e Rossano non producevano filato “ad aspo piccolo”⁶⁵. Infine, bisogna notare che già nel 1836 a una diminuita produzione di seta rispetto al 1835 corrispose una maggiore esportazione di bozzoli al di fuori della provincia⁶⁶. Non è escluso, quindi, che alcune aree, quali forse il

⁶¹ Dal segretario perpetuo della Società Economica di Calabria Citra, *Rapporto dell’anno 1833*, 207-208.

⁶² Intendenza della Calabria Citeriore, Esercizio 1835, *Stato del raccolto della seta in detta provincia, paragonato col raccolto del 1834 e distinto per circondari e distretti giusta la Ministeriale di Sua Eccellenza il Ministro Segretario di Stato degli Affari Interni del 30 dicembre 1835* (14 marzo 1836), in ASCS, *Intendenza della Calabria Citra, I Ufficio, Statistiche provinciali*, fascio 6, busta 1, fasc. 4.

⁶³ Intendenza della Calabria Citeriore, Esercizio 1836, *Stato generale del raccolto in seta grezza paragonato a quello del 1835* (7 gennaio 1837), in ASCS, *Intendenza della Calabria Citra, I Ufficio, Statistiche provinciali*, fascio 6, busta 1, fasc. 4. Nella fonte i dati sono espressi in libbre. Quindi, nel 1835 la produzione serica totale sarebbe stata di 270.860 libbre (86.675,2 chilogrammi) e quella di organzino di 39.350 libbre (12.592 chilogrammi). Dati leggermente difforni sulla produzione totale (267.390 libbre, cioè 85.564,8 chilogrammi) vengono forniti da GIUSEPPE BARBERA CARDILLO (*La Calabria industriale preunitaria. 1815-1860*, Napoli 1999, tavola 5, 83), che invece concorda sulla cifra relativa alla produzione di organzino.

⁶⁴ Nel 1835, s’è visto, la Calabria Citeriore produceva 39.350 libbre (12.592 chilogrammi) di organzino contro le 136.397,5 libbre (43.647,2 chilogrammi) della Calabria Ulteriore Prima (FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505).

⁶⁵ Nel 1836 la produzione totale di seta grezza della Calabria Citeriore fu di 171.880 libbre (55.001,6 chilogrammi). Di queste solo 25.540 libbre (8.172,8 chilogrammi) furono tratte “alla piemontese”: 24.360 libbre (7.795,2 chilogrammi) nel distretto di Cosenza e 1.180 libbre (377,6 chilogrammi) in quello di Paola. Negli altri due distretti di Castrovillari e di Rossano vennero prodotte sete costa, appalto e girella. I bozzoli utilizzati nella trattura furono soprattutto bozzoli locali, mentre solo in minima parte venne usata nella trattura materia prima proveniente da fuori provincia. Cfr. *Intendenza della Calabria Citeriore, Esercizio 1836, Stato generale del raccolto*.

⁶⁶ Nel 1836 la produzione di seta diminuì rispetto a quella del 1835, sembra a causa della rigidità del clima verificatasi tra aprile e maggio del 1836. Inoltre, nel 1836, 51.300

Reggino stesso, dove nel 1835-36 il numero degli opifici aveva subito un notevole e improvviso incremento, avessero iniziato a esercitare una forte attrazione sulla materia prima prodotta nel resto della Calabria.

Tuttavia, gli anni Cinquanta ebbero un effetto di rinnovamento anche in Calabria Citeriore. Come nel Reggino, dove sorsero numerose filande "alla piemontese", anche nell'area Citeriore si diffuse questo tipo di trattura⁶⁷. Non è un caso, quindi, che nel 1851 nel distretto di Cosenza fosse diminuita la produzione dell'appalto a differenza di quanto era avvenuto negli altri tre distretti di Rossano, Castrovillari e Paola, dove le tecniche di trattura dell'organzino erano quasi sconosciute e continuavano a essere lavorate le sete appalto e girella, mentre la lavorazione della seta costa stava scomparendo⁶⁸.

Era stata la domanda proveniente da fuori regione e l'aumento dei prezzi della seta, specie dell'organzino, a determinare questi cambiamenti nell'offerta⁶⁹. Diversi erano i mercati a cui le differenti qualità di filato si indirizzavano. Le sete di lavorazione più antica, quali l'appalto, la costa e la girella, rispondevano a una domanda interna, proveniente soprattutto da Napoli, e solo in via "mediata" a una domanda internazionale. Nella capitale, infatti, l'appalto veniva lavorata e trasformata in seta da cucire e poi esportata in Europa e negli Stati Uniti d'America⁷⁰; anche la girella trovava il suo mercato principale a Napoli, mentre solo marginalmente veniva venduta ai calabresi o a qualche straniero, che giungeva personalmente in provincia in occasione della fiera annuale di San Marco, a Cosenza⁷¹. Diversamente, l'organzino soddisfaceva la domanda internazionale in via "diretta". Per esempio, a Cosenza il filato prodotto dalla filanda di Giacinto Rizzo veniva venduto a Napoli direttamente agli stranieri; stessa sorte toccava alla seta di Pasquale Campagna, l'unica seta calabrese lavorata "ad aspo piccolo" che nel 1846 i francesi compravano nella capitale meridionale, data la sua ottima qualità⁷².

libbre (16.416 chilogrammi) di bozzoli furono vendute fuori provincia, contro le 38.480 libbre (12.313,6 chilogrammi) del 1835. Cfr. Intendenza della Calabria Citeriore, Esercizio 1836, *Stato generale del raccolto*.

⁶⁷ *Reddito della Real Società Economica della provincia di Calabria Citeriore per l'anno 1851*, 29-34.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁹ *Reddito della Real Società Economica di Calabria Citeriore dal 30 maggio 1851 al 30 maggio 1852*, 95.

⁷⁰ Cfr., più nei dettagli, Fusco, *Trattura e tecnologia*.

⁷¹ *Reddito della Real Società Economica della provincia di Calabria Citeriore per l'anno 1851*, 29-34.

⁷² Nel 1846, infatti, i francesi proibirono ai loro corrispondenti napoletani di comprare la seta calabrese, ma esclusero da tale divieto la seta di Campagna, acquistandola a un prezzo di 7 carlini la libbra più alto rispetto alle altre. Ancora nel 1851 Campagna spediva ogni anno la seta a Napoli per venderla soprattutto ai francesi (*Reddito della Real Società Economica della provincia di Calabria Citeriore per l'anno 1851*, 29-34).

Nonostante l'interesse, specie dei filandieri della capitale, per l'appalto, andando avanti negli anni Cinquanta la pressione della domanda internazionale di organzino divenne sempre più forte e condizionante per l'intero territorio calabrese, non ultimo per quello della Calabria Citeriore. Il metodo "alla piemontese" si estese ancora in nuovi comuni della provincia⁷³, favorito dall'incremento dei prezzi dell'organzino. Questa trasformazione tecnica della trattura mise sempre più in crisi la lavorazione tradizionale della seta appalto, girella e costa, che tuttavia, in questi anni, non fu ancora del tutto abbandonata⁷⁴. Ma non fu solo la diffusione dell'organzino a determinare la lenta sparizione di tali forme più antiche di trattura; frattanto, era emerso anche un altro "ostacolo" alla conservazione delle vecchie tecniche produttive e, più in generale, della lavorazione della seta: l'"incetto smodato" dei bozzoli, che da qualche tempo facevano i forestieri e che, causando l'aumento del loro prezzo, spingeva gli allevatori a venderli e non a trasformarli in filato⁷⁵.

Questo "ostacolo" divenne sempre più evidente a seguito dello scoppio della pebrina in Europa. Infatti, una volta diffusasi la notizia della scarsa produzione di seme-bachi e di bozzoli nel Milanese e altrove in Italia, anche in Calabria Citeriore molti dei vecchi sericoltori, che in passato avevano deciso di ritirarsi, iniziarono a dedicarsi nuovamente al settore. Segnali di tale cambiamento erano "la insolita altezza del prezzo dei bozzoli" (50-52 grana la libbra) e "la folla dei mercanti giornalieri" che dalla Sicilia, da Napoli e da altre parti del Regno si recavano direttamente in Calabria per acquistare bozzoli e semente⁷⁶. Contemporaneamente, anche la lavorazione del filato, specie dell'organzino, si estese⁷⁷. Tale era l'impulso dato alla trattura "alla piemontese" dal mercato e dal relativo incremento dei prezzi che nella provincia si iniziava ad avvertire un problema: per far lavorare i "filatoi", alimentati da carbone di legna, si stavano distruggendo tutti i boschi di cui il territorio calabrese era ricco⁷⁸.

L'espansione della trattura dell'organzino⁷⁹, tuttavia, se in Calabria Cite-

⁷³ *Rapporto del Segretario Perpetuo della Reale Società Economica di Calabria Citra letto nella generale adunanza del 30 maggio 1854*, in "Atti della Reale Società Economica di Calabria Citra", Cosenza 1855, 15.

⁷⁴ ASCS, *Società Economica*, busta 6, fasc. 33, ff. non numerati, 16 marzo 1855.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁶ *Reddicono della Real Società Economica della provincia di Calabria Citra dal 30 maggio 1856 al 30 maggio 1857*, in "Atti della Reale Società Economica di Calabria Citeriore", Cosenza 1859, 24.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁸ *Reddicono della Real Società Economica della provincia di Calabria Citra dal 30 maggio 1856 al 30 maggio 1857*, 26-28.

⁷⁹ La trattura dell'organzino, prima circoscritta in provincia, era oramai diffusa in tutti i luoghi dove si coltivava il gelso: cfr. *Relazione per l'anno accademico dal 30 maggio 1857 al 30 maggio 1858*, in "Atti della Reale Società Economica di Calabria Citeriore", Cosenza 1859, 54.

riore aveva ridotto le altre forme di lavorazione del filato, non era riuscita a eliminarle del tutto: ancora nel 1861 la Società Economica locale ribadiva che, se “le nostre sete organzine primeggiano nelle più rinomate piazze commerciali di Europa”, “non han forse le altre provincie la seta appalto, la costa e la girella che ancora abbiam noi”⁸⁰. In breve, a differenza di quanto era accaduto e stava ancora accadendo nel Reggino, la provincia Citeriore non si era completamente specializzata nella produzione dell’organzino, ancora legata qual era a tecniche più antiche di trattura.

La prevalenza di forme più tradizionali di lavorazione del filato, per lo più sparse nelle campagne, è ancora più evidente nell’altra Calabria, quella Ulteriore Seconda. Nel 1825 la Società Economica locale aveva provato a introdurre la trattura “alla piemontese” nella provincia, finanziando la lavorazione dell’organzino nell’orfanotrofio di Santa Maria della Stella a Catanzaro⁸¹. Tale tentativo aveva spinto altri a cimentarsi in questo tipo di trattura⁸². Tuttavia, nel 1845 in Calabria Ulteriore Seconda vi erano solo 12 filande “alla piemontese”, fornite di 174 bacinelle⁸³, contro le 92 strutture e le 1.245 bacinelle (e forse più) dell’area Ulteriore Prima negli anni 1841-44⁸⁴. Anche la produzione di organzino del Catanzarese era irrisoria rispetto a quella del Reggino: 3.673,6 kg. (11.480 libbre) nel 1843⁸⁵ e 6.080 kg. (19.000 libbre) nel 1845⁸⁶, vale a dire quasi 1/14 rispetto agli 82.813,6 kg. ottenuti nel territorio di Reggio nel 1844⁸⁷. Del resto, la quantità di filato “ad aspo piccolo” prodotto nella Calabria Ulteriore Seconda corrispondeva a solo 1/7-1/8 della produzione serica complessiva della provincia⁸⁸.

Pure l’organzino catanzarese era destinato a un mercato extra-provinciale: veniva spedito all’estero oppure a Napoli e a Messina⁸⁹, da cui probabilmente raggiungeva comunque i mercati stranieri. Diversamente, la più abbondante produzione di seta “ad aspo grande” della provincia (60.000 libbre, cioè 19.200 chilogrammi, nel 1840⁹⁰) affluiva a Catanzaro,

⁸⁰ ASCS, *Società Economica*, busta 6, fasc. 33, ff. non numerati, 9 maggio 1861.

⁸¹ GRIMALDI, *Studii statistici*, 89.

⁸² Nel 1826 a Catanzaro era stata fondata una filanda “alla piemontese” e nel 1830 altre 11 ne erano sorte in varie località della provincia (GRIMALDI, *Studii statistici*, 89).

⁸³ BARBERA CARDILLO, *La Calabria*, 66.

⁸⁴ FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505.

⁸⁵ Società Economica della Calabria Ulteriore Seconda, *Rapporto del Segretario Sostituto letto nella tornata generale del 30 maggio 1843*, in Archivio di Stato di Catanzaro (ASCZ), *Società Economica*, busta 1, fasc. 5, cod. 25, ff. non numerati.

⁸⁶ BARBERA CARDILLO, *La Calabria*, 66.

⁸⁷ FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505.

⁸⁸ Infatti, nel 1845 la Calabria Ulteriore Seconda produceva in media 142.144 libbre (45.486,08 chilogrammi) di seta l’anno (GRIMALDI, *Studii statistici*, 52).

⁸⁹ Società Economica della Calabria Ulteriore Seconda, *Rapporto del Segretario Sostituto letto nella tornata generale del 30 maggio 1843*.

⁹⁰ Nel 1840 la provincia esportava anche 1.500.000 libbre di bozzoli (480.000 chilogrammi): cfr. *Le forze economiche della provincia di Catanzaro. Relazione di Filippo Marincola S. Floro alla Camera di Commercio di Catanzaro per l’anno 1895*, Catanzaro 1896, 78.

da cui poi veniva inviata a Napoli; qui, al pari dell'appalto dell'area cosentina, il filato veniva trasformato in seta da cucire e riesportato all'estero, specialmente in America⁹¹.

Anche in Calabria Ulteriore Seconda era il mercato a controllare e a indirizzare la produzione di seta. Così, la crescente domanda di filato "ad aspo piccolo" registrata in Calabria negli anni Cinquanta interessò anche questa provincia calabrese, spingendo molti a convertirsi all'organzino. Nel 1852 le filande che avevano abbracciato il metodo "alla piemontese" erano diventate 22 e 276 erano le bacinelle attive nella lavorazione del relativo filato⁹², mentre nel 1854 la produzione annua di organzino era salita a 12.160 chilogrammi (38.000 libbre)⁹³. In breve, in dieci anni, dal 1845 al 1854, il Catanzarese aveva dimezzato il suo precedente divario rispetto al Reggino, passando la sua produzione di seta "ad aspo piccolo" da 1/14 a 1/7 rispetto a quella dell'area di Reggio⁹⁴.

Tuttavia, il divario non era stato completamente eliminato, anzi era ancora rilevante. Inoltre, in provincia si continuava ad attribuire grande importanza alla produzione di seta "ad aspo grande", tant'è che nel 1853 la Società Economica si mostrava preoccupata per la sorte di questo tipo di trattura, la seta appalto essendo diminuita in quantità e svilita nel prezzo, specie se paragonata all'organzino, considerato il principale colpevole di tali cambiamenti⁹⁵.

Ciò nonostante, il Reggino continuava a detenere il primato nella produzione di organzino calabrese. Si pensi, per esempio, che negli anni Cinquanta 1/4-1/3 di tutta la seta prodotta in Calabria era organzino proveniente dalla Calabria Ulteriore Prima⁹⁶. Nello stesso periodo, poi, la produzione dell'area di Reggio aveva conquistato terreno anche rispetto a quella complessiva del Regno di Napoli: nel 1854 la provincia produceva 1/5-1/6

⁹¹ *Le forze economiche*, 72.

⁹² Real Società Economica della Calabria Ulteriore Seconda, *Rapporto del Segretario Perpetuo della Real Società Economica della Calabria Ulteriore Seconda, letto nella tornata generale del 30 maggio 1852*, in ASCZ, *Società Economica*, busta 1, fasc. 9, ff. non numerati.

⁹³ BARBERA CARDILLO, *La Calabria*, 155.

⁹⁴ Infatti, i 12.160 chilogrammi prodotti nel 1854 dalla Calabria Ulteriore Seconda corrispondevano quasi a 1/7 dei 78.748,16 chilogrammi (246.088 libbre) della Calabria Ulteriore Prima (FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505).

⁹⁵ Real Società Economica della Calabria Ulteriore Seconda, *Rapporto letto dal Segretario Perpetuo della Real Società Economica della Calabria Ulteriore Seconda nella tornata generale del 30 maggio 1853*, in ASCZ, *Società Economica*, busta 1, fasc. 10, cod. 2, ff. non numerati.

⁹⁶ A metà Ottocento, infatti, la produzione serica calabrese avrebbe raggiunto la cifra di 320.000 chilogrammi (1.000.000 libbre) (*Memorietta*, in ASCZ, *Società Economica*, 4/91, ff. non numerati; il documento è senza data, ma presumibilmente risale agli anni Cinquanta dell'Ottocento), mentre la produzione di organzino della Calabria Ulteriore Prima avrebbe oscillato intorno agli 80.000 chilogrammi circa (85.677,12 chilogrammi nel 1847, 76.800 chilogrammi nel 1853 e 78.748,16 chilogrammi nel 1854), tenendo conto di una breve fase di crisi lieve verificatasi agli inizi degli anni Cinquanta, probabilmente superata intorno al 1855-65 (FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505, e 507).

della seta del Mezzogiorno, mentre vent'anni prima, nel 1835, da quest'area calabrese si ricavava solo 1/8-1/9 del filato meridionale⁹⁷.

In breve il Reggino, più delle altre due Calabrie, anch'esse produttrici di seta, si specializzò nell'organzino. La motivazione principale di tale specializzazione e della crescente capacità della zona di attrarre anche i bozzoli provenienti dagli altri territori calabresi⁹⁸ deve essere cercata nella domanda di mercato. L'organzino non era utilizzato in Calabria, ma era destinato ai mercati stranieri, dove giungeva anche attraverso Napoli, ma soprattutto attraverso Messina⁹⁹. Fu proprio questo traffico di seta, "mediato" da Messina, a favorire la concentrazione della trattura "alla piemontese" nell'area reggina.

5. Calabria, seta, Mediterraneo: conclusioni

Volendo trarre delle conclusioni, si può affermare che la prima metà dell'Ottocento si caratterizza per un generale incremento della produzione calabrese di bozzoli e di organzino e per la concentrazione di buona parte delle filande di trattura "alla piemontese" in una zona peculiare della Calabria, che corrisponde alla Calabria Ulteriore Prima e più in particolare all'area dello Stretto. Tale aumento di produzione, la specializzazione del Reggino nella lavorazione della seta "ad aspo piccolo" e la sua capacità di attrarre materia prima proveniente anche da altri territori calabresi sono comprensibili solo se vengono letti attraverso la parola Mediterraneo.

Una parola, questa, che sottende il porto di Messina e, attraverso questo, la domanda internazionale di seta. Calabria, seta, Mediterraneo rappresentano un trinomio che non è possibile scindere. È il Mediterraneo a stimolare l'incremento della produzione serica. È il Mediterraneo a convogliare buona parte dei bozzoli calabresi nel Reggino. È il Mediterraneo a favorire la concentrazione della trattura "alla piemontese" nell'area dello Stretto. È ancora il Mediterraneo a spingere la zona reggina a specializzarsi in un determinato tipo di filato, l'organzino, richiesto sui mercati stranieri. È, infine, il Mediterraneo ad avvicinare la Calabria di Reggio alla Si-

⁹⁷ Nel 1835 la Calabria Ulteriore Prima produceva 43.647,2 chilogrammi (136.397,5 libbre) (FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505) su una produzione complessiva meridionale di 384.000 chilogrammi (1.200.000 libbre) (DEMARCO, *Il crollo*, 60), mentre nel 1854 dalla provincia calabrese provenivano 78.748,16 chilogrammi (246.088 libbre) (FUSCO, *La trattura della seta*, tabella 1, 505) su un totale di 448.000 chilogrammi annui (1.400.000 libbre) (riferiti al 1855) (DEMARCO, *Il crollo*, 63).

⁹⁸ Nel 1896, per esempio, dei bozzoli prodotti nella provincia di Catanzaro (la cui produzione si era ridotta appena a 300.000 chilogrammi complessivi) solo 40.000 chilogrammi venivano lavorati nella trattura Bianchi di Catanzaro, mentre il resto veniva acquistato da alcuni "speculatori" per conto delle filande di Villa San Giovanni e di Messina (Le forze economiche della provincia di Catanzaro. *Relazione*, 78).

⁹⁹ Nel 1839, l'81% della seta esportata dal porto di Messina proveniva dalla Calabria (BATTAGLIA, *Il commercio*, 97).

cilia di Messina, a creare rapporti assai stretti tra i due territori e a unificarli quasi fossero un'unica provincia¹⁰⁰.

Il Mediterraneo rappresenta, quindi, la chiave di lettura dello sviluppo e dell'evoluzione delle attività seriche calabresi nella prima metà dell'Ottocento e per buona parte della seconda. Lo svantaggio geografico della Calabria e più in particolare della Calabria Ulteriore Prima, priva di strade, sfornita di fari, di porti e di approdi sicuri nonostante i suoi 220 chilometri di costa¹⁰¹, finisce per favorire un'area particolare della provincia. L'area tirrenica, con i suoi due circondari di Reggio e di Palmi, presenta vantaggi maggiori rispetto a quella ionica e al suo circondario di Gerace, agevolata dal porto della vicina Messina¹⁰². Questa vicinanza crea e promuove relazioni assai strette tra la seta e il territorio, tra la seta e il mare, tra produzione e commercio serico: a metà Ottocento a Villa San Giovanni "non v'era possidente ed anco padron di barche che non avessero la loro piccola filanda"¹⁰³. E Villa col tempo, grazie alla seta e al Mediterraneo, più di altri centri del Reggino manifestò questa vocazione produttiva e commerciale, trasformandosi, come è stato significativamente notato, nella "piccola Manchester delle Calabrie"¹⁰⁴. La seta e il Mediterraneo arrivarono a incidere persino sulla mentalità dei suoi abitanti: la piccola località "difettava di belle chiese e, mentre venti filande gigantesche innalzavano superbe le svelte ciminiere fino alle nuvole, in modo da distinguersi come la città industriale per eccellenza, nessuno pensava alle chiese neppure i parroci (...) "¹⁰⁵.

Ancora negli anni Sessanta, ha un senso congiungere Calabria, seta e Mediterraneo. Nel 1864 il commercio estero della provincia, che esportava "su vaste proporzioni" la seta assieme ad altri pochi prodotti¹⁰⁶, avveniva via Messina e aveva come destinazione Malta, Marsiglia, Amsterdam, San Pietroburgo, Trieste e le Americhe¹⁰⁷. Le particolari franchigie di cui godeva la vicina Messina attraevano non solo i produttori ma anche "i consumatori di tutte le Calabrie" e favorivano il contrabbando¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁰ Si veda, per esempio, la vicinanza lessicale, per quanto riguarda i termini "baco" e "bozzolo", tra l'area calabrese dello Stretto e la punta orientale della Sicilia. Cfr. le figure 15 e 16 e, in generale, il saggio di JOHN B. TRUMPER, MARTA MADDALON e NADIA PRANTERA, *La seta: un percorso linguistico*, in *La seta*, a cura di I. FUSCO, 293-321.

¹⁰¹ *Seconda relazione della Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio (Calabria) al Ministero di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio su l'andamento industriale e commerciale della provincia per l'anno 1864* (Reggio Calabria 1865), in ASRC, *Prefettura*, Inventario 8, busta 74, fasc. 2242, 7.

¹⁰² *Seconda relazione della Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio*, 5.

¹⁰³ LUIGI NOSTRO, *Libro primo. Notizie storiche e topografiche intorno a Colonna Reggina antica città sul Cenide prima dell'era volgare*, Reggio Calabria 1923, 155.

¹⁰⁴ NOSTRO, *Libro primo*, 106.

¹⁰⁵ NOSTRO, *Libro primo*, 159.

¹⁰⁶ *Seconda relazione della Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio*, 27 e 63.

¹⁰⁷ *Seconda relazione della Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio*, 64.

¹⁰⁸ *Seconda relazione della Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio*, 65.

Le cose cambiarono solo intorno agli anni Ottanta, quando, con la costruzione della ferrovia nel 1883, venne creato un collegamento via terra tra la lontana Calabria e gli altri territori italiani e, quindi, europei. In questi anni, il rapporto tra la Calabria della seta e il Mediterraneo mutò e la regione tese a isolarsi dal mare. Certo, la principale destinazione del filato calabrese restava ancora il mercato straniero¹⁰⁹. Tuttavia la seta iniziò a raggiungere i mercati esteri, e in particolare la Francia, soprattutto via terra. Nel 1894, dei 100.000 chilogrammi di seta prodotti nel Reggino, ben 95.000 vennero spediti a Lione via Modane¹¹⁰. Ugualmente, nel 1897-98 la maggior parte del filato proveniente dalle filande reggine veniva mandata direttamente in Francia sempre via Modane, mentre solo 12.000 chilogrammi circa raggiungevano i mercati di Messina, Torino e Napoli e quasi 9.000 la città di Milano¹¹¹.

Il rapporto tra la Calabria e il Mediterraneo era irrimediabilmente compromesso. Come osserva Nostro, fino al 1883 “grosse e piccole barche a vela (provenienti da centri calabresi dello Stretto) solcavano i mari del Levante, di Venezia, del Ionio, di Malta (...), o giornalmente facevano la spalletta tra Villa e Messina, specialmente nei giorni di mercato, fino a che venne la ferrovia ed assorbì tutto”¹¹². Oltre che della piccola “marineria”, la ferrovia segnò la fine del legame assai stretto che da tempi antichi aveva caratterizzato le relazioni tra la “Calabria della seta” e il mare. Del resto, negli ultimi decenni dell’Ottocento, anche il settore serico calabrese stava subendo profonde modificazioni, per poi volgere definitivamente alla fine nel corso del secolo seguente.

¹⁰⁹ Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio Calabria, *Le condizioni economiche della provincia di Reggio Calabria, Relazione sull’andamento dell’industria e del commercio nell’anno 1892* (Reggio Calabria 1893), in ASRC, Biblioteca, A115/3, 96.

¹¹⁰ Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio Calabria, *Movimento delle industrie e del commercio nella provincia di Reggio Calabria nell’anno 1894*, XV Relazione (Reggio Calabria 1895), in ASRC, Biblioteca, A116/1, 51-52.

¹¹¹ Camera di Commercio ed Arti di Reggio Calabria, *Movimento delle industrie e del commercio nella provincia di Reggio Calabria nell’anno economico 1897-98*, XVIII Relazione (Reggio Calabria 1898), in ASRC, Biblioteca, A116/1 bis, 76.

¹¹² NOSTRO, *Libro primo*, 159.

Luigi Piccioni

Liquorice juice production in Calabria XVIIIth-XXth centuries

1. *Liquorice: the root and the juice*

The subject of this paper is the extract of liquorice, the juice obtained by boiling the crushed root in hot water, and then filtering and drying it.

The four or five botanical varieties of liquorice used for commercial purposes are diffused within a Euro-Asiatic belt that goes from the Iberian peninsula to the North-Eastern Chinese province of Liaoning and between the 30th and the 45th degree north latitude. In this belt the plant grows wild in relatively small areas with a dry and warm climate and in sandy, deep soils, generally along big rivers.

The medical properties of the root were well known from ancient times in the whole Eurasia. This circumstance allowed the development of liquorice trade between the production areas and much wider consumption areas, where the plant did not grow. This trade could be within short distances but also areas that extended for thousands of kilometers. The amount of root traded over long distances was always very small when compared to strategical goods such as spices, cereals or tissues. Nonetheless, liquorice trade was quite constant over the centuries and from the Early Modern Period it progressively increased.

On the western side of the liquorice belt, we have evidences of long-distance trade from at least the 12th century (around 1191). In fact, bales of liquorice root were regularly sent from Constantinople to Regensburg in Bavaria through Kiev. In the subsequent centuries, there is additional evidence testifying to the existence of two main trade flows, the first moving from eastern Spain to Provence, Flanders and England; the second from the big Syrian emporiums of Antioch, Aleppo and Acre to Marseille and Venice.

2. *The “modern” juice*

Greek, Latin and medieval medical treatises often described liquorice juices and compounds in which liquorice was an important ingredient.

And yet, none of them showed clear evidence of a product similar to what we call today liquorice extract. Thus, it is difficult to determine the exact period when an international trade of this peculiar good began. For instance, we do not know where and when the liquorice juice took the present-day commercial features – probably the solid extract went through a process of standardization in the first decades of the 16th century. In the 1540s, in fact, for the first time some botanical and medical treatises described a product that is clearly the one we know today.

In the following century, evidences of international trade of liquorice juice became more clear and numerous, while the fame spread of small northern European centres of root cultivation and juice production, like Pontefract in England and Bamberg in Bavaria. In this period the global consumption of juice in Northern Europe seemed to increase significantly. The juice came from these local centres and especially from Mediterranean areas like Spain, Crete and, by the last decades of the century, from southern Italy.

At this early stage, Spanish production gained a solid reputation that was bound to endure for centuries, even though Italian juices exceeded in quantity and quality the Spanish products by the 18th century. Still today in England the expression “Spanish juice” is synonymous with pure liquorice extract.

3. Origin and characteristics of the Italian production areas

Southern Italy, and more specifically Calabria, entered this young international market in the second half of the 17th century with a good quality juice that conquered quickly the favour of merchants and final consumers. The earliest evidence we have about an Italian juice production for northern European markets dates back to 1678, but we also have a great number of documents about the following years showing the establishment of a strong liquorice district in the northern Ionian part of Calabria. During the 18th century northeastern Calabria, Sicily and northeastern Abruzzo established themselves as the main Italian areas for manufacturing juice. While Calabria began producing liquorice juice in the 1670s, Sicily probably began around the middle of the 18th century, and Abruzzo after 1760. There were also two areas that were less important: southeastern Calabria and the plain of Capitanata, in northern Apulia.

An important difference among the three main production areas is that Abruzzo and Calabria, at least in the 18th and 19th centuries, exported juice rather than the root. During some periods they even experienced a lack of raw material for their manufacturing needs, while Sicily, in contrast, continued exporting both juice and root.

One can say that the fortune of these three areas has been different. While Abruzzo was able to preserve and progressively expand its manufacturing heritage, the Sicilian firms have totally disappeared and Calabria keeps only one of the many important firms of the past.

4. The Calabrian leadership and its features

In spite of its quite sad end, the Southern Italian area where the production of liquorice juice has been historically more successful was northern Ionian Calabria. For more than 250 years the largest quantity of Italian liquorice juice, and always the best, has been produced in its factories each year. Usually, it was also the best paid on the world market. This leadership was based at least on three elements: the excellent quality of local raw material; the soundness of the main firms; the high technical standards of production. The root from the Ionic area has one of the most harmonic balances among the different components and, in particular, between the active principle, the glycyrrhizin, and sugars. This is an aspect that has always been strongly appreciated both in the pharmaceutical and the confectionery industry.

Calabria experienced for over two centuries a peculiar mix of small and medium firms, often of very short life, and big firms embedded in aristocratic latifundia. For the owners of these latifundia, the production of liquorice juice was usually the most profitable among their many activities, and it was carefully pursued to improve the global economic balance of the estate. Moreover, the large amount of land owned by these families allowed to obtain more easily the root, often scarce and subject to a strong commercial competition. This kind of business structure allowed the formation, during the 18th and 19th centuries, of a solid network of great northern Ionian enterprises, very long-lived and whose trade-marks soon became famous all over the world.

The high technical standards were the result of two main factors: the entrepreneurial soundness and the existence of a traditional nucleus of well skilled workers coming from a small mountain district in the neighbourhoods of Cosenza. This territory, suspended between the hard plateau of the Sila and the basin of the Crati river, was a typical area of seasonal migration. Its inhabitants were accustomed to spending the summer months looking after the lands and woods of the Sila, and in winter they were engaged in several specialized work in the hills around the Crati river or on the flat coast of Calabria and other provinces. From the second half of the 17th century onward, some of these seasonal migrants became the keepers of the best technical knowledges about the manufacture of liquorice juice so that they were soon recognized as the masters of this art. They were

employed in Calabria but also in Sicily, Apulia and even in the far Abruzzo. Some of these men, moreover, were not manual workers but technical managers, often able to transform themselves in independent businessmen. This local dynasty of masters would dominate the Calabrian liquorice manufacturing scene far into the 20th century.

5. *The rise and fall of Calabrian juices*

From its apparition, at the end of the 17th century, to the first half of the 20th century almost all the Calabrian juice was exported in Northern Europe and in some extra-European countries. Until the end of the 18th century most of the Sicilian and Calabrian production reached the foreign markets through the port of Leghorn. The cases of juice were sent there directly from the places where they were produced or through the port of Messina. Leghorn merchants successively sold and sent the juice mainly to Marseille, Amsterdam, Antwerp and London. Smaller amounts reached the northern Adriatic (for a short time Venice and then Trieste), often through Messina, and were then sent to the markets of Central and Eastern Europe.

After the Napoleonic Wars, these flows seemed to undergo important structural changes, probably due also to a strong increase in demand, as testified, for example, by British trade statistics. In Italy, this growth resulted in the birth of many new companies and plants as well as a strong rise in the export of juice and the confirmation that the national and especially Calabrian products were most appreciated by Western markets. The structure of trade was simplified. The number of brokers decreased. The great Calabrian producers often took advantage of the purchase of their whole production by a single buyer over a period of several years. Leghorn disappeared as an intermediate trade center and the big producers began to arrange by themselves the shipment of their liquorice to the northern harbours from the warehouses they had established in Naples.

This global success of the Calabrian manufacturers was nevertheless undermined by some internal weaknesses and by some major transformations of the international markets that became more and more evident at the turn of the 19th century.

Regarding the Calabrian manufacturers, it is necessary to stress that they had always been able to control only the first step of the cycle, while everything concerning the placement of the juice remained constantly in the hands of the merchants. This situation prevented them to have a clear knowledge of the markets, of their changes, and to develop adaptive strategies. When the dramatic political and economic events of the first half of the 20th century upset the international flows of trade, even if only

temporarily, or when the liquorice market experienced changes that made less strategic the high quality Italian juices, the great Calabrian producers were in no condition to reshape their supply and to build new, still profitable, commercial relations. The access to alternative, conspicuous sources of income led these aristocratic families to give up easily the manufacture of liquorice when it seemed to require too expensive efforts.

An exception to this model were the Amarellis, a relatively small family of Rossano, who were able to survive enlarging the range of commercial items and diversifying the final markets by relying entirely on their autonomous entrepreneurial effort. The same strategy was adopted by the small capitalist producers of Abruzzo.

Other major changes reshaped the international trade of liquorice juice from the middle of 19th century and inevitably damaged the Italian manufacturers. In the 1830s there began a network of innovative Provençal producers capable of dumping juice and confectionery liquorice-based of medium quality at competitive prices on European markets. In Great Britain, MacAndrew and Forbes, a big British capitalist company, emerged and soon dominated the international market through the creation, for the first time, of a real global market for liquorice. Finally, synthetic substances progressively substituted high quality liquorice extracts in the pharmaceutical industry.

In conclusion, even if only few traces of the history of this important production remain in Calabria, it has been thanks to the liquorice juice that this region took part in the creation of a global market of manufactured goods in the last three centuries.

REFERENCES

- BRUTZKUS J., "Trade with Eastern Europe, 800-1200", in *The Economic History Review*, XIII (1943), nn. 1-2, 31-41.
- CASELLA LUIGI ALFONSO, *La pianta e l'estratto di liquirizia* (Casale Monferrato, 1908).
- CORI BERARDO, "Note geografiche sull'industria italiana della liquirizia", in *Atti del XIX congresso geografico italiano Como 1964* (Como, 1965), vol. III, 395-412.
- DI MARTINO CRESCENZO, PICCIONI LUIGI, "Liquirizie dell'Alto Ionio: la parabola dei Compagna", in *Natura e società. Scritti in memoria di Augusto Placanica*, a cura di PIERO BEVILACQUA e PIETRO TINO (Roma, 2005), 255-285.
- GOETZ JOHANN CHRISTOPH, *De glycyrrhiza* (Altdorf, 1711).
- MACANDREWS & FORBES COMPANY, *The Story of Licorice* (New York, 1952).
- MARZI VITTORIO (a cura di), *La dolce industria. Conci e liquirizia in provincia di Cosenza dal XVIII al XX secolo* (Corigliano, 1991).

PICCIONI LUIGI, "Appunti di storia della liquirizia", *Working papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica dell'Università della Calabria* (gennaio 2010).

PLACANICA AUGUSTO, "Pece e liquirizia nei casali di Cosenza: forme d'industria e forze di lavoro", in *La Calabria nell'età moderna. I. Uomini, strutture, economie*, a cura di AUGUSTO PLACANICA (Napoli, 1985), 319-357.

U.S. Bureau of Foreign Commerce, *The licorice plant. Reports from the consuls of United States, on the licorice plant, licorice manufacture, and licorice trade, in answer to a circular from the Department of State* (Washington, 1885).

VENN HEATHER, *The market for liquorice* (London, 1966).

Flavio Corpina

Il commercio marittimo tra Stati Uniti e Trieste 1825-1865

Il valore del commercio marittimo con Trieste

La prima comparsa della bandiera americana nelle acque triestine ebbe luogo il 10 febbraio 1800, quando il brigantino *Sukey*, comandato dal capitano Samuel Swett e proveniente da Salem (New England), ormeggiava nel Canal Grande, sbarcando grandi partite di zucchero, legname e caffè¹. Nel 1815, dopo un'interruzione durata un quindicennio, una volta cessate le ostilità tra gli Stati Uniti e l'Inghilterra, e tolto il blocco inglese alle coste americane, altri due bastimenti battenti bandiera statunitense approdano nel porto triestino, segnando l'avvio di un interscambio sempre più consistente tra Stati Uniti e Trieste². Già nel 1820, il valore delle merci importate dall'America a Trieste assommava a ben 1.381.207 fiorini, mentre

¹ Per festeggiare "la comparsa nelle acque triestine della bandiera stellata" veniva anche organizzato un ricevimento. Cfr. OSCAR DE INCONTRERA, *Trieste e l'America*, Trieste 1960.

² Su Trieste e sulla sua economia nell'800, si vedano, fra gli altri: ELIO APIH, *Trieste*, Roma-Bari 1988; FULVIO BABUDIERI, *I porti di Trieste e della regione Giulia dal 1815 al 1918*, in "Archivio economico dell'unificazione italiana", Serie I, vol. XIV, fasc. 2, Roma 1965; BRUNO CAZZI, *L'economia lombarda durante la Restaurazione (1841-1859)*, Milano 1972; MARINA CATTARUZZA, *Trieste nell'Ottocento: le trasformazioni di una società civile*, Udine 1995; JACOPO CAVALLI, *La storia di Trieste*, Trieste 1911; UGO COVA, *L'amministrazione austriaca a Trieste agli inizi dell'800*, Milano 1971; ID., *Commercio e navigazione a Trieste e nella monarchia asburgica*, Udine 1992; ID., *Trieste e il suo hinterland provinciale in epoca austriaca*, Udine 2006; RONALD E. COONS, *I primi anni del Lloyd austriaco. Politiche di governo a Vienna ed iniziative imprenditoriali a Trieste (1836-1848)*, Udine 1983; FABIO CUSIN, *Appunti sulla storia di Trieste*, Trieste 1930; WERNER DROBESCH, *Il ruolo di Trieste tra i porti marittimi e fluviali austriaci (1719-1918)*, in ROBERTO FINZI, LOREDANA PANARITI, GIOVANNI PANJEK, *Storia economica e sociale di Trieste*, Trieste 2003, 349-367; FERRUCCIO FOELKEL, CAROLUS L. CERGOLY, *Trieste provincia imperiale. Splendore e tramonto del porto degli Asburgo*, Milano 1983; GIOVANNI GEROLAMI, *Trieste e il mare, ieri oggi e domani*, Trieste 1955; ELVIRA MARINELLI, *Gli Asburgo. Splendori e miseria di una dinastia*, Firenze 2005; MARCO MERIGGI, *Il Regno Lombardo-Veneto*, Torino 1987; SILVIO RUTTERI, *Trieste, spunti dal suo passato*, Pordenone 1950; ATTILIO TAMARO, *Storia di Trieste*, Roma 1912; GIAMPAOLO VALDEVIT, *Trieste. Storia di una periferia insicura*, Milano 2004.

quello delle merci esportate nel continente americano era di 1.513.000 fiorini, con un saldo attivo per Trieste di 131.793 fiorini³.

Nel 1833 si fecero negativamente sentire gli effetti dei primi sintomi della crisi commerciale che colpì gli Stati Uniti almeno sino al 1837-38. Dal 1833 al 1836, peraltro, da parte di imprese commerciali anglo-americane vi era stata un'eccezionale richiesta di manufatti europei, in cambio dei quali erano spediti in Europa ingenti quantitativi di materie prime, buona parte delle quali si dirigeva a Trieste⁴, che assumeva così un ruolo di rilievo negli scambi commerciali con gli Stati Uniti. A questo proposito, De Incontrera ha fatto notare come già nel primo ventennio della Restaurazione l'interscambio commerciale triestino fosse, nei riguardi di tutto il continente americano, molto alto e decisamente in crescita. Tale commercio si sarebbe sviluppato maggiormente in seguito e si sarebbe mantenuto costante fino a circa il 1860⁵.

In realtà, per i tre periodi (1828-1835, 1836-1842, 1855-1861) per i quali sono disponibili dati omogenei e dunque comparabili, il valore delle merci sbarcate dalle navi statunitensi nel porto triestino cresce complessivamente da 8.768.544 dollari per i primi sette anni (1828-1835)⁶ a 14.510.868 del periodo 1855-1861, mentre tra il 1836 e il 1842 era stato di 11.638.178. In media il valore di quelle immissioni passava da 1.252.649 a 1.662.596, per toccare i 2.072.981 dollari per anno nell'ultimo settennio. Anche percentualmente la crescita è confermata: nel periodo 1836-1842 l'incremento era, infatti, del 32,7% rispetto ai sette anni precedenti e del 65,5% nel periodo 1855-1861⁷.

Di fatto, la reale crescita del valore di quegli scambi, fatta eccezione per il 1828, anno su cui abbiamo trovato dati incompleti, è confermata sin dal 1829 e sino a tutto il 1860, allorché il volume delle merci sbarcate da navi americane nel porto di Trieste si mantenne particolarmente significativo. Si va infatti da un valore minimo di circa 827.000 dollari nel 1835 ad uno massimo di 3.118.607 dollari nel 1836, con valori intermedi stabilmente superiori al milione di dollari l'anno (nel 1830, 1831, 1837, 1838 e 1839), con valori significativi intorno al milione e mezzo di dollari nel 1841, 1842 e 1855, e con punte al di sopra dei due milioni di dollari nel 1829, nel 1840 e dal 1856 al 1860 (Tabella 1)⁸.

³ Per questi valori cfr. DE INCONTRERA, *Trieste*, tabelle.

⁴ Cfr. BABUDIERI, *I porti di Trieste e della regione Giulia*, 130.

⁵ Cfr. DE INCONTRERA, *Trieste*.

⁶ Mancano i dati per l'anno 1834.

⁷ I dati qui riportati sono stati elaborati dai prospetti redatti dei consoli statunitensi a Trieste per gli anni 1804-1807, 1828-1833, 1835-1842, 1850-1852, 1854-1861. Cfr. National Archives Washington, Despatches from United States Consuls in Trieste (da ora: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*).

⁸ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

Tab. 1. Valore in dollari (\$) delle merci sbarcate da navi statunitensi nel porto di Trieste dal 1828 al 1861

| Anno | \$ | Anno | \$ | Anno | \$ |
|--------|-----------|------|------------|------|------------|
| 1828 | 208.000 | 1836 | 3.118.607 | 1855 | 1.437.685 |
| 1829 | 2.148.400 | 1837 | 1.110.912 | 1856 | 2.857.300 |
| 1830 | 1.379.500 | 1838 | 1.190.951 | 1857 | 2.494.024 |
| 1831 | 1.244.500 | 1839 | 1.033.188 | 1858 | 2.700.349 |
| 1832 | 1.977.300 | 1840 | 2.011.800 | 1859 | 2.041.705 |
| 1833 | 984.000 | 1841 | 1.635.200 | 1860 | 2.641.733 |
| 1835 | 826.844 | 1842 | 1.537.500 | 1861 | 338.072 |
| Totale | 8.768.544 | | 11.638.158 | | 14.510.868 |

Fonte: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular returns* (1804...1861)

Le principali merci immesse a Trieste dal naviglio statunitense

La principale merce che giungeva a Trieste su navi statunitensi era il cotone, vale a dire una delle voci più significative dell'export USA di quegli anni. Nel periodo 1829-1860 il valore medio del carico sbarcato nel porto giuliano da navi statunitensi arrivate con carichi di solo cotone si mantenne costante per tutti gli anni Trenta, per poi cominciare a crescere in misura considerevole a partire dal 1857 e sino al 1860 (Tabella 2). Tale trend positivo, era però bruscamente interrotto dallo scoppio della Guerra Civile, che avrebbe modificato profondamente il flusso commerciale degli Stati Uniti⁹.

Il valore di tale genere non era strettamente connesso solo alle quantità immesse, per quanto queste fossero in crescita, ma risentiva in misura significativa delle oscillazioni dei prezzi. Infatti, i rapporti dei consoli indicano un andamento fortemente altalenante, che conosce picchi e rapide discese anche in periodi alquanto ravvicinati. Punte massime vengono raggiunte nel 1833 (con un valore medio di 64,8 dollari per balla), nel 1835 (83,8) e nel 1836 (68,5) per poi arrivare a 88,2 dollari nel 1860. È comunque importante notare che, quando a partire dalla seconda metà degli anni Cinquanta gli arrivi di cotone nel porto giuliano crescono in misura significativa, il prezzo di questa merce aumenta, dapprima lentamente, poi in modo rapido e consistente, passando da un valore di 605.505 dollari (16.657 balle) nel 1856 a ben 1.802.501 dollari (20.438 balle) nel 1860. Infatti, se le quantità di cotone sbarcato a Trieste tra il 1856 e il 1860, pur in costante crescita, registrano un incremento complessivo di 3.781 balle, pari al 22,3%, il suo valore invece ha un incremento di 1.197.001 dollari, pari al 197,7%, che conferma il costante e significativo aumento del valore di questo genere.

Del resto, la crescente rilevanza delle immissioni di cotone statunitense nel porto giuliano emerge allorché compariamo il valore di quest'ultimo con il valore complessivo delle merci sbarcate nel porto di Trieste. Si può

⁹ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

allora constatare che nel periodo 1829-1842 tale percentuale è soggetta a forti oscillazioni, passando da un minimo dell'1,2% nel 1832 ad un massimo del 36,3% nel 1840, e che soltanto dopo il 1857 ha inizio un'accelerazione che consente al cotone di acquisire un ruolo di grandissimo rilievo nel quadro del valore dei generi trasportati a Trieste da navi battenti bandiera americana. Infatti, tale quota percentuale sale al 38,0% nel 1858, balzando al 57,3% nel 1859 e raggiungendo addirittura il 68,2% nel 1860. È un crescendo impressionante e di grande rilievo, che sarà interrotto soltanto dallo scoppio della Guerra Civile.

È altresì significativo rilevare che, nel periodo preso in esame, il cotone sbarcato dalle navi statunitensi nel porto di Trieste non giungeva più dalle tradizionali aree del Sud degli Stati Uniti, ma soprattutto dal Sud-Ovest, dove, grazie alla presenza di terreni alluvionali e al clima più adatto alla coltivazione della fibra, si era realizzato un progressivo spostamento della produzione verso il Golfo del Messico, vale a dire verso il cosiddetto "profondo Sud" (soprattutto Alabama e Louisiana)¹⁰. Tali Stati, negli anni immediatamente antecedenti lo scoppio della Guerra Civile, fornivano di fatto circa la metà della produzione totale di tutti gli USA¹¹. Le immissioni nel porto di Trieste dunque confermano ed anzi accentuano tale mutamento delle provenienze, dal momento che nel periodo considerato (1829-1860) una quota del 54,1% proveniva da New Orleans, cioè dal principale porto della Louisiana, seguito a grande distanza (con il 23,8%) da Mobile, il porto più importante dell'Alabama. Una quota decisamente inferiore (8,6%) era riservata a Charleston, porto della South Carolina (Stato del Sud "tradizionale"), mentre il resto toccava ad Apalachicola (Florida, con il 3,2%), Savannah (Georgia, con il 2,4%), Petersburg (Virginia, con l'1,7%) e Norfolk (sempre in Virginia, con lo 0,2%). Al Nord non restavano di conseguenza che le briciole di questo commercio cotoniero, con il 3,6% di New York e il 2,8% di Boston.

Tuttavia, non c'era soltanto il cotone, dal momento che, nel periodo che va dal 1828 al 1861, numerose erano le navi che entravano nel porto di Trieste con carichi esclusivi di tabacco, zucchero, caffè e pepe. Addirittura più numerose erano le navi che entravano nel porto giuliano con un carico misto, ma purtroppo una valutazione specifica, ripartita per singole merci, dei loro carichi, spesso assai articolati e complessi, è impossibile per via del sistema con cui i consoli annotavano le navi in ingresso¹². Se il cotone e il

¹⁰ Sullo sviluppo delle piantagioni di cotone nel "profondo" Sud cfr. LEWIS C. GRAY, *History of agriculture in the Southern United State to 1860*, Washington 1933.

¹¹ GRAY, *History of agriculture*.

¹² L'unico valore segnato dai consoli statunitensi a Trieste era il valore complessivo del carico. Risulta quindi ovvia l'impossibilità di stabilire il valore delle singole merci nelle navi con carico misto.

tabacco erano tipici prodotti dell'agricoltura statunitense, le merci restanti che abbiamo testé citato provenivano dall'area dei Caraibi, dalle Indie Orientali e dal Sud America, mentre il pepe proveniva da Sumatra e Giava.

Nei limiti dei dati disponibili, è possibile tentare qualche approfondimento relativo alle merci di maggiore importanza. Per quanto concerne il tabacco, nel periodo considerato (1838-1855), si tratta di una percentuale mediamente modesta (intorno al 2-3% annuo del valore complessivo delle immissioni a Trieste su navi americane), con una sola punta del 15,7% nel 1841, che tuttavia non risulta facilmente motivabile. Anche le quantità sbarcate, dal canto loro, non appaiono significative (Tabella 2).

Tab. 2. Navi statunitensi arrivate a Trieste con carico esclusivo di cotone, tabacco, zucchero, pepe, caffè, dal 1828 al 1861. Valore in dollari (\$)

| Anno | Cotone | | Tabacco | | Zucchero | | Pepe | | Caffè | |
|------|--------|-----------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|------|---------|-------|---------|
| | Navi | \$ | Navi | \$ | Navi | \$ | Navi | \$ | Navi | \$ |
| 1828 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 40.000 | - | - |
| 1829 | 7 | 199.500 | - | - | 5 | 171.000 | 1 | 40.000 | 1 | 84.000 |
| 1830 | 1 | 20.000 | - | - | 3 | 57.000 | - | - | 7 | 178.000 |
| 1831 | 5 | 166.000 | - | - | 1 | 25.000 | 2 | 86.000 | 3 | 98.000 |
| 1832 | 2 | 23.000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 | 547.000 |
| 1833 | 2 | 107.000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 | 365.000 |
| 1835 | 2 | 250.700 | - | - | 2 | 135.000 | 1 | 23.600 | 1 | 118.649 |
| 1836 | 6 | 469.450 | - | - | 5 | 330.000 | - | - | 4 | 343.600 |
| 1837 | 5 | 311.000 | - | - | 4 | 149.942 | 1 | 70.000 | 3 | 168.800 |
| 1838 | 8 | 326.019 | 1 | 28.800 | 4 | 129.300 | 1 | 45.000 | 2 | 77.150 |
| 1839 | 2 | 138.438 | - | - | 1 | 25.000 | - | - | 1 | 41.000 |
| 1840 | 24 | 728.700 | 1 | 64.100 | 6 | 195.200 | 1 | 100.000 | 1 | 37.000 |
| 1841 | 10 | 504.400 | 3 | 256.000 | 3 | 102.000 | - | - | - | - |
| 1842 | 7 | 284.700 | 1 | 90.000 | 2 | 51.300 | 1 | 50.000 | 1 | 72.800 |
| 1855 | 2 | 126.000 | 1 | 35.000 | 14 | 481.000 | 1 | 40.000 | 3 | 125.000 |
| 1856 | 13 | 605.500 | - | - | 11 | 1.062.000 | - | - | 2 | 64.000 |
| 1857 | 6 | 854.000 | - | - | 1 | 90.200 | 1 | 50.000 | - | - |
| 1858 | 8 | 1.027.450 | - | - | 8 | 694.186 | - | - | - | - |
| 1859 | 10 | 1.170.747 | - | - | 1 | 200.000 | 1 | 70.000 | - | - |
| 1860 | 11 | 1.802.501 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1861 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 66.900 |

Fonte: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular returns (1804...1861)*

Decisamente più significativa appare invece, tra i prodotti coloniali, la quota dello zucchero che le navi statunitensi sbarcavano a Trieste. Calcolata in termini di valore e riferita – come nei casi precedenti – alle navi con carico esclusivo di questo prodotto, si può affermare che essa non segue un andamento rettilineo, ma vari a seconda delle annate: in certi periodi (1830-31, 1839, 1842, 1857) non è mai superiore al 3-4% del totale delle immissioni di merci americane nel porto giuliano; in altri (1829, 1836, 1840, 1859) si aggira intorno all'8-9%; in altri ancora (1835, 1837, 1838) è superiore al 10%. I picchi più significativi vengono raggiunti nel 1855 (con il 33,5%) e soprattutto nel 1856, quando lo zucchero finisce per rappresenta-

re addirittura il 37% delle merci americana sbarcate a Trieste (ci stiamo riferendo alle sole navi a carico esclusivo), per poi ridiscendere – in ogni caso solo parzialmente – al 25,7% nel 1858 e scivolare ulteriormente indietro nel 1859 (9,8%) (Tabella 2).

Il pepe, dal canto suo, era trasportato a Trieste su navi americane che provenivano esclusivamente da Sumatra e, in subordine, da Giava. Nel trentennio compreso tra il 1828 e il 1859, solo una nave all'anno battente bandiera a stelle e strisce – fatta eccezione per il 1831, quando le navi furono 2 – approdò nel porto giuliano avendo a bordo questo prodotto come carico esclusivo (Tabella 2). Non sorprende perciò che, escluso il 1828 (che non fa testo in quanto i dati da noi raccolti su quell'anno sono incompleti), l'incidenza in termini di valore di questa spezia su quello totale delle immissioni statunitensi nel porto triestino si aggiri mediamente fra il 2 e il 5%, con punte massime del 6,9% nel 1831 e del 6,3% nel 1837.

Per quanto si riferisce infine al valore del caffè che giungeva a Trieste con carichi esclusivi, nel periodo in esame si registrano incidenze percentuali alquanto ineguali in rapporto al valore annuo del totale delle immissioni statunitensi (Tabella 2). Si va così dal 2-5% di anni come il 1829, il 1839, il 1840, il 1842 e il 1856, all'8-15% del 1830-31, del 1835-37 e del 1855. Le punte massime vengono toccate nel biennio 1832-1833, rispettivamente con il 28,8 e il 37,1%. Non più di 2-4 navi l'anno con carico esclusivo di caffè approdavano a Trieste in questo arco di tempo, con punte di 7 unità nel 1830 e un massimo di 10 unità nel 1832.

In definitiva, dal 1828 al 1861, su un totale di 866 navi che approdarono a Trieste battendo bandiera americana, 131 (pari al 15,1%) trasportavano un carico composto esclusivamente di cotone, 7 (0,8%) di tabacco, 71 (8,2%) di zucchero, 12 (1,4%) di pepe e 47 (5,4%) di caffè. Le restanti erano navi a carico misto¹³. Questo quadro percentuale consente di valutare con una certa chiarezza la ripartizione delle merci che affluivano sotto bandiera statunitense al principale porto della monarchia asburgica.

Le importazioni statunitensi da Trieste

Per quanto concerne invece le importazioni da Trieste condotte con navi americane, non disponiamo di dati significativi, se non il fatto che molto numerosa è la schiera dei bastimenti che ripartivano dal porto giuliano in zavorra, vale a dire dopo essersi svuotati del carico, il che non fa che confermare la tesi per la quale Trieste avrebbe sviluppato un ruolo commerciale molto significativo, in particolare per quel che concerne lo Stato asburgico. Se si guarda al periodo che va dal 1804 al 1861, cioè dal perio-

¹³ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

do delle guerre napoleoniche fino all'inizio della Guerra Civile americana, si può innanzi tutto constatare che la media delle navi uscite in zavorra era molto elevata rispetto al totale delle navi, segno che il porto giuliano svolgeva effettivamente la funzione di terminale di una densa schiera di prodotti. Per lunghi periodi, tale quota era attorno al 40%, in altri vi si discostava di poco e balzava stabilmente sopra il 70% dall'inizio degli anni Cinquanta, per poi dare segni di discesa con l'inizio degli anni Sessanta. Pochi dunque erano i bastimenti statunitensi che imbarcavano carichi completi nel porto giuliano. Semmai, tali navi si recavano presso altri porti, sovente italiani, dove prendevano nuovi carichi. Frequenti erano, infatti, le partenze di navi in zavorra che si dirigevano verso la vicina Fiume o specialmente verso i porti siciliani¹⁴.

Se si guarda invece alle principali merci dell'esportazione triestina su navi battenti bandiera americana, e dunque prevalentemente dirette verso il loro Paese, si può notare che in un primo tempo un ruolo dominante era riservato alle lastre di ardesia e alla balle di canapa. Con il passare degli anni, tuttavia, questi prodotti cominciarono ad essere sostituiti dall'uva sultanina e soprattutto dal legname.

Il movimento navale tra gli Stati Uniti e Trieste

Il movimento marittimo tra Trieste e gli Stati Uniti è relativamente debole nel periodo delle guerre napoleoniche, quando non più di 5-10 navi americane l'anno attraccavano ai moli triestini, tende a riprendersi nel primo periodo della Restaurazione (solo 6 navi nel 1828) e si rinvigorisce decisamente a partire dal 1829, cioè dal momento in cui – come si è già avuto modo di sottolineare – l'Europa ritorna alla normalità dopo un lungo periodo critico. Anche se il 1829 (con 67 bastimenti americani in arrivo ai moli giuliani) è un anno di punta, il numero delle navi USA si mantiene sostenuto pure nel periodo 1830-1832, per poi segnare un calo nel 1833-35 e riprendere decisamente nel 1836 (con 57 approdi). Fino al 1840 si registra una certa discesa, controbilanciata però dai 60 approdi di quell'anno. Seguono anni stabili, con una presenza annua intorno alle 40 unità, mentre il periodo 1850-1854 è caratterizzato da un numero di approdi decisamente più basso, che riprende tuttavia nel 1855 e torna ai valori massimi nel 1856, con 61 approdi annui. Segue un periodo di stabilizzazione, su valori relativamente elevati, che perdura fino al 1861, anno in cui lo scoppio della Guerra Civile tra Nord e Sud fa precipitare a 9 il numero degli approdi a Trieste di naviglio americano (Tabella 3).

¹⁴ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

Tab. 3. Numero e tonneggio delle navi statunitensi arrivate a Trieste dal 1804 al 1861

| Anno | Navi | (Tonn.) | Anno | Navi | (Tonn.) | Anno | Navi | (Tonn.) |
|--------|------|----------|------|------|----------|------|------|-----------|
| 1804 | 7 | (1.496) | 1835 | 15 | (4.008) | 1852 | 10 | (4.888) |
| 1805 | 5 | (952) | 1836 | 57 | (14.186) | 1854 | 26 | (N.D.) |
| 1806 | 9 | (1.917) | 1837 | 23 | (5.931) | 1855 | 44 | (23.898) |
| 1807 | 9 | (1.476) | 1838 | 39 | (9.922) | 1856 | 61 | (38.446) |
| 1828 | 6 | (1.854) | 1839 | 29 | (7.597) | 1857 | 45 | (25.535) |
| 1829 | 67 | (16.605) | 1840 | 60 | (16.298) | 1858 | 36 | (16.771) |
| 1830 | 47 | (11.108) | 1841 | 42 | (12.353) | 1859 | 22 | (12.295) |
| 1831 | 39 | (9.859) | 1842 | 39 | (12.680) | 1860 | 40 | (17.433) |
| 1832 | 4 | (9.601) | 1850 | 15 | (5.106) | 1861 | 9 | (3.248) |
| 1833 | 20 | (4.451) | 1851 | 31 | (11.583) | | | |
| TOTALE | | | | | | | 897 | (299.743) |

Fonte: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, Consular returns (1804...1861)

Relativamente alle medie mensili degli approdi, esse si mantengono al di sotto di un'unità navale al mese per il periodo 1804-1828, ma salgono a 3 e più unità nel periodo 1830-1832, dopo aver toccato un picco di 5,5 unità al mese nel 1829. Tra il 1833 e il 1835 si registra un nuovo ripiegamento a poco più di una nave al mese, ma nel 1836 si ha un nuovo picco di quasi 5 unità. Segue una nuova discesa fino al 1840, anno in cui la media mensile risale nuovamente a quasi 5 unità. Si registra a quel punto un'ulteriore discesa, che tocca il suo punto più negativo nel 1852, con meno di una nave al mese. Si ha poi una inversione di tendenza, che consente di raggiungere nel 1856 il picco di 5,08 unità al mese, il secondo in assoluto (dopo il 1829) nel periodo considerato. Infine, nuova discesa fino all'inizio degli anni Sessanta, quando il divampare della crisi politica interna negli Stati Uniti e successivamente (aprile 1861) lo scoppio della Guerra Civile riportano al di sotto di una nave la media mensile degli approdi di naviglio americano a Trieste¹⁵.

Per quanto attiene alla stagionalità degli approdi, si può affermare che, nel periodo 1804-1861, il porto di Trieste sia stato frequentato dalle navi con bandiera a stelle e strisce in quasi tutti i mesi dell'anno, senza particolari eccezioni, ma con una certa prevalenza riservata (nell'ordine) ai mesi di settembre e agosto.

Se si procede a valutare la consistenza del tonneggio complessivo delle navi statunitensi approdate a Trieste nel periodo in questione, si deve innanzi tutto notare che esso è minimo (da 1.000 a 2.000 tonnellate) negli anni delle guerre napoleoniche (1804-1807) e fino al 1828. Per contro, a partire dal 1829 si registra un fortissimo incremento (16.605 tonn.) che, pur senza raggiungere nuovamente un tale picco, perdura fino al 1832. Segue un periodo di calo a 4-5.000 tonnellate l'anno nel triennio 1833-

¹⁵ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

1835, interrotto da una puntata a 14.200 tonnellate circa nel 1836. Dopo qualche annata di stabilizzazione a valori più bassi, l'inizio degli anni Quaranta riporta il tonnellaggio complessivo delle navi USA a Trieste al di sopra delle 10.000 tonnellate annue. L'avvio degli anni Cinquanta è più cauto, ma nel 1855-56 si ha una crescita vigorosa, con 23.800 tonnellate nel 1855 e ben 38.400 l'anno successivo. Segue infine un rallentamento costante, in parte rotto nel 1860, ma poi confermato più che ampiamente – per le più volte citate ragioni interne americane – nel 1861¹⁶.

Al di là di questo andamento relativamente altalenante, un dato emerge con forza in relazione al tonnellaggio: mentre nel periodo 1830-1840 il tonnellaggio delle navi statunitensi entrate nel porto di Trieste ammonta a 93.136 tonnellate, nel periodo 1850-1860 tale cifra cresce a 155.955 tonnellate, il che testimonia un incremento molto significativo (+67,5%) e indiscutibile¹⁷.

I velieri a stelle e strisce nel porto di Trieste: tipologie e tonnellaggio

Le navi americane che frequentavano il porto di Trieste nel periodo che va dal 1829 al 1861 erano ovviamente di tipo, tonnellaggio e caratteristiche diverse¹⁸.

Su un totale di 897 navi approdate nella città giuliana nel lasso di tempo preso in esame, 318 erano brigantini (dunque una quota del 35,5%). Questi erano velieri a due alberi dotati di un'ampia velatura e avevano di norma una stazza compresa fra le 150 e le 300 tonnellate, che solo raramente, in particolare dopo il 1856, poteva raggiungere le 300 o addirittura le 400 tonnellate. Il loro numero risulta particolarmente nutrito nel periodo che va dal 1829 al 1841, mentre tende a ridursi successivamente, fin quasi a scomparire. Questo non è un fenomeno sorprendente, dal momento che il progresso nelle costruzioni navali rendeva inutile utilizzare navi di piccole dimensioni su rotte lunghe e difficili, per non parlare del fatto che navi più grandi erano ovviamente in grado di trasportare un carico maggiore.

Al secondo posto, in questo elenco, si collocavano le *ships* (284 unità nel periodo considerato, pari al 31,7% del totale). Si trattava di ampi bastimenti a tre alberi, provvisti di ampie velature e notevoli capacità di carico, e – come tali – largamente impiegati nelle lunghe rotte tra le Indie Orientali, le Americhe e l'Europa¹⁹. Non particolarmente numerose fino alla metà degli anni Cinquanta (anche se la loro presenza deve essere comunque conside-

¹⁶ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

¹⁷ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

¹⁸ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

¹⁹ Cfr. ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, "Stelle e strisce" sotto la Lanterna. Il commercio tra Stati Uniti e Genova dalla seconda presidenza Madison alla Guerra Civile, Messina 1999, 96 ss.

rata significativa), le unità di questo tipo assumono un ruolo preponderante nel triennio 1855-57, salvo poi diminuire sensibilmente. Cresce però di continuo – e questo deve essere considerato un dato permanente – la loro stazza massima, che nel decennio 1829-1838 non superava le 300-400 tonnellate, ma che in quello successivo si avvicinava già alle 800 tonnellate. Alla fine degli anni Cinquanta, poi, non era raro che le unità di questo genere cominciassero a superare le mille tonnellate, nell'ambito di un processo generalizzato che vedeva comunque crescere la stazza di ciascuna di esse. È evidente che bastimenti di tali dimensioni rappresentavano il vettore ideale per i traffici commerciali tra l'Europa e l'America.

Al terzo posto si collocavano i velieri della classe *bark*: 258 approdarono a Trieste nel periodo in oggetto, per una quota del 28,8%. Queste erano imbarcazioni che disponevano di una stazza compresa fra le 200 e le 400 tonnellate, e che raramente superavano le 600 tonnellate. Esse navigavano di norma su tutte le rotte transoceaniche, ma soprattutto venivano utilizzate sulla rotta atlantica tra gli Stati Uniti e l'Europa, dopo potevano costituire un'alternativa alle imbarcazioni più grandi oppure un più sicuro surrogato a quelle più piccole. Per quanto concerne la loro presenza nel porto giuliano, il loro numero comincia a farsi significativo solo dopo il 1840 e tende a crescere fino al 1860.

All'ultimo posto si situavano i velieri della classe *schooner*, approdati in numero di 32 (3,6% del totale) a Trieste nel periodo in esame. La loro stazza variava normalmente tra le 110 e le 180 tonnellate, ma non era comunque inusuale trovarsi in presenza di *schooner* di stazza superiore, fino a 400 ed anche 600 tonnellate. Nel porto giuliano, la loro presenza è segnalata in misura superiore alla media solo negli anni delle guerre napoleoniche, mentre rimane molto bassa per il resto del periodo in esame. La cosa non è incomprensibile, dal momento che si trattava di imbarcazioni veloci, con caratteristiche in buona misura diverse dal semplice trasporto di carichi più o meno rilevanti²⁰.

Come ha opportunamente fatto notare Rosario Battaglia, a differenza delle varie flotte straniere, quella degli Stati Uniti, in un'epoca che vedeva il diffondersi e l'ampliarsi dell'impiego del vapore anche nella navigazione mercantile, continuava invece a far segnare – nel periodo analizzato – una completa assenza di navi con propulsione a vapore sulla rotta per il Mediterraneo e Trieste, anche se in realtà proprio in quegli stessi anni si stava assistendo negli USA ad un notevole sviluppo della navigazione a vapore interna. Il perdurante ricorso alla vela sulle rotte transoceaniche era probabilmente favorito dal grande sviluppo delle comunicazioni interne, che permetteva alla marina mercantile americana di adottare, anche mediante

²⁰ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

il ricorso a bastimenti di grande tonnellaggio, una politica di bassi noli che le consentisse di rimanere competitiva a livello internazionale²¹.

Boston e New York rappresentavano i centri vitali di quella linea commerciale che aveva in Trieste uno dei terminali della rotta atlantica, e non era un caso che i velieri che approdavano nel porto giuliano risultassero per lo più registrati nei compartimenti marittimi newyorchese e bostoniano²².

Itinerari e rotte

All'interno dei grandi itinerari della navigazione commerciale, si svolgeva un flusso continuo di bastimenti che collegavano più continenti e più regioni. I velieri statunitensi che approdavano nel porto di Trieste percorrevano molte delle rotte interne ai grandi itinerari testé citati, in genere connessi alle correnti commerciali e alle produzioni di quelle vaste aree.

La più frequentata (quella del cotone, del tabacco e dei prodotti coloniali riesportati) era la via che vedeva i velieri americani partire dagli Stati Uniti e giungere nel porto giuliano. Lungo questa direttrice, nel periodo 1804-1861 risultano essere transitate 520 navi statunitensi, pari al 58,0% del totale delle navi con bandiera a stelle e strisce approdate nel periodo in esame a Trieste, e con un carico di valore superiore ai 20,1 milioni di dollari, pari a sua volta al 56,9% del totale del valore dei carichi trasportati. Ad essa faceva seguito – in ordine di importanza per il porto giuliano – la rotta delle Indie Occidentali e del Sudamerica, per la quale nel periodo in esame risultano essere transitate 264 unità, pari al 29,4% del totale dei velieri, e con un carico del valore di 11,4 milioni di dollari, equivalente al 32,3% del valore totale dei carichi approdati a Trieste. C'era poi la rotta delle Indie Orientali, per la quale – sempre nel periodo considerato – risultano essere transitate 17 navi, una quota pari al 1,9% del totale delle navi approdate a Trieste, con un carico del valore di 1 milione di dollari, pari al 2,9% del totale. Infine, 96 velieri risultavano provenire dall'Europa, ma in realtà si trattava in genere di navi che stavano solo compiendo una tappa intermedia di un viaggio decisamente più lungo. Questi bastimenti costituivano il 10,7% delle unità navali approdate tra il 1804 e il 1861 nella città giuliana, e il loro carico aveva un valore di 2,8 milioni di dollari, pari al 7,9% del totale (Tabella 4).

All'interno di questi grandi itinerari, la rotta più frequentata era quella che aveva come porti di partenza, nell'ordine, Boston e New York. Dal primo porto risultano partiti, nel periodo oggetto del nostro studio, 129 bastimenti (il 14,4% del totale), con un carico del valore di 4,1 milioni di

²¹ Cfr. BATTAGLIA, "Stelle e strisce" sotto la Lanterna, 103.

²² I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

Tab. 4. Porti di provenienza dei bastimenti statunitensi approdati a Trieste nel periodo 1804-1861 e valore del relativo carico in dollari (\$)

| Stati Uniti | Bastimenti | \$ | Caraibi e America Latina | Bastimenti | \$ |
|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Boston | 129 | 4.105.364 | Matanzas | 44 | 1.691.332 |
| Newbury Port | 4 | - | Trinidad de Cuba | 7 | 235.500 |
| Gloucester | 2 | - | Avana | 55 | 2.982.757 |
| Salem | 2 | 16.000 | Santiago de Cuba | 83 | 3.268.290 |
| Providence | 1 | - | Guantanamo | 1 | 101.122 |
| Newport | 2 | 81.000 | Laguna | 5 | 47.899 |
| New York | 127 | 3.595.767 | Portorico | 14 | 342.499 |
| Filadelfia | 20 | 307.500 | Mayaguez | 1 | 58.300 |
| Baltimora | 37 | 1.152.500 | Macero | 1 | 28.000 |
| Richmond | 3 | 266.100 | Tobasco | 1 | 8.000 |
| Norfolk | 2 | 18.100 | Cienfuegos | 1 | 17.200 |
| Petersburg | 3 | 422.700 | Rio de Janeiro | 26 | 1.712.750 |
| Charleston | 20 | 908.180 | Bahia | 7 | 316.900 |
| Mobile | 25 | 2.271.063 | Pernambuco | 12 | 453.800 |
| New Orleans | 122 | 6.084.262 | Berbice | 2 | 45.000 |
| Savannah | 8 | 361.820 | Paraiba | 1 | 15.000 |
| Apalachicola | 3 | 289.800 | Saint Thomas | 2 | 82.000 |
| Wilmington | 8 | 115.282 | Maracaibo | 1 | 2.800 |
| Any Cayes | 1 | 5.000 | | | |
| Duxbury | 1 | 118.649 | | | |
| Totale | 520 (58,0%) | 20.119.087 (56,9%) | Totale | 264 (29,4%) | 11.409.149 (32,3%) |

| Europa | Bastimenti | \$ | Asia | Bastimenti | \$ |
|---------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Glasgow | 2 | 75.000 | Sumatra | 14 | 783.600 |
| Liverpol | 54 | 1.861.415 | Singapore | 1 | 93.000 |
| Swansea | 1 | - | Giava | 2 | 148.000 |
| Plymouth | 1 | 71.070 | | | |
| Cornovaglia | 1 | - | | | |
| Anversa | 3 | 244.000 | | | |
| Amsterdam | 9 | 181.340 | | | |
| Rotterdam | 2 | 64.300 | | | |
| Genova | 2 | - | | | |
| Messina | 1 | - | | | |
| Venezia | 4 | 1.080 | | | |
| Marsiglia | 4 | 160.000 | | | |
| Nantes | 1 | 29.000 | | | |
| Bergen | 3 | 18.300 | | | |
| Oporto | 2 | 20.200 | | | |
| Lisbona | 1 | 44.000 | | | |
| Barcellona | 1 | - | | | |
| Gibilterra | 1 | 26.000 | | | |
| Cadice | 1 | 2.000 | | | |
| Odessa | 1 | 7.500 | | | |
| Gallipoli | 1 | - | | | |
| Totale | 96 (10,7%) | 2.805.205 (7,9%) | Totale | 17 (1,9%) | 1.024.600 (2,9%) |

Fonte: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, Consular returns (1804...1861)

dollari (l'11,6% del totale), mentre i velieri partiti dal secondo porto erano 127 (il 14,1% sul totale) con un carico del valore di 3,6 milioni di dollari (circa il 10,2% del totale). Subito dopo questa rotta si poneva, in termini di importanza, quella che prendeva avvio da New Orleans, in Louisiana, che nel nostro caso registra la partenza di 122 bastimenti (il 13,6% del totale), con un carico di circa 6 milioni di dollari (il 17,2% del valore totale). Non molto diversa da questa era la rotta che da Mobile, in Alabama, portava a Trieste 25 velieri (il 2,8% del totale), con a bordo un carico del valore di 2,3 milioni di dollari (il 6,4% del totale).

Dall'area caraibica e latino-americana, invece, partivano varie rotte, che avevano come punto di avvio soprattutto Cuba, Portorico e la Martinica. Stando ai dati consolari, i due porti di partenza più frequentati erano quelli di Santiago de Cuba e Avana. Dal primo risultano partiti, nell'arco di tempo in oggetto, 83 bastimenti (il 9,6% del totale), con un carico del valore di 3,3 milioni di dollari (il 9,42 del totale); dal secondo i velieri partiti erano solo 55 (il 6,1% del totale), ma con un carico del valore di quasi 3 milioni di dollari, pari all'8,4% del totale. Seguivano Rio de Janeiro, con 26 navi (il 2,9% del totale) e un carico del valore di 1,7 milioni di dollari (il 4,8% del totale); e Matanzas, con 44 navi (il 4,9% del totale) e un carico del valore di 1,7 milioni di dollari (il 4,9%).

La più lunga era la "rotta delle spezie", che vedeva i velieri statunitensi salpare dalla lontana Sumatra e da Giava, nell'area asiatica. Nel periodo in esame, 17 navi statunitensi (l'1,9% del totale) la percorsero, con un carico del valore di circa 1 milione di dollari (il 2,9% del totale).

In Europa, infine, è da segnalare il ruolo di rilievo riservato a Liverpool, porto dal quale - negli anni che vanno dal 1804 al 1861 - risultano salpati ben 54 velieri battenti bandiera americana (il 6,0% del totale), con un carico di 1,86 milioni di dollari (il 5,3% del totale)²³.

Trieste, in definitiva, che pure intorno alla metà dell'Ottocento era il settimo porto al mondo e, dopo Marsiglia, il secondo nel Mediterraneo²⁴, coltivava una vocazione commerciale e liberoscambista in un Paese protezionista che non riusciva a comprendere il senso di tanta vivacità. Trieste, in altre parole, era la perla di un impero che non sapeva in realtà valorizzarla. La mancanza di una visione strategica che ispirasse una politica per il porto giuliano rappresentava la più grave delle tare che affliggevano Trieste nel corso della prima metà dell'Ottocento ed è certamente per questa ragione che, dopo il periodo delle guerre napoleoniche, gli anni che vanno fino al 1854 furono un periodo di moderato sviluppo (per altro in-

²³ I dati sono stati elaborati da: NAW, DUSC-Trieste, *Consular Return*.

²⁴ Cfr. APIH, *Trieste*, 41 ss.; cfr. anche GIORGIO ROLETTI, *Trieste e la sua funzione internazionale ed europea*, in "Rassegna Europea" (Trieste), maggio 1959.

feriore a quello di molti altri scali italiani) cui avrebbe fatto seguito una fase di grave crisi²⁵. La città giuliana disponeva di potenzialità molto notevoli, ma nessuno pareva intenzionato a sfruttarle, anzi – come si è avuto modo di vedere nel corso del presente lavoro – la politica economica austriaca dava un potente contributo più alla penalizzazione che alla valorizzazione del porto. Tuttavia, sul finire degli anni Cinquanta, l'allacciamento ferroviario di Trieste al suo retroterra grazie alla *Suedbahn* creava un ulteriore fattore di sviluppo, che però ancora una volta non era adeguatamente sfruttato dal miope ceto politico. In tale realtà, deve essere considerato un merito del ceto mercantile triestino l'essere riuscito, pur in mezzo a notevoli difficoltà e ostacoli, a fare del porto di Trieste uno scalo dedito prevalentemente al commercio di transito e in grado di gestire una quantità annua cospicua (e crescente) di merci straniere, con una specializzazione specifica nel campo dei generi coloniali.

Un'altra seconda ragione delle difficoltà esistenti nei rapporti commerciali tra Trieste e gli Stati Uniti era data dal fatto che questi ultimi non includevano, comprensibilmente, il porto giuliano tra le loro destinazioni prioritarie. I dati a nostra disposizione mostrano che, nel periodo 1851-1860, l'interscambio tra USA e Impero austro-ungarico ammontava ad un valore di 19,7 milioni di dollari. Tale interscambio si svolgeva per gran parte attraverso il porto di Trieste, al punto che le navi battenti bandiera statunitense raggiungevano una quota dell'11,1% sul totale del traffico marittimo dello scalo giuliano con l'estero. Si trattava comunque di non più del 2% delle esportazioni dirette da quest'ultimo porto verso il resto del mondo e, all'inverso, di non più del 2% di incidenza sul commercio estero statunitense²⁶.

Con queste premesse, non sembra una forzatura sostenere che quello tra gli Stati Uniti e Trieste era un interscambio commerciale sostanzialmente "di nicchia" (anche se indubbiamente significativo), quanto meno sotto il profilo strettamente quantitativo. Sotto quello qualitativo, per contro, il rapporto tra queste due realtà consente di delineare un quadro che è altamente esplicativo di come si svolgessero e quale natura avessero le relazioni mercantili tra un Paese che si avviava a diventare una grande potenza economica e il maggiore scalo marittimo dell'Impero austro-ungarico.

²⁵ Cfr. APIH, *Trieste*, 41 ss.

²⁶ I dati sono ricavati da U.S. CONGRESS HOUSE, *Domestic Exports, 1789-1883*, House Miscellaneous Document n. 2236 compiled by C. H. Evans, 48th Congress, 1st Session, 1883-1884, Washington, Government Printing Office 1884.

Nicola Criniti

American shipping and trade with Barcelona (1800-1861)

The American vessels in the U.S. Consular District of Barcelona

This essay will focus on the trading activities by American ships between the United States of America and Barcelona in the first half of the 19th century. This research is based on the analysis of the harbour data concerning the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona, through the study of the six-monthly returns sent by the U.S. consuls in Barcelona to the Secretariat of State in Washington¹.

Data concerning U.S. trading activities in the Mediterranean in the first sixty years of the 19th century cannot be compared to those with Atlantic Europe, especially with England. However, some well-defined trends, concerning above all some kinds of goods, will be outlined by the trading dynamics of the USA in the Mediterranean, influenced by the political and military events at the beginning of the 19th century and, later, by tariff issues. New light will be shed on these little known trading activities, especially in defining the role of intermediation coveted by the U.S. navy even in Mediterranean trades.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the trading prospects of the USA were best defined thanks to the federal Constitution, which gave the government a little known ability of action and defence of their own interests. Between 1789 and 1812, 13 measures in trading and tariff matters were taken. These measures, together with the boom of "Neutral Trade", brought to an impressive growth of U.S. foreign trade. After this golden age, U.S. foreign trade was strongly influenced by the controversy between protectionists and free traders. This controversy concerned a deep conflict between the needs of the industrialist northern part of the country, asking for protection for its fragile manufacturing system, and the

¹ National Archives Washington, Despatches from United States Consuls in Barcelona 1799-1861 (from now Naw, Dusc-Barcelona, 1799-1861).

agricultural South, devoted to international free trade based on plantation staples, especially cotton².

After the measures taken between the 18th and the 19th century, a new series of measures marked the beginning of the new protectionist phase (with the new tariffs of 1816 and 1824). This chapter reached its climax in 1832 with the so-called “Tariff of Abominations”, with which *ad valorem* duties were increased by up to 40% on cotton and wool textiles, iron artefacts and mass consumer goods, thus marking the tensest point between the two main production areas of the country. However, the Tariff Bill of 1828 was properly moderated by the measures taken in 1832 (the Compromise Tariff), and the hot phase of a controversy that would soon lead the country to civil war was then contained by the measures taken in 1846 and 1857. These measures introduced a scaled tariff according to the kind of goods, abolished duties for mass consumer goods and introduced moderate duties for industrial productions.

In Catalonia, the richest and most advanced area in Spanish economy, U.S. consuls, the first of whom was William Willis, began in 1797 to promote trades between USA and Catalonia. As to American trade with Catalonia, it is possible to mark out some historical stages: the first one (1800-1806) coincides with the “Neutral Trade”; the second one marks the difficult recovery of the 1820s; the third one (1830-1850) coincides with the golden age of wood and cotton; the last one concerns trades in the decade before the War of Secession.

The first phase, concerning “Neutral Trade”, is based on the intermediation trade of the West Indies production (rum, cane sugar, cocoa) and on the export of North America (the North Sea fish, flour, corn, rice) together with cotton (1/3 of exports) and skins³. The ships of the “Neutral Trade” reached Catalonia more than 100 times: usually coming from the Northern Coast (especially Boston and New York), they carried goods for \$ 10,000-40,000, reaching the climax in 1806 after the end of the peace of Amiens⁴, while red wine and brandy were the main products coming out from Barcelona⁵.

The second phase follows the end of the Napoleonic age up to 1830s, putting an end to the gap reported by consular returns between 1806 and

² P.A. TONINELLI, *Nascita di una nazione. Lo sviluppo economico degli Stati Uniti (1780-1914)* (Bologna, 1993), 210-218.

³ T. PITKIN, *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America*, Reprint of Economic Classics, Library of early American business and industry (New York, 1967), 34.

⁴ TONINELLI, *Nascita di una nazione*, 206.

⁵ Naw, Dusc-Barcelona, *Consular Returns (1800-1810)*; F. VALLS JUNYENT, *La Catalunya atlàntica, Aiguardent i teixits a l'arrencada industrial catalana* (Barcelona, 2003); F. VALLS JUNYENT and J. COLOMÈ, “La viticultura catalana durant la primera meitat del segle XIX. Notes per a una reflexió”, *Recerques* 30 (1994).

1818: U.S. brigs reappeared, but with no significant action ability. The U.S. presence in Barcelona was marked by the exportation of wood artefacts, whose value, however, was not that remarkable, but in the 1820s they got their best result, precisely in 1829, when an important phase of development began. In fact, the third phase is the most interesting one, with the exportation of wood from North American forests, especially of staves, and with the cotton boom that, however, doesn't last more than some years, 1830-1832, 1845-1850 (especially 1845), 1856 and 1861.

The achievements of the 1830s were the most remarkable ones, especially in the first half of this decade and about cotton trade. However, these years were influenced by the new U.S. and Spanish tariff frameworks, with some important consequences, above all on cotton exports on U.S. ships, whose trade volume was very poor for many years. 1832, nevertheless, was the best year as to the value of freighted goods, especially for cotton: in fact, the value of these goods was higher by 150% compared to 1831, 1833 and 1834, when there were the most relevant values by registering levels in a series that, as to imported goods, didn't occur anymore in the context of the USA intermediation with Barcelona. In the 1840s there was the so-called "Cotton Boom" that brought U.S. economy for almost 15 years to a civil war and, as for cotton, they gave some important information thus strengthening the positive trend of the previous decade. Nonetheless, despite some relevant years, as 1845, the situation of this decade appeared chaotic and unsatisfying. Surely, 1845 was the year which recorded a particularly high quantity of cotton freights, thus showing the great difference of price between cotton and wood, though in the 1840s there were few references and there was a collapse compared to the previous years (especially to the early 1830s). Trading choices, on the one side, and political and military events, on the other, affected this situation: Barcelona thus became an uncertain landing place, especially at the end of 1842, when it declared itself against General Espartero, who bombed the city just three weeks later (3 December 1842). The fall of the hateful general occurred just a few months after and was however auspicious for the resourceful middle class, now free to invest and industrialize the Principality. The freights coming out of the district recorded the primacy of in-ballast, data with the exception of re-exportations of casks of red wine and, to a lower extent, of brandy.

The last phase (1850-1861) marked the return to Caribbean food productions with quite relevant freights of coal and coke, fitting in the stream of strong industrialization concerning Barcelona and its hinterland.

In 1850s a series of records was collected in all the examined fields, from the number of ships to the value of goods, obviously thanks to more systematic and precise data and to a higher product characterization of U.S. trade with Barcelona and Tarragona. As we will see later on, wood

Tab. 1. American vessels arrived in the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona (Us Consulate in Catalonia) 1800-1861

| Years | Number of vessels | Value landed (\$) | Value coming out from these ports (\$) |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|--|
| 1800-1819 | 41 | 608.360 | 129.760 |
| 1820-1829 | 39 | 214.300 | 225.700 |
| 1830-1839 | 110 | 471.261 | 634.266 |
| 1840-1849 | 41 | 509.059 | 14.841 |
| 1850-1861 | 140 | 939.180 | 365.047 |
| Tot. | 371 | 2.742.160 | 1.369.614 |

Source: Data processing based on NAW, Dusc-Barcelona, *Consular Returns* 1800-1861

will stand out more and more remarkably thus characterizing, together with other products of U.S. forests, the great majority of results of this final part of the research. In this stage, the best year of which was certainly 1861, quite significant freights of imported coal and coke are recorded and the U.S. trades with Barcelona will reach also some British harbours. However, the goods values are far away from those they could get if exporting the best and most popular product, which is cotton, and, in order to verify this, more than the analysis and calculations that are going to be examined, it would be enough to compare the data of the last decade with those of 1845, when there were 17 freights, 13 of which carrying cotton. I'm now going to make a detailed analysis of 1845, but I can already certainly tell that there was a record value of 391,396 \$, 94% of which was made up of cotton.

The cotton of the U.S. fleet in Barcelona

The event of "king cotton" is for Barcelona and for the USA the one that best represents the symbol of trade between these two worlds. This event represents both the fate of Barcelona, a rich and industrial city which is almost the only example of urban and industrial changes in the Euro-Mediterranean area, and the exporting ability of the U.S. fleet that, since the days of the "Neutral Trade", based its fortune on this product⁶. Nev-

⁶ About the cotton-industrial progress of Barcelona, J.K.J. THOMSON, *A distinctive industrialization, Cotton in Barcelona 1728-1832* (Cambridge, 1992); A.B. GASSÒ, *España con industria, fuerte e rica* (Barcelona, 1816); T. NIUBÒ, *El moderno resurgir textil de Barcelona (siglos XVIII e XIX)* (Barcelona, 1961); J. AGUSTI, *Ciència i tècnica a Catalunya en el segle XVIII o la introducció de màquina de vapor* (Barcelona, 1983); J. NADAL OLLER, *Cataluña, la fábrica de España. La formación de la industria moderna a Cataluña*, in *Moler, tejer y fundir. Estudios de historia industrial* (Barcelona, 1992).

ertheless, as to Catalonia, the action of the U.S. navy was actually reduced in a few significant years, taking a substantially marginal stock as to the transportation of cotton.

Tab. 2. American Vessels landed in Barcelona and Tarragona carrying cotton (1830-1861)

| Years | American Vessels carrying cotton | Balls of cotton | Value (\$) |
|-------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|
| 1830 | 2 | - | - |
| 1831 | 5 | 1.626 | - |
| 1832 | 5 | 1.858 | - |
| 1844 | 1 | 755 | - |
| 1845 | 11 | 2.484 | 329.046 |
| 1846 | 1 | 772 | 39.078 |
| 1847 | 1 | 650 | 28.257 |
| 1848 | 2 | 3.861 | - |
| 1849 | 1 | 1.444 | - |
| 1850 | 3 | 839 | 61.200 |
| 1856 | 1 | 1.760 | 105.600 |
| 1858 | 1 | 94 | - |
| 1861 | 1 | 2.098 | - |
| Tot. | 35 | 28.241 | 563.181 |

Source: Data processing based on NAW, Dusc-Barcelona, Consular Returns 1830-1861.

For 1844: FRADERA, *Industria i mercat*, 250

After the Napoleonic Wars, the British laid down the law on the oceans, especially for the transportation of Brazilian cotton, and managed to exploit a propitious opportunity in trading activities with Barcelona. Afterwards, however, the Spanish fleets, especially from Catalonia, entrenched their supremacy⁷. British trading supremacy and the dominance of Brazilian cotton also explain the reason why Spanish protectionist measures of 1820 were not exploited by the USA. These measures stopped the importation of cotton textiles and semi-finished products, thus favouring the importation of raw cotton. This choice, which was very important for the industrial development and the repositioning of Catalonia after the loss of the Spanish colonies, detected a new productive area to carry out a specific protection by gathering neo-industrialist requests. This area was cotton manufacturing production⁸. In this context, the North-American fleet could become the supplier *par excellence* of Catalan harbours, especially as to the serious tension between the new nations and the ex Span-

⁷ VALLS JUNYENT, *La Catalunya atlàntica*, 381-386.

⁸ J. NADAL, A. SÁNCHEZ, "En los orígenes del éxito algodonero catalán", in *De la fibre a la fripe. La textile dans la France meridionale et l'Europe mediterranee (XVIII^e-XX^e siècles)*, (Montpellier, 1998), 48-52; VALLS JUNYENT, *La Catalunya atlàntica*, 382.

ish mother country. Anyhow, it wasn't this way, both for the strong presence of other fleets, such as the British one, and for the particularly weak position of North-American cotton towards Spain.

As to the provenance of cotton towards Barcelona, in fact, there were few references to direct imports from the USA⁹. In 1824, only 163 cotton bales arrived to Catalonia (and, as we can see from the available returns, none on an American ship) and three years later none. Even in Cuba, a traditional landing place for the American cotton, only 3.3% of the whole production arrived in 1824 and 10.4% in 1827¹⁰. This situation, which was extremely penalizing for American intermediation, can be explained by the dominance of Brazilian cotton exploiting a still satisfying exchange with Catalan brandy. The marginality of the U.S. cotton will thus strongly influence even the American fleet, which assumed *a priori* a minor role compared to others. Only in the second half of the 1840s there was a sort of about-turn, which became ripe during the Cotton Boom. This little remount of the U.S. fleet and of the North American production is best explained by the variations of the Spanish "arancelarios" (customs) regimes, which will be examined later on, rather than by the expansion phase of cotton production in the USA. In 1825, the age of the so-called "differential flag duty" began in Spain: it brought an advantage for cotton importations made by ships flying the Spanish flag¹¹. Faced with the impetuous growth of cotton trade and its income, this theme is reintroduced almost immediately by the Royal Law of 2nd August 1827¹² and by the measures of 16th March 1830¹³, though only in 1834 there was a new change of course with the Royal Law of 6th May. This law introduced a differential duty, following a larger case record and much higher than that of 1825.

The provenance principle established that the cotton imported to Spain would be less taxed if going through (and only on Spanish ships) from the colonial deposits of Cuba and Puerto Rico¹⁴. These became the main junctions for Brazilian and North American cotton, and this explains why at the beginning of 1840s the 70% of cotton importations in Barcelona came from the Antilles¹⁵. This situation, very unfavourable for customs,

⁹ VALLS JUNYENT, *La Catalunya atlàntica*, 384.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ About this law, *Real arancel general de entrada de frutos, gèneros y efectos del extranjero, para gobiernode las aduanas del reino* (Madrid, 1825).

¹² *Suplemento del arancel general de entrada de frutos, gèneros y efectos del extranjero, para gobierno de las aduanas del reino* (Madrid, 1827).

¹³ J.M. FRADERA, *Industria i mercat: les bases comercials de la indústria catalana moderna (1814-1845)* (Barcelona, 1987), 245.

¹⁴ FRADERA, *Industria i mercat*, 192-194.

¹⁵ P. MADOZ, *Diccionario Geografico-Estadistico-Historico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar* (Madrid, 1846), vol. III, 459; VALLS JUNYENT, *La Catalunya atlàntica*, 391.

explains the collapse of cotton importations from U.S. harbours in those years¹⁶ and the negative cotton volumes of the U.S. mercantile navy to Barcelona over the 1830s¹⁷. The difficulties of trading between North America and Catalonia, in such an important field, are even easier to understand if we also consider the serious tensions between Spain and the USA in the first five years of that decade and the political and military events of Barcelona during the following phase¹⁸. The USA seriously complained about it, if we think that just in that period North American cotton clearly outclassed its only serious rival on the Spanish (mainly Catalan) and global market: Brazilian cotton. This is because, geographically, Cuba and Puerto Rico are closer to the USA than to Brazil and, in order to gain access to Barcelona market, the Brazilian cotton thus had to follow a more unnatural course compared to the cotton coming from the South of the USA¹⁹. This preference for the North American cotton also influenced trades with Brazil, even the wine trade (which was a return to cotton), thus dislocating the whole trade flow with that area²⁰.

The new turning point occurred the following year, with the American cotton boom with Catalonia. In 1846, in fact, the Spanish customs policy brought about a reform that cancelled the deposit duty of the Antilles for the freights of cotton coming from North and South America. This measure was demanded by the Catalan traders, who were likely to pay a higher customs differential duty just to get their goods more rapidly and without unnatural courses, which could be dangerous for the ships and the integrity of their freight²¹. This reform had some important consequences even for the USA and their navy: the favoured position of North American cotton had consolidated during the previous decade characterized by the reform of 1834, so that the change of 1846 brought about a new situation as to the goods coming from Catalan harbours. Jumping over the Antilles' deposits caused the introduction of direct trades from Southern USA harbours (especially New Orleans, Charleston and Mobile) to Spain and, of course, to Barcelona. If up to 1845 trades were mostly from the Antilles, since the following year there was a serious USA remount, well known to

¹⁶ P. MADÓZ, *Diccionario*, 390: Quadre 8.4. *Procedència dels vaixells arribats a Barcelona carregats totalment o parcialment de cotó en floca*.

¹⁷ Naw, Dusc-Barcelona, *Consular Returns* 1799-1861.

¹⁸ Naw, Dusc-Barcelona, *Consular Returns* 1799-1861, despatch of P. Pon (U. S. Consul in Barcelona), January 18, 1844, and despatch of P. Anguera (U.S. Consulate Barcelona), January 30, 1844; VALLS JUNYENT, *La Catalunya atlàntica*, 405.

¹⁹ VALLS JUNYENT, *La Catalunya atlàntica*, 392-397.

²⁰ FRADERA, *Industria i mercat*, 244-245.

²¹ G. GRAELL, *Historia del fomento del trabajo nacional* (Barcelona, 1911), 68-72; *Junta de Comerç*, f. LXI, n. 53, c. 86.

Catalan statistics, which show a vertical collapse of goods coming from Cuba and Puerto Rico, greatly counterbalanced by goods coming from Brazilian and mainly North American harbours²². This, however, brought some advantages to the U.S. mercantile fleet (1845-1850): we must not forget that the “derecho diferencial” was always into force. It caused the expulsion of all foreign fleets engaged in cotton trade with North and South America from the maritime intermediation system to and from Barcelona.

From this moment on, Catalan ships and assets became necessary by developing the intermediation in this field and along those courses, following a growth trend favoured by at least three things: the resumption of relations between Spain and its ex-colonies; the consolidation of wine and cotton trade through Cuba; the strong integration between sailing activities to North and South America and the trading context. These typical Catalan phenomena also tend to explain the deep difference of data compared to cities such as Genoa and Trieste, where the U.S. mercantile navy brought much higher quantities of cotton. However, it's clear that Spain was able to reduce U.S. intermediation areas thanks to its remaining colonies; thanks to a stronger maritime power than Austria's (where Trieste had an excellent position), or thanks to a political authority that, though declining, was always more powerful than the Savoy one, whose main harbour was Genoa. Thus, from 1850 to 1861, the contraction of cotton exportations on North American ships to Catalonia was very evident: the U.S. cotton still arrived in Barcelona but on Spanish (mostly Catalan) ships.

So, it was not a choice of trading strategy or an ephemeral phenomenon in renouncing to cotton. It was a forced choice caused by the events described before. However, U.S. intermediation to Barcelona had to make some important choices: it was left out from the Catalan trades in cotton, the best and most appreciated U.S. product, that was developing a lot in those years and that was pulling national exportations everywhere; it had to deprive itself of an important cotton market such as Barcelona, an unrivalled industrial case in the whole Mediterranean (the creation of “Bonaplata” industry in the 1830s was the trailblazer for the brilliant and dynamic Catalan industry); it couldn't become part of the trading activity consolidated by Catalonia, making cotton a counterpart for the wine exportations; it was cancelled by Barcelona mercantile marine that, since the years before *comerç lliure*, skilfully entered the Atlantic context, thus getting some important intermediation slices.

The entrance of Barcelona mercantile fleet into the Atlantic context, however, had some bad effects on the U.S. mercantile navy with a decline of exportations in the second half of 1800 and so the American strategy

²² L. FIGUEROLA, *Estadística de Barcelona en 1849* (Barcelona, 1849), 174.

ended up by favouring exportations that, though not as profitable as cotton, allowed to enter Catalan markets, to get access to Barcelona harbour and to become part of the wine production in that area.

U.S. trade to Barcelona: stave exports and wine imports

Trades between the USA and Barcelona were not based on cotton, that would revive American economy and Barcelona renowned industrialization, but on the trade related to wine-growing and producing. This meant staves and wood from the USA in return for Catalan wine and wine distillates. The typical product of the American forests had a strong demand from local consumers, even if forest products had a firm exportation basis; it was the same with products such as pitch, turpentine, resins, tinctures, skins, furs, and, of course, wood, which played a very important role in U.S. exports, usually in the form of staves for building ships or casks or in the form of lumbers (for building ships or other artefacts).

Tab. 3. Staves on American vessels arrived in the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona

| Years | Vessels with staves | Number of staves | Value (\$) |
|-------|---------------------|------------------|------------|
| 1823 | 3 | - | - |
| 1829 | 1 | - | - |
| 1830 | 1 | - | 2.300 |
| 1831 | 4 | - | - |
| 1832 | 4 | - | 6.000 |
| 1833 | 7 | - | 25.300 |
| 1834 | 8 | - | 23.500 |
| 1835 | 7 | 36.000 | 7.600 |
| 1836 | 3 | - | 3.600 |
| 1837 | 2 | - | - |
| 1838 | 1 | - | - |
| 1839 | 4 | 114.600 | 3.400 |
| 1840 | 2 | 3.500 | - |
| 1842 | 2 | - | 9.800 |
| 1845 | 9 | 199.280 | 13.343 |
| 1846 | 4 | 201.480 | 15.556 |
| 1847 | 3 | 63.138 | 10.585 |
| 1848 | 7 | 147.800 | 13.548 |
| 1849 | 7 | 444.972 | 27.704 |
| 1850 | 13 | 812.640 | 59.810 |
| 1851 | 3 | 127.780 | 9.842 |
| 1852 | 4 | 226.800 | 17.017 |
| 1853 | 8 | 261.560 | 22.629 |
| 1854 | 7 | 312.000 | 36.037 |
| 1855 | 5 | 562.000 | 56.200 |
| 1856 | 8 | 373.625 | 35.644 |
| 1857 | 1 | - | 670 |
| 1858 | 11 | 514.136 | 34.953 |
| 1860 | 6 | 454.720 | - |
| 1861 | 6 | 217.268 | 14.758 |
| TOT. | 151 | 5.073.299 | 449.796 |

Source: Data processing based on NAW, Dusc-Barcelona, *Consular Returns* 1830-1861

Tab. 4. American vessels leaving Barcelona and Tarragona with wine or brandy on freight

| Years | American vessels with with wine or brandy | Barrels of wine and brandy | Value (\$) |
|-------|--|-------------------------------|------------|
| 1823 | 3 | - | - |
| 1803 | 3 | - | 32.000 |
| 1804 | 6 | - | 63.160 |
| 1805 | 5 | 8 | 8.000 |
| 1806 | 33 | - | 6.600 |
| 1823 | 10 | - | 99.000 |
| 1825 | 12 | - | 54.000 |
| 1829 | 17 | - | 42.700 |
| 1830 | 13 | 500 | 59.400 |
| 1831 | 9 | - | 19.600 |
| 1832 | 16 | - | 31.700 |
| 1833 | 21 | - | 2.500 |
| 1834 | 17 | - | 57.500 |
| 1835 | 6 | 80 | 5.600 |
| 1836 | 6 | 40 | 3.900 |
| 1837 | 7 | - | 33.900 |
| 1838 | 2 | 30 | - |
| 1843 | 1 | - | 250 |
| 1845 | 2 | - | 4.725 |
| 1846 | 3 | - | 8.666 |
| 1850 | 1 | - | - |
| 1851 | 0 | - | - |
| 1852 | 2 | - | 1.000 |
| 1853 | 7 | 671 | 1.650 |
| 1854 | 6 | 1.431 | - |
| 1855 | 1 | - | - |
| 1856 | 6 | - | 85.655 |
| 1857 | 1 | - | 39.035 |
| 1861 | 4 | 1.221 | 14.800 |
| TOT. | 217 | 3.981 | 675.341 |

Source: Data processing based on NAW, Dusc-Barcelona, *Consular Returns* 1830-1861

In the first stage of the research concerning USA "Neutral Trade", the situation is particularly significant, especially for output data, strongly influenced by the presence of brandy. However, many ships evade a detailed analysis, paying both for the precariousness of the international context and for the chaotic system of data collection in consulates, which didn't favour trades and their certain classification. In the 1820s data are not that significant yet, but they already announce one of the best periods for the U.S. navy in Barcelona in the 1830s, when the upswing of North American achievements was based on the trade of staves and wine. It's also important to notice the substantial lack of symmetry during this decade (at first mainly based on wine exports and low staves imports, later completely opposite), which was in our opinion strongly influenced by the customs events that would often bring the two countries to strained relations.

This phase of the U.S. trade with the Catalan harbour consolidated in the first half of the 1830s, even if the Carlist events (the first war of 1833-1839) obviously influenced the potential trading progress. With a simple data analysis, it is clear that there was a substantial growth, which reached its climax in 1850, even if with lower results than interoceanic trade, in which even Catalonia got qualified. However, with respect to a higher clearness in consular references, it is possible to notice that the U.S. intermediation, in this phase, ran into a particularly firm process of specialization, as if it found its way, aiming at the exportation of wood products, mainly staves. Only in some cases, the USA aimed to different kinds of production, but always linked to "forest products" (pitch, tinctures, resin and coal).

As I have already said, the American intermediation particularly suffered the competition with the Catalan mercantile navy, as shown by the general data drawn by American consuls on the typical products of trade. For example, in 1846 American ships carried 201,480 tons of staves: the real challenge was, however, that of the Catalan fleet, with a tonnage (staves) of 1,378,294 tons, mostly from American harbours²³. The previous reference to Genoa and Trieste, in the 1840s, aimed to clear the different export trend of U.S. cotton. By the way, on the contrary, the differences concerning output freights, in that phase, disappeared: between 1845 and 1850, most U.S. ships carried great quantities of cotton and staves to Barcelona but, as to output data, as in Genoa, they were almost always in ballast²⁴. In ballast freights showed the way to Southern Italian harbours, especially to the ports of Sicily, where Mediterranean goods were freighted, or to other coastal Spanish harbours, before returning to the USA. This situation did not change later (1850-1855), when the U.S. trade appeared weaker in comparison to the Catalan wine imports against good freights of wood products²⁵. In 1861 there was a larger and more composite quantity of freights, even if it is important to consider the decline of 1859-1860, probably due to the American political troubles in that period, as shown by the lack of data from American consuls, which are our main source for the processing of arrivals.

North American food exports, other food productions and other goods landed in Barcelona through U.S. intermediation

Generally, at the beginning of this research, part of the American intermediation gave its best results in the field of food trade. This trade in-

²³ Naw, *Dusc-Barcelona Consular returns 1799-1861*.

²⁴ R. BATTAGLIA, *Stelle e strisce sotto la lanterna. Il commercio tra Stati Uniti e Genova dalla seconda presidenza Madison alla guerra civile* (Messina, 1999), 78-81.

²⁵ Naw, *Dusc-Barcelona, Consular returns 1799-1861*.

volved Caribbean and North American products such as cereals, rice, cold sea fish (codfish or stockfish) and, more rarely, meat. As I have previously outlined, the best phase, which came before the dominance of wood and cotton freights, occurred at the beginning of the century, thanks to the remarkable and lucrative incentive of the "Neutral Trade", based on the trade and the exportation of Caribbean products by the U.S. mercantile navy. After the standstill and its serious consequences, U.S. trades towards Barcelona focused on other products, thus significantly reducing food exports for about 30 years.

At the end of the research period, however, there was a little change of trend that, together with the first industrial exportations of coke, allowed the presence of freights of small quantities of flour and corn in our returns. Though not included in the tables, some data concerned Mediterranean productions, such as oil, almonds, nuts and liquorice, though they did not influence the levels of other Mediterranean realities in contact with the U.S. mercantile fleet. The following data concern cereal production. The favourable trend as to input values was caused by the impulse of the "Neutral Trade", which had its best phase just in the end and stopped with the renewal of wars in Europe and, above all, with the end of the untouchability regime of the American fleet, whose international trade suffered the ban policy put into force by two rival forces. With the return of peace, the Americans were not able to get back their role in the field of food trade with Catalonia, surpassed as they were by European cereal trade that in the past preferred closer markets, such as France, Central Europe and, above all, the Baltic area. Afterwards, as I have already said, the Catalan system began to found its cereal demand on the coastal trade from Marseilles and other Northern Mediterranean harbours, such as Genoa, which were maritime terminals for European cereal production. After the protectionist measures of 1820, Catalonia ended up by looking out on national cereal supply, beginning to focus on Castilian productions in return for Catalan textiles. For the USA, after military hostilities, it was not easy to fit into such a profitable but complicated field based on ocean transport of goods that the Catalans could manage with less risk and at a lower cost through coastal trade from Marseilles or by land from Castile.

As to food productions the situation was not at the best, especially those coming from the West Indies. Even there, though there were some prerequisites, "Neutral Trade" had opened up some unimaginable horizons, thus recording a substantial U.S. hegemony in the intermediation of Caribbean productions. The end of this phase of expansion damaged both the Caribbean intermediation with Barcelona at the beginning of the century and, for the reasons previously explained, their possible intermediation after the wars of the first half of the 19th century. The chart shows

how, after the "Neutral Trade", the level of U.S. intermediation as to Caribbean productions lowered a lot, about a ship every 10 years, for the whole period of our research. Nevertheless, some interesting data can be recorded for the value of exported goods. Even in this case, it was impossible to offer optimal input quantities. However, there was quite a high value of Caribbean goods carried to Barcelona by the Americans (30,000-60,000 \$ in the best periods).

Tobacco and skins, that had always been a part of U.S. trade, were reduced in trade with Barcelona after a few years with few reference values. This was the situation of the landing places: the U.S. trade reached a good level on freights of raw materials for industrial use, such as coal and coke, just in the last phase of our research. As to arrivals, they did not include mixed freights carrying those raw materials.

Before concluding, we can briefly talk about the kind of ships of the U.S. mercantile fleet landing in Barcelona. There were mainly four kinds of ships: the brigs, medium and little-sized two-sailed ships, that dominated most trades in this research: between 1800 and 1840, 132 of the 175 ships landing in Barcelona and Tarragona were "brigs" and there were still many of them even in the following centuries; the ships, bigger and best equipped for longer routes, though not much frequently used in the trades between USA and Catalonia except for some years, especially in 1840s; and the schooners, a similar kind of ships with almost the same tonnage. A real change occurred with the so-called barks (or barques), which had a good capacity of freight (200-450 tons) and characterized mainly the last five years of this research, with more than 500 tons. From 1850 to 1861 there were 80 barks out of 172. This was obviously a sign of a better and wider trade between the countries examined in our research.

Sergio Di Giacomo

Trade and consular relations between the United States and Livorno in the mid-19th century

In my research on *Trade and diplomatic relations between the United States and Livorno (1831–1860)*, I deal with the ties which were created between Tuscany and the main ports of the United States. In particular, the work analyses the trade and diplomatic relations which developed over the thirty year period preceding the Unification of Italy between the United States and Livorno, the main port of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and one of the main ports of call for American Mediterranean trade, which also included other Italian ports (Genoa, Cagliari, Civitavecchia, Naples, Messina, Palermo and Trieste). By integrating the data supplied by local historical documentation and American consular reports National Archives Washington Despatches from United States Consuls (1793–1906), I retrace the traffic of ships, capital and goods which went on between Livorno and the principal ports of the US, above all New York and Boston. In this period of the mid-19th century Mediterranean ports, including Livorno, were of growing interest in trade terms, as is shown by two valuable commercial works. One was the specialist work entitled *A view of the commerce of the United States and the Mediterranean sea-ports* by John Martin Baker, a diplomat who describes himself as “formerly United States Consul in the Mediterranean”, in which reference is made to the wide variety of American cargo goods profitably sold in the Tuscan port and which were favoured over other similar products because of their inexpensiveness. Another commercial handbook was *An historical account of the foreign account* by Isaac Smith Homans, published in 1857, in which the author describes certain areas of Tuscany, including the Maremma, and describes the port of Livorno as “protected by a fine mole, running upward of half a mile into the sea, and a small inner harbour or basin”.

For American merchants the Tuscan port was a marketplace for the direct purchasing of specialist local agricultural produce and manufactured goods, particularly the trio of goods represented by valuable Carrara marble, cloths and straw hats. From the data acquired during research, it

can be seen that sailing ships arriving from the United States, before calling at Livorno, stopped off in ports to load produce from colonies or in other Mediterranean ports, such as Barcelona, Marseilles, Genoa and Trieste, thus engaging in profitable import-export activities. On the one hand re-exported colonial produce (coffee, sugar, timber, rum, etc.) was placed on the Tuscan market, along with some typical American products such as tobacco, which were processed locally to great effect (for example the famous Tuscan cigars). On the other hand, once their ships were unloaded, American merchants filled the holds with local products in great demand on the American market: typical straw hats, much in fashion among the affluent middle-classes in the States, the *stracci* used by the paper-making industry and, above all, Carrara marble, for which Livorno was the main international marketplace. The marble was used by the American construction industry for public and private buildings in the European neo-classical style, which was in vogue in large American cities such as Boston, Philadelphia and Washington. It is of particular interest to note the routes taken by ships returning to the USA from Livorno, some of which sailed directly to New York and Boston, while others called at other Italian ports, such as Civitavecchia (where they bought Roman cement) and Cagliari, a marketplace for the salt extracted from the Royal Sardinian salterns. Above all they stopped off in the ports of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples, Palermo, Messina and other smaller ones such as Trapani and Marsala), where they took on board local produce, such as citrus fruits, wine, olive oil, silk and fruit. Some vessels also headed for Spanish ports, such as Malaga, or Crimea.

It should be underlined that there are differences in commercial traffic between Livorno and the USA over different decades. The revolution in trade in the mid-19th century led to Livorno changing, from the 1840s onwards, from a collection and sorting centre to a marketplace for the direct purchase of products from the region. Indeed, the trade in products from the colonies and tobacco declined significantly in the late 1840s and especially in the 1850s, while the sale of marble experienced a boom in the same period. In the context of this brisk commercial traffic, the correspondence of the United States consuls in Livorno Appleton and Binda give us a unique insight into the questions regarding both the administrative and bureaucratic activity of the consular office and the local political and diplomatic situation, at a time when the area was experiencing the uprisings of the Italian Risorgimento.

The consulate in Livorno was the first American consulate to be set up in Italy, in 1794, in order to defend and consolidate important trade and maritime interests. Through their periodical reports and returns the consuls sent the State Department data and statistics regarding US maritime traffic in Livorno, as well as information on changes in fiscal laws, im-

provements to the port and the spread of diseases. Many dispatches informed the US authorities of the rebellions and demonstrations of the Italian Risorgimento, in which patriots often held up the American people as an example of freedom and democracy. In the US consular documents there is also reference to the "Binda case", that is the constant absence of the US consul James Binda, a native of Lucca but American citizen because he had married an American woman, who was appointed consul in 1841 but was forced to delay taking up his position in order to look after his sick wife in South Carolina. In their reports the American consuls in Livorno also complain about the inadequate wages paid by the government, which did not allow them to cover the expenses incurred in running the consulate. They particularly complain about the problem of assisting sailors from US vessels who were abandoned destitute by their captains because they cost too much or were too ill and were then replaced by local sailors, who cost less. The consuls complain that they were obliged to help these sailors, offering them money to live on and to fund their return to the United States.

In conclusion, the considerable consular documentation from this thirty year period offers us a picture of the role of Tuscany in American Mediterranean trade, the dynamism and sense of commercial opportunity of American merchants and, at the same time, the various problems that the consuls had to face in a new and, for them, unfamiliar environment

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BAKER JOHN MARTIN, *A View of the commerce and the mediterranean Sea-ports including the Adriatic and Morea with maps of the principal harbours in those seas* (Philadelphia, 1847).
- BARUCHELLO MARIO, *Livorno e il suo porto. Origini, caratteristiche e vicende dei traffici livornesi* (Livorno, 1932).
- BATTAGLIA ROSARIO, *Stelle e Strisce sotto la Lanterna. Il commercio tra gli Stati Uniti e Genova dalla seconda presidenza Madison alla Guerra civile* (Messina, 1998).
- BATTAGLIA ROSARIO, "Consular and Commercial Relations between the United States and the Italian States in 1800-1861", in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean. Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries)*, ed. by CARMEL VASSALLO and MICHELA D'ANGELO (Malta, 2007), 151-166.
- CASTIGNOLI PAOLO - DONOLO LUIGI - NERI ALGERINA (a cura di), *Storia e attualità della presenza degli Stati Uniti a Livorno e in Toscana* (Pisa, 2003).
- DAL PANE LUIGI, *Industria e commercio nel Granducato di Toscana nell'età del Risorgimento* (Bologna, 1973).

- DI GIACOMO SERGIO, *Dall'Atlantico al Mediterraneo. I rapporti commerciali e diplomatici tra gli Stati Uniti e Livorno (1831-1860)* (Soveria Mannelli, 2004).
- DI GIACOMO SERGIO, "Toscana e Stati Uniti nella prima metà dell'800: i consoli di Livorno e il caso Ombrosi", in *Rassegna Storica Toscana*, 2004, 37-56.
- DI GIACOMO SERGIO, "U.S. Consuls and Travellers in Nineteenth Century Sicily", in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean. Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries)*, ed. by CARMEL VASSALLO and MICHELA D'ANGELO (Malta, 2007), 167-179.
- FIELD JAMES A., *America and the Mediterranean World 1776-1882* (Princeton, 1969).
- FILIPPINI JEAN PIERRE, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)* (Napoli, 1998).
- GIURA VINCENZO, *Russia, Stati Uniti d'America e Regno di Napoli nell'età del Risorgimento* (Napoli, 1967).
- HOMANS ISAAC SMITH, *An historical and statistical account of the foreign commerce of the United States, showing the foreign commerce of each state, the aggregate imports from, and exports to, and the foreign commerce of the United States, from the year 1820 to the year 1856* (New York, 1857).
- GUARNIERI GINO, *Livorno marinara* (Livorno, 1962).
- LO ROMER DAVID G., *Merchants and Reform in Livorno 1814-1868* (Berkeley, 1987).
- LO SARDO EUGENIO, *L'espansione economica statunitense nel Mediterraneo e il Regno delle Due Sicilie (1784-1812)*, in *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane*, n. CIV (1986).
- KEENE C.A., "American Shipping and Trade, 1798-1820: The evidence from Leghorn", *The Journal of Economic History*, 3 (1978), 685-686.
- MANGIO CARLO, "Livorno nel Granducato: un'identità inconfondibile e mutevole", *Rassegna Storica Toscana* (2002), 1-40.
- MARRARO HOWARD ROSARIO, *Le relazioni tra Italia e Stati Uniti* (Roma, 1954).
- MARRARO HOWARD ROSARIO, *L'unificazione italiana vista dai diplomatici statunitensi* (Roma, 1963).
- MORI GIORGIO, "Linee e momenti dello sviluppo della città, del porto e dei traffici di Livorno", *La Regione*, III (1956).
- NERI ALGERINA, *Viaggiatori americani a Livorno nella prima metà dell'Ottocento* (Pisa, 1979).
- REPETTI EMANUELE, *Dizionario geografico fisico storico della Toscana contenente la descrizione di tutti i luoghi del Granducato, ducato di Lucca, Garfagnana e Lunigiana* (Firenze, 1835).
- SPINI GIORGIO, "Le relazioni politiche fra l'Italia e gli Stati Uniti durante il Risorgimento e la Guerra Civile", in GIORGIO SPINI, *Incontri europei e americani col Risorgimento* (Firenze, 1988), 203-262.

THE PORT AND THE STRAITS OF MESSINA

Anna Maria Prestianni Giallombardo

Lo Stretto e il porto di Messina nell'antichità (età greca)

Mi è stato affidato il compito di delineare gli aspetti principali ed i momenti salienti della vicenda storica dello Stretto e del porto di Messina, dalle fasi più antiche, precedenti anche la colonizzazione d'età greca (VIII sec. a.C.) sino all'affermarsi del dominio romano (III sec. a.C.). La ricostruzione delle complesse dinamiche storico-politiche che offrirò terrà conto, innanzitutto, delle indicazioni imprescindibili della tradizione letteraria, purtroppo assai limitata e discontinua, quindi della *evidence* di alcuni significativi dati numismatici ed epigrafici, nonché dei risultati noti degli scavi archeologici. Ho ritenuto opportuno corredare il testo con immagini perché esso sia immediatamente e più facilmente comprensibile a quanti sono distanti geograficamente e cronologicamente dalla storia antica di questa peculiarissima area geografica del Mediterraneo*.

1. *Lo Stretto di Messina*

È appena un punto al centro nella carta geografica del Mediterraneo, uno stretto braccio di mare (circa 3 Km), percorso quotidianamente da migliaia di persone che vivono sulle sue opposte sponde o che si recano in Sicilia; è ancora un fiume d'acqua, anzi due fiumi d'acqua che, scorrendo in senso opposto, per una lunghezza di 20 Km si incontrano e si scontrano, creando gorgi, vortici e correnti, dando luogo a fenomeni peculiari che fanno dello Stretto di Messina una delle aree di maggiore interesse geografico, e sin dall'antichità, sede di miti straordinari (Scilla e Cariddi,

* Ringrazio Carmel Vassallo e Michela D'Angelo per avermi coinvolta nella loro 'navigazione' sulle onde del Mediterraneo, affidandomi il compito - un onore ed un privilegio per me - di aprire, con questo intervento, la sezione relativa alla storia antica di Messina, inaugurando al contempo, un nuovo, opportuno ed importante segmento di questo annuale ed itinerante Convegno.

La presente ricerca è stata condotta con il contributo dei fondi di un PRA ordinario (2002) dedicato a: *Per una storia del territorio zancleo nell'antichità. La falce-porto di Zankle-Messana. Ruolo strategico ed economico.*

Ulisse, le Sirene, etc.), oltre che di vicende importanti nella storia del Mediterraneo di tutti i tempi¹ (Fig. 1).

Quello che oggi chiamiamo 'Stretto di Messina', nell'antico era definito solo *porthmós*, stretto attraversato, ad indicare la sua funzione di separazione tra le sponde della Sicilia e del Bruzio (odierna Calabria). Ma era anche *póros*, vale a dire uno stretto percorso nel senso della lunghezza, elemento dunque di comunicazione tra due mari, il Tirreno e lo Ionio e, più ampiamente tra i settori orientale ed occidentale del Mediterraneo².

Lo Stretto non è solo il canale marino, comprende anche le sue sponde. E nel caso dello Stretto di Messina, non due sponde soltanto, bensì tre: quella calabra (da Capo dell'Armi sino a Vibo Valentia) e le due siciliane, la ionica (da Capo Sant'Alessio a Capo Peloro) e la tirrenica (da Capo Peloro a Capo Milazzo, isole Eolie incluse)³ (Fig. 2). Anche per la storia antica, dunque, lo Stretto di Messina va inteso come un'area regionale unitaria e peculiare, come 'territorio' occupato e vissuto in quanto tale dalle ondate successive di popolazioni che vi si insediarono a partire dal IV millennio sino a giungere ai Greci, che iniziarono ad occuparlo nell'VIII sec. a.C.⁴.

Di questo Stretto, passaggio obbligato ma pericoloso nell'antichità, il porto di Messina ha costituito il punto focale (Fig. 3). Si tratta di un porto naturale, costituito da una lunga lingua di terra dalla forma arcuata, ellittica e quasi chiusa di falce, lunga 1900 m e larga circa 500 nella sua parte più ampia, all'altezza della 'Lanterna' del Montorsoli. La profondità dei fondali, in alcuni punti superiore ai 50 metri, la notevole estensione del circuito interno che raggiunge i 4 Km chilometri e, di contro, la modesta ampiezza dell'imboccatura di appena 400 m, hanno fatto sì che il suo porto

¹ Per l'aspetto geodinamico e fisiografico dello Stretto, si cfr. GIACOBBE 2005; RANDAZZO-LANZA, 2005. Per l'aspetto storico, in generale, resta fondamentale ancora BRAUDEL 1966. Sul versante più specifico delle vicende d'età greca nell'area dello Stretto di Messina, imprescindibile VALLET 1958; e, con ulteriori approfondimenti, ampliamento di prospettive ed aggiornamenti, VALLET 1981 e VALLET 1993. Si vedano, inoltre, i molteplici, importanti contributi contenuti in *Stretto crocevia* 1993, alcuni dei quali, in particolare quello di Ampolo e di Prontera, riproposti con modifiche ed aggiornamenti, rispettivamente in *Cuore del Mediterraneo* 2000 (= AMPOLO 2000) e in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005 (= PRONTERA 2005).

² Sulla natura 'bifronte' degli stretti, e su quello di Messina in particolare, cfr. LA CECLA, ZANINI 2004, 205-212. Per le definizioni di *porthmós* e *póros*, cfr. PRONTERA 1993, 128-130. Sulla funzione e sulle modalità di controllo degli Stretti, si cfr. i diversi articoli in *Controllo degli stretti* 2002, in particolare, quello di GRAS 2002/I, 6 sgg.; inoltre, GRAS 1997, 18 sgg.; GRAS 2000, 24-26.

³ Sull'ampiezza geografica del concetto 'Stretto di Messina', o piuttosto 'area dello Stretto' già per l'età antica, cfr. VALLET 1958, 104; BERNABÒ BREA 1993, 189 sgg.; GRAS 1999, 21.

⁴ Sullo Stretto come 'territorio', cfr. GRAS 2000, 23; LOMBARDO 2005, 71.

sia stato considerato sempre tra i più accoglienti e sicuri⁵. Si può ben dire che la storia della città di Messina ruoti intorno al suo porto, anzi sia la storia di uno straordinario porto che nel corso del tempo diventa, 'si fa' città⁶.

2. La situazione geomorfologica e gli insediamenti più antichi

Per comprendere appunto questo suo 'farsi' città, è opportuno accennare alla situazione geomorfologica del territorio, in antico un po' diversa dall'attuale, soprattutto nell'area portuale.

L'area su cui sorge l'odierno centro cittadino di Messina costituisce l'unica pianura costiera relativamente ampia lungo il versante ionico dei Peloritani a sud di Capo Peloro. È attraversata da numerosi torrenti e fiumare che incidono profondamente nei rilievi collinari⁷. Il deposito continuo dei detriti da essi trasportati ha costituito la pianura costiera che *gradualmente* si è estesa sino alla dimensione attuale, solcata sempre dai torrenti, in gran parte ormai ricoperti e resi percorribili con strade (Fig. 4).

In antico, tra XX e XIII sec. a. C., questa pianura era più depressa e la linea di costa, all'interno del porto, si estendeva più a sud, disegnando un profondo golfo delimitato da un'area bassa e paludosa⁸ (Fig. 5). Per questo motivo i più antichi e rari insediamenti umani noti, del Neolitico medio e tardo e dell'età del Rame, sembra abbiano preferito le posizioni elevate⁹, ed è solo durante l'età del Bronzo, sia antico che medio, che viene impegnata stabilmente la pianura costiera e l'area pianeggiante alle spalle della penisola di San Raineri¹⁰.

⁵ Cfr. COLUMBA 1906, 301 sgg. Inoltre, ORTECA 1990, 147; LA CORTE-CAILLER 1913, 7 sgg; GIUFFRÈ, 1997. Per le vicende della zona 'falcata' di Messina, non solo storico-politiche, ma economiche ed architettoniche, indagate sulla *longue durée*, dall'antichità sino ai giorni nostri, si rimanda al recente volume dedicato alla *Penisola di S. Raineri* 2002, che contiene anche una ricca documentazione iconografica, oltre che bibliografica; in particolare, per l'età antica si cfr. PRESTIANNI 2002/II, 132 sgg.

⁶ Illuminante la definizione di MATVEJEVIC' 1987, 18: «Distinguiamo...le città col porto dalle città-porti: nelle prime i porti vennero inseriti per necessità, nelle altre si sono creati per la natura dei luoghi; qui sono il centro e l'inizio, là una mediazione o un completamento; certi porti restano per sempre soltanto degli approdi o degli ancoraggi, altri diventano mondi a parte. In questi ultimi si raccoglie di tutto e le cose giungono da ogni parte, si possono raggiungere da terra e vi si accede dal mare, dai diversi mari e dalle varie parti del mondo: si tratta di *porti franchi*».

⁷ Ricordiamo, da Sud verso Nord, sino al Peloro, i torrenti S. Cosimo, Zaera, S. Marta, Portalegni, Boccetta, Trapani, Giostra, S. Licandro, Fiumara dell'Annunziata, Torrente Pace, Fiumara della Guardia, Torrente Papardo.

⁸ BONFIGLIO 1999, 9 sgg.

⁹ SCIBONA 1992, 34; SPIGO, MARTINELLI 2001. Per il giacimento preistorico al torrente Boccetta, cfr. SCIBONA 1993, 441-442.

¹⁰ BACCI 1999, 52; BACCI 2002/III, 122-125.

Il sito collinare di Camaro ha restituito due idoletti 'a violino', in pietra filladica, assai simili a prototipi cicladici degli inizi del III millennio, benché di probabile fattura peloritana, che pongono il problema dei rapporti assai precoci – poi costanti nei secoli – dell'area dello Stretto con il Mediterraneo orientale¹¹ (Fig. 6 a-b).

Della peculiare natura alluvionale del territorio zancleo si aveva percezione anche in antico. Ne resta memoria nel mito, conservatoci da Diodoro Siculo (IV, 85, 5), storico greco del I sec. a. C., che assegnava ad Orione, eroe beotico dalla forza sovraumana, la straordinaria impresa di avere fornito adeguata sistemazione ai detriti alluvionali che concorrono a costituire - in antico come oggi- da una parte la cosiddetta *Akte*, vale a dire la 'falce' del porto, dall'altra il promontorio Peloro¹².

3. La fondazione greca

La notevole importanza che il sito (per la sua ampia ed accogliente insegna portuale), prima ancora che la città vera e propria, aveva nell'ambito dei percorsi e dei traffici marittimi arcaici, tra Egeo e Tirreno, emerge dalla complessa tradizione relativa alla sua fondazione, avvenuta intorno alla metà dell'VIII sec., ma certo preceduta da ben più antiche frequentazioni¹³.

Secondo la tradizione storiografica confluita in Tucidide (VI, 4, 5), Zancle fu dapprima stanziamento di *lestai* provenienti da Cuma, in Opicia (odierna Campania), la prima colonia calcidese in Occidente, da intendersi costoro non proprio come «pirati», quanto piuttosto come «trafficienti», «gente di mare» Proprio una tale presenza sottolinea il ruolo strategico del sito a fini strettamente commerciali, di scambio e/o di sfruttamento attraverso pratiche anche di pirateria¹⁴; dato peraltro, confermato archeologicamente dalla presenza nel suolo urbano, in livelli databili all'VIII sec. a.C., di una significativa varietà di materiali ceramici importati dall'area greco-orientale, soprattutto euboico-cicladica, ma anche etrusca e fenicia¹⁵ (Fig. 7).

Solo in un momento successivo, che può essere collocato tra 735-730 a. C. circa, si sarebbe realizzato uno stabile insediamento, legato anche allo

¹¹ MARTINELLI, BACCI 2001, 173-175.

¹² PRESTIANNI 2002/I, 154-157.

¹³ GRAS 2000, 22-23.

¹⁴ Sul rapporto tra pirateria e commercio durante la colonizzazione e in età arcaica, cfr. VALLET 1958, 204-205; AMPOLO 1993, 57 sgg.; BOARDMAN 1995, GRAS 2002, 9 sgg.

¹⁵ Sulle differenti categorie ceramiche d'età protoarcaica e arcaica, rinvenute in Messina, e sulla loro diversa consistenza, cfr. SCIBONA 1992, 27, 33-34; BACCI, SPIGO 1993, 250 sgg.; BACCI 2002/I, 23 sgg.; SPAGNOLO 2002.

sfruttamento agricolo del territorio, con l'arrivo e l'organizzazione in forma urbana di popolazione proveniente dall'Eubea, e da Calcide in particolare, sotto la guida di due ecisti, Periere da Cuma e Cratemene da Calcide, che fondarono la *polis*.

Giunta per occupare anche la terra, la seconda ondata di coloni greci, sempre di stirpe ionica, instaurò con le genti sicule già installate nel territorio rapporti di pacifica convivenza, al punto da mantenere alla nuova fondazione l'antico nome di Zancle, datole dai Siculi, perché - sottolinea Tucidide - «il luogo ha la forma simile a quella di una falce, e i Siculi chiamano la falce *zanklon*».

Corretta o meno che ne sia l'etimologia¹⁶, sembrerebbe che i Greci abbiano condiviso il significato del toponimo, se è vero che proprio alla forma falcata del porto allude la linea arcuata contenente un delfino - accompagnata dalla leggenda ΔANKΛΕ - raffigurata sul D/ delle prime emissioni monetali della città, che vengono datate tra 530-525¹⁷ (Fig. 8).

E dobbiamo riconoscere che nella sua realtà odierna, osservato dall'alto, il profilo della zona falcata del porto richiama alla mente, con le sue numerose, diversificate e più o meno evidenti espansioni, proprio l'immagine di una falce denticolata.

L'attenzione preponderante sul porto e sulla sua funzione commerciale ha fatto sì che anche il più ampio e stabile insediamento greco abbia interessato innanzitutto l'area portuale, occupando però solo parzialmente il braccio di San Raineri, mai del tutto urbanizzato¹⁸. Resti riferibili all'insediamento calcidese della fine dell'VIII-VI secolo e all'abitato di età classica sono stati rilevati entro un breve tratto della pianura costiera, compreso a Nord-Est tra il corso del torrente Portalegni - che anteriormente al 1548, prima di essere deviato a sud, lungo il percorso delle fortificazioni spagnole del XVI secolo, sfociava all'interno della baia del porto - e il bacino del torrente Camaro o Zaera a sud-ovest¹⁹ (Fig. 9).

Possiamo aggiungere che scavi recentissimi, condotti nel dicembre del 2005 nell'isolato nr. 315 della via Cavour, adiacente la piazza del Duomo, i cui materiali sono ancora in fase di studio, hanno portato alla luce tra molto altro, nei livelli più bassi dello scavo, anche un'*insula* abitativa che sembrerebbe potersi datare all'VIII sec. a. C. Se gli ulteriori approfondi-

¹⁶ Per il rapporto tra toponomastica ed iconografia monetale, cfr. PRESTIANNI 2002/II, 133; 147, n.17; inoltre, le utili osservazioni di POCETTI 2004, 323 sgg.

¹⁷ Cfr. CALTABIANO 1993, 12-13.

¹⁸ Il dato emerge dai saggi di scavo condotti da SCIBONA 1992, 32-33. Inoltre, merita ricordare che in qualche momento della sua storia la parte terminale della 'falce' del porto, potrebbe essere stata *non* collegata al resto del promontorio: di una *insula Sancti Iacynthi* riferiscono documenti medievali dell'XI sec., in relazione a questa zona della città Cfr. PRESTIANNI 2002/II, 133; 148, n. 22.

¹⁹ Cfr. BACCI 2002/II, 11; BACCI 2005, 255.

menti confermeranno questa datazione, si dovrà ritenere che la presenza greca d'età arcaica doveva essere più consistente, o comunque disseminata attorno all'intera area della 'falce' e che occupasse, dunque, un'area più ampia che la sottile striscia di terra a ridosso di San Ranieri, attorno al porto, giungendo quasi ai piedi della zona collinare.

Lo scavo nell'area dell'isolato nr. 315 ha anche offerto ulteriore conferma della regolarità dell'impianto urbano. Definito nelle sue linee essenziali probabilmente fin dai primi decenni della fondazione - dal momento che ne esistono tracce della fine dell'VIII secolo - ma pienamente sviluppatosi nel corso del VI, tale impianto è costituito da isolati allungati (di cui ignoriamo comunque cadenza e dimensioni), che presentano un orientamento costante delle strutture in senso Nord-Ovest / Sud-Est, perpendicolare alla linea di costa e, in linea di massima, parallelo all'andamento delle fiumare, anche per facilitare il deflusso delle acque²⁰ (Fig. 9, carta archeologica con il reticolo degli isolati).

Secondo una costante rilevabile nella storia degli insediamenti antichi, l'appropriazione del territorio da parte dei Greci fu marcata dal sacro²¹, non solo sulla punta della penisola di San Raineri, con la delimitazione di un'area sacra-santuario dedicata forse alla ninfa Pelorias o a qualche divinità del mare, di cui restano tracce archeologiche in una serie di raffinati oggetti ceramici, databili tra VIII e VI secolo, recuperati in più occasioni, a partire dal 1926, nei pressi del Forte San Salvatore²² (Fig. 10, vasetti Orsi), ma anche nell'altro punto strategicamente rilevante del territorio zancleo, il Capo Peloro, dove secondo le indicazioni di Diodoro (IV, 85, 5), Orione avrebbe organizzato per Poseidon, celeste scuotitore della terra e dio del mare, un *temenos*, - «area sacra», piuttosto che «santuario» - della quale non permane traccia archeologica alcuna²³.

4. Vicende storiche di Zancle-Messana

Dopo la fondazione della *polis* di Zancle, i Calcidesi, nell'assoluta necessità di controllare entrambe le sponde dello Stretto, oltre che la sua imboccatura, con immediatezza organizzarono, intorno al 730 a.C., la fondazione di Reghion (Reggio Calabria), alla quale gli Zanclei presero parte attiva (Strabone VI, 257)²⁴. Quindi, l'esigenza di ampliare il limitato territorio

²⁰ BACCI 2002/II, 12 e Tav. II; GRAS 2002/I, 20sgg.

²¹ Cfr. MALKIN 1987, 141-148; 160-164.

²² Cfr. ORSI 1929, 38-46; VALLET, 1958, 114; D'AMICO, RAVESI 2002, nn. 6-7; BACCI 2005, 264-266.

²³ Per una proposta di identificazione del *temenos* di Poseidon al Peloro con l'area occupata dagli odierni laghi di Ganzirri e Faro, cfr. PRESTIANNI 2002/I, 159-161.

²⁴ Cfr. MERCURI 2004; MUSTI 2006.

agricolo e la 'vocazione tirrenica', che costantemente caratterizzerà la storia di Zancle, portarono gli Zanclei a fondare, intorno al 716, prima Mylai (odierna Milazzo), un avamposto militare (*phrourion*), ed in corrispondenza, sulla costa calabra, Matauros (odierna Gioia Tauro)²⁵.

Entrambi gli stanziamenti sembra abbiano dato origine a *poleis* dipendenti dalla *metropolis*, perché mai emisero monetazione autonoma²⁶. Testimoniano tuttavia – Matauros in particolare – la dinamicità degli Zanclei, ribadendo anche l'importanza strategica del Peloro: anticamente, infatti, il sito nel quale sorge Gioia Tauro era più facilmente accessibile da mare, salpando dal promontorio siciliano, che da terra, partendo da Reghion²⁷.

Successivamente nel 648, insieme con altri Calcedesi e i *Myletidae*, siracusani esiliati forse a Mylae, Zancle fonda Himera (poco distante dall'odierna Termini Imerese), che sarà invece una vera e propria *apoikia*, vale a dire una colonia di popolamento (Tucidide VI, 5, 1; Strabone VI, 2, 3; Pseudo-Scimno 283-90). Il rapporto particolarmente intenso instaurato con le sue tre colonie consentirà a Zancle di svolgere un ruolo egemone in quello che è stato definito il 'sistema dello Stretto', attraverso il controllo delle rotte dirette rispettivamente verso la Sicilia orientale e il Tirreno settentrionale²⁸.

A parte questi significativi episodi, che denotano l'ampiezza geografica degli interessi economici, non meno che territoriali della città dello Stretto, il silenzio, sostanzialmente, circonda la vicenda storica di Zancle tra 700 e 500.

Tra la fine del VI e gli inizi del V sec., nella ridefinizione degli equilibri arcaici nel Mediterraneo tra Egeo e Tirreno, seguiti alla conquista persiana delle città ioniche d'Asia Minore, Zancle, che solo raramente è stata in grado di esprimere un potere politico autonomo ed 'interno' alla città, comincia ad essere ambito oggetto di desiderio, di possesso o anche solo di controllo, da parte dei 'signori della guerra', soprattutto dei *dynastai* (tiranni) di Gela prima, quindi di Siracusa, che pongono in atto una politica espansionistica, mirante al controllo del Tirreno prima, quindi anche dell'area adriatica²⁹.

Vi giunge dapprima Ippocrate di Gela (498-491), che la conquista e vi insedia quale *mounarchos* Scite, già tiranno di Cos, isola dell'Asia Minore soggetta ai Persiani (Erodoto VII, 154). Vi si insediano successivamente, a seguito della diaspora degli Ionî d'Asia conseguente al fallimento della loro rivolta contro i Persiani, tra 493 e 488 a.C., profughi Samî e Milesî.

²⁵ Per Mylai, Eusebio, *Chronichon* 90 bH; cfr. SABBIONE 1993; TIGANO 2005. Per Matauros, Solino II, 11; cfr. da ultimo, SABBIONE 2005.

²⁶ Cfr. HANSEN, NIELSEN 2004, 144-149.

²⁷ SABBIONE 1993, 222.

²⁸ GRAS 1999, 23; GRAS 2000, 25-26.

²⁹ LURAGHI 1994, 119 sgg.; BRACCESI 1998, 22 sgg.

Costoro, già invitati dagli Zanclei a colonizzare la 'bella costa' (*kalè aktê*) settentrionale della Sicilia, vengono persuasi da Anaxilaos, tiranno di Reghion (491-476), ad occupare piuttosto la «bellissima città» (*kalliste pólis*) di Zancle, momentaneamente sguarnita dei suoi uominini, impegnati militarmente altrove (Erodoto VI, 22-24).

La permanenza, o diremmo più correttamente la preminenza, nella *polis* di questi abili e ricchi mercanti ed armatori – ne fa fede l'immagine della prora di nave samia (*samáina*) che caratterizza il rovescio dei loro stateri in argento, recanti al diritto uno scalpo di leone, fu di breve durata (Fig. 12, monete dei Samii).

Appena sei anni dopo, nel 488, Anaxilaos, tiranno di Reghion, ma di probabili origini messeniche, con l'ausilio consistente di truppe messeniche, profughi provenienti dal Peloponneso, ne prende il controllo, la ripopola con Messeni, ne muta il nome da Zancle in Messene (Tucidide VI, 4, 6; Pausania IV, 23, 9).

Ad Anaxilaos si deve «il primo tentativo di costituire un unico dominio incentrato sulle città dello Stretto»³⁰, il primo e «unico tentativo, peraltro, che parta dall'interno di tale 'territorio' e che non veda come protagonisti soggetti esterni»³¹.

Il controllo politico realizzato da Anaxilaos – per il quale fin troppo sovente si registra l'inappropriata e non condivisibile definizione di «regno dello Stretto» - verrà sottolineato dalla metonomasia del nome di Zancle in Messene, mentre la volontà di unificazione economica e culturale delle due città sarà espressa attraverso l'emissione di monete che presentano, tra il 487 e il 462, i medesimi tipi monetali di Reghion – al diritto la testa di leone e sul rovescio la protome di vitello³² – pur se distinte resteranno le leggende monetali (ΠΕΓΙΝΩΝ/ΜΕΣΣΕΝΙΩΝ), a contraddistinguere comunità politiche, comunque diverse (Figg. 12 a-b; 13 a-b-monete).

A partire dal 461 a. C., anno di rivolte antitiranniche in numerose *poleis* della Sicilia, che segna una cesura importante anche nella storia dello Stretto come 'territorio', Messene diventa rifugio di numerosi fuoriusciti e mercenari espulsi da altre città sicelioti (Diodoro XII, 76, 5-6). Ne seguono lotte intestine, con scontri politici di fazioni avverse che portano ad una preminenza sempre maggiore dell'elemento dorico, documentata anche dal mutamento fonetico dell'etnico nelle leggende monetali da ΜΕΣΣΕΝΙΩΝ in ΜΕΣΣΑΝΙΩΝ³³ (Fig. 14, monete).

Nella seconda metà del V sec. a.C., anche a causa della pressione eserci-

³⁰ Così AMPOLO 1993, 59-60.

³¹ Così LOMBARDO 2005, 75-76. Sulla politica di Anaxilaos nell'area dello Stretto, cfr. anche LURAGHI 1994, 187 sgg.

³² CACCAMO CALTABIANO 1993, 17 sgg.

³³ CACCAMO CALTABIANO 1993, 67 sgg.

tata sulla città dai tiranni di Siracusa, potenza egemone nella Sicilia dell'epoca, si registra in Messana, da un lato una continua e profonda mistione etnica, di genti sia greche che anelleniche, dall'altro, una costante e penalizzante oligantropia, documentata anche archeologicamente da una riduzione dell'estensione dell'abitato³⁴.

Proprio questa carenza demografica, nonostante l'eccellenza del porto, pare non abbia consentito alla città di sviluppare una grande flotta, che sembra essere stata inferiore a quella di Reghion³⁵. Le fonti menzionano in rade occasioni partecipazione di navi messanensi negli episodi militari più rilevanti, che pure hanno come teatro di guerra aree prossime allo Stretto. Per esempio, non sono ricordate navi di Messana, durante le due spedizioni ateniesi in Sicilia del 427 e del 415, laddove ne sono menzionate 10 di Reghion per la spedizione del 427-424 (Tucidide III, 86, 1 e 88, 1). Ancora, nel 401, contro Dionisio I, Messana avrebbe armato solo trenta triremi, contro le cinquanta di Reghion (Diodoro XIV, 40, 3-4; da cfr. con 8, 2).

La città doveva essere dotata, tuttavia, di efficienti arsenali che lavoravano anche su commesse, come dimostra il caso del siracusano Ermocrate il quale, nel 424 a.C., commissiona ai cantieri di Messana l'allestimento di una flottiglia di cinque triremi, assoldando anche mille mercenari per le sue iniziative militari (Diodoro XIII, 63, 2). Ed ancora più intensamente questi arsenali, potenziati, lavoreranno per Roma, durante le guerre puniche³⁶.

Il grosso delle entrate della città doveva derivare dalle diverse tasse dovute per la sosta nel porto in attesa del momento migliore per l'attraversamento, dalle prestazioni d'opera per la riparazione d'imbarcazioni danneggiate da fortunali e battaglie, per altre forme di supporto logistico. Sembra da escludere invece, qualunque forma di riscossione di pedaggi come diritti di passaggio per l'attraversamento dello Stretto, pedaggi documentati solo per Bisanzio, che ne traeva considerevoli guadagni, e per Atene nel Bosforo, nell'età della lega delio-attica (Senofonte, *Elleniche* I, 1, 22; IV, 8, 27 e 31; Demostene XX, 60; Polibio IV, 38, 2; 44, 4; Diodoro XIII, 64, 2; *Inscriptiones Graecae* I³, 61)³⁷.

Nei decenni finali del V secolo, che vedono Atene militarmente impegnata in Sicilia contro Siracusa, diversamente da Reghion che si mostra favorevole ad Atene – almeno nelle prime fasi della sua spedizione in Si-

³⁴ Cfr. SCIBONA 1992, 26; PRESTIANNI 2002/II, 140; 150 e nota 57; BACCI 2005, 259.

³⁵ COLUMBA 1906, 131.

³⁶ Cfr. PINZONE 1999, 121-172. Questi arsenali dovevano essere capaci anche di invenzioni e novità se è vero che vi si costruirono i rostri per la battaglia di *Mylae*. Ed in grado di costruire non solo flotte militari ma anche particolari navi da trasporto, come dimostra il caso della straordinaria *cybaea* donata dai Mamertini a Verre (Cicerone, *Verri-nae* II 2, 5, 13; 4, 8, 17; 9, 19; 10, 23; 67, 150).

³⁷ Cfr. VALLET 1958, 171; AMPOLO 1993, 61; 1994 237-239; 2000, 59.

cilia - Messina appare piuttosto collegata all'orbita siracusana. Una particolare testimonianza della sua 'distanza' da Atene è costituita anche dal recupero di epicoriche tradizioni documentate dalla tipologia monetale; in particolare dalle serie, coniate in oro, argento e bronzo, che presentano al diritto un profilo femminile con leggenda ΠΕΛΟΠΙΑΣ (*Peloriás*), personificazione del promontorio peloritano e, al contempo protettrice del territorio (*ge pelorís*), e al rovescio un eroe guerriero, identificato dallo leggenda come ΦΗΡΑΙΜΟΝ (*Pheraimon*)³⁸ (Fig. 15, moneta).

Al fallimento della spedizione ateniese in Sicilia (415-413 a.C.) segue, a breve distanza di tempo, l'invasione cartaginese dell'isola, con la conseguente distruzione, tra 409 e 405, di Imera, Selinunte e Agrigento: Messina è ancora una volta rifugio di esuli (Diodoro XIII, 61, 5). Quindi, nel 396, nel quadro di un ennesimo confronto militare tra Punici e Greci, anche Messina viene conquistata dal generale cartaginese Imilcone, il quale consapevole dell'eccellente posizione geografica della città (*eukairían ton tópon*), anche nella prospettiva di ostacolare soccorsi e approvvigionamenti che dagli Italioti e dal Peloponneso sarebbero potuti pervenire all'avversario siracusano, Dionisio I, decide di raderla al suolo a.C. (Diodoro XIV, 56-57)³⁹.

Senza porre indugi, nel 395, Dionisio I la ricostruisce, la fortifica, e ne rafforza la popolazione con elementi misti e fidati, Locresi, Medmei, Messeni del Peloponneso esuli da Zacinto e Naupatto (Diodoro XIV, 78, 5; Pausania IV, 26, 2). E ciò anche nella prospettiva di costituire un saldo dominio territoriale comprendente anche l'area dello Stretto: nello stesso anno, infatti, il tiranno di Siracusa fonda Tindari (Diodoro XIV, 78, 6), in una posizione strategicamente favorevole al controllo della costiera tirrenica della Sicilia.

Anche lo stratega corinzio Timoleonte, richiesto da Siracusa alla madrepatria Corinto, nel quadro di un ennesimo confronto della grecità di Sicilia contro Cartagine, consapevole della necessità di controllare militarmente lo Stretto, conquista Messina nel 344, solo dopo averla assediata per terra e per mare (Plutarco, *Timoleonte* 19-20, 1; 34, 1-2)⁴⁰.

Allo scorcio del IV sec. a.C., ancora un monarca siracusano, Agatocle, pone in atto, tra 315-314, due vani tentativi di espugnare la città (Diodoro XIX, 65). Solo successivamente riuscirà a conquistarla, con un abile e fraudolento stratagemma, facendo pagare un alto prezzo di sangue agli oppositori interni ed esterni che in Messina avevano trovato rifugio politico (Diodoro XIX, 102, 2-7).

Nel secondo decennio del III secolo, tra 289 e 282, mercenari campani già al servizio di Agatocle e da lui ricompensati con il diritto di cittadi-

³⁸ CALTABIANO 1993, 126 sgg.; 131 sgg.

³⁹ Cfr. MEISTER 1993, 75-76; LOMBARDO 2005, 78-80.

⁴⁰ Cfr. MEISTER 1993, 81-82; LOMBARDO 2005, 81.

nanza, alla sua morte sono costretti ad allontanarsi da Siracusa. Giunti a Messina, con la violenza si impadroniscono della città e vi istaurano un nuovo regime (Polibio I, 7-8; Dionisio di Alicarnasso XX, 4, 2; Diodoro XXII, 7, 4) che produrrà alla *civitas mamertina* (*touto mamertina*), come i nuovi arrivati la chiameranno, un ampliamento dell'abitato (determinato anche da un accrescimento demografico) e benessere economico⁴¹. Emerge quest'ultimo, dall'individuazione di quartieri artigianali, desunti anche dal rinvenimento di numerose fornaci⁴² (Fig. 16, fornaci per la ceramica), adibite alla produzione del materiale ceramico indispensabile alla vita quotidiana: vasellame comune e 'da fuoco', vere di pozzo, tubature, ed ancora, tegole e mattoni, alcuni dei quali contraddistinti dal bollo con *legenda* MAMEPTINOY'M ed esportati anche a Reghion⁴³. Emerge inoltre tale benessere dalla presenza di tombe monumentali, alcune delle quali dalla peculiare tipologia ad *epitymbia*⁴⁴ (Fig. 17, tombe p. 57, Fig. 77 II da Zancle a *Messana* p 81, fig. 6 e p. 83, fig. 10), dall'ampia varietà dei materiali ceramici e coroplastici rinvenuti nelle necropoli⁴⁵, ed ancora, dalla cospicua monetazione in bronzo⁴⁶ (Fig. 18, moneta).

Proprio ad età mamertina vengono datati brani significativi di mura cittadine⁴⁷ (Fig. 19, mura) e le iscrizioni pubbliche più monumentali che la città antica ci ha conservato⁴⁸ (Fig. 20 a-b-c iscrizioni osche).

Con i Mamertini si apre un nuovo capitolo nella storia non solo di Messina, ma dell'intera Sicilia, a scrivere la quale contribuiranno soprattutto i

⁴¹ Sulle complesse vicende dell'insediamento dei mercenari oschi in Messina, cfr. TAGLIAMONTE 1994, 191-198; PRESTIANNI 2006, 115-118; 128-129. Il termine *touto mamertina* risulta conservato nel testo frammentario della più monumentale iscrizione osca sopravvissuta. Cfr. infra, nota 48.

⁴² Alle fornaci già note, riportate alla luce, una nello scavo di via Cesare Battisti, is.141 (Casa dello Studente), tre nello scavo di via dei Mille, is.145 (cfr. D'AMICO, RAVESI 2002, nn. 68; 79), va aggiunta anche quella emersa nello scavo di via Cavour, is. 315, nel 2005, utilizzata anche per la produzione di mattoni con bollo MAMEPTINOY'M, inedita.

⁴³ Cfr. BITTO 2001, 126-127, nrr. 49-50.

⁴⁴ TIGANO 2001, 79-83 e figg. 2, 6, 10.

⁴⁵ Di particolare rilevanza va considerata una tomba a camera ipogeica con tre *klinai* e «frustuli di polvere d'oro» su una di esse, venuta alla luce nel 1971 presso Largo Avignone, databile verso la fine del IV sec. a.C. e tuttora inedita - notizia ne è in SCIBONA 1992, 28-29; inoltre, D'AMICO, RAVESI 2002, n. 59. Essa ha restituito anche un vaso sul quale è dipinta una breve iscrizione, in lingua e caratteri greci, menzionante una *Pakia Pomptia*, di stirpe forse sannitica, traccia di un presumibile, precoce inserimento di elementi di origine italica nella città dello Stretto. Cfr. TAGLIAMONTE 1994, 196.

⁴⁶ Cfr. SÄRSTRÖM 1940.

⁴⁷ Per i diversi segmenti di strutture murarie reperite (cfr. ORSI 1916, 201-205; 212-218), nel tempo diversamente interpretate e ricostruite, cfr. VALLET 1958, 111-113; BACCI 1999, 55-56; SCIBONA 2001, 51 sgg.; BACCI 2005, 260-262; MASTELLONI 2005, 275-277

⁴⁸ Le iscrizioni, provenienti da diversi punti dell'area urbana, sono conservate nel Museo Regionale di Messina. Cfr. MASTELLONI 2005, 277-283. Sono in caratteri greci, ma

Romani. Costoro, accogliendo la richiesta di aiuto dei Mamertini, procederanno in realtà alla conquista dell'intera isola, facendone la prima *provincia* di Roma. Nel dipanarsi di questa storia, durante le guerre puniche, il ruolo del porto e dello Stretto di Messina saranno, ancora una volta, tutt'altro che trascurabili (Fig. 21, carta archeologica con l'indicazione dei ritrovamenti d'età sia greca che romana).

La comprova dell'importanza che il porto di Messina avrà per la storia della città è racchiusa nell'ultima composita immagine alla quale affido la conclusione del mio intervento. In essa, alla moneta greca del VI sec. a. C., è accostata una miniatura della città di Messina – opera di anonimo – che appartiene alle pagine del codice cinquecentesco che contiene il *De laudibus Messanae* di Angelo Callimaco Siculo⁴⁹. Più di venti secoli separano le due immagini. Eppure esse contengono ed esprimono, pur nella ovvia differenza del segno grafico, la medesima realtà concettuale di base: quella di una città 'monospazio', immaginata e vagheggiata come avvolta e quasi conclusa attorno al suo porto. Si tratta della medesima *forma* di città-porto scelta, secoli dopo, per campeggiare nello stendardo dell'Università di Messina, della quale ancora oggi costituisce emblematicamente il logo (Fig. 22, moneta, miniatura, logo).

BIBLIOGRAFIA

- AMPOLO 1993 = C. AMPOLO, *La funzione dello Stretto nella vicenda politica fino al termine della guerra del Peloponneso*, in *Stretto crocevia*, 1993, 45-71.
- AMPOLO 2000 = C. AMPOLO, *La funzione dello Stretto nella vicenda politica fino al termine della guerra del Peloponneso*, in *Cuore del Mediterraneo* 2000, 49-70.
- ARICÒ 2002 = N. ARICÒ, *Segni di Gea, grafie di Atlante. Immagini della Falce dal VI secolo a.C. all'epifania della Cittadella*, in *Penisola di San Raineri* 2002, 19-88., part. 21-22.
- BACCI 1999 = G.M. BACCI, *Alcuni elementi di topografia antica*, in *Da Zancle a Messina I*, 1999, 51-57.
- BACCI 2000 = G.M. BACCI, *Topografia archeologica di Zancle-Messana*, in *Cuore del Mediterraneo*, 2000, 237- 249.
- BACCI 2002/I = G.M. BACCI, *Ceramica protoarcaica di Zancle: aspetti e problemi*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II.2*, 2002, 21- 30.

in lingua osca (cfr. PARLANGELI 1966), come osche sono le istituzioni ed i termini utilizzati per definirle (*meddix, touto*), totalmente italica l'antroponomastica dei *meddices*, patronimici compresi.

⁴⁹ Il codice è conservato nella Biblioteca Nazionale di Roma, fondo Vittorio Emanuele, n. 55. La miniatura è contenuta nella c.18. Si cfr. la suggestiva interpretazione storico-architettonica della miniatura offerta da Aricò 2002, 21-22.

- BACCI 2002/II = G.M. BACCI, *La carta archeologica*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II.2*, 2002, 9-14.
- BACCI 2002/III = G.M. BACCI, *Zancle- Messana: alcune considerazioni sulla topografia e sulla cultura materiale*, in *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità* 2002, 25-46.
- BACCI 2002/IV = G.M. BACCI, *La penisola durante l'antichità*, in *Penisola di San Raineri* 2002, 121-128.
- BACCI 2005 = G.M. BACCI, *Zancle- Messana*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005, 253-273.
- BACCI SPIGO 1993 = G.M. BACCI SPIGO, *Aspetti della ceramica arcaica dello Stretto*, in *Stretto crocevia* 1993, 247-274.
- BERNABÒ BREA 1993 = L. BERNABÒ BREA, *Lo Stretto di Messina nella preistoria*, in *Stretto crocevia*, 1993, 189-219.
- BITTO 2001 = I. BITTO, *Le iscrizioni greche e latine di Messina*. I, *Pelorias* 7, Messina 2001.
- BOARDMAN 1995 = J. BOARDMAN, *Les Grecs d'outre-mer. Colonisation et commerce archaïques*, Naples 1995.
- BONFIGLIO 1999 = L. BONFIGLIO, *La distribuzione dei siti archeologici, il contesto stratigrafico e la ricostruzione paleoambientale*, in *Da Zancle a Messina I*, 1999, 9-17.
- BRACCESI 1998 = L. BRACCESI, *I tiranni di Sicilia*, Roma-Bari 1998.
- BRAUDEL 1966 = F. BRAUDEL, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris 1949 (trad. it. *Civiltà ed imperi del Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II*, Torino 1966).
- CALTABIANO 1993 = M. CACCAMO CALTABIANO, *La monetazione di Messana con le emissioni di Rhegion dell'età della tirannide*, Berlin 1993.
- COLUMBA 1906 = G.M. COLUMBA, *I porti della Sicilia*, in *Monografia storica dei porti dell'antichità nell'Italia insulare*, I, Roma 1906, (rist. anast. Palermo 1991).
- Controllo degli stretti 2002 = *Controllo degli stretti e insediamenti militari nel Mediterraneo*, a cura di R. VILLARI, Roma 2002.
- Cuore del Mediterraneo 2000 = *Nel cuore del Mediterraneo antico. Reggio, Messina e le colonie calcidesi dell'area dello Stretto*, a cura di M. GRAS, E. GRECO, P.G. GUZZO, Corigliano Calabro 2000.
- Da Zancle a Messina I*, 1999 = *Da Zancle a Messina. Un percorso archeologico attraverso gli scavi*, a cura di G. M. BACCI e G. TIGANO, I, Messina 1999.
- Da Zancle a Messina II.1*, 2001 = *Da Zancle a Messina. Un percorso archeologico attraverso gli scavi*, a cura di G. M. BACCI e G. TIGANO, II. 1, Messina 2001.
- Da Zancle a Messina II.2*, 2002 = *Da Zancle a Messina. Un percorso archeologico attraverso gli scavi*, a cura di G. M. BACCI e G. TIGANO, II. 2, Messina 2002.
- D'AMICO, RAVESI 2002 = E. D'AMICO, M. RAVESI, *Schede per la lettura della carta archeologica*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II. 2*, 2002, 15-20.
- FISCHER-HANSEN, NIELSEN, AMPOLO 2004 = T. FISCHER-HANSEN, T.H. NIELSEN, C. AMPOLO, *Zankle*, in M. H. HANSEN - T. H. NIELSEN, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, Oxford 2004, 233-236.
- GIACOBBE 2005 = S. GIACOBBE, *Il mare e le correnti*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005, 13-25.
- GIUFFRÈ 1997 = M. GIUFFRÈ, *L'Isola e il mare: il porto di Messina e altri porti*, in *Sopra i porti di mare. III. Sicilia e Malta*, a cura di G. SIMONCINI, Firenze 1997, 193-238.
- GRAS 1999 = M. GRAS, *Zankle, Rhegion ed il mondo tirrenico*, in *Da Zancle a Messina I*, 1999, 21-24.
- GRAS 2000 = M. GRAS, *Lo Stretto fra Calabria e Sicilia e i traffici arcaici*, in *Cuore del Mediterraneo antico* 2000, 19-28.

- GRAS 2002/I = M. GRAS, *Contrôles et échanges dans la Méditerranée archaïque*, in *Controllo degli stretti*, 2002, 5-20.
- GRAS 2002/II = M. GRAS, *L'urbanisme de Zancle*, in *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità*, 2002, 13-24.
- LA CECLA, ZANINI 2004 = F. LA CECLA, P. ZANINI, *Lo stretto indispensabile. Storie e geografie di un tratto di mare limitato*, Milano 2004.
- LA CORTE CAILLER 1913 = G. LA CORTE CAILLER, *La zona falcata del porto di Messina attraverso i tempi*, Messina 1913.
- LOMBARDO 2005 = M. LOMBARDO, *La colonizzazione e l'età greca*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità*, 2005, 71-84.
- LURAGHI 1994 = N. LURAGHI, *Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia. Da Panetio di Leontini alla caduta dei Dinomenidi*, Firenze 1994.
- MALKIN 1987 = I. MALKIN, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece*, Leiden 1987.
- MARTINELLI, BACCI 2001 = M.C. MARTINELLI, G.M. BACCI, *L'insediamento neo-eneolitico di Camaro*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II.1*, 2001, 169-181.
- MASTELLONI 2005 = M. A. MASTELLONI, *Messana e i Mamertini*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005, 275-292.
- MATVEJEVIC' 1987 = P. MATVEJEVIC', *Breviario Mediterraneo*, Milano 1987.
- MEISTER 1993 = K. MEISTER, *Problemi di storia dello Stretto dal IV sec. a.C. all'inizio della prima guerra punica*, in *Stretto crocevia*, 1993, 73-92.
- MERCURI 2004 = L. MERCURI, *Eubéens en Calabre à l'époque archaïque*, Rome 2004.
- Messina e Reggio nell'antichità* 2002 = *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità: storia, società, cultura*, Atti del Convegno della S.I.S.A.C., Messina-Reggio Calabria 24-26 Maggio 1999, a cura di B. GENTILI e A. PINZONE, Di.Sc.A.M., Messina 2002.
- MUSTI 2006 = D. MUSTI, *Fondazioni coloniali su istmi e stretti*, in "Troianer sind wir gewesen" - *Migrationen in der antiken Welt*, Stuttgarter Kolloquium zur Historischen Geographie des Altertums" 8, 2002 [2006], 70-76.
- ORSI 1916 = P. ORSI, *Messana. La necropoli romana di S. Placido ed altre scoperte nel 1910-1915*, MAAL 24, 1916, 171 201-205; 212-218
- ORSI 1929 = P. ORSI, *Messina. A. Tracce di santuarietto arcaico verso la punta della Zancle*, in *Notizie degli Scavi* 1929, 38-46.
- ORTECA 1990 = *Il porto di Messina dalle origini ai nostri giorni*, a cura di P. ORTECA, Messina 1990.
- PARLANGELI 1966 = O. PARLANGELI, *Le iscrizioni osche (mamertine) di Messina*, in «Bollettino del Centro Studi Filologici e Linguistici Siciliani», IV, 1966, 28-38.
- Penisola di San Raineri* 2002 = N. ARICÒ (a cura di), *La penisola di San Raineri. Diaspora dell'origine*, DRP nr. 4, Messina 2002.
- PINZONE 1999 = A. PINZONE, *Provincia Sicilia Ricerche di storia della Sicilia romana da Gaio Flaminio a Gregorio Magno*, Catania 1999.
- PINZONE 2005 = A. PINZONE, *Roma sullo Stretto*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005, 85-98.
- POCCETTI 2004 = P. POCCHETTI, *Il nome e l'immagine: interazione tra iconografia e scelte linguistiche nella monetazione dell'Italia antica*, in *La tradizione iconica come fonte storica*, a cura di M. CACCAMO CALTABIANO, D. CASTRIZIO e M. PUGLISI, Reggio Calabria 2004, 301-333.
- PRESTIANNI 2002/I = A.M. PRESTIANNI GIALLOMBARDO, *Il Peloro nell'antichità. Miti Scienza Storia*, in *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità*, a cura di B. GENTILI e A. PINZONE, 2002, 141-184.
- PRESTIANNI 2002/II = A.M. PRESTIANNI GIALLOMBARDO, *La falce-porto di Zancle Messana. Dall'alto arcaismo alla tarda antichità*, in *Penisola di San Raineri* 2002, 129-154.

- PRESTIANNI 2006 = A.M. PRESTIANNI GIALLOMBARDO, *Il ruolo dei mercenari nelle dinamiche di guerra e di pace in Sicilia tra fine V- metà del III sec. a.C.*, in *Guerra e pace in Sicilia e nel Mediterraneo antico (VIII- III sec. a. C.). Arte prassi e teorie della pace e della guerra. Quinte Giornate Internazionali di Studi sull'area elima e la Sicilia occidentale*, Erice-Gibellina 11-14 ottobre 2003, vol. I, Pisa 2006, 107-129.
- PRONTERA 1993 = F. PRONTERA, *Lo Stretto di Messina nella tradizione geografica antica*, in *Stretto crocevia*, 1993, 107-131.
- PRONTERA 2005 = F. PRONTERA, *Lo Stretto nella geografia antica*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005, 29-38.
- RANDAZZO-LANZA, 2005 = G. RANDAZZO, S. LANZA, *Fisiografia dello Stretto*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005, 5-12.
- SABBIONE 1993 = C. SABBIONE, *Matauros e Mylai*, in *Stretto crocevia*, 1993, 221-236.
- SABBIONE 2005 = C. SABBIONE, *Le testimonianze di Metauros a Gioia Tauro*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità*, 2005, 241-252.
- SÄRSTRÖM 1940 = M. SÄRSTRÖM, *A Study in the Coinage of the Mamertines*, Lund 1940.
- SCIBONA 1992 = G. SCIBONA, s.v. *Messina (B. Storia della ricerca archeologica)*, in G. NENCI, G. VALLET (edd.), *Bibliografia topografica della colonizzazione greca in Italia e nelle isole tirreniche (= BTCGI)*, X, Pisa-Roma 1992, 16-36.
- SCIBONA 1993 = G. SCIBONA, *Punti fermi e problemi di topografia antica a Messina: 1966-1986*, in *Stretto crocevia*, 1993, 433-458.
- SCIBONA 2001 = G. SCIBONA, *La fortificazione greca e un nuovo quartiere di Messina in età classica*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II.1*, 2001, 51-56.
- SPAGNOLO 2002 = G. SPAGNOLO, *Le anfore da trasporto arcaiche e classiche nell'Occidente greco: nuove acquisizioni da recenti rinvenimenti a Messina*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II. 2*, 2002, 31-46.
- Stretto crocevia* 1993 = *Lo Stretto crocevia di culture*, Atti del XXVI Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia, Taranto- Reggio Calabria 9-14 ottobre 1986, Taranto 1987 [1993].
- Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005 = *Lo Stretto di Messina nell'Antichità*, a cura di F. GHE-
DINI, J. BONETTO, A.R. GHIOTTO e F. RINALDI, Roma 2005.
- SPIGO, MARTINELLI 2001 = U. SPIGO, M.C. MARTINELLI, *L'insediamento di Monte Tìdora relativo all'età del Bronzo finale -prima età del Ferro*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II.1*, 2001, 185-191.
- TAGLIAMONTE 1994 = G. TAGLIAMONTE, *I figli di Marte. Mobilità, mercenari e mercenariato italici in Magna Grecia e Sicilia*, Roma 1994.
- TIGANO 2001 = G. TIGANO, *Scavi nella necropoli lungo la via Cesare Battisti (isolati 83 e 96)*, in *Da Zancle a Messina II.1*, 2001, 77-97.
- TIGANO 2005 = G. TIGANO, *Milazzo*, in *Stretto nell'Antichità* 2005, 293-312.
- VALLET 1958 = G. VALLET, *Rhégion et Zancle: histoire, commerce et civilisation des cités chalcidiennes du Détroit de Messine*, Paris 1958.
- VALLET 1981 = G. VALLET, *Rhégion et Zancle vingt ans après*, in *Il commercio greco nel Tirreno in età arcaica* (Atti del seminario in memoria di M. Napoli), Salerno 1977, Salerno 1981, 111-125.
- VALLET 1993 = G. VALLET, *Après le XXVI Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia. Quelques réflexions sur le détroit de Messine*, in *Flotte e commercio greco, cartaginese ed etrusco nel Mar Tirreno*, Atti del Simposio Europeo (Ravello, gennaio 1987 (Pact, 20), a cura di T. HACHENS, 1993, 161-171.




Fig. 1. Lo Stretto di Messina. Immagine da satellite



Fig. 2. Immagine satellitare



Fig. 3. Immagine satellitare




Fig. 4. Modello digitale dell'area attuale su cui sorge l'odierna Messina)




Fig. 5. Ricostruzione, in modello digitale, della pianura costiera di Messina nell'età del Bronzo (da BONFIGLIO 1999, p. 16, fig. 9b)



Fig. 6. Idoletti 'a violino' in pietra filladica, età del Rame, località Camaro (da *Da Zancle a Messina* II.1, 2001, tav. XV a-b)



Fig. 7. Coppa 'ad uccello' di importazione greco-orientale (da Bacci, Tigano 2001, p. 13, fig. 14)



Fig. 8. Zancle. Dracma d'argento, 525-520 a.C. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 114, fig. 1)




Fig. 9. Carta archeologica di Zancle-Messana (da BACCI, TIGANO 2001, p. 8)

Fig. 10a-b. Messina. Museo Regionale. a) *aryballoi* protocorinzi da San Raineri; b) *aryballos* greco-orientale in faïence (da Bacci 2005, p. 267, fig. 9)




Fig. 11. Zancle. Tetradramma d'argento dei Sami, 494-488 a.C. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 116, fig. 3)



Fig. 12a. Rhegion. Dracma d'argento, 494-488 a.C. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 116, fig. 5)



Fig. 12b. Messene. Tetradramma d'argento, 487-481 a.C. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 116, fig. 4)



Fig. 13a. Messene. Tetradramma d'argento, 480-461 a.C. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 118, fig. 6)



Fig. 13b. Rhegion. Tetradramma d'argento, 480-461 a.C. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 118, fig. 7)



Fig. 14. Messana. Tetradramma d'argento, 415 a.C. ca. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 124, fig. 14)



Fig. 15. Messana. Dracma d'argento, 410 a.C. ca. (da Caltabiano 2005, p. 127, fig. 15)




Fig. 16. Messina. Fornace d'età ellenistica presso la casa dello Studente, via C. Battisti, is. 141 (da Bacci, Tigano 2001, p. 44, fig. 60)



Fig. 17. Messina. Necropoli d'età ellenistica, via C. Battisti, is. 83 (da Bacci, Tigano 2001, p. 57, fig. 77, part.)



Fig. 18. Mamertini. Litra in bronzo, 288-278 a.C. (da Särström 1940, Pl. I, nr. 5)



Fig. 19. Messina. Tratto di mura di cinta d'età mamertina, presso via S. Marta, is. 163 (da Bacci, Tigano 2001, p. 10, fig. 3)



Fig. 20a. Messina. Museo Regionale. Iscrizione osca trovata in via Cardines (da Mastelloni 2005, p. 281, fig. 5)



Fig. 20b. Messina. Museo Regionale. Frammenti di un'iscrizione osca trovata nell'area dell'Arcivescovado (da Mastelloni 2005, p. 282, fig. 6)




Fig. 21. Carta dei ritrovamenti archeologici in Messina, d'età greca (in grigio scuro) e d'età romana (in grigio chiaro). Aggiornata al 1997, (da Bacci 2002/II, tav. II)




Fig. 22a. *recto* della dracma di Zancle (cfr. fig. 8); b. miniatura della città di Messina (da Aricò 2002, p. 22); c. logo dell'Università di Messina

Maria Cannatà Fera

Zancle città bellissima

È noto come gli antichi etimologizzassero il nome di Zancle nel senso di ‘falce’; in Tucidide leggiamo che “di nome fu chiamata prima Zancle dai Siculi, perché il luogo è a forma di falce, e i Siculi chiamano la falce ζάγκλον” (VI 4, 5)¹, Strabone afferma come Messene, fondata dai Messeni del Peloponneso che le diedero questo nome, “prima si chiamava Zancle per la curvatura del luogo: ζάγκλον significava infatti ‘ricurvo’” (VI 2, 3, 268e)², Nicandro parlava della “città di Zancle a forma di falce” (fr. 21 Gow-Scholfield); e la caratteristica forma del porto era incisa sulle monete arcaiche della città con la *legenda* ΔΑΝΚΛΕ³.

Altrove il nome è posto in relazione col mito di Crono che in questo luogo aveva nascosto la falce di cui si era servito per evirare il padre Urano: così anzitutto Callimaco, che nel passo degli *Aitia* dedicato alle città siciliane (fr. 43 Pf.=50 Mass.) narra come la città fu fondata intorno alla falce nascosta da Crono, dopo l’evirazione del padre, in una tana sotto-

¹ La spiegazione è accolta da P. CHANTRAINE, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, Paris 1970, mentre M. NIEDERMANN, *Essais d’étymologie et de critique verbale latines*, Paris-Neuchâtel 1918, 24-28, pensava ad una origine ligure, da cui il latino *falcula*, *falx* (altre ipotesi etimologiche moderne in G. TROPEA, *Il mito di Crono in Sicilia e la ragione del nome Zancle*, “Rivista di Storia antica” 2, 1897, 129-130). La notazione sull’origine sicula ritorna nello scolio al passo tucidideo, in uno scolio papiraceo a Callimaco (231 McNamee), in schol. Lycophron. 869a, in Steph. Byz., s.v. Ζάγκλη. Sesto Empirico citava il termine tra quelli tucididei bisognosi di spiegazioni (*Adv. math.* I 59); si limitano a glossare Ζάγκλη con δρέπανον (“falce”) Hesych. ζ 7 (sps. καὶ ὄνομα πόλεως; cfr. δ 6 δάγκλον· δρέπανον), Mich. Psell. *Poem.* 6, 396.

² Similmente Eustath. ad Hom. *Od.* 1716, 11-13 Μεσσήνη ἐν τῷ κατὰ Σικελίαν κόλπῳ τῆς Πελοπόρου πόλις μεγάλη, κτίσμα Πελοποννησίων Μεσσηνίων, ἢ ποτε καλουμένη Ζάγκλη, δι’ ἣν ἔχει σκολιότητα. ζάγκλιον γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς ἐκεῖ τὸ σκολιόν. ὄθεν καὶ ζάγκλον τὸ δρέπανον.

³ Per cui ved. P.R. FRANKE-M. HIRMER, *Die griechische Münze*, München 1964, 42-43 e tav. 16; M. CACCAMO CALTABIANO, *Le monete ‘greche’ di Messina e Rhegion*, in *Lo stretto di Messina nell’antichità*, a cura di F. GHEDINI ed altri, Roma 2005, 114, fig. 1. Esclude che si tratti della falce del porto G.G. BELLONI, “Aevum” 51 (1977), 1-9, il quale pensa invece alla falce del mito di Crono (su cui ved. *infra*).

terra (vv. 69-71)⁴. Altri facevano invece derivare il nome da Zanclo, nato dalla terra, o da una fonte Zancle⁵.

Recentemente si è ipotizzato che già Erodoto facesse riferimento all'etimologia nota da Tucidide quando (in VI 22-24) parla delle vicende zanclee: gli abitanti della città avevano invitato gli Ioni a fondare una città al Capo Bello (Καλή Ἀκτή), sulla costa tirrenica. Attraverso varie vicende i Sami, che avevano risposto all'appello, occuparono invece Zancle, che era rimasta in quel momento deserta: "senza fatica" conclude Erodoto "essi si erano impadroniti della bellissima città di Zancle" (Σάμιοι δὲ... ἄπονῆτι πόλιν καλλίστην Ζάγκλην περιεβέβλεατο). Il nome della città, "falce", per traslato varrebbe "costa", cosicché si avrebbe che "partiti alla volta di un «Bel Promontorio» si trovarono, senza fatica, padroni di una «Bellissima Zancle»"⁶. L'idea è suggestiva, ma non convince il passaggio da "falce" a "costa" (lo stesso si può dire di un secondo livello ipotizzato, "per occupare la «Bella Punta», si impossessarono della «Bellissima Falce»"⁷). Bisogna considerare inoltre che quasi sempre Erodoto si premura di dare l'equivalente nella sua lingua quando utilizza parole e nomi non greci: persiani (I 110, 1; 192, 3; VI 98, 3; VIII 85, 3; 98, 2; IX 110, 2), arabi (III 112), egizi (II 30, 1; 59, 2; 69, 3; 81, 1; 94, 1; 96, 5; 137, 5; 143, 4; 144, 2; III 26, 1), scitici (IV 27, 52, 3. 110, 1), libici (IV 155, 2; 192, 3)⁸; se avesse avuto

⁴ Che si tratti di invenzione callimachea ritengono G.B. D'ALESSIO, *Callimaco*, Milano 2007², II, 429, n. 26; G. MASSIMILLA, *Callimaco. Aitia. Libri primo e secondo* (Pisa, 1996), 348 (diversamente L. ANTONELLI, *La falce di Crono. Considerazioni sulla prima fondazione di Zancle*, "Kokalos" 42, 1996, 319-320). Cfr. poi Steph. Byz., s.v. Ζάγκλη; schol. Lycophron. 869a, dove si dice che fu Zeus a evirare Crono (Licofrone a v. 869 parla della "Falce di Crono" in relazione a Drepanon=Trapani). La versione callimachea anche in Sil. Ital. XIV 48-49 ("nec Zancae gerunt obscuram moenia famam, / dextera quam tribuitposito Saturnia telo"), mentre in Ovid. *Fasti* IV 474 "quique locus curvae nomina falcis habet", se il riferimento va a Zancle (ma alcuni pensano a Trapani), l'interpretazione potrebbe essere quella tucididea.

⁵ La prima spiegazione in Diod. Sic. IV 85, 1, entrambe ancora in Steph. Byz., s.v. Ζάγκλη; poiché immediatamente prima il geografo cita Ecateo, è possibile che almeno una delle spiegazioni riportate risalga al logografo.

⁶ Così C. MARCONI, "Annali della Scuola Normale di Pisa", s. III, 24 (1994), 873-877; cfr. G. NENCI, *Erodoto. Le storie*. Libro VI, Milano 1998, 192, che cita altri casi di "giochi di parole" all'interno dello stesso libro; su "puns" erodotei, già J.E. POWELL, "Class. Rev." 51 (1937), 103-105.

⁷ MARCONI, 876. Di Ἀκτή a proposito di Zancle parla invece Diod. Sic. IV 85, 1, il quale, riferendo l'operazione compiuta da Orione per il re della città Zanclo, afferma λέγεται... καὶ τὸν λυμένα προσχώσαντα τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Ἀκτὴν ποιῆσαι: la frase è interpretata nel senso che il gigante sistema i "detriti alluvionali che concorrono a costituire la cosiddetta Akte, quell'adunca digitazione che si protende nel mare a formare la 'falce' del porto", da A.M. PRESTIANNI GIALLOMBARDO, in *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità: storia, società, cultura*, a cura di B. GENTILI e A. PINZONE, Messina 2002, 155.

⁸ Sulle "traduzioni" erodotee, D. CHAMBERLAIN, "Arethusa" 32 (1999), 263-312; M.E. DE LUNA, *La comunicazione linguistica fra alloglotti nel mondo greco. Da Omero a Senofonte* (Pisa

consapevolezza del termine siculo, c'è da credere che non avrebbe rinunciato a manifestarla.

Che l'espressione erodotea relativa a Zancle celi qualcosa è tuttavia possibile. Le etimologie che riportavano il nome a "falce" individuavano nella parola il prefisso intensivo ζα (eolico per διά) e κοῖλον ("cavo") o ἀγκύλον ("curvo"), per cui il significato sarebbe stato λίαν κοῖλον ("molto incavato")⁹ o λίαν ἀγκύλον, "molto curvo"¹⁰. Possiamo immaginare senza difficoltà che la parte iniziale fosse così interpretata da Erodoto, nella cui opera ricorrono due aggettivi formati con questo prefisso: ζάθεος, "molto divino", che si trova all'interno di un oracolo citato (7, 141), è diffuso a partire da Omero, mentre per ζάπλουτος, "ricchissimo", altre attestazioni antiche si hanno soltanto in Euripide (*Andr.* 1282 e fr. 285, 6 Kann.). L'aggettivo è utilizzato dallo storico nel passo in cui attribuisce a Solone l'affermazione che "molti uomini straricchi sono infelici, sono invece fortunati molti che dispongono di mezzi modesti" (I 32, 5 πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ζάπλουτοι ἀνθρώπων ἀνόλβιοί εἰσι, πολλοὶ δὲ μετρίως ἔχοντες βίου εὐτυχέες); si tratta del famoso dialogo con il sovrano lidio Creso, che aveva chiesto al saggio ateniese chi fosse l'uomo "più felice", credendo che la sua ricchezza lo mettesse in quella posizione, ma fu disilluso da Solone, per il quale la 'felicità' non coincideva necessariamente con la 'ricchezza' (I 29-33)¹¹: il passo è dunque particolarmente ricco di termini relativi a questi concetti, di sostantivi, verbi, aggettivi espressi al comparativo e al superlativo (ὄλβος, εὐτυχία, εὐδαιμονία, μακαρίζω, πλουτέειν, ἀκαζούσας πλούτω, ὄλβιος, ὄλβιώτερος, ὄλβιώτατος, ἀνόλβιος, ὁ μέγα πλούσιος, εὐτυχής), per cui è probabile che ζάπλουτος sia una formazione dello scrittore, spinto dall'esigenza di variare (nello stesso paragrafo 5, l'idea che "un uomo molto ricco non è più felice di uno che vive alla giornata" era stata espressa nei termini οὐ γάρ τι ὁ μέγα πλούσιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ἐπ' ἡμέρην ἔχοντος ὄλβιώτερός ἐστι).

Erodoto poteva pensare poi per la seconda parte di Ζάγκλη ad una derivazione da καλή, col risultato di "molto bella, bellissima"; Καλλίστη, "Bel-

2003): a 213 uno specchietto, dove accanto alle parole straniere si trovano quasi sempre i corrispettivi greci o le perifrasi esplicative; R. VIGNOLO MUNSON, *Black Doves Speak. Herodotus and the Languages of Barbarians*, Washington 2005, *passim* (ved. in particolare il terzo capitolo, "Herodotos Hermeneus"); L. MILETTI, *Linguaggio e metalinguaggio in Erodoto*, Pisa-Roma 2008, 67-115.

⁹ *Etymol. Gen.* AB Funaioli, "Mus. Crit." 18 (1983), 305 e 308.

¹⁰ *Etymolog. Magn.*, s. v. Ζάγκλον: Τὸ δρέπανον. "Ὡς φησι Καλλιμαχος, Κέκρυπται γυνὴ ζάγκλον ὑποχθονίη. Παρὰ τὸ ΖΑ ἐπιτατικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγκύλον, ζάγκλον· καὶ κατὰ συγκοπὴν, ζάγκλον, τὸ λίαν ἀγκύλον (cfr. Ps. Zonar. ζ p. 951 T); schol. Nicandr. *Alexiph.* 180d ζάγκλησι· ταῖς δρεπάναις παρὰ τὸ εἶναι λίαν ἀγκύλας.

¹¹ In proposito, oltre i commenti di D. ASHERI (Milano, 1988) e L. BELLONI (Venezia, 2000), S. CALDERONE, in *Tradizione e innovazione nella cultura greca da Omero all'età ellenistica. Scritti in onore di B. Gentili*, a cura di R. PRETAGOSTINI, Roma 1993, I, 301-327.

lissima", era oltretutto un toponimo (dell'isola successivamente chiamata Tera), come egli stesso attesta, insieme con molti altri autori antichi, in IV 147, 4. Che l'interpretazione qui ipotizzata sia poco attendibile non deve meravigliare: lo storico, come tutti alla sua epoca, quando l'etimologia si configurava "come procedimento artistico di tipo stilistico-retorico"¹², era naturalmente lontano da teorie linguistiche scientifiche¹³. In II 52 egli riferisce la teoria che faceva derivare θεοί da τίθημι: così erano stati chiamati dai Pelasgi gli dei "che pongono in ordine tutte le cose" (κόσμοθ ένντες τὰ πάντα πρήγματα, 'etimologia' che ritorna in Clem. Al. *Strom.* I 29, 182, 3, *Etymolog. Magn.* 445, 48-50, Eust. ad Hom. *Il.* 1148, 52, e probabilmente già in Aesch. *Per.* 283)¹⁴.

L'ipotesi che Erodoto interpretasse il nome Zancle nel senso di "bellissima" può forse trovare sostegno nel fatto che è questo l'unico caso in cui egli utilizza il superlativo καλλίστη in riferimento ad una città¹⁵. Allo stesso modo in Pausania, il quale racconta che Anassila reggino, quando invitò i Messeni a venire in occidente, promise loro che li avrebbe aiutati a conquistare una terra ricca e una città έν καλῶ τής Σικελίας (IV 23, 6), è unica l'espressione έν καλῶ¹⁶, espressione chiarita come superlativa nei

¹² W. BELARDI, *L'etimologia nella storia della cultura occidentale*, Roma 2002, I, 14.

¹³ Per Erodoto, D. FERRANTE, *Le etimologie nella storiografia attica e nella poesia ellenistica*, "Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo", Classe Lettere, 100 (1966), 473-484 (dello stesso, *Le etimologie nei Dialoghi di Platone*, *ivi*, 98, 1964, 162-170; *Immagini etimologiche nei poeti greci dell'età ionico-attica*, *ivi*, 99, 1965, 453-489). Sono numerosi gli studi dedicati a etimologie di autori greci (ved. ora E. TSITSIBAKOU-VASALOS, *Ancient Poetic Etymology. The Pelopids: Fathers and Sons*, Stuttgart 2007), mentre manca una raccolta moderna complessiva corrispondente a quella di R. MALTBY, *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies*, Leeds 1991; ancora di qualche utilità perciò I. OPELT, "Etymologie", in *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum* VI (1966), coll. 797-844.

¹⁴ Interessante la suggestione di V. PISANI, *L'etimologia. Storia - Questioni - Metodo* (Brescia, 1967), 14, secondo cui Erodoto, contrapponendo in I 32 έντυχής a ὄλβιος, vedeva in questo aggettivo βιος, 'vita' e probabilmente ὄλος, 'tutto': "cosicché uno non può chiamarsi ὄλβιος se non avrà terminato bene la sua vita". L'ipotesi può apparire debole in quanto nel passo lo storico non menziona ὄλος, ma potrebbe trovare sostegno in IV 177 dove, parlando dei Lotofagi come "quelli che vivono mangiando solo il frutto del loto", egli non utilizza la radice φαγ- che avrebbe chiarito meglio l'etimologia, ma τρώλω, 'sgranocchiare'.

¹⁵ L'osservazione è di MARCONI, n. 6, 874-875.

¹⁶ A indicare posizione geografica ritorna più volte in Xenoph. *Hell.* VI 2, 9, curiosamente a proposito di Corcira, che pure era collegata alla "falce" (Lycophr. 761-762 "Falce odiosa a Crono per il taglio dei genitali"; cfr. Apoll. Rh. 4, 982-992, con il commento di E. LIVREA, Firenze 1973): κείσθαι τήν Κέρκυραν έν καλῶ μὲν τοῦ Κορινθιακοῦ κόλπου καὶ τῶν πόλεων αἰ ἐπὶ τοῦτον καθήκουσιν, έν καλῶ δὲ τοῦ τήν Λακωνικὴν χώραν βλάπτειν, έν καλλίστῳ δὲ τῆς τε ἀντιπέρας Ἠπειροῦ καὶ τοῦ εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἀπὸ Σικελίας παράπλου ("in buona posizione" rispetto al golfo corinzio e alle città relative, "in buona posizione" per devastare il territorio laconico, "in ottima posizione" di fronte all'Epiro e per la navigazione dalla Sicilia al Peloponneso).

lessici (*Lex. Seguer.* = Phot. = Suda, s. v. γέγονεν ἐν καλῶ· καλλίστως ἔσχεν; similmente Esichio, alla stessa voce). E proprio da Erodoto potrebbe dipendere il Periegeta, che utilizza qui lo stesso aggettivo διάφορος per indicare i rapporti degli Zanclei con Anassila: l'aggettivo non è raro, ma per questa accezione di 'discorde' il lessico Vindobonensis (δ 75: πολέμιος) cita proprio il passo erodoteo.

I superlativi, per la città dello stretto, erano comunque destinati a susseguirsi: se Diodoro ne parlava come del luogo "più favorevole della Sicilia" (XIV 58, 4), Messina è definita in assoluto come l'approdo "più bello che si possa immaginare" dal visitatore scozzese settecentesco Patrick Brydone¹⁷. Tra gli altri superlativi, una considerazione particolare meritano "maximae et locupletissimae" di Cic. *Verr.* II 5, 43; si tratta di un passo in cui Cicerone rimprovera a Verre di non aver imposto tasse alla città per riceverne sottobanco la contropartita; l'oratore amplifica dunque qui le ricchezze di Messina, mentre in II 4, 3 ricorda le bellezze naturali della città, definendola "situ, moenibus portuque ornata", ma "vacua atque nuda" di quelle opere d'arte tanto care a Verre. È interessante vedere come gli stessi superlativi, rafforzati, siano riferiti da Cicerone in II 4, 50 a Centuripe ("totius Siciliae multo maxima et locupletissima"), per la quale non siamo sicuri che la definizione sia confermata dai dati archeologici¹⁸; è certamente più credibile quanto egli dice di Siracusa "urbis omnium pulcherrimae atque ornatissimae, Syracusarum... urbem Syracusas maximam Graecarum, pulcherrimam omnium" (II 4, 115-117): ma l'*amplificatio*, e le contraddizioni, non devono comunque stupirci troppo all'interno del genere oratorio.

¹⁷ P. BRYDONE, *Tour through Sicily and Malta* (London, 1773); trad. it.: *Viaggio in Sicilia e a Malta*, a cura di V. FROSINI, Milano 1968, 43.

¹⁸ In positivo, ved. ora il commento di G. BALDO a M. TULLI CICERONI, *In C. Verrem actionis secundae liber quartus*, Firenze 2004, 346; diversamente R.J.A. WILSON, *Sicily under the Roman Empire*, London, 1990, 382, n. 78. R. SCUDERI, *La raffigurazione ciceroniana della Sicilia e dei suoi abitanti*, in *Studi in onore di A. Garzetti*, a cura di C. STELLA e A. VALVO, Brescia 1996, 426, vede in questa esagerazione "lo scopo d'ingrandire di conseguenza l'entità del furto di Verre"; similmente A. LAZZARETTI, M. TULLI CICERONIS, in *C. Verrem actionis secundae liber quartus (De signis). Commento storico e archeologico*, Pisa 2006, 141.

Maria Caccamo Caltabiano

The coins of the Straits: images and symbols of the political identity of Messina and Rhegion in the Vth century BC

In ancient times Messina and Rhegion developed strong political and economic links, giving rise in the first half of the 5th century BC to the “Kingdom of the Straits”. The first issues of Messina (525 BC ca) present a dolphin within the sickle-shaped harbour (fig.1). The sickle, called *zanclo* in the language of the Sikels, represented the city’s harbour, and was the origin of its ancient name Zancle. The dolphin evokes the sea and can be compared to issues from other maritime centres, especially on islands and in the eastern Mediterranean. According to myth, Apollo in the form of a dolphin guided the Greeks in the western colonies’ foundation, and particularly the Chalcidians in founding Zancle. Also the shell on the reverse of the coinage evokes the aquatic element and the seabed of the Straits. In the Mediterranean culture the shell is closely linked with female divinities that preside over human fertility and births; expression of sexuality, the shell is also the symbol of Aphrodite, the goddess born from the foam of the sea or from a shell. The shell, depicted in the centre of a square divided into nine sections, recalls the design of some coins from Knossos, which present a labyrinth divided into nine sections with a star at the centre. The shell of Zancle and the star of Knossos symbolise something sacred and precious, attainable only with difficulty and after successfully facing many trials with divine help. The types of the dolphin within the sickle and the shell inside may be read as an allusion to Apollo, the god who “leads to the harbour of salvation” and through whom regeneration and rebirth are possible.

In 494 BC a group of rich exiles arrived in Zancle from Samos. Taking advantage of the absence of the tyrant of the city, they occupied Zancle. In the six years of their stay, the Samians coined tetradrachms with a lion’s scalp on the obverse and the prow of the typical Samian ships, the *samaina*, on the reverse. The bow reproduces a boar’s head; the ship bows with an animal’s head were widespread in the east, as shown in the coins of Phaselis or Cyzicum. The form of the bows with a boar’s head appears on

vase paintings and on some clay cups; the cup is the vehicle in which the Sun completes its journey through the night. In Greek culture in fact the lion was the animal of the Sun god, Helios, and often represented him.

In around 487 BC Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegion, after having expelled the Samians, with the help of a group of compatriots from Messene, conquered Zancle and renamed it Messene. Under the government of the Anaxilas dynasty, Rhegion and Messene constituted a single Kingdom, economically flourishing and politically supported by the people. They minted tetradrachms with the types of a lion's head and a protome of a calf (*fig. 2*), two images which recall those used in their coinage by the oriental Kings of Lydia or Cyprus.

After 480 BC, the victories of Athens over the Persians and of Syracusans over the Carthaginians changed economic and trading relationships and the political balance of power in the Mediterranean region. The consequences can also be seen in the changes in monetary choices made by the Kingdom of the Straits. Anaxilas adopted the types of the mule biga (*apene*), driven by a charioteer crouching in the racing position, and of the hare (*fig. 3*). Aristotle relates the introduction of the mule cart type to Anaxilas' victory at Olympia in 480 BC. Why did Anaxilas choose a mule biga to participate in the most important games in Greece? The *apene* was originally a farm cart used in magical rites to pray for the fertility of the earth, to transport newlyweds to their new home and to take the dead to the afterlife. The mule-cart therefore had a symbolic meaning and a ritual use, linked with the most pregnant events of human life: fertility, marriage, death.

The same meanings emerge from the analysis of the hare. This animal is linked to the idea of abundance and prolific exuberance. Its miraculous fertility makes it a symbol of love, closely linked to Aphrodite and Cupid. Protagonist in hunting scenes, where it is chased by dogs of huntman, the hare is shown as a defenceless and innocent victim. Represented in the form of clay vases in a crouched position or running, but more often dead, the hare is found in funerary contexts. Just in the western regions of Asia Minor, on the so-called Fikellura vases, we find the image of a running hare together with a running man with a hare's head. This figure, with an animal's head, demonstrates the Greek assumption of an Egyptian ideology. In the hieroglyphic writing of Ancient Egypt, we find the crouched hare used to express the auxiliary verb 'to be', in the dynamic sense such as "something that is jumping", "that is springing forth" and therefore "that is". Egyptian mythology gave the appearance of the hare to the god Osiris, the god of the Universe of the underworld or of the nocturnal Sun. A faïence amulet of the 8th-7th century BC, which reproduces the Egyptian model in the form of a crouched hare, has been found in Sicily, in a necropolis of Gela. This finding suggests the possibility of a

transferral of the Egyptian symbolism of the hare in the western world, a transferral which was made easier by the merchants of Asia Minor, above all Samians, Milesians and Rhodians present in Sicily.

In Greek art we find the hare related to Apollo or Helios. Coherent with the cult of Apollo, as Sun God, a Boeotian cup presents a clay protome in the form of a hare's head. This patera bears on its interior a representation of the labyrinth, the solar building which symbolises the difficult trials which must be faced in order to reach the light of the god.

In conclusion the hare, whose speed evokes the dynamic nature of life, symbolises at the same time the Sun rising and the flourishing of nature. Its running image, linked to the ideas of love and sacrifice, together with the mule-cart, the vehicle representing the most important moments of "passage" in a man's life - marriage and death - expresses the cyclical nature of existence and its perpetual change from life to death.

A pre-Hellenistic religious substratum reflowered from this nucleus of beliefs, in which we can see shaded a unitarian vision of the deity, whose roots are to be found in the deepest and most ancient beliefs of Mediterranean antiquity.



Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

ESSENTIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

- MARIA CACCAMO CALTABIANO, *La monetazione di Messina, con le emissioni di Rhegion dell'età della tirannide* (Berlin - New York 1993).
- MARIA CACCAMO CALTABIANO, "Il simbolismo del "Lepre". Influenze ideologico-religiose dell'Egitto sull'area dello Stretto riflesse dal documento monetale", in N. BONACASA *et alii*, *L'Egitto in Italia dall'Antichità al Medioevo*. Atti Congr. Int. Roma - Pompei, 1995 (Roma 1998), 33-40.
- SEBASTIANA CONSOLO LANGHER, "Zankle-Messana e Rhegion nel gioco politico interstatale del Mediterraneo", in B. GENTILI e A. PINZONE, *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità*, Atti Conv. S.I.S.A.C. Messina - Reggio C. 1999 (Messina 2002), 247- 272.

Antonino Pinzone

Le port de Messine à l'époque romaine

Lorsque Polybe écrivait qu'en 264 av. J.-C. les Romains décidèrent l'intervention pour venir en aide des Mamertins parce que "ils pensaient qu'il était nécessaire de ne pas abandonner Messine à son sort et de ne pas permettre que les Carthaginois créent un pont pour leur passage en Italie" (Polyb. I, 10, 9) il faisait recours à une métaphore très significative, au fond de laquelle il y avait l'idée d'une substantielle unité entre les extrêmes ramifications de la région sicilienne et de celle de la Calabre, d'un Détroit, qui, plus que diviser, unit. Dans une semblable perspective, contrôler Messine, et surtout son port, pouvait signifier avoir les portes de l'Italie ouvertes, mais, en renversant la direction, celles de la Sicile aussi. Voilà ce qui rendait stratégiquement sa possession essentielle. C'est pour cela qu'il est difficile, aussi pour l'époque romaine, de parler du port de Messine sans le faire en même temps de toute l'aire du Détroit, dont, avec Rhegium, il constituait le point de référence principal.

Les Romains comprirent vite tout cela, même précédemment au conflit avec les Carthaginois, qui marqua l'entrée de Messine dans le monde romain. Un moment de forte attention des Romains pour la région du *fretum* fut, par exemple, celui qui, au début de la guerre contre Phyrre, eut comme protagonistes Decius Vibellius et sa *legio* Campanienne, qui étant envoyés par le consul à garnir Rhegium, s'en emparèrent, en employant une main très lourde avec ses habitants. Les sources insistent beaucoup sur la collaboration qui serait venue à s'instaurer, au nom de la communauté ethnique, entre les *Italici* de Rhegium, qui fondèrent dans la ville une sorte d'état indépendant, et sa voisine d'en face Messana, où depuis quelque temps s'étaient installés les Mamertins, mercenaires, eux-aussi d'origine osque, qui avaient combattu pour Agatocle. Licenciés par les Syracusains, sur le chemin du retour, ils étaient passés de Messana, et, frappés par la beauté de son endroit et de son parfait emplacement géographique, ils s'étaient emparés de la polis, en fondant dans son centre un petit état, organisé selon leurs institutions ancestrales. La présence des Campaniens à Rhegium et des Mamertins à Messana d'un côté ralluma les contacts étroits qui historiquement unissaient les deux villes, de l'aut-

re contribua à former, entre Romains d'un côté et Sicéliotes et Carthaginois de l'autre, un espace 'coussinet', qui présentait de forts caractères d'unité si ce n'est du point de vue politique, sûrement du point de vue ethnique et culturel. Cependant, la situation décrite eut une durée limitée. Le danger de Phyrre disparu, les Romains mirent fin par les armes à l'épisode de Vibellius (270 av. J.-C.), laissant ainsi sans appui les Mamertins. Hieron II de Syracuse profita de l'occasion et, recueillant les voix de protestation qui provenaient du monde sicéliote qui avait dû dans le passé subir les incursions des ex-mercenaires, se dirigea contre eux. Comme tout le monde le sait, ce fut à cause de cela qui se déclancha, en 264 av. J.-C., la première guerre punique.

Les Mamertins, en effet, vaincus pendant la bataille et mis aux pieds du mur, durent faire recours à une aide étrangère. Ils s'adressèrent d'abord aux Carthaginois - très intéressés au port de Messine pour son importance stratégique - et aussitôt, ayant changé d'avis, aux Romains, qui, après de longues hésitations, décidèrent d'intervenir en Sicile malgré les dispositions contraires d'un traité avec les Carthaginois (le traité de Philine), dispositions qui cependant ne furent pas observées. Partant de Rhegium, qui, après avoir éliminé Decius, était solidement récupérée à leurs *fides*, les Romains traversèrent le Déroit et s'installèrent à Messana, vite assiégés par les Carthaginois et les Syracusains, désormais alliés entre eux. Le siège dura environ un an et après la ville fut libérée. La guerre ainsi entamée devait bien durer 23 ans, pendant lesquels le contrôle du Déroit fut solidement dans les mains des Romains, qui firent de Messine et de son port la principale base de leurs opérations militaires en Sicile. De Rhegium et de ses alentours partaient les armées et les bateaux pour traverser le Déroit, de là le bois de la Sila destiné aux chantiers navals de Messane. Ceux-ci furent très utiles dans les opérations de préparation et de réparation des bateaux des flottes romaines, continuellement endommagées par des batailles ou des tempêtes. Quelqu'un a écrit que c'est exactement dans l'arsenal de Messine qu'auraient été construits les célèbres *corvi* employés par Caius Duilius dans la bataille de Mylae, la première bataille navale gagnée par les Romains. On doit rappeler que Messine fut même résidence d'hiver des consuls engagés dans leurs campagnes siciliennes.

La guerre finie Messana se retrouva avec le privilège, très limité, d'être liée à un *foedus* avec Rome, ce qui confirmait, au moins en théorie, son indépendance et faisait de la *civitas italica* du Déroit, l'un des principaux interlocuteurs dans la province de Sicile des preteurs romains. Le bras de mer qui séparait la péninsule italienne de celle qui serait devenue la première province romaine fut, pour des raisons de caractère religieux - juridique, la cause principale de la forte discrimination institutionnelle avec la *terra Italia*, en constituant une précise frontière, mais une frontière *sui generis*, devenue en faite toujours plus labile. Il n'est pas peut-être casuel,

si l'on part d'une pareille perspective, que, comme Livius (21, 48-50) nous informe, ses eaux assistent à ce spectacle, en 218, de la rencontre entre Hiéron II, maintenant très fidèle allié des Romains, avec les bateaux qu'il portait en don, et le consul T. Sempronius Longus, auquel le Sénat avait confié les opérations dans le secteur sicilien-africain. Nous sommes au commencement du deuxième conflit contre Carthage, pendant lequel, même si nous n'avons pas des nouvelles précises par les sources, on peut toutefois également affirmer que le rôle de tête de pont joué dans la première guerre punique par le port de Messine se répéta presque dans les mêmes termes. Les légions romaines qui allaient combattre contre les Syracusains et les autres villes siciliotes qui s'étaient rebellées, arrivées sur les rivages calabrais en suivant la Capua-Rhegium, affrontaient les trois dangereux kilomètres du Déroit, en partant d'une localité à six milles de Rhegium, appelée *ad Fretum ad statuum* ou *ad Columnam*. Débarqués en localité *ad Traiectum* (environ 15 Km. au nord de la ville actuelle de Messine) les soldats romains faisaient une étape dans la ville péloritaine, véritable *caput viarum* du système routier sicilien, avant de rejoindre leur destination finale, suivant la *via Valeria* à l'ouest ou la *via Pompeia* au sud.

Même les années de la seconde guerre punique furent donc importants pour Messana. À partir de la fin d'un tel conflit, la Sicile, maintenant totalement contrôlée par les Romains, apparaît très sporadiquement dans les comptes rendus historiographiques, nous empêchant ainsi d'avoir des nouvelles suffisantes. Le climat d'une paix substantielle, de tranquillité et de bien-être profitant à l'île dans les soixante ans suivants la seconde guerre punique, dont parle Diodore, dut avoir ses effets bénéfiques même pour la zone du Déroit, comprise celle de Calabre, et cela surtout dans la perspective des échanges de caractère commercial. Comme souvent, et justement, on a écrit, Messine, qui avait un réduit territoire cultivable, placée comme elle l'était immédiatement si près des monts Péloritains, fondait surtout sur le port son bien-être. Le commerce de la province avec l'Italie faisait du port de la ville mamertine un intermédiaire utile, sinon indispensable, en lui procurant des richesses considérables, augmentées du fait qu'elle contrôlait, par sa position stratégique, aussi les voies commerciales qui de l'Afrique et de l'Orient arrivaient à Rome et en Italie. On peut dire la même chose, en faisant les justes proportions, pour les autres petits centres, les villages et les abordages de la côte sicilienne (comme le Peloro avec sa *statio navalis* et, s'il diffère de ce dernier, l'*ad Traiectum* au nord de Messine) et la côte calabraise.

Ni la troisième guerre punique, ni les célèbres guerres des esclaves de la fin du II^e siècle intéressèrent de manière significative l'aire du Déroit, qui cependant dut être à cette occasion solidement contrôlé par les Romains pour permettre l'habituel passage de troupes qu'on devait emmener à combattre en Afrique ou même en Sicile contre les esclaves rebelles d'Eu-

nus ou d'Athenio ou pour empêcher que des foules d'esclaves *fugitivi* passent à ravager l'Italie. Que du reste le contrôle militaire de l'aire du *fretum* était important on le constata une cinquantaine d'années après, aux temps de la révolte de Spartacus. Dans la tentative d'échapper aux armées romaines, le chef des gladiateurs tenta de se rendre dans l'île, où il entendait peut-être répéter l'exploit des esclaves rebelles, mais il en fut empêché par la trahison des pirates qu'il avait contactés pour le transport. Même le tristement célèbre Verres se serait montré, le cas échéant, à la hauteur de la situation, en mettant en acte à Messine des actions de force de dissuasion qui contribuèrent à détourner le gladiateur thrace de son intention de nuire à la province. Il est licite de suspecter qu'à stimuler le gouverneur, au-delà des intérêts de politique générale, aient été ses étroits liens avec cette ville, qui, au moins dans l'immédiat, aurait pu subir les dommages les plus grands de l'invasion de Spartacus, Messine, citée par lui toujours privilégiée durant ses trois ans de gouvernement de l'île, jusqu'au point de l'exempter de la fourniture d'un bateau pour la flottille qui devait défendre les côtes siciliennes des pirates, à laquelle les Marmertins auraient été tenus sur la base de leur vieux *foedus*. Il est même vrai qu'il prétendit en échange une *oneraria*, certainement construite dans les chantiers de Messine, avec laquelle transporter en Italie le fruit de ses vols, qu'il amassait dans la ville, peut-être avec le but de ne pas payer le *portorium*, c'est-à-dire les taxes douanières, dont elle était probablement exempte, puisque elle était *civitas foederata*.

Le port de *Messana* et le Déroit revinrent fortement au centre de l'attention dans la guerre qui vit comme protagonistes Octavien et Sextus Pompeius et qui se termina avec la victoire du premier dans la fameuse bataille de Naulocus, localité dont l'emplacement est incertain, entre Messine et Milazzo, en 36 av. J.-C. Dans une telle conjoncture il fut encore une fois évident aux yeux de tout le monde l'importance stratégique du Déroit et surtout de Messana. Sextus Pompeius – le *Neptunius dux*, comme il fut défini à cause de son choix de se mettre sous l'aile protectrice du dieu de la mer, le temple duquel existait *ab antiquo* à Messine – s'installa avec ses bateaux dans la ville péloritaine, faisant d'elle son repère, et, après s'être emparé de toute la Sicile, il affama Rome, en interceptant avec sa flotte les ravitaillements en grains qui pouvaient arriver de l'Afrique ou de l'Orient, et en forçant Octavien à une guerre difficile et dangereuse.

La victoire d'Octavien dans le *bellum Siculum* contre Sextus causa de grandes transformations même en Sicile, y compris l'aire du Déroit. Les *Italici* qui s'étaient installés à Messana et qui s'étaient ouverts à l'hellénisation, étaient même restés solidement ancrés à leur spécificité ethnique. En faisant levier sur leur amitié avec les Romains et surtout sur le thème de l'affinité, depuis longtemps ils aspiraient à obtenir la citoyenneté *pleno iure*, celle même qui avait été concédée aux voisins Rhagini, comme à tous

les autres *socii italici*, après le *bellum sociale*. Ce fut Octavien Auguste qui finalement vint en aide aux attentes des Mamertins et Messana eut le titre de *municipium* (Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 3, 80). Au même empereur on doit la création de cinq colonies de citoyens romains, c'est-à-dire Thermae, Tyndaris, Tauromenium, Catina et Syracusae, toutes placées pour faire un cercle protecteur de la cuspide nord orientale de la Sicile, dont le contrôle stratégique, ainsi garanti, était essentiel aussi bien pour la tranquillité des trafics maritimes, que pour la possession sûre de toute la *provincia Sicilia*.

Le manque d'informations sur le Détroit et le port de Messine en époque impérial est désolant. Parmi les nouvelles de quelque importance il faut rappeler celle qui est référée par Flavius Iosephus (*A.I.* 205-207), selon lequel l'empereur Caligula aurait agrandi le port de Rhegium pour développer le commerce de grain et de marchandises précieuses avec le nord-Afrique le long de la route qui conduisait à Puteoli et à Hostie. La nouvelle de l'agrandissement est référée par l'historien juif même pour la Sicile, ce qui nous induit à croire que, en nous appuyant aux mêmes motivations attribuables pour le cas de Rhegium, obligatoirement même le port de Messine doit avoir été pris en considération, ce qui confirmerait en plein soit une vitalité de la région du Détroit, soit son importance structurelle dans le commerce méditerranéen.

Pour trouver dans les sources des nouvelles explicites sur notre aire il nous faut faire un saut dans le temps de quatre siècles, et passer aux années où Alaric, après avoir pillé Rome, dirigea avec ses Gothes vers le sud avec l'intention de passer en Sicile et de là en Afrique, où il entendait s'établir. Il ne réussit pas à réaliser son plan: comme dans l'analogue cas de Spartacus, même cette fois le passage de Rhegium à Messine n'aboutit pas à bonne fin, parce que les eaux peu sûres du *fretum Siculum* firent couler à pic les bateaux du roi barbare (*Olymp. Hist.*, fr. 15 Müller; *Oros. Hist.* 7, 43, 12). À l'époque vandالية et byzantine l'aire du Détroit aurait encore montré son importance logistique, surtout du côté sicilien: Messine et son port continuèrent à être une base stratégique, comme le témoignent le débarquement des Vandales en 455, les opérations de Totila en 550 et le fait qu'au temps de Belisarius, pour l'énième fois dans sa longue histoire, la ville a fait fonction de tête de pont pour des manoeuvres militaires concernant l'île (*Procop. Goth.* 3, 28; 39).

Si l'évidence historiographique et littéraire ne nous dit presque rien sur les événements de Messine et de son port pour l'âge impérial, il est alors nécessaire de recourir, pour combler les lacunes, à une documentation d'un autre genre. En particulier à la documentation épigraphique et archéologique, de laquelle il est possible de tirer, quelle qu'ait été la réalité économique, sociale, institutionnelle, culturelle et religieuse de notre centre, des informations qui nous aident à mieux comprendre. Ces matériels épigraphiques et archéologiques nous permettent, par exemple, de nous

faire une idée assez précise sur l'économie de la ville. Si l'agriculture était la base principale de l'économie des villes anciennes, on ne peut pas dire de même pour Messine. Celle-ci n'était pas entièrement absente, comme le montre la production vinicole, avec le précieux vin Mamertin, très recherché par les Romains, pour ne pas dire du grain que, en âge républicain les Mamertins devaient obligatoirement vendre à Rome. Même les activités artisanales devaient être répandues. À Messine, par exemple, on a retrouvé des restes de fournaies, qui permettent de supposer l'existence d'usines de briques et de céramique, qui devaient être actives depuis l'aube de la domination mamertine. Mais il n'y a pas de doute que la vocation principale était la vocation maritime. Répandues étaient la pêche et la relative industrie de transformation: *gurgite de siculo* et de la mer de Carybdis seraient arrivées à Rome, selon Juvenal (*Sat.* 1, 5, vv. 91-101), de délicieuses murènes, tandis que sur le rivage opposé, à Rhegium auraient existé des installations pour la préparation du *garum*, sauce de poisson appréciée. Le port, avec son important arsenal, était le cœur palpitant de la ville. Militairement très utile, il l'était davantage du point de vue des commerces, en constituant un abordage indispensable soit comme un point de départ et d'arrivée dans les échanges à niveau local, soit comme point de référence obligatoire dans les grandes routes commerciales, qui, surtout de l'Orient, rejoignaient l'Italie, Rome et plus en général le bassin occidental de la Méditerranée. L'initiative de Caligula, dont on a parlé auparavant, en est une preuve évidente, ainsi comme, pour l'âge républicain, comme on peut lire dans les *Verrines* cicéroniennes. L'archéologie sous-marine, qui s'est beaucoup développée dans les dernières décennies, s'est révélée très utile dans ce sens, en nous faisant connaître des pièces et des épaves répandus ici et là dans les eaux du Déroit, dont l'étude confirme pleinement une telle reconstruction, en nous permettant aussi de comprendre ce qui était l'objet des échanges commerciaux, c'est-à-dire quelles étaient les marchandises, du vin aux marbres, qui voyageaient sur les bateaux qui traversaient le Déroit.

Des escales commerciales signifient, presque toujours, des présences *in loco* de marchands étrangers stables ou du moins irrégulières présences *in loco* de marchands étrangers stables et la ville du Déroit n'échappait pas à une telle règle. Des présences d'*Italici* et Romains sont expressément attestées pour Messine dans le premier siècle av. J.-C., même s'ils datent sûrement du début des rapports avec Rome. C'est surtout l'épigraphie qui nous permet d'élargir le cadre, en documentant de manière consistante la présence aussi de marchands qui venaient de l'Orient et en particulier de l'Égypte, région avec laquelle depuis toujours la Sicile entretenait des rapports d'échange intenses. La présence de cultes orientaux, comme le culte isiaque, véhiculés par des continuels contacts commerciaux, en sont une évidente conséquence.

Pour conclure: le terme de “carrefour de cultures” est une définition classique qui définit parfaitement le Déroit de Messine même pour l'âge romain. Mais, aussi en sous-ordre, auprès de celle-ci, elle est cependant dominante l'image d'une entité qui, ensemble, unit et divise deux mondes égaux et contraposés, l'Italie et la Sicile: et dans une telle perspective le port de Messine, le *vestibulum Siciliae* dont parlait Cicéron (*Verr.* 2, 5, 66, 170), joua un rôle de premier plan.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE ESSENTIELLE

- AA.VV., *Lo Stretto crocevia di culture. Atti del XXXVI Convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia* (Taranto-Reggio Calabria 9-14 ottobre 1986), Napoli 1987.
- R. ARCURI, *A proposito di presenze osche nell'area dello Stretto: il caso di Taurianum*, in *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità: storia, società, cultura. Atti del Convegno della SISAC* (Messina-Reggio Calabria 24-26 maggio 1999), a cura di B. GENTILI e A. PINZONE, in *Pelorias* 9, 2002, 415-431.
- G.M. BACCI, *Attività della sezione ai beni archeologici della soprintendenza B.C.A. di Messina negli anni 1989-1993*, in *Kokalos* 39-40, 1993-1994, 941-943.
- G.M. BACCI - U. SPIGO, *Il complesso di età tardoimperiale di località Pistunina*, in *Da Zancle a Messina*, a cura di G.M. BACCI e G. TIGANO, I-II, Messina 2000-2003, 2, 1, 217-227.
- G.M. BACCI - G. TIGANO (a cura di), *Da Zancle a Messina*, I-II, Messina 2000-2003.
- M. BARRA BAGNASCO, E. DE MIRO e A. PINZONE (a cura di), *Origine e incontri di culture nell'antichità. Magna Grecia e Sicilia. Stato degli studi e prospettive di ricerca. Atti Incontro Progetto Strategico CNR “Il sistema Mediterraneo”* (Messina 2-4 dicembre 1996), *Pelorias* 4, 1999.
- I. BITTO, *Le iscrizioni greche e latine di Messina*, *Pelorias* 7, 2001.
- E. CALIRI, *Messana nell'età di Gregorio Magno*, in GENTILI - PINZONE 2002, 433-440.
- D. CASTRIZIO, *Reggio ellenistica*, Roma 1995.
- D.M. CHILÀ, *Il versante orientale dello Stretto di Messina: Rhegium, il suo porto e il sistema di approdi vicini*, in GENTILI e PINZONE (2002), 441-454.
- G.M. COLUMBA, *I porti della Sicilia*, Roma 1906.
- F. COSTABILE, *Il culto di Apollo quale testimonianza della tradizione corale e religiosa di Reggio e Messana*, in *MEFRA* 91, 1979, 525-545.
- M.H. CRAWFORD, *Origini e sviluppo del sistema provinciale romano*, in AA.VV., *Storia di Roma*, I, 2, Torino 1990, 91-121.
- M. CRISTOFANI, *I Campani a Reggio*, in *SE* 36, 1968, 37-53.
- L. DE SALVO, *Presenze orientali in Sicilia e commercio con l'Oriente in età imperiale e tardoantica*, in BARRA BAGNASCO, DE MIRO e PINZONE (1994), 447-457.
- L. DE SALVO, *Traffici marittimi nello Stretto di Messina*, in GENTILI e PINZONE (2002), 365-378.
- G. De SENSI SESTITO, *Gerone II. Un monarca ellenistico in Sicilia*, Palermo 1977.

- G. DE SENSI SESTITO, *La Sicilia dal 289 al 210 a.C.*, in AA.VV., *Storia della Sicilia*, 2, Napoli 1979, 343-370.
- L. DI PAOLA, *Tradizione cassiodorea ed «evidence» archeologica a Reggio Calabria*, in GENTILI e PINZONE 2002, 455-462.
- J. HEURGON, *Apollon chez les Mamertins*, in MEFRA 68, 1956, 63 ss. (= HEURGON, *Trois études sur le "Ver sacrum"*, Bruxelles 1957, 20-35).
- B. GENTILI - A. PINZONE (a cura di), *Messina e Reggio nell'antichità: storia, società, cultura*, Atti del Convegno della SISAC (Messina-Reggio Calabria 24-26 maggio 1999), *Pelorias* 9, 2002.
- F. GHEDINI - J. BONETTO - A.R. GHIOTTO - F. RINALDI (a cura di), *Lo Stretto di Messina nell'antichità*, Roma 2005.
- R. KAMIENIK, *La ritirata di Spartaco e il mancato passaggio in Sicilia*, in *Storia sociale ed economica dell'età classica negli studi polacchi*, a cura di I. BIEZUNSKA e MALOWIST, Milano 1975, 143-164.
- V. LA BUA, *Regio e Decio Vibellio*, in *Terza Miscellanea greca e romana*, Roma 1971, 63-161.
- G. MANGANARO, *Ricerche di antichità e di epigrafia siceliote, VII, Orientali e piccoli commercianti a Messina e a Siracusa*, in *ArchClass* 17, 1965, 183-210.
- G. MAFODDA, *Aspetti e problemi di storia siceliota dalla morte di Agatocle all'inseppimento mamertino in Messana*, in *Kokalos* 25, 1979, 197-204.
- V. ORIOLES, *Bilinguismo e biculturalismo nella Messana mamertina*, in *Studi linguistici e filologici offerti a Girolamo Caracausi*, Palermo 1992, 331-345.
- V. ORIOLES, *I Mamertini a Messana: una vicenda di acculturazione ellenica*, in *Circolazioni culturali nel Mediterraneo antico. Atti della sesta giornata Camitico-Semitica ed Indoeuropea. I Convegno Internazionale di linguistica dell'area mediterranea* (Sassari, 24-27 aprile 1991), Cagliari 1994, 207-212.
- O. PARLANGELI, *Le iscrizioni osche (mamertine) di Messina*, in *Boll. Centro St. Filol. Linguist. Sic.* 4, 1966, 614.
- A. PINZONE, *Storia ed etica in Polibio. Ricerche sull'archeologia della prima punica*, Messina 1983.
- A. PINZONE, *Provincia Sicilia. Ricerche di storia della Sicilia romana da Gaio Flaminio a Gregorio Magno*, Catania 1999.
- A. PINZONE, *L'immigrazione e i suoi riflessi nella storia economica e sociale della Sicilia del II sec. a.C.*, in BARRA BAGNASCO - DE MIRO - PINZONE 1994, 381-402.
- A. PINZONE, *Elementi di novità e legami con la tradizione a Messana tra tarda repubblica e inizi impero*, in GENTILI - PINZONE 2002, 111-125.
- A. PINZONE, *I socii navales siciliani*, in *Nuove prospettive della ricerca sulla Sicilia del III sec. a.C. Archeologia, Numismatica, Storia*, a cura di M. CACCAMO CALTA-
BIANO, L. CAMPAGNA e A. PINZONE, *Pelorias* 11, 2004, 11-34.
- A. PINZONE, *Roma sullo Stretto*, in GHEDINI, BONETTO, GHIOTTO e RINALDI 2005, 85-98.
- A.M. PRESTIANNI, *Il Peloro nell'antichità. Miti Scienze Storia*, in GENTILI e PINZONE 2002, 141-196.
- G. SALMERI, *Strade greche e romane: il caso della Sicilia*, in SALMERI, *Sicilia romana. Storia e storiografia*, Catania 1992, 9-28.
- M. SÄRSTRÖM, *A Study in the Coinage of the Mamertines*, Lund 1940.

- H.H. SCHMITT, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, III: Die Verträge der griech.-röm. Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.*, München 1969.
- S. SETIS (a cura di), *Storia della Calabria antica, II, Età italica e romana*, Roma 1994.
- G. TAGLIAMONTE, *I figli di Marte: mobilità, mercenari e mercenariato italici in Magna Grecia e Sicilia*, Roma 1994.
- G. UGGERI, *La viabilità romana in Sicilia con particolare riguardo al III e al VI secolo*, in *Kokalos* 28-29, 1982, 424-460.
- G. UGGERI, *Il sistema viario romano e le sopravvivenze medievali*, in *La Sicilia rupestre nel contesto delle civiltà mediterranee. Atti VI Conv. Intern. sulla civiltà rupestre medioevale nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia* (Catania-Pantalica-Ispica 7-12 sett. 1981), Galatina 1986, 85-120.
- A. VALLONE, *I Mamertini in Sicilia*, in *Kokalos* 1, 1955, 22-61.
- D. VERA, *Augusto, Plinio il Vecchio e la Sicilia in età imperiale. A proposito di recenti scoperte epigrafiche e archeologiche ad Agrigento*, in *Kokalos* 42, 1996, 31-58.
- G.P. VERBRUGGHE, *Sicilia, Itinera romana, Beiträge zur Strassengeschichte des römischen Reiches, 2*, Bern 1976.
- R.J.A. WILSON, *Sicily under the Roman Empire. The archaeology of a Roman Province, 36 B.C.-A.D. 535*, Warminster 1990.

Rosa Santoro

The damned charm of Scylla and Charybdis

The objective difficulties of navigation for the rapid and irregular tides, for the violent winds that are sometimes in conflict among themselves, for the oceanic depths of some sea lines, have made the Straits of Messina a dangerous area with all the necessary factors to the development of the myth as a ruinous and bewitched passage, to the limit of the impassable and the outskirts of the known horizon, an ideal place to set heroic tests of strength and audacity, typical of the agonistic tension, intrinsic component of the myth. Crossing the waters that separated the Sicilian banks from the Calabrian banks was to go beyond and to profane a rightful border, beyond which man lost his competences of dominion, lost the control of his ship, metaphor of his same life, and was swallowed in the chasm of an abyss without end and without confinements, populated by two terrible monstrous divinities, Scylla¹ and Charybdis², set to watch the passage, that laid a trap for whoever wanted to overcome it. It was not possible to avoid one without coming upon the other³.

The consecration of the two mythological monsters derives from Homer. In *Od.* XII 73-126 Scyllas and Charybdis are described with abundance of details by Circe to Ulixes. The sorceress, wanting to inform Ulixes of the dangers of future navigation, speaks about two rocks: one perpetually surrounded by a black cloud and made of very smooth rock, impossible to climb; to its center a dark cave holds Scylla. She has the voice of a little bitch, but she is a horrible monster; she has twelve feet, six long necks and on every one a horrendous head with three rows of teeth, nu-

¹ O. WASER, s.v. *Skylia* in W.H. ROSCHER (hrsg.), *Ausführliches Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, IV, 2, Leipzig 1909-1915, 1024-1064; J. SCHMIDT, s.v. *Skylia*, in *RE* III A I, 1927, 647-655.

² O. WASER, s.v. *Charybdis*, *RE* III 2, 1899, 2194-95. About the fortune of Scylla and Charybdis in the Greek-Roman literature and in the art O. WASER, *Skylia und Charybdis in der Literatur und Kunst der Griechen und Römer*, diss. 1894. See also G. GASPAROTTO, *Cariddi e Scilla da Sallustio a Isidoro di Siviglia: la realtà e il mito*, Verona 1988.

³ From here the phrase: *Incidit in Scyllam cupiens vitare Charybdim* (to be between Scylla and Charybdis) has come to mean being in a state where one is between two dangers and moving away from one will cause you to be in danger from the other.

merous and dense, "full of black death". She eats up sailors and the cetaceans that she succeeds in uncovering looking around the rock. The other rock can be found "to the distance of a draught of arc" from Scylla; there, hidden under a lower rock marked by a fig tree, Charybdis, invisible monster, "three times a day" sucks the sea waters and living beings down from the bottom, and as many times it vomits what it had sucked under. Homer tells us that Ulixes, sailing in the Straits, was particularly careful to avoid Charybdis, clinging to the fig tree that grew luxuriant at the entrance of the cave in which the monster itself hid; so that, when it vomited his ship's remains, Ulixes could save himself and to continue the voyage, rowing with his hands (*Od.* XII 426-46). The hero nevertheless didn't succeed in avoiding Scylla who abducted six men from his ship and devoured them (*Od.*XII 223-59). In Latin literature the Homeric description of the "keepers" of the Straits resounds in the diviner Helenus's words who exposes to Aeneas, the fugitive hero from destroyed Troy, the dangers of the Sicilian shores and the best itinerary for a safe navigation. In comparison to Homer, the Virgilian description clarifies with precision the geographical position of the two monsters in the Straits of Messina. The father of the Latin epic sets Scylla on the right bank of the Straits, therefore on the Calabrian slope, Charybdis on the left⁴.

Later traditions to Homer give different information on the origins and on the stories of the two monsters: Charybdis is said to have been a very greedy woman who, for having stolen Hercules' oxen, was struck by lightning by Jupiter and deeply buried in the sea, where she continued to suck down all that happened around her⁵, easily passing to symbol of avarice and proverbial expression⁶. Scylla, instead, above all for impulses coming from a whole iconographic italic tradition, appears as a beautiful nymph⁷. She, upon intervention by Circe, assumed monstrous characteristics in the inferior parts of her body. According to Ovidius, in fact, Scylla, who had the tendency not to reciprocate the attentions of her pretenders (*Ov. Met.*XIII 735ff.), also rejects the love of the newt Glaucus, which, to conquer the heart of the girl, doesn't hesitate to ask for help from Circe. The sorceress, in love with Glaucus declares her love to him, but Glaucus refuses her. Circe then offended and vexed, moved by jealousy, decides to

⁴ Verg., *Aen.* III 420ff.: *Dextrum Scylla latus, laevom inplacata Charybdis / obsidet atque imo barathri ter gurgite vastos / sorbet in abruptum fluctus rursusque sub auras / erigit alternos et sidera verberat unda.*

⁵ Serv., *ad Aen.* III 420: *Charybdis autem in Siciliae parte posita femina fuit voracissima, ex Neptuno et terra genita, quae quia boves Herculis rapuit, fulminata a Iove est et in maria praecipitata unde naturam pristinam servet; nam sorbet universa quaeprehendit.*

⁶ Cic., *Philipp.* II 67: *Quae Charybdis tam vorax? Charybdim dico? Quae si fuit, animal unum fuit.* See also Verr. V 146.

⁷ *Ov., Met.* XIII 731ff. e Verg. *Aen.* III 423ff.

take revenge on her rival; she pollutes (with poisonous potions) the mirror of sea where the girl usually bathes, and she turns her into a bifurmed monster, who from the abdomen up maintains the aspect of a beautiful girl, from the groin down she is encircled by six heads of growling dogs⁸.

The analysis of the literary use of the myth of Scylla and Charybdis underlines how the Latin authors, approached it with different formalities. It's possible to isolate three narrative nuclei that briefly clarify these different points of view:

1) *Instrumental and didactic function of the myth*. It uses the mythological story of Scylla and Charybdis as a metaphoric emblem, and intellectual incentive in the development of the treated thematic. A remarkable example is the use of the myth in Ovidius, the most prolific of Roman poet, who died in exile on the Black Sea in 17 AD, banished by the Emperor August. As well as his famous *Metamorphoses* (our key source for most important myths of Greece and Rome), he produced a large body of elegiac poetry.

2) *Scientific realism*. It could be said to be a toponymic use, in which the detailed description of the myth is not found. Scylla and Charybdis offer the opportunity to expose relative thesis about the genesis of the Straits and the explanation of the sea's vortexes⁹. It deals with forms and ways of rationalization and, sometimes, even of refusal of the myth¹⁰.

3) *Isidorus, Etymologiae*, XIII 18, 4ff.¹¹. Isidorus of Seville (VI-VII AD) in the section devoted to the tides and the Straits, completes an admirable synthesis of the two above exposed perspectives.

It seems to me interesting to notice in this place the literary perspective of the myth that contains an interaction of myth and metaphor, in the first point of the subdivision above noted. Particularly relating to the production of Ovidius. Ovidius uses the myth of Scylla and Charybdis in almost all his works. They (therefore the Straits of Messina) are a metaphor of insurmountable obstacles that only the power of a divinity¹² or the strength of love¹³ succeed in reorganizing and overcoming. The geographical location

⁸ Ov., *Met.* XIV 51-74.

⁹ E.g. Sall., *Hist.* IV 26 Maur.; Verg., *Aen.* III 416-418; Sen., *ad Marc.* 17, 2; Plin., *Nat. Hist.* III, 73 and 87; Mela II 11.

¹⁰ Likewise Verg., *Aen.* III 554-559; Lucr. IV 732ff. and V 890ff.; Ov., *Tr.* IV 7, 11ff.; Sen., *Ep.* 79.

¹¹ *Scyllam accolae saxum mari imminens appellant, simile celebratae formae procul visentibus. Unde et monstruosam speciem fabulae illi dederunt, quasi formam hominis capitibus caninis succinctam, quia conlisi ibi fluctus latratus videntur exprimere. Charybdis dicta quod gurgitibus occultis naves absorbeat; est enim mare verticosum et inde ibi laniata naufragia profundo emergunt. Ter autem in die erigit fluctus, et ter absorbet; nam accipit aquas ut vomat, vomit ut rursus accipiat.* W.M. LINDSAY, *Isidori hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum Libri XX*, II, Oxford 1911 (repr. 1989).

¹² Ov., *F ast.* 499f.

¹³ Ov., *Am.* II, 17, 23ff.; *Met.* VII 73ff.

represented by the two monsters recalls in the imaginary a dangerous place destined to cause shipwrecks and ruins to sailors. So Scylla and Charybdis easily pass as a metaphor of certainty of death when Ovidius in the full awareness of going towards a sure death, in a sincere and grieved outrage, which the exaggeration justifies, asks August to transfer elsewhere his relegation: the poet prefers to be in the middle of Charybdis (*ex P.* IV 14, 9f.), that to stay in that remote place that he thinks be more dangerous than Scylla for sailors (*ex P.* IV 10, 25ff.). If on one hand the contexts in which Ovidius chooses to use the myth are topical places, on the other a deeper analysis of the lexicon (adjectives and verbs) used to characterize Scylla and Charybdis is revealed to be effective, to clarify the terms of another frequent metaphor in which the two sea monsters are emblems of female cruelty. In *Ov. Met.* VIII 119ff. the “other” Scylla of the myth, the daughter of Nisus, who, pushed by the love for Minos, betrays her father and provokes his death, she attributes the maternity of the ungrateful person in love, over that of the inhospitable Sirte and the tigresses of Armenia, also to the “Austroque agitata Charybdis”, to Charybdis, agitated by the Sirocco. The nature of the place evoked by the two monsters, is transferred to a typology of perfidious women: they in turn produce cruel creatures, destined to perpetuate the maternal nature arousing in those who love them pain and suffering. Scylla is enumerated among the worst women of the myth (*ex P.* III 1, 122): with Procne, who prepared the meat of her child Itys to her husband Tereus; with one of the Danaides who killed their husbands on their wedding night, and finally with Clytemnestra, wife and merciless murderess of Agamemnon.

From the analysis of the Ovidian passages the qualities that are recognized with a regular frequency to Scylla and Charybdis are substantially voracity and rapacity, shown by the regular use of the adjectives *vorax*¹⁴, “voracious”, “greedy”, and *rapax*¹⁵, “rapacious”, “that every thing grabs with avarice and with violence”. To these adjectives correspond as much the action of the *vorare*¹⁶ or *devorare*¹⁷, “to devour”, as to the action of the *eripere*¹⁸, “to tear with strength”, evidently from life. Of exclusive pertinence of Charybdis is instead the constant activity of sucking down, *sorbere*, *resorbere*, and throwing back, *reddere*, *vomere*, the overwhelmed ships¹⁹. A linguistic investigation from the comedy to the first generation elegiac poets (Tibullus and Propertius), passing through Catullus and Horatius has allowed us to underline that the adjectives and the verbs

¹⁴ *Ov., Ibis* 383 (Scylla).

¹⁵ *Ov., Met.* VII 65 ed *Her.* 125 (Scylla).

¹⁶ *Ov., Met.* XIII 731 (Charybdis).

¹⁷ *Ov., Tr.* V 2,74 (Charybdis).

¹⁸ *Ov., Ibis* 384 (Scylla and Charybdis).

¹⁹ *Met.* VII 63f.: *inimica Charybdis / nunc sorbere fretum, nunc reddere* and *Her.* XII 127: *quaeque vomit totidem fluctus totidemque resorbet.*

that are denotative of the monsters of the Straits of Messina in Ovidius, often find correspondence in the preceding poets in metaphoric contexts and with connotative value in reference to a type of cruel and voracious, avid and rapacious woman: who surely has an attractive aspect but with bestial soul, who leads the person in love with her to his downfall.

In Plautus there is a meaningful use of *devoro* and *absorbeo* (from *sorbeo*). The prostitute is like the sea, she *devours* that what you give her and she is never satiated²⁰; the second is used for pointing out the avarice of the woman that *with fury she sucks down in a vortex whoever she touches*²¹. *Absorbeo* is used by Catullus as a metaphor of an unhappy love; to Laodamia (LXVIII 107f.) the poet says: “the billow of the love that swallowing you in an immense eddy sank you in the abyss”. *Vorax* has an obscene meaning in Catullus (XXXIII 4 and *vorare* LXXX 6), and *rapax* is more for the attribute of a woman without scruples, who aims to appropriate the patrimony of the person in love²². It would seem then that Ovidius uses the myth of Scylla and Charybdis according to an articulated sequence that, by metaphor in metaphor, reaches to make the characteristics of a determined geographical zone, the Straits of Messina coincide with the reprehensible characteristics of a fierce woman without pity, naturally prone to the transgression of sacred blood ties and the relative social prohibitions to every kind of taboo.

The absence of the physical details of Charybdis which, as we have seen, makes up for the constant characterization of the action, is contrasted by the wealth of figurative details of the description of Scylla. The poet aims with insistence on the inferior part of the body and on the abdomen encircled by the fierce dogs, like when Ovidius (*Met.* XIII 730ff.) finds the pretext to recall the myth of the Straits. In this passage *illa* (Scylla) *feris atram canibus succingitur abvum, / virginis ora gerens et... aliquo tempore virgo* (vv. 732f.), “she has a black abdomen belted by fierce dogs but the face of a young girl and... was once a young girl”. These details aim to underline a spoiled and sick femininity and are mostly clarified to the light of the analysis of the well known passage on the transformation of Scylla in monster. In *Met.* XIV 65ff. to the inevitable terrorized amazement of the girl who suddenly “she sees sprouting around her hips horrible growling dogs”, instinctively trying “to reject their insolent snouts”, follows an attitude of self-awareness and self-determination, for which Scylla, recognizes the beasts as part of herself, she dominates with strength and governs them with authority: *statque canum rabie, subiectaque terga ferarum / inguinibus truncis uteroque ex-*

²⁰ Pl., *Truc.* 568ff.: *meretricem ego item esse reor, mare ut est: quod des devorat, nec unquam abundat.*

²¹ Pl., *Bacch.* 471f.: *atque acerrime aestuosam: absorbet, ubi quemque attigit.*

²² Likewise Hor., *Epist.* I 14,33: *Cinara rapax* and Tib., II 4,25: *domina rapax.*

tante coercet. In comparison to *Met.* XIII 732, in which the passive verb *succingitur*, belted, provides the image of Scylla who submits an appalling loss of identity; in the second passage the verbs *stare*, "to rise"; *exstare*, "to dominate", *coercere*, "to force", contribute to the creation of a new character who, setting aside the precedent virgin attitude, breaks through in an aggressive femininity, in a wild sexuality, directed in sowing destruction and death. The fierce dogs are not but a metonymical connection, the ferocity in reality belongs to the monster in its whole being, and on the first occasion it instigates her against Ulixes, depriving him of his companions and discharging in this way its anger against Circe²³. The acquisition of the monstrosity causes Scylla to acquire a new personality; to the external form an internal bestial and wicked nature formed, unlike other protagonists of the *Metamorphoses*, that maintain after transformation their *mens pristina*, their identity, their intimate patrimony of thoughts and ideas²⁴. The continuity of the preceding, avid and greedy nature, is evident for Charybdis, that also as a monster keeps on raiding other people's things, and even before Ovidius she was the object of metaphoric use to point out a monstrous woman that provokes suffering to her lovers.

On the line of the well note metaphor of the loving relationship that is like a voyage at sea or a shipwreck and of the woman/stormy sea, Ovidius proposes the woman Scylla/Charybdis. Whoever falls in the trap of this woman is destined to become a negative hero, an anti-Ulixes, who succeeds in overcoming the challenge of dangerous waves with great difficulties or ends smashed against the rocks. In Scylla and Charybdis Ovidius synthesizes, the physical and moral characteristics of a woman not suited to marriage, inclined to prostitution, who nevertheless as a tyrant (*domina*) dictates rules to an imprisoned man and in total enslavement, who is no longer master of himself but soldier and subject at the same time, forced to accept continuous requests of money to avoid fierce revenge. This woman not only reflects the woman immortalized by Latin elegy, but also the whore of the comedy, the Lesbia of Catullus and the freedwomen that follow in the loves of Horatius, all women that Ovidius binds to the myth of the monsters of the Straits of Messina. This typology of woman-monster²⁵, an infernal mixture of accursed beauty and horror, enriches with a further tessera the mosaic of the *femme fatale*, who feeds in various ways the fantasies, the evasions, the symbols of European culture, had so much fortune from Shakespeare up to the *Lupa* by Giovanni Verga.

²³ Ov., *Met.* XIV 70f.: *Scylla loco mansit, cumque est data copia primum, / in Circes odium sociis spoliavit Ulixen.*

²⁴ See Ov., *Met.* II 485 and III 203.

²⁵ Studied in Greek literature by E.K. BORTHWICK, A 'femme fatale' in *Asclepiades*, «CR» LXXXI, n.s. 17 (1967), 250-254.

Enrico Pispisa

Il porto di Messina dall'XI al XV secolo

Messina durante il lungo dominio musulmano assistette ad un forte decadimento della propria vita civile, sia perché fu in ogni modo svantaggiata dai dominatori a causa della notevole presenza di cristiani nel suo territorio, sia perché la chiusura dello Stretto, ormai zona di confine militare, rese il porto del tutto inattivo sotto gli aspetti commerciali.

La riconquista normanna del 1061 aprì una nuova felice stagione: la città fu ripopolata anche da un certo numero di mercanti e, per ciò che riguarda il porto, le sue banchine furono intensamente frequentate sia da barconi impegnati nei commerci di breve raggio con la Calabria e il resto della Sicilia, sia da navi dirette in Oriente per le necessità connesse alle crociate e agli scambi intrattenuti dai trafficanti italiani. Ebbero, quindi, notevole impulso il commercio di transito e quello impegnato a rifornire il mercato locale.

La rinascita messinese dei secoli XI-XII fu, pertanto, connessa anche alla presenza dei mercanti forestieri che ne frequentavano lo scalo e dei trafficanti locali che battevano le rotte mediterranee e, principalmente, si dedicavano ai rapporti con la Calabria. Oltre al porto, quindi, ebbe notevoli benefici la zona dello Stretto, che fino all'età angioina, ma, tutto sommato, anche oltre, costituì una sub-regione caratterizzata da un'economia integrata e da intensi scambi di modi di vita.

La realtà della seconda metà del XII secolo è messa in chiara evidenza da due musulmani: il geografo di re Ruggero, Idrisi, e il viaggiatore andaluso Ibn Giubayr. Idrisi afferma che "Messina è da comprendere fra i paesi più illustri e prosperi anche per il continuo andirivieni di viaggiatori" e che "ospita un arsenale". Vi si "ormeggiano e da qui salpano le imbarcazioni provenienti da tutti i paesi costieri dei Rum" e vi "si raccolgono le grandi navi nonché i viaggiatori ed i mercanti dei più svariati paesi latini e musulmani, i mercati sono fiorenti, le mercanzie hanno smercio e numerosi vi affluiscono gli avventori [...], il porto è un'autentica meraviglia e se ne fa un gran parlare in tutto il mondo dato che non vi è nave, di qualsiasi stazza essa sia, che non possa gettar l'ancora nei pressi della spiaggia in modo da procedere allo scarico delle merci passandole di mano in mano fino alla terraferma".

Ibn Giubayr ci conduce all'interno della città, che gli appare "l'emporio dei mercanti infedeli; la meta delle navi che solcano il mare venendo da tutte le regioni. Comodissimo soggiorno per il buon mercato delle cose [...], è piena di sudiciume e di fetore; schiva e inospitale ha pure mercati ricchi e frequentati; ha copia di quanto mai si possa desiderare per gli agi della vita. Vi starai sicuro la notte e il giorno, quando anche il tuo viso, la borsa e la lingua ti svelassero straniero". "Mirabilissimo poi il suo tra tutti i porti di mare, poiché non c'è nave così grande che non possa avvicinarsi fino a toccare quasi terra: e vi si passa mettendo soltanto una passerella, sulla quale salgono i facchini con i pesi in spalla [...], così vedresti le navi schierate lungo la riva come i cavalli legati ai pali nella stalla".

La Messina di Ibn Giubayr, ancor più di quella di Idrisi, è essenzialmente una città mercantile, dove il sudiciume e il fetore sono la diretta conseguenza di transazioni economiche continue e dell'ammassarsi di commercianti venuti da ogni dove. In questo spazio urbano delimitato dal porto, dal palazzo reale, dall'arsenale e dalla nuova cattedrale dedicata a S. Maria e consacrata all'inizio dell'età sveva, accanto ai *cives* locali, dimorarono i mercanti forestieri.

Gli amalfitani diedero il nome ad una via dove soggiornavano (la *ruga Amalfitanorum*) e ad un quartiere (l'*Amalfitania*) e furono attivi durante tutto il Medioevo. Come accadeva anche ad altri trafficanti, alcuni si stabilirono in città e si fusero con l'elemento locale, portando il contributo della loro esperienza. Più significativa fu la presenza di genovesi, pisani e veneziani. I genovesi ebbero un console dal 1169 e considerarono il porto di Messina un punto di transito irrinunciabile per la rotta verso Oriente. La loro incidenza sulla vita commerciale, politica e sociale della città, dove presero dimora in gran numero, andò sempre più aumentando, fino a culminare nel Trecento. All'inizio del XIII secolo consolidarono le loro posizioni (nel 1200 ebbero concessa da Federico II una loggia) ed indirizzarono i propri commerci anche verso il territorio peloritano e l'intera Sicilia. In tale periodo furono presenti a Genova mercanti messinesi, sicché fu istituito un flusso continuo di trafficanti tra Messina e la Liguria attivo nelle due direzioni.

I pisani sono attestati a Messina dal 1129; nel 1190 possedevano un fondaco con dei consoli e insediavano nella città anche artigiani. Molti di essi diventarono cittadini messinesi. I veneziani, meno numerosi di pisani e genovesi, furono presenti fin dai tempi di Ruggero II, commerciando con l'elemento locale e, principalmente, usando il porto per il "viaggio di Romania". Come gli altri trafficanti godevano di notevoli facilitazioni commerciali, ed avevano il loro fondaco presso l'arsenale.

Altri forestieri sono documentati con minore frequenza. Fra essi si segnarono gli inglesi, nella maggior parte pellegrini e soldati. Ma vi era anche qualche commerciante ed alcuni di essi, attestati nel Duecento, presero per-

fino la cittadinanza locale. Accanto ai mercanti forestieri erano attivi quelli messinesi. Si dedicavano prevalentemente al commercio di breve corso, ma qualcuno trafficava in Mediterraneo. Per il Duecento le testimonianze al riguardo sono relativamente numerose. Godevano di minori vantaggi rispetto ai forestieri, ma col tempo migliorarono le loro condizioni.

Per ciò che concerne le merci che passavano dal porto, bisogna dire che da Messina veniva riesportato il grano giunto da altre zone della Sicilia, e partivano notevoli quantità di olio e di vino. Le merci in entrata erano le più varie e fra esse primeggiavano i panni.

Come si è detto, il porto era uno scalo di prim'ordine per la Siria e le altre località del Levante, sicché a Messina gli ordini palestinesi ebbero le loro case e collegarono l'Europa con l'Oriente anche per ciò che riguardava i rifornimenti.

La situazione finora tratteggiata rimase stabile sia durante le età sveva ed angioina, sia nel corso del Trecento. Per l'epoca svevo-angioina offre notevoli informazioni un documento emesso da Carlo I d'Angiò nei primi anni Settanta del Duecento. Esso spiegava i molti crimini accaduti a Messina richiamando il massiccio afflusso di forestieri arrivati "da diverse parti del mondo nella città, quasi posta al centro", evidenziando il grande movimento di merci e la vocazione cosmopolita che avevano contraddistinto la sede peloritana fin dalle età precedenti e che Carlo ereditava da un settantennio di amministrazione sveva.

All'epoca degli Hohenstaufen il porto attraversò fasi alterne. Durante il breve regno di Enrico VI la città fu inserita nei progetti orientali dell'imperatore, il quale concesse ai negozianti locali totale libertà di commercio nel loro scalo. Gli affari dei trafficanti locali e forestieri andarono bene fino al 1220, ma quando Federico II riaffermò l'autorità regia e, con le costituzioni di Melfi del 1231, limitò gravemente le libertà mercantili della città e la sua autonomia, scoppì una rivolta dei commercianti, che fu, tuttavia, repressa. Le limitazioni imposte alla libertà di commercio da Federico II incisero negativamente sugli scambi del porto, ma esso fino al 1250 ricevette impulso da altre iniziative. L'arsenale fu molto attivo e la presenza a Messina dell'ammiraglio, del giustiziere, del secreto e della zecca fornì diverse possibilità di sviluppo.

Negli anni di Manfredi, fino al 1266, la pressione regia fu allentata. Per il particolare sistema di governo voluto dall'ultimo Svevo, i ceti burocratici cittadini, operanti nell'ambito dell'influenza di un conte, acquistarono nuovo impulso. Il porto di Messina godette, quindi, di nuove facilitazioni mercantili e il ceto amministrativo locale incominciò a controllare i suoi traffici. Tale prerogativa si sarebbe grandemente sviluppata nel Trecento.

Insieme alle merci nello scalo peloritano transitavano anche idee, modi di vita, cultura. Basti pensare ai molti pellegrini diretti in Terrasanta, che talvolta venivano raggirati dai cambiavalute e dagli armatori locali, e ai

mercanti, i quali insieme ai panni portavano libri e quadri. Le conseguenze di tali relazioni possono riscontrarsi nella precoce circolazione a Messina di opere letterarie europee, nel sorgere di un "laboratorio" di poeti afferenti alla Scuola Siciliana e diretti da Guido delle Colonne, e nella frequente citazione di Messina in cronache, romanzi ed opere poetiche capillarmente diffusi in area mediterranea e nell'Europa continentale.

Durante l'epoca angioina (1266-1282), il commercio di lungo corso messinese ebbe notevole impulso, perché Carlo I stava tentando di ribaltare i rapporti di forza mediterranei: la progettata conquista dell'impero bizantino, l'avversione ai genovesi, il desiderio di promuovere, entro certi limiti, un commercio che si irradiasse dal regno avevano fatto intravedere la possibilità di uno sganciamento dei trafficanti messinesi dalla tutela forestiera. In città in quel tempo dominò la famiglia dei De Riso, mercanti di grano ed amministratori della cosa pubblica.

Dopo il Vespro del 1282, il dominio aragonese mutò le prospettive politiche ed economiche della città, ma non ostacolò l'attività del porto, che rimase molto intensa. Messina, da città produttrice di ricchezza, quale era stata in epoca angioina, quando accanto al commercio di lungo corso aveva incrementato gli scambi con la Calabria, si trasformò in città consumatrice, affidando la prosperità dei propri ceti dirigenti allo sfruttamento dei possedimenti terrieri e al controllo delle attività portuali e del terziario. Questa politica, da mettere in relazione anche con la graduale perdita del dominio sulla sponda calabrese, esaltò la collaborazione tra la classe egemone locale e i mercanti stranieri, specie i genovesi. L'accordo tra gruppi dirigenti peloritani e trafficanti forestieri depresse i medi e piccoli mercanti di Messina, mentre qualche operatore di lungo corso, come Pino Campolo morto nel 1380, continuò a prosperare. È, tuttavia necessario, sottolineare ancora che nel corso del Trecento e del primo Quattrocento dal porto derivò alla città una ricchezza connessa più alla sua gestione burocratica che agli scambi, prevalentemente in mano straniera.

Circa il movimento di merci, le esportazioni erano costituite da grano, vino, olio, formaggi, burro, agnelli, cuoi bovini, manna, mandorle, noci, castagne, sale, ossa di bue, coralli, zuccheri, miele, zolfo, zibibbo, zafferano; mentre si importavano spezie, cotone, panni, drappi pregiati, lane d'Africa. Come si può notare, il porto di Messina, in entrata e in uscita, trattava merci che riguardavano gran parte della Sicilia.

Nel Quattrocento, durante il Vicereame, Messina, grazie alla coltura ed al commercio della seta e dello zucchero ed alla riconquista della Calabria ad opera di Alfonso il Magnanimo, partecipa nuovamente in prima persona ai commerci, amplia i propri mercati e vede collaborare nei traffici ceti dirigenti, piccoli mercanti ed artigiani. Si sviluppa anche l'attività bancaria, in parte gestita da operatori locali. La città nel XV secolo contava 25/30.000 abitanti, era una "città carovaniera" e nel suo porto si incon-

travano e scambiavano esperienze di tipo mercantile e culturale siciliani di ogni contrada dell'isola, francesi, inglesi, ragusei, genovesi, veneziani, pisani, catalani ecc., i quali oltre a trafficare nel centro peloritano, ne usavano lo scalo per la linea del Levante o per il viaggio di Fiandra. I mercanti messinesi, a loro volta, frequentavano intensamente i porti mediterranei e dell'Europa del Nord e qualcuno, come Pietro Rombulo, raggiungeva perfino la Cina. Gli operatori peloritani, inoltre, misero in atto una sorta di teoria dei costi comparati, giacché, anche nei momenti di carestia, rinunziarono a produrre frumento e decisero di acquistarlo coi proventi della seta e di altri commerci, incrementando, così, i propri profitti. Nella sfera culturale, la vivacità del porto facilitò la diffusione della civiltà umanistica, rafforzando una consapevolezza al passo coi nuovi tempi, come testimoniano i ritratti di Antonello, alcuni dei quali riproducono sicuramente le fattezze di patrizi messinesi.

Il porto avrebbe continuato a prosperare nel corso del Cinquecento e, anche dopo le gravi crisi del XVII secolo, avrebbe continuato a rappresentare il polmone di Messina.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

Del porto di Messina nel Medioevo si occupano ampiamente le storie generali della città. Si vedano al riguardo: C.D. GALLO, *Gli annali della città di Messina*, nuova ed. a cura di A. VAYOLA, II, Messina 1879; P. PIERI, *La storia di Messina nello sviluppo della sua vita comunale*, Messina 1939; C. TRASELLI, *I privilegi di Messina e Trapani (1160-1355)*, prefaz. di E. PISPISA, Messina 1992; AA. VV., *Messina. Il ritorno della memoria*, Palermo 1994; F. MARTINO, "Messana Nobilis Siciliae Caput". *Istituzioni municipali e gestione del potere in un emporio del Mediterraneo*, Roma 1994; E. PISPISA, *Messina medievale*, Galatina 1996; *Messina. Storia e civiltà*, a cura di G. MOLONIA, Messina 1997; F. MARTINO, *Messina e il suo distretto. Dalla «fidelitas» all'esercizio della giurisdizione*, in *La Valle di Agrò. Un territorio, una storia, un destino*, I, a cura di C. BIONDI, Palermo 2005.

Per le età normanna, sveva e angioina: E. PISPISA, *Aspetti della storia di Messina in età normanna*, in E. PISPISA, *Medioevo fridericiano e altri scritti*, Messina 1999, 221-38; E. PISPISA, *Messina e Catania. Relazioni e rapporti con il mondo mediterraneo e l'Europa continentale nelle età normanna e sveva; Stratificazione sociale e potere politico a Messina nel Medioevo; Messina in età sveva*, in E. PISPISA, *Medioevo meridionale. Studi e ricerche*, Messina 1994, 323-411.

Per il Trecento e Quattrocento: E. PISPISA, *Messina nel Trecento. Politica, economia, società*, Messina 1980; D. ABULAFIA, *The Merchants of Messina: Levant Trade and Domestic Economy*, in "Papers of the British School at Rome" LIV, 1986, 196-212; C. TRASELLI, *Messina dal Quattrocento al Seicento*, in E. PISPISA e C. TRASELLI, *Messina nei secoli d'oro*, Messina 1988; C. SALVO, *Giurati, feudatari, mercanti. L'élite urbana a Messina tra medioevo ed età moderna*, Roma 1995; SALVO, *Una realtà urbana nella Sicilia medievale. La società messinese dal Vespro*

ai Martini, Roma 1997; D. SANTORO, *Messina l'indomita. Strategie familiari del patriziato urbano tra XIV e XV secolo*, Caltanissetta-Roma 2003.

Per gli aspetti culturali: G. LIPARI, *Per una storia della cultura letteraria a Messina (dagli Svevi alla rivolta antispagnola del 1674-78)*, in "Archivio Storico Messinese", s. III, XXXII, 1982; S. TRAMONTANA, *Antonello e la sua città*, Palermo 1981; C. BIANCA, *Stampa, cultura e società a Messina alla fine del Quattrocento*, 2 voll., Palermo 1988.

Salvatore Bottari

The port of Messina, 1591-1783

1. *The background* *

Under Arab domination (IXth-XIth century) Sicily was divided into three valleys: the Val di Mazara (the north-western section of Sicily), the Val di Noto (the southern part of the island) and the Val Demone (the north-eastern area)¹. Messina, near the north-east corner of Sicily, was the most important town in the Val Demone.



Antonio Bolifoni, Sicily, engraving, 1692 (Private Collection, Messina)

* I should like to thank Michela D'Angelo, John Dickie and Nicola Criniti who read earlier versions of this essay and who all offered useful comments and suggestions.

¹ MICHELE AMARI, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia* (Firenze, 2002), vol. I, 346-348; PIETRO CORRAO, VINCENZO D'ALESSANDRO, "Geografia amministrativa e potere sul territorio nella Sicilia tardomedievale (secoli XIII-XIV)", in GIORGIO CHITTOLENI, DIETMAR WILLOWEIT (eds.), *L'organizzazione del territorio in Italia e in Germania: secoli XIII-XIV* (Bologna, 1994), 395-444.

Since ancient times ‘*grande histoire*’ and local history have been intertwined in the Straits of Messina². In fact, thanks to its geographical position, the city was the meeting point both for the ships sailing between East and West Mediterranean, and for coastal navigation between the Ionian and the Tyrrhenian Seas³. Products and merchandise coming from and going to Sicily, Calabria and many ports in the Mediterranean Sea passed through the port of Messina, which was the main trading place in Sicily.

Because Messina was isolated from the food-producing interior areas of Sicily, its survival depended on trade along the coasts. Its hinterland yielded very few cereals, so it was driven to trade in order to pay for grain and other staple goods coming from the Val di Mazara and Val di Noto⁴. Messina was hemmed against the sea by the Peloritani Mountains, making its real hinterland of Messina the sea: its port was a natural shelter for ships and vessels of all kinds and had been a commercial emporium for centuries. Messina, in sort, was pushed inexorably outwards, towards the other countries of the Mediterranean⁵. The core of the economic and social life of Messina was the natural ‘sickle-shaped’ port in the Straits, described by the Sicilian historian Tommaso Fazello in the following terms (1558):

Proinde sita est Messana pro maiori parte in planitie, ad littus maris, ortum prospectans, longior quam latior. Habet in conspectu (freto vorticoso, parvoque; euryppo interfluente) extremos Italiae montes: ad quorum radices oramque maritimam Rhegium et Flumara de muro Calabriae visuntur oppida. Habet citra ipsius maris angustias curvum telluris tractum falcis (ut diximus), instar, longum, ac tenuem, longitudinis utpote passuum circiter octingentorum, latitudinis vero ferme centum, ac maris interfluxu (qui portus est) ab urbe mille et paulo plura. p.m. distantem, et ab eius dextera saepagatum, Brachium S. Rainerij hodie, sed aetate superiori, et a D. Hyacintho et a Lingua Phari, ac Messana appellatum. Ea tellus cum instar iactae natura molis propendeat, quosque in sinuosum arcum curvata protenditur, quietum, tutum, spatiosum, ac profundum etiam ad littus ipsum efficit portum. Nam et onerariae, inusitati etiam magnitudinis naves, tuto littori ita adhaerent, ut nautae altero pede littus, altero navim saepe attingant⁶.

Since the Norman conquest (XIth century), Messina had experienced a

² See, for example, GEORGES VALLET, *Rhégion et Zancle. Histoire, commerce et civilisation des cites chalcidiennes du détroit de Messine* (Paris, 1958); GIACOMO SCIBONA, “Zancle”, in *The Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites* (Princeton, 1976), 998-999; MARIA CACCAMO CALTABIANO, “Storia antica”, in GIOVANNI MOLONIA (ed.), *Messina. Storia e civiltà* (Messina, 1997), 45-55; SEBASTIANA NERINA CONSOLO LANGHER, “L’età greca e romana”, in FULVIO MAZZA (ed.), *Messina. Storia, cultura, economia* (Soveria Mannelli, 2007), 25-61.

³ AMELIA IOLI GIGANTE, *Messina* (Roma-Bari, 1980).

⁴ ORAZIO CANCELILA, *Baroni e popolo nella Sicilia del grano* (Palermo, 1983), 44-51.

⁵ SALVATORE BOTTARI, *Post res perditas. Messina 1678-1713* (Messina, 2005), 121-124.

⁶ TOMMASO FAZELLO, *De rebus siculis decades duae, deca I, liber II, De Zancle et Messana urbibus* (Palermo, 1558), 47-48.

significant immigration, and large trading community of native and foreign merchants (especially from Amalfi, Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Venice and Catalonia) developed⁷. Furthermore, the city of the Straits became a regular stop on the route to the Holy Land at the time of the Crusades⁸. Muhammad al-Idrisi, the Andalusian geographer who lived in Sicily at the court of Roger II, characterised Messina as a port where ships, coming from Christian and Muslim countries, landed for loading and unloading various products and merchandise⁹. The importance of the role of Messina was even underlined by two of the major Spanish travellers in the Mediterranean during the XIIth century: Benjamin of Tudela described it as a place where most of the pilgrims assembled to cross over to Jerusalem and Ibn Jubayr portrayed the town as the 'merchant infidels' main market¹⁰.

After 1197 the natural harbour of Messina began to be considered a free port¹¹. Moreover, time after time, the Norman, Swabian, Angevin and Aragonese kings granted the city other privileges such as the *Consolato del Mare*, duty free, fair dockyard, etc., and made it an emporium between the Levant and Europe¹². Under Spanish rule Messina acquired new privileges so most historians have defined it as a sort of 'republic in a kingdom' or a kind of 'city-state'¹³. At the beginning of the early Modern Age the port of Messina was well connected with the Mediterranean as well as with the North European sea trade routes thanks to the special facilities granted to the foreign merchants and ships calling there¹⁴. Moreover, still at the begin-

⁷ ENRICO PISPISA, *Medioevo fridericiano e altri scritti* (Messina, 1999), 221-238; LUCIANO CATALIOTO, "Il Medioevo: economia, politica e società", in MAZZA (ed.), *Messina*, 63-101.

⁸ DAVID ABULAFIA, *Commerce and Conquest in the Mediterranean. 1100-1500* (Aldershot-Brookfield, 1993), 196-212.

⁹ IDRISI, *Il libro di Ruggero*, transl. and ed. by Umberto Rizzitano, (Palermo, 1966), 41-42.

¹⁰ DAVID ABULAFIA, *The two Italies. Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes* (Cambridge [et alt.], 1977), 42-43.

¹¹ "Considerantes igitur fidei puritatem et devota servitia, que Cives Messanenses, fideles experti nostri, semper et in presenti tempore maxime nostris studuerunt servitiis fide non ficta, et immaculate puritati propensius exhibere, eis de solita benignitate concedimus, ut liceat eis omnia mercimonia et res eorum quaslibet libere et sine aliqua dacione per portum nostrum ipsius Civitatis nostre Messane tam per mare quam per terra immictere vel extrahere". See the privilege given to Messina by Henry VI of Hohenstaufen (11 May 1197) in CAMILLO GIARDINA (ed.), *Capitoli e privilegi di Messina* (Palermo, 1937), 25-30; and also CARMELO TRASELLI, *I privilegi di Messina e di Trapani (1160-1355)*, (Messina, 1992), 17-19.

¹² CARMEN SALVO, "Il Consolato del Mare di Messina", *Clio. Rivista trimestrale di studi storici*, XXVI, No. 2 (1990), 187-226.

¹³ LUIS ANTONIO RIBOT GARCÍA, *La revuelta antiespañola de Mesina. Causas y antecedentes (1591-1674)* (Valladolid, 1982), 54-64; GIUSEPPE GIARRIZZO, "La Sicilia dal Cinquecento all'Unità d'Italia", in VINCENZO D'ALESSANDRO, GIUSEPPE GIARRIZZO, *La Sicilia dal Vespro all'Unità d'Italia* (Torino, 1989), 326-332; MARINO BERENGO, *L'Europa delle città. Il volto della società urbana europea tra Medioevo ed Età moderna* (Torino, 1999), 34-35.

¹⁴ MICHELA D'ANGELO, "Porti e traffici marittimi in Sicilia fra Cinquecento e Seicento", in GIORGIO SIMONCINI (ed.), *Sopra i porti di mare*, III, *Sicilia e Malta*, (Firenze, 1997), 71-110.

ning of the XVIth century, many local merchants, sailors, and ships had constant and direct trade with the main English and Flemish ports as well as with the Levant Seas¹⁵. The role of Messina as an important center of seaborne trade is well exemplified by the story of Tuccio Fieravanti, a Pisan merchant residing in the city of the Straits, who exported Sicilian silk and imported English and Flemish clothes in the 1520s¹⁶. Therefore Messina was at one point of a trade triangle that had the other two points in London and Antwerp; but it also had strong links with Lyons, Palermo, Pisa, Lucca and other Italian cities. Moreover the merchants from Messina were involved in trading wine from the Levant which they sent to London on Biscayan ships¹⁷. The dearth of records relating to the port of Messina makes the fragmentary data provided by a register of the *Secrezia* (Customs) from January to April and from June to August 1587 particularly valuable¹⁸. This register attests the presence of 49 vessels (i.e., 15 Ragusean, 13 French, 8 Sicilian, 6 Venetian, 2 Neapolitan, 2 Genoese, 1 from Apulia, 1 from Chios, 1 unknown) and confirms the vitality of the harbour as a commercial emporium between Western Europe and the Levant.

In the Mediterranean, where Christianity was trying to contain the advance of the Sublime Porte, the port of Messina proved to be strategic also under the geopolitical profile. The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus (1570) brought Spain back in force to the Mediterranean¹⁹, and Messina was chosen as the assembly-point for the allied forces of the Holy League (mostly the Pope, the King of Spain and the Republic of Venice)²⁰. On 16 September 1571, the Christian fleets sailed from the port of Messina and, three weeks later (7 October), defeated the Ottoman galleys at Lepanto²¹.

¹⁵ CARMELO TRASELLI, "Porti e scali in Sicilia dal XV al XVII secolo", in *Le grandes escales*, II, *Le temps modernes* (Bruxelles, 1972), 257-281; AMELIA IOLI GIGANTE, "Rotte del commercio della seta", in CATERINA CIOLINO (ed.), *La seta e la Sicilia*, (Messina, 2002), 89-90.

¹⁶ See GIOVANNA MOTTA, "Dal Mediterraneo al Nord Europa. La presenza italiana sui mercati di Londra e di Anversa 1526-1527", in GIOVANNA MOTTA (ed.), *Mercanti e viaggiatori per le vie del mondo* (Milano, 2000), 45-63.

¹⁷ CARMELO TRASELLI, "Il mercato dei panni a Messina all'inizio del secolo XVI", *Annali della Facoltà di Economia e Commercio, Università degli Studi di Messina*, XI, No. 1 (1973), 74.

¹⁸ CARMELO TRASELLI, "Sul movimento del porto di Messina nel 1587", *Economia e storia*, II, No. 4 (1955), 453-461.

¹⁹ MOLLY GREENE, "The Ottomans in the Mediterranean", in VIRGINIA H. AKSAN, DANIEL GOFFMAN (eds.), *The Early Modern Ottomans. Remapping the Empire* (Cambridge, 2007), 106-116.

²⁰ GIUSEPPE ARENAPRIMO, *La Sicilia nella battaglia di Lepanto*, (Messina, 1892); GIOVANNA MOTTA, "Da Messina a Lepanto. Guerra ed economia nel Mediterraneo cinquecentesco", in GIOVANNA MOTTA (ed.), *I turchi, il Mediterraneo e l'Europa* (Milano, 1998), 78-102.

²¹ ROGER CHARLES ANDERSON, *Naval wars in the Levant. 1559-1853* (Liverpool, 1952), 34-46; BARTOLOMÉ BENNASSAR, *Don Juan de Austria. Un héroe para un imperio* (Madrid, 2004),



Andrea Calamech, The Christian Fleet in the Port of Messina, bronze bas-relief on the pedestal of the statue of John of Austria, 1572 (Messina, Italy)

2. The 'golden silk thread'

The discovery of America and the shifting of '*grande histoire*' from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic seems to have had scarcely any consequences in Messina, which received new impetus from the silk trade²². Throughout the XVth century and almost all of the XVIIIth, local silk manufactures became the city's economic mainstay²³.

In Sicily sericulture and silk production had specific characteristics. Abundant fresh mulberry leaves were fundamental for successful silkworm rearing and therefore plantations of black mulberries became a typical element in the rural scenery of the Val Demone. Moreover sericulture and silk production reflected a gender division of labour²⁴. The first stage, the breeding of silkworms, was a task performed by women. The next stage in silk production, that of making a useful thread from the cocoon, was a job for men, who carried cocoons to the '*posti delli mangani*' - i.e. the places of mangles, where the reeling machines, used to unwind the

107-139; ONUR YILDRIM, "The battle of Lepanto and its impact on Ottoman history and historiography", in ROSSELLA CANCELILA (ed.), *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII)*, 2 vols., (Palermo, 2007), vol. I, 533-556; NICCOLÒ CAPPONI, *Lepanto 1571. La Lega Santa contro l'Impero Ottomano* (Milano, 2008), 195-264; GIANCLAUDIO CIVALE, *Guerrieri di Cristo. Inquisitori, gesuiti e soldati alla battaglia di Lepanto* (Milano, 2009), 69-84.

²² STEPHAN R. EPSTEIN, *An island for itself. Economic development and social change in late medieval Sicily* (Cambridge-New York, 1992), 251-295.

²³ SALVATORE BOTTARI, "L'ingresso nella modernità: da Ferdinando il Cattolico al terremoto del 1783", in MAZZA (ed.), *Messina*, 103-181.

²⁴ SIMONA LAUDANI, *La Sicilia della seta. Economia, società e politica* (Catanzaro, 1996), 43-49.

silk filaments from a group of cocoons, were located - where the filaments were unwound from the cocoons and the thread itself prepared²⁵. Just one filament was too thin and weak to be of any practical use, so it was combined with others²⁶. The resultant thread was wound onto a fast moving reel. Manufactures used large-scale reeling machines for reasons linked to the taxation system in use in Sicily (the first tax on raw silk was collected during this phase of the production process, which was therefore subject to intensive control)²⁷.

The port of Messina was not only where most Sicilian silk was marketed, but a large quantity of silk from southern Calabria would be sold here as well²⁸. The activities of the silk sector were regulated by an institution that played a leading role in Messina during the early Modern Age, namely the "*Consolato dell'Arte della Seta*" (Consulate of the Silk Craft). In 1520 Messina's silk weavers, at their own request and by intercession of the city's Senate, obtained permission from Viceroy Pignatelli to establish a Consulate of the Silk Craft whose chapters were approved by Emperor Charles V ten years later²⁹. In the beginning there were four consuls (two of them weavers and two of them silk cloth merchants). In 1617 two of them - a merchant and a weaver - were replaced by an aristocrat and an elected member of the Senate, while in 1703 the number of consuls was raised to six to include a master spinner and a master dyer.

The attempt to put a tax on silk dates back to 1562³⁰. That year a tax of 1 *tari* was levied on every ounce of silk cloth, wool, fur and the like, while another *tari* was levied on each pound of raw silk regardless of whether it was produced in Sicily or imported from abroad. The tax could be collected either at the moment of production or exportation. As we have already noted, due to tax laws, a centralized system for silk-throwing was set up in Sicily. This activity was carried out in dedicated places (*posti delli man-*

²⁵ The process consisted in placing cocoons in a basin filled with hot water (60° or 70° Celsius). Placing cocoons in hot water softened the sericin (the resinous substance that cements fibroin fibre in the cocoon) and allowed the end of the filament to be found. See RICHARD L. HILLS, "From cocoon to cloth. The technology of silk production", in SIMONETTA CAVACIOCCHI (ed.), *La seta in Europa. Sec. XIII-XX* (Prato-Firenze, 1993), 59-90.

²⁶ A number of cocoons were unwound together to give strength to the thread. Therefore the individual filaments from all of them were drawn together and fixed into one as the softened sericin dried. See Archivio di Stato di Palermo (ASP), *Miscellanea Archivistica*, s. II, No. 447, *Lettera di autore ignoto, Messina giugno 1779*.

²⁷ LAUDANI, *La Sicilia della seta*, 70-79.

²⁸ CARMELO TRASELLI, "Ricerche sulla seta siciliana (sec. XIV-XVII)", *Economia e Storia*, II (1965), 226; GIUSEPPE CARIDI, *Lo Stretto che unisce. Messina e la sponda calabra tra Medioevo ed Età moderna* (Reggio Calabria, 2009), 46-52.

²⁹ CAIO DOMENICO GALLO, *Apparato agli Annali della Città di Messina* (Napoli, 1755), 66.

³⁰ HELMUT KOENIGSBERGER, *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain. A Study in the Practice of Empire* (London-New York, 1951), 154-155.

gani'), where the silk cocoons had to be taken by law to be unravelled. Two years later the Sicilian Parliament summoned in Messina abolished the tax, which was then levied again in 1575 together with a tax of one *tari* per ounce on various textiles for 10 years. The tax was further extended by Parliament in 1585³¹. Messina's ruling class reacted, and six years later (1591) it donated 583,333 scudos to Philip II, who granted Messina the privilege of being exempted from the tax³². Thanks to this privilege, Messina established a monopoly over the silk trade in the large area covering the Termini-Messina-Syracuse triangle and it also saw the confirmation of some privileges and the granting of other concessions. The operation turned out to be less profitable than expected because it came at the price of a loan at an 8% interest rate for the creditors. In order to pay back the loan, they were forced to levy new city taxes that turned out to be even more burdensome than the despised royal tax and a tax of 25 *grani* per ounce of silk leaving the port of Messina was imposed. This triggered a vicious circle that fuelled smuggling and the quantity of silk reaching Messina proved to be less than estimated. In addition, in order to cover the city's deficit, the 'funded debt' was securitized through the issue of treasury stocks thus yielding the creditors a fixed and secure income weighing on precise tax receipts. The social impact was clear to all: led to a redistribution of wealth that hit consumption and favoured the ruling class.

Moreover, the Genoese now had a tool to better control silk production³³. The silk market started to take on the form of a network of connections and interdependencies. The Val Demone became a highly specialized economic area. The huge burden resulting from the city taxes led to easier and more profitable transactions shifting capital from investments in production to public debt, stifling entrepreneurship and exacerbating parasitic interests. In 1612 came a new clash between Messina's Senate and the judges of the *Corte Stratigoziale*, on the one hand, and the Viceroy, the Duke of Osuna, and the *Deputazione del Regno*, on the other. The Sicilian Parliament approved a tax of one *tari* on each pound of raw silk to be collected at the moment of silk-throwing, an action that violated the privilege granted to Messina in 1591³⁴. The violation of Messina's exemptions led to an uprising in the city on the Strait, which was brutally repressed

³¹ LODOVICO BIANCHINI, *Storia economico civile della Sicilia*, ed. by FRANCESCO BRANCATO (Napoli, 1971), 130.

³² Archivio di Stato di Torino (AST), Fondo Sicilia (FS), 130/1, cat. 2, m. 3, f. 26, *Relazione delle gabelle di Messina, loro pesi e modo d'augmentarle*, Messina 16 maggio 1714.

³³ GIARRIZZO, "La Sicilia dal Cinquecento all'Unità d'Italia", 248-249.

³⁴ FRANCESCO BENIGNO, "Messina e il duca d'Osuna: un conflitto politico nella Sicilia del Seicento", in DOMENICO LIGRESTI (ed.), *Il governo della città. Patriziati e politica nella Sicilia moderna* (Catania, 1990), 173-207.

by the Duke of Osuna. After alternating fortunes the new tax was abolished by Philip III (May 15, 1616). Messina's privileges were confirmed in exchange for a donation of 180,000 scudos and the renunciation by the city to the taxes unduly collected amounting to about 150,000 scudos. In that same year, in order to cover the new outlay the Senate levied a new city tax of 5 *grani* on each pound of silk. The other donations to the King in the years that followed, among them a donation of 150,000 scudos to Philip IV in 1622, were matched by a rise in city taxes³⁵.

In the first half of the 17th century silk had become Sicily's most important export, totalling more than 400,000 pounds a year³⁶. The sector's first signs of decline were noticed by Messina's ruling *élite* only towards the middle of the century. Thanks to the handsome income from silk, Messina, whose territory was poor in wheat, could pay for this precious cereal coming from southern and western Sicily.

3. Sugar, shipbuilding and other economic activities

Up to the mid-17th century a major role was played by the cultivation of sugarcane in the plantations - *cannameleti* - located especially around Taormina, Milazzo and Patti³⁷. Cultivating sugarcane required abundant water for irrigation and wood for cooking. The processing was done in mills (*trappeti*) and the production cycle required the labour of dozens of workers. Another result of its cultivation was the development of related economic activities employing many other people³⁸. Blacksmiths, carpenters, woodcutters, boilermakers, potters and other labourers supported and created the conditions for the development of the sugar industry by carrying out various tasks (e.g., transporting firewood) or making the tools needed for the processing and sale of sugar (presses, canvas sacks, clay moulds for the sugarloaves, the vats to boil molasses, and so on). Sugar production started an unrelentingly decline during the second half of the 17th century; this was due particularly to high production costs, climate change and, above all, competition by sugar from Brazil, which

³⁵ CARMELO ELIO TAVILLA, *Per la storia delle istituzioni municipali a Messina tra Medioevo ed età moderna* (Messina, 1983), vol. II, 301.

³⁶ MAURICE AYMARD, "Commerce et production de la soie sicilienne aux XVI^e-XVII^e siècles", *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, École française de Rome, LXXVII, No. 2 (1965), 609-640.


³⁷ SALVATORE BOTTARI, "Note sulla produzione dello zucchero nel Valdemone tra Medioevo e Età Moderna", in LUIGI CHIARA (ed.), *Attività produttive e dinamiche socio-culturali in Sicilia in Età moderna e contemporanea* (Roma, 2005), 93-106.

³⁸ CARMELO TRASELLI, *Storia dello zucchero siciliano* (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1982), 96-104; ANTONINO MORREALE, *Insula dulcis. L'industria della canna da zucchero in Sicilia (secc. XV-XVII)* (Napoli, 2006), 139-153.

Table 1. Silk exports from the port of Messina (1592-1678)

| Year | Total (in lbs.) | Year | Total (in lbs.) |
|-----------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1592-1595 | 376,320 | 1657 | 334,601 |
| 1596-1599 | 385,612 | 1658 | 355,096 |
| 1600-1603 | 404,041 | 1659 | 468,352 |
| 1604-1607 | 460,202 | 1660 | 500,905 |
| 1608-1611 | 497,088 | 1661 | 541,208 |
| 1612-1615 | 470,669 | 1662 | 559,198 |
| 1616 | 482,412 | 1663 | 593,888 |
| 1617-1619 | 479,610 | 1664 | 619,182 |
| 1620 | 503,600 | 1665 | 481,279 |
| 1621-1624 | 512,020 | 1666 | 482,170 |
| 1625-1626 | 610,063 | 1667 | 385,897 |
| 1627-1630 | 492,401 | 1668 | 423,366 |
| 1631-1634 | 497,443 | 1669 | 398,004 |
| 1635-1638 | 520,302 | 1670 | 522,640 |
| 1639-1642 | 550,736 | 1671 | 327,128 |
| 1643 | - | 1672 | 410,140 |
| 1644-1647 | 483,031 | 1673 | 430,600 |
| 1648 | 407,251 | 1674 | 174,962 |
| 1649 | 570,448 | 1675 | 52,536 |
| 1650-1653 | 467,211 | 1676 | 66,069 |
| 1654 | 344,644 | 1677 | 100,110 |
| 1655 | 592,278 | 1678 (until August) | 88,020 |
| 1656 | 368,948 | | |

Source: Maurice Aymard, "Commerce et production de la soie sicilienne aux XVI-XVII siècles", *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire, École française de Rome*, LXXVII, 2 (1965).



joined the other traditional competitors on the sugar market, namely Madeira, Cuba, the Canary Islands and Asia³⁹.

Another of Messina's major economic activities was shipbuilding. Besides the old dockyard, a new one was built in 1565 in the San Raineri

³⁹ SIDNEY W. MINTZ, *Storia dello zucchero. Tra politica e cultura* (Torino, 1990), 30-33; ANTONINO MORREALE, "La produzione siciliana dello zucchero (1550-1650): ipotesi e stime", *Società e storia*, 89 (2000), 421-445.

Peninsula, near Forte San Salvatore⁴⁰. In 1615, with the easing of Ottoman pressure in the Mediterranean, the new dockyard was dismantled, while the older and smaller dockyard (near the Royal Palace) continued its activities, although these were limited to maintenance and repair works.

Messina was also home to Sicily's mint, which employed a large number of skilled technicians and workers⁴¹. Other important activities included printing and publishing and the making of maps and nautical charts. Salt pans could be found in the San Raineri Peninsula and between Faro and Ganzirri⁴². The salt was mainly used to preserve fish and tuna, which was principally exported. Swordfish was caught predominantly for local consumption. Coral fishing in the Strait was rather important at least until the end of the 17th century. The coral was exported or used by local craftsmen. The other products exported from Messina included olive oil, wine, salted fish, hazelnuts and cheese⁴³. Of course, they did not all come from the Messina district, but they would reach its market, which was a major one in those days.

A port of call for French, Dutch, Genoese, Tuscan and Neapolitan merchants, Messina was almost a compulsory stop along the route that English vessels covered between the Levant and Livorno and it consolidated this role further around the mid-17th century when the 'safe routes' system was adopted⁴⁴. It was also a hub to other Mediterranean ports where English merchant ships and man-o-wars were based⁴⁵.

Trade was supported also by the insurance market despite the fact it witnessed a sharp decline in the early decades of the 17th century⁴⁶. Before a journey, merchants or shipowners would insure the goods or the entire vessel for a given amount by paying a premium. In turn, the insurer would cover the risk, in case of loss, up to a certain amount usually equal to just a part of the total insured. The policy signed by the insurers would be given to a notary who would make an authenticated copy to use if the original was lost. In case of a dispute between the parties the Consulate of the Sea of Messina would pass judgement.

⁴⁰ MARIA GIUFFRÈ, "L'isola e il mare: il porto di Messina e altri porti", in SIMONCINI (ed.), *Sopra i porti di mare*, 202-209.

⁴¹ ANTONINO GIUFFRIDA, *La finanza pubblica nella Sicilia del '500* (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1999), 285-312.

⁴² ORAZIO CANCELILA, *L'economia della Sicilia. Aspetti storici* (Milano, 1992), 54.

⁴³ MASSIMO PETROCCHI, *La rivoluzione cittadina messinese del 1674* (Firenze, 1954), 39-42.

⁴⁴ GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, *Mercanti inglesi nell'Italia del Seicento. Navi, traffici egemonie* (Venezia, 1990), 72-73.

⁴⁵ HELMUT G. KOENIGSBERGER, "English Merchants in Naples and Sicily in the Seventeenth Century", *English Historical Review*, LXII (1947), 302-366.

⁴⁶ CARMELO TRASELLI, "Banchieri, armatori, assicuratori", in *Storia della Sicilia*, vol. III (Napoli, 1980), 487-500.

Craftsmen making luxury goods (goldsmiths, silversmiths, silk makers, etc.), banks and specialized agriculture (grapes and olives) on Messina's farmsteads completed the city's and its district's range of production activities⁴⁷. The population grew three-fold over the course of a century: from the 25,000-30,000 inhabitants of the early 16th century, it rose to 100,000 inhabitants in the early years of the 17th century. This was the result of the sharp rise in birth compared to mortality and of the fact that the city drew migrants from its hinterland and especially from the Nebrodi area and from Calabria.

Among its speculative activities, besides insurance – as mentioned above – and banks – which, according to the few indicators available seem to witness a sharp decline in the 17th century⁴⁸ –, it is worth pointing out the major interests linked to the running of administration. In particular, by the agreement of 1591, Messina had offered to the king 583,333 scudos for the abolition of the tax on crude silk and other textiles. This sum was borrowed from Genoese bankers at high interest rates, and for the repayment of it new taxes were imposed. Furthermore, the practice of contracting out the taxes (*arrendamento* - leasing) set in motion a vicious circle, which led to a rise especially in the taxes on consumer goods and products essential to the city's economy (e.g., silk) to pay those reaping revenues from the public debt⁴⁹.

This state of affairs in the running of city finances led to a rise in the cost of living, which starting from consumer goods, was reflected in all production and commercial activities to the point that it became the cause of the structural weakness of Messina's economy, which was doomed to rely more and more heavily on a system of monopolies⁵⁰. Moreover, these could allow collectors (lease holders) to control the entire production and marketing cycle of any given commodity.

The obligation for silk makers to export the silk manufactured in the area covered by the Syracuse-Messina-Termini triangle, as ordered by the privilege of 1591, also led to an increase in the revenues of the city of Messina as result of the increase in exports from the city's port. The silk leaving the port of the city on the Strait was burdened by a tax, which, in addition to the one levied in 1616, added up to a total of 30 *grani* per

⁴⁷ BOTTARI, "L'ingresso nella modernità", 119-121.

⁴⁸ VITO CUSUMANO, *Storia dei banchi della Sicilia*, 2 vols. (Roma, 1887-1892); CARMELO TRASELLI, *Note per la storia dei banchi in Sicilia nel XV secolo*, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1959-1968); ROMUALDO GIUFFRIDA, *Banchi e banche in Sicilia dal XVI al XIX secolo* (Palermo, 1994), 14-17.

⁴⁹ ROSSELLA CANCELILA, *Fisco, ricchezza, comunità nella Sicilia del Cinquecento* (Roma, 2001), 298-318.

⁵⁰ SALVATORE BOTTARI, "Dalla rivolta antispagnola al 'decennio inglese' (1674-1815)", in SALVATORE BOTTARI, LUIGI CHIARA, *La lunga rincorsa. Messina dalla rivolta antispagnola al terremoto del 1908* (Manduria-Bari-Roma, 2009), 30.

pound of silk exported⁵¹. There was a drop in exports from the middle of the century. This took place against the background of a more general re-organization, which - especially in Italy - changed the sector's territorial hierarchies⁵². Moreover, starting from the end of the 16th century there was a rise - first slowly and then at an ever increasing pace - in silk production in Palermo and, in the mid-17th century, in Catania as well to meet the demand for inexpensive products⁵³.

4. From the Revolt of 1674 to the end of the Spanish Government

The 1674-1678 rebellion in Messina made Sicily and, in particular, Messina's port, one of the fronts in the war between Spain, the Netherlands and France during the Dutch War⁵⁴. Messina rebelled against the Spanish rule and called for the help of the French who sent a fleet. During the war the British were neutral, so the fighting favoured British trade and cut out its traditional Dutch and French trade competitors - at least for the time being⁵⁵. However, both the French and Spanish would force British ships

⁵¹ UMBERTO DALLA VECCHIA, *Cause economiche e sociali dell'insurrezione messinese del 1674* (Messina, 1907), 17-18.

⁵² For a general discussion on this theme, see CARLO PONI, "Archéologie de la fabrication: La diffusion des moulins à soie «alla bolognese» dans les États vénitiens du XVI^e au XVIII^e siècle", *Annales. Économie, Sociétés, Civilisations*, XXVII, No. 6 (1972), 1475-1496; PONI, "All'origine del sistema di fabbrica: tecnologia e organizzazione produttiva dei mulini da seta nell'Italia settentrionale (sec. XVII-XVIII)", *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXXXVIII, No. 3 (1976), 444-497; GABRIELLA SIVORI, "Il tramonto dell'industria serica genovese", *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXXXIV, No. 4 (1972), 893-944; PAOLA MASSA, "Conseguenze socioeconomiche dei mutamenti di struttura nella tessitura serica ligure (secoli XVI-XIX)", in *Studi in memoria di Mario Abrate* (Torino, 1986), vol. II, 601-620; ROSALBA RAGOSTA PORTIOLI, "Specializzazione produttiva a Napoli nei secoli XVI e XVII", in CAVACIOCCHI (ed.), *La seta in Europa*, 339-349; GIUSEPPE CHICCO, *La seta in Piemonte, 1650-1800. Un sistema industriale d'ancien régime* (Milano, 1995), 19-115; FRANCESCO BATTISTINI, *L'industria della seta in Italia nell'età moderna* (Bologna, 2003), 19-28.

⁵³ TRASELLI, "Ricerche sulla seta siciliana", 245-246; FEDELE MARLETTA, "L'arte della seta a Catania nei secoli XV-XVII", *Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale*, XXII (1926), 46-91; ANTONIO PETINO, "L'arte ed il Consolato della seta a Catania nei secoli XIV-XIX", *Bollettino Storico Catanese*, VI-VII (1942-1943), 15-78.

⁵⁴ GIACOMO GALATTI, *La rivoluzione e l'assedio di Messina (1674-1678)* (Messina, 1899); FRANCESCO GUARDIONE, *Storia della rivoluzione di Messina contro la Spagna (1671-1680)* (Palermo, 1907); ÉMILE LALOY, *La révolte de Messine, l'expédition de Sicile et la politique française en Italie (1674-1678). Avec des chapitres sur les origines de la révolte (1648-1674) et sur le sort des exilés 1678-1702*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1929-1931); FRANCESCO BENIGNO, "Lotta politica e sbocco rivoluzionario: riflessioni sul caso Messina (1674-1678)", *Storica*, V, 13 (1999), 7-56; LUIS ANTONIO RIBOT GARCIA, *La Monarquía de España y la guerra de Mesina (1674-1678)* (Madrid, 2002); SAVERIO DI BELLA, *Caino barocco. Messina e la Spagna 1672-1678* (Cosenza, 2005); BOTTARI, *Post res perditas*, 57-84.

⁵⁵ KOENIGSBERGER, "English Merchants in Naples and Sicily", 318-324.



Anonymous, View of Messina, engraving XVIIth century (Private Collection, Messina)

sailing through the Strait to stop seizing their loads⁵⁶. However, while the British merchants were paid by the French for the loads they were carrying, the Spaniards seized the loads to prevent them from reaching the rebels.

The failed 1674-1678 rebellion was followed by harsh repression by the Spaniards. Some of the measures affected the city's economic livelihood. These included the confiscation of exiles' property, the abolition of the mint, and the abolition of the privilege that allowed Messina and its district not to be included in the census and hence not to pay royal taxes⁵⁷. The city taxes were now managed by the *Regia Giunta*, a body set up by the Viceroy Francisco Benavides, Count of Santo Stefano. Messina lost most of its artworks: those not carried away by the French were taken to Spain, while another part of the city's patrimony was lost elsewhere. The Senate Palace was torn down.

As for the silk industry, the royal treasury took over the tax of three carlines (30 *grani*) on the export of silk from the port of Messina and it limited the obligation to export silk from Messina only to strictly specific towns and to the district. Then in 1679 there came the order to levy a royal tax of 36 *grani* on raw silk; the tax was to be collected at the moment of silk-throwing. When added to the two city taxes of two *grani* each on the silk manufactured in Messina's territory, this new measure 'de facto' imposed the two-*tari* tax on silk levied in the rest of Sicily⁵⁸. The city's revenues, without the three-carline tax, were compensated by the levying of another nine city taxes. Messina's producers had lost their privileges and now had to bear a very heavy tax burden. This led to the emigration of skilled workers, merchants and foreign merchant companies. Their destinations included not only France, but also Naples, Catania, Palermo and other Italian cities.

⁵⁶ GIACOMO DENTICI, "Rapporti del console inglese a Messina negli anni della rivolta (1674-1678)", *Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato*, XXVII, No. 1-2-3 (1977), 19-43.

⁵⁷ BOTTARI, *Post res perditas*, 89-100.

⁵⁸ AST, FS, 130/1, cat. 2, m. 3, f. 23, *Relazione delle 26 gabelle del patrimonio della città di Messina*, Messina 16 maggio 1714.

Soon came, however, the problem of reviving the city's economy after being stifled by the events following the 1674-1678 rebellion, while the climate of suspicion and distrust did not help the situation.

Sicily's silk production still played a major role on international markets. In the 1680s the city of Lyon received 6,000 bales of silk, 1,600 of which from Sicily, 1,500 from the rest of Italy, 300 from Spain, 1,400 from the Levant and 1,200 from Languedoc, Provence and Dauphinate⁵⁹. A major role was also played by trade with Britain⁶⁰. Quality control over the goods was a key issue for Messina's Consulate of the Silk Craft⁶¹. In 1680 Catania was granted the Consulate of the Silk Craft and could hence manufacture cloth with a code like Palermo's. Competition with Catania started to be felt in Messina as a result both of the lighter tax burden on Catania's products and of the cheaper cost of living thanks to the greater availability of wheat and lower taxes on basic necessities. On 8 May 1693, a few months after the terrible January earthquake that hit Catania and the Noto Valley, Catania's Senate issued a call to draw skilled workers and revive the city's silk industry⁶². Moving to Catania and setting up a business there became even more convenient especially for Messina's craftsmen.

In 1685 the Viceroy Benavides, who had played a leading role in the harsh repression aimed at administering an exemplary punishment to Messina, showed that he was aware of the situation and tried to stop the city's economic decline by ordering the construction of a new lazaretto within the framework of a policy to revitalize trade with the Levant⁶³. However, several years passed before the plan to give Messina a free port actually took off. It was finally set up in 1695⁶⁴. The regulations governing the free port included the granting of a 25-year safe-conduct to foreign merchants, including Jews, who would move to Messina. Despite some

⁵⁹ LAUDANI, *La Sicilia della seta*, 99.

⁶⁰ See Biblioteca Regionale Universitaria di Messina (BRUM), Manoscritti (Ms), Fondo Vecchio (FV) 126, *Consulta del Principe di Niscemi in risposta di alcuni quesiti fattegli da S. E. sopra la pannizzazione e trafichi di Messina*, Messina 16 dicembre 1702, ff. 35r-36r. See also BRUM, Ms, FV 126, *Rappresentazione per il negozio della Piazza di Messina del Principe di Niscemi*, Messina 25 gennaio 1703, f. 18v.

⁶¹ Archivio di Stato di Messina (ASM), Consolato della Seta (CS), vol. I, ff. 25v-26r, Messina 1 luglio 1695; ff. 26r-26v, Messina 15 luglio 1695. See also *Istruzioni seu capitoli del Consolato dell'Arte della Seta della Nobile, Fedelissima ed Esemplare Città di Messina, formate d'ordine della Maestà del Re Nostro Signore Carlo III di Borbone Re delle Due Sicilie, di Gerusalemme, &c. Infante di Spagna, Duca di Parma e Piacenza, e di Castro, Principe Ereditario di Toscana, &c.* (Messina, 1736), 61-63.

⁶² PETINO, *L'arte e il Consolato della seta a Catania*, 29-30.

⁶³ Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado, leg. 3503, doc. 103, *Disposizioni per il ristabilimento del commercio; costruzione di un nuovo lazaretto, e Istruzioni dettate dal viceré conte di Santo Stefano per il suo governo*, giugno 1685.

⁶⁴ BRUM, Fondo Messano-Calabro, Misc. C. 1210/1, *Bando di istituzione della Scala e Porto franco di Messina*, Messina 15 agosto 1695.

adjustments to the operation of the free port in 1698, the positive effects were short-lived. Although it is difficult to make an estimate, a Jewish community was established in Messina following the creation of the free port. British merchants trading silk thread could also be found in Messina. Up to the second decade of the 18th century, Britain lacked the technical know-how to make silk thread that was strong enough for the warp.

The free port's structural shortcomings and, above all, the outcome of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) weakened the effects in the medium and long term, since the British left Sicily taking huge amounts of money home with them⁶⁵. Moreover, the Grand Duke of Tuscany took advantage of the delicate political situation arising at the death of Charles II and exerted pressure on ministers and officials to hinder the business of foreign merchants operating in Messina to make the free port go bankrupt⁶⁶.

5. *Between the House of Savoy and the Austrian Habsburg Dynasty*

At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Treaty of Utrecht (11 April 1713) granted the title of kings to the Savoy family who were given the island of Sicily.

The issue of the free port came back to the fore under the Savoy in the debate on how to revive Messina's economy. The blame was placed on the port's structural shortcomings and on the diversity of the economic and commercial situation in Messina compared to Livorno's. The Tuscan port's liveliness – according to reports sent to King Victor Amadeus II – was due to the development of local economies with a high demand for goods drawing trade and, above all, due to the fact that – unlike Messina – the privilege had been extended to the city's entire territory⁶⁷. In August 1714 Victor Amadeus II of Savoy issued new rules for the management of Messina's free port and lazaretto⁶⁸. However, the measure did not have the hoped-for effects, since the Savoy government turned a deaf ear on

⁶⁵ BOTTARI, *Post res perditas*, 156-166.

⁶⁶ Biblioteca Comunale di Palermo (BCP), Ms. Qq. G. 66, *Supposizioni di fatto per maggior intelligenza delle risposte e sentimenti del Tribunale della Regia Giunta alli capitoli della due proietti, che s'hanno presentato per li negozianti di Messina, sovra il vero stabilimento del porto e scala franca della medema* [1727], ff. 648r-652v.


⁶⁷ See IDA FAZIO, "Rappresentazioni di un'economia urbana. Le proposte all'amministrazione sabauda e il rilancio di Messina dopo la crisi di fine Seicento", *Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino*, No. 1 (1996), 214-272.

⁶⁸ AST, FS, 130/2, cat. I, m. 5, f. 13; *Istruzioni di Lazaretto Scala e Porto Franco della Città di Messina, Tassa delle mercedi che potranno esigere dalli Padroni de' bastimenti li Piloti del faro per loro servitù, con la tariffa, seu stima delle mercanzie che entrano in Lazaretto a far quarantena, ed altra de' stallaggi di Porto Franco, e dritti spettanti al Giudice Privativo, Ufficiali, e servienti di esso*, Messina 28 agosto 1714.

Table 2. Silk exports from the port of Messina (1678-1729)

| Year | Total (in lbs.) | Year | Total (in lbs.) |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------|-----------------|
| 1678-1679 | 224,787 | 1704-1705 | 95,012 |
| 1679-1680 | 250,552 | 1705-1706 | 168,016 |
| 1680-1681 | 229,276 | 1706-1707 | 150,022 |
| 1681-1682 | 230,727 | 1707-1708 | 133,642 |
| 1682-1683 | 262,421 | 1708-1709 | 48,835 |
| 1683-1684 | 218,781 | 1709-1710 | 103,893 |
| 1684-1685 | 254,981 | 1710-1711 | 86,215 |
| 1685-1686 | 197,814 | 1711-1712 | 93,765 |
| 1686-1687 | 332,669 | 1712-1713 | 112,324 |
| 1687-1688 | 246,127 | 1713-1714 | 176,742 |
| 1688-1689 | 323,780 | 1714-1715 | 94,499 |
| 1689-1690 | 269,313 | 1715-1716 | 133,014 |
| 1690-1691 | 295,165 | 1716-1717 | 183,656 |
| 1691-1692 | 274,846 | 1717-1718 | 137,816 |
| 1692-1693 | 295,373 | 1718-1719 | 44,842 |
| 1693-1694 | 314,568 | 1719-1720 | 55,099 |
| 1694-1695 | 177,687 | 1720-1721 | 42,429 |
| 1695-1696 | 400,633 | 1721-1722 | 75,956 |
| 1696-1697 | 242,626 | 1722-1723 | 149,572 |
| 1697-1698 | 269,071 | 1723-1724 | 67,276 |
| 1698-1699 | 219,753 | 1724-1725 | 38,385 |
| 1699-1700 | 233,402 | 1725-1726 | 69,960 |
| 1700-1701 | 232,245 | 1726-1727 | 98,192 |
| 1701-1702 | 111,287 | 1727-1728 | 73,841 |
| 1702-1703 | 121,565 | 1728-1729 | 24,111 |
| 1703-1704 | 207,632 | | |

Source: Maurice Aymard, "Commerce et production de la soie sicilienne aux XVI-XVII siècles", *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire, École française de Rome*, LXXVII, 2 (1965).



the calls for reforms from the city's economic operators and the free-port area was left unvaried and without the much-desired interaction with the rest of the city. Basically this marked the introduction of what had been ordered 20 years before by Charles II with just a few changes.

The new king stayed in Messina between May and August 1714; during his visit, he was presented with memoranda containing proposals for re-

viving the silk trade. The reduction in the revenues from the three-carlini tax on silk exports, collected after the repression of the Messina rebellion by the royal treasury, had a substantial impact on the Kingdom's finances and its sharp drop from 25,000 scudos in 1707 to 8,000 in 1712 caused great concern⁶⁹. In 1715 silk exports amounted to 132,841 pounds. The quantity was rather meagre and reflected a situation of decline.

Taken as a whole, though, Savoy policy on the issue proved to be ineffective. Moreover, the reorganization of the Piedmontese silk industry in the second half of the 17th century and its reconversion to the production of raw and semi-finished silk made the king rather reluctant to take measures favouring the export of Sicilian silk to France and Britain and stepping up the competition for Piedmont's yarns on foreign markets⁷⁰.

The measures taken under Austrian rule (1719-1734) to revitalize the city's economy had positive effects. Efforts were made to favour manufacturing. In 1727, by government initiative, a group of entrepreneurs from Messina established a Trade Company whose main purpose was the production of gold, silver and silk fabrics⁷¹. This new consortium also was granted a series of privileges, among them the exemption from taxes and donations, the granting of premises and the right of monopoly for five years for the sale of the new textiles developed and manufactured by the Company. In the short term, the foundation of the Trade Company seemed to stimulate business in the silk sector. The 314 new registrations with the Consulate of the Silk Craft marked a positive change⁷². There was a rise in the number of foreign merchants especially from Greece who would open shops in Messina⁷³.

The issue of exorbitant customs duties was still pending though. Silk was also exported from the port of Palermo where customs were cheaper. As a result, the silk exported from the port of Palermo during the decade was almost double that of the silk leaving Messina (1,264,990 pounds as opposed to 688,440.90 pounds)⁷⁴. Corrective measures were adopted to

⁶⁹ LAUDANI, *La Sicilia della seta*, 99.

⁷⁰ BOTTARI, "L'ingresso nella modernità", 146-147.

⁷¹ RAFFAELE MARTINI, "Le condizioni economiche di Messina durante il governo di Carlo IV d'Austria (1719-1734)", *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, XXIX, No. 1-2, (1904), 27-28; FRANCESCA GALLO, *L'alba dei gattopardi. La formazione della classe dirigente nella Sicilia austriaca (1719-1734)* (Catanzaro, 1996), 118-122.

⁷² BCP, Qq. G. 41, f. 228, *Fede di Domenico Gaetano, Regio Maestro Notaro della Corte del Consolato della Seta di Messina*, Messina luglio 1732.

⁷³ MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina tra XVIII e XIX secolo. Alle origini del British Cemetery*, (Messina 1995), 19-20.

⁷⁴ Haus-Hof und Staatsarchiv (HHSA), Italien Spanischer Rat (ISR), Sizilien, Korrespondenz, Karton 13, alt 26, *Fede del maestro credenzero della Regia Dogana di Palermo Abadal*, Palermo 6 maggio 1729.

standardize customs at the two Sicilian ports, but it is rather difficult to assess their effectiveness.

In 1732 – except for the months of March, October, November and December for which data are lacking – besides Sicilian and Calabrian vessels and 64 Neapolitan boats, 201 foreign vessels stopped in the port of Messina: 50 were Maltese, 21 British, 19 Genoese, 17 French, 7 from the Morea, 6 from the Levant, 5 from Rijeka, 5 Spanish, 2 Venetian, 1 from Trieste, 1 from Constantinople, 1 from Alexandria, 1 from the Ambracian Gulf, 1 from Lisbon, 1 from Preveza and 1 from Finale⁷⁵. Upon leaving Messina, some of these vessels were headed for other Sicilian ports where they loaded wheat, or Milazzo where they loaded olive oil, or for the Levant.

Foreign sailors and merchants were supported in the customs and administrative paperwork by the consuls of their countries who would make sure that there was no abuse by customs officers and that the landing and the sale of their commodities were both carried out according to the privileges of their country. Every shipowner or captain would pay a set fee to the consul for the support received in these activities.

According to data provided by Liliana Iaria, whose researched draws on the logbook of a captain from the port of Messina for the period between 1735 and 1738, of the 1,707 foreign vessels landing in Messina, the most numerous were English (386), followed by the Genoese (371), French (307) and Maltese (281)⁷⁶. The British vessels carried here: Bristol cloth, first and second-choice British cloth, black and white textiles, scarlet wool, black Loden cloth, Eden cloth, long-staple wool, fabrics, sugar, lead, tobacco, camel fur, linen, porcelain, cotton, Spanish wool, pepper, cinnamon, saffron, tin rods, iron, steel, copper, paper, alum, sandalwood, leather, cocoa, coffee, leather, Venetian paper and commodities, dried salted cod, herring, stockfish and salmon. Raw silk, soda ash, sumac, manna, citrus fruit and salt would be loaded in Messina. Salt had become one of Sicily's main exports. However, it was mainly exported from Trapani⁷⁷.


6. *The Bourbons' mercantilist policy*

The effort made by the Bourbons in the early years to revive Sicily's economy and, in particular, Messina's soon clashed with corporative interests and the dramatic crisis of the 40-year period stretching between

⁷⁵ LILIANA IARIA, "Il porto di Messina tra Austriaci e Borboni", *Memorie e Rendiconti dell'Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Arti degli Zelanti e dei Dafnici di Acireale*, III (1983), 36.

⁷⁶ IARIA, "Il porto di Messina", 78.

⁷⁷ ORAZIO CANCELILA, *Aspetti di un mercato siciliano. Trapani nei secoli XVII-XIX* (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1972), 53-73; FRANCESCO BENIGNO, *Il porto di Trapani nel Settecento. Rotte, traffici esportazioni (1674-1800)* (Trapani, 1982), 47-64.



Anonymous, View of Messina, engraving, XVIIth century (Private Collection, Messina, Italy)

1743 and 1783. But inconsistency in economic policy was also a problem. New chapters of the Consulate of the Silk Trade were approved by Charles III by initiative of the corporation's consuls; once approved, they confirmed the excessive number of restraints that were already in place, on both the manufacture and sale of silk products. Meanwhile, Catania and other Italian producers were tackling the expansion in commercial circuits and the ensuing transformations in a much more dynamic manner⁷⁸. The Bourbons' mercantilist policy was based on the signing of trade treaties, on customs measures, and on the appointment of magistrates to centralize powers on commercial matters. This led to the appointment of the *Supremo Magistrato del Commercio* in Sicily with the order of November 28, 1739⁷⁹. However, this instrument too met with corporate resistance, and Viceroy Corsini yielded. Soon the institution was emptied of relevance and deprived of its main competences thus leading to its paralysis and powerlessness, although it was never formally abolished. A similarly inconsistent line in economic policy regarded the situation of the Jewish community. The Jews had been called to settle in Naples and Sicily through the granting of favours and privileges in February 1740⁸⁰. They were then expelled with the order of July 30, 1747, because – as it was alleged – only “poor Jews without any credit, driven only by the wanton craving of wealth through usury” had come⁸¹. A period of weak growth registered in the 1730s, thus seemingly reversing the long negative trend, but even that increase came to a sudden end in 1743 due to the outbreak of the plague, which led to a sharp drop in population and the collapse of

⁷⁸ BOTTARI, “L’ingresso nella modernità”, 154-156.

⁷⁹ GIOVANNI RAFFIOTTA, *Il Supremo Magistrato del Commercio in Sicilia* (Palermo, 1953); VITTORIO SCIUTI RUSSI, “Il Supremo Magistrato di Commercio in Sicilia”, *Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale*, LXIV, No. 1 (1968), 253-300.


⁸⁰ ASP, Real Segreteria, Incartamenti, Rappresentanze, b. 246, *Isidoro Terrana al viceré*, Palermo 25 febbraio 1735.

⁸¹ LODOVICO BIANCHINI, *Storia economico civile della Sicilia*, ed. by FRANCESCO BRANCATO (Napoli, 1971), 305.

Table 3. Domestic and foreign boats and vessels landed in Messina (1735-1738)

| Year | Domestic Boats and Vessels | Foreign Boats and Vessels | Total |
|-----------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|
| 1735 | 3,399 | 399 | 3,798 |
| 1736 | 3,201 | 448 | 3,649 |
| 1737 | 3,602 | 493 | 4,095 |
| 1738 | 2,864 | 367 | 3,231 |
| 1735-1738 | 13,066 | 1,707 | 14,773 |
| 1703-1704 | 207,632 | | |

Source: Liliana Iaria, "Il porto di Messina tra austriaci e Borboni", extract from *Memorie e Rendiconti dell'Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Arti degli Zelanti e dei Dafnici di Acireale*, III (1983).



the city's economy⁸². In fact, because of the plague all communication was cut off not only with the rest of the Kingdom but likewise with the whole of Europe for upwards of two years⁸³. The next set of measures were enforced by Viceroy Eustachio de Laviefeuille, who came to Messina in July 1751 and stayed in the city for

two years; these fell within the framework of the Bourbons' centralized approach, but did very little to change the city's economic fabric⁸⁴. The brief experience of the New Trade Company established in 1752 and dissolved just a few years later did not give the positive and lasting results expected, although it did meet with the immediate favour of the city's inhabitants⁸⁵.

The scars left by the plague of 1743 were very difficult to heal, and as a result the 1750s and 1760s were difficult decades. The heavy rains that hit the city on October 8th and 9th of 1754 led to the overflowing of the Portalegni and Bocchetta streams, which damaged many homes in the city centre⁸⁶. The alluvial debris carried by the streams partly blocked the operation of the port of Messina. Proposals to open the port again were

⁸² ORAZIO TURRIANO, *Memoria Istorica del Contagio della Città di Messina dell'anno MDC-CXLIII* (Napoli, 1745); FRANCESCO TESTA, *Relazione istorica della peste che attaccossi a Messina nell'anno 1743* (Palermo, 1745); GIUSEPPE RESTIFO, *Peste al confine. L'epidemia di Messina del 1743* (Palermo, 1984).

⁸³ SALVATORE BOTTARI, "Relations between Sicily and Great Britain in 1750-1800: the interplay of culture and economy", in CARMEL VASSALLO, MICHELA D'ANGELO (eds.), *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean. Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries)* (Malta, 2007), 83-84.

⁸⁴ BOTTARI, "L'ingresso nella modernità", 159-162.

⁸⁵ GIOVANNA ANASTASI MOTTA, "La compagnia di commercio di Messina del 1753", *Annali della Facoltà di Economia e Commercio, Università di Messina*, X, No. 1 (1972), 20-36.

⁸⁶ GAETANO OLIVA, *Annali della città di Messina*, vol. V, (Messina, 1892), 34-35.

heavily debated in the press of the day. Three years later, on July 6, 1757, there was a rainstorm with strong winds⁸⁷. It lasted just a few hours, but it was so intense that the streams overflowed and flooded many ground-floor homes causing casualties and huge damage. The Senate was forced to allocate large funds to solve the most urgent problems.

As for maritime trade, despite Messina's downsizing, coastal navigation still survived, as did trade on board small vessels and especially feluccas⁸⁸. They soon became the means for Messina's merchants to project themselves at sea: feluccas (about 15 meters in length) were suitable for navigation along Sicily's and Calabria's coasts and for longer journeys along Mediterranean routes⁸⁹.

The major traffic was dominated by foreign fleets, but there was a return of the Genoese fleet⁹⁰. On May 20, 1770 Patrick Brydone wrote that the port of Messina had many boats and that three of them had set sail in the morning to guard the coast against raids by Barbary pirates who targeted the southern shore especially⁹¹. Two days later, in another letter, he described the road between Giardini and Messina noting that the Strait was "covered with chebecks, galleys, galliots and a quantity of fishing boats"⁹².

The demand for silk on international markets started to grow again including the demand for Sicilian silk and it was matched by a widespread rise in prices. Between September 1764 and August 1765, the export of raw and semi-finished silk amounted to 177,789 lbs from the port of Messina as opposed to the 116,231 lbs from the port of Palermo⁹³. According to the British consul in Messina, George Tatem, about 200 bales per year of raw silk and *organzine* were sent directly to Britain⁹⁴. It should be noted that, while silk exports witnessed a recovery in absolute terms, this greater foreign demand was covered mainly by Piedmont in terms of percentage⁹⁵.

⁸⁷ OLIVA, *Annali della città di Messina*, 42-43.

⁸⁸ GAETANO CINGARI, "Uomini e navi nell'area dello stretto di Messina nel Settecento", in ROSALBA RAGOSTA (ed.), *Le genti del mare Mediterraneo* (Napoli, 1981), 1003-1029; and also SERGE COLLET, *Uomini e pesce. La caccia al pescespada tra Scilla e Cariddi* (Catania, 1993), 114-115.

⁸⁹ GAETANO CINGARI, *Scilla nel Settecento: «feluche» e «venturieri» nel Mediterraneo* (Reggio Calabria, 1979), 19-29, 43-53.

⁹⁰ ORAZIO CANCELILA, *Impresa, redditi, mercato nella Sicilia moderna* (Roma-Bari, 1980), 282-283; ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, "Attività commerciali nei porti della Sicilia tra Settecento e Ottocento", in SIMONCINI (ed.), *Sopra i porti di mare*, 123-124.

⁹¹ PATRICK BRYDONE, *A tour through Sicily and Malta in a series of letters to William Beckford, Esq. Of Somerly in Suffolk* (London, 1773), 53-95.

⁹² BRYDONE, *A tour through Sicily and Malta*.

⁹³ TRASELLI, *Ricerche sulla seta siciliana*, 214.

⁹⁴ The National Archives (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO), 388/95, Letter from George Tatem to the Board of Trade, Messina 14 May 1765.

⁹⁵ MICHEL MORINEAU, "Il commercio settecentesco tra Francia e Italia", *Rivista Storica Italiana* XCV, No. 2 (1983), 350-388.

Other exports included: oils, manna, Lipari raisins, wines, Spanish fly powder (cantharides), and tartar. In 1770 the French Vice Consul D'Armeni wrote that about 79,000 lbs of Sicilian silk reached France from the port of Messina, while silk exports were also sent to Piedmont, Britain and Livorno⁹⁶. The unknown author of a memoir dated 1779 estimated that Sicilian silk production amounted to about 1,300 bales, 500 of which were produced in the territory of Messina⁹⁷. Since the weight of each bale, as stated by the author, amounts to approx. 300 lbs, total production stood at about 390,000 lbs. The 150,000 lbs produced in the Messina area accounted for slightly more than 38% of Sicily's silk production.

Tatem's account also inform us that trade registered a period of decline in Sicily and in particular in Messina because products exported from Calabria were now being shipped from the port of Naples predominantly⁹⁸. Moreover the plague of 1743 isolated Messina and led to, or at least increased, direct trade between smaller ports outside Messina and the ports of Genoa and Livorno; smuggling also continued to spread.

During the second half of the 18th century the port of Messina registered a rise in the exports of citrus fruit, citrus essences and wine produced both in the Milazzo area and in the territory between Mascali and Acireale⁹⁹. In the 1770s, when the Tuscan abbot Domenico Sestini came to Messina, he was impressed by the great number of British, Dutch, Danish and Russian ships that called at Messina to load citrus fruit and its by-products¹⁰⁰. Sestini estimated the value of these exports at around 30,000 *onze* per annum. Some of the lemons, were salted, pickled, barrelled and sent to Russia, where lemons were used to treat leather in the tanning industry; others were squeezed and their juice was sent in barrels to England, France and Holland, where it was used to make cosmetics and dyes¹⁰¹.

The detailed account written by Herman Katenkamp (8 February 1774) is very useful in providing a clear description of the shipping movements in the port of Messina in 1773¹⁰². Katenkamp informed the British Minis-

⁹⁶ LILIANA IARIA, *Per una storia economica di Messina nel '700. Un rapporto inedito del vice-console francese M. Lallement*, Nuova Rivista Storica LII (1968), 673.

⁹⁷ ASP, Miscellanea Archivistica, s. II, No. 447, *Lettera di ignoto*, Messina June 1779.

⁹⁸ TNA, PRO, CO, 388/95, Letter from George Tatem to the Board of Trade, Messina 14 May 1765.

⁹⁹ GAETANO CINGARI, "I traffici tra l'area calabro sicula e la costa orientale adriatica nel Settecento", *Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale*, LXXV, No. 2-3 (1979), 277-296; SALVATORE LUPO, *Il giardino degli aranci. Il mondo degli agrumi nella storia del Mezzogiorno* (Venezia, 1990), 21-22; ENRICO IACHELLO, *Il vino e il mare. Trafficanti siciliani nella contea di Mascali* (Catania, 1991), 107-130.

¹⁰⁰ DOMENICO SESTINI, *Lettere scritte dalla Sicilia e dalla Turchia a diversi suoi amici in Toscana*, (Firenze, 1779-1784), vol. IV, 175-178.

¹⁰¹ ORAZIO CANCELIA, *Storia dell'industria in Sicilia* (Roma-Bari, 1995), 15.

¹⁰² TNA, PRO, State Paper (SP) 93/29, Herman Katenkamp to William Hamilton,

ter Plenipotentiary at the Court of Naples, William Hamilton, that 609 vessels landed in Messina: 40 were British, 211 Neapolitan, 39 Sicilian, 172 French, 45 Spanish, 87 Genoese, 7 imperial, 2 Dutch, 2 Greek, 2 of the Pontifical Navy, 1 Maltese and 1 Danish¹⁰³. According to the records of British consul Katenkamp, Messina was the favourite commercial port of the French. There was a greater presence of Spanish and Genoese ships in Palermo, while the Swedish would land especially in the port of Trapani where they would load the salt needed for preserving fish. As for British merchant ships, in the light of their ports of origin and the commodities composing their loads, it is clear that British goods would reach Messina directly. The vessels would reach Trapani in ballast to load salt, which would then be shipped to Britain or Newfoundland in North America or even Russia and Sweden. British merchant ships doing trade by commission would land in Palermo. In Messina British ships would predominantly unload, wool products and lead and load mainly lemons as well as silk, manna, raisins, tartar, linen rags, sulphur and wine.

In 1781 the economist Carmelo Guerra proposed revitalizing the trade in silk products with the Levant¹⁰⁴. In addition, he proposed that an important role could be played by the relaunch of the free port.

On February 5 1783, Messina and most of Calabria were hit by a terrible earthquake¹⁰⁵. About 700 people out of more than 40,000 inhabitants died in Messina, while the ruins covered about half the city¹⁰⁶. Considering the intensity of the earthquake and the impact on the city's buildings and monuments, the number of victims was relatively low¹⁰⁷. However, in the following months diseases and poor hygienic conditions plagued the survivors. Moreover, many craftsmen, among whom silk weavers, were left without any work and forced to leave the city to find work elsewhere. According to estimates, the 1798 census would have counted an additional 6,000 inhabitants, had it not been for the diseases and emigration following the earthquake¹⁰⁸.

Messina 8 February 1774. On December 27th 1771, Katenkamp was appointed British consul in Sicily and the adjacent islands. See, *The annual register, or a view of the history, politics and literature for the year 1771* (London, 1772), 175.

¹⁰³ TNA, PRO, SP 93/29, Herman Katenkamp to William Hamilton, Messina 8 February 1774.

¹⁰⁴ CARMELO GUERRA, *Stato presente della città di Messina*, (Napoli, 1781), 54-68.

¹⁰⁵ AUGUSTO PLACANICA, *L'Iliade funesta. Storia del terremoto calabro-messinese del 1783* (Roma, 1982); PLACANICA, *Il filosofo e la catastrofe. Un terremoto del Settecento* (Torino, 1985).

¹⁰⁶ VINCENZA CALASCIBETTA, *Messina nel 1783*, ed. by GIOVANNI MOLONIA (Messina, 1995), 13-25.


¹⁰⁷ NICOLA ARICÒ, "Cartografia di un terremoto: Messina 1783", *Storia della città*, No. 45 (1988), 7-53.

¹⁰⁸ GIUSEPPE PARDI, "Storia demografica di Messina", *Nuova Rivista Storica*, V, No. 4 (1921), 450.

Table 4. Ships arrived to the three main Sicilian Ports in the year 1773

| Nationality | Messina | Trapani | Palermo | Total |
|-------------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| English | 40 | 38 | 57 | 135 |
| Neapolitan | 211 | 87 | 312 | 610 |
| Sicilian | 39 | 40 | 61 | 140 |
| French | 172 | 29 | 116 | 317 |
| Spanish | 45 | 4 | 47 | 96 |
| Genoese | 87 | 42 | 112 | 241 |
| Imperial | 7 | 2 | 8 | 17 |
| Dutch | 2 | 14 | 19 | 35 |
| Roman | 2 | - | - | 2 |
| Greek | 2 | - | - | 2 |
| Maltese | 1 | 1 | - | 2 |
| Danish | 1 | 12 | 12 | 25 |
| Swede | - | 32 | 8 | 40 |
| Total | 609 | 301 | 752 | 1662 |

Source: TNA, PRO, SP 93/29, Herman Katenkamp to William Hamilton, Messina 8 February 1774



The city's economy was on its knees again, but it was the earthquake of 1783 – the second major disaster to hit Messina in the 18th century after the plague 40 years earlier – that set in motion the change in trend. The Bourbon government revamped the free port by providing it with the infrastructure necessary to draw large ships¹⁰⁹. In the 19th century, despite the international scenario marked by the fast growth of transoceanic trade, which downsized the commercial role played by the Mediterranean, and the situation in Sicily where Catania's economic and political growth led to the rise of a new and fierce competitor right next door, Messina was able to recover a vocation of its own and redefine its identity¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁹ MICHELA D'ANGELO, MARCELLO SAJIA, "A City and two Earthquakes: Messina 1783-1908", in GENEVIÈVE MASSARD GUILBAUD, HAROLD L. PLATT e DIETER SCHOTT (eds.), *Cities and Catastrophes. Villes et catastrophes* (Frankfurt am Main [et alt.], 2002), 122-140; ERNESTO PONTIERI, *Il Marchese Caracciolo viceré di Sicilia ed il Ministro Acton. Lettere inedite sul governo di Sicilia (1782-1786)* (Napoli 1932), 100-192; GIARRIZZO, "La Sicilia dal Cinquecento all'Unità d'Italia", 565-568.

¹¹⁰ MICHELA D'ANGELO, "Un «lungo Ottocento»: 1783-1908", in MAZZA, *Messina*, 183-232. See also ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *L'ultimo splendore. Messina tra rilancio e decadenza* (Soveria Mannelli, 2003); LUIGI CHIARA, *Messina nell'Ottocento. Famiglie, patrimoni, attività* (Messina, 2002).

Michela D'Angelo

'The Emporium of Trade of the Two Seas':
The re-launching of the port of Messina, 1784-1815

1. *After the 1783 earthquake*

'The approach to Messina - Patrick Brydone wrote in 1770 - is the finest that can be imagined; it is not so grand as that of Naples, but it is much more beautiful and the quay greatly exceeds anything I have ever yet seen, even in Holland. It is built in the form of a crescent, and is surrounded by a range of magnificent buildings four stories high, and exactly uniform for the space of an Italian mile. The breadth of the street betwixt these and the sea is about an hundred feet, and forms one of the most delightful walks in the world. It enjoys the freest air, and commands the most beautiful prospect. It is only exposed to the morning sun, being shaded all the rest of the day by these sumptuous buildings. It is besides perpetually refreshed by the cooling breeze from the Straits; for the current of the water produces likewise a current in the air, that renders this one of the coolest habitations in Sicily'¹.

On 5 February 1783, just after noon, this scenario was hit by a violent earthquake that struck also a great part of Calabria, beyond the Straits. In Messina it caused the death of 700 out of its 40,000 inhabitants and destroyed most of its buildings. The most striking images of the disaster caused by the earthquake were the ruins of the 'Maritime Theatre' or *Palazzata*, i.e. the group of beautiful buildings erected at the beginning of the XVIIth century in order to compose a coherent vista of merchant houses and shops². Arriving at Messina in May 1787, just four years after the earthquake, Wolfgang Goethe observed that 'there is nothing more gloomy than the so-called *Palazzata*, a series of imposing, crescent shaped buildings enclosing and framing the anchorage along a fifteen minute

¹ PATRICK BRYDONE, *A tour through Sicily and Malta* (London, 1773), I, 46-47.

² VINCENZA CALASCIBETTA, *Messina nel 1783* (Palermo, 1937; reprint ed. by GIOVANNI MOLONIA, Messina, 1995); NICOLA ARICÒ, 'Cartografia di un terremoto: Messina 1783', in *Storia della città*, 45 (1988), 7-53.

walk. They were all four storey high, big buildings in stone; many of their façades were undamaged up to the cornice of the roof, whereas other façades collapsed up to the third, second, or first floor; therefore, that ancient and sumptuous line of buildings has now the aspect of an awful row of crashes and holes, the blue sky peeping through almost every window³.

The collapse of the 'Maritime Theatre', the symbol of wealth of Messina in its previous 'golden age', seemed to symbolise the sunset of the town and its maritime and merchant activities. Therefore its reconstruction became the metaphor of the dawn of the new city and its renewed link to the sea. The old *Palazzata* had been a virtual barrier between port and town. The new one now represented a point of union rather than of separation between the sea and the city, which became a 'free port' within its walls⁴. After 1783, indeed, Messina was rebuilt according to a new town plan and with the objective of re-launching its port and maritime trade. In spite of the horrendous losses, the earthquake marked a positive turning-point because it provided the town with the opportunity to launch an era of economic recovery, which would last for more than a century, i.e. until the 1908 earthquake⁵.

As regards to the port, the 1783 earthquake closed a 'black' XVIIIth century, which had begun soon after the 1674-78 insurrection against the Spanish rule, and launched the port-town redevelopment again as a free port⁶. In a few years, both the city and its economic structure were rebuilt. A plan for the restoration of Messina's port and commerce was soon launched, beginning an urban revival that produced its full effects during the succeeding 'long' XIXth century.

On 5 September 1784, in fact, Ferdinand IV of Bourbon granted the privilege of a free port to the 'noble and faithful city of Messina, which in ancient times had been the emporium of trade of the two seas.' The hopeful aim was to produce 'a successful renaissance, along that way which the circumstances of the times and the privileges of the situation, the soil and the climate leave open to this enterprise in the fields of marketing and trade'. The privileges of a free port were extended to the whole urban area: foreign goods could be imported, re-exported or sold for consumption in the city merely at the price of a light, one percent duty. The royal

³ AUGUSTO PLACANICA, *Goethe tra le rovine di Messina* (Palermo, 1987), 35.

⁴ The new *Palazzata* had more gates than before: thorough these openings (23 large and 14 small ones), the port came inside the city and it found an outlet to the sea.

⁵ MICHELA D'ANGELO, MARCELLO SAJJA, 'A City and Two Earthquakes: Messina 1783-1908', in *Cities and Catastrophes. Coping with Emergency in European History*, ed. by HAROLD PLATT, GENEVIEVE MASSARD GILBAUD and DIETER SCHOTT (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), 123-140.

⁶ LILIANA IARIA, *Il porto di Messina dagli Austriaci ai Borboni* (Acireale, 1983); LILIANA IARIA, 'Per una storia economica di Messina. un rapporto inedito del viceconsole francese M. Lallement', in *Nuova rivista storica* 1968, 661-676.



Filippo Villari, *Veduta di Messina*, 1732 (Università degli Studi di Messina, Rettorato)



Philipp Jakob Hackert, *Veduta del porto di Messina presa dal Palazzo del Senato*, 1791 (Casserta, Palazzo Reale)

edict invited foreign merchants to reside in Messina and granted to them some privileges such as freedom of religion, etc.⁷

Time by time, the free port began to attract more and more traffic flows, becoming once again a clearing house and distribution point for both foreign and Sicilian goods⁸. It attracted ships from the Mediterranean and Northern Europe, while some Swiss, German, English and French merchants established themselves here in order to re-established old trade connections⁹.

In the 1790s, as we can see also in the busy and crowded scene reproduced in the painting of Philipp Jakob Hackert (*Veduta del porto di Messina*, 1791), the free port of Messina seemed to have recovered its traditional role as a meeting-point for the Mediterranean trade.

According to the Neapolitan economist Giuseppe Maria Galanti, in the early 1790s arrived yearly about 1000 vessels, 900 of whom were in transit and 100 bound directly to Messina¹⁰. In the lack of quantitative sources, this rough calculation about maritime traffic is particularly precious. It suggests that the port of Messina resumed or continued, as before, to play its roles in the Mediterranean trade. As in the past, the port of Messina was a transit market as well as a clearing house: it acted, indeed, as an interchange market between the Kingdom of Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples; as a link of trade between 'the region of the Straits' (Eastern Sicily-Southern Calabria) and the inner and outer Mediterranean markets; as a bridge between the Levant and West Mediterranean-Northern Europe. In the waters of this natural 'funnel shaped' harbour local and international trade intertwined when the cabotage routes met the long-distance navigation: produce and staples carried here from the Ionian and Thyrrenian coasts, from Sicilian and Calabrian landing places, were exchanged with goods here landed from the near and the far ports of the Mediterranean and Northern Europe¹¹.

After 1784 the concession of the privilege of the free port surely enhanced these functions, but the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars altered substantially the role played by the free port of Messina in the Mediterranean trade between 1793 and 1815.

The lack of primary sources prevent from sketching a complete prospect about the maritime traffic in the free port of Messina between

⁷ *Editto reale per lo stabilimento ed ampliamento de' privilegi e del salvacondotto della Scala e Porto Franco della città di Messina* (Napoli, 1784).

⁸ MICHELA D'ANGELO, 'Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo: Messina 1795-1805', in *Atti Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti*, 1979 (LV), 201-247.

⁹ MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina tra XVIII e XIX secolo* (Messina, 1995), 51-57.

¹⁰ GIUSEPPE M. GALANTI, *Memorie storiche del mio tempo*, a cura di DOMENICO DEMARCO (Napoli, 1970), 64.

¹¹ D'ANGELO, 'Aspetti commerciali e finanziari', 202-203.

1784 and 1815, though it is possible to get information for some years by means of different and scattered records, particularly the data of the Health Office (*Deputazione di Salute*) transcribed by the Russian consul in his reports, as well as the local notarial deeds for the years 1801-06 and the registers of the Health Office for 1810-11, i.e. before and during Napoleon’s Continental Blockade¹².

2. Before the Continental Blockade: ships and goods (1801-06)

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were an important turning-point for the port traffic and trade links. Since 1793 the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily had taken a part in the first coalitions in alliance with Great Britain against revolutionary France. Since then and until 1815, Messina became a theatre of the military and commercial struggle between those two major powers.

The reports of the Russian consul de Becker, who transcribed data of the local Health Office, give precious information on the maritime trade on the eve of the Continental Blockade. The arrival of ships in the free port of Messina was increasing, at least in the five years between the French-Neapolitan peace (1801) and the second French occupation of the Kingdom of Naples and the Continental Blockade (1806). In 1801-04 in Messina arrived 4965 vessels (yearly average, 1241 vessels). Of these, only 1191 (24%) hoisted Sicilian (257) and Neapolitan (934) colours, while 3774 (76%) flew a foreign flag: this comparison lays stress on the revival and the relevance of the international trade in the port of Messina. As shown in Table 1, the most numerous foreign ships were 1023 Austrian vessels (21%), followed by 518 Ottoman and 96 Greek-Ottoman (12%), 363 Russian (7%), 341 English (7%), 298 Anglo-Maltese (6%), 164 Ligurian and 110 Genoese (5%), 199 Ragusan (4%), 196 Spanish (4%), 178 French (4%), 121 Danish (2%), 90 Ionian (2%), 36 American, 24 Swedish, etc.¹³.

A research carried on the deeds drawn up by notary Giuseppe Micale,

¹² The lack and scattering of records depend on the fact that ships arrived in the free port were not subject to a registration like in other port, and that some records connected with the maritime trade were destroyed in the 1908 earthquake and in the last World War. For the consular reports kept in the Archives of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs see MARIA LUISA CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento. Le relazioni commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli e la Russia 1777-1815* (Genève, 1979), 235. For the records of the Health Office for 1810-11 see Archivio di Stato di Palermo (ASP), Real Segreteria, Incarceramenti, 5389, *Movimento porto di Messina 1810-11*.

¹³ CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 235. The English Customs registered that English ships bound to ‘Italy, Venice & Sicily’ were 74 in 1800, 61 in 1801, 241 in 1802 (the year of the treaty of Amiens), 47 in 1803, 16 in 1804, 7 in 1805 and 9 in 1806. Messina was a port of call for many of them: in 1801 and in 1802, for example, there arrived respectively 31 of 61 and 156 of 241. National Archives (UK), CUST 17/22-30.

Table 1. Ships arrived in Messina in 1801-04, 1806* and 1810-11

| | 1801 | 1802 | 1803 | 1804 | Total [1801-04] | 1806* | Total 1801-06 | 1810-11 |
|---------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------|------------------|---------------|
| National ships (N) | | | | | | | | |
| Sicilian | - | 117 | 55 | 85 | [257] | 20 | 277 | 1657 |
| Neapolitan | 347 | 223 | 147 | 217 | [934] | 48 | 982 | - |
| <i>Total (N)</i> | 347 (37%) | 340 (21%) | 202 (16%) | 302 (26%) | [1191] [24%] | 68 (15%) | 1259 (23%) | 1657 (76%) |
| Foreign Ships (F) | | | | | | | | |
| American | 13 | 6 | - | 17 | [36] | 19 | 55 | 16 |
| Austrian | 174 | 233 | 289 | 327 | [1023] | 23 | 1046 | - |
| Danish | 30 | 29 | 34 | 28 | [121] | 20 | 141 | - |
| Dutch | - | 1 | - | - | [1] | - | 1 | - |
| English | 31 | 156 | 91 | 63 | [341] | 156 | 497 | 468 |
| French | 2 | 109 | 59 | 8 | [178] | - | 178 | - |
| Genoese | 48 | 39 | 23 | - | [110] | - | 110 | - |
| Ligurian | - | 164 | - | - | [164] | - | 164 | - |
| Gerosolimitan (Malta) | 15 | - | 4 | - | [19] | - | 19 | - |
| Maltese | 12 | 23 | 154 | 89 | [298] | 26 | 304 | - |
| Greek-Ottoman | 96 | - | - | - | [96] | - | 96 | 26 |
| Ottoman | 40 | 254 | 143 | 81 | [518] | 67 | 585 | - |
| Ragusan | 91 | 29 | 42 | 37 | [199] | 19 | 218 | - |
| Roman (Papal) | 1 | 4 | - | 5 | [10] | - | 10 | - |
| Russian | 29 | 104 | 128 | 102 | [363] | 38 | 401 | - |
| Sardinian | 2 | 1 | - | 4 | [7] | - | 7 | 14 |
| Septinsular (Ionian) | - | 26 | 46 | 18 | [90] | 10 | 100 | - |
| Spanish | 2 | 63 | 62 | 69 | [196] | - | 196 | 5 |
| Swedish | 4 | 1 | 2 | 17 | [24] | 9 | 33 | - |
| <i>Total (F)</i> | 590 (63%) | 1242 (79%) | 1077 (84%) | 865 (74%) | [3774] [76%] | 387 (85%) | 4161 (77%) | 529 (24%) |
| TOTAL (N+F = 100%) | 937 | 1582 | 1279 | 1167 | [4965] | 455 | 5420 | 2186 |

* January-April 1806. Source: CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 235-248 (for years 1801-06; data for 1805 are not available); ASP, R. Segreteria, 5389, *Movimento porto di Messina 1810-1811*.

one of the most active notaries in Messina, affords a view of goods and destinations between 1800 and 1805. These notarial deeds concerned freights, insurances and maritime loans for 565 ships sailing from Messina. To subscribe notarial deeds were mostly masters of ships with Sicilian or Neapolitan flags (449, i.e. 79%), while only 116 (21%) were those whose vessels flew foreign flags, i.e. 42 were Maltese under English colours, 26 Austrian, 10 Ragusean, 7 Russian, 7 Ionian, 6 Spanish, 6 Genoese, 6 Northern European (Danish, etc.), 2 English, 1 French, 1 Sardinian, 1 Roman, 1 Greek¹⁴.

The free port attracted and connected local and international trade. Little boats from Sicily and Calabria, indeed, carried in Messina local products as, for example, grain, oil, wine, raisins, lemons, oranges, cheese, al-

¹⁴ Archivio di Stato di Messina (ASM), Fondo Notarile (FN), notaio Giuseppe Micale, voll. 1481-1490; D'ANGELO, 'Aspetti commerciali e finanziari', 201-247.

monds, nuts, salted fishes, sumac, silk, hides, etc. These goods were transhipped in Messina mostly on board of foreign ships bound to Naples, Leghorn, Genoa, Marseilles, Barcelona, Valencia, Malta, Trieste, Izmir, Constantinople, Odessa, Taganrog, Cronstadt, etc.¹⁵. The notarial sources permit also to have some information about places of origin as well as places of destination of the goods sent from Messina¹⁶.

According to a French commercial directory (1802), from the free port of Messina were exported ‘silk, wine, lemons, oranges, olive oil, almonds, currants, manna, soda, sulphur, cream of tartar, corn dry vegetables as peas, beans, broad beans, lentils, etc.’ At the same time here were imported ‘sugar, coffee, cocoa, chocolate, every sort of wool and cotton cloths, silk goods, linens, jewels, watches, small fancy articles and haberdashery, nails, iron and all kind of iron goods’¹⁷. In 1804 John Jackson referred that Messina was ‘the best port in Sicily for an assorted cargo of merchandise; besides a large proportion of various produce of Sicily, there is generally a good variety of goods’, coming from Greece and the Ottoman empire: he added moreover that ‘the Greeks bring to Messina, currants, cotton, carpets, silks, drugs, figs, rosin, timber, gums, and a great variety of other merchandise, the produce of the Morea and the Levant’¹⁸.

¹⁵ From Messina these goods were also sent to the Sicilian harbours or landing-places (*marina, scaro*) of Acireale, Acitrezza, Agnone, Augusta, Avola, Brolo, Calabernardo-Noto, Catania, Cefalù, Falconara, Falcone, Gioiosa, Girgenti, Lentini, Licata, Lipari, Marina di Naso, Marina di Taormina, Marsamemi, Mascali, Mazzarelli, Milazzo, Oliveri, Palermo, Palma, Patti, Pozzallo, S. Agata, S. Stefano, Samperi, Scoglitti, Siracusa, Spadafora, Termini, Terranova, Torrenova, Trapani, Vendicari; and in Calabria towards Acciarello, Bagnara, Botricello, Capo Stilo, Cariati, Catanzaro, Corigliano, Crotone, Gerace, Gioia, Marina di Badolato, Marina di Bovalino, Nicotera, Pizzo, Roccella, Rossano, Rossano, S. Lucido, Tropea. ASM, FN, notaio Giuseppe Micale, voll. 1481-1490.

¹⁶ At Messina, according to the notarial deeds, ships and boats arrived from Malta, Marseilles, Barcelona, Cadiz; Adriatic ports (Gallipoli, Trani, Barletta, Manfredonia, Fortore, Vasto, Pescara, Abruzzo, Ancona, Goro, Venezia, Trieste, Dalmazia); Greece (Corfu, Gulf of Lepanto, Stalimen, Mitilene); the Levant (Costantinopoli, Odessa, Crimea); North Africa (Algiers, Tunis, Susa, Alexandria); from Sicily (Agnone, Augusta, Balate di Noto, Brolo, Catania, Cefalù, Girgenti, Lentini, Lipari, Marina di Taormina, Marsamemi, Mascali, Mazzarelli, Milazzo, Oliveri, Palermo, Patti, Pozzallo, Samperi, Scoglitti, Siculiana, Siracusa, Santo Stefano, Termini, Terranova, Torrenova, Trapani, Vendicari); from Calabria (Bagnara, Cannitello, Cariati, Cassano, Catanzaro, Crotone, Gerace, Marina di Badolato, Nicotera, S. Lucido, Reggio, Roccella, Rossano, Tropea, Villa San Giovanni). ASM, FN, notaio Giuseppe Micale, voll. 1481-1490.

¹⁷ DESOLNEUX, *La Clef du Commerce, ou Etat du Commerce et des Manufactures, par Desolneux, négociant* (Paris, 1802).

¹⁸ JOHN JACKSON, *Reflections on the commerce of the Mediterranean* (London, 1804), 149: ‘Messina is by far the best port in Sicily for trade; its situation is superior to any other port in the Mediterranean for general trade; it has also very good accommodation for shipping; the only fault it has is having too much water, there is from 20 to 25 fathom all over the harbour. Every master of a ship should be careful how he moors his ship, particularly in the winter; he should have two good anchors out in the stream, and two

Table 2. Goods exported from Messina in 1804

| | Malta | Levant | Russia | Austria | Naples | Tuscany | Genoa | France | Spain | G. Britain | Sweden | Denmark | TOTAL |
|----------------|-------|--------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------|--------|-------|------------|--------|---------|--------|
| Wine | 7430 | 1570 | 6800 | - | 20 | 2055 | - | - | 190 | 350 | 480 | 870 | 19765 |
| Oil | 8000 | - | 180 | 4700 | 12600 | 4060 | 18000 | 2170 | - | - | 1340 | 2000 | 53050 |
| Grain | 7000 | - | - | - | - | 1500 | - | - | 1570 | - | - | - | 24200 |
| Barley | 100 | - | - | - | 3400 | 2570 | - | - | 1000 | - | - | - | 7070 |
| Salt | - | - | - | 5700 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5700 |
| Salted foods | 380 | - | - | 427 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 807 |
| Carobs | 270 | - | - | 180 | 575 | 170 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1195 |
| Orange | - | 1200 | 4700 | 7500 | 1100 | 2120 | 2310 | 1500 | 2685 | 2100 | 1400 | 2720 | 29335 |
| Citrus juice | 11460 | 13200 | 18050 | 27067 | - | 1400 | 5000 | - | - | 17000 | 1800 | 15000 | 122577 |
| Dried figs | 580 | - | 180 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 110 | - | - | 870 |
| Manna | 35 | 117 | - | 240 | 120 | 116 | - | 117 | 256 | 175 | 140 | 160 | 1476 |
| Honey | 80 | - | - | 120 | 90 | 100 | - | - | - | 75 | - | - | 465 |
| Almonds | 230 | 380 | - | 345 | - | 110 | - | 213 | 175 | 380 | 450 | 150 | 2433 |
| Hazelnuts | 425 | - | 376 | 130 | - | 177 | - | - | - | 190 | 142 | 220 | 1660 |
| Raisins | 150 | - | - | 370 | 200 | 127 | - | - | 409 | 747 | 332 | 420 | 2755 |
| Aqua-vitae | 475 | 200 | - | 800 | 960 | 1660 | - | - | 190 | 376 | 100 | 300 | 5061 |
| Spirits | 140 | - | - | 650 | 1700 | 1420 | - | - | - | 270 | 140 | 97 | 4417 |
| Cotton padding | - | - | - | 216 | 160 | 97 | - | 230 | 110 | - | - | - | 813 |
| Hemp | 112 | - | - | 570 | - | 320 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1002 |
| Silk | 1510 | 2700 | 1160 | 3818 | 1500 | 2220 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 12908 |
| Rags | - | - | - | 400 | 580 | 100 | 208 | 110 | - | - | - | - | 1398 |
| Sumac | 488 | - | - | 225 | 630 | 550 | - | - | - | - | 100 | 160 | 2153 |
| Linseed | - | - | - | 1230 | 310 | 218 | - | 100 | - | - | - | - | 1858 |
| Soda ashes | 1900 | 800 | - | 1750 | 550 | 430 | - | 713 | 318 | 800 | - | 180 | 7441 |
| Tartar | 130 | - | - | 1110 | 557 | 300 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2097 |
| Woods | 1480 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1480 |
| Coal | 2400 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2400 |
| Sulphur | 710 | - | - | 1140 | 740 | 1600 | - | - | - | 1475 | 400 | 580 | 6645 |

Quantities are not specified in the reports of the Russian consul De Becker: CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 248.

In 1804, in particular, the reports of the Russian consul referred that the free port of Messina exported and imported a large range of produce. The most relevant quantity of Sicilian produce exported from the port of Messina in 1804 were lemon-juice (mostly towards Austria, Russia, Great Britain); oil (Genoa, Naples); soda ashes (Austria, Malta); sulphur (Tuscany, Great Britain); corn (Spain, Malta); wine (Malta, Russia); barley (Tus-

good strong hawsers, made fast to moorings on shore; we have known instances of ships being nearly lost here, on account of their being carelessly moored; there are frequently very strong gusts of wind from the hills behind the city, which are sometimes so violent, as to cause the ships to break their moorings on shore, and if they are not well moored in the stream, the ship may be lost before there is time to get another anchor and cable ready".

Table 3. Goods imported at Messina in 1804

| | Malta | Levant | Russia | Austria | Naples | Tuscany | Genoa | France | Spain | G. Britain | Sweden | Denmark | Romagna | TOTAL |
|-------------|-------|--------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------|--------|-------|------------|--------|---------|---------|--------|
| Corn | - | 80000 | 144000 | 26000 | 112000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 14160 | 376160 |
| Indian corn | - | 7112 | 5600 | 3420 | 9530 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1930 | 27592 |
| Barley | - | 3420 | 12700 | 7410 | 5670 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1750 | 32950 |
| Oats | - | 1700 | 1200 | - | 3200 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6100 |
| Legumes | - | 15633 | 8936 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 25569 |
| Oil | - | 1720 | - | 850 | 3800 | 2400 | 1800 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10570 |
| Raisins | - | 1975 | - | - | 7000 | - | - | 1320 | - | - | - | - | - | 10295 |
| Sugar | 750 | - | - | - | 220 | 140 | 90 | 150 | 780 | 400 | - | - | 300 | 2830 |
| Rice | - | 882 | 780 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1662 |
| Salt | 1800 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1800 |
| Wine | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 170 | 340 | - | - | - | - | 510 |
| Salted | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fishes | 1290 | - | - | - | 755 | 950 | - | - | 1400 | 1438 | 10250 | - | 39 | 16349 |
| Cocoa | 97 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 809 | - | - | - | - | - | 906 |
| Coffee | 70 | 140 | - | 1700 | 49 | 85 | 30 | 40 | 78 | - | - | - | - | 2192 |
| Pepper | - | - | - | 880 | - | 68 | - | - | 170 | - | - | - | 70 | 1188 |
| Cheese | - | 87 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 87 |
| Caviar | 740 | 52 | 33 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 825 |
| Linen | - | 540 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 540 |
| Wool | 118 | 128 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 246 |
| Silk | - | 120 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 120 |
| Cotton | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| padding | 50 | 86 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 136 |
| Cloths | - | 1418 | - | 750 | 213 | 130 | - | 3015 | - | 11217 | - | - | - | 16743 |
| Indigo | 120 | - | - | - | - | 185 | - | 379 | 400 | - | - | - | 197 | 1272 |
| Galls | - | 1400 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1400 |
| Logwood | - | - | - | - | 700 | 309 | - | - | 1000 | - | - | - | - | 2009 |
| Cochineal | 180 | - | - | 1180 | - | 1180 | - | - | 1781 | - | - | - | - | 4321 |
| Valonia | - | 3720 | - | 400 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4120 |
| Leather | 4710 | 1413 | - | - | 318 | 580 | 1780 | 2240 | 1300 | - | - | - | 140 | 12481 |
| Spanish | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| leather | 5700 | - | - | - | - | 1500 | 4016 | 1300 | 5780 | - | - | - | 1800 | 20096 |
| Soles | 450 | - | - | - | - | 500 | - | 760 | 800 | - | - | - | 210 | 2720 |
| Tobacco | - | 700 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 700 |
| Alum | - | - | - | 75 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 56 | 131 |
| Wax | - | 10 | - | 1800 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1810 |
| Lead | - | - | - | 3700 | - | 180 | - | 180 | 1410 | 3104 | - | - | 130 | 8704 |
| Plates | - | 170 | - | 1150 | 1170 | 1206 | 140 | 1140 | 2400 | 1570 | - | - | - | 8940 |
| Iron | - | - | 1850 | 117813 | 37 | - | - | - | 830 | 600 | - | 1800 | - | 122930 |
| Steel | - | - | - | 11450 | 1180 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 12630 |
| Sulphur | 180 | - | - | - | 120 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 300 |
| Paper | - | - | - | 1720 | 978 | 675 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1200 | 4573 |
| Vetriol | - | - | - | - | 313 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1340 | 1653 |
| Pecola | - | 3400 | - | 170 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 120 | - | 3690 |
| Tar | - | 2970 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2970 |

Quantities are not specified in the reports of the Russian consul De Becker: CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 246-247.

cany, Naples); oranges (Austria, Russia); silk (Austria, the Levant, Tuscany), etc.¹⁹. Apart the large quantity of corn, indian corn, oats, oil and raisins imported from Naples, the most important goods were corn and barley (from Russia); iron, steel, coffee, pepper, wax, paper (from Austria); linen and cotton goods, muslins, lead (from Great Britain); salt and dried fishes (from Denmark); cocoa (from France); dry vegetables, 'cordovan' leather, galls, vallonina, tobacco (from the Levant); leather and Spanish leather, salt (from Malta); logwood, sugar, wine (from Spain); oil (from Tuscany), etc.²⁰ (see Tables 2 and 3).

In 1804 the export markets from Messina were Malta, Austria, Tuscany, Naples, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweeden, Spain, France, the Levant, Russia, Genoa. In the first 4 months of 1806 to these markets also added North Africa, Dalmatia, Portugal, America and Germany²¹. The same prospect can be sketched for imports: to the same markets of 1804 also added Dalmatia, Portugal, America and Cisalpin Republic²².

Therefore, just before the Continental Blockade, the free port of Messina seemed to have recovered somewhat its traditional role of meeting-point for the Mediterranean trade²³. But the situation had to change deeply in the years 1806-1815, i.e. in the decade of the most intensive Anglo-Sicilian political and economic relationships. Since 1806, indeed, the war in the Mediterranean and Napoleon's Continental Blockade altered international trade also in the free port of Messina.

3. In the 'British Decade' 1806-1815: ships, goods and merchants

In 1806, when the French occupied the Kingdom of Naples for the second time, as in 1799, the Bourbons were obliged once again to take a shelter in Sicily under the English protection²⁴. This was the beginning of the so called 'British Decade' which lasted until the end of the Napoleonic Wars. In 1806-15, indeed, as consequence of the Anglo-Sicilian alliance, the ships of the Royal Navy and the soldiers of the British Army sought to protect Sicily from a possible invasion by Napoleon and to help the Bourbons re-conquer the Kingdom of Naples. For Sicily, the 'British Decade' was a period of important political, economic and social change: in 1812, for example, the new Sicilian Constitution, which was supported by the English, put an end to the feudal system in the island²⁵.

¹⁹ CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 246.

²⁰ CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 247.

²¹ CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 253.

²² CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 252.

²³ D'ANGELO, 'Aspetti commerciali e finanziari', 232 ss.

²⁴ HENRY BUNBURY, *Narratives of some passages in the Great War with France (1799-1810)*, (London 1852, 1927).

²⁵ JOHN ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the British Occupation of Sicily 1811-14*,

Since 1806, moreover, also many merchants from Great Britain or from the Mediterranean ports occupied by the French began to move directly to Sicily: before the Continental Blockade only about 6 British merchants were residing in Sicily²⁶, but they became more than 60 in 1806-15. More than 40 British merchants and commercial houses set up in business in Messina,²⁷ at least 20 in Palermo,²⁸ and half a dozen in the wine-growing districts of Marsala and Mazara²⁹. These numbers also reflect the role suddenly acquired by Sicily for English merchants: when the Continental Blockade cut off British trade with European markets and other Mediterranean ports, English merchants found a shelter in Sicily as well as in Malta. The former proved to be an asset, while the latter, which was under the British flag since 1800, became a clearing-house to distribute English goods in the Mediterranean and to collect products to be sent back to Great Britain³⁰. Sicily offered a large consumption market (2,000,000 in-

(Cambridge, 1956); JOHN ROSSELLI, *Lord Bentinck e l'occupazione britannica in Sicilia 1811-1814*, ed. by MICHELA D'ANGELO (Palermo, 2002); DILETTA D'ANDREA, *Nel «decennio inglese». La Sicilia nella politica britannica dai «Talenti» a Bentinck* (Soveria Mannelli, 2008).

²⁶ Before 1806 John Broadbent and John Thomas Roche were residing in Messina; Abraham Gibbs, William James Turner and the consul James Tough in Palermo; John Woodhouse in Marsala; James Hopps and Joseph Payne in Mazara. ROSARIO LENTINI, 'Note su un operatore commerciale in Sicilia: Abraham Gibbs (1799-1802)', in *Nuovi Quaderni del Meridione*, 56 (1976), 387-394; MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia 1806-1815. Rapporti commerciali tra Sicilia e Gran Bretagna nel periodo del Blocco Continentale* (Milano, 1988), 61-64.

²⁷ D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia*, 61-64. These mercantile houses were: Ashe Ramsay & C.; J. Bayly; Baron Beverley; Joseph Bidwell; Bernard Bischoff; Nicholas Bownas & Brothers; John Broadbent; James Carlill; John Coop; T. Cowper; Cummins Pater & C.; Thomas Dawson; Maximilian Fischer & C.; Simon Fraser; John Gray; Holland Ashe & C.; Holland Holmes & C.; George Irving; Joseph Isaacs; John James; A. McKenzie; Henry Mandsley; Mendham & Cailler; James Morris; Thomas Mort & C.; Richard Nascio; L. Newton; Richard Nuttall; John Oastler; George Peirce; Thomas Robson; Rogers Smith & Jameson; Ross Brothers; Leonard Sampson; Sheppard Ramsbotham & Jennings; John Smith & C.; Joseph Smithson & C.; John Sparrow; Joseph Sutcliff; John Thurburn; Thomas Warington.

²⁸ ROSARIO LENTINI, "La presenza degli inglesi nell'economia siciliana", in *La storia dei Whitaker*, ed. by R. TREVELYAN (Palermo, 1988), 115-146; D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia*, 65-66. The merchants were James Adamson; John Badge; William Baldwin; William Wilton Barker; Baron Beverley; Robert Cassels; Crokot & Wood; Abraham Gibbs; Hardmann & C.; Benjamin Ingham & C.; Thomas Mort & C.; George Oates; Paterson & Brown; Samuel Prior; Rogers Brothers; Edmund Taunton; E. B. Thomas; Turner & Prior; Richard Walker; John Wainhouse.

²⁹ In Marsala there were John Woodhouse, Benjamin Ingham, George Wood, John Barlow, Matthias Clark, Thomas Corlett; in Mazara Joseph Payne and James Hopps. See ROSARIO LENTINI, 'L'organizzazione commerciale e finanziaria di Benjamin Ingham (1809-1830)', in *Benjamin Ingham nella Sicilia dell'Ottocento* (Marsala, 1987), 95-119.

³⁰ MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi a Malta 1800-1825* (Milano, 1990); MICHELA D'ANGELO, 'British Trade and Merchants in the Mid-Mediterranean: an Alternative Market during the Napoleonic Wars', in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean: Commerce, Politics and*

habitants) for the English goods and provided British market with a wide range of agricultural products and raw materials, including oil, wine, sulphur, manna, raisins, sumac, silk, citrus and lemon juices³¹.

The warfare caused more significant changes in international routes and more close trade links between Sicily and Great Britain until the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Notwithstanding the alterations imposed by the Continental Blockade, the port of Messina overcame the difficulties of the international economic situation and gained significant enhancement during the 'British Decade': the arrivals of sailing boats and ships appear almost doubled between 1790 and 1810. In the 'British Decade' the free port of Messina strengthened its role also when traditional trade routes were altered. British Merchants and goods, as well as ships sailing from and to Great Britain, won very soon the supremacy in the free port of Messina. According to the above quoted consular reports, in 1801-1804 British ships were only 7% of all vessels arrived in Messina (341 on 4965), while in the first four months of 1806, just before the Continental Blockade was introduced, they were already 156 on 455, i.e. 34% (or 40% if we add the 26 Maltese with English colours) on the total amount³².

In the first three months of 1806, according to the data referred by the Russian consul, the port of Messina symbolised the changing situation in the Mediterranean routes and also the leading role of the English in the Sicilian trade: following the 182 English and Maltese ships, in fact, the most numerous were 67 Ottoman (15%), 48 Neapolitan (11%), 38 Russian (8%), 23 Austrian (5%), 20 Sicilian (4%), 20 Danish (4%), 19 Ragusan (4%), 19 American (4%) and 9 Swedish (2%)³³.

These numbers lay stress on the important role of the free port of Messina for the English trade in the Mediterranean since 1806: its importance was much more evident during the 'British Decade'. For one year, i.e. between 1810 and 1811, the records of the Health Office highlight the number and flags of the vessels arrived in Messina. The '*Note degli arrivi*', daily compiled by the Health Office between 1 July 1810 and 14 July 1811, can give a general outlook of the total arrivals in an intensive year of struggle in the Straits of Messina (it was in September 1810 that the French troops tried to land near Messina to occupy Sicily)³⁴.

Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries), ed. by CARMEL VASSALLO and MICHELA D'ANGELO (Malta, 2007), 97-114.

³¹ D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia*.

³² Under English colours sailed not only the boats (*speronare*) from Malta, which since 1800 was a possession of Great Britain, but also some Sicilian, Calabrian and Neapolitan captains which registered their boats at Malta or had on board a Maltese captain in order to obtain English documents (*passavanti*) and to avoid therefore risks of the maritime war for their ship and cargo.

³³ CAVALCANTI, *Alle origini del Risorgimento*, 251. In all the year 1806 in Malta arrived 150 English ships: National Archives (UK), CO 158/20.

³⁴ ASP, Real Segreteria, 5389.

According to this source, arrivals doubled in comparison with the preceding years, i.e. 2186 ships in 1810-1811 against an average of 1241 in 1801-1804 and of about 1000 in the 1790s³⁵. But now, on a total 2186 vessels, over 76% were Sicilian coasting vessels and only 24% hoisted foreign flags, while in 1801-06 the proportion was exactly opposite (see table 1). The Napoleonic Wars restricted, indeed, the free navigation also in the port of Messina. In 1810-11 it was frequented by 1657 Sicilian (mostly *paranze*, *speronare*, *feluche* within 50 tonnage) and 529 foreign ships (*pinchi*, *sciabecchi*, *brigantini*, *polacche*, *navi* beyond 100 t.). The 468 English colours represented the 88% of the foreign vessels, while the 26 Greek-Ottoman, 16 American, 14 Sardinian and 5 Spanish covered the remaining 12%³⁶ (Table 4).

Table 4. Ships arrived at Messina in 1810-11

| Ports | Sicilian | English | American | Greek-Ottoman | Sardinian | Spanish | TOTAL |
|----------------------------|----------|---------|----------|---------------|-----------|---------|-------|
| Sicily | 1647 | 287 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 1946 |
| Malta | 5 | 155 | 11 | - | - | - | 171 |
| Gibraltar | - | 3 | - | - | - | - | 3 |
| Lisbon | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 |
| Liverpool | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Newfoundland & Yarmouth | - | 5 | - | - | - | - | 5 |
| Cagliari | 3 | - | - | - | 5 | - | 8 |
| Carloforte | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Maddalena | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| Oristano | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| Civitavecchia | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 |
| Naples | - | - | 1 | 3 | - | - | 4 |
| Ancona | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 |
| Durazzo | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Zante | - | 5 | - | 2 | - | - | 7 |
| Patras | - | 3 | - | - | - | - | 3 |
| Corone | - | 3 | - | - | - | - | 3 |
| Navarino | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Ydra | - | - | - | 7 | - | - | 7 |
| Spezzia | - | 1 | - | 3 | - | - | 4 |
| Messolonghi | - | - | - | 3 | - | - | 3 |
| Cocos | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Preveza | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 |
| Morea | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Tunis | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | 2 |
| Alexandria | - | - | - | 2 | - | - | 2 |
| Damietta | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Total | 1657 | 468 | 16 | 26 | 14 | 5 | 2186 |

Source: ASP, Real Segreteria, 5389.

³⁵ ASP, Real Segreteria, 5389. No ship arrived in 18 days (28 October, 15 November, 18-19 December 1810; 4, 18, 23-25 January, 6, 14, 19, 22, 24 February, 9, 17, 29 March, 15 April 1811). Data are missing for 26 days (16 July, 1-19 August, 1-2, 16 December 1810, 1-2 January, 14 April 1811).

³⁶ ASP, Real Segreteria, 5389. In the years 1810 and 1811 in Malta arrived, respectively 296 and 300, English ships: National Archives (UK), CO 158/20.

Before the Continental Blockade, 19 foreign flags entered the port of Messina, while in 1810-11 they were reduced to only 6. English ships from foreign ports came mostly from Malta (155), but also from Greece (15), Newfoundland (5), Gibraltar (3), Liverpool (1) and Tunis (1). American vessels arrived from Malta (11) and Naples (1); Greek-Ottoman came from Greece (16), Naples (3), Alexandria (2), Ancona (1), Civitavecchia (1), Lisbon (1), Tunis (1); Sardinian came from Sardinia (7). Foreign ships were engaged also in the coasting trade: 287 English ships, i.e. mostly Maltese boats with English flag, but also 7 Sardinian and 5 Spanish ships carried goods in Sicily for Messina. All Sicilian boats came from ports of

Table 5. Goods arrived from foreign ports 1810-1811

| PORTS | GOODS |
|-------------------------|---|
| Malta | alum, beer, calicoes, camel's hair, champagne, cinnamon, cloths, cocoa, codfish, coffee, copper, corn, cotton and cotton goods, English manufactures, hams, hay, hemp, indigo, iron, glass, lead, leather, linen, linseed, liquorice paste, nails, olive oil, opium, overcoats, paper, plates, pepper, pitch, potatoes, pottery, raisins, rice, rosolio, rum, soap, soda, soles, spices, steel, straw, sugar, sulphur, tar, tea, tobacco, vitriol, wax, wine, wool, woods |
| Gibraltar | bier, cider, leather, sugar, tobacco, wine |
| Lisbon | leather |
| Liverpool | English manufactures |
| Newfoundland & Yarmouth | codfish, herrings |
| Sardinia | oxes |
| Cagliari | bacon, cheese, cloths, hides, honey, lard, soles, silk cloth |
| Carloforte | salted tunafish |
| I. of Maddalena | bacon, cheese, soles |
| Oristano | cheese |
| Naples | aqua-vitae, capers, hams, perfums, potatoes, silk, tartar, tobacco, woods |
| Tunis | caps, paper, silk, soles, leather |
| Alexandria | corn, |
| Damiata | broad beans, rice |
| Zant | aqua-vitae, copper, corn, gum, hides, oil, raisins, rice, silk, soap, spirits, tar, turpentine, verdigris, wax, wine, woods |
| Patras | cheese, cotton, hides, oil, vallonina, wool |
| Cephalonia | sundry goods |
| Corfu | oil |
| Corone | dried figs, silk goods, silk rags, soap, sponges |
| Navarino | cheese, coal, dried figs, oxes, soap, woods |
| Ydra | corn, oil, soap |
| Spezzia | barley, corn, hides, resin, tar, wine |
| Missolongi | gum, raisins, soap, woods, wool |
| Cocos | 'alinari', cordovan, hides, resin, wax, zafranon, |
| Preveza | oil, woods |
| River, Orpheus, Morea | cheese, tar, woods |
| Durazzo | salt |
| Ancona | nails, silk socks, woods |

the island, except 10 coming from other Mediterranean ports (5 from Malta, 4 from Sardinia, 1 from Albania).

The Health Office's records permit to know the routes of arrivals to Messina. The Mediterranean ports in English possession or out of French rule were the main foreign import places, especially Malta, Gibraltar, Sardinia, but also Greece and North Africa (Table 5).

A large variety of goods arrived at Messina from Sicilian ports and places of production. Wine, for example, arrived from the wine-district of Mascali; salt from the saltpans of Trapani; sulphur from Girgenti and Licata; malmsey and raisins from Lipari; almonds from Noto and Avola; etc. (Table 6).

Table 6. Goods arrived in Messina from Sicily 1810-11

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Aci Castello / Aci Trezza | broad beans, dregs ashes, hay, pasta, woods |
| Acireale | almonds, aqua-vitae, barley, hemp, lupins, melons, ropes, woods |
| Acquedolci | cheese, coal, cork, oranges |
| Acquicella, scaro di | melons, straw, woods |
| Augusta | anchovies, cheese, corn, hay, hemp, herrings, potatoes, pottery, rags, salt, straw, woods |
| Avola | almonds, barley, cheese, honey, hemp, linseed, rags, woods |
| Bauso | stones |
| Brolo | acorns, chestnuts, coal, cork, hazelnuts, nuts, oranges, reeds, woods |
| Calabernardo di Noto | corn |
| Caltabiano, marina di | mellons, reeds, straw |
| Capo d'Orlando | beans, chestnuts, corals, cork, figs, hazelnuts, straw, woods |
| Capo dei Molini | cheese, rice, straw |
| Caronia | anchovies, coal, cork, oranges, woods |
| Castellammare del Golfo | anchovies, manna, ropes, sardines, tunafish |
| Catania | barley, black stones, bricks, broad beans, cantharides, carobs, cheese, chestnuts, cloths, corn, eels, English manufactures, fishes, flour, hay, hemp, honey, iron, liquorice paste, melons, pasta, rice, rush, safranon, soda ashes, straw, stones, sumac, tobacco, wine, woods |
| Cefalù | anchovies, broad beans, cheese, corn, hides, manna, oil, rags, rice, salted pork meat, salted tunafish |
| Cottone, scaro di | coal, chestnut woods, melons, onions, pumpkins, pinewoods, straw, wine, woods |
| Falcone | coal, woods |
| Fico, scaro del | hay, straw |
| Finale | woods |
| Fiumefreddo, scaro di | coal, corn, melons, pumpkins, wine, woods |
| Fondaco Nuovo | corn |
| Fontane Bianche | corn |
| Forte, scaro del | coal, hay, reeds, straw, woods |
| Furnari | coal, hay |
| Giardini | woods |
| Gioiosa | anchovies, straw |
| Girgenti | barley, broad beans, cheese, chick-peas, corn, rags, soda, sulphur |
| Golfo di Bonagia | tunafish |
| Lentini / Agnone | barley, broad beans, cheese, hemp, rice, straw |
| Letojanni / Gallodoro | woods |
| Licata | barley, broad beans, cheese, chick-peas, corn, lamb hides, lentils, pistachios, soda ashes, sulphur |
| Lipari | capers, codfish, herbs, malmsey, pumex, raisins, soda, tobacco, vinegar, wine |

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Marsala | broad beans, salt |
| Marsamemi | cheese, rush |
| Mascali | almonds, aqua-vitae, beans, coal, hazelnuts, lupins, melons, pumpkins, rags, reeds, tartar, vinegar, wine, woods |
| Mazara | broad beans, cheese, linen, linseed oil |
| Mazzarelli | barley, corn, hemp |
| Milazzo | beer, brushes, cheese, dried figs, hazelnuts, lemon juice, liquorice, oranges peel, onions, pottery, reeds, slaked lime, salted tunafish, straw, tiles, wine, woods |
| Militello | coal |
| Naso, marina di | woods |
| Noto | almonds, ashes, carobs, cheese, corn, honey, rush, steel |
| Oliveri | coal, hay, straw, wine, woods |
| Palermo | almonds, anchovies, aqua-vitae, artchokes, bacon, beer, books, brushes, carriages, cheese, cloths, coal, cocoa, codfish, coffee, cork, English goods, flour, fruits, furnitures, galls, glass, hare hides, hats, hay, indigo, iron, lamb hides, lard, lead, leather, linseed oil, log-wood, manna, marble, melons, oil, oranges, pasta, pepper, plates, rum, salt, salted meat, salted tunafish, ship-biscuit, silk, small fanc-articles, soles, sugar, sumac, straw, tar, tea, tomatoes, velvets |
| Palma | almonds, rags |
| Patti | anchovies, beans, cheese, cork, earthenware pots, garlics, hay, hazelnuts, liquorice, onions, pumpkins, straw, salted tuna, woods |
| Piraino, marina di | hazelnuts, woods |
| Pizzillo, scaro | melons, wine |
| Pozzallo | barley, carobs, corn |
| Reitano / Margi | anchovies, cheese, onions, oranges, liquorice paste |
| Sant'Agata | coal, hams, oranges, woods |
| Santa Croce | carobs, rush |
| San Fratello | oranges |
| San Marco | grapes, hazelnuts |
| San Pieri di Scicli | cheese, hemp, honey |
| Santo Stefano | cheese, cork, hemp, manna, oranges, pottery, rags |
| Salina | woods |
| Savoca | wine |
| Sciacca | barley, corn |
| Scicli | cheese, corn, honey |
| Scoglitti | barley, corn, wine |
| Siculiana | corn, soda ashes |
| Siracusa | cheese, coal, corn, dregs ashes, figs, hay, hemp, honey, lamb hides, melons, oil, raisins, ropes, rush, salted tunafish, soda ashes, straw, stones, wool |
| Spadafora | hay, straw, woods |
| Taormina | almonds, bricks, coal, cloths, hazelnuts, melons, pumpkins, reeds, straw, tiles, wine, woods |
| Termini | anchovies, artchokes, cork, galls, grapes, hides, leather, medlars, olive oil, oranges, pasta, reeds, sumac |
| Terranova | barley, broad beans, cork, corn, flour, iron, soda, tobacco |
| Torremuzza | broad beans |
| Torrenova | coal, dried figs, hazelnuts, oranges |
| Trabia | glue |
| Trapani | corals, corn, salt, salted tunafish, soda ashes, stones, sumac |
| Tusa | cheese, coal, cork, corn, oranges |
| Vendicari | barley, carobs, cheese, corn, rush |
| Vittoria | cheese |

Source: ASP, Real Segreteria, 5389.

A great part of goods coming to Messina from other Sicilian ports were often transhipped on board of English ships bound, directly or through Malta, to Great Britain. A 'triangular' market, indeed, linked Sicily, Malta and Great Britain. In this trade the free port of Messina played a preminent role thanks to its commercial and financial connections³⁷.

Notwithstanding the difficult situation of the international economic situation, Messina enjoyed an intense movement of ships and goods. The number of boats arrived at the port doubled in the 20 years between 1790 and 1810. These partial, but significant figures confirm that the 1783 earthquake launched the redevelopment of Messina as a free port. Overcoming the difficulties of the Napoleonic wars, its gains were significantly enhanced during the 'British Decade' and later consolidated during the remainder of the century. The growth of the port's trade was emblematic throughout the XIXth century. In conclusion, since 1784 a positive turning point for Messina began, and in the years 1806-15 it enhanced its maritime trade. This positive recovery would last for more than a century, at least until the 1908 earthquake. After the 'black' XVIIIth century (1678-1783), the port of Messina recovered and later consolidated its role in its 'long' XIXth century (1784-1908)³⁸.

³⁷ D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia*, 228-229; D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi a Malta*, 227-228.

³⁸ ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *L'«ultimo splendore». Messina tra rilancio e decadenza 1815-1920* (Soveria Mannelli, 2003); MICHELA D'ANGELO, 'Un "lungo Ottocento": 1783-1908', in *Messina. Storia, cultura, economia*, ed. by FULVIO MAZZA (Soveria Mannelli, 2007), 183-232.

Rosario Battaglia

Il porto e la città di Messina tra rilancio e decadenza (1815-1920)

Esaminare il movimento marittimo del porto di Messina dalla Restaurazione (1815) all'abolizione del porto franco (1880) e al terremoto del 1908 significa porre al centro dell'indagine le strettissime relazioni tra le oggettive condizioni di un emporio per quell'epoca importante e i processi economici in un'età di progressivo sviluppo dei traffici marittimi e commerciali. La struttura economica di Messina è stata storicamente dominata, per una parte rilevante, dal suo porto e dalla spinta commerciale ad esso connessa. Porto e commercio rappresentavano un'attività in cui meglio si esplicavano le attitudini imprenditoriali locali, per la più alta e più sicura remunerazione dei capitali investiti.

Il porto, polmone fondamentale della città e di buona parte della provincia messinese e della vicina Calabria, a metà '800 e ancora per molti decenni dopo l'Unità fungeva da regolatore dei rapporti economici e sociali, in linea, per questa parte, con il ruolo svolto nel passato come nodo commerciale tra l'Occidente e l'Oriente. Questa specifica attitudine o vocazione poggiava su fattori ben solidi che avevano sfidato peste, guerre, terremoti, pur dopo l'inizio della fase di lenta decadenza. Pertanto, ripercorrere la vicenda di questo emporio marittimo tra la cesura della Restaurazione e quella, tutta messinese, del terremoto del 1908, porta l'indagine inevitabilmente a snodarsi dal medio al lungo periodo in modo da poter cogliere e chiarire con maggior evidenza tanto i fenomeni di trasformazione intercorsi nelle varie epoche, quanto i momenti di rilancio e di crisi, che la città viveva tra XIX e XX secolo, individuandone i fattori salienti e le ragioni del lento e progressivo decadere.

Tra '800 e '900 Messina passava da una fase di rilancio ad una di decadenza, mentre in questo lungo periodo è possibile chiarire il ruolo e la funzione del ceto urbano e della sua borghesia mercantile locale e straniera presente e operante nella città e, nello stesso tempo, definire in particolare il "peso" e la portata di taluni settori economici e la stretta connessione di questi con la funzione del porto messinese dal 1815 in poi e il loro

contribuito all'azione di crescita e di ripresa, mentre la definitiva decadenza era per lo più dettata da fattori esterni.

Alla fine del '700 il porto messinese non solo concentrava i traffici di gran parte della Sicilia e della vicina Calabria, ma possedeva ancora un apparato industriale di prima trasformazione della seta. Perciò attirava i bastimenti del Levante i quali, approfittando del porto franco, vi portavano le loro merci e ne ripartivano carichi di prodotti dell'isola e di derrate straniere. In particolare, i documenti del periodo "inglese" 1806-1815 riferiscono di un commercio marittimo fiorente durante il Blocco continentale soprattutto, se non quasi esclusivamente, con la Gran Bretagna, che in quel decennio proteggeva la Sicilia borbonica contro Napoleone. È un periodo di alti prezzi e di buoni affari. Ma le stesse fonti cambiano nettamente segno dopo il 1815: riferiscono appunto del diminuito afflusso di navi straniere a Messina e di una sensibile caduta del commercio all'ingrosso e al dettaglio. L'apertura di tutti i porti dell'Isola all'esportazione straniera e la riduzione del porto franco di Messina ai soli suoi magazzini erano reputate da quegli osservatori tra le cause principali della recessione. Intorno al 1850 il giudizio complessivo era diverso e meno drammatico. Messina forniva ancora, per la gradualità delle sue dogane e per la grandezza e sicurezza del suo porto, essenziali vantaggi al commercio e alla navigazione. Nel 1852 era stato peraltro rafforzato dal governo borbonico il porto franco ed erano in crescita gli scambi con l'Inghilterra, la Francia, con il Nord Europa, con il Mar Nero, con gli Stati Uniti d'America. In realtà, tra gli anni Venti e Quaranta, Messina aveva stentato a ritrovare un nuovo spazio commerciale che la compensasse del danno subito per il mutato equilibrio istituzionale e per i nuovi vincoli doganali dettati da Napoli. Già nel periodo napoleonico, mentre il porto di Messina era protetto dagli inglesi, il commercio della Calabria, occupata dai francesi, si era diretto verso il porto di Napoli. Dopo il 1815, con la nascita del Regno delle Due Sicilie, il riassorbimento, pur favorito dalla nuova congiuntura politica, non si era mostrato agevole, mentre i nuovi flussi commerciali, certamente in aumento dopo il 1830 per l'intensificato interscambio internazionale, toccavano solo parzialmente il porto di Messina.

Nel 1852 l'ampliamento del porto franco, ricordato al momento politico e alla nuova dinamica dell'interscambio europeo, oltre che al concreto aumento di talune produzioni isolate specializzate, segnava dunque una netta inversione di tendenza, provocando un forte rilancio del movimento commerciale e portuale messinese. Tutte le fonti concordano, infatti, su tale forte ripresa delle relazioni commerciali e degli scambi con i paesi dell'Europa e con l'America. Difficili, comunque, erano gli anni attorno al 1848 per Messina e il suo porto. Mentre da un lato non si spiegavano ancora i benefici delle modifiche tariffarie conseguenti all'attenuazione della linea protezionista adottata nel 1845, dall'altro pesavano gli effetti ne-

gativi di queste scelte sull'apparato industriale (manifatture di tabacchi, concerie, industrie tessili). Ma si era ad un punto di svolta segnato all'interno dalla rivolta messinese del 1847 e dalla rivoluzione siciliana del 1848 e all'esterno dall'inizio del processo di accelerato sviluppo delle economie occidentali al cui mercato era collegato il commercio all'esportazione. Tale svolta, già manifesta nel 1850, maturava chiaramente nel 1852 quando il governo borbonico consentiva al commercio cittadino un'area ben più vasta dei tradizionali magazzini per la contrattazione delle merci indigene e straniere.

Nel porto messinese, oltre ai prodotti delle aree limitrofe calabro-sicule, arrivavano soprattutto le merci provenienti dall'estero e in particolare i prodotti dell'industria tessile inglese. Rispetto alla parte continentale del Regno delle Due Sicilie, più legata commercialmente alla Francia, in Sicilia vi era una cospicua presenza di operatori economici di origine britannica arrivati nel "decennio inglese" 1806-1815 e nel periodo successivo. Messina, in particolare, ospitava il nucleo più numeroso e più importante (Aveline, Oates, Hallam, Sanderson, Peirce, ecc.). La città, con i suoi operatori locali e stranieri, di fatto operava una sorta di *osmosi* nella redistribuzione di quei prodotti provenienti per lo più dall'Inghilterra e comunque in genere dall'estero. Spesso erano prodotti industriali, ma anche spezie e generi coloniali provenienti dalle Indie Occidentali e Orientali che erano qui scambiati con le produzioni locali, in un intreccio di rotte commerciali e di navi che aveva il suo epicentro a Messina e nel suo porto.

Nel primo '800 Messina cominciava ad avere una produzione importante di agrumi, i migliori dell'area; iniziava ad avere già le prime connessioni con una struttura di tipo industriale, cioè quella dei derivati agrumari, di cui andrà assumendo, sempre più, lungo il corso del XIX secolo un primato nazionale e mediterraneo, sia per l'esportazione dei prodotti dell'industria dei derivati agrumari che per quella degli agrumi, che sempre più si affermavano sui mercati internazionali. Gli agrumi, che erano prodotti in grande quantità anche in Calabria, giungevano per la maggior parte a Messina per essere qui "lavorati" e/o esportati. Ma il *boom* dell'esportazione del comparto agrumario è un fenomeno che assumerà sempre più rilevanza dopo l'Unità. Ciò che invece dominava, sino ai primi anni Sessanta dell'800, in termini di valore delle esportazioni, era la seta. Messina di fatto importava prodotti dall'estero e li scambiava con quelli locali dell'agricoltura specializzata, in parte provenienti dall'area dello Stretto, in parte giunti dal resto della Sicilia o dalla Calabria più lontana (seta, olio, vino, agrumi). Pertanto, funzioni essenziali e primarie del porto restavano quelle legate tanto alla raccolta e all'esportazione di questi generi quanto all'importazione e redistribuzione di quelli esteri.

Sotto l'aspetto del movimento marittimo è opportuno far notare come nel 1850 il porto di Messina si collocava, per movimento, al nono posto

tra i porti del Mediterraneo, preceduto da Costantinopoli, Marsiglia, Trieste, Livorno, Genova, Isole Ionie, Gibilterra e Barcellona e seguito da Malta, Alessandria e Smirne. Ma ancora alla fine degli anni Settanta dell'800 il porto messinese era il primo in Sicilia e, comunque, precedeva quello di Napoli. Nel 1870, infatti, era al sesto posto tra quelli del Mediterraneo, superato soltanto dai porti di Costantinopoli, Marsiglia, Genova, Alessandria d'Egitto e Livorno, mentre tra i porti italiani era al terzo posto e precedeva persino quello di Trieste. L'Unità d'Italia aveva segnato, per così dire, un rilancio consistente, tale da far ritenere la nuova fase come inizio di una definitiva ripresa e ristrutturazione. Messina conosceva allora, percentualmente, una fortissima crescita, molto più marcata di porti importanti come Trieste e Genova. Il porto messinese si riempiva nuovamente di navi di tutte le nazionalità: l'incremento dell'esportazione di derrate agricole e la navigazione a vapore, che dirigeva la marina mercantile a rifornirsi di viveri e carbone in un punto tanto centrale del Mediterraneo, davano vitalità a tutte le operazioni commerciali. E, malgrado la cessazione del porto franco, finché non giunse la morsa ferrea della crisi degli anni Ottanta, la borghesia cittadina continuò a sperare di riconquistare l'antico primato, puntando sul progetto ambizioso del Canale di Suez e, poi contemporaneamente e più concretamente, su quello di centro di smistamento tra Oriente e Occidente grazie alla sperata costruzione della ferrovia.

In realtà sino alla fine dell'800 vi era una vasta area che dipendeva ancora esclusivamente da Messina e dal suo ruolo commerciale e finanziario gravitante attorno all'area falcata. Tuttavia, nella seconda metà del XIX secolo, il nuovo stato unitario guardava a tutte le regioni in misura uguale, ma in questa direzione va avanzata qualche riserva sul liberismo di impostazione piemontese. Il provvedimento di abolizione del porto franco (1865) riguardava non solo Messina, ma anche Genova, Livorno e Ancona. Questi quattro porti perdevano il loro "privilegio" sul presupposto di un falso egualitarismo che aveva effetti estremamente diversi sulla realtà messinese se raffrontata, ad esempio, con quella di Genova o di Livorno. Il governo italiano aveva operato quella scelta egualitaria senza però tenere in debito conto le carenze infrastrutturali di cui risentiva il porto e la città di Messina. Infatti, la parte più importante ed estesa della sua provincia era di fatto quella tirrenica; la ionica in fondo era limitata, né vi era una grande produttività. Sul versante tirrenico vi erano le coltivazioni specializzate di agrumi e i vigneti che si andavano sviluppando nella piana di Milazzo, gli uliveti verso le pendici dei Nebrodi, ecc. Era la sezione che più e meglio poteva dare impulso all'economia messinese, ma era anche quella che meno era collegata a Messina per via di terra, naturalmente finendo per gravitare non più sul porto messinese, così come era stato prevalentemente sino ai primi decenni post-unitari, ma verso il più vicino porto di Milazzo, mentre sul versante opposto dello Stretto, in Calabria, il completamento della co-

struzione della strada ferrata sottraeva molta parte della produzione calabrese che, alla fine del secolo, era ormai spedita per ferrovia.

Pertanto, Messina verso la fine del secolo finiva per subire una serie di condizionamenti, dovuti – come si è detto – all’ampliamento dei porti vicini, siciliani e calabresi, mentre il porto franco messinese era abolito definitivamente dal 1 gennaio 1880. Messina, infatti, aveva goduto di una proroga - compensazione dell’abolizione del porto franco - condizionata peraltro al completamento della ferrovia Messina-Catania-Caltanissetta-Palermo, alla creazione dei Magazzini Generali e alla costruzione di un bacino di carenaggio, che il governo, riconoscendone la debolezza, aveva voluto accordare alla città e al suo porto. Ma al momento della cessazione del regime di porto franco sostanzialmente la sola ferrovia era operante, cioè la via interna, che inevitabilmente avrebbe finito per favorire lo sviluppo delle attività economiche catanesi connesse alla raffinazione dello zolfo. La scelta di quel tracciato ferroviario era stata dettata dall’esigenza di rafforzare il commercio dello zolfo che comunque risentiva di alcune difficoltà dovute alla carente modernizzazione del settore estrattivo. Si era finito così, senza volerlo, con il favorire le attività economiche catanesi e del suo porto. Tuttavia il porto messinese non subì un immediato contraccolpo e ancora nei primi anni '80 città e porto apparivano dinamici e vivi, anche se già erano presenti i segni di una forte inquietudine degli operatori economici.

Ma è altrettanto vero che il declino del traffico portuale messinese, a partire dagli anni Novanta, muoveva da specifiche ragioni. Tra il 1886-1890 e il 1908, si osserva difatti un declino più qualitativo che quantitativo del commercio messinese, dovuto, per un verso, al poco dinamico progresso economico dell’isola a cui si aggiungeva, in particolare, la parziale scomparsa di alcune industrie (tessili) e la crisi – soprattutto tra gli anni Ottanta e Novanta – di taluni principali settori commerciali (agrumi e derivati, vino); dall’altro – come si è ricordato – si aggiungeva, determinante, l’attrazione, sempre più crescente degli altri porti siciliani e calabresi. Se, in precedenza, l’influenza del porto messinese si era estesa fin presso Catania e Palermo, dopo l’Unità (con i lavori di miglioramento dei porti vicini e con il rafforzarsi dell’organizzazione commerciale di quelle città, peraltro con un *hinterland* più vasto e produttivo) si era andata gradualmente limitando. Successivamente, anche Milazzo, sulla costa settentrionale, e Riposto, su quella orientale, avevano finito con il ridurre ancor più la sua zona d’influenza, mentre a partire dal 1905 il miglioramento dei porti di Villa San Giovanni e di Reggio Calabria avevano completato l’erosione, anche sul versante calabrese, di importanti quote del commercio messinese. La posizione relativa al traffico del porto messinese si era così progressivamente indebolita in questo spazio di tempo, tant’è che era passata dal primo al terzo posto tra i porti siciliani e dal sesto al decimo tra quelli nazionali. Al-

l'arretramento del porto messinese corrispondeva peraltro l'incremento dei porti minori dell'isola (da 561.000 tonnellate in media nel 1901-1902 a 694.000 nel 1907-1908) e di quelli di Reggio Calabria e Villa San Giovanni (in media da 41.000 tonnellate nel 1901-1902 a 71.000 nel 1907-1908).

È pur vero tuttavia che intorno ai primi anni '60 uno dei settori più importanti dell'economia messinese, quello della seta, era entrato in una profonda crisi dovuta alla grave epidemia che aveva colpito il settore della gelsicoltura e della bachicoltura. Ma se per un verso la crisi aveva fatto aumentare i costi di produzione e la concorrenza di quella asiatica ne aveva ridotto la domanda, dall'altro però aveva dato inizio ad un processo di ristrutturazione del settore che, pur ridimensionato, alla fine del secolo comunque usciva dalla crisi in qualche modo rafforzato. Alla vigilia del terremoto pertanto pochissime erano le filande operanti a Messina, solo due o tre in tutto, ma più moderne. La seta dunque aveva esaurito il suo lungo ciclo. Naturalmente era ancora presente nelle esportazioni messinesi, ma non più come il principale prodotto. Tale primato era altresì rilevato dagli agrumi e soprattutto dalle essenze che, tra la seconda metà dell'800 e il primo decennio del '900, vedevano via via intensificarsi sia la produzione che la lavorazione dei derivati (essenze, acido citrico, succo di limone, ecc.). Attorno a tale produzione nasceva il nuovo rilancio messinese, che non era il solo collegato all'attività portuale, ma era sempre dal porto che Messina aveva preso e prendeva ossigeno e impulso.

Lo sviluppo del settore agrumario e dei derivati aveva una momentanea flessione, ma era tutta l'economia messinese che risentiva del contraccolpo della cessazione del porto franco a partire dai primi anni '80. Del resto – come si è detto – Messina e il suo porto erano strettamente connessi al commercio d'importazione e quindi alla libera immissione dei prodotti provenienti dall'estero e alla loro redistribuzione che permetteva lo scambio di questi con quelli delle aree limitrofe e la commercializzazione verso l'estero dei prodotti locali. Ma alla fine dell'800 il porto messinese diventava "monocommerciale", cioè era sì il porto più importante del Mediterraneo e forse del mondo, secondo la Camera di Commercio messinese, per l'esportazione degli agrumi, ma il fatto di essere esclusivamente legato solo ad essi e quindi agli andamenti e alle fluttuazioni di mercato di un unico genere ne determinava nel contempo una grande debolezza.

Alla fine del secolo la risposta alla crisi da parte messinese avveniva comunque su due direttrici principali: quella legata all'attività portuale ma connessa al commercio degli agrumi e al settore industriale dei derivati agrumari e quella dello sviluppo dell'attività armatoriale, che rinnovava un'antica tradizione marinara della città, con i Peirce ed altri esponenti della borghesia imprenditoriale messinese che, creando un forte nucleo di nuovi armatori, avrebbero consentito collegamenti stabili e continui del porto di Messina con le Americhe e con altre aree del mondo.

In realtà, per capire i tratti salienti del profondo cambiamento delle condizioni economiche e sociali della città dopo il terremoto, non si può non insistere sul fatto che Messina, ancora nel 1908, costituiva un centro commerciale vitale e ricco di potenzialità. Tra il 1900 e il 1908 il commercio marittimo – dopo la flessione di fine '800 seguita all'abolizione del porto franco – risultava in costante ascesa con 6.432 navi approdate nel porto per 5 milioni di tonnellate di stazza e con 556.000 tonnellate di merci manovrate, di cui 190.000 imbarcate.

Il porto di Messina, dunque, ancora in quegli anni restava un nodo marittimo di buon livello. Era non solo centro di importazione dei cereali che alimentavano i pastifici della città e della vicina Milazzo; degli oli minerali, lavorati dalla «Società italo-americana petroli» e poi riesportati; del carbon fossile grazie alla presenza di depositi di rifornimento e buncheraggio che ne facevano la stazione carbonifera più importante del Mediterraneo (si ricorda la «Società Anonima Italiana Hugo Stinnes», di origine tedesca passata successivamente sotto il controllo dell'armatore e finanziere messinese Giuseppe Battaglia). Il porto di Messina era anche l'approdo regolare delle linee di navigazione sovvenzionate dallo Stato e di piroscafi per l'imbarco degli emigranti, la cui soppressione dopo il terremoto sarà causa della perdita di importanti correnti del traffico internazionale. In questi anni perciò resistevano alcune strutture importanti e in primo luogo il settore armatoriale, che appunto tra anni '80 e '90, era apparso come il comparto che più aveva tentato di modernizzare l'apparato commerciale messinese, alimentando il commercio di cabotaggio e, in parte, anche quello internazionale. Si possono ricordare importanti armatori come, ad esempio, Guglielmo Peirce, fondatore della *Società di Navigazione Sicula-Americana* e della *Peirce Brothers*, ma anche Vincenzo Bonanno ed Ernesto Ilardi, proprietari di navi da carico per le rotte transoceaniche, la *Società Siciliana di Navigazione*, Giuseppe Battaglia e Antonino Scimone.

Pertanto, ancora nel 1908, la posizione geografica e le tradizioni marittime di Messina avevano un peso fondamentale e rendevano il suo porto un centro con funzioni e irradiazioni internazionali. La constatazione della dinamicità della Messina pre-terremoto, di contro al lento e inesorabile declino che la città conobbe tra gli anni '20 e '30, pone al centro dell'attenzione la catastrofe del 1908 come un dato periodizzante essenziale. Il terremoto infatti aveva recato gravissimi danni alle opere portuali: sommerse o frante le banchine, distrutti i magazzini di deposito dei carboni e le tettoie della dogana; rovinata le gru; divelti i binari; indeboliti i mezzi d'ormeggio che rimanevano; danneggiato e paralizzato il bacino di carenaggio, il traffico marittimo era reso difficile, lento e oneroso. Si era addirittura pensato ad un crollo definitivo, tanto che nel 1911 Giorgio Mortara si meravigliava che, in quelle disastrose condizioni, le merci imbarcate e sbarcate avessero raggiunto il volume complessivo di 467.000 tonnellate.

Se la flessione in assoluto non era stata molto forte, quella relativa appariva più consistente. Nel periodo 1908-1911, alla riduzione del 16% del traffico complessivo del porto messinese, si contrapponeva l'aumento del 2% di Palermo e del 18% di Catania. D'altra parte, nell'insieme dei porti italiani, il movimento del porto di Messina copriva ormai soltanto un sessantatreesimo, porzione di due terzi inferiore a quella accertata negli anni intorno al 1890. Tale processo di accentuata crisi può riscontrarsi d'altra parte sul terreno più propriamente commerciale, allorché è meglio accertabile, tra la fase di considerevole crescita e quella post-bellica, quando il porto di Messina perderà definitivamente il primato commerciale dell'isola.

L'andamento delle merci sbarcate e imbarcate nel suo porto tra il 1898 e il 1934 indica che le quantità delle merci in entrata erano costantemente inferiori a quelle in uscita e che, ad eccezione del 1909 con 92.000 tonn., nel periodo tra guerra e dopoguerra (sino al 1922) le quantità imbarcate si erano mantenute costantemente poco al di sotto delle 100.000 tonnellate e dal 1923 al 1934 intorno alle 119.000 tonnellate, mentre in precedenza, cioè dal 1898 al terremoto, si erano mantenute in media intorno a 167.000 tonnellate. Di contro le quantità delle merci sbarcate, pur risentendo dei cicli sfavorevoli, si mantenevano tuttavia abbondantemente al di sopra delle 240/250.000 tonnellate, con un picco di 436.000 nel 1927. Tale andamento del resto, tranne per gli anni della guerra, tendeva a crescere dopo il terremoto, principalmente per effetto della ricostruzione della città, mantenendosi in media - soprattutto tra il 1920 e il 1934 - al di sopra delle 300.000 tonnellate, quantità cioè lievemente superiori a quelle medie degli undici anni che precedono il terremoto (nel periodo 1898-1908 in media 297.000 tonnellate) che non è tuttavia il segno di un ritrovato slancio economico della piazza messinese. Sostanzialmente immutate però restavano le categorie di merci importate dall'estero, e a cui corrispondevano le più cospicue e tradizionali correnti del traffico commerciale, tanto prima che dopo la catastrofe. In realtà anche su questo versante i segnali non erano rassicuranti. Nel raffronto tra il 1907 e il 1911, la flessione riguardava le materie prime o i semilavorati destinati all'industria di trasformazione, segno questo di una completa stagnazione del settore; aumentavano invece le importazioni di generi di consumo e principalmente del caffè e dei grassi, che possono essere intesi come l'indice di un primo, sia pur limitato, ripristino della funzione di centro di smistamento esercitata dalla città nel passato per le zone circostanti. Diminuita - a Messina più che nella sua provincia - l'importazione di merci destinate alle trasformazioni industriali, aumentate quelle delle derrate di consumo e delle materie sussidiarie all'agricoltura, nell'insieme appare scemata l'importanza industriale, ma non del tutto quella commerciale della città.

Sul versante delle esportazioni verso l'estero, il valore del traffico dal porto di Messina nel 1911 era inferiore di circa un terzo di quello del 1907 (28

milioni circa contro 41 e mezzo). Gran parte della differenza era dovuta alla diminuita esportazione di agrumi e derivati, che anche dal lato delle quantità faceva segnare una consistente flessione delle esportazioni messinesi.

In definitiva si può affermare che per tutto l'800 Messina era stata in grado di esprimere forti impulsi, sia economici che culturali, e che sino al 28 dicembre del 1908 godeva ancora di quelle condizioni. Certo si avviava verso una lenta decadenza, poiché tutte quelle condizioni che l'avevano favorita e di cui aveva goduto nel passato si stavano progressivamente modificando. Gli ultimi fattori favorevoli di cui il porto di Messina aveva goduto erano dovuti al fatto di trovarsi sulle rotte tra Oriente e Occidente, tra i grani russi e i grandi centri dell'Europa continentale nel momento in cui le navi, tra gli anni '80 e il primo decennio del '900, avevano abbandonato definitivamente la vela per il vapore, utilizzando il carbone. Messina allora diventava uno dei porti principali di rifornimento di carbone lungo quelle rotte. Traffici numerosissimi, nutriti, continui, intensi, ma anche il ruolo del porto di Messina come porto di rifornimento di carbone, dopo la fine del primo conflitto mondiale veniva presto ad esaurirsi. Le innovazioni tecnologiche producevano il passaggio dal carbone al combustibile liquido, consentendo una maggiore autonomia di navigazione. Il porto messinese così, tra gli anni '20 e '30, palesava i suoi limiti; il suo lungo ciclo favorevole volgeva ormai al termine, mentre la città e il suo porto avevano iniziato la definitiva fase del declino.

BIBLIOGRAFIA ESSENZIALE

- G. BARBERA CARDILLO, *Messina dall'Unità all'alba del Novecento*, Genève 1981.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *Porto e commercio a Messina nei rapporti dei consoli inglese, francese e piemontese (1840-1880)*, Reggio Calabria 1977.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *Sicilia e Gran Bretagna. Le relazioni commerciali dalla Restaurazione all'Unità*, Milano 1983.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *Il commercio della Calabria attraverso il porto di Messina (1839-1840)*, in "Archivio Storico per la Calabria e la Lucania", a. LIII, 1986.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *Filande calabresi e capitali messinesi a metà Ottocento*, in *Messina e la Calabria dal Basso Medioevo all'età contemporanea*, Messina 1988.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *La "conurbazione" commerciale dell'«area dello Stretto» nell'Ottocento*, in "Archivio Storico per la Calabria e la Lucania", a. LVIII, 1991.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *Mercanti e imprenditori in una città marittima. Il caso di Messina (1850-1900)*, Milano 1992.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *Guglielmo Peirce da negoziante ad armatore*, in *I Whitaker e il capitale inglese tra l'Ottocento e il Novecento in Sicilia*, Trapani 1992.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *Il porto di Messina nell'età della decadenza*, in *Messina negli anni*

- Venti e Trenta*, vol. I, a cura di R. BATTAGLIA, M. D'ANGELO, S. FEDELE, M. LO CURZIO, Messina 1997.
- R. BATTAGLIA, *L'ultimo "splendore". Messina tra rilancio e decadenza*, Soveria Mannelli 2003.
- S. BOTTARI, *Post Res Perditas. Messina 1678-1713*, Messina 2005.
- L. CAMINITI, *Dalla pietà alla cura. Strutture sanitarie e società nella Messina dell'Ottocento*, Milano 2002.
- O. CANCELILA, *Storia dell'industria in Sicilia*, Roma-Bari 1995.
- A. CHECCO, *L'età della decadenza (1861-1945)*, in *Il porto di Messina dalle origini ai nostri giorni*, Messina 1990.
- A. CHECCO, *Messina dal terremoto del 1908 al fascismo: la ricostruzione senza sviluppo*, in "Storia Urbana", n. 46, 1989.
- L. CHIARA, *Messina nell'Ottocento. Famiglie, patrimoni, attività*, Messina 2002.
- M. D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo: Messina (1795-1805)*, in "Atti dell'Accademia Peloritana", vol. LV, 1979.
- M. D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia 1806-1815*, Milano 1988.
- M. D'ANGELO, *Comunità straniere a Messina tra XVIII e XIX secolo*, Messina 1995.
- M. D'ANGELO, *Un "lungo Ottocento": 1783-1908*, in *Messina. storia, cultura, economia*, a cura di FULVIO MAZZA, Soveria Mannelli 2007.
- D. DEMARCO, *Il crollo del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, Napoli 1960.
- S. DI GIACOMO, *Il commercio marittimo a Messina (1860-1870)*, in "Atti dell'Accademia Peloritana", vol. LXV, 1996.
- E. GAMBERINI, *Monografia marittima della Sicilia Nord-Orientale*, Messina 1918.
- L. IARIA, *Per una storia economica di Messina. Un rapporto inedito del viceconsole francese M. Lallement*, in «Nuova Rivista Storica», 1968, pp. 661-676.
- S. LAUDANI, *La Sicilia della seta. Economia, società e politica*, Roma 1996.
- L.A. PAGANO, *L'industria armatoriale siciliana dal 1816 al 1880*, Roma 1964.
- "Un luogo dell'anima". Villa Pace dai Sanderson ai Bosurgi all'Università*, a cura di L. CAMINITI, M. D'ANGELO, L. HYERACE, Messina 2003.

Maria Gabriella Adamo

Le Port de Messine, l'emplacement du Phare et le Déroit à travers les témoignages de quelques écrivains et 'chroniqueurs' français au tournant de 1860

Mais outre le peu que Messine a sauvé de ses époques anciennes, le décor qu'elle nous offre évoque aujourd'hui encore les fastes de son histoire. Dans l'arc parfait de son Port, dominé par des montagnes pittoresques, toutes les flottes du monde sont passées: on voit émerger sur l'eau les mâts des navires [...] des Carthaginois, des Grecs, des Romains, des Sarrasins [...], de Murat...

DOMINIQUE FERNANDEZ, *Du Vésuve à l'Etna*, Paris, 1952

1. Comparé souvent au Port d'Alexandrie d'Égypte pour sa position de carrefour au cœur de la Méditerranée, le Port de Messine a joui d'une vaste renommée au fil des siècles: mais c'est peut-être au cours de l'année 1860 – année qui marque la transition entre le Royaume des Deux-Siciles et le nouveau Règne d'Italie – qu'il a assumé, avec l'emplacement du Phare et donc dans l'espace du Déroit, une fonction capitale pour les observateurs et les volontaires italiens et étrangers. L'expédition des *Mille* de Garibaldi, qui avait pris son essor à Palerme au mois d'avril, a été une aventure qui a retenu l'attention et suscité les attentes – politiques, idéologiques et messianiques – d'une grande partie de l'Europe, notamment de la France de Napoléon III, dont on connaît les rapports ambivalents face à la question italienne. Nous pouvons donc relever le phénomène de la présence et de la participation d'un grand nombre de Français (et de Francophones) aux «grands et prodigieux événements» de 1860: tour à tour volontaires, chroniqueurs, journalistes, écrivains, à qui l'on doit une production remarquable d'articles, d'essais, de mémoires et de 'tableaux vivants'; entre autres, l'envoyé du «Siècle», Jules Kergomard, Émile Gigault de La Bédollière, Charles La Varenne, le Belge Charles Bottalla, le

Suisse Marc Monnier, correspondant à Naples du «Journal des Débats», jusqu'à Louise Colet, elle aussi présente dans la ville vésuvienne¹.

Il faut pourtant s'arrêter sur trois personnages, dont l'itinéraire tourne, avec des modalités différentes, autour du Déroit de Messine et auxquels l'on doit des témoignages importants à plusieurs titres. Il s'agit premièrement d'Henri Durand-Brager, peintre officiel de la Marine française et ami de Garibaldi: en tant que volontaire, il resta longtemps à Messine, surtout du côté des emplacements du Phare, où il s'adonna à la composition de très jolis croquis et de chroniques ponctuelles, destinés au «Monde Illustré» et plus tard réunis dans le volume *Quatre mois de l'expédition de Garibaldi en Sicile et en Italie* (Tables I-II)². On retrouve en outre deux écrivains, dont l'un est le célèbre auteur des *Trois Mousquetaires*, c'est-à-dire Alexandre Dumas père, et l'autre est Maxime Du Camp, auteur de romans et d'essais mais aussi de poèmes comme *Les Chants Modernes*, d'inspiration saint-simonienne, et *Les Convictions*, marqués par l'engagement idéologique: ami et confrère de Flaubert, il fut de même grand voyageur et on lui doit un *Voyage en Orient* enrichi de photographies extraordinaires pour son époque³. Dumas, devenu grand ami de Garibaldi, le soutint (en lui fournissant même des cargaisons d'armes) et suivit l'expédition par mer, à bord de sa goélette *Emma* au cours d'une croisière méditerranéenne. De Palerme il passa par le Déroit de Messine (qu'il avait déjà traversé en 1842) et s'arrêta à Naples, où il reçut bien des honneurs (mais aussi quelques contestations) et en profita même pour fonder un journal 'révolutionnaire', «L'Indépendant». Ses expériences, assez romancées mais très vivantes et relatées avec humour, sont contenues, outre que dans *Les Garibaldiens* (1861), dans *Vive Garibaldi. Une Odyssée en 1860*⁴: malgré – ou à cause – de son attitude romanesque, l'entreprise garibaldienne a joui d'un

¹ Pour ces repères, je me permets de renvoyer à mon essai introductif à: MAXIME DU CAMP, *Expédition des Deux-Siciles*, Paris, Bourdilliat-Librairie Nouvelle, 1861; réédité par M.G. ADAMO: Reggio Calabria, Parallelo 38, 1977, pp. 449, 4 photos f.t. Nouvelle édition intégrale par M.G. ADAMO, Torino, Cirvi, 2011. Quant à LOUISE COLET, il faut notamment rappeler, outre *L'Italie des Italiens*, le volume *La Naples de Garibaldi* (Paris, Dentu, 1861).

² Paris, Dentu, 1861 (avec illustrations de l'Auteur).

³ Cfr. DU CAMP, *Expédition des Deux-Siciles* (les citations de l'œuvre renvoient à mon édition de 1977). Le texte avait déjà paru, sauf quelques ajouts, dans la «Revue des Deux Mondes» des 15 mars, 1^{er} et 15 avril, 1^{er} mars 1861. L'année suivante Du Camp publiera un court ouvrage consacré à la suite de l'aventure garibaldienne: *Naples et la société napolitaine sous le roi Victor-Emmanuel*, «Revue des Deux Mondes», 1862, et Paris, Claye, 1862: voir à ce propos mon étude *Du Camp a Napoli nel 1860 e nel 1862*, dans *Actes du Colloque Naples et la France*, Roma, Sief, 1980.

⁴ Cfr. notamment ALEXANDRE DUMAS, *Mémoires de Garibaldi*, Paris, Lévy, 1860; *Les Garibaldiens*, Paris, Lévy, 1860; *Vive Garibaldi!* (Paris, Fayard, 2002) a été traduit en italien par MARGHERITA BOTTO (Testo critico di CLAUDE SCHOPP, Edizione italiana a cura di GILLES PÉCOUT e M. BOTTO, Introduzione di G. PÉCOUT, Torino, Einaudi, 2004).

retentissement international et, comme nous le dirions aujourd'hui, d'un remarquable 'écho médiatique'⁵.

2. Mais c'est surtout Maxime Du Camp qui a donné le témoignage le plus complet de l'aventure militaire garibaldienne, et notamment de la période 'messinoise', juste avant la traversée, au mois d'août, du Déroit vers les Calabres en vue d'arriver, plus tard, jusqu'à Naples. Dans ce cadre, il donnera une double contribution: l'année suivante il publiera en volume *l'Expédition des Deux-Siciles*, qui relate ses «Souvenirs personnels», comme l'indique le sous-titre, mais aussi ses réflexions face à cette aventure militaire et politique qui était en même temps – d'après les *topoi* idéologiques de l'époque – «civilisatrice et humanitaire». Mais auparavant, lors de son séjour à Messine (et plus tard au cours de ses longues marches à travers les Calabres), Du Camp avait envoyé des correspondances anonymes au journal parisien «L'Opinion Nationale»⁶. Plus particulièrement, un article daté *Messine, le 22 août* (voir *Annexe*), qui offre la chronique 'sur place' des faits concernant la *Cittadella*, encore aux mains des troupes napolitaines, de leur violation de la Convention Clary-Medici et du bombardement de Messine, outre que des manœuvres des garibaldiens dans le Port et au Phare en vue du débarquement en Calabre:

«... Tous vos lecteurs connaissent la configuration du Déroit de Messine, fermé du côté de la Sicile par la longue langue de terre appelée le Phare, et qui appartient à l'armée méridionale (c'est le titre officiel de l'armée de Garibaldi), et du côté de la Calabre par les hautes falaises de Scylla [...]. Puis le Déroit s'évase et porte à chacune de ses extrémités, en Sicile, Messine, dont les Forts maritimes (*Forte San Salvatore*) appartiennent seuls aujourd'hui aux Napolitains [...]. Le jour où nous serons en possession de *Forte Cavallo*, comme nous sommes en possession du Phare, le passage nous serait assuré en toute sécurité [...]. Depuis deux nuits, les ouvrages garibaldiens du Phare sont canonnés à outrance par les navires de guerres napolitains, car le Phare est en dehors de la convention signée par Garibaldi [...]

Ces éléments, et la suite du siège de la *Cittadella* par l'armée garibaldienne, seront élaborés et précisés par Du Camp, et en même temps enri-

⁵ Cfr. SCHOPP, éd. citée.

⁶ C'est à travers la consultation des manuscrits de Du Camp conservés à la Bibliothèque de l'Institut de Paris que j'ai pu établir l'attribution de ces articles à l'auteur de *l'Expédition*.

⁷ DU CAMP, *Messine, 22 août 1860, Lettres d'Italie*, «L'Opinion Nationale», 3 septembre 1860. Dans: M. G. ADAMO, *Maxime Du Camp e «L'Opinion Nationale»: una corrispondenza anonima da Messina nel 1860*, in AA. VV., *Apophoreta, Scritti offerti a Gino Raya*, a cura di ANTONIO MAZZARINO, Roma, Herder, 1982, 1-15. Cfr. *infra*, ANNEXE.

chis de ses propres expériences, dans la première partie de *l'Expédition (La Sicile, Livre Ier)*: là, y sont retracés notamment les épisodes concernant le mois d'août, depuis la résistance de la *Cittadella* et le bombardement de la ville de la part des Napolitains, le 21 de ce mois, au combat naval du 22 (dont la description très vivace apparaît aussi dans la chronique de Durand-Brager), jusqu'au débarquement sur la côte de Calabre:

«une frégate et un brick de la marine napolitaine canonnaient le Phare, qui ripostait de toutes ses batteries; les Forts de la terre ferme s'en mêlèrent ...» (*Expédition*, p. 207).

La situation militaire est relevée à plusieurs reprises par Du Camp:

«Deux petits lacs, situés à la base de cette langue de terre dont le Phare occupe l'extrémité, avaient été réunis entre eux et ensuite joints à la mer par un canal que Garibaldi avait fait creuser. De la sorte, il avait, à l'abri de toute attaque, [...] un bon port qui contenait toutes les barques dont il comptait se servir pour faire passer son armée sur le continent» (*Expédition*, p. 208).

«Quatre forteresses armées de pièces à longue portée défendaient aussi le Détroit et rendaient, jusqu'à un certain point, la côte de Calabre inabordable par son rivage qui fait face à la Sicile; ces forteresses sont, du sud au nord, *Alta-Fiumara, Punta-del-Pizzo* (sc. *Pezzo*), *Torre-Cavallo*, et enfin la formidable *Scylla*...» (*Expédition*, p. 211).

Par ailleurs, dans l'ensemble de son œuvre Du Camp portera son témoignage, personnel et historique à la fois, sur toute l'aventure des Deux-Siciles, jusqu'à la bataille du Volturne et à l'arrivée des Piémontais à Naples: dans ce dernier cadre, l'écrivain français, seul, en dénoncera l'ingratitude manifestée à l'égard de Garibaldi, «ce plébéien donateur de règnes», et l'amertume de cet épisode marque la fin de l'épopée des *Mille*.

2.1. Ce sont là, de la part des Français, des témoignages directs portant notamment sur la ville de Messine, devenue pendant cette période «théâtre de nombreux et intéressants événements» (Durand-Brager); donc, sur des épisodes vécus au jour le jour et dans un état d'âme d'enthousiasme collectif, signes d'un phénomène répandu à un niveau international mais qui, dans ce moment politique et historique particulier, trouvait une réception privilégiée au delà des Alpes. Si le récit de Dumas se révèle en équilibre entre réalité et goût romanesque, se déroulant dans une optique différente et privilégiée⁸, il faut ici reconnaître le souci d'objectivité

⁸ Dans un chapitre de *Vive Garibaldi!*, Dumas relate à son tour très précisément les phases des accords et des mouvements militaires de la période messinoise. Son point

caractérisant soit les chroniques de Durand-Brager soit les «souvenirs» de Du Camp:

«Je me suis donc résigné à écrire les faits dont j'ai été témoin, comme je les aurais dessinés, cherchant à reproduire leur côté pittoresque sans blesser personne»⁹.

«Si je n'ai point dissimulé mes convictions, du moins j'ai fait tous mes efforts pour éviter les entraînements de l'esprit de parti; j'ai écrit ce que j'ai vu [...], si ce livre a un mérite, c'est celui de la sincérité»¹⁰.

Pourtant, par le *pathos* lié à l'aventure, ainsi que par les suggestions venant du décor mythique propre au Déroit, le compte-rendu se double presque toujours chez eux d'une vision personnelle, renvoyant à l'imaginaire de chaque auteur: un imaginaire plus naïf et tourné vers le «côté pittoresque» chez Durand-Brager, ou qui se pose encore, comme chez Dumas, sous le signe d'un romantisme passionné; ou bien qui est marqué, comme dans le cas de Du Camp, par les mythes de l'Orient et de la Grande Grèce autant que par les modernes 'mythologies' libérales et messianiques renvoyant à Michelet et à Quinet. Leurs représentations, même à travers la grande aventure militaire, contiennent aussi la vision des 'voyageurs': issues du regard de l'Autre, elles révèlent la diversité culturelle, plus encore que politique et idéologique, qui les nourrit. Ainsi, la ville du Déroit était, en 1842 déjà pour Dumas, «Messine la Noble», «porte puissante de deux mers», «reine du Déroit»¹¹. En 1860, pour Durand-Brager elle est la «ville aquatique», construite «en amphithéâtre sur le bord de la mer», avec son Port «vaste et parfaitement à l'abri, défendu par une imposante Citadelle», marquée par les couleurs, de longues plages et le grouillement de sa population bigarrée¹². Mais pour Du Camp la «ville blanche et rose» s'élargit jusqu'à ses environs et notamment jusqu'au Phare, dont l'espace méditerranéen garde des parfums de vanille et l'illusion de suggestions orientales:

«...ce grandiose paysage, composé par les flots bleus de la Méditerranée, les montagnes de la Sicile et celles du continent, enveloppées de ces limpides atmosphères que l'Orient connaît seul. Et cependant ce

de vue se pose différemment par rapport à Du Camp et à Durand-Brager, car il suivait l'armée méridionale étant à bord de sa goélette, et, à ce qu'il paraît, était en contact continu avec Garibaldi (cfr. l'édition italienne, 122-127). Notamment, il décrit les emplacements du Phare («un beau spectacle») et la vue des sentinelles des troupes napolitaines sur les bastions de la *Cittadella*, face à la mer.

⁹ DURAND-BRAGER, *Préface*, éd. citée, III.

¹⁰ DU CAMP, *Avertissement*, éd. citée, 162.

¹¹ DUMAS, *Le Capitaine Arena*, Paris, 1842, 89 svv.

¹² DURAND-BRAGER, éd. citée, 92, 121.

n'est pas l'Orient, ce n'est qu'une Italie plus chaude, plus personnelle, plus sarrasine» (*Expédition*, pp. 206-207).

D'ailleurs, la ville révèle ses marques négatives, soit dans les désastres qui l'ont autrefois ravagée (la peste et le grand tremblement de terre de 1783, rappelés aussi par Durand-Brager)¹³, soit du côté politique, social et civil: notamment, dans une religiosité se doublant de superstition et dans sa «malheureuse population», qui fait front aux privations dues à la guerre et qui apparaît proie de la peur face à la nouvelle autorité portée par les événements de cette période-là:

La chronique de Durand-Brager, très vivace et riche en couleur locale, se double d'un sentiment de *pietas* dans le récit des jours des bombardements. Sur la plage, aux environs de la ville, trouve refuge

«... un monde d'enfants, glapissant, braillant, gémissant à qui mieux mieux, des mères aux voix criantes et discordantes [...], et toujours cette inimitable odeur de poisson grillé, d'ail frit, d'oignons sautées [...]. C'est à y perdre l'ouïe et l'odorat. Malheureusement, tout cela est de la triste comédie. Si on rit par ici en regardant, on est tenté de pleurer par là en détournant les yeux; ce sont d'affreuses misères qui, certes, eussent ajouté de graves maladies au fléau de la guerre [...]. Beaucoup de ces pauvres gens vivaient au jour le jour avec leurs enfants. [...] Heureusement, cette triste situation ne dura qu'une semaine [...]; cette population endurait ses privations avec une résignation digne d'un meilleur sort» (*Quatre mois de l'expédition [...]*, 122-123).

«Le corps du général Bosco a l'avantage [...] de sauver d'un bombardement la ville de Messine. Cette malheureuse cité n'était plus qu'un vaste désert depuis l'évacuation complète du port» (*ibid*, 124).

A l'occasion de la fête organisée le 20 août par les Garibaldiens dans la ville, Du Camp relate l'épisode de la participation 'forcée' des messinois sur un ton plaisant, mais conclut:

«...l'effroi de l'autorité, quelle qu'elle fût, était si vivace encore chez ces pauvres gens longtemps opprimés, que nul d'entre eux n'avait osé refuser de se rendre à cette invitation imprévue» (*Expédition*, 199).

Pourtant, reste la gaieté bruyante et bigarrée de ces mêmes gens et des volontaires, ainsi que la suggestion d'un *notturmo*, du côté du Port, par une nuit d'orage, décrit par Du Camp:

«Messine était dans une agitation extraordinaire; nos soldats allaient par les rues, isolément ou en groupes, en compagnie, se hâtant vers le Port

¹³ Éd. citée, 91. De sa part, Du Camp déclare avoir gardé «un pauvre souvenir» de la ville, en soulignant surtout le bruit insupportable, et faisant une critique 'positiviste' de ses croyances religieuses, notamment le culte de la *Madonna della Lettera*.

ou vers le Phare, le fusil sur l'épaule, le havre-sac au dos, joyeux, chantant pour la plupart [...]. Les habitants les regardaient passer; on échangeait un mot: - Que la Madone vous conduise!» (*Expédition*, 216).

«Les quais, ordinairement si peuplés pendant la fraîcheur de la nuit, étaient vides et mornes; les cafés, où d'habitude nos bruyants soldats prenaient des glaces en chantant, étaient fermés; la flamme des réverbères remuée par le vent jetait ses reflets mobiles sur les dalles humides et luisantes; dans le Port, les matelots d'un navire viraient au cabestan et psalmodiaient une de ces traînantes mélopées qui, dans l'obscurité, au-dessus des flots, ressemblent à un chœur de dieux marins. Tout cela était triste et grave» (*Expédition*, 205).

3. En outre, le thème du passage du Déroit atteint ici une connotation nouvelle, où le mythe classique du risque lié à la navigation entre Charibde et Scylla à travers ce bras de mer qui sépare la Sicile des Calabres - qui est aussi métaphore du passage de la vie à la mort -, devient attente, impatience et anxiété, balancement continu entre l'idée de la réussite et celle de la faillite de l'entreprise: c'est justement de cette 'traversée', longtemps préparée par Garibaldi, que dépend le passage *au delà*, sur le Continent, vers Naples et les batailles décisives:

«On attendait, on avait confiance, on regardait vers la Calabre sans pouvoir secouer l'ennui tenace qui naît de l'incertitude [...]. On n'avait guère d'autres sujets de conversation: le verbe *passer* avait pris tout à coup la signification de 'partir de Sicile, traverser le Déroit et débarquer en terre ferme'. *Quand passe-t-on?* était la question incessante répétée par les officiers aussi bien que par les soldats. [...] L'anxiété de notre attente se nourrissait de tous les bruits que l'absence de Garibaldi exagérait encore. Où était-il?»¹⁴.

Par ailleurs, c'est là une aventure où le risque de la perte physique de soi-même entraîne, parallèlement, une quête de soi-même, qui peut aboutir à une découverte ultérieure de son propre être et de ses transformations dans le temps par la perception aiguë d'une identité 'autre'. C'est encore Du Camp qui exprime cet état d'esprit:

«En 1844, j'avais déjà traversé ce Déroit de Messine, où je jetais l'ancre en 1860. J'étais alors gonflé de ces fortes illusions dont l'écroulement successif nous fait tant regretter notre jeunesse éteinte [...]. J'y revenais, non plus comme un pèlerin des soleils couchants et des paysages, mais comme un homme auquel la vie a appris sa terrible expérience, et comme l'obscur soldat d'une cause éternelle, la cause de la liberté

¹⁴ DU CAMP, *Expédition*, 211-212.

contre l'oppression, du droit contre la force. Si l'homme que j'étais autrefois avait rencontré l'homme que je suis aujourd'hui sur ces mêmes rivages [...], je ne sais pas s'ils se seraient reconnus. Qu'aurait pu répondre l'un au *Qui vive* de l'autre?»¹⁵.

En effet, l'idée d'une «cause éternelle» se pose au centre de cette expérience et éclaire le processus idéologique, outre qu'existential, lié à la grande aventure de 1860. Pour les héritiers de la Révolution de 1789, le thème de l'espérance parcourt toutes leurs chroniques, préconisant une perspective de changement radical par rapport à l'ancienne monarchie de droit divin et à son «effroyable tyrannie». Ce sera là une évolution se réalisant par le «lent réveil» de ces peuples, comme le dit encore Du Camp, vers l'unité et l'indépendance de la Nation italienne, et donc vers le Progrès matériel et moral. Notamment, il faut envisager le Midi italien:

«Quand ils seront devenus les soldats d'un État libre, les Siciliens oublieront les exemples d'indiscipline et de pillage...».

«...les ressources extraordinaires qu'elle [l'Italie du Midi] offrira au commerce et à l'industrie lorsque des voies ferrées, de grandes routes, [...] la mettant en communication avec les mers qui l'entourent, l'auront fait entrer dans la loi d'échange commune aux peuples civilisés».

«Le plus beau et le plus riche royaume de cette riche et belle Italie est celui-ci [...]. Que l'âme de la nation s'élève et il n'y aura point de patrie comparable !»¹⁶.

Et cela d'après les principes du libéralisme européen, où la France, cette «nation expansive, toujours prête au sacrifice, appelée entre toutes à donner la liberté au monde», avait assumé à travers tout le XIX^e siècle un rôle prioritaire, donnant une forte dimension idéale à ses interventions politiques et militaires¹⁷ Comme l'avait affirmé Du Camp dans la *Préface* à ses *Chants Modernes*:

«Nous sommes ce peuple qui, à la fin du dernier siècle, [...] illumine le monde entier par la plus sublime révolution [...], nous sommes ce peuple qui va porter à toutes les nations les germes d'une liberté [...]; nous sommes ce peuple qui souffre d'une gestation d'avenir»¹⁸.

Ainsi, à travers le regard de ces volontaires venus d'ailleurs, ces 'chroniques' françaises de 1860 proposent-elles une lecture en profondeur d'un

¹⁵ *Ib.*, 186-187.

¹⁶ DU CAMP, *Expédition*, 194, 197, 218-219; et DU CAMP, *Naples et la société napolitaine sous le roi Victor-Emmanuel*, éd. citée, 14-15.

¹⁷ *Expédition*, 197-198.

¹⁸ DU CAMP, *Préface à Les Chants Modernes*, Parsi Calmann-Lévy, 1855, p. 8.

tournant de notre histoire, ayant comme moment fondamental la découverte de ce lieu privilégié, réel et symbolique à la fois, qu'est le Déroit, auquel sont liées aujourd'hui encore notre appartenance et notre identité méditerranéennes.




Table I. HENRI DURAND-BRAGER, *Le Déroit* (*Quatre mois de l'Expédition de Garibaldi en Sicile*, Paris, Dentu, 1861)




Table II. HENRI DURAND-BRAGER, *Le Phare* (*Quatre mois de l'Expédition de Garibaldi en Sicile*, Paris, Dentu, 1861).

ANNEXE

Maxime DU CAMP, *article paru sur l'«Opinion Nationale» du 22 août 1860*, signé Joseph MALIGÈRE (Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France, Ms. 3723, III).

LETTRES D'ITALIE

Messine, 22 août 1860

Cette lettre ne pourra partir d'ici que dimanche prochain, 26 août; je vous l'écris en quelque sorte par provision, et il est même possible que je n'aie pas le temps de l'achever, car je puis recevoir d'une minute à l'autre l'ordre de m'embarquer pour passer en Calabre.

Vous savez, depuis longtemps déjà, le nouveau succès de Garibaldi à Reggio. La ville a été vite emportée; les soldats qui la défendaient ont pris la fuite et, recueillis sur bateaux de guerre napolitains, ont été ramenés dans la forteresse de Messine.

Le fort de Reggio s'est rendu par capitulation (c'est le quatrième depuis l'ouverture de la campagne). Garibaldi y a trouvé, depuis une lettre de lui qui m'a été communiquée, des canons, une grande quantité de munitions et bon nombre de chevaux qui rendront ici d'importants services, car nous en manquons pour notre cavalerie.

On a fait environ sept cents prisonniers napolitains; nos pertes sont insignifiantes et ne se montent pas à plus d'une dizaine de morts. Le général Nino Bixio a été blessé au bras gauche, légèrement disent les uns, gravement disent les autres.

Si sa blessure eût été dangereuse, il eût été sans aucun doute ramené ici pour être soigné; or, il n'est pas revenu, et j'en conclus que la blessure n'est pas très sérieuse, et qu'elle ne l'empêchera pas de continuer sa route. Des renforts envoyés hier par le général Cosenz ont été, avant-hier au soir, rejoints le corps expéditionnaire. Les choses sont en bonne voie, et nous avons le ferme espoir que tout ira pour le mieux.

Tous vos lecteurs connaissent la configuration du Détroit de Messine, fermé du côté de la Sicile par la longue langue de terre appelée le Phare, et qui appartient à l'Armée méridionale (c'est le titre officiel de l'armée de Garibaldi), et du côté de la Calabre par les hautes falaises de Scylla, aux pieds desquelles s'élève une très solide forteresse nommée *Forte Cavallo*.

Puis le Détroit s'évase et porte à chacune de ses extrémités, en Sicile, Messine, dont les forts maritimes (*Forte San Salvatore*) appartiennent seuls aujourd'hui aux Napolitains, en Italie, Reggio entièrement prise par Garibaldi. Le jour où nous serons en possession de *Forte Cavallo*, comme nous sommes en possession du Phare, le passage nous serait assuré en toute sécurité, car les deux Forts commandent l'embouchure du Détroit, de telle sorte qu'un bateau ne pourrait le franchir sans leur autorisation.

Il est donc probable que Garibaldi, par lui-même ou par un de ses lieutenants, va attaquer la forteresse de Scylla, à moins que, maître des hauteurs qui la dominent, il n'établisse des batteries qui l'annihilent. *Forte Cavallo*, du reste, fait bonne garde: avant-hier, au milieu de la nuit, un bâtiment de com-

merce, entraîné par le courant, qui est très rapide en cet endroit, s'approcha des batteries, qui firent immédiatement feu sur lui. Une frégate napolitaine en croisière, s'apercevant de l'erreur, arriva de toute la vitesse de son hélice pour faire taire la canonnade; mais à travers l'obscurité elle ne fut point reconnue, et reçut cinq boulets dans sa coque.

Depuis deux nuits, les ouvrages garibaldiens du Phare sont canonnés à outrance par les navires de guerres napolitains, car le Phare est en dehors de la Convention signée par Garibaldi, convention qui ne concerne absolument que la ville de Messine. Les dommages que nous avons éprouvés sont peu graves, et nous n'avons guère eu qu'une cinquantaine d'hommes mis hors de combat. Les travaux de défense du Phare sont confiés à un jeune Français fort intelligent, M. Bourdon Calmet, et à M de Flotte, qu'il suffit de nommer pour tout éloge. Ces attaques sont-elles sérieuses et annoncent-elles chez les Napolitains, chez les royaux, ainsi que l'on dit ici, une intention déterminée de reprendre le Phare, et par conséquent de fermer absolument l'entrée du Déroit aux troupes insurrectionnelles? Je ne le crois pas. On veut simplement nous tenir en alerte, nous faire croire à l'éventualité prochaine d'une grave entreprise et, par là, nous empêcher de nous dégarnir en envoyant à Garibaldi son armée entière.

On ne sera pas pris à pareille ruse: l'armée passera brigade par brigade; malheureusement nous manquons de grands navires et, à ce point de vue, la perte du *Torino* est un très regrettable accident.

Je viens de vous parler plus haut de la Convention qui a été signée, au nom de Garibaldi, par le général Medici, avec le commandant des forces napolitaines renfermées dans la Citadelle maritime de Messine. Vous savez que par cette Convention, dont vous avez publié le texte, il a été arrêté qu'en cas de rupture de la trêve, le commencement des hostilités serait dénoncé *quarante-huit heures à l'avance*.

Hier à cinq heures de l'après-midi, cette Convention a été outrageusement violée par les Napolitains; je ne sais pas comment en termes militaires se nomme une infamie semblable: je vous en fais juge. Donc, à cinq heures, au moment où la population sort sur les larges quais de la Marine pour trouver un peu de fraîcheur, au moment où tous les états-majors allaient se mettre à table, chacun dans son hôtel respectif, trois bataillons sortirent de la Citadelle, s'avancèrent à mi-chemin d'un énorme glacis qui la précède, et, s'arrêtant à deux cents mètres des avant-postes garibaldiens, firent feu et se retirèrent.

Puis, on commença purement et simplement à bombarder la ville: aux premiers coups, deux maisons prirent feu, dont celle du Consul de France; des grenades furent lancées sur les toits et des balles à mitraille éclatèrent dans les rues. Les habitants fuyaient, les femmes criaient, des appels de trompettes et de tambours retentissaient par la ville, les soldats accouraient au pas de course, et personne ne comprenait rien à cette inqualifiable agression.

Le général Türr, qui en l'absence de Garibaldi a le commandement en chef, arriva suivi du général Medici et de quatre officiers, en tout six personnes; il s'avança vers la Citadelle et fut reçu par deux feux de peloton qui, par un bonheur miraculeux, n'atteignirent personne.

Le comte Carissimi, major des hussards, fut envoyé en parlementaire; la réponse qu'il rapportait n'étant point satisfaisante, le général Türr envoya le général Medici, signataire de la Convention. [...]

Tout rentra peu à peu dans l'ordre et, comme pour montrer aux hommes l'inanité de leur fracas, le ciel déchaîna sur Messine un des plus effroyables orages que j'aie jamais entendus; le tonnerre tomba deux fois dans la mer, à l'extrémité du mouillage des navires de commerce. A huit heures du soir, j'allai visiter nos avant-postes [...].

Même jour, six heures après midi.

J'ai bien fait de prendre mes précautions avec vous, car on vient me prévenir que cette nuit nous nous jetons en Calabre; Dieu nous conduise ! N'attendez plus guère de lettres de moi: vous comprenez qu'à travers les marches et les contre-marches que nous allons faire dans un pays où la poste manque absolument, il ne sera pas facile de vous envoyer des nouvelles de notre expédition . Comptez sur moi, cependant, pour profiter de toutes les occasions. Il nous faut au moins trente-cinq jours pour arriver à Naples, regardez la carte pour vous en convaincre. N'ayez donc point d'impatience, et surtout qu'on n'accuse pas Garibaldi de lenteur¹.

¹ En effet, l'ordre de passer le Déroit fut révoqué, et ce ne fut que quelques jours après, le 24 août, que Maxime Du Camp débarqua sur la plage de Cannitello avec Türr et d'autres volontaires de la brigade hongroise. En ce qui concerne les correspondances envoyées à l'«Opinion Nationale» et signées *Joseph Malignère*, malgré les prévisions de l'écrivain elles parviendront régulièrement au journal pendant les marches à travers les Calabres, jusqu'à l'arrivée à Naples, le 9 septembre (donc, bien avant la date prévue, alors que la bataille finale du Volturno se déroulera au début d'octobre). Comme nous l'avons remarqué, la plupart des matériaux de ces *lettres*, ultérieurement élaborées, sera insérée dans *l'Expédition des Deux-Siciles*.

Maria Teresa Di Paola

Tra mare e terra.
Il porto di Messina all'alba del XX secolo

Premessa

Tra la *rêverie* ottocentesca dei viaggiatori francesi e la *métaphore* novecentesca dell'*Horcynus Orca*, che Maria Gabriella Adamo e Lucrezia Lorenzini hanno proposto, mi è sembrato appropriato inserirmi con una visione 'realistica' del porto di Messina come appariva all'alba del Novecento, e per restare nei limiti del tempo assegnatomi presento *Tra mare e terra*, un breve filmato realizzato con fotogrammi ricavati per lo più da vecchie cartoline illustrate. Nel produrre questo breve filmato mi son posta l'obbiettivo di mostrare l'organizzazione del porto e le attività che vi si svolgevano, scegliendo immagini fotografiche che permettessero d'osservare le attrezzature portuali esistenti ed anche alcuni momenti di vita vissuta nel suo tratto di mare e lungo le banchine dei suoi moli, sia prima che dopo il terremoto del 28 dicembre 1908. Nella parte iniziale, che mostra il porto prima della catastrofe, esse sono animate e seguono un ordine progressivo che fa intravedere le strutture portuali inseritevi tra il 1861 e il 1901; mentre in quella finale, sui danni causati dal sisma alle banchine dei moli e agli edifici situati intorno alla falce, il loro montaggio è stato attuato a fotogrammi fissi e all'apparenza sconnessi, per far rivivere come, dopo lo smarrimento iniziale, lungo la cortina dissestata del porto la vita riprese il suo corso, nella memoria di un contesto urbano per sempre svanito.

Ovviamente, trattandosi di una carrellata d'immagini eseguite da vari fotografi in momenti e luoghi diversi, il filmato *Tra mare e terra* non può che riprodurre una realtà virtuale osservata a volo di uccello; poiché ogni singola fotografia può solo fermare la memoria di un determinato luogo in un certo momento, ma non restituire l'insieme di sensazioni percepite dall'autore nel momento in cui la eseguì. Ho comunque cercato di supplire a questa carente coesione con il montaggio, che è stato eseguito assecondando il sottofondo sonoro della magica e coinvolgente musica di *Ondine*, la prima sonata per piano che Maurice Ravel compose nel 1908 per la trilogia *Gaspard de la nuit*. Ispirata dall'omonimo poema di Aloysius Bertrand su una ninfa acquatica innamorata di un mortale che non l'asse-

conda, la musica rende infatti bene la fluidità e la forza distruttiva del mare, riuscendo con la sua magia a coinvolgere emotivamente in questa simulata ripresa del porto all'alba del Novecento.

Il progetto all'origine del mio contributo è ancora *in fieri*, e nasce dall'esigenza di conoscere le ragioni che hanno portato al decadimento del porto e della tradizione marittima di Messina, e dalla convinzione che, in mancanza di filmati specifici, le fotografie d'epoca sono le fonti più immediate ed efficaci per farsi un'idea dei cambiamenti intervenuti nel periodo a cavallo degli ultimi due secoli, anche se non possono restituire il miscuglio di suoni, odori e colori che lo animavano. Osservando oggi la falce del porto riesce piuttosto difficile percepire quello che un tempo fu il teatro marittimo, e si tende a dare per scontato che la trasformazione di Messina "da città di mare a città senza mare" avvenne in seguito al terremoto del 28 dicembre 1908¹, come se ad un certo punto i suoi abitanti avessero voluto voltare le spalle all'elemento da cui per secoli avevano tratto il loro maggior sostentamento, quando invece un tale cambiamento ha avuto una più lunga e complessa gestazione, che merita di essere approfondita². Per questo motivo, nelle pagine che seguono ho cercato d'illustrare quanto emerge da una prima esplorazione delle fonti a stampa consultate, riguardo al porto di Messina e ai provvedimenti di manutenzione e adeguamento in esso attuati nel corso dell'Ottocento, incluso la sistemazione del teatro marittimo e la costruzione di nuove strutture portuali.

Posizione geografica, funzioni e condizioni del porto

Sin dall'Unità d'Italia le condizioni strutturali e funzionali del porto di Messina sono state al centro di un vivace dibattito, che oltre ad avere riflessi sulla stampa ha sollecitato la pubblicazione d'importanti contributi da parte di personalità locali interessate al suo potenziamento per sviluppare l'economia cittadina. Per la rilevanza che le attività marittime hanno avuto nella vita economica della città, quasi tutte le storie di Messina in età moderna e contemporanea fanno riferimento allo stato delle sue strutture portuali, e ai provvedimenti presi nel corso degli anni per migliorarle³; cionon-

¹ Questo progressivo restringimento degli orizzonti di riferimento sta all'origine dell'attuale crisi strutturale di Messina, che non ha visto sorgere attività imprenditoriali innovative atte a compensare la scomparsa di quelle tradizionali legate al porto. JOSÈ GAMBINO, *Il progetto Messina: da polo urbano a polo metropolitano a polo mediterraneo*, in "Quaderni del Dipartimento di statistica", 2002, n. 2, 270.

² Per una prima analisi dei fenomeni di trasformazione che, tra momenti di rilancio e di crisi, la città ed il suo porto vissero tra il 1815 e il 1920 cfr. ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *L'ultimo "splendore". Messina tra rilancio e decadenza*, Soveria Mannelli 2003.

³ AMELIA IOLI GIGANTE, *Le città nella storia d'Italia: Messina*, Roma-Bari 1980; GIUSEPPE

nostante, nel far la storia del porto raramente gli studiosi si soffermano a considerarne l'organizzazione o le modifiche strutturali apportatevi nel tempo, tendendo in genere ad approfondire soprattutto l'analisi quantitativa e qualitativa dei suoi traffici e lo sviluppo delle attività imprenditoriali collegate⁴.



La darsena del porto in una cartolina edita dal fotografo De Angelis - Messina 1902

Per tutta l'antichità e nei tempi moderni, la posizione geografica veramente strategica aveva fatto del porto di Messina la chiave militare e commerciale dell'isola e il maggior emporio del basso Mediterraneo. Situato verso il centro dello Stretto, alla confluenza dei mari Tirreno e Jonio, esso era considerato il miglior rifugio esistente su tutte le coste prossime al Canale di Sicilia, anche se a volte il fondo marino a forma d'imbuto e il rapido pendio delle pareti sabbiose e melmose rendevano un po' scomodo l'ancoraggio, che all'interno del suo bacino era però perfettamente sicuro. Il porto abbraccia, infatti, una profonda insenatura naturale di circa 82,5 ettari, protetta verso il largo da una lingua di terra a forma di falce detta Punta di San Raineri che, secondo quanto si tramanda, fu prolungata nel 1060 per formare il braccio del molo che serviva il forte di S. Salvatore, lasciando così un'imboccatura a nord di circa 387 metri⁵.

BARBERA CARDILLO, *Messina dall'unità all'alba del Novecento*, Genève 1981; ENRICO PISPISA, CARMELO TRASELLI, *Messina nei secoli d'oro*, Messina 1989; MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Messina. Storia moderna e contemporanea*, in *Messina. Storia e civiltà*, a cura di GIOVANNI MOLONIA, Messina 1997; BATTAGLIA, *L'ultimo "splendore"*.

⁴ ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *Porto e commercio a Messina nei rapporti dei consoli inglese, francese e piemontese (1840-1880)*, Reggio Calabria 1977; MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto Mediterraneo. Messina (1795-1805)*, in "Atti dell'Accademia Peloritana", 1979, vol. LV; LILIANA IARIA, *Il porto di Messina tra Austriaci e Borboni*, in "Memorie dell'Accademia degli Zelanti di Acireale", vol. III, 1983; ANTONINO CHECCO, *L'età della decadenza (1861-1945)*, in *Il porto di Messina dalle origini ai nostri giorni*, a cura di PIERO ORTECA, Messina 1990; ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, *Mercanti e imprenditori in una città marittima. Il caso di Messina (1850-1900)*, Milano 1992; SERGIO DI GIACOMO, *Il commercio marittimo a Messina (1860-1870)*, in "Atti dell'Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti", 1996, vol. LXV.

⁵ Per questi dati cfr. MINISTERO DEI LAVORI PUBBLICI, *Notizie sui porti marittimi italiani raccolte dagli ingegneri del Genio Civile E. Coen-Cagli e O. Bernardini*, Milano 1905, 162.

Protetto da tutti i venti, salvo quelli da nord-est e da est che ne costituiscono la traversia, il bacino del porto presenta solo agitazioni di limitata violenza, poiché le correnti indotte da quelle dello Stretto, mutando ogni tre ore, provocano maree in genere appena percepibili, e che al massimo possono raggiungere 60-70 centimetri d'altezza; tuttavia, il riflusso delle correnti interne e i venti di traversia incidono con la loro azione sull'ormeggio, soprattutto a settentrione della sua darsena, quando le navi sono ancorate di punta e non affiancate al molo. Per ovviare a questo problema qualcuno suggerì nel passato di costruire a sud del torrente Bocchetta un argine a pennello. Oltre a facilitare l'ormeggio nel molo all'imbocco del porto, dove solo l'attracco a fianco di pochi piroscafi alla volta era possibile, tale opera avrebbe contribuito ad aumentare la superficie utile per metro lineare della banchina adibita al commercio, consentendo all'erario di accrescere l'entrate per tassa d'ancoraggio; ciononostante, essa non fu mai realizzata⁶.

Essendo lo Stretto passaggio obbligato per le navi che viaggiavano tra l'Europa, l'Oriente, l'Estremo Oriente e le coste settentrionali dell'Africa, Messina aveva continuato ad essere, anche nei secoli più recenti, una sosta importante nelle rotte di navigazione attraverso il Mediterraneo, ed attirava con le franchigie del porto franco bastimenti nazionali ed esteri, che vi portavano mercanzie e ne ripartivano carichi di prodotti locali e di derrate straniere⁷. Ciò aveva fatto del porto peloritano il momento focale di un processo economico che, oltre ad interessare la città, "coinvolgeva nell'ambito del traffico mediterraneo ed anche mondiale un'intera regione economica"⁸. Per lungo tempo esso concentrò, infatti, il commercio di gran parte della Sicilia e della vicina Calabria, nonostante che i controlli delle autorità portuali e doganali spesso prolungassero più del necessario il movimento delle merci e dei passeggeri, per altro impedito dall'arcaico sistema di trasbordo e dalle carenti attrezzature portuali.

Gli uffici della Sanità Marittima, della Dogana e del Capitano del porto erano situati distanti l'uno dall'altro, e dai locali di deposito per le merci

⁶ Previsto della lunghezza di 30 metri, il pennello ancora nel 1904 era da costruire, tanto che fu pure incluso nel memorandum che la rappresentanza parlamentare messinese presentò nel dicembre del 1905 al Presidente del Consiglio Fortis. Cfr. *ivi*, 163; *Il memorandum del Municipio di Messina a S. E. Fortis* in "Gazzetta di Messina e delle Calabrie", 13-15 dicembre 1905; ed anche MINISTERO DEI LAVORI PUBBLICI, *La ricostruzione dei porti marittimi nazionali*, Roma 1953, 463-464.

⁷ Al tempo del dominio spagnolo la città aveva perso (1678) il privilegio del porto franco, di nuovo accordatole (1784) dal re Ferdinando IV di Borbone per farla risorgere in fretta dopo il terribile terremoto del 1783. Successivi provvedimenti doganali presi nei primi decenni dell'Ottocento modificarono poi la natura delle franchigie concesse con il porto franco. Sul ruolo del porto di Messina nell'area dello Stretto tra il 1815 e il 1920 cfr. BATTAGLIA, *L'ultimo "splendore"*, 17-53 e 120-129.

⁸ Cfr. D'ANGELO, *Aspetti commerciali e finanziari in un porto mediterraneo*, 202.

entrate nel porto franco; e, quel che peggio, il personale addetto a questi uffici sottoponeva a veri abusi i capitani delle navi straniere, i quali dovevano sottostarvi, altrimenti le operazioni d'attracco e di trasbordo avrebbero richiesto una sosta di almeno due giorni, quando in un porto come Gibilterra simili operazioni non duravano più di quattro ore⁹. Oltre a non essere attrezzato con mezzi meccanici per il carico e scarico delle merci, il porto aveva banchine d'attracco mal collegate con l'entroterra e che al minimo acquazzone si trasformavano insieme alla strada marina in un pantano di melma, in cui le ruote delle carrozze e dei carri trainati dai buoi affondavano, schizzando i passanti e le vetrate delle botteghe situate lungo la Palazzata¹⁰.

Nel corso dell'Ottocento il porto peloritano era riuscito a svolgere comunque tre importanti funzioni, essendo stato scalo al servizio del proprio hinterland, posto di carenaggio, raddobbo e rifornimento per la navigazione, e punto di smistamento per il traffico commerciale. Col passaggio dalla vela alla navigazione a vapore, esso aveva assunto una particolare importanza pure come posto di rifornimento per carbone e carburante, divenendo scalo abituale per navi da guerra nazionali ed estere ed anche – soprattutto dopo l'apertura del Canale di Suez – per piroscafi di commercio e di transito oceanico, che con i loro approdi periodici fecero di Messina un porto d'imbarco per coloro che intendevano emigrare nelle Americhe e in Australia. Con l'avvento delle ferrovie, esso aveva visto sviluppare il trasporto di merci e passeggeri tra le due sponde dello Stretto, anche per mezzo di traghetti a ruota e vapore, tanto che una stazione marittima fu costruita nelle vicinanze del binario che dal molo sud portava alla stazione ferroviaria¹¹. Ciò aveva contribuito a peggiorare l'aspetto estetico e funzionale del porto, in quanto l'edificio della stazione appariva piuttosto miserello; inoltre, con l'aumentata domanda i vaporetto di questo servizio furono sostituiti con più celeri e capienti navi bi-direzio-

⁹ Al fine di accelerare la procedura di tali controlli i capitani delle navi dovevano pagare sottobanco, come 'douceur', delle somme in denaro e la moneta richiesta tra il 1830 e il 1850 era il dollaro americano. Ciò emerge dalla documentazione del vice consolato britannico a Messina relativa a quegli anni, ed anche da un dispaccio del 20 dicembre 1837 che il capitano Tonkinson inviò da Siracusa all'ammiraglio R. Spottford (HMS "Tribune"). The National Archives of United Kingdom (da ora NA), FO 352/60b.

¹⁰ Riferimento al problema e alla necessità di sistemare la strada del teatro marittimo in GIACOMO ROL, *Ricordi messinesi dal 1860 al 1875*, Messina 1877, 88.

¹¹ All'inizio i traghetti provenienti da Reggio Calabria attraccavano a un pontile temporaneo in prossimità della Cittadella, dove i passeggeri che dovevano proseguire in treno erano attesi dalle vetture ferroviarie per Catania e Palermo. I traghetti provenienti da Villa San Giovanni, ad eccezione del vaporetto che arrivava alle 9.15 al suddetto pontile, gettavano l'ancora vicino al Palazzo municipale e facevano sbarcare e imbarcare i passeggeri su piccole barche allo sbarcatóio di marmo. KARL BAEDEKER, *Italy Handbook for Travellers, Third Part: Southern Italy and Sicily*, Leipzig 1903, 334.

nali, attrezzate per trasportare interi convogli ferroviari, che in certi periodi dell'anno facevano fino a nove corse giornaliere e avrebbero richiesto la costruzione di due invasi d'attracco, ma solamente una fu subito realizzata, mentre la seconda era ancora in costruzione nel 1908¹².

Il traffico commerciale nel porto aveva tuttavia registrato a fine secolo una contrazione, che dipendeva tanto da fattori esogeni, quali la perdita delle franchigie, i dazi protezionistici, la crisi da offerta, la costruzione di nuovi porti e l'evoluzione del trasporto; quanto da fattori endogeni, quali la vetustà e la mancata manutenzione dell'intero complesso portuale, sempre meno competitivo rispetto alla mutata domanda del trasporto marittimo. I fondali lungo i suoi moli, essendo in prevalenza di profondità inferiore agli 8 metri, non favorivano del resto l'attracco dei piroscafi di grande stazza, le cui operazioni di carico e scarico erano aggravate dal vecchio arredamento e dall'infelice ubicazione delle banchine, tanto che spesso le merci, prima di essere stoccate, erano lasciate alla furia degli agenti atmosferici¹³.

Un attento esame delle vicende politiche ed amministrative di Messina all'indomani della Unità, e del dibattito che si sviluppò sulla stampa intorno al potenziamento del porto, porta d'altro canto a concludere che se da un lato le pubbliche amministrazioni interessate ebbero un'errata valutazione dei bisogni infrastrutturali da colmare per rendere lo scalo peloritano effettivamente competitivo, dall'altro gli operatori economici locali realizzarono in ritardo che lo sviluppo delle attività commerciali sulla piazza di Messina era compromesso dalla cattiva gestione e mancato potenziamento del porto¹⁴. Da tempo questo era in decadenza e necessitava interventi immediati, mirati soprattutto a realizzare quelle opere indispensabili per rendere più facile, più rapido ed economico l'imbarco e lo sbarco di merci e passeggeri¹⁵.

Non sempre, però, i piani delle opere pubbliche necessarie per rendere il porto rispondente alle mutate esigenze furono forgiati su tali finalità, anche perché i vari governi nazionali tesero a valutarlo solo in base al tonnellaggio del traffico commerciale, senza considerare il valore effettivo delle merci esportate, il cui prezzo di mercato era invece molto rilevante e faceva sì che in termini di valore esse corrispondevano ad un terzo di

¹² GIUSEPPE ROTA, *Trasporto merci a mezzo ferry boat*, Messina, 1910. Sul dibattito parlamentare a proposito del servizio pubblico di traghettamento sullo Stretto, e la possibilità d'istituire un simile servizio sul canale di Otranto, cfr. LAURA PULEJO, *Realtà economiche e territorio. Gli interessi italiani in Albania*, Cosenza 2003, 95-100.

¹³ PIETRO LONGO, *Il porto di Messina e la sua aderenza alla vita della città*, Messina 1934, 25.

¹⁴ GIUSEPPE GALLETTA, *Il porto di Messina nel primo ventennio del Novecento. Vicende politiche e amministrative*, tesi di laurea a.a. 1989-90, Università degli studi di Messina, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, relatore prof. Rosario Battaglia.

¹⁵ Cfr. CAMERA DI COMMERCIO ED ARTI DI MESSINA, *Commercio e navigazione di Messina nel 1897. Relazione sull'andamento del commercio nel 1897*, Messina 1898, XXVI.

quanto l'intera nazione esportava¹⁶; mentre all'interno degli enti locali interessati si stentava a trovare un accordo circa le opere d'avviare per migliorarne l'efficienza, la cui progettazione ed esecuzione in seguito all'Unità era divenuta competenza del Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici, che a livello locale operava attraverso il Genio Civile.

Provvedimenti di manutenzione e adeguamento del porto nell'Ottocento

Durante il Regno dei Borbone la manutenzione del porto di Messina era stata affidata ad una Deputazione del porto, sotto la cui supervisione alcune opere furono attuate per aumentare l'importanza dello scalo, migliorandone le strutture a spese della città. Risulta, infatti, che dopo la peste del 1743 un Lazzaretto più vasto ed arieggiato fu costruito a ovest della Lanterna di San Raineri¹⁷, mentre nel 1754 la banchina al molo del San Salvatore fu sistemata ed attrezzata con qualche albero di carenaggio per il raddobbo dei velieri¹⁸. La città spese pure ingenti somme per la riparazione dei moli danneggiati in seguito al terremoto del 1783 e ai bombardamenti del 1848, e per alcune opere portuali ritenute necessarie, quali lo sbarcatoio marmoreo semicircolare progettato dall'architetto Giacomo Fiore in prossimità del maestoso Palazzo municipale¹⁹ e l'ampia vasca di decantazione a forma di mezza luna alla foce della Bocchetta, concepita nel '700 dall'abate Giacomo Minutoli per risolvere il problema dell'interramento causato all'ingresso del porto da questa fiumara, e poi realizzata nel 1857-58 su progetto dell'ingegnere-architetto Leone Savoia²⁰. Inoltre,

¹⁶ FRANCESCO BERNAVA, *Il problema del porto di Messina. Ricchezza decadenza e ripresa del traffico*, "L'eco della Sicilia e delle Calabrie", 7 dicembre 1926. L'autore evidenzia che all'inizio del '900 il valore delle esportazioni dal porto di Messina si aggirava intorno a 100 milioni di lire italiane all'anno, e cita come fonte la relazione finale della Commissione reale per lo studio del piano regolatore dei porti italiani, presentata il 10 agosto 1905 dagli ingegneri Inglese e Simonetti.

¹⁷ Situato al centro della falce che delimita l'area portuale, per accogliere 'in quarantena' merci ed equipaggi di navi provenienti da porti 'sospetti' ed evitare l'insorgere di micidiali epidemie, il Lazzaretto fu gestito secondo una specifica normativa dalla locale 'Deputazione di Sanità'. Vedi *Istruzioni e Statuti particolari per il Governo di Sanità e Lazzaretto*, Messina 1753.

¹⁸ Ciò è riferito in *Il porto di Messina nel passato nel presente e nell'avvenire. Relazione degli'ingegneri cav. Luigi Borzì e Carlo Sollima Novi, compilata per incarico degli Enti locali*, Messina 1907, 7.

¹⁹ Fiore aveva pure curato il progetto per il restauro di questo edificio, gravemente danneggiato durante i moti del 1848. Cfr. *Guida per la Città di Messina del Cav. Antonino Busacca* (Messina 1873), reprint in *Guide e Annuari di Messina nell'Ottocento*, a cura di ROSARIO BATTAGLIA, Messina 1994, vol. I, 57.

²⁰ Vedi riferimenti a proposito in MINISTERO DEI LAVORI PUBBLICI, *Notizie sui porti marittimi italiani*, 163; e in *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 7 e 4.

essendo il molo dirimpetto al Porto franco (all'epoca situato nelle rovine dell'antico palazzo reale) ritenuto piuttosto angusto, la Direzione generale delle Dogane dispose nel 1843 che la sua linea di sbarco fosse prolungata sino all'isolato Siracusano, per mezzo di una cancellata in ferro lunga 130 metri²¹; mentre l'ansa del vecchio molo commerciale fu attrezzata con cinque gru fisse manovrabili a mano, di cui tre da 2,50 tonnellate ed una da 5 tonnellate, le quali ancora all'inizio del '900 costituivano gli unici mezzi meccanici per il movimento delle merci lungo la banchina tra la fontana del Nettuno e la Dogana²².

Tutte le operazioni di trasbordo continuarono, comunque, ad essere in prevalenza effettuate adoperando lunghi e stretti pontili e passerelle, su cui in file parallele i caricatori e gli scaricatori si affollavano, oppure ricorrendo all'impiego di barche a remi (i 'caicchi') quando le navi non potevano accostarsi al molo. Ciò aveva visto sorgere compagnie di 'barcaccieri' (per il trasporto delle merci) e 'barcaioli' (per il trasporto delle persone), di caricatori e scaricatori, e di stivatori, tutte coordinate e controllate da capisquadra, capi delle imbarcazioni, mediatori e appaltatori, i quali contendendosi il controllo del porto ne condizionavano ulteriormente l'efficienza²³; ma anche il fenomeno della presenza di ragazzini poveri che per una piccola ricompensa si rendevano utili nei pressi dello sbarcatoio, trasportando i bagagli più pesanti ai viaggiatori ed anche recuperando i piccoli colli che a volte nel trasbordo potevano cadere in mare.

Dopo l'Unità la questione portuale di Messina tenne a lungo agitato il Parlamento, non essendo stata in un primo tempo compresa. In considerazione della posizione strategica dello Stretto, i primi governi unitari mirarono soprattutto a rafforzare come base militare e area di servizio la zona falcata del porto, che divenne luogo d'insediamento per il Distretto militare, il Comando d'Artiglieria, l'Artiglieria da costa e la Stazione delle torpediniere, mentre la municipalità aspirava invece ad ottenere la piena

²¹ Ciò è ricordato in RICCARDO HOPKINS, GIUSEPPE MUNAGÒ, *Riflessioni sul nuovo progetto per riparto del piano di Terranova ed ubicazione dei magazzini di deposito, dock e dogana da costruirsi in Messina*, Messina 1867 (Estratto dalla "Gazzetta di Messina e delle Calabrie", a. V, 1867, nn. 50-51).

²² L'arredamento meccanico del porto di Messina fu rinnovato solo dopo la prima guerra mondiale, secondo il progetto presentato nel 1919 dall'Ente portuale di Messina e completato nel 1927. Cinque gru elettriche a cavalletto di 1,5 e di 3 tonnellate furono installate, due sulla banchina della Dogana, due allo sporgente del molo Norimberga ed una sulla banchina attigua, dove fu pure collocato un elevatore-trasportatore per il carbone di 8 tonnellate. Cfr. *Inaugurazione delle calate Norimberga e degli arredi ferroviari ed elettromeccanici del porto di Messina (discorso di V. Furnari)*, Messina 1927; *Porti Cantieri Navi d'Italia*, a cura di GIORGIO ROLETTA, Brescia 1934, 244.

²³ Sulle forme organizzative dei lavoratori portuali nei primi anni del '900 vedi ROLF WÖRSDÖRFER, *Movimento operaio e socialista a Messina (1900-1914)*, Roma 1990, 36-37.

fruibilità di queste aree, avanzando il presupposto giuridico della loro appartenenza al demanio comunale e non a quello statale²⁴.

Con il primo regolamento doganale del regno d'Italia, emanato con R. decreto del 29 ottobre 1861, la città ebbe riconfermato il privilegio del porto franco goduto sotto i Borbone; ma le successive istruzioni disciplinari del 28 novembre glielo annullarono, poiché per le merci immesse nei magazzini del porto franco stabilirono l'osservanza delle stesse norme prescritte per quelle depositate nei magazzini di proprietà privata²⁵. Un nuovo regolamento doganale, emanato con R.D. del 5 ottobre 1862, precisò poi che l'abolizione delle città franche sarebbe decorsa a cominciare dall'anno 1866, riuscendo solo minimamente ad attutire il malessere suscitato dalla nuova legislazione doganale²⁶.

Al fine di attenuare la delusione provata dai messinesi per la prospettata abolizione delle franchigie doganali del loro porto, grandi risorse e benefici furono fatti sperare dal previsto collegamento ferroviario di Messina con Catania, Caltanissetta e Palermo, e dall'avvio di opere pubbliche necessarie a migliorare le condizioni igieniche della città ed anche le sue strutture portuali. In particolare, nel 1863 i lavori furono avviati per costruire nella zona falcata un bacino di carenaggio ed una comoda banchina larga 9.50 metri ad ovest dell'ex Lazzaretto, i cui magazzini erano utilizzati ormai come deposito per carbone e petrolio. Tali opere rimasero, però, a lungo incomplete ed inutilizzate, e costituirono fino al 1882 un continuo passivo per la Provincia e il Comune di Messina²⁷. In città corse voce che per il bacino di carenaggio era stato concesso uno stanziamento governativo di 1.320.000 lire²⁸, quando in effetti il governo della Destra storica, avendo come obiettivo primario il pareggio del bilancio e poca comprensione della politica portuale da perseguire, aveva accordato soltanto l'anticipo della somma prevista per l'esecuzione di tale importante struttura portuale e destinato, nel 1864, alla copertura delle spese per la manutenzione ordinaria ed eventuale miglioramento dei porti siciliani appena poco più di 300 mila lire, che Messina ebbe a dividere con Palermo, Catania, Siracusa, Trapani, Porto Empedocle e Marsala²⁹.

²⁴ A proposito cfr. MICHELA D'ANGELO, «Un lido piegato a guisa di falce». *Storia memoria e progetti tra '500 e '800*, in «DRP», n. 4 (2002), 198.

²⁵ Ciò è riportato in BATTAGLIA, *L'ultimo "splendore"*, 23.

²⁶ Vi fa riferimento ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 43.

²⁷ *Guida descrittiva della città di Messina*, Messina 1882, 15, ora in *Guide e Annuari di Messina*.

²⁸ ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 43.

²⁹ FRANCESCO DE STEFANO, FRANCESCO L. ODDO, *Storia della Sicilia dal 1860 al 1910*, Bari 1963, 152. Sulle prime opere avviate dal governo italiano per migliorare il sistema di comunicazione nell'isola cfr. CARLO POSSENTI, *Relazione al signor Ministro dei Lavori Pub-*

Quando nell'aprile 1865 il definitivo progetto di legge sull'abolizione delle franchigie e dei privilegi doganali fu portato per l'approvazione alla camera dei deputati, gli emendamenti proposti a favore del porto peloritano dagli onorevoli Macri e Tamaio furono inseriti solo dopo un accurato intervento di Francesco Crispi, il quale rivendicando il sentimento nazionale dei siciliani invitò i presenti ad approvarli, perché riguardavano il futuro di un porto che aveva un'importanza nazionale, "per le magnifiche tradizioni del passato e la sicura potenza marittima e militare d'Italia nell'avvenire"³⁰. Conseguentemente, la legge che fu emanata l'11 maggio successivo vincolò la soppressione delle franchigie doganali nel porto peloritano al suo collegamento ferroviario con Catania, Caltanissetta e Palermo, e alla costruzione in esso di capienti Magazzini generali per lo stoccaggio delle merci³¹; ciononostante, riguardo alle somme concesse dal governo per incrementare le attrezzature portuali Messina sarebbe rimasta a lungo agli ultimi posti, insieme a Bari e Palermo³². Dopo aver deliberato con la legge sulle opere pubbliche del 20 marzo 1865 di unificare le precedenti disposizioni legislative dei singoli stati riguardo all'ordinamento amministrativo dei porti, il parlamento italiano fece in effetti passare altri venti anni prima di regolare con un'apposita legislazione i diritti e gli oneri che lo Stato avrebbe assunto nell'amministrazione dei porti.

Con la legge del 1865 i Prefetti ebbero attribuita la funzione di coordinare il delicato meccanismo del finanziamento per le attività di gestione portuale, che per l'80% gravava sul Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici e per il restante 20% sulle provincie e i comuni 'interessati'. La gestione del porto di Messina continuò così a dipendere essenzialmente dagli *inputs*, piuttosto disordinati, impressi dalla finanza pubblica nazionale e dalle condizioni spesso miserevoli della finanza locale, con l'inevitabile accendersi di liti e contenziosi; mentre sul piano dell'organizzazione corrente lo scalo peloritano rimase ancora esposto a sollecitazioni ed esigenze discordanti, essendo diversi gli organi amministrativi che dispiegavano la propria presenza sullo spazio portuale, in ottemperanza di servizi e funzioni che esulavano dalla semplice attività mercantile³³. Dall'insieme di competenze

blici di visita alle opere di ponti e strade, e di porti, spiagge e fari nelle provincie siciliane, Milano 1865.

³⁰ Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, tornata del 24 e 25 aprile 1865; inoltre, per la frase citata, cfr. FRANCESCO BERNAVA, *Il problema del porto di Messina. Come lo considerava un grande italiano: Francesco Crispi*, in "L'eco della Sicilia e delle Calabrie", 21 novembre 1926.

³¹ Ciò permise alla classe dirigente locale di ritardare il provvedimento fino al 1879, quando il R.D. del 9 novembre stabilì che col nuovo anno tutte le franchigie doganali sarebbero cessate. BATTAGLIA, *Mercanti e imprenditori*, 37-55.

³² *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 4.

³³ La Capitaneria di porto (legge del 20 luglio 1865) controllava tutte le operazioni di entrata, uscita, sbarco e imbarco dei navigli nazionali. L'Autorità sanitaria marittima

amministrative, finanziarie, sanitarie, tecniche che convergevano nella gestione del porto non emergevano poi responsabilità o competenze direttamente riferibili alle esigenze degli operatori locali, i quali per proiettare all'esterno le loro istanze di solito si affidavano ai voti della Camera di Commercio, che a sua volta li sottoponeva alla Prefettura, al Comune, ai Ministeri interessati, oppure direttamente al capo del governo³⁴.

Nel corso delle adunanze tenute in occasione dell'inchiesta parlamentare sulla marina mercantile del 1881-82 era intanto emersa l'opinione che l'Italia marinara, per vivere in libertà, mal si governava coi metodi e col culto della disciplina e delle norme proprie degli ordini militari, e che il difettoso ordinamento e il lento sviluppo delle opere portuali in Italia era dovuto alla mancanza di un criterio direttivo nell'azione dispiegata dall'amministrazione pubblica³⁵. In particolare, affinché l'azione del Ministero della Marina non andasse a detrimento della marina mercantile era stato suggerito di creare "un Consiglio non consultivo, ma realmente amministrativo che, collegialmente con le giunte comunali e le deputazioni provinciali, regoli la gestione della Marina mercantile"; inoltre, da più parti era stato auspicato che le capitanerie di porto fossero dipendenti dal Ministero dell'Agricoltura e del Commercio, "organizzate meno militarmente e formate da persone più familiari al commercio"³⁶. Di fatto, nei porti italiani continuarono a interagire più autorità.

Nel 1885, con le leggi del 2 aprile e 16 luglio, i porti italiani furono ripartiti in due categorie, ognuna divisa in quattro classi, secondo il concetto giuridico di tenerne presente l'importanza rispetto al commercio e alla navigazione. I proventi prodotti dai porti sotto forma di concessioni e di tasse sulle navi erano percepiti dallo Stato, il quale provvedeva al loro arredamento³⁷

controllava il Lazzaretto, determinava l'ammontare dei diritti sanitari di approdo, e stabiliva decisive limitazioni al movimento portuale in occasione di eventi epidemici, mentre la funzione di controllo sulle condizioni igieniche delle merci era esercitata dalla Direzione sanitaria e dal Consiglio sanitario (legge 30 giugno 1861). La Dogana era l'organo periferico dell'amministrazione finanziaria addetto alla percezione degli introiti e alla misurazione dei volumi di traffico. Il Servizio speciale dei porti, dei fari e spiagge aveva invece il compito di provvedere a realizzare, in collegamento con le autorità prefettizie, gli interventi in grado di modificare ed ampliare lo scalo portuale. Su queste diverse competenze vedi riferimenti in PAOLO FRASCANI, *Strutture e traffici del porto di Napoli: 1860-1960*, in "Memoria e ricerca", II, 2002, 41-62.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ *Inchiesta parlamentare sulla Marina mercantile (1881-82). Verbali delle adunanze della commissione d'inchiesta*, Roma 1882-83, vol. VI, 512; vol. VII, 162.

³⁶ Cfr. *ivi*, vol. VII, 62 e 164. Cfr. pure PAOLO FRASCANI, *Il mare*, Bologna 2008, 46.

³⁷ Questa voce comprendeva gli impianti ferroviari, le attrezzature di carico e scarico delle merci, le tettoie e magazzini di deposito, il cui esercizio era poi affidato dallo Stato ad Enti pubblici, come le Camere di Commercio, o a concessionari privati.

e ai lavori di carattere essenzialmente marittimo³⁸, assumendosi l'intero onere delle spese per le opere riguardanti la sicurezza dell'approdo e dell'ancoraggio nei porti di prima categoria, mentre in quelli di seconda categoria concorrevano alle spese insieme con la Provincia e il Comune, in proporzione ai servizi che ciascun porto prestava ai traffici³⁹. Bisogna attendere la congiuntura politica ed economica di fine secolo, però, per vedere organicamente riformulata con la legge del 14 luglio 1889 una consistente proposta di potenziamento delle strutture portuali nel paese al fine di accrescerne la funzionalità, e in cui rientrò anche lo scalo messinese. Dei 64 milioni di lire previste da tale legge per l'esecuzione d'opere portuali, il 10% avrebbe dovuto essere assegnato al porto di Messina, che con decreto reale del 12 febbraio 1888 era stato dichiarato porto mercantile di seconda categoria e di prima classe⁴⁰; ciononostante, i soli lavori progettati ed eseguiti in esso tra il 1895 e il 1900 furono le nuove calate per il molo tra il mercato e la dogana, e per quello ad ovest dell'ex Lazzaretto, che insieme comportarono la spesa complessiva di 536.000 lire⁴¹.

Nel corso del secolo le condizioni dell'ancoraggio furono indubbiamente migliorate, essendo stati eseguiti ai moli dei lavori per accrescere sia la superficie utile delle banchine che la loro altezza sul livello del mare⁴². Ai primi del Novecento le banchine del porto di Messina presentavano uno sviluppo complessivo di 2.060 metri lineari, e quelle riservate a uso commerciale coprivano uno spazio di circa 20.417 metri quadrati. I loro muri di sponda avevano tuttavia fondali varianti per lo più da 1,50 a 7,50 metri, per cui solo 1.350 metri lineari di esse potevano essere utilizzate per l'attracco di piroscafi e grossi velieri; mentre fondali variabili da 7 a 8 metri si avevano soltanto per 737 metri lineari in quelle addette al commercio⁴³. La loro distribuzione discontinua lungo la falce del porto contravveniva però a quella che ormai era la tendenza predominante nella progett-

³⁸ Quali per esempio la costruzione, manutenzione e illuminazione dei fari e fanali di posizione e entrata dei porti.

³⁹ MINISTERO DEI LAVORI PUBBLICI, *Notizie sui porti marittimi italiani*, 9-10.


⁴⁰ *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 4.

⁴¹ ENRICO ZAPPULLI, GUIDO LELLI, *Il porto di Messina 50 anni di storia*, Messina 1953, 21-23.

⁴² Il molo tra la Sanità marittima e lo Sbarcatoio era stato il primo ad aver avuto un ampliamento della banchina, che per 280 metri aveva fondali di 4 metri; tra il 1879 e il 1882 era stato poi realizzato un nuovo molo dinanzi ai Magazzini generali e alla Dogana, la cui banchina aveva fondali che variavano dai 4,5 ai 6,5 metri, e per ultimo, tra il 1895 e il 1900, nuove calate erano state costruite ad ovest del vecchio Lazzaretto, dove i fondali erano di 7 metri, ed anche al vecchio molo tra il Mercato e la Dogana che, essendo il solo ad avere 330 metri lineari di banchina con fondali di 8 metri, consentiva l'attracco dei grossi vapori usati per la navigazione transatlantica e per l'emigrazione. *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 7.

⁴³ *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 7.

tazione dei porti, cioè di realizzare calate uniche a grande sviluppo lineare e dotate di grandi spazi a terra⁴⁴. Inoltre, le opere attuate lasciarono molto a desiderare, in quanto appena qualche anno dopo il loro completamento le nuove banchine si presentavano già in cattivo stato, soprattutto quella del molo sud. Per realizzarlo i muri di sponda erano stati fondati sul fango, mediante una gettata di grosse pietre aggregate che in certi punti avevano subito ceduto, provocando in alcune parti della banchina un abbassamento di oltre mezzo metro, e per questo motivo già nel 1887 era stato necessario un primo urgente e costoso intervento di riparazione, che comprendeva lo spianamento del fondo antistante fino a 7 metri di fondale e la posa a



loro difesa di massi artificiali fino a 3 metri d'altezza sotto il livello del mare⁴⁵. Dieci anni dopo il problema si ripresentò nel tratto vicino alla Dogana e richiese nuovi lavori di riparazione che a giugno del 1898 erano ancora in corso⁴⁶.

All'epoca la responsabilità dello stato in cui il porto di Messina si trovava fu fatta ricadere sull'inerzia delle amministrazioni centrali interessate e sulle irrisorietà delle somme stanziare dal governo italiano per la sua manutenzione ordinaria ed eventuali spese di miglioramento, e che sino al 1901 sembra ammontassero in tutto a 1.088.000 lire; ma il mancato ammodernamento

⁴⁴ Ciò è riportato in PIETRO TORTAROLO, *Norme prevalenti nell'organizzazione dei porti moderni e loro applicazione eventuale al riordinamento del porto di Genova*, Genova 1890, 266-280, come citato in M. ELISABETTA TONIZZI, *Il porto di Genova: 1861-1970*, in "Memoria e ricerca", n. 11, 2002, 35, n. 54.

⁴⁵ Il tipo d'intervento effettuato per ampliare le banchine del porto è visibile sopra il tratto del rilievo eseguito dai tecnici del Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici per l'indagine condotta nel 1887. Cfr. *Album dei Porti del Regno d'Italia*, Firenze 1891.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*. Gaetano La Corte Cailler ricorda nel suo diario che il 17 giugno 1898 continuavano i lavori al molo vicino alla Dogana, crollato l'anno precedente, e che il 19 dicembre 1898 fu inaugurato «il prolungamento del Corso Vittorio Emanuele alla Dogana, dove fu abbattuto il recinto di chiusura, restando quella strada aperta al pubblico». GAETANO LA CORTE CAILLER, *Il mio diario 1893-1903*, a cura di GIOVANNI MOLONIA, Messina 1998, 114 e 133.

mento delle strutture portuali, divenute a fine Ottocento obsolete e fatiscenti, era conseguenza anche dell'incapacità mostrata dalle autorità locali nel programmare le opere necessarie e nel gestire le somme stanziare, da esse considerate irrilevanti rispetto ai "sacrifici fatti per lo scuotimento del giuoco borbonico"⁴⁷.

La sistemazione del teatro marittimo e la costruzione di nuove strutture portuali

Nei primi due decenni dopo l'Unità l'amministrazione di Messina fu controllata da forze politiche e sociali che, pur avendo come referenti alcune famiglie nobili (Natoli, Cianciafera, Silipigni), erano interessate al rilancio dell'economia cittadina attraverso l'avvio d'indispensabili opere pubbliche e la costruzione di strutture portuali in grado di compensare l'imminente abolizione del porto franco⁴⁸.

Fra i provvedimenti varati dal Consiglio comunale ci fu innanzitutto, nell'inverno 1861-1862, l'apertura di un prestito (800 mila ducati) per intraprendere importanti opere pubbliche⁴⁹ e il riavvio delle pratiche per rivendicare al demanio comunale l'area del braccio di San Raineri dove sorgeva la Cittadella⁵⁰. In considerazione della posizione strategica della zona falcata, i primi governi unitari avevano ben visto un suo rafforzamento quale base militare ed area di servizio per la navigazione; tuttavia, per accontentare la cittadinanza che vi voleva poter accedere comodamente anche da terra, il 21 settembre 1863 un pezzo del bastione Norimberga a sud della Cittadella fu abbattuto⁵¹. Quello stesso anno il Comune fece pervenire a tutti i proprietari degli edifici lungo il teatro marittimo la diffida a ultimare i lavori necessari per riparare e completare la Palazzata, ed anche aumentò l'imposta comunale per colmare la passività del bilancio municipale, provvedimenti questi che non mancarono di suscitare "mormorazioni e lamenti di scialacquo e sciupio" fra la popolazione⁵².

⁴⁷ *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 7.

⁴⁸ Sulla composizione del Consiglio comunale di Messina in quel periodo cfr. ROSARIO LUCÀ, *Cronologia delle amministrazioni comunali di Messina (1860-1990)*, Messina 1990.

⁴⁹ A giustificazione del prestito si portarono le opere necessarie per la demolizione della Cittadella, l'erezione del Camposanto, la costruzione di strade e il rifacimento del prospetto principale della Cattedrale, salvo ad effettuare poi altre opere di dimostrata necessità ed utilità. Sul prestito e il suo impiego cfr. *Atti del Consiglio comunale*, tornate del 6 novembre e 10 dicembre 1861; 17 febbraio e 7 luglio 1862.

⁵⁰ A proposito di queste rivendicazioni per la piena fruizione cittadina di S. Raineri cfr. SALVATORE BUSCEMI, ANTONIO e ROSARIO PICCIOTTO, *Ragioni del Comune di Messina sui terreni di Terranova di S. Raineri e delle antiche mura della città*, Messina 1861.

⁵¹ A proposito cfr. D'ANGELO, «Un lido piegato a guisa di falce», 198.

⁵² L'espressione citata è in ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 46.

Inoltre, il sindaco Salvatore Natoli propose di attrezzare il porto con un mercato per le vettovaglie da costruirsi al centro del molo commerciale, che nel 1864 fu realizzato in breve tempo con un'artistica struttura di ferro fuso e legname dal suo successore, il barone Giuseppe Cianciafara⁵³.

Negli anni seguenti la Giunta comunale affidò agli architetti Spadaro, Benincasa e Marabello l'incarico di stendere un definitivo piano regolatore e d'ampliamento urbano per Messina, poi approvato col Regio Decreto del 21 febbraio 1869⁵⁴, e fu pure impegnata ad esaminare vari progetti per la sistemazione del porto e del lungomare a nord della città, al fine di migliorarne l'usufruzione da parte della popolazione e al tempo stesso valorizzare le adiacenti proprietà immobiliari.

Per rispondere alle esigenze del commercio essa prese in considerazione la possibilità di costruire nuovi moli d'attracco, con fondali profondi ed ampie banchine, che facilitando l'approdo alle navi più grandi avrebbero portato un maggiore movimento di merci; ma fino al 1870, oltre alcuni lavori di manutenzione ordinaria, le uniche opere eseguite per migliorare l'attracco nel porto furono la messa in mare di un gavitello in lamiera per ormeggio, 310 metri lineari di nuove banchine tra la Sanità marittima e lo sbarcadero, e altri 35 metri lineari costruiti per il carenaggio nel braccio di San Raineri, per una spesa complessiva di circa 229.000 lire⁵⁵. Per la sistemazione della strada marina fu bandito un concorso ad idee, che alla fine portò alla segnalazione nel marzo 1870 di due proposte a pari merito⁵⁶, destinate ad essere tenute in poco conto, poiché ancor prima del suo espleta-

⁵³ Il mercato originale fu poi ingrandito verso il mare per ospitare alcuni posti addetti alla vendita del pesce, e la cui apertura avvenne a Natale del 1870, per mostrare "l'abbondanza pubblica e il decoro del paese". ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 85.

⁵⁴ Per il dibattito e le polemiche intorno all'esigenza di espandere il centro urbano di Messina dopo l'Unità vedi gli *Atti del Consiglio Comunale di Messina* degli anni 1866-1869 e 1870-1873; inoltre, FRANCESCO ALIBRANDI, ADRIANA SALEMI, *Dall'Unità al terremoto*, in GIUSEPPE CAMPIONE, *Il progetto urbano di Messina: documenti per l'identità 1860-1988*, Roma 1988, 93-120; ed anche MICHELA D'ANGELO, *Sul filo della memoria: una città tra "malcontento" e aspirazioni*, in *Gli anni dimenticati. Pittori a Messina tra Otto e Novecento*, a cura di GIOACCHINO BARBERA, Messina 1998, 21-31.

⁵⁵ Ciò è riportato in GIUSEPPE MARTINEZ, *Guida Manuale di Messina* (Messina 1874), ora ristampato in *Le guide di Messina*, a cura di SERGIO BERTOLAMI, Messina 2008.

⁵⁶ Secondo la procedura concorsuale, una commissione composta di tre membri (G. Moscuza, F. Torregrossa e F. E. Di Simone) fu nominata per esaminare i vari progetti, si riunì a Palermo dal 22 al 27 gennaio 1870 e chiuse poi i propri lavori il 12 marzo successivo, presentando una relazione in cui, "dolente per non poter rendere altro omaggio al merito degli autori", raccomandava i progetti siglati "L. M." e "Quod potui feci", poiché il primo rispondeva meglio "allo scopo che si ebbe nello istituire il concorso", mentre l'altro si distingueva "per larghezza di alcune idee, benché ora praticamente non attuabili, e per i studi relativamente maggiori". *Esame dei progetti per la sistemazione della Strada Marina in Messina*, Messina 1870.

mento la municipalità provvide a trasformare la riviera dall'imbocco del porto fino al torrente Giostra in un elegante giardino a mare, che fu inaugurato il 30 marzo 1868 alla presenza del Principe Amedeo di Savoia⁵⁷. In questo tratto la strada fu divisa in tre viali alberati che all'altezza del maestoso palazzo Bonanno e della villa D'Alcontres confluivano in un'area centrale attrezzata a giardino pubblico, con aiuole ad arbusti e fiori, sedie di ferro, chiosco per la musica, e un gran bacino di marmo sormontato da una fontana di metallo. Altri tre anni dovettero passare, però, prima che un accordo sul materiale da utilizzare per la pavimentazione stradale fosse raggiunto. Solo nel 1871 l'ingegner Domenico Scatolini ebbe affidato, infatti, l'incarico di lastricare a pietra lavica il Corso Vittorio Emanuele, fiancheggiandolo con due comodi marciapiedi. Appaltata per 435.764,30 lire, l'opera fu completata nel 1873 e costò alla fine circa 600.000 lire⁵⁸.

I lavori per la sistemazione del lungomare non finirono lì, poiché nel giro di pochi anni nuovi interventi furono necessari per installarvi i binari del servizio tranviario a vapore e i successivi pali della sua elettrificazione⁵⁹; ed anche per realizzare l'ampliamento e l'illuminazione delle banchine dalla Sanità marittima alla Dogana, dove col nuovo secolo quattordici lampade ad arco, della potenza di 47 volts e 12 ampères ognuna, furono installate⁶⁰.

La progettazione del bacino di carenaggio fu curata invece dal Genio Civile, che affidò il progetto all'arch. Francesco Damiani e la direzione dei lavori all'ing. Giuseppe Medici⁶¹. Avviata con tanto entusiasmo, l'esecuzione dell'opera finì col prolungarsi più del previsto, sia per vari ostacoli sorti nel corso dei lavori sia per il disaccordo tra Governo e Municipalità riguardo ai finanziamenti aggiuntivi necessari per completarla⁶². Sospesi i lavori, le opere già costruite si deterioravano e il bacino, pur essendo stato ultimato già nel 1877, ancora nel 1882 non era in esercizio ed aveva in

⁵⁷ ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 55 e 78.

⁵⁸ *Ivi*, 109; *Guida per la Città di Messina del Cav. Antonino Busacca*, 21.

⁵⁹ Negli anni Ottanta il Comune di Messina affidò l'impianto e gestione delle linee tranviarie alla "*Société anonyme des tramways siciliens*", una società belga finanziata dalla Banca di Liegi. Il servizio fu attivato a vapore su due linee extra urbane, la Messina-Barcellona e la Messina-Giampileri, con capolinea nei pressi dello 'sbarcatoio'. In una fase successiva avrebbe dovuto avere anche delle linee urbane, se non che la ditta belga che lo aveva in gestione ostacolò il completamento del servizio e, in un secondo momento, anche la sua elettrificazione. WÖRSDÖRFER, *Movimento operaio e socialista*, 42.

⁶⁰ *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 8.

⁶¹ MINISTERO DEI LAVORI PUBBLICI, *Notizie sui porti marittimi italiani*, 163.

⁶² Secondo quanto riportato da Rol, l'accordo raggiunto nel 1873 fu che la spesa per il Bacino sarebbe stata ripartita tra Governo, Provincia, Comune di Messina e Comuni del circondario. Nel complesso la quota di Messina per gli anni 1871 e 1873 fu di lire 109.871,51 mentre per facilitazione il Governo concesse l'anticipo della somma fatto in suo conto. ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 108.

corso altre opere di rifinitura, col risultato che alla fine esso venne a costare alle casse del Comune e della Provincia intorno a 3.500.000 lire, senza che la città ne ricavasse alcun beneficio⁶³. Inoltre, non essendo le sue dimensioni rispondenti alle moderne esigenze della navigazione⁶⁴, esso rimase a lungo inattivo, poiché in un primo momento nessuno mostrò interesse ad assumersene la gestione; ed anche quando fu dato in concessione il suo esercizio finì coll'essere sempre più oneroso⁶⁵. Continui cambi di gestione avevano fatto trascurare, infatti, la manutenzione della sua vasca che, a causa di numerose infiltrazioni d'acqua e delle pompe solo parzialmente utilizzabili, richiedeva per lo svuotamento cinque ore, ben un'ora e mezza in più del tempo medio necessario in un bacino efficiente⁶⁶. Ciò non impedì al bacino di Messina di svolgere tuttavia la sua funzione, dato che fu segnalato pure tra i bacini più frequentati d'Italia⁶⁷.

Più controversa fu invece la progettazione dei Magazzini generali o Docks, la cui realizzazione avrebbe contribuito a compromettere definitivamente la funzionalità del porto. Raggiungere un accordo sull'ubicazione e sulle caratteristiche strutturali del fabbricato che li avrebbe dovuto accogliere non fu facile. Una lunga contesa sorse tra il ceto mercantile, le amministrazioni locali interessate e il Governo, che fece slittare l'esecuzione del progetto definitivo di quasi un decennio, sebbene l'opinione pubblica cittadina concordasse sulla funzione essenziale che tale struttura

⁶³ *Guida descrittiva della città di Messina*, Messina 1882, 15.

⁶⁴ Il bacino di carenaggio aveva sulla soglia un tirante d'acqua di 7,92 metri, ma al piano superiore misurava 107 metri di lunghezza e 21 metri di larghezza; la sua capienza interna era perciò insufficiente per le navi di stazza superiore alle 3.500 tonnellate ed abbondante per bastimenti o piroscafi di piccola stazza, cosa che ne rendeva oneroso l'esercizio. *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 7; ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 48; ROSARIO POMARA, *Interessi e bisogni della città di Messina*, Messina 1878, 18.

⁶⁵ Assegnato nel 1883 in concessione trentennale all'imprenditore Domenico Collica, il bacino ben presto entrò in funzione sotto la direzione del conte A. Miglioretti e pubblicò pure il *Regolamento e tariffe per l'esercizio del Bacino di carenaggio nel porto di Messina*, Messina 1885, ma l'improvvisa morte del Collica mise il suo esercizio a rischio, poiché gli eredi non furono interessati a continuarne l'attività in questo settore. La gestione di questa importante struttura portuaria fu assunta allora dalla "Società del bacino di carenaggio" (in seguito rilevata dalla ditta "Bonanno & C."), che nel 1891 pagava allo Stato un canone annuo di 5.750 lire, poi aumentato nel 1895 a 7.666 lire; e successivamente, nel 1902, dalla società anonima "Cantieri navali, bacini e stabilimenti meccanici siciliani" dell'industriale palermitano Ignazio Florio, che l'ottenne in concessione per quindici anni allo stesso canone del 1895. Cfr. BATTAGLIA, *Mercanti ed imprenditori in una città marittima*, 88.

⁶⁶ A proposito vedi GAMBERINI, *Monografia marittima*, 106.

⁶⁷ Tra il 1887 e il 1903 il tonnellaggio totale del naviglio ricoverato in esso passò da 42.348 a 97.306 tonnellate, mentre il numero dei vapori salì da 36 a 78 e quello dei velieri scese da 7 a 1. MINISTERO DELLA MARINA, *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre 1887. Relazione*, Roma 1888, 278-279; MINISTERO DELLA MARINA e *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre 1903 Relazione*, Roma 1904, 242-243.

avrebbe dovuto svolgere per sviluppare i commerci e dare un lavoro quotidiano, stabile e garantito ai lavoratori portuali⁶⁸. Ritardando il realizzarsi del progetto la classe dirigente locale mirava a prolungare l'esistenza delle franchigie doganali che la città aveva goduto come porto franco, ma di fatto tutelava gli interessi ai proprietari di magazzini locati per deposito e a chi prestava denaro ai commercianti quando subivano pignoramenti, poiché offrendo la possibilità di depositare le merci in un luogo dove potevano essere trafficate senza altri impedimenti doganali la nuova struttura avrebbe posto un ostacolo a questi loro lucrosi affari⁶⁹.

Nella relazione presentata al Consiglio comunale nella primavera del 1869 la Commissione municipale per i docks riferì che due proposte erano state avanzate, una dall'architetto-ingegner Leone Savoia, secondo cui questi sarebbe dovuti sorgere a Terranova, accanto all'edificio della nuova Dogana⁷⁰; l'altra dagli ingegneri Riccardo Hopkins e Giuseppe Munagò, che suggerivano come luogo adatto la zona dell'ex Lazzaretto, in quanto prossima al costruendo bacino di carenaggio ed esterna al centro abitato⁷¹. Dei due progetti, il secondo rispondeva meglio alle esigenze del commercio locale e per l'espansione a sud della città⁷², tanto che aveva incontrato subito la piena approvazione della Camera di commercio, ma non quella del Consiglio comunale, che a riguardo mantenne una posizione un po' ambigua. Dopo aver inizialmente sostenuto il progetto Savoia, tra il 13 aprile e il 18 maggio 1869 la maggioranza dei consiglieri comunali sembrano mutar parere e si espressero a favore dell'altro progetto, tanto che persino una commissione fu nominata per compiere le opportune pratiche nella capitale. Al tempo stesso, per risolvere la controversa questione del luogo dove situare i Magazzini generali il Consiglio deliberò di chiedere l'intervento di un rappresentante governativo, il quale nella relazione sulla perizia fatta a Messina suggerì di collocarli a Terranova⁷³. Al fine di trovare

⁶⁸ Sulla cessazione delle franchigie doganali. *Rapporto dell'On. F. Loteta*, Messina 1875, 24.

⁶⁹ ROL, *Ricordi messinesi*, 93.

⁷⁰ L'area, nota come spiaggia delle Pagliarelle, era stata già in precedenza individuata per costruirvi il palazzo del porto franco, che nella visione dell'architetto Giacomo Fiore avrebbe dovuto essere situato dove un tempo sorgeva il Palazzo Reale e costruito con una grandiosa struttura in ferro e vetro, simile a quella del famoso Cristal Palace di Londra. Cfr. *Sul Palazzo del Porto franco da organizzarsi per Messina. Pensieri dell'architetto Giacomo Fiore*, Messina 1860.

⁷¹ Atti del Consiglio Comunale, tornata del 13 aprile 1869; ed anche *Relazione della Commissione Municipale pei Docks o Magazzini Generali presentata al Consiglio Comunale nella sessione ordinaria di primavera*, Messina 1869.

⁷² Per una dettagliata descrizione di questo progetto vedi HOPKINS e MUNAGÒ, *Riflessioni sul nuovo progetto per riparto del piano di Terranova*.

⁷³ La perizia fu compiuta dal cav. Bianchini e discussa nel Consiglio comunale del 18 maggio 1869.

una soluzione atta a rimuovere le obiezioni sollevate per la loro ubicazione al Lazzaretto, e che potesse servire pure da base d'asta per l'appalto dell'opera, nel marzo 1871 il Consiglio comunale affidò l'incarico di studiare questa relazione ad una commissione mista, composta di consiglieri comunali e membri della Camera di commercio, la quale suggerì di specificare nel progetto di massima che l'estensione e l'altezza del costruendo edificio andavano calcolate rispettando le esigenze militari del luogo⁷⁴.

Le amministrazioni statali interessate (Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici, Ministero delle Finanze, Ministero della Marina e Ministero della Guerra) mal vedevano infatti l'ubicazione dei Magazzini generali nell'ex Lazzaretto in quanto, oltre ad allontanarli dal centro commerciale della città e dalla dogana, essa richiedeva la costruzione di una strada ordinaria e di un tratto di ferrovia da realizzare a fianco della Cittadella e, soprattutto, non teneva in conto le esigenze militari e sanitarie della località, che come nel passato era utilizzata sia per le esercitazioni di tiro della postazione militare sia per le quarantene d'osservazione delle navi provenienti dal Levante⁷⁵. Di fronte al loro parere contrario il Consiglio comunale di Messina non ebbe la capacità di opporsi con convinzione, anzi avanzò una proposta di compromesso, che prevedeva di edificarli articolati in due sezioni, una a Terranova e una a San Raineri, collegate da una banchina di congiunzione da realizzare. Tale soluzione non incontrò l'approvazione del Governo, che acconsentì solo alla costruzione dei Magazzini generali a Terranova e all'eventuale utilizzo dell'ex Lazzaretto come deposito per il carbone e altri combustibili liquidi⁷⁶, cosa che per altro richiese la sua completa ristrutturazione ed anche la costruzione di una nuova banchina d'attracco con almeno 7 metri di fonda, i cui lavori ancora nel 1882 non erano ultimati⁷⁷.

Intanto, era divenuto evidente che senza adeguare le strutture portuali alle nuove esigenze del commercio marittimo anche l'efficace funzionamento degli auspicati Magazzini generali sarebbe stato compromesso; il molo davanti a loro avrebbe dovuto avere infatti fondali più profondi e banchine capaci, in modo da consentire l'approdo di navi più grandi e un maggiore movimento di merci. Dopo anni di discussioni, trattative e indagini tecniche, durante i quali la classe politica locale aveva stentato a trovare sui progetti presentati convergenze maggioritarie, il 14 maggio 1877 Governo ed enti locali interessati raggiunsero infine un accordo sugli aspetti finanziari, ed entro un anno la costruzione delle nuove banchine e dei Magazzini generali ottenne pure l'approvazione quasi unanime

⁷⁴ *I Docks di Messina. Relazione della Commissione mista eletta dal Consiglio Comunale e dalla Camera di Commercio, Messina 1871.*

⁷⁵ Atti del Consiglio comunale, tornate del periodo giugno-agosto 1872.

⁷⁶ Atti del Consiglio comunale, tornate dell'agosto 1873, dicembre 1875 e ottobre 1876.

⁷⁷ *Guida descrittiva della città di Messina*, 15.

del Parlamento. L'incarico di progettare le opere necessarie fu affidato all'ingegner Savoia, il quale insieme con gli ingegneri Trombetta, Guarnera e Raineri preparò il progetto definitivo presentato il 20 gennaio 1879 in Consiglio comunale⁷⁸.

Pensati per fungere d'ausilio ai nuovi bisogni del porto dopo l'abolizione delle franchigie, i Magazzini generali occupavano una superficie di circa 27.000 metri quadrati, di cui 7.900 coperti da sei fabbricati a due piani per deposito merci, allineati in modo equidistante lungo la banchina, e da un piccolo fabbricato per gli uffici, posto sul lato interno confinante con la nuova dogana⁷⁹. Pur essendo stati costruiti col concorso finanziario dello Stato⁸⁰, essi erano proprietà del Comune, ma l'amministrazione comunale del tempo non seppe affrontare tempestivamente la questione della loro funzionalità ed utilizzo. Ufficialmente inaugurati nell'agosto 1882, in occasione della prima Esposizione regionale di Messina organizzata al loro interno⁸¹, i Magazzini generali furono lasciati dal Comune a lungo inutilizzati, disattendendo le aspettative dei commercianti locali, che dalla loro introduzione s'attendevano vari benefici, quali la riduzione della spesa per lo sbarco delle merci e la garanzia della loro buona conservazione, il fido della Dogana per il pagamento dei diritti sui generi messi in deposito fino alla vendita, e l'assicurazione del credito presso le banche per trasformare all'occorrenza la merce immagazzinata in capitale circolante⁸². Il regolamento per la loro gestione fu d'altronde approvato dalla locale Camera di commercio il 13 dicembre 1893, mentre il Comune strinse un accordo con la Banca di Messina, cui concedeva i nuovi edifici in locazione per 25 anni, ad un canone annuo di 6.000 lire. La banca utilizzò la palazzina degli uffici a fianco della nuova dogana come propria sede, e a sua volta cedette in sub-locazione alla Società Italo-Americana Petroli i due padiglioni e l'area di stoccaggio accanto al binario ferroviario collegante la stazione ferroviaria con l'attracco dei traghetti. La società ebbe così in uso complessivamente 11.600 metri quadrati di superficie dove stabilire il proprio deposito e sull'area libera concessale collocò 8.500 metri cubi di serbatoi in lamiera d'acciaio per lo stoccaggio del petrolio, ed

⁷⁸ BATTAGLIA, *Mercanti e imprenditori*, 47 e 49.

⁷⁹ MINISTERO DEI LAVORI PUBBLICI, *Notizie sui porti marittimi italiani*, 162.

⁸⁰ Gli ingegneri Luigi Borzì e Carlo Sollima riferiscono che la costruzione dei Magazzini generali era costata 1 milione di lire, di cui 800 mila erano state stanziare dallo Stato. *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 7.

⁸¹ Per quanto è stato possibile accertare, la *Pianta dei locali della Esposizione* riprodotta in prima pagina dal quotidiano pubblicato a Messina durante questo evento è l'unica planimetria rimasta dei Magazzini generali. "La Mostra Siciliana", a. 1882, n. 8, Messina 15 agosto 1882.

⁸² FRANCESCO PUGLISI, *Messina e il suo commercio. Pensieri*, Messina 1879, 15-16.



Porto di Messina. Progetto del Genio Civile 1903 (da L. BORZI, C. SOLLIMA Novi, *Il porto di Messina nel passato, nel presente e nell'avvenire*, Messina 1907)

anche costruì vari locali dove confezionare e depositare le cassette di latta per la sua vendita⁸³.

Indubbiamente la soluzione prospettata da Hopkins e Munagò era la più appropriata per l'efficienza e lo sviluppo del porto, in quanto anticipava quella che da lì a qualche anno sarebbe stata la tendenza predominante nella progettazione dei porti. Con la costruzione di grandi vapori con scafo metallico, infatti, le quantità di merci e di passeggeri trasportati erano aumentate enormemente, e il frammentare in una pluralità di ponti le strutture d'accosto come principio cominciava ad essere ritenuto superato, tanto che i maggiori scali del Nord Europa stavano procedendo, dove possibile, a costruire calate uniche a grande sviluppo lineare e dotate di grandi spazi a terra⁸⁴. Invece, lasciando che i Magazzini generali e la Dogana fossero situati a Terranova la classe politica locale contribuì a limitare lo sviluppo del porto, e solo a lavori ultimati si rese conto che i loro edifici, posti com'erano in continuazione all'ampia curva dei palazzi alla marina, deturpavano la vista dal mare della città.

Ormai, il danno era stato fatto, e all'ingegnere Hopkins non restò altra consolazione che accusare pubblicamente il sindaco Cianciafara, che per

⁸³ *Il porto di Messina nel passato*, 7.

⁸⁴ Ciò è riportato in TORTAROLO, *Norme prevalenti nell'organizzazione dei porti moderni*, 266-280.

ripicca e grettezza d'idee aveva lasciato deturpare il piano Terranova con questi edifici⁸⁵, la cui progettazione sotto il profilo architettonico e funzionale fu aspramente criticata anche da altri, in quanto l'edificio della Dogana si distingueva "per spregevole e gretta architettura, senza fantasia senza concetto ben indovinato e senza una ripartizione che ben corrisponda agli usi cui è destinato"; mentre i Magazzini generali non facevano "bella figura per la troppa loro semplicità" ed avevano apportato "un restringimento del porto e la perdita della malaugurata banchina, per la cui sbagliata fondazione andarono perdute più che cinquecento mila lire, oltre a quelle che bisognerà spendere per rifarla"⁸⁶. Come un illustre personaggio britannico di passaggio nel porto ebbe a notare, questi sei edifici allineati con i loro tetti rossi e muri bianchissimi, sembravano costruiti ad imitazione delle casette giocattolo per bambini, e persino "la Croata Fiume sarebbe arrossita a possederli"⁸⁷.

⁸⁵ RICCARDO HOPKINS, *La vera piaga di Messina*, Messina 1882, 17-18.

⁸⁶ GIUSEPPE MARTINEZ, *Passeggiata per Messina. Idee storico-critiche*, Messina 1884, 15. Martinez riprendeva le critiche mosse dall'ingegner Hopkins.

⁸⁷ Ciò fu notato da sir Richard F. Burton (1821-1890), che si trovò a passare da Messina nell'inverno del 1881. Capitano di nave, esploratore, poeta, linguista e raffinato traduttore del *Kamasutra* e dei racconti di *Mille e una notte*, Burton fu pure console britannico a Trieste. Per le frasi citate cfr. RICHARD F. BURTON, VERNEY LOVEIT CAMERON, *To the Gold Coast for Gold. A Personal Narrative*, London 1883, vol. I, 10.

Lucrezia Lorenzini

Le Déroit de Messine et la métaphore de l'existence

*Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas,
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suavest.*

(Lucrezio, *De rerum natura*, II, 1-4)

La métaphore de l'existence et le parcours cognitif: communion de l'espace intérieur subjectif de la conscience et du temps intérieur subjectif de la conscience. Le Moi et la Mémoire comme mouvement dans le temps et dans l'espace, mais encore désir, tension de connaissance et de recherche, filtre et lumière qui nous orientent parmi toutes les pensées possibles.

Le monde merveilleux des monstres, mages, sortilèges et des tentations menaçantes ont caractérisé le déroit de Messine par une variété d'attitudes dans sa caractéristique non seulement de navigateur-voyageur, mais aussi dans sa signification du voyage comme valeur de métaphore non seulement de la condition humaine mais aussi et surtout de la connaissance: soit cognitive, violation effrénée du sacré, révélation mystérieuse et risquée. Le mer comme dépassement des dangers, des obstacles, des épreuves, d'expériences: ainsi comprise elle devient preuve de connaissances, recherche du nouveau voire défit à la confrontation: *πολύτλας*, parce que celui qui souffre sait oser. On enregistre un cercle, défini par un parcours, dans lequel émerge la réunion et la reconquete de valeurs de base. L'eau, comme le feu et le soleil, est synonyme de destruction, symbole d'un destin entendu comme nécessité inéluctable, prédestinée par des forces supérieures. L'on ne peut rien faire contre le débordement de la mer et l'homme, vis-à-vis d'une telle inéluctabilité, se trouve dans un état de passivité et d'inertie, manifestation très semblable à la mort.

La mer comme métaphore de la vie, ou bien comme bagage conceptuel fait de règles, de significations, d'ententes et de sous-entendus dont est riche la raison humaine. Et, c'est en vertu de cela, un monde fondé sur la recherche et l'inquiétude, sur les questions et les réponses, souvent provisoires: le «beau risque» ainsi le définit Platon, aujourd'hui nous pourrions le redéfinir à travers le terme «inoggettivabile», une voie de transition

plus que de séjour peuplé de personnages, caractérisés par *μήτις*, l'intelligence du stratagème et de la parole. Le voyage en mer c'est le chemin de la pensée, l'être masse, la profondeur des abysses, la métaphore de l'instabilité de l'âme humaine: il recourt à l'altérité et l'intériorité, au dialogue et au langage, à l'union et à la division; il est espace mobile, changeant, séduisant et insidieux. La recherche, l'immersion profonde, les réseaux de significations et le rapport entre l'anthropologie et l'inconscient mettent en exergue l'interaction entre les mythes familiers d'où l'on est ravi, et les explorations d'un monde et de son altérité. Il s'agit d'une comparaison entre deux diverses épistémologies maritimes: celle de la continuité et celle de la discontinuité. Dans la géographie humaine de la mer l'horizon devient le point de vue bipolaire: le point de vue de celui qui regarde la mer et le point de vue de celui qui se trouve au centre du bassin aqueux.

A la mer l'existence qui fait recourt à l'image du bateau est destinée à perdre son guide (visualisation de la raison) et l'homme, qui représente le drame humain, se sent à la merci de lui-même dans une vision de la connaissance, dans une péripétie du savoir et de l'âme, dans un état expérimental continu, parcourant des traces tantôt certaines tantôt instables. Et aussi, la mer comme métaphore de l'abandon; le navigateur devient naufragé dans les remous de l'existence, le but s'annule dans la recherche de l'illimité et de l'infini. La partie brève de la mer qui sépare la Sicile de la Calabre est la dimension de l'espace et du temps que tout individu mesure dans sa vie quotidienne en émotions et souvenirs; une glace d'eau qui dans la nature existentielle de l'existence se propose telle la somme de fragments, telle l'essence de lieux discontinus mais plutôt délimités par des parcours parfois inattendus, aventureux, souvent réinventés. Le détroit assure aussi une valeur anthropologique sous l'aspect magico-rituel, dans son appartenance psycho-affective qui unit la personne à son milieu, ce dernier ici entendu comme monde expressif, doté d'intuitions, de conceptions projectuelles, de procès expérimentaux: l'homme s'interroge sur son itinéraire et ce voyage prend la valeur d'une métaphore non seulement de la condition humaine mais aussi et surtout de la connaissance, de l'acte de reconnaître ce que l'on possède déjà. La mer et l'inquiétude, la non-tranquillité, ou mieux l'idée d'une relation irrésolue avec l'autre par soi-même, qui devient ainsi conscience pure de la limite et de la contenance de la raison, désespération existentielle de l'homme, dissacractions des idéaux, emprisonnement monstrueux des images qui accompagnent le progressif rapprochement de l'homme à son objectif final.

L'œuvre de Stefano D'Arrigo, *Horcynus Orca*¹, présente une structure

¹ Située en 1943, parmi les dévastations de la deuxième guerre mondiale, on raconte l'histoire de 'Ndria Cambria, simple nocher de feu Regia Marina, qui rentre chez lui

ouverte, ou coagulée seulement en partie, autour d'un centre qui met en ordre un système de valeurs et de rapports. La mer et la barque, les Fere et l'orque accompagnent le voyage de 'Ndria Cambria, pecheur et ame de l'homme, vecteur d'épisodes implantés entre les maisons de Messine et la rive calabraise entre l'eau abyssale du détroit et ses habitantes malignes: symboles d'une condition extrémiste, allégorie transitoire, instruments d'analyses, métaphore de la vie qui sous-tend à une existence pleine de risques et de peines. Les épisodes sont liés par analogie; le dialogue coloré du langage populaire domine². D'Arrigo pousse la page dans une sorte d'accélération mécanique oriente une prose recherchée et cultivée vers des réponses phoniques, d'imposants effets de répétitions, des variations sémantiques: et la page précise un univers de choses, qui bondit au simple rappel d'un mot.

A partir du texte et dans l'horizon du contexte on avertit une altérité personnelle, dont la compréhension est liée à la prise de conscience de sa situation, à la clarification de son affectivité, à la lecture de son existence. 'Ndria fait un voyage, linéaire dans sa délimitation de l'espace, labyrinthique pour son parcours de mémoire. Un voyage dense d'échos de mort, symboliques et marins; il ne s'agit pas seulement des Fere et de l'orque marine, élevée à Mort éternelle, mais de tous les éléments que la mort a semé autour d'elle dans le temps: le retour de 'Ndria dans le détroit est accompagné par l'assèchement de la mer, le «scill' e cariddi» devenu un désert d'os³. Tout est deuil, et la bière c'est la barque dans la fantaisie du

dans un village près de Messine. Notre personnage principal traverse le détroit de Messine, scénario de multiples rencontres, de figures mythiques monstrueuses dans un hallucinant paysage marin dominé par la présence des «Fere». STEFANO D'ARRIGO, *Horcynus Orca* (Milano, 1975).

² FRANCESCA GATTA, *Il mare di sangue pestato. Etudes sur Stefano D'Arrigo* (Soveria Mannelli, 2002).

³ GATTA, *Il mare di sangue; Odissee del moderno: Joyce e D'Arrigo*, dans Francesca Gatta (ed.), table ronde avec Giancarlo Alfano, Gabriele Frasca, Fabrizio Frasnedi, département SITLeC, Université de Bologne, 2 février 2005. Fille de Forco et de Crateis, selon certains, et de Tifone et Echidna, selon d'autres, Scilla était une très belle nymphe, qui refusa l'amour du dieu Glauco. Celui-ci s'adressa à la magicienne Circe, pour qu'elle préparât un filtre capable de rendre folle d'amour Scilla. Circe, amoureuse de Glauco prépara bien entendu ce filtre, mais un filtre de mort et le jeta dans la source où Scilla avait l'habitude de se baigner. Quand la nymphe toucha l'eau, elle se transforma en un horrible monstre au buste de femme, six têtes de chien, douze pattes qui sortaient de ses flancs et chaque tête possédait trois rangées de dents aigues. Terrorisée par son aspect, elle se jeta à la mer et se cacha dans la cavité d'une roche près de la grotte de Cariddi entre Reggio Calabre et Messine. Au passage d'un bateau elle penchait ses têtes et attrapait les marins. Ainsi moururent six compagnons d'Ulysse. Une variante du mythe soutient que Scilla, aimée par Poseidon, fut transformée par Anfitrite en un monstre à la tête et à la poitrine de femme au corps de loup et de poisson. Cariddi, fille de Gea et de Poseidon, vola à Eracle les troupeaux de Gerione et c'est pour ce gestes que Zeus la transforma

jeune homme, qui recueille les mots machonnés d'Orioles, l'étrange barque de Ciccina Circè apparaît dans sa mémoire comme une bière. Dans le roman D'Arrigo on entrevoit des différents niveaux de mal: le mal des 'vitoso', représenté par les Femminote et par les Fere et le mal absolu, radical, incarné par l'orque: «le progressif rapprochement de l'homme à la dernière et définitive réponse existentielle est toutefois encadré dans une dispersion de notes, dans un entassement descriptif des us, des milieux arcaïques, des maniérismes épiques, vernis d'une couleur grise décadente, et puis la «pantomyme» du père Caitanello»⁴.

Le «scill' e cariddi» est en soi-même un récit avec son éthique. Même s'il est plongé dans un élément aqueux, l'anthropomorphisme, soutenu par une éthique aux fortes connotations humaines possède tout élément pour se représenter et se raconter. C'est l'univers nocturne qui dépeint une autre vie où les hommes deviennent des ombres et les monstres ressemblent aux hommes. C'est en cela que sied la vraie nature de «scill' e cariddi»: dans une coexistence entre la dimension de l'insularité et le genre géographique, mais aussi géométrique, du détroit, interprété comme zone naturelle de paysage, séparé par de grandes mers, réalité suspendue entre réalité opposée dans une atmosphère «fabuleuse et métaphorique», alors que «s'impose une épique plus vaste du détroit» et «s'élève le chant de cette rareté de mer double»⁵:

Quella rarità di doppio mare, forse unico al mondo, affumicato fra isola e continente, come fra due sponde, subissato di reme, con pesce marino sopra e pesce oceanico sotto, doveva prestarsi a una perenne e varia imboscata, e quanto alle reti, in quelle strettoie, lo scempio e l'assassinaggio, laddentro, dovevano riuscire una meraviglia, una meraviglia sia d'utile e sia di dilettevole, perché a criterio della fera, col solo utile non c'è gusto⁶.

'Ndria dans son éducation à la mort, est impliqué dans des enchevetrements et des superpositions, plonge dans les mémoires ancestrales, récupère dans l'histoire des événements de la réalité et de la fiction en intervallant le recours sophistiqué au songe au ravissement métahistorique. L'ouverture à la totalité, suggérée par la mer et parce qu'elle est horizon dessinent des images qui débordent dans la dimension de l'infini:

E intanto guardava fisso il mare: un punto solo, ma come se in quel punto si raccogliesse tutto nel suo occhio. Perché, il mare sembra vera-

en un monstre marin, qui dans le détroit de Messine, face à Scilla, dévorait les navigateurs engloutissant trois fois par jours les ondes et les recrachait. Ulysse réussit à sauver par miracle de cette tentative d'engloutissement son équipage et lui-même.

⁴ GIUSEPPE AMOROSO, *Narrativa italiana 1975-1983* (Milano, 1983), 10-11.

⁵ AMOROSO, *Narrativa italiana*, 10-14.

⁶ D'ARRIGO, *Horcynus Orca*, 181-182.

mente essere tutto in ogni suo punto, se si guarda come lo guardava il vecchio in quel momento, col chiaro, profondo occhio, rigonfio di tutte le lagrime che possono riempire un occhio e l'occhio trattenere e mai versare, di tutte le lagrime di cui è capace l'animo umano quando è veramente felice e quando è veramente infelice, quando felicità e infelicità non si sa più che cosa precisamente sia l'una e che cosa sia l'altra, se si può credere di provarle, sentirle e vederle confuse insieme, indecifrabilmente, in un occhio che fissa un punto del mare al tramonto e si fa rigonfio di lagrime, rigonfio di tutto il mare di lagrime che guarda⁷.

Et c'est sur la mort de l'orque que les Fere semblent incrédules, il se lève une note d'illusion et d'ironie amère; 'Ndria rencontre des visages transfigurés, comme celui de Ciccina Circé, la femme magicienne qui l'aide à traverser les eaux du détroit en enchantant les Fere par le son de sa cloche. Les choix linguistiques constituent une fonction de leur être, les mots appartiennent à la sphère sémantique marine: «aloppiate», «linea del duemari», «affiumarato», «millunanotte di fatti e fatarelli», «uova d'anguilla», «delfino portafortuna», «pelliaquadre», «arcalamecca».

«Scill' e cariddi» se présente sous un double aspect, scénique et existentielle en même temps, dans lequel l'un (l'espace géographique) peut consentir la lecture de la vérité de l'autre (sa coexistence dans son non-être), et tout concourt à la lecture de l'existence. L'incohérence du temps est métaphorique, glace qui éloigne, espion du désespoir de l'homme, chronique multicolore de la quotidienneté effimère, images fragiles de l'homme oscillant entre temporalité et éternité, entre l'être et la transcendance. Les pêcheurs, ombres des hommes, fantômes dans l'attente d'une réalité, vivent une période d'attente, un détroit à traverser rapidement dans l'espoir d'accoster; pêcheurs, qui colment la faim comme dans un «effroyable voyage de connaissance», «che remano chini e assorti, in un gesto severo e immutabile, in un tentativo continuamente ripetuto di condurre l'imbarcazione dentro, più dentro dove il mare è mare»⁸.

Qui brise ce détroit de la vie, cette réalité faite de rien? Celui qui, pris dans son charme, transgresse une loi, qui semble éternelle. Au moment même où le voyage de 'Ndria arrive à sa fin que la réalité de «scill' e cariddi» est célébrée: existence et temps, vérité et communication conduisent le personnage hors de l'orbite du détroit. Dans le monologue de 'Ndria sur l'épéron face à l'orque mourante 'le temps intérieur' semble une éternité face au parcours bref du 'temps extérieur', développé dans le récit. Au voyage en superficie correspond un voyage dans l'obscurité des eaux abyssales, peuplées de créatures fuyantes, oxymores dangereusement séduisantes.

⁷ D'ARRIGO, *Horcynus Orca*, 199.

⁸ D'ARRIGO, *Horcynus Orca*, 7-8.

Le charme nocturne du détroit recommence après la parenthèse diurne de l'orque, qui au lever du jour rencontre la mort. Le détroit est donc le symbole d'une existence vouée à la destruction et à la désagrégation. Ce noyau symbolique construit le réseau du roman en le liant à une vision de l'existence qui fonde ses racines dans l'idée de l'inconsistance, de la fluidité et de la négativité du réel. Le recours à un langage caractérisé par des empreintes analogiques, par des adjectifs translétés, par des substantifs et par des formes verbales qui ont une valeur symbolique que l'attitude de l'écrivain extrait à la prévisibilité de schémas connus, met en relief un amalgame complexe de processus symboliques, d'où dérive une particularité technico-narrative, tressée d'analogies et de métaphores chargées d'une forte valeur sémantique. Mais, il ne suffit pas de définir les paramètres interprétatifs de la métaphore. En feuilletant *Horcynus Orca* on relève l'usage fréquent de la similitude; il suffit de faire référence à ses exemples: «quella faccia ovale e nera, specie di piatto colmo di grumi tenebrosi, sospesa per aria, sul collo lunghissimo gli ricordava i girasoli», «quel terribilio di animalone, con tutta la sua gigantesca apparenza di roccia levica», «il suo essere orcinuso aveva pigliato la via dell'aceto», «persino un verme di terra come dumdum».

La mer attire et rend timide; la mer est vie et mort; la mer qui offre la nutrition, mais elle est aussi risque et fatigue. La mer, qui sème l'effroi; la mer la voleuse, qu'il faut craindre et respecter pour ne pas être englouti par sa colère; la mer, qui dicte ses lois et impose ses règles. Le symbole cotoie le réalisme mimétique dans une froide représentation métaphysique et dans un favoritisme illustré qui accentuent l'atmosphère fabuleuse et métaphorique du détroit. Et les Fere représentent la menace obscure de la mer; «barbaro animale, capriccioso e pestifero» personnifient le symbole de la dévastation dans un enchaînement d'images, qui renferment la mort marine, l'Orque, «celle qui donne la mort, tandis qu'elle semble immortelle».

Le détroit se rompt, se teint de veinures furieuses aux créatures terrifiantes, qui remontent du fonds de l'abysse assoiffées de sang. Dans une écriture qui capture et ravit, D'Arrigo mele les thèmes, les tons, les atmosphères pour raconter l'histoire angoissante de 'Ndria dans une suggestive alternance de scénarios angoissants et colorés, pour narrer le voyage douloureux d'une âme à travers le langage de la métaphore marine et dans l'espace géographique du détroit de Messine.

THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA:
SCIENCE, FISHING & LEISURE

Oliver E. Craig - Marco Biazzo - Mary Anne Tafuri

Palaeodietary records of coastal Mediterranean populations

Introduction

The coastlines of the Mediterranean have long been a focus for human activity. Archaeological investigations have documented numerous sites dating back to the Upper Palaeolithic period (from ca. cal 35,000 BC), with more or less evident signs of continual occupation across the early post-glacial period (from ca. cal 12,000 BC). Evidence of a stronger cultural discontinuity is first documented with the arrival of early farming groups in the Neolithic (from ca. cal 7,000 BC). The development of hunting, farming, stock herding and fishing and the establishment of exchange and later trade networks have shaped the lives of Mediterranean populations. To better understand these developments and their impact on Mediterranean society, archaeologists have focused on providing evidence for food acquisition and production.

Evidence for prehistoric fishing, hunting and gathering as well as the inception of food production have traditionally relied on determining the abundance of plant and animal species, particularly from sites (often caves) with long, continuous occupation sequences, such as Grotta dell'Uzzo in north-west Sicily¹ and Franchthi Cave in the north-east part of the Peloponnese in Greece². In the Bronze Age, excavations of food remains on settlement sites, finds of vessels associated with food storage and agricultural equipment attest to the importance of food production and the establishment of the Mediterranean staples; principally grain (and other seed crops, such as legumes), olives and wine. The emergence

¹ ANTONIO TAGLIACOZZO, *Archeozoologia della Grotta dell'Uzzo, Sicilia* (Roma, 1993).

² THOMAS. W. JACOBSEN, 'Franchthi Cave and the beginning of settled life in Greece', *Hesperia*, L (1981), 303-319; T.W. JACOBSEN, WILLIAM R. FARRAND, *Franchthi Cave and Paralia. Maps, plans, and sections* (Bloomington, 1987).

of social complexity is strongly associated with the control over such resources and related redistribution, while the consumption of typical Mediterranean foodstuffs (i.e. wine and oil) has been associated with feasting among such emerging social elites³. In later historic periods, this is reinforced by written records which also document the establishments of trade networks for the distribution of these important cultivated foods throughout the Mediterranean region⁴.

Within the context of the evolution of the Mediterranean diet, the role of fish and other marine products, have received less attention. As a tradable commodity fish may have had less significance than cultivated products, at least until the classical period, when it was preserved by salting and fermenting. Yet a common assumption is that populations living on or close to the coast have always exploited the sea for a range of food resources.

This is backed up by finds of fish bones, molluscs' shells, fishing gear and boats throughout the region. However, until later periods when the activities of fisheries begin to be documented, determining the degree of marine exploitation has been difficult. Small, friable, fish bones are not well preserved and are harder to recover from archaeological sites than larger mammalian remains, severely hampering comparative assessments of fishing practices through the archaeological record. Conversely, marine molluscs tend to be over-represented in respect to other faunal remains. Some of these biases may partly be overcome by considering a single site with a long occupation sequence. In doing so, archaeologists have often noticed variation in the types and frequency of marine organisms that were consumed throughout a site's use. For example at Grotta dell'Uzzo, the influence of other subsistence practices, such as hunting of large mammals and later the arrival of pastoralism, in turn related to how and at what times of the year the site was used, may partly explain the variable finds of fish and mollusc remains in the different chronological levels⁵. Unfortunately sites such as Grotta dell'Uzzo are rare and, in general, we have little understanding of the regional or chronological variability in marine exploitation throughout the Mediterranean.

The traditional focus by scholars on economies and models of production has often detracted from other areas of research. In particular, patterns

³ YANNIS HAMILAKIS, 'Food technologies/technologies of the body: the social context of wine and oil production and consumption in Bronze Age Crete', *World Archaeology*, XXXI (1999), 38-54.

⁴ P. GARNSEY, *Food and Society in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1999), 22-34.

⁵ TAGLIACCOZZO, *Archeozoologia*; and KENNETH D. THOMAS, MARCELLO A. MANNINO, 'Archeomalacologia della Sicilia nord-occidentale: un programma di ricerca per lo studio dell'ecologia e della sussistenza umana nella preistoria tramite l'analisi dei gusci di molluschi marini da siti archeologici', *Quaderni del Museo Archeologico Regionale 'Antonio Salinas'*, VII (2003), 45-58.

of consumption are often overlooked. This is surprising since the remains of food preparation and consumption, i.e. bones, charred seeds, shells, flint tools, cooking pots and fire places, are often the most abundant finds on archaeological sites. Recent attention on consumption in archaeology has been associated with specific theoretical approaches⁶. When consumption, as opposed to production, is given prominence for the interpretation of past dietary habits the research agenda is somehow subverted. Patterns of consumption are read at an individual's level, within geographic, cultural, chronological boundaries, allowing individuals to become categorised, for example, by relating their diets to their gender or age. This presents another obvious goal for palaeodietary research.

However, reconstructing an individual's dietary record, in archaeological terms, presents a very different challenge. Again, it is important to point out that faunal and floral assemblages are usually highly fragmented and are biased towards the preservation of larger mammalian bones, rather than smaller mammals, fish and plant remains. They are also palimpsests deposited over long, or sometimes very short, periods of time and therefore inherently difficult to disentangle in order to consider the diet of an individual. Written records can be more valuable sources of information but they generally focus on describing the diets of urban elites and even then rarely describe an individual's complete diet. Only by directly analysing human remains can an individual dietary record be more rigorously assessed. In doing so, differential access to food sources according to an individual's status can also be examined. One method of directly assessing an individual's diet has been to study skeletal pathologies associated with dietary deficiencies (e.g. rickets, scurvy, cribra orbitalia)⁷ or dental diseases such as caries, calculus and enamel hypoplasia⁸. However, the development of chemical analysis of isotopes in bone collagen offers a more applicable and informative approach. Stable isotope analysis provides a direct record of an individual's long-term diet and is particularly suited to determining the relative dietary contribution of marine and terrestrial foods. For this reason it has been widely applied

⁶ PRESTON MIRACLE, NICKY MILNER, *Consuming Patterns and Patterns of Consumption* (Cambridge, 2004); and MIKE PARKER-PEARSON, 'Food, identity and culture: an introduction', in MIKE PARKER-PEARSON, 'Food, culture and identity on the Neolithic and Early Bronze Age', *British Archaeological Reports (International Series)*, 117 (Oxford, 2003), 1-30.

⁷ A. PAPATHANASIOU, 'Stable isotope analysis in Neolithic Greece and possible implications on human health', *International Journal of Osteoarchaeology*, XIII (2003), 314-324.

⁸ For example, CARLOS LALUEZA-FOX, ANTONIO G. MARTIN, 'Oral pathology on the Iberian Peninsula and Balearic Islands from the Mesolithic to present times', *Homo*, L (1999), 54-65 and PATRICIA L. STUART MACADAM, 'Nutritional deficiency diseases: a survey of scurvy, rickets and iron-deficiency anaemia', in MEHMET Y. ISCAN, KENNETH A.R. KENNEDY, *Reconstruction of Life from the Skeleton* (New York, 1989), 201-222.

to prehistoric skeletal remains from coastal Northern European sites. This research has focused both on determining chronological changes in diet at the population level corresponding to gross economic transitions⁹ and examining dietary variability within specific populations¹⁰. In Southern Europe and particularly the Mediterranean, stable isotopes have been less widely applied although there has been a recent resurgence in interest in this area and isotope studies are beginning to emerge. Therefore it is timely to review the existing stable isotope data so far collected from the Mediterranean area and also to make some suggestions for the future direction of this research. First we will briefly outline how stable isotope analysis can be used for palaeodietary reconstruction.

Stable Isotope Analysis and Palaeodietary Reconstruction

Stable isotopes are atoms of the same elements which exhibit different masses. The ratio of isotopes of an element often varies in different foods. When foods are consumed their atoms, with distinctive isotope ratios, are synthesised into the consumer's tissues, including bone. By analysing isotope ratios in these tissues post mortem using a mass spectrometer, an individual's diet can be reconstructed. Stable carbon and nitrogen isotope analysis of human bone collagen (a bone protein) is the technique most frequently used for palaeodietary studies. It has been widely applied to reconstruct past human diets from a range of geographical locations and periods¹¹.

⁹ For example, HENRIK TAUBER, 'C-13 Evidence for Dietary Habits of Prehistoric Man in Denmark', *Nature*, CCXCII (1981), 332-333; M.P. RICHARDS, R.E.M. HEDGES, 'A Neolithic revolution? New evidence of diet in the British Neolithic', *Antiquity*, LXXIII (1999), 891-897; M.P. RICHARDS, R.J. SCHULTING, R.E.M. HEDGES, 'Sharp shift in diet at onset of Neolithic', *Nature*, CDXXV (2003), 366; and J.H. BARRETT, A.M. LOCKER, C.M. ROBERTS, 'The origin of intensive marine fishing in medieval Europe: The English evidence', *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, CCLXXI (2004), 2417-2421.

¹⁰ For example, M.P. RICHARDS, R.E.M. HEDGES, T.I. MOLLESON, J.C. VOGEL, 'Stable isotope analysis reveals variations in human diet at the Poundbury Camp cemetery site', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXV (1998), 1247-1252; K.L. PRIVAT, T. O'CONNELL, M.P. RICHARDS, 'Stable isotope analysis of human and faunal remains from the Anglo-Saxon cemetery at Berinsfield, Oxfordshire: Dietary and social implications', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXIX, (2002), 779-790; and M. JAY, M.P. RICHARDS, 'Diet in the Iron Age cemetery population at Wetwang Slack, East Yorkshire, UK: carbon and nitrogen stable isotope evidence', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXXIII (2006), 653-662.

¹¹ For example, S.H. AMBROSE, 'Isotopic analysis of palaeodiets: Methodological and interpretive considerations', in M.K. SANDFORD, *Investigations of ancient human tissue. Chemical Analyses in Anthropology* (Philadelphia, 1993), 59-130; M.P. RICHARDS, P.B. PETTIT, E. TRINKAUS, F.H. SMITH, M. PAUNOVIC, I. KARAVANIC, 'Neanderthal diet at Vindija and

Carbon ($\delta^{13}\text{C}$) and nitrogen ($\delta^{15}\text{N}$) stable isotope ratios in human bone collagen provide an average dietary record of the individual ca. 5-10 years prior to death. Studies also suggest that bone collagen isotopes reflect predominantly the protein portion of diet, although this is modulated by overall nutritional status¹². Carbon isotope ratios vary principally according to the ecosystem that foods are derived from. Carbon isotopes from marine organisms, and therefore consumers of marine foods, are enriched in the heavier isotope (^{13}C) and therefore have less negative $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values compared to most terrestrial consumers. However, consumers of terrestrial C4 plants (mainly tropical sedges and grasses) are also enriched in ^{13}C relative to C3 plants (most temperate grasses and dicotyledonous plants) providing a possibility of overlap with marine consumers.

Stable nitrogen isotope ratios indicate the trophic level of the consumer and are enriched ca. 3‰ in the heavier isotope (^{15}N) with increasing trophic level. Therefore nitrogen isotopes also provide a good basis for discriminating marine from terrestrial consumers as marine foods are usually at higher trophic level and thus more enriched in ^{15}N . They can also be used to discriminate herbivores from carnivores. It is worth noting that isotope ratios in the same foodstuffs may vary geographically and temporally¹³ therefore accurate reconstruction of diet is only possible by measuring stable isotope ratios in bone collagen from associated faunal remains. Associated plant materials are not generally available from archaeological sites for analysis therefore assumptions have to be made by considering isotope ratios in modern plant materials and archaeological herbivore bone collagen. Carbon isotope values of consumers are also slightly enriched in the heavier isotope (by ca. 1‰) compared to the foods they eat, i.e. by trophic level.

Neanderthal predation: The evidence from stable isotopes', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, XCVII (2000), 7663-7666; M.J. SCHOENINGER, K. MOORE, 'Bone Stable Isotope Studies in Archaeology', *Journal of World Prehistory*, VI (1992), 247-296; and A.H. THOMPSON, M.P. RICHARDS, A. SHORTLAND, S.R. ZAKRZEWSKI, 'Isotopic palaeodiet studies of Ancient Egyptian fauna and humans', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXXII (2005), 451-463.

¹² S. JIM, V. JONES, S.H. AMBROSE, R.P. EVERSLED, 'Quantifying dietary macronutrient sources of carbon for bone collagen biosynthesis using natural abundance stable carbon isotope analysis', *British Journal of Nutrition*, XCV (2006), 1055-1062; M. MURRAY, M. SCHOENINGER, 'Diet, status and complex social structure in Iron Age Central Europe: some contributions of bone chemistry', in D.B. GIBSON, M.N. GESELOWITZ, *Tribe and Polity in Late Prehistoric Europe: Demography, Production and Exchange in the Evolution of Complex Social Systems*. New York: Plenum (New York, 1988), 155-176; and R. HEDGES, 'Where does our protein carbon come from?', *British Journal of Nutrition*, XCV (2006), 1031-1032.

¹³ N. MILNER, O. E. CRAIG, G. N. BAILEY, K. PEDERSEN, S. H. ANDERSEN, 'Something fishy in the Neolithic? A re-evaluation of stable isotope analysis of Mesolithic and Neolithic coastal populations', *Antiquity*, LXXVIII (2004), 9-22.

Application of Stable Isotope Analysis to Mediterranean Populations

So far, there has only been a handful of stable isotope studies conducted on coastal Mediterranean populations. However, some data from pre-agricultural and Neolithic populations are available¹⁴. Richards and Hedges¹⁵ have also conducted wide-spread stable isotope analysis from the Bronze Age of the Aegean and van Strydonck¹⁶ has compiled data from later prehistoric sites on the Balearic isles. In later periods, bones from the Roman cemetery at Isola Sacra, close to Rome¹⁷, and from the Middle Byzantine site of Kastella, Crete¹⁸ have been analysed isotopically. There are also a number of stable carbon isotope ($\delta^{13}\text{C}$) measurements available through radiocarbon dating programs. The available data is summarised in Table 1.

Isotope Measurements of Faunal Remains

Interpretation of the human data sets to determine the degree of marine exploitation is complicated by the fact that marine and terrestrial theoretical isotopic end points (i.e. the isotope values corresponding to 100% marine or terrestrial diets) are not well defined for the Mediterranean region. This data may be ascertained by considering the isotope values of fauna with known diets, ideally on a site-specific basis, as they may vary slight-

¹⁴ P. FRANCALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element and stable isotope data from two Italian coastal sites', *Rivista di Antropologia*, LXVI (1988), 239-250; E. GARCIA GUIXÉ, M.P. RICHARDS, M.E. SUBIRA, 'Palaeodietary Analysis of Humans and Fauna from the Spanish Mesolithic Site of El Collado', *Current Anthropology*, XLVII (2206), 549-556; A. PAPATHANASIOU, 'Stable isotope analysis'; and M.P. RICHARDS, R.E.M. HEDGES, I. WALTON, S. STODDART, C. MALONE, 'Neolithic Diet at the Brochtorff circle, Malta', *European Journal of Archaeology*, IV (2001), 253-262.

¹⁵ M.P. RICHARDS, R.E.M. HEDGES, 'Stable isotope evidence of past human diet at the sites of Gerani, Armenoi and Mycenae', in H. MARTLEW, Y. TZEDAKIS, *Minoans and Mycenaean: Flavours of their Times* (Athens, 2002), 210-231.

¹⁶ M. VAN STRYDONCK, M. BOUDIN, A. ERVYNCK, 'Stable isotopes (^{13}C and ^{15}N) and diet: animal and human bone collagen from prehistoric sites on Mallorca, Menorca and Formentera (Balearic Islands, Spain)', *British Archaeology Reports (International Series)*, MXCV, (2001), 189-197.

¹⁷ T. PROWSE, H. P. SCHWARCZ, S. SAUNDERS, R. MACCHIARELLI, LUCA BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic evidence for age-related variation in diet from Isola Sacra, Italy', *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, CXXVIII (2005), 2-13; and PROWSE, SCHWARCZ, SAUNDERS, MACCHIARELLI, BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic paleodiet studies of skeletons from the Imperial Roman age cemetery of Isola Sacra, Rome, Italy', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXXI (2004), 259-272.

¹⁸ C. BOURBOU, M.P. RICHARDS, 'The Middle Byzantine Menu: Palaeodietary Information from Isotopic Analysis of Humans and Fauna from Kastella, Crete', *International Journal of Osteoarchaeology* (in press). Data not yet available.

ly by geographical location¹⁹. However, by considering the available published isotope values made on archaeological terrestrial herbivores [$n=79$] from the central Mediterranean region as a whole, the values are quite consistent ($\delta^{13}\text{C} = -20.3 \pm 0.9 \text{‰}$)²⁰. This value serves as a theoretical end-point corresponding to a 100% terrestrial diet for this region. The results also indicate that there is very little input of wild or cultivated C4 plants to animal's diet throughout these periods (Mesolithic to Roman) which is broadly consistent with other evidence²¹. Far fewer isotopes measurements have been made on archaeological marine fauna from the Mediterranean region. In total only two values are available from fish bones ($\delta^{13}\text{C} = -10.3 \pm 0.3 \text{‰}$) and one value from a cetacean bone ($\delta^{13}\text{C} = -17.1 \text{‰}$), all recovered from Mesolithic layers at Grotta dell'Uzzo²². Based on these data and also the values from modern Mediterranean fish tissues, Garcia Guixé et al.²³ have tentatively used a theoretical marine end-point of -12‰ to interpret the diets of individuals at the Spanish Mesolithic site of El Collado. Clearly, however, more data from archaeological specimens of marine organisms are needed to confirm this value.

Nitrogen isotope values of Mediterranean terrestrial herbivores are more variable ($\delta^{15}\text{N} = +5.2 \pm 1.7 \text{‰}$)²⁴ but broadly consistent with values from Northern Europe. This value corresponds to 100% consumption of plant foods and thus $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ values of ca. 6–10‰ would correspond to the 100% consumption of herbivores. It is assumed, therefore, that $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ values above

¹⁹ For example, G.J. VAN KLINKEN, H. VAN DER PLICHT, R.E.M. HEDGES, 'Bone 13C/12C ratios reflect (palaeo-) climatic variations', *Geophysical Research Letters*, XXI (1994), 445-448.

²⁰ FRANCALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element', 239-250; GUIXÉ, RICHARDS, SUBIRA, 'Palaeodietary Analysis', 549-556; PROWSE, SCHWARCZ, SAUNDERS, MACCHIARELLI, BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic paleodiet studies', 259-272; VAN STRYDONCK, BOUDIN, ERVYNCK, 'Stable isotopes', 189-197.

²¹ Isotope studies have shown that *millet* (a C4 plant) was cultivated both for human and animal consumption during the Iron Age of Central Europe [M. MURRAY, M. SCHOENINGER, 'Diet, status and complex social structure in Iron Age Central Europe: some contributions of bone chemistry', in D.B. GIBSON, M.N. GESELOWITZ, *Tribe and Polity in Late Prehistoric Europe: Demography, Production and Exchange in the Evolution of Complex Social Systems* (New York, 1988), 155-176]. There is also some historical evidence for the use of millet as animal fodder during the Roman period [For example, M.S. SPURR, 'The cultivation of millet in Roman Italy', *Papers of the British School at Rome*, LI (1983), 1-15]. However, there is relatively little isotopic or botanical evidence for the cultivation or consumption of millet by humans or animals in Southern Europe in previous periods.

²² FRANCALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element', 239-250.

²³ GARCIA GUIXÉ, RICHARDS, SUBIRA, 'Palaeodietary Analysis', 549-556.

²⁴ For example, FRANCALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element', 239-250; GUIXÉ, RICHARDS, SUBIRA, 'Palaeodietary Analysis', 549-556; PROWSE, SCHWARCZ, SAUNDERS, MACCHIARELLI, BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic paleodiet studies', 259-272; and VAN STRYDONCK, BOUDIN, ERVYNCK, 'Stable isotopes', 189-197.

10‰ indicate the presence of high trophic level marine or freshwater fish in the diet. There are, however, no isotope measurements of high trophic level marine mammals available from the Mediterranean region to indicate the marine $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ theoretical end-point. Tentatively this value is estimated to be ca. 15‰ ($\pm 1\%$) based on measurements made on Northern Europe seals²⁵.

Gross Changes in Marine Exploitation through Time

The Mediterranean Sea and its coastal zones offer a wide range of food resources which may have been variably exploited over its long history. In this context, certain social and economic events have to be considered, most importantly perhaps was the arrival of agriculture (mainly grain but also legumes) and pastoralism (mainly sheep/goat) in the Neolithic period (from 7,000 cal BC)²⁶ but also the development of long-distance exchange and trade networks in the historical period which brought new food products from foreign shores. Given these social and economic developments, it is interesting to consider the contribution of marine foods to the Mediterranean diet through time. This same question has been recently tackled for Northern European contexts using stable isotopes. Isotopic analysis of bones from prehistoric and historical coastal sites have suggested that marine foods were hardly exploited at all after the arrival of agriculture in this region (ca. 4,000 cal BC) until a resurgence in much later periods (e.g. Viking/Norse)²⁷. The implications of this research are startling and imply that even populations living in coastal zones relied much more heavily on terrestrial cultivated and pastoral products rather than seafood. Could this same pattern be repeated in the Mediterranean?

In Figure 1, $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ are plotted against the available radiocarbon data (since 6,000 cal BC) for coastal Mediterranean populations. These data however excludes the majority of studies where stable isotope analysis has been performed on bone without associated radiocarbon dates. In

²⁵ O.E. CRAIG, R. ROSS, N. MILNER, G.N. BAILEY, 'Sulphur Isotope variation in Archaeological Marine Fauna from Northern Europe', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXXIII (2006), 1642-1646; and M.P. RICHARDS, R.E.M. HEDGES, 'Stable isotope evidence for similarities in the types of marine foods used by late mesolithic humans at sites along the Atlantic coast of Europe', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXVI (1999), 717-722.

²⁶ J. ZILHAO, 'Radiocarbon evidence for maritime pioneer colonization at the origins of farming in west Mediterranean Europe', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, XCVIII (2001), 14180-14185.

²⁷ RICHARDS, HEDGES, 'A Neolithic Revolution'; RICHARDS, SCHULTING, HEDGES, 'Sharp shift in diet'; M.P. RICHARDS, B.T. FULLER, T.I. MOLLESON, 'Stable isotope palaeodiet study of humans and fauna from the multi-period (Iron Age, Viking and Late Medieval) site of Newark Bay, Orkney', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXXIII (2006), 122-131; and TAUBER, 'C-13 Evidence', 332-333.

Figure 2, samples with both $\delta^{13}\text{N}$ and $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ values are plotted and have been ordered according to nominal chronological age categories (phases). This data set does not include samples where only $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ measurements were made, therefore excluding the majority of data from radiocarbon date lists. Also plotted in Figure 2 are Mesolithic samples from coastal Scotland²⁸, demonstrating the values for a diet thought to consist almost entirely of marine foods, albeit from the Atlantic rather than Mediterranean. A summary of this data set, including site names and mean ^{13}C values, is included in Table 1. Care has to be exercised when interpreting this data set as within each phase the data is often skewed by the inclusions of a large number of individuals from a single site. For example, data from the phase corresponding to 1,000 BC to 500 AD is largely derived from a study of the Imperial Roman cemetery at Isola Sacra, near Rome²⁹. Nevertheless, some general observations can be tentatively offered³⁰.

The range of $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values from all the Mediterranean sites is from ca. -21.5‰ to -17‰ . If a carbon isotope endpoint of -12‰ corresponding to 100% marine diet is considered, it seems that none of the humans consumed very high levels of marine foods in any period³¹. Whilst a significant number of individuals have $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values range from -18 to -17‰ and $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ above 10‰ , indicating a moderate (25-40%) marine contribution to diet, the majority have $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values close to the terrestrial end-point of -20‰ ($\pm 1\text{‰}$)³². Significantly this also includes the data from pre-agricultural sites which contrasts significantly with pre-agricultural populations living along the Atlantic coast whose diets were rich in marine foods (Figure 2). With the arrival of agriculture in the Mediterranean (from 6,500 cal B), there is no significant difference in $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values and if anything some of the most heavy marine consumers date to this period. Again this contrasts sharply with the data from the Atlantic coast, where it has been suggested, based on the isotope evidence, that there was a shift to a terrestrial diet with the onset of the Neolithic period (ca. 4,000 cal BC) denot-

²⁸ M.P. RICHARDS, P.A. MELLARS, 'Stable isotopes and the seasonality of the Oronsay middens', *Antiquity*, LXXII (1998), 178-184.

²⁹ PROWSE, SCHWARCZ, SAUNDERS, MACCHIARELLI, BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic palaeodiet studies', 259-272.

³⁰ FRANICALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element', 549-556; and GARCIA GUIXÉ, RICHARDS, SUBIRA, 'Palaeodietary Analysis', 549-556.

³¹ D. LUBELL, M. JACKES, H. SCHWARCZ, M. KNYF, C. MEIKLEJOHN, 'The Mesolithic Neolithic Transition in Portugal - Isotopic and Dental Evidence of Diet', *Journal of Archaeological Science*, XXI (1994), 201-216; RICHARDS, MELLARS, 'Stable isotopes'; R.J. SCHULTING, M.P. RICHARDS, 'Dating women and becoming farmers: New palaeodietary and AMS dating evidence from the Breton Mesolithic cemeteries of Teviec and Hoedic', *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology*, XX (2001), 314-344; and TAUBER, 'C-13 Evidence', 332-333.

³² For example, from Franchthi Cave, cf. PAPATHANASIOU, 'Stable isotope analysis', 314-324.

ed by much lighter $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values³³. From the Middle Neolithic (ca. 5,000 cal BC) and into the Bronze Age the stable isotope data points again to a heavy reliance on terrestrial foods by coastal populations although there are exceptions, especially in the Bronze Age. The Bronze Age sample is dominated by individuals from the Aegean³⁴. The samples from Mycenae in particular are more variable in both $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ and $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ than the other samples during this period and clearly some individuals had consumed marine foods. This perhaps reflects social differentiation during this period especially considering the sites chosen for analysis (see below). At the Bronze Age settlement of Gatas, 5km from the coast near Almeria, the $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values are also relatively enriched in the heavier isotope (Figure 1, Table 1) suggesting some input of marine foods. Of all the Mediterranean data, only those from the Roman Cemetery at Isola Sacra are consistently enriched in $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ and $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ and individuals from this site are clearly discernable from Bronze Age samples and those dating to the latter part of the Neolithic (Figure 2)³⁵. However, even at this site, the isotope data indicates that marine foods were only a minor component to an overall terrestrial based diet.

Intra-population Variability in Marine Consumption

Fish is often considered to be a high status food and probably was less available compared to staples such as grain. However, other marine foods such as fish by-products and inter-tidal molluscs may have been considered less valuable or may have been more available in the past. In addition, the perceived importance of marine foods and their distribution was likely to be variable both chronologically and geographically according to availability and cultural preference. Nevertheless, differential access to marine foods may have existed within a society according to age, gender, social status or professional role. Generally there is not enough stable isotope data from a single Mediterranean population to test these hypotheses. There are however exceptions. At Mycenae, the isotopic evidence shows that some of the individuals buried in the royal graves had more marine diets compared to those buried in chambered tombs³⁶. Also at the Imperial Roman cemetery at Isola Sacra, where a large number of individuals were considered, there appears to have been greater consumption of marine foods by older members of society (alternatively, those mem-

³³ RICHARDS, SCHULTING, HEDGES, 'Sharp shift in diet', 366.

³⁴ RICHARDS, HEDGES, 'Stable isotope evidence', 210-231.

³⁵ PROWSE, SCHWARCZ, SAUNDERS, MACCHIARELLI, BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic paleodiet studies', 259-272.

³⁶ RICHARDS, HEDGES, 'Stable isotope evidence', 210-231.

bers of the population who consumed a greater proportion of marine foods lived longer)³⁷.

Conclusions

From the available evidence, it seems that there is a different long-term trend in marine exploitation by Mediterranean populations compared to those from Northern and Western Europe. Notably, there is little isotopic evidence that marine foods have ever made a hugely significant contribution to the Mediterranean diet, despite some evidence for moderate consumption in specific periods³⁸. This finding contrasts sharply with many historical accounts and archaeological evidence for fishing in this region. These discrepancies can only be reconciled by further research aimed at enhancing the interpretation of both isotopic and archaeological data sets. As we have pointed out, dietary end-points corresponding to 100% consumption of marine foods are not well defined for the Mediterranean region³⁹. This has hampered an accurate assessment of the relative dietary contribution of marine and terrestrial foods based on the current data set. For example, if the marine end-point for $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ were significantly more negative than -12% , then the marine dietary contribution based on the current model would be severely under-estimated. Conversely, if the isotope record is correct then perhaps the interpretation of the archaeological evidence for marine exploitation needs to be re-evaluated and the importance of terrestrial foods even at coastal locations should be given more prominence⁴⁰.

Acknowledgements

We particularly thank the organisers of the 2nd Mediterranean Maritime History Network Conference at Messina/Taormina for providing such a stimulating session. The inspiration for this work came from a workshop entitled 'Diet and Migration in Mediterranean Prehistory: a methodological

³⁷ PROWSE, SCHWARCZ, SAUNDERS, MACCHIARELLI, BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic Evidence for Age-Related Variation', 2-13.

³⁸ C. BRONK RAMSEY, 'Radiocarbon Calibration and Analysis of Stratigraphy: The Ox-Cal Program', *Radiocarbon*, XXXVII (1995), 425-430.

³⁹ P.J. REIMER, M.G.L. BAILLIE, E. BARD, A. BAYLISS, J. W. BECK, C. BERTRAND, P.G. BLACKWELL, C.E. BUCK, G. BURR, K. B. CUTLER, P.E. DAMON, R. L. EDWARDS, R. G. FAIRBANKS, M. FRIEDRICH, T.P. GUILDERSON, K. A. HUGHEN, B. KROMER, F. G. MCCORMAC, S. MANNING, C. BRONK RAMSEY, R. W. REIMER, S. REMMELE, J. R. SOUTHON, M. STUIVER, S. TALAMO, F.W. TAYLOR, J. VAN DER PLICHT, C. E. WEYHENMEYER, *Radiocarbon*, XLVI (2004), 1029-1058.

⁴⁰ RICHARDS, MELLARS, 'Stable isotopes', 178-184.

reappraisal' organised by two of the authors (Oliver Craig and May Anne Tafuri) and financially supported by Università degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza. Oliver Craig would also like to thank the Marie Curie Inter-European fellowship programme and the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council for support. We also thank Prof. Geoff Bailey for his useful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.




Fig. 1. Plot of $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values against calibrated radiocarbon dates for Mediterranean coastal human samples. The dates have been calibrated by using the OxCal program and the atmospheric calibration data




Fig. 2. Plot of $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ against $\delta^{15}\text{N}$ values for Mediterranean coastal human samples. Also plotted are the theoretical marine end-points corresponding to Marine Piscivores and Terrestrial Herbivores. Plotted for comparison are stable isotope values obtained from Mesolithic humans from the island of Oronsay off the West Coast of Scotland

Table 1. Summary of stable isotope data for Mediterranean coastal populations. Sites located within 10km of the coast were considered and grouped according to nominal age categories (given in cal BC/AD) according to available calibrated radiocarbon dates or other contextual data. Average $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ values are shown within two standard deviations (2). n = number of individuals considered.

| Phases | Site Name/Country | n. | \bar{x} $\delta^{13}\text{C}$ (‰) | 2 σ |
|----------------|--|-----|-------------------------------------|------------|
| <8,000 BC | Arene Candide/Italy ⁴¹ | 3 | -18.8 | 1.2 |
| 8,000–6,500 BC | El Collado/Spain ⁴² | 9 | -18.4 | 0.7 |
| | Grotta dell'Uzzo/Italy ⁴³ | 2 | -21.0 | 0.0 |
| 6,500–5,000 BC | Arene Candide/Italy ⁴⁴ | 4 | -20.1 | 0.3 |
| | Franchthi Cave/Greece ⁴⁵ | 10 | -18.7 | 1.1 |
| | Masseria Candelaro/Italy ⁴⁶ | 2 | -20.1 | 0.8 |
| 5,000–3,500 BC | Alepotrypa/Greece ⁴⁷ | 26 | -20.0 | 0.4 |
| | Brochtorff Circle/Malta ⁴⁸ | 7 | -19.2 | 0.3 |
| | Gerani Cave/Greece ⁴⁹ | 2 | -19.7 | 0.1 |
| | Kephala/Greece ⁵⁰ | 5 | -19.1 | 1.2 |
| 3,500–1,000 BC | Balearic Isles/Spain ⁵¹ | 34 | -19.7 | 0.5 |
| | Armenoi, Crete/Greece ⁵² | 37 | -19.7 | 0.3 |
| | Gatas, Almeria ⁵³ | 24 | -18.1 | 0.4 |
| | Hal-Saflieni Hypogeum/Malta ⁵⁴ | 1 | -19.7 | 0.0 |
| | Ifre, Mazarron, Murcia/Spain ⁵⁵ | 1 | -18.6 | 0.0 |
| | Kavos, Keros/Greece ⁵⁶ | 3 | -18.7 | 0.4 |
| | Midea/Greece ⁵⁷ | 2 | -20.9 | 0.3 |
| | Mycenae/Greece ⁵⁸ | 25 | -19.0 | 0.5 |
| | Archontiki, Psara/Greece ⁵⁹ | 1 | -18.7 | 0.0 |
| 1000 BC–500 AD | Balearic Isles/Spain ⁶⁰ | 31 | -19.9 | 0.8 |
| | Isola Sacra/Italy ⁶¹ | 105 | -18.8 | 0.3 |

⁴¹ FRANCALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element', 239-250; and P.B. PETTIT, M.P. RICHARDS, R. MAGGI, V. FORMICOLA, 'The Gravettian burial known as the Prince ("Il Principe"): new evidence for his age and diet', *Antiquity*, CCXCV (2003), 15-19.

⁴² GARCIA GUIXÉ, RICHARDS, SUBIRA, 'Palaeodietary Analysis', 549-556.

⁴³ FRANCALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element', 239-250.

⁴⁴ FRANCALACCI, 'Comparison of archaeological trace element', 239-250.

⁴⁵ PAPATHANASIOU, 'Stable isotope analysis', 253-262.

⁴⁶ 'Oxford Radiocarbon Accelerator Unit Datelist 19', *Archaeometry*, XXXVII (1995), 195-214 (Hereafter ORAUD).

⁴⁷ PAPATHANASIOU, 'Stable isotope analysis', 253-262.

⁴⁸ RICHARDS, HEDGES, WALTON, STODDART, MALONE, 'Neolithic Diet', 253-262.

⁴⁹ RICHARDS, HEDGES, 'Stable isotope evidence', 210-231.

⁵⁰ PAPATHANASIOU, 'Stable isotope analysis', 253-262.

⁵¹ VAN STRYDONCK, BOUDIN, ERVYNCK, 'Stable isotopes', 189-197.

⁵² RICHARDS, HEDGES, 'Stable isotope evidence', 210-231.

⁵³ 'ORAUD 20', *Archaeometry*, XXXVII (1995), 417-430.

⁵⁴ 'ORAUD 28', *Archaeometry*, XLI (1999), 421-431.

⁵⁵ 'ORAUD 20', *Archaeometry*, XXXVII (1995), 417-430.

⁵⁶ 'ORAUD 15', *Archaeometry*, XXXIV (1992), 337-357.

⁵⁷ 'ORAUD 17', *Archaeometry*, XXXVI, (1993), 305-326.

⁵⁸ RICHARDS, HEDGES, 'Stable isotope evidence', 253-262.

⁵⁹ A. AGELARAKIS, 'Report on the Mycenane Human Skeletal Remains at Archontiki, Pasra', *Ossa*, XIII (1987), 3-11.

⁶⁰ VAN STRYDONCK, BOUDIN, ERVYNCK, 'Stable isotopes', 189-197.

⁶¹ PROWSE, SCHWARCZ, SAUNDERS, MACCHIARELLI and BONDIOLI, 'Isotopic paleodietes', 259-272.

Athena Trakadas

‘Exhausted by fishermen’s nets’.
Roman sea fisheries and their management

In the last few centuries BC and first centuries AD, during the late Republic and early Empire, the number of Roman territories increased throughout the Mediterranean. With this socio-political expansion, economic stability and prosperity also increased, as did the population of Rome and its settlements. In the third-second centuries BC, new colonies were established in the *ora maritima* (the Tyrrhenian coastal zones in Campania and Latium) and throughout the Italic peninsula as well as the western islands of Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia¹. A majority of these new population centres were fortuitously situated on the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea, which provided a major source of food. A variety of evidence depicts increased demand for seafood and increased fishing activity, but also observable population decline in the Tyrrhenian fisheries. Particularly by the early Empire, in the first century AD, the human response to these changes is traceable in the archaeo-historic record.

Eating and Catching Fish

Although fish had long been a part of the common Greek diet, the Roman cultural predilection for fish only grew with the hegemony’s expansion around the shores of the Mediterranean, becoming a preferable foodstuff by the later Republic². Athenaeus, the third-century AD authority on

¹ M. TORELLI, *Studies in the Romanization of Italy* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1995), 3-15; J. H. D’ARMS, *Romans on the Bay of Naples. A social and cultural study of villas and their owners from 150 BC to AD 400* (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 1.

² See arguments *contra* T.W. GALLANT, *A Fisherman’s Tale: an analysis of the potential productivity of fishing in the ancient world* (Gent, 1985) presented in T. BEKKER-NIELSEN, ‘Fish in the ancient economy’, in K. ASCANI, V. GABREILSEN, K. KVIST and A. HOLM RASMUSSEN (eds), *Ancient History Matters. Studies presented to Jens Erik Skydsgaard on his Seventieth Birthday* (Rome, 2002), 29-37; T. BEKKER-NIELSEN, ‘The technology and productivity of ancient sea fishing’, in T. BEKKER-NIELSEN (ed.), *Ancient fishing and fish processing in the*

food, relates throughout his dialogue the now-established Roman fondness for consuming fish, particularly among people who lived along the sea coasts (*Deipnosophistae*, 120 ff, 306 ff, 355 ff). Even more revealing is Athenaeus' assertion that seafood was consumed by all levels of society in the Roman world, from the poorer, coastal-dwelling plebeians to wealthy city-dwelling patricians, providing a major and possibly consistent source of protein (*Deipnosophistae*, 274d-e, 276e-277a).

The advent of the popularity of seafood during the later Republic was no doubt also deeply rooted in the proximity of and access to marine resources. The right to obtain fish was open to all in antiquity, which was a concept based in common access to the sea. Clearly defined during the early Empire, Roman jurists considered Mediterranean waters solely of nature (*bona naturae*) so that, by extension, 'it is common by natural law' (*Digest* 1.8.2.1; 47.10.13)³. This open-access concept (*'mare commune omnium est'*) is first brought to our attention, using nearly the same language, in a third-century BC comedy by Plautus. Here also fish are considered *res nullius*, belonging to no one because they are part of *bona naturae* (*Rudens* v. 964-65, 972). But because fish belong to no one individual, they in fact do belong to *universitas*, and are available for all to take⁴; if one caught a fish from the open sea, the animal unquestionably became that person's property in a legally-justifiable action called *occupatio* (*Digest* 41.1.1-3)⁵.

Perhaps understandably, with *occupatio* fishing was not an uncommon practice along the coasts of the Tyrrhenian Sea and throughout the *Mare Nostrum* (Fig. 1). Fishing could be undertaken as a local, part-time occupation for sale of goods at market or to supplement one's individual food supply, usually a diet rooted more in vegetables, cereals and pulses⁶. Be-

Black Sea region (Aarhus, 2005), 83-95; N. PURCELL, 'Eating fish. The paradoxes of seafood', in J. WILKINS, D. HARVEY and M. DOBSON (eds), *Food in Antiquity* (Exeter, 1995), 133, 138-139; R.I. CURTIS, *Garum and salsamenta. Production and commerce in material medica* (Leiden, 1991), 149, 176; J. WILKINS, 'Fish as a source of food in antiquity', in T. BEKKER-NIELSEN (ed.), *Ancient fishing and fish processing in the Black Sea region* (Aarhus, 2005), 21-30; J. DE GROSSI MAZZORIN, 'État de nos connaissances concernant le traitement et la consommation du poisson dans l'Antiquité à la lumière de l'archéologie; l'exemple de Rome', *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome, Antiquité* CXII (2000), 155-167; J. WILKINS, 'Social status and fish in Greece and Rome', in G. MARS and V. MARS (eds), *Food, culture and history*, I (London, 1993), 191-192, 197; T.H. CONCORAN, *The Roman fishing industry of the late Republic and early Empire* (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1957), 86-87.

³ The *Digest* is a collection of early Roman legal opinions collected in *Corpus Juris Civilis* issued between AD 529-534 by Justinian I.

⁴ P. ØRSTED, 'Salt, fish and the sea in the Roman Empire', in I. NIELSEN and H. SIGISMUND NIELSEN (eds), *Meals in a Social Context. Aspects of the Communal Meal in the Hellenistic and Roman World* (Aarhus, 1998), 15.

⁵ Y. PEURIÈRE, 'Fisheries, property rights and regulation in ancient Rome: nihil novi sub mari', *Marine Resources: Property rights, economics and environment*, XIV (2002), 18.

⁶ WILKINS, 'Social status', 194; BEKKER-NIELSEN, 'Fish in the ancient economy', 30.




Fig. 1. A 3rd-century AD mosaic depicting a fisherman throwing a net. Rome, Galleria Borghese (after P. Donati Giacomini, 'Il pesce nella letteratura antica', in A. Donati & P. Pasini [eds], *Pesca e pescatori nell'antichità* [Rome, 1997], 56)

ing able to eat or sell the fish that one caught (or appropriated) was a clear primary benefit for those who chose to participate in the endeavour, particularly in light of changing Roman culinary taste.

Fresh Fish and Pisciculture

Fish are best eaten shortly after they have been caught, and in the Mediterranean climate in antiquity, seafood was more indicative of the coasts, being proximate to fishing grounds. Ideally, fishermen would therefore try to return from the sea as quickly as possible in order to consume their catches or to deliver them to markets where the degree of freshness would be reflected in the sale price⁷. One solution to controlling such freshness was to keep fish caught at sea alive in boats equipped with wells (*navis vivaria*; Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 3.16.10)⁸. The desire for ultimate freshness of a catch was soon taken one step further: transported fish could be subsequently transplanted in an artificial environment, such as a fishpond built on land, where they were kept alive for later consumption. This ingenious process rapidly caught on during the late Republic, and textual and archaeological sources document the growth of pisciculture, or the keeping of fish in ponds, at numerous facilities purpose-built along

⁷ BEKKER-NIELSEN, 'Fish in the ancient economy', 31.

⁸ An example of a *navis vivaria*, dating to the second century AD, has been excavated at Portus, Rome's Imperial harbour; see O. TESTAGUZZA, *Portus* (Rome, 1970), 132.

the Tyrrhenian coast of the Italic peninsula (Varro, *De Re Rustica* 3.3.2-4; Pliny, *Natural History* 9.30, 9.78-81; Columella, *De Re Rustica* 8.16.2, 8.17.1-16; Martial, *Epigrams* 3.60)⁹.

Pisciculture was not an entirely new concept in the ancient world; fish had been kept for pleasure in artificial enclosures along the Nile since Hellenistic times (Plato, *Politics* 264b), and fish stocks were added to lakes throughout Classical and Hellenistic Greece (Aristotle, *History of Animals* 8.592a) and in Republican Italy (Columella, *De Re Rustica* 8.16.2). By the early second century BC, however, it appears that the Roman preference for seafood had led to some rather large-scale piscicultural undertakings, almost exclusively for the purpose of providing fresh fish to eat at the table. At this time, large villas were being built along the Tyrrhenian coast from Naples to Cosa, and the first *piscinae*, or pools used for raising or keeping fish, were constructed on the villa grounds (Fig. 2)¹⁰.

These were sea-water *piscinae* (*salsa* or *maritimae*), built free-standing above the shore or cut into rock and in some instances, incorporated into a villa's architecture (Varro, *De Re Rustica* 3.5.12). Adjoining sluice channels helped trap fish and re-fresh the ponds' waters during high tides, keeping the fish alive at the correct level of salinity and oxygenation (Columella, *De Re Rustica* 8.17.1-2). The main species described in texts as thriving in Ro-




Fig. 2. The 1st-century AD *piscinae* at the 'I Bagni di Agrippa' villa on the island of Pianosa, southwest of Elba (after Higginbotham, *Piscinae*, 73, fig. 8)

⁹ J. HIGGINBOTHAM, *Piscinae. Artificial fishponds in Roman Italy* (London, 1997), 1, 4-5, 58.

¹⁰ D'ARMS, *Romans on the Bay*, 1-9.

man *piscinae* are *aurata* (gilthead or dorade), *murena* (murry, lamprey or eel), *mugil* (grey mullet sp.), *rhombi* (turbot), and *lupi* (sea bass)¹¹.

Along the Tyrrhenian coast, ca. forty large villas with *piscinae* ranging from 4 m³ to 5,000 m³ capacity have been identified that were utilised from the early second century BC–first century AD¹². Many of the villas' owners, such as Servilius Vatia in Cumae (Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium* 55.6-7), kept fish so that in the event of seasonal irregularities in the natural supply, they would still be able to eat the popular foodstuff. Villas' *piscinae* would help supplement insufficient wild catches, but also ensure predictable, regular access to a food source whose recovery could fluctuate in the wild: catch/effort ratio is greatly increased while chance/risk is reduced¹³. Additionally, the scale of supply could be manipulated by *piscinae* owners, such as Gaius Hirrius, who was able to furnish 6,000 murrays (or eels/lampreys) from his ponds for a course at Caesar's triumphal banquets in 46-45 BC (Pliny, *Natural History* 9.81)¹⁴.

By the late Republic, a few owners of villas with *piscinae* kept their fish more for aesthetic pleasure and a show of luxury than as a source of food¹⁵. Indeed, in the first- and third-century AD writings of Martial (*Epigrams* 10.30) and Aelian (*History of Animals* 8.4), *piscinae* fish are treated more comically as dressed-up pets of the wealthy. Such attitudes were more likely an exception than the rule, and intentions toward profit appear frequently in the archaeological record and contemporary texts. Much like their inland counterparts, most *villae maritimae* were self-sufficient or even productive estates, that is *fundus maritimus*, as indicated ca. 70 BC in one of Cicero's judicial speeches (*In Verrem* 5.46). Many of the *piscinae* fish would be eaten by residents of the villa, serving as a sustainable foodstuff much like vines or olives would be grown for consumption on inland *villae rusticae*¹⁶. But it is likely that most villa owners were not also above making a profit through the sale of their surplus fresh fish, becoming *piscinariii*¹⁷. Varro, in his first-century BC agricultural treatise, asks why a *villa maritima* owner

¹¹ The ancient references referring to these species are collected in CONCORAN, *The Roman fishing industry*, 27, 48, 62.

¹² HIGGINBOTHAM, *Piscinae*, 10-12, 69-72; X. LAFON, 'Piscinae et pisciculture dans le bassin occidental de la Méditerranée', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* XI (1998), 573, n. 1.

¹³ R.C. HOFFMAN, 'Economic development and aquatic ecosystems in medieval Europe', *The American Historical Review*, CI (1996), 659; R.J. ZEEPvat, 'Fishponds in Roman Britain', in M. ASTON (ed.), *Medieval Fish, Fisheries and Fishponds in England*, I (Oxford, 1988), 17; I. DE GAINE and G. A. HARRISON, 'Preface', in I. DE GAINE and G. A. HARRISON (eds), *Coping with uncertainty in food supply* (Oxford, 1988), vi.

¹⁴ VARRO (*De Re Rustica* 3.17.3) gives the number of murrays/eels/lampreys as 2,000.

¹⁵ D'ARMS, *Commerce and social standing in ancient Rome* (London, 1981), 80-81.

¹⁶ D'ARMS, *Commerce and social standing*, 80-82.

¹⁷ HIGGINBOTHAM, *Piscinae*, 57.

would not want to have just one but an entire row of *piscinae* (*De Re Rustica* 3.17.3-4). In fact, in his agricultural treatise written a century later, Columella states that the owner of a coastal villa should look to the sea "as a source of revenue" (*De Re Rustica* 8.16.6), and this assertion is also stated in an essay by Cicero, in his relation of an anecdote of a Roman who wants to purchase a profitable *villa maritima* near the rich fishing grounds off Syracuse (*De Officiis* 3.58-59).

The rather large fishery at Cosa in Etruria, possibly associated with the Sestii family who owned a villa nearby¹⁸, certainly operated for commercial purposes. Situated in an extensive coastal lagoon, the fishery and its port operated at varying levels from the mid-second century BC-third century AD and probably raised eels, sea bass, gilthead, sole and grey mullet (Fig. 3)¹⁹.

It is the very size of the fishery, however, that suggests it was established for production purposes, rather than strictly for private supply: *piscinae* stretched for over 100 m within the lagoon, covering ca. two acres. These, together with an extensive lagoonal weir system, helped produce an estimated average of 150,000 kg of fish per year²⁰.

Shellfish were also included in *piscinarii* profit schemes. Gaius Sergius Orata, who owned a villa near Naples in the early first century BC, was business-minded enough to expand his pisciculture into the Lucrine Lakes, risking a lawsuit by expanding beyond from his own *piscinae*²¹. His business acumen was helped by his invention of the 'hanging culture method' whereby young oysters were harvested from the sea and raised on ropes in a controlled environment²². The products of his successful *ostraria* fields were well-known and sought after in antiquity (Pliny, *Natural History* 9.79; Valerius Maximus, 9.1.1).

But keeping fish, whether for one's table or for profit, was not simply a pastime of the wealthy. In the first century BC, the Roman scholar Varro states that freshwater *piscinae* were used by the 'common people' and could adequately provide for the table and be profitable (*De Re Rustica* 3.17.2); by the later first century AD, Columella states that the *piscinae* ex-

¹⁸ D'ARMS, *Commerce and social standing*, 56; P.A. BRUNT, 'Two great Roman landowners', *Latomus* XXXIV (1975), 619-635.

¹⁹ E.K. GAZDA and A.M. McCANN, 'Reconstruction and function: port, fishery, and villa', in A.M. McCANN, J. BOURGEOIS, E.K. GAZDA, J.P. OLESON and E. LYDING WILL, *The Roman Port and Fishery of Cosa* (Princeton, NJ, 1987), 141-155; A.M. McCANN, 'The Harbor and Fishery Remains at Cosa, Italy', *Journal of Field Archaeology*, VI (1979), 393.

²⁰ A.M. McCANN, 'Conclusions', in McCANN, BOURGEOIS, GAZDA, OLESON and LYDING WILL, *The Roman Port and Fishery of Cosa*, 338.

²¹ PEURIÈRE, 'Fisheries', 19.

²² D. BROTHWELL and P. BROTHWELL, *Food in Antiquity. A Survey of the Diet of Early Peoples* (London, 1969), 65-66.



Fig. 3. Reconstruction of the fishery at Cosa in Etruria in the late 2nd/early 1st centuries BC. The lagoon is in the upper right, and the trapping channels and piscinae are in the centre, at the base of the hill (after A.M. McCann, et al., *The Roman Port*, 14, fig. 1-1)

cesses undertaken by the wealthy during the late Republic had changed to a more honest practice in his own day. Pisciculture had spread to less affluent parts of society and ceased to be an exclusive occupation (*De Re Rustica* 8.16.1-6).

Observing Changes in Fish Stocks

The popularity of eating seafood in the Roman world, as stated by Athenaeus or demonstrated by pisciculture's rapid rise, created a demand upon the natural fish stocks in the waters surrounding the Italic peninsula. By the early Empire, a variety of textual and archaeological evidence suggests that this demand on the open-to-all Tyrrhenian Sea was creating noticeably adverse changes in the abundance of local marine resources.

In the first part of the first century AD, the rhetorician Seneca claims that fish now have to be imported from other waters due to too much fishing near Rome (*Epistulae morales ad Lucilium* 89.22). In a late first/early second-century AD satire by Juvenal, Virro, a wealthy Roman patron, is served surmullet and murry/eel/lamprey caught off the Corsican and Sicilian coasts because fish from the Tyrrhenian had 'become exhausted by fishermen's nets, preventing the fish from obtaining their full size' (*Satire* 5 v. 92-96). Writing at the same time as Juvenal, Martial indicates in one of his poems that the shores near Laurentum south of Ostia are bringing poor catches or no catches at all, unfavourably contrasting the local waters to those of the 'Spanish Ocean' (*Epigrams* 10.37). Juvenal's and Mar-

tial's explicit statements, although made in the context of satires, have a likely basis in fact as they echo Seneca's observations; they are also verifiable by other forms of evidence, mainly the responses to a perceived decline in marine abundance.

To check or counter-act the decline in fish stocks, certain fishing techniques were prohibited. For example, using torches at night from a boat to attract fish and cephalopods had long been effective, used as early as the fourth century BC in Greece (Plato, *the Sophist* 220d). During the early Empire, from the first-third centuries AD, the natural historians Pliny (*Natural History* 9.23), Oppian (*Haleutica* 4.640) and Aelian (*History of Animals* 2.8) describe this method. However, in Corsican waters, torch-fishing had been so productive that by the second century AD, it was outlawed by the local port authority because it had 'removed so many fish'. The use of torches thereafter was granted only in exceptional circumstances (*Digest* 47.8.10).

Furthermore, attempts were made to supplement dwindling marine stocks. Scarus (*Scarus Cretensis* or *Sparisoma Cretense*), a type of parrot fish native to the eastern Aegean, became a popular Roman import during the early Empire (Pliny, *Natural History* 9.29; Horace, *Epodes* 2.50). To meet the growing demand for the scarus, attempts had been made to raise the fish in *piscinae* in Italy, albeit unsuccessfully (Columella, *De Re Rustica* 8.16.9). It was then thought possible that scarus populations could be transplanted into Campanian waters. This endeavour was organized ca. AD 50, when large quantities of scarus were caught and removed from their native habitat along Asia Minor and shipped live aboard naval vessels to the Ostian and Campanian coasts²³. To allow for the fish to take to their new environment and build their numbers (presumably to allow for a sustainable population in the Tyrrhenian), no fishing of scarus was allowed for a subsequent five years and penalties were levied on those who did catch the species in the interim (Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 3.16.10; Pliny, *Natural History* 9.29).

Trying to boost natural availability with transplanted stocks had also been attempted with shellfish: before ca. 50 BC, Fulvius Lupinus (or Lipinus) first raised *Cochlea* (sea snails), collected from Tunisia and Dalmatia, in a pond in Etruria (Pliny, *Natural History* 9.82). Just after the attempt at scarus stocking, the Emperor Nero (AD 55–68) had the Roman naval fleet based at Misenum, near Naples, deposit local oysters to grow in the ocean along the Campanian coast²⁴. Pliny (*Natural History* 9.79) also tells us that during the early Empire, oysters were transported from Brindisi in the

²³ Pliny attributes this decision to the Emperor Tiberius (AD 14–37) while Macrobius attributes it to Augustus (27 BC–AD 14).

²⁴ LAFON, 'Piscinae et pisciculture', 577.

Adriatic and allowed to fatten in the *ostraria* of the Lucrine Lakes, a practice that Juvenal mentions continuing into the second century AD (*Satire 4* v. 140-143). *Ostraria* were still present around the Bay of Naples and near Baiae in the late third and early fourth centuries AD (Fig. 4)²⁵.




Fig. 4. The *ostraria* 'hanging culture method' oyster beds that were developed in the Bay of Naples region, depicted on the 4th-century AD glass Populonia Bottle (after Harden, *Glass of the Caesars*, 209)

Perhaps the most telling event that illustrates a decline in Tyrrhenian fish populations is the nearly abrupt end to pisciculture by the late first century AD²⁶. No seawater *piscinae* were being built in *villae maritimae* and they are little referred to in texts after this time²⁷. The fact that more people (of varied socio-economic classes) participated in pisciculture by the early Empire was also compounded by the inherent problems within the practice itself: live fish, spawn (*seminii*) and fertilized eggs were removed from the ocean and deposited in *piscinae*, lagoons, or lakes (Varro, *De Re Rustica* 3.3.4; Columella, *De Re Rustica* 8.16.2)²⁸. There are no records describing or alluding to captive fish-breeding programmes, and it appears that the natural stocks from which the eggs, spawn, or young fish were taken were constantly tapped²⁹. Therefore, the marine populations were being depleted because more and more fish were not reaching maturity in the wild and subsequently being unable to replenish their numbers in the natural environment³⁰.

²⁵ Demonstrated by the *ostraria* scene on the Populonia bottle, among others: O. B. HARDEN, *Glass of the Caesars* (Milan, 1987), 208-209.

²⁶ LAFON, 'Piscinae et pisciculture', 581; HIGGINBOTHAM, *Piscinae*, 39, 60-64.

²⁷ HIGGINBOTHAM, *Piscinae*, 61.

²⁸ The spawning times of fish appear to have been known in antiquity, as described by Pliny (*Natural History* 9.74), among others.

²⁹ W. RADCLIFFE, *Fishing from earliest times* (Chicago, 1921), 289-291; BROTHWELL and BROTHWELL, *Food in Antiquity*, 58.

³⁰ PEURIÈRE, 'Fisheries', 20-21.

Demand and Salted-fish Products

Despite the observations of decline in the local fish populations of the Italic peninsula, the popularity of seafood did not wane in the early Empire. Instead, other types of fish products began to achieve notoriety. These consisted of dried and salted fish meat (*salsamenta*) and fermented, salted fish sauces (*garum*, *allec*, *liquamen* and *muria*). Processed at a comparatively minor level in the Iberian Peninsula and northern Black Sea since as early as the fifth-fourth centuries BC³¹, salted-fish products had also been briefly manufactured in the Bay of Naples region during the late Republic and very early Empire. However, this activity ended in the Italic peninsula at about the same time as coastal Tyrrhenian piscicultural practices³².

Surpassing other Mediterranean salted-fish products completely were those manufactured by private, commercial consortia established in Spain, Portugal and Morocco. Nearly eighty processing sites, some encompassing more than ten independent factories per site, were rapidly built in the western Mediterranean region in the first centuries BC/AD (Fig. 5)³³.

Because of extensive finds of the distinctive ceramic amphorae that transported the products from the western provinces, it is understood that while salted fish and fish sauces were exported throughout the Mediterranean and Europe, they were largely imported to Rome and other settlements in the Italic peninsula³⁴.

³¹ R. ÉTIENNE, 'A propos du "garum sociorum", *Latomus* XXIX (1970), 298-299; Á. MUÑOZ VICENTE, G. DE FRUTOS REYES and N. BERRIATUA HERNÁNDEZ, 'Contribución a las orígenes y difusión comercial de la industria pesquera y conservera Gaditana a través de las recientes aportaciones de las factorías de salazones de la Bahía de Cadiz', in E. RIPOLL PERELLÓ (ed.), *Actas de Congreso Internacional 'el Estrecho de Gibraltar'*, Ceuta, noviembre 1987, I (Madrid, 1988), 488-496; J.M. HØJTE, 'The archaeological evidence for fish processing in the Black Sea region', in BEKKER-NIELSEN (ed.), *Ancient fishing and fish processing in the Black Sea region*, 133-160.

³² CURTIS, *Garum and salsamenta*, 46-147. Finds of imported ceramic *garum* amphorae at Pompeii and Herculaneum demonstrate that local sites were no longer processing salted-fish products even prior to Mt. Vesuvius' eruption in AD 79, see R.I. CURTIS, 'In defense of garum', *The Classical Journal* LXXVIII (1983), 236-237; R. ÉTIENNE and F. MAYET, 'Le garum a Pompéi. Production et commerce', *Revue des Études Anciennes* C (1998), 199-215.

³³ A. TRAKADAS, 'The archaeological evidence for fish processing in the western Mediterranean', in BEKKER-NIELSEN (ed.), *Ancient fishing and fish processing in the Black Sea region*, 47-82; R. ÉTIENNE & F. MAYET, 'Cartographie critique des établissements de salaisons de poisson dans la péninsule Ibérique', in É. RIETH (ed.), *Méditerranée antique. Pêche, navigation, commerce* (Paris, 1998), 33-57.

³⁴ CURTIS, *Garum and salsamenta*, 38-45; S. MARTIN-KILCHER, 'Amphores à sauces de poisson du sud de la péninsule ibérique dans les provinces septentrionales', *Congreso internacional 'Ex Baetica Amphorae'*. *Conservas, aceite y vino de la Bética en el Imperio Romano. Sevilla - Écija, 17 al 20 de diciembre de 1998*, III (Écija, 2000), 759-786; J. MARTÍNEZ MARGANTO, 'Inscripciones sobre ánforas de salazón: interpretación sobre la estructura y si-



Fig. 5. The 1st-century BC rectangular and circular processing vats (*cetariae*) for fermenting and salting fish and fish sauces at Baelo Claudia, Spain (Photo: A. Trakadas)

The rapid growth and extensiveness of the fish-salting industry in the western Mediterranean certainly suggests the products' desirability among consumers. However, it also helped that diverse quality levels of sauces were available and therefore attainable by people of varying socio-economic classes³⁵. If it was not possible to obtain live fish, or made more difficult by the decline in Tyrrhenian fish populations, then imported salted fish and fish sauces made from seafood in other waters was a type of 'solution' or response to the situation. Salted-fish products rapidly began to fill the gap for preference of this foodstuff, particularly the sauces in effect being a very concentrated form of fish that was not perishable and easily transportable³⁶.

Conclusions

In the first decade of the first century AD, the Roman poet Ovid nearly laments that in the early years of the Roman Republic, 'fish swam round with no traps set for them by humans and oysters were safe in their shells' (*Fasti* 6.173-174). The rise in demand of fish for the table had first been satisfied by the fishermen's nets along the coasts of the Tyrrhenian Sea, and for a time, this was the exclusive and perhaps limited method of

gnificación commercial de los *tituli picti*', *Congreso internacional 'Ex Baetica Amphorae'. Conservas, aceite y vino de la Bética en el Imperio Romano. Sevilla – Écija, 17 al 20 de diciembre de 1998*, IV (Écija, 2000), 1207-1219.

³⁵ CURTIS, 'In defense', 238-239.

³⁶ WILKINS, 'Social status', 198-199.

obtaining the foodstuff. Pisciculture and the construction of *piscinae* by eventually a varied level of social classes in the later Republic and early Empire allowed for the private control and limited access to some fish resources that had up until then been freely accessible in the ocean.

But the demand for fish, whether from a fishermen's net or fresh from *piscinae*, created an observable depletion in the natural stocks of fish. The responses to these changes included some level of state involvement such as the outright prohibition of a certain fishing method, such as that stated in the *Digest* for Corsican waters in the second century AD. Another, earlier response meant to check the depletion and yet sustain the consumption demand was the stocking of fish and shellfish from abroad in the Tyrrhenian Sea and coastal lakes. This prompted Pliny to comment that the introduction of the scarus fish was 'greed giving the sea a new inhabitant' (*Natural History* 9.29).

Inevitably, too, the end of piscicultural practices was realised largely by the end of the first century AD. The arguments for the stoppage of the construction of seawater *piscinae* at this time largely focus upon the fact that many *villae maritimae* were taken over as Imperial estates. Some Imperial elite, too, as the builders of fishponds, became more distributed throughout the provinces rather than concentrated in Italy³⁷. As demonstrable as this may be, there are certainly environmental factors present in pisciculture's demise that cannot be ignored. Seneca, Juvenal and Martial not only comment on the unavailability of fish from the nearby ocean, but it is clear that fish were unable to breed once they have been taken to *piscinae*. Additionally, it is only by the end of the first century AD that the construction of small freshwater *piscinae* begins to increase briefly at inland sites in the Italic peninsula³⁸, strengthening the argument that other fish sources were being sought.

The growth of the fish-salting industry in the west also reflects that, in the face of local decline, there existed outside the Tyrrhenian a large source of readily-attainable fish stocks that were appealing to Romans. Indeed, the waters of southern Spain, the Straits of Gibraltar, and the European Atlantic littoral were prodigiously praised by ancient writers for their rich marine resources, especially migratory species such as tunny and mackerel (i.e., Pliny, *Natural History* 9.32, 9.48; Strabo, *Geography* 3.2.7, 3.3.1; Martial, *Epigrams* 10.37). The supply of western salted fish and fish sauces could not be maintained, however. Due to a combination of factors, such as the reduction of the western North African provinces and wider Imperial political and economic instability, a serious decline in the

³⁷ HIGGINBOTHAM, *Piscinae*, 62, 66-67.

³⁸ HIGGINBOTHAM, *Piscinae*, 67.

manufacturing of saltedfish products occurred in Morocco, Spain and Portugal by the end of the third century AD. Continued demand for imported fish sauces into Rome and the Italic peninsula, however, was briefly met by central North African fisheries³⁹. Such sauces seem to have fallen out of favour in the Mediterranean all together by the fifth-sixth centuries, although a very few isolated factories continued to produce products for local consumption and limited export⁴⁰.

A combination of evidence, both textually and archaeologically derived, demonstrates that after the rise in popularity of seafood around the Tyrrhenian Sea during the Republic, an untenable demand was put upon the natural stocks. Once realised, different measures of human intervention were introduced, which ultimately proved unsuccessful. These measures, or reactions to the depletion, can be seen as a form of 'management', a term I apply very loosely because the actions appear to be anything but systematic and were applied both publicly and privately. However, these reactions do provide a glimpse into past recognition of a negative anthropogenic affect upon the marine environment. Simply stated, the fish that the Romans preferred to consume came under evident stress due to demand, too many fishermen and/or too much fish removal. The openly-accessible sea was noticeably less bountiful in its production and this created reactions, both at the state and private levels, that varied from regulation to manipulation of the natural ecosystem.

³⁹ TRAKADAS, 'The archaeological evidence', 74; C. PANELLA, 'Annotazioni in margine alle stratigrafie delle Terme ostiensi del Nuotatore', *Recherches sur les amphores romaines* (Rome, 1972), 151-165.

⁴⁰ CURTIS, *Garum and salsamenta*, 184-190.

Maria Lucia De Nicolò

Comunità costiere e storia della pesca nel Mediterraneo (XVI-XVIII secolo)

“Per il poco conto che si fa del pesce e per conseguente del pescare, i nomi antichi de’ pesci in tutto sono mancati, perciocché i nostri pescano studiosamente e a gara solo in primavera e non pigliano perciò di tutte le sorte pesci; conciosia che i pesci col variar dei tempi hora vanno attorno, e hora cercano i ripostigli per nascondersi, né si possono pigliare, se non a certi tempi alternativi”.

Sono le considerazioni di Paolo Giovio nelle pagine introduttive al *De romanis piscibus* (Roma 1523) in cui si lamenta una sorta di regressione delle arti della pesca imputabile alla perdita del patrimonio conoscitivo delle specie e con esso delle tecniche di cattura, individuandone la causa nel mutato atteggiamento culturale nei confronti dell’alimento ittico rispetto a quanto succedeva invece nell’antichità classica¹.

Giovio denuncia il disgusto provato dai più verso il pesce dovuto alla carica penitenziale posta sul cibo cosiddetto “di magro” dalla religione. Nel primo Cinquecento il pesce non si mangia “se non sforzati da legge”, dunque contro voglia, “con solennissimo sacrificio ... di maniera che, se gli animi fossero sciolti dalla religione, i golosi non mangierebbero mai pesce, ma desidererebbero in cambio di muli, orate, e spigole, fagiani e capponi”. Ecco dunque un buon motivo per giustificare il fatto che “molti stromenti poi dell’arte del pescare sono mancati” e con essi “le regole delle loro fatture”.

Il giudizio espresso da Giovio, in linea di massima condivisibile, non può comunque essere esteso a tutte le regioni del Mediterraneo. Lungo alcuni litorali contraddistinti da particolari condizioni geografiche e ambientali si matura un particolare “senso del mare”, per usare un’espressione di Alberto Tenenti, che si riflette in un rapporto simbiotico con le acque e con le creature marine, stretto e articolato nel tempo, che va a modulare sul lungo periodo tutta la vita della collettività ivi insediata, con implicazioni che si riflettono anche nella cultura alimentare e in particolare sul consumo di pesce.

¹ Sull’argomento cfr. M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *Mangiar pesce nell’età moderna. Diritto di pesca, produzione, conservazione, consumo*, Fano 2004, in particolare 79-84.

Una situazione anfibia, quella delle società lagunari, con una dimensione marittima predominante che spiega la loro capacità di adattarsi e di imporsi con prontezza nei momenti di congiuntura delle arti alieutiche e di farsi sotto molti aspetti motori trainanti di mutamenti epocali². Un “dominio innanzitutto psicologico” del mare ed una superiorità guadagnati grazie a tutta una serie di conquiste quali la convergenza delle energie collettive alla tutela dell’*habitat* naturale, l’acquisita conoscenza del ciclo biologico della fauna ittica, la messa a punto di efficaci mezzi tecnici di cattura, ma anche di ripopolamento, perseguite caparbiamente per secoli attraverso generazioni di pescatori, fanno insomma di alcune comunità rivierasche i centri ispiratori e di irradiazione della cultura marittima orientata allo sfruttamento delle risorse marine.

Le lagune, le valli, gli stagni costieri fungono infatti da condensatore di esperienze molteplici che partono dalla conoscenza dell’ambiente e dall’osservazione dei comportamenti delle varie specie ittiche e delle loro peregrinazioni stagionali finalizzate inizialmente ad una pesca di mera sussistenza, per poi configurarsi in particolari momenti storici in una sorta di laboratorio di innovazioni tecnologiche per la graduale conquista del mare aperto. Sono da accreditare ai pescatori vallivi di Catalogna, della Provenza, a quelli delle lagune venete, delle isole ionie e dell’arcipelago le invenzioni tecniche e gli investimenti nel settore che, in forza anche di una favorevole congiuntura, nel Settecento immettono finalmente anche la pesca marittima fra le voci di un’economia di mercato degna dell’attenzione dei governi. In forza della sperimentazione plurisecolare di alcuni sistemi di cattura, di una trasmissione del sapere di lunghissima durata e sull’onda di sollecitazioni esterne prima assenti, nei secoli dell’età moderna si avvia infatti un processo di trasformazione e di perfezionamento delle tecniche venatorie tradizionali per l’intraprendenza di alcuni gruppi di pescatori, intenzionati a potenziare la loro capacità produttiva con il trasferimento delle proprie strumentazioni dalle acque costiere a quelle d’altura.

In sostanza si passa dalla pesca solitaria di poche unità isolate ad una pesca più organizzata che necessita oltre che di barche e attrezzi, di uomini ben preparati e di capitali, in sintesi di una marineria ben strutturata, alla stregua delle compagnie marittime operanti nell’Atlantico, frutto organico di uno sviluppo collettivo³.

² Sullo sviluppo delle pratiche peschive d’altura nel Mediterraneo cfr. M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *Tecniche di pesca e tipi navali. Tra invenzioni e nuove maniere di pescare*, in DE NICOLÒ, *Microcosmi mediterranei. Le comunità dei pescatori in età moderna*, Bologna 2004, 99-173.

³ L’argomento viene sviluppato in *Microcosmi mediterranei*. In questa trattazione non vengono prese in esame le pesche specialistiche (tonno, pesce spada, corallo, spugne), forme di lavoro complesse, consolidate da una solida organizzazione e basate su tecniche plurisecolari che si mantengono nel tempo, pur nella specificità di comportamenti

Con tutta probabilità è l'accresciuta domanda di pesce, che si registra a partire dalla seconda metà del Cinquecento, a spingere i pescatori degli stagni costieri della Provenza, dell'Albufera di Valencia, delle lagune venete all'ideazione di "nuove maniere di pescare". Vuoi per l'incremento demografico che si registra in tutta Europa, vuoi per l'aumentata richiesta di pesce per i giorni di astinenza nel rispetto del nuovo calendario alimentare dettato dalla Chiesa post-tridentina, le comunità già forti delle proprie "economie d'acqua" tendono a rendersi più competitive e a trasferire il loro lavoro al largo, adattando le strumentazioni già positivamente impiegate nelle acque vallive e sotto costa, alle diverse condizioni meteorologiche e del moto ondoso del mare aperto con l'apporto di migliorie tecnologiche e di originali accorgimenti.

Va comunque preso atto che qualsiasi invenzione, per essere accettata, attecchire e poi diffondersi come in una reazione a catena in altri spazi, necessita di determinate e favorevoli condizioni e di particolari congiunture, così come i cambiamenti economico-sociali. Nel caso delle lagune rimane esemplare il caso della popolazione di Chioggia che, votata precipuamente fin dal medioevo ad una navigazione mercantile minore di sostegno a quella di Venezia, con l'aggravarsi della crisi dell'emporio della Serenissima, rinsalda la propria identità a cominciare dal rapporto con il mare, dimostrandosi capace di reinterpretare le proprie professionalità e la dimestichezza ("continuo moto") della sua flottiglia a "tesser le acque", sostituendo nel corso del Seicento all'antica attività di traffico su cui era imperniata l'economia della città, quella di produzione con il trasferimento dell'abilità piscatoria consolidata negli specchi costieri alla "aratura" del mare aperto.

Si guadagna dunque finalmente l'alto mare nonostante la persistenza di tutta una serie di difficoltà ancora non risolte, non ultima la minaccia dei corsari. Il Mediterraneo di questi secoli non offre mai per lunghi periodi, e neanche ampie zone, in cui se ne possono solcare le acque senza incorrere in agguati o insidie, anche al di fuori dei momenti di vero e proprio conflitto. La mentalità collettiva riconosceva nel mare un concentrato di negatività, di qui la riluttanza ad allontanarsi troppo dalla linea di riva, sia per il radicato sentimento di paura verso l'elemento, sia per il sempre incombente *periculum gentis*. Una volta perso il contatto visivo con la terra si entra nella dimensione dell'incerto, nel "dominio dell'informe": "il mare è il luogo della rottura degli equilibri e delle stabilità, la perenne negazione o almeno la ricorrente insidia a quelle sicurezze che porta più o me-

delle varie aree geografiche; si è prestata attenzione esclusivamente alla formazione delle marinerie da pesca in relazione all'aumento della domanda di pesce e alla crescita del mercato per il prodotto fresco riscontrabile nei secoli dell'età moderna.

no consapevolmente un essere abituato a terra"⁴. Forse anche per questo motivo, al di là di particolari eccezioni, fino a tutto il Cinquecento le pratiche piscatorie si svolgono pressoché esclusivamente lungo i litorali. Le acque costiere perciò risultano necessariamente monitorate con un accesso regolamentato dagli statuti comunali al fine di scongiurare situazioni di sovraffollamento ed il depauperamento delle riserve. La ristrettezza dei campi acquei in cui dar pratica ai pescatori obbliga infatti le autorità di molte località rivierasche, quali ad esempio Noli, Gaeta, Lissa, ad una ripartizione equa delle zone operative con un sistema di turni a rotazione che dispone un utilizzo nominativo a tempo determinato delle diverse "poste" individuabili nelle rispettive giurisdizioni, assegnate per graduatoria. Si assiste insomma ad una sorta di "gara", come precisa del resto anche Giovio, che se da un lato preclude una libera pesca, limitata peraltro ai tempi della buona stagione, dall'altro tende a scongiurare l'insorgenza di possibili controversie.

Conflitti fra pescatori si accendono però anche quando i gruppi più intraprendenti si avventurano al di fuori degli ambiti geografici di appartenenza, invadendo gli spazi territoriali di altre comunità con emigrazioni marittime stagionali all'inseguimento della preda e per il raggiungimento dei banchi di pesce a medio mare e in altura. Se da un lato gli spostamenti delle flottiglie pescherecce maggiormente evolute alimentano preoccupazioni di tipo protezionistico, dall'altro contribuiscono a volte a sopprimere meglio all'approvvigionamento dei mercati delle città portuali mancanti di pescatori di mestiere. L'osservazione poi della superiorità tecnologica di strumentazioni differenti rispetto a quelle normalmente in uso, dà spunto ai pescatori locali per cimentarsi in strategie di pesca alternative attraverso un'emulazione personalizzata delle pratiche "forestiere" che permette loro di azzardare anche il salto di qualità. Proprio in virtù di questi contatti si evidenziano due importanti momenti di svolta nella storia delle attività alieutiche del mare interno.

Il processo evolutivo di due differenti "maniere di pescare" che vanno a caratterizzare i corrispettivi periodi storici che ne vedono la diffusione, permette di definire una periodizzazione nella storia della pesca nel Mediterraneo in quanto la loro affermazione non investe un limitato ambito geografico ma spazia dal settore occidentale a quello orientale comportando un rapido e radicale stravolgimento di secolari sistemi di pesca, con implicazioni estremamente importanti non solo sul piano organizzativo dell'impresa marittima, ma anche sotto l'aspetto della produzione, volta non solo al consumo interno delle varie compagini statali, ma anche

⁴ A. TENENTI, *Venezia e il senso del mare. Storia di un prisma culturale dal XIII al XVIII secolo*, Napoli 1999, 173.

all'esportazione. L'introduzione di una metodologia venatoria in grado di amplificare in maniera considerevole il volume del pescato rende peraltro obbligatorio da parte di tutte le comunità orientate verso un'economia di produzione, l'adeguamento delle flottiglie alle nuove strumentazioni di navigazione e di pesca, in modo da poter tenere il passo e di riuscire a reggere la concorrenza⁵.

La ricerca, concentratasi soprattutto sul monitoraggio delle comunità costiere adriatiche, ha posto in netta evidenza il fenomeno, rilevabile come una vera "rivoluzione piscatoria" scandita da due fasi distinte: la prima, a partire dall'inizio del Seicento è caratterizzata dal decollo e successiva affermazione della pesca "a tartana"; la seconda, che si impone prepotentemente nella seconda metà del Settecento, è invece imperniata sulla pesca "a coppia"⁶, una tecnica che consente un vistoso sviluppo mercantile nel commercio del prodotto fresco e si mantiene sostanzialmente inalterata fino al tramonto della propulsione velica.

La tecnica cosiddetta "a tartana", d'invenzione francese o catalana, si traduce in una particolare maniera di navigare che implica un complesso di accorgimenti nello scafo e l'adozione della vela latina con il supporto di velette aggiuntive per facilitare il traino di una rete definita con lo stesso termine *tartana*. Il litorale adriatico pontificio si è rivelato un interessante osservatorio soprattutto per la messa a fuoco del processo di assimilazione della tecnica. Il monitoraggio di alcune località romagnole e marchigiane infatti ha permesso di seguire le tappe del mutamento, peraltro estremamente rapido. L'arrivo in Adriatico di tartane provenzali e con esse del nuovo metodo di pesca, provoca nel giro di un lustro la completa sostituzione di barche e strumenti ed il definitivo abbandono del precedente sistema venatorio cosiddetto "a bragoccio" (in qualche modo antesignano della settecentesca pesca "a coppia"), esercitato con due piccole barche a poca distanza dalla riva e con rese assolutamente inferiori rispetto alla "tartana". La classe dei pescatori si mostra molto duttile ad accogliere e a metabolizzare l'idea innovativa, dando peraltro anche prova di sapervi apportare modifiche funzionali alle diverse esigenze, maturate dai singoli nell'esercizio della professione.

L'adozione su larga scala della pesca "a coppia", che trova i primi consensi nel Mediterraneo occidentale per diffondersi poi ai bacini contermini fino a risalire nel golfo di Venezia ed affermarsi definitivamente nell'ultimo ventennio del Settecento, appare invece più problematica. Mentre la

⁵ M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *La pesca a coppia. Invenzione dell'età moderna o riscoperta?*, Fano 2004.

⁶ Su queste tecniche periodizzanti cfr. M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *La pesca in Adriatico tra Sei e Settecento. Innovazioni tecniche e sbocchi commerciali*, in *La pesca in Italia tra età moderna e contemporanea. Produzione, mercato, consumo. Atti del convegno (Alghero - Cabras, 7-9 dicembre 2001)*, a cura di G. DONEDDU, Sassari 2003.

diffusione della pesca "a tartana" non crea riguardo all'invasione degli spazi territoriali grossi problemi, fatta eccezione per il caso di Cetara, l'arrivo della pesca "a coppia", per l'impatto distruttivo sui fondali che le viene attribuito, scatena una iniziale opposizione, sia da parte della categoria che da parte delle varie autorità statali, costrette ad emanare tutta una serie di divieti di pesca e, riconoscendosene però la remuneratività, anche a concepire licenze occasionali con accesso solo alle zone con fondali molto profondi o magari una liberalizzazione pilotata limitando l'esercizio a flottiglie a numero chiuso⁷.

Nella storia della pesca per l'età moderna emergono con particolare frequenza le conflittualità inerenti sia lo sfruttamento delle risorse ittiche locali con tecniche di cattura sperimentate e ben radicate nella pratica lavorativa tradizionale, sia la consuetudine di una pesca itinerante con migrazioni stagionali in gruppo di lavoratori del mare spinti da un luogo all'altro all'inseguimento dei banchi di pesce in movimento e alla ricerca di più fruttifere zone di pesca⁸. Con l'individuazione delle risorse marine, solo apparentemente di facile acquisizione, intervengono però nel corso del tempo vari fattori di disturbo, di carattere geografico, economico, giuridico, politico, sociale che appaiono quasi una costante. Il fenomeno, non ancora studiato per i secoli dell'età moderna⁹, è stato in qualche modo rilevato per il passato più recente, soprattutto nella messa a fuoco delle "rivalità" e dei "conflitti" di lavoro fra le marinerie. Come osserva Marco

⁷ Una interessante inchiesta che pone in discussione, anche sotto il profilo giuridico, la liceità dell'utilizzo della pesca a strascico, pone in chiara evidenza già nel primo Settecento l'avvenuta diffusione della pratica con l'utilizzo di una e/o più barche. Cfr. a proposito N. JOELE, *Difesa della proibizione della pesca, con tartane francesi, anche ad una, a tenor del generale editto del fu Cons. Coll. del 1729. Da eseguirsi non solo da maggio fino all'ultimo di settembre per lo divieto in quello già espresso, ma per tutto l'anno ancora, con altro ordine da spedirsi in virtù del medesimo Editto*, Napoli 1738.

⁸ Sull'emigrazione temporanea del primo Novecento dei pescatori dell'Adriatico si vedano gli studi di S. LEVI MORENOS, *L'emigrazione peschereccia pel lavoro nell'Adriatico*, in *Regio comitato talassografico italiano*, Memoria XXXII, Venezia 1916, e di A. MORI, *Note sulla pesca a Zara e Lågosta e sull'emigrazione peschereccia nell'Adriatico*, in "Bollettino della Regia società geografica italiana", s. 6, X (1933), fasc. 9-10, 661-680. Prendono spunto dal contributo di DAVID LEVI MORENOS i lavori di F. FERRARI, *I pescatori dell'Adriatico dalle lagune alle grandi migrazioni*, in "Chioggia. Rivista di studi e ricerche", 12 (1998), 120-137; C. BERGO, *L'emigrazione temporanea dei pescatori italiani nell'Adriatico*, in "Chioggia", 20 (1992), 75-93. Recentemente è stato pubblicato un contributo sulla marineria di S. Benedetto del Tronto: *Le emigrazioni marinare sanbenedettesi. Una civiltà "altrove"*, numero speciale della rivista «Cimbas», febbraio 1998. Sulla conflittualità fra pescatori cfr. D. LEVI MORENOS, *Le contese fra chioggiotti e slavi nel litorale dalmato-istriano*, in "Rivista politica e letteraria", Roma 1899.

⁹ Per un primo approccio riguardo a questo campo di ricerca cfr. M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *Le comunità dei pescatori vaganti. Risorse, migrazioni, conflitti*, in DE NICOLÒ, *Microcosmi mediterranei*, 175-230.

Armiero, su una stessa risorsa ambientale “insistono diversi soggetti sociali, che attingono ad essa con tecniche, finalità, filosofie differenti”¹⁰. Per l’uso di quella risorsa nasce un conflitto “tra interessi economici antagonisti, tra gruppi sociali contrapposti, ma anche conflitto tra un potere centrale che intende gestire la risorsa e i gruppi che ne hanno fatto uso e che se ne ritengono i legittimi proprietari”¹¹.

In sostanza accadeva che “un gruppo si opponeva all’altro perché temeva che gli strumenti, le tecniche adoperate dai concorrenti potessero conferire loro un vantaggio competitivo incolmabile, capace di compromettere gli equilibri riproduttivi delle specie ittiche e di conseguenza la possibilità di continuare a ricavare un reddito dell’esercizio della attività”¹². Si evidenziano conflitti plurisecolari, ad esempio, tra i pescatori di tratta e i “voigari” delle isole dalmate (Lissa, Lesina), il cui approccio all’uso della risorsa era basato sull’impiego di tecniche differenti e differenti investimenti. Non a caso dal punto di vista delle disposizioni legislative hanno la meglio i proprietari di tratta, rappresentati da un ceto sociale di maggior peso nella comunità. I conflitti tuttavia non sono solo di carattere locale, ad esempio tra pescatori costieri e pescatori d’altura con zone di pesca magari confinanti, quanto piuttosto fra intere comunità di pescatori “vaganti” che si trasferivano per mesi in spazi acquei solitamente sfruttati da altre comunità con l’impiego di altre tecniche. Si pensi al conflitto tra Istriani e Chioggiotti nel Settecento. Da parte delle comunità dei pescatori locali si registra anche il rifiuto ad accogliere passivamente l’innovazione tecnica, quando questa è ritenuta dannosa all’ecosistema. Lo si è riscontrato a Cetara, ma anche a San Benedetto del Tronto, a Senigallia, a Pesaro, a Rimini.

La trasformazione del settore implica poi l’allestimento di nuove imbarcazioni¹³, modificate negli scafi e nella velatura rispetto ai precedenti tipi navali, l’utilizzo di reti anch’esse ridimensionate nella tessitura e nella grandezza delle maglie, l’adozione di tecniche di navigazione fino a quel momento non ancora sperimentate, l’organizzazione sociale dell’impresa di pesca con la definizione di precise specificità lavorative fra i membri dell’equipaggio sia a bordo che a terra, la costruzione di particolari strutture edilizie, le conserve o ghiacciaie per il mantenimento del pesce fresco, la creazione di una efficiente rete distributiva con la mediazione di

¹⁰ M. ARMIERO, *La risorsa contesa: norme, conflitti e tecnologie tra i pescatori napoletani meridionali (XIX sec.)*, in «Meridiana», 21 (1998), 112.

¹¹ M. ARMIERO, *La risorsa contesa*, 192-193.

¹² M. ARMIERO, *La risorsa contesa*, 193.

¹³ Sull’evoluzione del naviglio da pesca in Adriatico cfr. M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *Adriatico. Cultura e arti del mare*, Fano 1996; DE NICOLÒ, *Tipi navali in Adriatico nella documentazione archivistica dei secc. XVII-XVIII*, in “Navis. Rassegna di studi di archeologia, etnologia e storia navale”, II, 2000; DE NICOLÒ, *Tartanon pesarese un veliero adriatico. Costruzione governo attività usi marittimi*, Villa Verucchio 2005.

un corpo di spedizionieri e di corrispondenti impegnati in continui spostamenti pendolari fra i porti di sbarco e le città dell'interno. A livello di comunità marittime, per quanto riguarda l'Adriatico particolarmente dinamici si dimostrano i centri costieri della Romagna, dove si avvia fin da subito l'edificazione di un considerevole numero di conserve per l'accumulo di ghiaccio e neve per una pronta quanto efficace "mercantilizzazione" del pesce fresco, favorita d'altro canto da un entroterra piuttosto popoloso e soprattutto ben servito da una rete viaria regionale imperniata sulla via Emilia ed i suoi numerosi diverticoli stradali.

I tangibili progressi delle arti della pesca stimolano anche gli investimenti nel settore da parte di categorie estranee all'ambiente, attratte da forme contrattuali che prevedono rischi d'impresa molto bassi per il prestatore.

Punto di partenza nell'impresa di pesca è naturalmente l'acquisto dei mezzi di produzione, cioè il capitale di lavoro rappresentato da barca e attrezzi, ma proprio a partire da questa ovvietà si innesta un processo che finisce spesso per penalizzare proprio il principale attore della catena produttiva, cioè il pescatore-armatore¹⁴. Le problematiche rilevabili ancora nel 1869 a Chioggia, riconosciuta almeno dalla fine del Cinquecento come la società peschereccia adriatica senza dubbio più rappresentativa, possono essere prese a campione di una situazione dovuta alla persistenza di consuetudini secolari, generalizzabile anche ad altri comparti marittimi mediterranei. Ciò che si rileva a Chioggia è che, "non vi è nessun armatore di naviglio e pesca che nell'istesso tempo non sia anche conduttore del proprio legno"¹⁵.

Un pescatore qualunque conosciuto per onesto, che vuol possedere una barca propria la fa costruire ad un proto calafato con poche centinaia di lire alla mano, obbligandosi di estinguere il rimanente prezzo in tante rate mensili di lire 12 fino a 24. Nell'istesso modo acquista il paviglione, gli attrezzi e le reti che si rendono necessarie per armare il suo naviglio alla pesca in mare.

Da queste prime battute si intuisce che nell'avvio dell'impresa di pesca, uno dei primi personaggi che viene ad allacciare un rapporto di tipo creditizio con il pescatore è lo stesso costruttore del naviglio, il proto calafato. L'accettazione da parte di quest'ultimo di consegne rateali del compenso dovutogli, che a prima vista potrebbe apparire per il committente una "facilitazione" del pagamento, in realtà poi, con il passar del tempo, viene ad assumere l'aspetto di una soluzione capestro per il pescatore, costretto ad esborsi continui e quasi usurari. Il costo del naviglio completo di

¹⁴ Su questo argomento cfr. M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *Finanziamento e rischio nell'impresa di pesca*, in DE NICOLÒ, *Microcosmi mediterranei*, 291-304.

¹⁵A. TARGIONI TOZZETTI, *La pesca in Italia. Annali del Ministero di Agricoltura Industria e Commercio*, Genova 1872, I, II, 509.

attrezzature, infatti, finiva per risultare “più del doppio del valore suo reale”, in quanto “coi restauri occorrenti successivamente al legno, di ritorno si può dire da ogni campagna di pesca, egli [pescatore] non fa che aggiungere un altro debito al primitivo”.

Rispetto all’impegno creditizio iniziale, in forza delle successive opere di restauro, via via si allontana la possibilità di estinguere il debito, che diventa oltremodo gravoso anche per l’aggiunta di altre spese obbligatorie. Nella fase di commercializzazione del prodotto infatti, la presenza del *parzienevolo*, un “fiduciario” a cui veniva affidata la vendita del pescato assicurando una “provvigione del 5% sul prezzo di vendita lordo”, decurtava non poco i cespiti di guadagno. Stretto nella morsa fra *protocolafato* e *parzienevolo*, insomma, con l’andar del tempo per il pescatore l’indebitamento poteva diventare addirittura cronico.

Le mansioni del venditore del pesce erano a tutti gli effetti quelle di amministratore finanziario dell’impresa di pesca, in quanto si delegavano totalmente a lui sia i conteggi delle partite di pesce di volta in volta sbarcate, sia quelli relativi alla vendita, che effettuava nella pubblica pescheria “all’orecchio”, cioè con una sorta di battuta d’asta che lanciava a partire da un prezzo base. Al momento della divisione degli utili “all’importo totale del ricavato lordo detrae prima la sua provvigione del 5%” e successivamente procede alle altre operazioni:

sul residuo importo diffalca tutte le spese erariali, consolari e di vittuario, dalla quale ultima partita sono esclusi però il pane e la farina della polenta, dacché questi due articoli deve provvederseli da sè il pescatore. Dall’avanzo netto il parzienevolo fa tante parti quanti sono gli individui che componevano la compagnia, figurandovi in questa il naviglio per due parti e più ... una parte intiera riceve ogni pescatore, tre quarti o mezza parte il morè (mozzo di bordo)¹⁶.

Il sistema di partizione degli utili, peraltro molto somigliante a quello in uso già in tempi pregressi presso le marinerie di “sottovento” presentava alcune macroscopiche incongruenze. Alla prima domanda che si poneva l’estensore della relazione d’inchiesta e cioè, come mai “i parzienevoli sono per lo più gente agraria ed i pescatori (compresi anche la maggior parte degli armatori) all’incontro sieno per lo più miserabili”, faceva seguito una seconda riguardo i dividendi calcolati dal *parzienevolo*¹⁷. Perché il venditore-fiduciario percepiva la sua quota percentuale del 5% calcolando l’ammontare sull’importo totale del ricavato, mentre per gli stipendi da ripartirsi fra i membri dell’equipaggio, eseguiva il computo, previa detrazione delle spese, sul guadagno netto?

¹⁶ TARGIONI TOZZETTI, *La pesca in Italia*.

¹⁷ Sull’organizzazione sociale dell’impresa di pesca cfr. DE NICOLÒ, *Stile, usanza e consuetudine della marineria*, in DE NICOLÒ *Microcosmi mediterranei*, 249-289.

Le risposte davano un quadro contabile a tutto vantaggio dei *parzienevoli*, per i quali si prospettavano anche altre possibilità di profitto:

hanno [i venditori di pesce] un'altra parte di risorsa, senza contare l'utile del giro del denaro che rimane presso di loro della vendita del pesce, durante tutto il tempo che dura la campagna di pesca, e questa consiste nel dare a prestito somme di danaro ai suoi stessi committenti verso un compenso di una quarta, mezza ed anche una parte eguale a quella che guadagna un pescatore per porli in grado di far fronte alle spese per intraprendere una seconda campagna di pesca, allorché coll'ultima, tra il dare e l'avere, siano rimasti debitori al parzienevole, per le somministrazioni di danaro che di quando in quando durante la campagna, fa alle rispettive famiglie dei committenti stessi.

Una condizione di estrema precarietà dunque quella della maggior parte dei pescatori da cui traevano profitto soprattutto il protocolafato e il parzienevole, ma anche altri artigiani impegnati nelle attività di supporto all'impresa ittica, come il fabbro ferraio e il cordaio, in definitiva "quattro vampiri" per dirla con l'efficace metafora a cui ricorre Domenico Andrea Renier, estensore dell'indagine governativa¹⁸. La posizione creditizia del costruttore della barca poteva prolungarsi per anni, incrementata da un cespite di interesse calcolabile di solito al tasso del 6%, ma suscettibile delle variazioni dettate dai periodi di congiuntura. Il rischio per il creditore poteva essere rappresentato dall'eventuale naufragio del naviglio, perché in questo caso, secondo consuetudine, avrebbe dovuto rassegnarsi all'applicazione dell' "antica regola a *barca persa e conti fatti*, liberando i naufraghi o gli eredi dal debito restante"¹⁹.

La clausola "barca rotta e conti fatti" che, secondo l'espressione dei "capi parcenevoli" di Venezia, tramandava un "antichissimo vernacolo, o proverbio"²⁰, si ritrova inserita anche nei contratti di prestito marittimo che vanno sotto il nome di *creditum super cymba* e *contractus risico maris*. Un'interessante produzione di questo tipo di strumento giuridico, specie dal Settecento, si documenta a Rimini dove, probabilmente sulla scia della congiuntura particolarmente favorevole del commercio marittimo e delle arti della pesca, si mette in luce l'attività feneratizia di mercanti disposti a sostenere lo sforzo imprenditoriale di singoli pescatori-armatori o delle società motivate all'intrapresa del lavoro sul mare²¹. L'aggiunta nel negozio giuridico definito *creditum super cymba* della clausola "barca rotta e

¹⁸ TARGIONI TOZZETTI, *La pesca in Italia*, 501.

¹⁹ MARELLA, *Annotazioni pescherecce*, a cura di L. DIVARI e G. PENZO, Sottomarina 1990, 12: nota dei curatori.

²⁰ G. ZORDAN, *Il codice per la veneta marina mercantile*, I, Padova 1981, 40.

²¹ Su tale forma di credito cfr. M.L. DE NICOLÒ, *Note sull'attività cantieristica e portuale a Rimini nel Settecento*, in *Barche e gente dell'Adriatico*, a cura di U. SPADONI, Bologna 1985, 43 e 124.

conti fatti", cautelava il pescatore armatore, o la società tra pescatori, di fronte al prestatore in quanto valeva a cassare il debito nei confronti del mutuante nell'eventualità della perdita del legno in caso di naufragio o altro accidente. In assenza di incentivi del governo, per i pescatori, sempre a corto di disponibilità finanziarie dal momento che numerose forze inibitrici mantenevano la formazione del risparmio entro limiti estremamente esigui, il ricorso al prestito diventa una condizione preliminare obbligatoria per tentare l'intrapresa lavorativa. I redditi, quando si riesce a percepirla, non consentono che lentissime accumulazioni, per cui, pur di dotarsi di natanti adeguati alla navigazione d'alto mare e delle attrezzature necessarie per il lavoro in mare, i pescatori nell'intento di aumentare la propria capacità produttiva, si predispongono al rischio accollandosi debiti non solo con i maestri d'ascia, ma anche con calafati, velai, alberanti, cordai ed altri personaggi che esercitano attività collaterali a quella piscatoria. Il finanziamento esterno diventa perciò essenziale e pur di conseguirlo nell'immediato ci si piega a soddisfare anche interessi onerosi, solitamente equiparati ad una parte, o anche a frazioni di parte, da calcolarsi periodicamente nella partizione degli utili prodotti dalla vendita del pescato. Particolarmente propensi alla pratica feneratizia finalizzata a soddisfare le necessità pecuniarie di questa categoria di lavoratori del mare, si riconoscono a Rimini alcuni "negozianti". Fra questi si mettono in luce gestori di botteghe e vari faccendieri che, da buoni speculatori, colgono con profitto le nuove opportunità che si maturano per il mercato ittico nel secondo Settecento calandosi nella veste di banchieri privati ad esclusivo servizio dei pescatori. Questi personaggi devono principalmente al dinamismo delle loro operazioni finanziarie la crescita delle proprie fortune immobiliari che tendono ad incrementarsi anche con il recupero di barche, case e terre per insolvenza del debito. L'attività feneratizia appare infatti particolarmente vantaggiosa ed il rischio di eventuali perdite del capitale molto contenuto. I saggi di interesse percepiti, piuttosto alti, garantiscono un utile più che soddisfacente e l'investitore si trova comunque garantito perché il rapporto finanziario prevede la possibilità di entrare sollecitamente in possesso dei beni del debitore insolvente e di goderne le rendite nel caso di mancata restituzione del capitale alla scadenza del contratto, moltiplicando in poco tempo il denaro investito in questa lucrosissima attività. Non sorprende quindi che le somme ricavate periodicamente dal pagamento delle rate o dall'estinzione dei prestiti venga puntualmente reinvestito in nuove operazioni, dando vita ad un intenso movimento di denaro.

L'aumento della produzione e la crescita delle marinerie non giova però a scalzare dallo stato di povertà la classe dei pescatori, qualificati già da Plauto come "famelica hominum natio", che rimangono relegati dall'osservanza di "usi e consuetudini" antichi in una situazione di sudditanza

nei confronti dei padroni di barca, dei rivenditori di pesce e dei prestatori di denaro, assai difficilmente riscattabile, che troverà soluzione molto più tardi, nel Novecento.

Dalla fine del Cinquecento comunque, nonostante le non poche problematiche sociali ed organizzative del settore, si avvia la trasformazione del commercio ittico che porta nel giro di due secoli al ribaltamento dei tradizionali traffici di pesce e con essi dei consumi impostatisi nell'età medievale, con il progressivo sviluppo dello smercio, anche sulle lunghe distanze, del prodotto fresco a discapito del pesce conservato.

Sono molti i temi che attendono ancora di una adeguata trattazione e la ricerca archivistica potrà restituire certamente altre importanti informazioni sul fenomeno di crescita della produzione ittica nel Mediterraneo fra Sei e Ottocento e dello smercio del pesce fresco, vale a dire "su quella microfunzionalità economica che intesse la vita quotidiana ed ha rilievo pratico non inferiore alle vicende delle merci di alto valore aggiunto"²².

²² A. CARILE, *Le corporazioni dei pescivendoli e dei pescatori a Costantinopoli nel X secolo*, in *Incontro internazionale nel 1050° anniversario della Carta piscatoria ravennate*, Ravenna 1994, 18.

Lisa Botter - Otello Giovanardi - Saša Raicevich

Migrazioni della flotta peschereccia di Chioggia nel mare Adriatico tra il XIX e il XX secolo

Origine e prime testimonianze della pesca dei chioggiotti in alto mare

La posizione geografica di Chioggia ha incoraggiato nel passato le attività di produzione di sale e di pesca. L'attività salinifera di Chioggia raggiunse il suo massimo splendore nel XII secolo (Hocquet, 1970) e rappresentò per la città l'attività commerciale principale fino al XVI secolo quando, a causa di cambiamenti nella politica della Repubblica Serenissima, la produzione subì una brusca interruzione. Molti degli abitanti di Chioggia che lavoravano in questo settore si trovarono quindi a dover cambiare attività lavorativa e si rivolsero alla pesca lagunare in quanto la fauna era molto ricca e ancora poco sfruttata (Perini, 1989). Alla fine del XVI secolo profitti derivanti dalla pesca lagunare cominciarono a decrescere in modo preoccupante a causa dell'eccessivo numero di operatori. La conseguenza fu lo spostamento di parte dell'attività di pesca dalle acque lagunari a quelle marine. Questo processo è identificato da Perini (1992) come l'inizio della vocazione dei pescatori chioggiotti alla pesca marina. Nel corso del tempo questa attività divenne talmente importante da rendere Chioggia il porto peschereccio più sviluppato dell'intero Adriatico. Il ruolo di Chioggia fu dovuto in particolar modo alla tenacia e al coraggio dei pescatori che affrontarono migrazioni per lunghe distanze e lunghi periodi, incorrendo in molti rischi per assicurare un guadagno alla propria famiglia.

Testimonianze delle migrazioni della flotta peschereccia di Chioggia possono trovarsi in numerosi documenti che descrivono i conflitti tra pescatori chioggiotti e pescatori locali in particolare quelli della costa orientale dell'Adriatico. Ad esempio, nel XVIII secolo (1716), il Podestà di Capo d'Istria proibì la pesca dei chioggiotti nelle acque istriane (Marella 1890). In pratica nessuna legge limitava l'attività dei chioggiotti fino al 1770, quando la Giustizia Vecchia (l'ufficio della Serenissima incaricato di gestire le attività di pesca), pressata dai pescatori di Rovigno, abolì l'autorizzazione alla pesca dei chioggiotti nella parte orientale del mare Adriatico.

Struttura della flotta peschereccia di Chioggia

Nel 1866, la data iniziale del periodo considerato in questo studio, la flotta peschereccia di Chioggia era sicuramente la più importante di tutto il mare Adriatico e l'attività di pesca rappresentava la più importante fonte di profitto per i suoi abitanti. Infatti, considerando i dati sulla pesca di Chioggia riferiti all'anno 1868, si evidenzia che ben il 21% della popolazione era costituita da pescatori (in totale 5509 persone, Memmo 1985) mentre il 2% era impiegata nell'attività cantieristica e di costruzione degli attrezzi da pesca. In tale periodo i pescatori chioggiotti erano soliti svolgere attività di pesca in ambienti diversi (laguna, valle da pesca e mare) utilizzando, a seconda dell'area sfruttata, imbarcazioni e strumenti da pesca diversificati.

Memmo (1985) riporta che nel 1869 la flotta peschereccia era costituita da circa 2500 imbarcazioni: 50 Tartane, 550 Bragozzi, 700 Velieri e 1200 imbarcazioni per la pesca lagunare e valliva. In particolare riferendosi ai Bragozzi, 510 di questi erano imbarcazioni di alto mare e, di questi, 313 pescavano in acque austro-ungariche.

È possibile valutare la grandezza di questa flotta considerando che nello stesso periodo (1869) lungo tutta la costa orientale dell'Adriatico, sotto l'impero austro-ungarico, c'era un totale di 1269 pescherecci ovvero la metà di quelli presenti a Chioggia, e 4049 pescatori (Faber, 1883). L'importanza della flotta peschereccia di Chioggia lungo le coste orientali dell'Adriatico è testimoniata soprattutto da Faber nel testo che scrisse nel 1883: *Fisheries of the Adriatic. The Austro-Hungarian sea-fisheries* (Le attività di pesca dell'Adriatico. La pesca marina nell'Impero Austro-Ungarico). Questo testo comprende una descrizione dettagliata delle attività di pesca lungo le coste orientali dell'Adriatico, inclusa quella dei pescatori di Chioggia, la quantificazione del pescato, delle imbarcazioni e degli attrezzi da pesca. Esso rappresenta una delle fonti più importanti relative all'attività dei chioggiotti in quell'area nella seconda metà del XIX secolo. Tuttavia la descrizione spazio-temporale delle attività di pesca è poco precisa, così come manca del tutto una descrizione dello sfruttamento lungo le coste occidentali dell'Adriatico.

A metà del XIX secolo, quando Chioggia passò al Regno d'Italia (1866), le attività di pesca erano regolate tramite un Trattato di Commercio e Navigazione, che veniva rinnovato circa ogni dieci anni (1869, 1878, 1891, 1904). Il Trattato permetteva la pesca in acque straniere purché non fosse svolta con attrezzi dannosi per gli organismi e l'ambiente, come la dinamite e tutti i tipi di esplosivi, nonché tutte le reti considerate distruttive per le uova e gli stadi giovanili dei pesci.

Tra il 1866 e il 1884 il numero dei pescatori e delle imbarcazioni dei chioggiotti fu soggetto ad una riduzione a causa degli ostacoli imposti dall'Impero Austro-Ungarico, che avrebbe voluto chiudere le proprie acque

agli stranieri ed a causa di ciò, nel 1876, rimasero attivi solo 2644 pescatori (Memmo, 1985). Questi avvenimenti determinarono inoltre una diminuzione nel numero dei calafati (artigiani costruttori di barche), parte dei quali migrarono alla ricerca di lavoro a Trieste nel 1871, allora sotto il dominio austriaco (Memmo, 1985). Conseguentemente, il numero delle imbarcazioni costruite a Chioggia in un anno diminuì da 71 nel 1870 a 48 nel 1873 (Memmo, 1985). Questa situazione cambiò nel 1884 quando la Conferenza di Gorizia impose uno stretto rispetto del Trattato di Commercio e Navigazione già esistente tra Regno d'Italia e Impero Austro-Ungarico, stabilendo che i pescatori di entrambi i paesi potevano pescare nelle acque straniere rispettando il limite di un miglio dalla costa o di otto metri di profondità, riservando le altre zone e la pesca ai coralli e alle spugne solo ai pescatori locali (Morenos, 1903). In questa tranquillità relativa, la pesca chioggiotta ricominciò a prosperare ed un numero sempre maggiore di chioggiotti cominciò a migrare per condurre la propria attività di pesca verso l'altra sponda dell'Adriatico. Domenico Razza (1895) scrisse: "...Nel tempo decorso, fino a dieci anni fa, la pesca dei chioggiotti sulle coste dell'Istria era poca cosa. Solo dai primi di agosto a mezzo novembre circa, alcune Tartane vi esercitavano la pesca...In seguito la pesca delle estinte Tartane veniva sostituita da quella dei Bragozzi...Al contrario da qualche tempo quel mare poco fruttuoso cominciò ad essere pescato per tutto l'anno"¹.

Tipologia di barche ed attrezzi da pesca

Bellemo (1908-12) e Levi-Morenos (1916) descrivono una grande varietà di imbarcazioni utilizzate dai chioggiotti per pescare in acque straniere, in particolare le Tartane, i Bragozzi, i Bragozzetti e le Sardelliere. Altre imbarcazioni di minore dimensione venivano usate per attività a distanze più limitate dal porto, come ad esempio il Battello da pizzo. Quest'ultimo era una piccola imbarcazione di circa sette metri di lunghezza, di 3-5 tonnellate e con tre uomini costituenti l'equipaggio. Queste imbarcazioni avanzavano mediante remi e con l'ausilio di "vele al terzo" (Marella, 1890) e venivano adottate solo lungo le coste venete e per la pesca in laguna.

Il Bragozzo, invece, fu la più tipica e famosa imbarcazione chioggiotta. Veniva costruita solo a Chioggia e il suo impiego fu prerogativa dei chioggiotti. Misurava generalmente 8-14 metri di lunghezza, con una stazza pari a 6-10 tonnellate e 3-5 uomini di equipaggio. Il Bragozzo era caratterizzato da due alberi e due vele "al quarto" di colorazioni molto vivaci e con

¹ DOMENICO RAZZA, *Lo sviluppo della pesca dei nostri sulle coste dell'Istria*, in "Neptunia", ottobre 1895.

disegnato, al suo centro, il simbolo della famiglia di proprietà del Bragozzo. Il Bragozzetto, invece, era uguale in forma al Bragozzo, ma molto più piccolo nelle dimensioni, con un solo albero ed una sola vela (Marella, 1890). La Sardelliera, simile al Bragozzo, ma anch'essa più piccola (circa 5 tonnellate alla fine del XIX secolo; Memmo, 1985) veniva utilizzata soprattutto per la pesca delle sogliole e delle sardine. Infine veniva utilizzata la Tartana, un'imbarcazione che vide il suo declino proprio nella seconda metà del XIX secolo. Le principali caratteristiche di questa imbarcazione erano le dimensioni molto elevate (circa 18-30 metri di lunghezza e 10-15 tonnellate di stazza) e l'elevato numero di pescatori necessario per le operazioni di bordo (circa otto persone).

Levi Morenos (1916) riporta le tipologie di attrezzi (7 in particolare), sia fissi che a strascico, che venivano utilizzati dai pescatori di Chioggia nelle attività di pesca in alto mare. Questi attrezzi rappresentano solo una piccola porzione di una varietà molto maggiore di attrezzi (circa 60) che venivano utilizzati nella Laguna di Venezia e per la pesca costiera nelle aree prossime a Chioggia, tutti attrezzi ad elevata specializzazione in quanto dedicati alla cattura di singole specie bersaglio (si veda Levi Morenos, 1916, per maggiori dettagli).

Nella pesca in alto mare gli attrezzi a strascico maggiormente impiegati erano l'Ostreghero, la Tartanella e la Cocchia, tutti concepiti per lo sfruttamento delle specie demersali e bentoniche. Questi attrezzi venivano utilizzati soprattutto da imbarcazioni di grandi dimensioni quali Sardelliere e Bragozzi sia lungo le coste italiane che quelle dell'impero e più raramente dai battelli nella pesca costiera. L'Ostreghero era una specie di sfogliara composta da una rete fissata ad un semicerchio di ferro o legno chiamato *massa* che, con l'aiuto di un bastoncino di legno (*bastonzin*) fissato alla bocca, manteneva aperta la rete. A volte denti di ferro venivano fissati alla bocca della rete con lo scopo di aumentare l'efficienza dell'attrezzo.

I chioggiotti solitamente pescavano con due o tre Ostregheri contemporaneamente, a seconda delle dimensioni dell'imbarcazione. Questi attrezzi erano fissati mediante l'uso di cime rispettivamente a poppa, prua e lungo la mezzeria dell'imbarcazione (Marella, 1890). Le specie bersaglio più importanti pescate con l'Ostreghero, erano la sogliola comune (*Solea solea*), il rombo (*Psetta maxima*) e la passera (*Platichthys flesus*).

La Cocchia era una rete trainata da una coppia di Bragozzi mantenuta aperta orizzontalmente mediante il controllo della distanza e la velocità relativa tra le due imbarcazioni. La Cocchia era costituita da tre parti chiamate *cielo* (parte vicino alla bocca della rete), *porta* (parte centrale) e *cogolo* (parte terminale). L'apertura verticale era ottenuta mediante la presenza nella parte anteriore della rete di una lima di piombo nella parte inferiore, e di una lima di sughero, nella parte superiore (Faber, 1883).

La Tartanella era invece una piccola Tartana (Marella, 1890), ovvero una

rete a strascico conica, meno efficiente della già vista Cocchia, essendo più piccola, ma con il vantaggio di poter essere trainata da un'unica imbarcazione (generalmente un Battello da pizzo o un Bragozzetto). La rete veniva fissata a prua e a poppa mediante due lunghi bastoni di legno, chiamati *spunteri* (Marella, 1890) e veniva trascinata perpendicolare al fianco della barca in direzione del vento. La Tartanella era un tipico attrezzo multi-specifico, utilizzata per catturare specie diverse tra cui il fragolino (*Pagellus erythrinus*), la triglia di fango (*Mullus barbatus*), il merluzzo (*Merluccius merluccius*), lo scorfano (*Scorpena spp.*) e il molo (*Merlangius merlangus*).

Gli attrezzi fissi erano soprattutto mono-specifici, ovvero concepiti per catturare solo una o alcune specie, in particolare la sardina (*Sardina pilchardus*), la sogliola comune (*Solea solea*), la papalina (*Sprattus sprattus*) e lo sgombro (*Scomber scomber*), che venivano pescati rispettivamente mediante la *Rè da sardele*, *Rè da sfogi o sfogioni*, la *Rè da renghe* e dalle Panole. Gli squali e le razze venivano pescate mediante parangali chiamati Amanti.

La *Rè da Sardele*, chiamate anche Melaidi (e attualmente Menaidi), era una rete fissa costituita da una serie di pannelli di rete con maglie della stessa taglia, mantenuta aperta verticalmente da una lima di piombi e una di sugheri. Concordemente con la strategia dei pescatori, la proporzione di piombo e sughero utilizzata cambiava a seconda che si volesse pescare a fondo o più in superficie, a brocco.

La *Rè da sfogi* o da *sfogioni* ha la stessa forma, ma veniva usata solo a contatto con il fondo; durante l'attività di pesca veniva fissata da una parte ad una grossa pietra e dall'altra direttamente alla barca. La *Rè da sfogioni* differiva solo nella dimensioni delle maglie, che erano più larghe in quanto gli *sfogioni* erano sogliole di grosse dimensioni. La *Rè da renghe*, invece, era una rete lasciata alla deriva nell'acqua. Le Panole erano, invece, degli ami legati ad un filo da pesca di 30-40 metri di lunghezza, in cui venivano innescati dei granchi come esca.

Infine, gli Amanti erano parangali di 480 metri di lunghezza, equipaggiati con ami ogni due metri con esche quali sardine, seppie e altre specie. I pescatori, a seconda della specie, lasciavano flottare il parangale o lo armavano con pietre per farlo sprofondare (Marella, 1890).

Durante le migrazioni, i chioggiotti si organizzavano in compagnie costituite da 18 o 20 Bragozzi con a capo un pescatore esperto. I pescherecci si univano in coppie di Bragozzi per pescare con la Cocchia o da soli per pescare con l'Ostreghero. Per risparmiare tempo nel trasporto del pescato al mercato veniva utilizzata un'altra imbarcazione, chiamata Portolata, che era più piccola e veloce di quella dedicata alla pesca (Marella, 1890). Da una parte questa soluzione permetteva, come dice Morenos (1916), di ridurre il tempo effettivo del trasporto del prodotto, evitando il suo deterioramento dovuto alla temperatura ed alla mancanza di sistemi per la refrigerazione; dall'altra i pescatori potevano così continuare nell'attività di pesca senza

sprecare tempo nel trasporto del pesce. Alla fine della stagione di pesca, il ricavato del pescato copriva abbondantemente le spese della Portolata.

I profitti di ogni imbarcazione venivano divisi in più parti, la cui composizione era basata su un'antica tradizione peschereccia: il 25% del totale era devoluto all'acquisto di beni di vario tipo (cibo, bevande, cassette per il pescato, ecc...); il rimanente 75% era ulteriormente suddiviso in due parti: il 40% costituiva la parte del proprietario dell'imbarcazione, il rimanente 60% andava all'equipaggio (Neptunia 1893-94). Curiosamente, essendo i pescatori analfabeti, prendevano nota dei profitti utilizzando segni Fenici o Etruschi (Neptunia 1893-94).

Distribuzione spazio-temporale dell'attività di pesca dei chioggiotti in Adriatico

Una prima descrizione organica della distribuzione spazio-temporale delle attività di pesca della marineria chioggiotta in Adriatico è fornita da Levi Morenos che nel 1916 dedicò a tale argomento un articolo pubblicato nella rivista scientifica "Regio Comitato Talassografico". A quel tempo Levi Morenos era il direttore della Società Veneta di Pesca e Acquicoltura che fondò nel 1893 con lo scopo di migliorare la qualità della vita dei pescatori italiani, incrementando le loro competenze tecnico-scientifiche, e promuovendo ogni iniziativa che potesse in qualche modo arricchire la loro situazione lavorativa (Gianni, 2003-4). Levi Morenos si basò sui dati raccolti periodicamente da Don Eugenio Bellemo, direttore della sezione di Chioggia della Scuola Veneta di Pesca e Acquicoltura, per gli anni 1914 e 1915, descrivendo tre contingenti di pesca impiegati in diverse tipologie di attività.

Il primo contingente era costituito da 1053 imbarcazioni (Bragozzi e Battelli da pizzo), che pescavano per tutto l'anno in laguna (973) e lungo la costa (80), tra la foce del fiume Piave e Po di Goro; questi pescatori utilizzavano una grande varietà di attrezzi da pesca inclusi cogolli, trappole, reti fisse e piccole reti a strascico. Il secondo contingente era solito sfruttare per tutto l'anno l'area compresa tra il confine Austro-Ungarico (Porto Buso) ed Ancona (Adriatico Centro-Occidentale); era costituito da 324 Bragozzi con circa 1500 pescatori che utilizzavano Cocchia, Tartana e Amanti. Il terzo contingente era infine costituito da 1250 pescatori imbarcati su 250 Bragozzi e Sardelliere che utilizzavano Amanti e Cocchia. Questo contingente sfruttava la costa veneto-romagnola fino ad Ancona, nel periodo compreso tra aprile e luglio, e migrava lungo la costa orientale dell'Adriatico nel periodo compreso tra agosto e aprile.

Questa sintesi fornita da Levi Morenos, rappresenta la prima descrizione organica delle migrazioni dei chioggiotti lungo le coste orientali dell'Adriatico. Allo scopo di fornire un ulteriore approfondimento, in mancanza della disponibilità dei dati originali su cui tale studio era basato, sono sta-

ti considerati dati analoghi pubblicati da Bellemo sulla rivista scientifica "Neptunia" (il periodico della Scuola Veneta di Pesca, pubblicato dal 1891 al 1912) che riguardano il periodo compreso tra il 1908 e il 1912. Questi dati descrivono il periodo immediatamente precedente quello considerato da Levi Morenos e permettono quindi, oltre a specifici approfondimenti, di verificare se quanto riportato dallo stesso autore è coerente con dati relativi agli anni precedenti da lui non considerati.

Le relazioni di Bellemo comprendono dati relativi a tre stagioni (primavera, autunno, inverno), per gli anni 1908-09, 1910-11, 1911-12. I dati sono molto dettagliati ed è possibile avere una descrizione precisa della flotta peschereccia, del numero di pescatori, della tipologia di pescato, dei guadagni dei pescatori, dei mercati in cui veniva venduto il pescato e dell'organizzazione di vendita. Tutti questi dati sono riportati per specifiche aree di pesca quali le Marche, la Romagna-Veneto, il litorale Veneto, il Golfo di Trieste, il Golfo del Quarnero, l'isola di Segna, la Dalmazia, Zara, Spalato, Makarska.

L'analisi preliminare dei dati ha permesso di stabilire che la distribuzione spazio-temporale delle attività di pesca nei diversi anni considerati era sostanzialmente la medesima; di conseguenza essi sono riassunti come valori medi dei tre anni descritti, per stagione ed area di pesca.

Durante il periodo primaverile, 527 imbarcazioni (354 Bragozzi, 45 Bragozzetti, 93 Sardelliere e 35 Battelli da pizzo) e circa 2070 pescatori pescavano lungo le coste italiane del mare Adriatico, da Ancona a Porto Buso. In particolare, lungo le coste della Romagna e del Veneto si dirigevano 93 Sardelliere munite di Melaidi per la pesca delle sardine. In confronto solo 145 imbarcazioni (138 Bragozzi e 7 Portolate) e circa 620 pescatori pescavano lungo la costa orientale, da Porto Buso a Makarska; il 59% era localizzato nel Golfo di Trieste.

Come riportato da Bellemo e Levi Morenos, parte dei pescatori che operavano lungo la costa italiana erano soliti abbandonare le coste della Romagna e delle Marche verso fine estate, in quanto diventavano povere di pesce. Ciò è confermato dai dati relativi alla stagione di pesca autunnale che mostrano come le imbarcazioni e i pescatori che operavano in quest'area diminuivano fino a 423 pescherecci (270 Bragozzi, 76 Bragozzetti, 23 Sardelliere, 40 Battelli da pizzo e 24 Portolate) e 1570 operatori. La capacità di pesca si riduceva ulteriormente in inverno, periodo in cui rimanevano in tale area solo 354 imbarcazioni (197 Bragozzi, 47 Bragozzetti, 50 Sardelliere, 60 Battelli da pizzo) e 1376 pescatori.

Di converso si evidenzia un incremento del numero di operatori chioggetti lungo le coste orientali dell'Adriatico. Sulla base dei dati di Bellemo è possibile ricostruire le zone in cui si concentrava l'attività di pesca. Infatti, durante il periodo autunnale sono riportate lungo la costa orientale 211 imbarcazioni (153 Bragozzi, 5 Bragozzetti, 47 Sardelliere, 6 Portolate) e 969

pescatori, in particolare in Istria (24%) e Quarnero (21%). Durante il periodo invernale il contingente di pescatori che operava lungo le coste dell'Impero Austro-Ungarico aumentava ulteriormente raggiungendo il numero di 256 pescherecci (185 Bragozzi, 8 Bragozzetti, 48 Sardelliere, 16 Portolate) e 1212 pescatori, concentrati in particolare in Dalmazia (29%) ed Istria (24%).

Cause della migrazione dei chioggiotti: aspetti economici, ecologici, geografici e storici

La comprensione delle cause che determinarono la migrazione dei chioggiotti lungo le coste dell'Adriatico necessita di considerazioni su aspetti di tipo economico, ecologico, geografico e storico.

I dati riportati da Bellemo riguardanti i guadagni delle differenti attività di pesca permettono di valutare l'importanza del fattore economico nel determinare le migrazioni dei pescatori chioggiotti dalle coste occidentali a quelle orientali. Da essi si evince come i profitti maggiori provenissero proprio dalla parte orientale dell'Adriatico. In primavera la differenza tra i rendimenti ottenuti lungo le due coste dell'Adriatico era relativamente ridotta: ad esempio, il guadagno di ogni pescatore per settimana di pesca era rispettivamente di 18,8 L, 17,5 L, 18,1 L per Marche, Romagna e per la pesca delle sardine e di 20,4 L, 19,7 L, 18,4 L per Trieste, Istria e la pesca nel Quarnero.

Durante il periodo autunnale i profitti lungo la costa italiana erano pressoché costanti (18,3 L per la pesca sottocosta) ma più bassi se confrontati con quelli della pesca nella zona orientale dell'Adriatico, specialmente in Istria (25,1 L), Quarnero (23,8 L) e Golfo di Trieste (23,5 L). In inverno, il quadro era lo stesso, ad esempio, tra Romagna e Veneto il guadagno di ogni pescatore per settimana di pesca era di circa 18,9 L contro le 26,1 L della pesca agli *sfogioni* in Istria e 23,6 L della pesca nell'area di Makarska.

I dati relativi ai guadagni che sono stati analizzati, ci permettono di capire la ragione più importante che determinò le migrazioni dei chioggiotti lungo la costa orientale dell'Adriatico, che è appunto quella economica. Infatti, la classe dei pescatori costituiva un proletariato analfabeta e povero, che non aveva altra fonte di sostentamento se non quella proveniente dall'attività di pesca.

A Chioggia e Venezia, prima della fondazione della Società Veneta di Pesca e Acquicoltura, i pescatori erano esclusi dalla cassa previdenziale della marina mercantile in quanto non erano ritenuti dei marinai, ed erano inoltre esclusi da ogni forma di sostegno pubblico (Ateneo Veneto, 1903). Per questo motivo David Levi Morenos difese strenuamente per tutta la vita gli interessi di questa classe proletaria. Infatti, in occasione del rinnovo del Trattato di Commercio e Navigazione tra Regno d'Italia e Im-

pero Austro-Ungarico (1903), presentò un Memoriale al Governo Italiano puntualizzando l'importanza economica della pesca lungo le coste orientali dell'Adriatico per i chioggiotti. In sintesi Levi-Morenos sostenne nel proprio memoriale che l'emigrazione era fondamentale in quanto permetteva ai chioggiotti di chiudere l'attività annuale di lavoro, essendo la loro pesca un'attività di sostentamento e non industriale. L'unità fisica e biologica dell'Adriatico è secondo l'autore la causa originaria della necessità di emigrare. I pescatori che si fossero limitati a pescare solo in una parte dell'Adriatico non avrebbero guadagnato abbastanza per sopravvivere per tutto l'anno, come sottolinea Levi Morenos nel suo Memoriale: *"Ben più gravi sarebbero le conseguenze immediate per i pescatori italiani che si trovassero all'improvviso privi dei loro tradizionali luoghi di pesca verso il litorale orientale dell'Adriatico. Devesi qui ricordare che, fatta eccezione di alcune paranze del compartimento di Bari, e di poche del Marchigiano, il massimo contingente dei pescatori danneggiati apparterebbe al Comune di Chioggia. Cocchie e Bragozzi sono reti e barche essenzialmente Chioggiotte, che rappresentano l'unico mezzo di sussistenza di questi arditi lavoratori dell'Adriatico... Gli odierni Bragozzi sono dunque troppo grandi per la pesca strettamente costiera, troppo piccoli per la pesca continuata d'alto mare che non avesse a far capo al litorale orientale dell'Adriatico. Così che i pescatori nostri, per il mancato accordo con l'Austria-Ungheria, si troverebbero all'improvviso nelle stesse condizioni di un piccolo possidente al quale sia portata via la terra e lasciati gli strumenti di lavoro che avevano un valore specialmente per quella lavorazione... Al pescatore, invece, non rimarrebbero che strumenti inadatti e quindi crisi gravissima..."*².

Gli elevati profitti dei pescatori chioggiotti erano però consentiti dallo scarso sviluppo della pesca locale lungo il litorale dell'Impero Austro-Ungarico. I pescatori chioggiotti e quelli austro-ungarici avevano una psicologia molto diversa, come affermava Anton Krisch, il Consigliere Aulico Austriaco "Neptunia" 1904: *"...Ci vuole organizzazione, ci vuole un'istruzione pratica, una propaganda paziente poiché i pescatori che si accontentino di andar in alto mare a gettar le reti, senza far sempre una preda copiosa e non perdano mai la pazienza, non si creano da un giorno all'altro, ma si formano. Formati questi pescatori, soprattutto invigorendo lo spirito d'associazione e la coltura delle acque, allora solo si potrà regolare completamente la pesca, secondo il desiderio di gran parte delle popolazioni litoranee Austriache..."*³.

Krisch e Hütterot permettevano ai pescatori chioggiotti di pescare nelle acque dell'Impero, solamente perché si rendevano conto che i pescatori austro-ungarici rappresentavano una classe immatura come sottolinea Hütterot durante il Congresso generale della Società Austriaca di Pesca

² DAVID LEVI MORENOS, *Memoriale presentato al Governo Italiano*, Venezia 1903, 22.

³ DOMENICO RAZZA, *I chioggiotti nelle acque austriache*, in "Neptunia", giugno 1904, 88.

(24 maggio 1903): “Non siamo ancora riusciti ad introdurre da noi con successo la pesca d’alto mare e ciò dobbiamo, a nostro malincuore, addebitare alla immaturità del nostro cetò dei pescatori...E ancor meno si potrebbe dire che le pesche dei pescatori indigeni siano così proficue e portino tale quantità di prodotto da bastare alle richieste”⁴.

Le migrazioni dei pescatori chioggiotti erano giustificate anche dalla presenza lungo la costa orientale di specie pregiate quali pesci di ambienti rocciosi e crostacei. Alcune specie erano comuni solo in queste aree, come ad esempio lo scampo *Nephrops norvegicus* che si riscontra solo nella zona del Golfo del Quarnero. La presenza di tali specie non è comunque una spiegazione sostanziale per le migrazioni di un numero così grande di imbarcazioni. Infatti, i chioggiotti adattavano perfettamente la loro strategia di pesca alla distribuzione spazio-temporale delle specie in accordo con la temperatura dell’acqua e il periodo riproduttivo. Ad esempio, le specie pelagiche, come sardine e sgombri migrano seguendo le correnti più calde. Durante la primavera e l’estate sono diffuse in tutte le acque dell’Adriatico invece, nel periodo freddo, migrano a profondità maggiori dove le acque sono più calde a causa dell’inversione termica che caratterizza il mare Adriatico. Faber riporta che le sardine venivano catturate principalmente due volte all’anno (aprile-maggio e settembre-novembre) lungo le coste del Golfo del Quarnero e in Dalmazia, ma erano assenti durante il resto dell’anno.

La sogliola, che costituiva anch’essa una delle specie più importanti per i chioggiotti in particolare lungo la costa istriana, migra verso tale area tra novembre e marzo, a scopo riproduttivo. Successivamente le larve e gli stadi giovanili raggiungono le zone estuarine (lagune e foci dei fiumi) lungo la costa occidentale, che rappresentano le aree *nursery*. Alla fine dell’autunno, esse tornano in mare continuando il loro percorso fino al nuovo periodo riproduttivo in Istria. In accordo con questa migrazione, i chioggiotti durante il periodo invernale praticavano la pesca agli *sfogioni* (grosse sogliole) proprio lungo le coste istriane.

Un ulteriore fattore che deve essere considerato è la morfologia dell’Adriatico. Infatti la costa occidentale e quella orientale sono, sotto questo punto di vista, molto diverse. Faber (1883) descrive la costa italiana come piatta e bassa, caratterizzata da banchi di sabbia e lagune, costantemente esposta ai venti specialmente lo scirocco da Sud-Est e la bora da Nord-Est.

Questa linea di costa è caratterizzata dalla totale assenza di porti naturali ad esclusione delle zone estuarine, come le lagune e le foci dei fiumi. Al contrario, la costa orientale è alta e frastagliata, presenta molte isole e rocce che fungono da frangiflutti contro vento e onde. La presenza di nume-

⁴ RAZZA, *I chioggiotti nelle acque austriache*, 8.

rosi fiordi, baie e golfi ha reso nota nel passato questa costa come “ tutto un porto” (Faber, 1883). Faber sostiene che i chioggiotti preferivano pescare lungo la costa orientale in autunno e inverno, per scongiurare naufragi che erano comuni in quelle stagioni caratterizzate da mal tempo. Ferrari (1998) riporta che in dieci anni, 1882-1892, ci furono 106 naufragi nella pesca sottocosta e 46 nella pesca d’alto mare, e ben 25 pescatori persero la vita in una sola notte, il 13 febbraio del 1889.

Un altro importante fattore delle migrazioni da considerare è quello storico, che contribuì a far diventare un’abitudine ed una tradizione le migrazioni pescherecce. Infatti, nel periodo della dominazione della Repubblica Serenissima tutto il Nord Adriatico occidentale e buona parte della costa orientale erano sotto dominio veneziano, ed era comune che i pescatori traessero risorse lungo queste aree considerandole come il proprio territorio. Tutto ciò divenne appunto una secolare abitudine e tradizione e la mentalità dei chioggiotti non cambiò nemmeno quando la situazione politica mutò. I chioggiotti erano abituati a navigare attraverso l’intero Adriatico e conoscevano perfettamente tutti i porti, le caratteristiche dei fondali e la distribuzione delle specie commerciali.

Conseguenze delle migrazioni pescherecce

Tra le maggiori conseguenze dall’attività di pesca dei chioggiotti lungo la costa orientale dell’Adriatico vi furono i vantaggi per la popolazione locale, in quanto venivano catturate grandi quantità di pescato con un corrispondente calo del prezzo del prodotto; inoltre, la grande varietà di pescato appagava sia le tavole dei ricchi con specie pregiate, sia quelle della popolazione povera con specie di più basso valore. I dati delle catture lungo l’insieme delle coste orientali nel 1878-9 (Faber, 1883), confermano l’importanza dell’attività dei chioggiotti: durante il periodo estivo, il 100% dei crostacei catturati, il 34,6% dei molluschi, 43,9% dei selaci e il 19% dei pesci ossei, provenivano dalle loro imbarcazioni; in inverno, invece, catturavano il 99,8% dei crostacei, l’82,6% dei molluschi, il 95,9% dei selaci e l’85,1% dei pesci ossei.

Domenico Razza scrive in “Neptunia” (1893): “ ...E quantunque non siano i nostri ben visti dai pescatori costieri per naturale gelosia di mestiere, sono però assai accetti dal rimanente della popolazione e per la quantità del pesce che loro offrono a buon mercato, e perché facendo i nostri in quei porti le loro provvisioni danno ai commercianti motivo di lucro maggiore”⁵.

Si manifestavano infatti, frequentemente, conflitti tra pescatori dell’Impero nei confronti dei chioggiotti in particolar modo legati a motivi di ge-

⁵ DOMENICO RAZZA, *Notizie della pesca dei chioggiotti nell’Impero*, in “Neptunia”, 1893.

losia professionale che si manifestarono anche con atti di vandalismo come, ad esempio, è riportato in "Neptunia" (1894): "...Lo scorso gennaio alcuni pescatori italiani patirono violenze per gelosia di mestiere all'isola di Brazza. La procura di stato imperiale aprì un'inchiesta in base alla quale si istrui processo contro i presunti autori di quelle violenze. Il pubblico dibattimento fu fatto ora presso il tribunale provinciale di Spalato. Dei quattro imputati, uno fu condannato a 44 giorni di arresto, un altro a tre settimane, due furono assolti. I danneggiati furono ammessi in oltre a far valere in via civile il loro diritto di indennità"⁶.

Anche le autorità politiche austro-ungariche utilizzavano ogni tipo di strategia per prevenire l'attività dei pescatori chioggiotti lungo le coste orientali dell'Adriatico. In particolare, non ottenendo altro limite alla pesca straniera se non quello dal miglio dalla costa, utilizzavano strumentalmente in riferimento alla proibizione di utilizzo di attrezzi impattanti da parte del Trattato di Gorizia, asserendo che la pesca dei chioggiotti, svolta con la Cocchia, distruggeva le uova degli organismi, i giovanili ed era inoltre distruttiva per le piante acquatiche che fungevano da riparo e da zona *nursery*. Levi Morenos, nel suo *Memoriale* (1903), riportò quindi le osservazioni di alcuni scienziati che avevano già dimostrato come gli stadi giovanili e le uova dei pesci non venivano distrutti con la Cocchia, ma con la dinamite e con le reti tirate dalla spiaggia (sciabiche), attrezzi che venivano esclusivamente utilizzati dai pescatori austro-ungarici. Levi Morenos aggiunse, inoltre, che una totale proibizione dell'uso di reti a strascico simili alla Cocchia, sperimentata in Inghilterra e Francia, non migliorò la situazione, ma al contrario causò una diminuzione delle catture. Si trova, infatti, una testimonianza riportata in *Neptunia* (1904): "*Il fondo dell'Adriatico, dice il pescatore Chioggiotto, là dove peschiamo, se è mosso da reti si mantiene pescoso, non si ricopre delle cosiddette teste, zucche, olive, zuccai, caneluzzi, grassi che sporcano il fondo e lo rendono sterile. Bisogna che il fondo sia arato perché vi siano pesche copiose*"⁷. Questa affermazione, che serviva a Levi Morenos per sostenere la causa dei pescatori chioggiotti, oggi verrebbe smentita in quanto è dimostrato che l'attività di pesca, se concentrata in determinate aree, è in grado di alterare la struttura della comunità bentonica (organismi che vivono sul fondale marino) alterandone le relazioni inter- ed intra-specifiche, con conseguenze negative anche sugli *stock* degli organismi commerciali.

Conclusioni

In conclusione, le migrazioni pescherecce dei pescatori chioggiotti rappresentano tra il 1866 e il 1915, la principale risorsa per il proletariato pe-

⁶ REDAZIONE, *Note e Comunicazioni*, in "Neptunia", 1904.

⁷ REDAZIONE, *Pei nuovi trattati di commercio e navigazione*, in "Neptunia", 1904, 13-15.

schereccio. L'attività di pesca fu causa di molti conflitti con le autorità Austro-Ungariche, ma era sostanzialmente accettata in quanto forniva cibo alle popolazioni locali che non venivano pienamente soddisfatte dai pescatori dell'impero.

Nonostante fossero analfabeti, i pescatori chioggiotti dimostravano di conoscere perfettamente l'ecologia e la distribuzione delle specie in relazione alle fluttuazioni ambientali, in modo da massimizzare il loro profitto. Molteplici furono i fattori che determinarono l'abitudine dei pescatori di Chioggia a migrare per la pesca sfruttando le zone lungo le coste orientali. Tra questi ricordiamo fattori economici (profitto), ecologici (distribuzione spazio-temporale delle risorse), geografici (maggiore protezione lungo le coste orientali) e storici (abitudine a considerare la Dalmazia come un proprio territorio). Le conseguenze di tale attività furono positive per le popolazioni locali dell'Impero Austro-Ungarico (in termini di disponibilità di pescato e basso prezzo) ma instaurarono un clima di conflitto non solo tra pescatori, ma anche tra le autorità dei relativi paesi.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

- EUGENIO BELLEMO, *Rapporto sul movimento peschereccio di Chioggia, Aprile-Giugno 1907-1908*, in "Neptunia", 1908, 135-137.
- EUGENIO BELLEMO, *Rapporto sul movimento peschereccio di Chioggia, Ottobre-Dicembre 1909*, in "Neptunia", 1910, 17-21.
- EUGENIO BELLEMO, *Rapporto sul movimento peschereccio di Chioggia, Gennaio-Marzo 1910*, in "Neptunia", 1910, 50-57.
- EUGENIO BELLEMO, *Rapporto sul movimento peschereccio di Chioggia, Aprile-Giugno 1910*, in "Neptunia", 1910, 97-103.
- EUGENIO BELLEMO, *Rapporto sul movimento peschereccio di Chioggia, Ottobre-Dicembre 1911*, in "Neptunia", 1912, 19-28.
- EUGENIO BELLEMO, *Rapporto sul movimento peschereccio di Chioggia, Gennaio-Marzo 1912*, in "Neptunia", 1912, 77-90.
- GEORGE LUIS FABER, *The Fisheries of the Adriatic Sea*, London 1883, 328.
- FABRIZIO FERRARI, *I pescatori dell'Adriatico dalle lagune alle grandi migrazioni*, in «Chioggia. Rivista di studi e ricerche», N. 12, 1998, 129-138.
- NICOLA GIANNI, *La pesca a Chioggia nei primi decenni del '900*, Tesi di laurea, Padova, 2004.
- JEAN-CLAUDE HOCQUET, *Expansion, crises et declin des salines dans la lagune de Venise au Moyen age*, Venezia 1970.
- ANGELO MARELLA, LUIGI DIVARI E GILBERTO PENZO, *Annotazioni Pescherecce*, Chioggia 1890, 223.
- DAVID LEVI MORENOS, *Per la conquista dell'Adriatico*, in "Ateneo Veneto", Venezia 1903, 187-216.

- DAVID LEVI MORENOS, *Memoriale presentato al Governo Italiano*, in «Neptunia», gennaio 1903, 1-26.
- DAVID LEVI MORENOS, *L'emigrazione peschereccia pel lavoro nell'Adriatico*, in *Regio Comitato Talassografico*, No. 32, Venezia 1916, 102.
- DINO MEMMO, *Calafati, squeri e barche di Chioggia*, I-II, Chioggia 1985, 143, 119.
- GIOVANNI PASTROVIC, *Manuale del Pescatore per l'anno 1913*, Trieste 1913, 283.
- SERGIO PERINI, *Chioggia dal Settecento all'età della Restaurazione*, Chioggia 1989, 315-337 e 401-406.
- DOMENICO RAZZA, *I pescatori chioggiotti e la loro industria*, in "Neptunia", aprile 1893, 73-84.
- DOMENICO RAZZA, *Lamentele dei pescatori chioggiotti*, in "Neptunia", 1899.

Vivia Bruni

Research on marine biology in the Straits of Messina

The Straits of Messina are a very troubled tract of sea, about 33 Km long, dividing Sicily from the Italian peninsula. In mythology they have been known since ancient times as the dwelling place of monsters because of the strong currents which make it extremely difficult to cross. On this matter, many legends arose about this side and also Homer, in the XII book of the *Odyssey*, wrote about the two women monsters, Scilla and Cariddi, which terrified the sailors and impeded the navigation. Beginning from 1960, a great cognitive interest about this marine environment arises above all in relation to the project of the bridge crossing it¹.

From a geomorphological point of view, the Straits cut through the Calabro-Sicilian Arc and link the Basins of the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas. This situation probably took place during early Pliocene times and from then on tectonic activity directly controlled the dynamic and morphology of the Straits². At the present time, the Straits present a funnel-shape with the wide part (about 17 Km) facing south and the narrow part (about 3 Km) towards the northern entrance (Figure 1). Its depth, from south to north, diminishes rapidly from two thousand meters opposite Capo d'Armi (Ionian Sea) to about eighty meters on the sill rising between Punta Pezzo (Calabria) and Ganzirri (Sicily)³.

The peculiar geomorphological conformation, the opposite tidal phases of the two neighbouring seas and the different physical and chemical features⁴ of their waters are the cause of this well known strong turbulence,

¹ PAOLO COLANTONI, "Seafloor morphology and sediment dynamics in the Straits of Messina", in L. GUGLIELMO, A. MANGANARO and E. DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina Ecosystem. Present knowledge for an eco-hydrodynamical approach* (Messina, 1995), 83-94.

² PASCAL BARRIER, "The Straits of Messina during Pliocene and Pleistocene times (Italy)", in GUGLIELMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina*, 71-82.

³ EMILIO DE DOMENICO, "Considerazioni sulle peculiarità dello Stretto di Messina", *L'Architetto Italiano*, 9 (2005), 22-25.

⁴ EMILIO DE DOMENICO, GIUSEPPA CORTESE and GIUSEPPA PULICANÒ, "Chemical characteristics of waters in the Straits of Messina", in GUGLIELMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina*, 155-168.




Fig. 1. Bathymetric map of the Straits of Messina (De Domenico, 2005)*
 * (DE DOMENICO, "Considerazioni sulle peculiarità", 25)

aggravated by the abrupt change in bottom topography in the vicinity of Messina (Figure 2). The complex hydrodynamism of this sea was firstly studied systematically from Vercelli (1925) by the cruise on the vessel "*Marsigli*" in the years 1922-23⁵. Along the Straits, Atlantic water ($S=38$ psu and $T=16.6^{\circ}\text{C}$; $\sigma_t = 28.93$) overlies intermediate Levantine water ($S=38.6$ psu and $T=14.2^{\circ}\text{C}$; $\sigma_t = 28.94$). The strong vertical mixing leads to the formation of another water mass of $\sigma_t = 28.6$ and $T=15^{\circ}\text{C}$ ⁶. The current flowing from south to north is locally called "*Rema montante*", while that running

⁵ FRANCESCO VERCELLI, "Crociere per lo studio dei fenomeni dello Stretto di Messina. Parte prima. Il regime delle correnti e delle maree nello Stretto di Messina", Commissione Internazionale del Mediterraneo, Venezia (1925).

⁶ GIUSEPPE MAGAZZÙ, VIVIA BRUNI, AUGUSTO PICCIONE, TREVOR PLATT, BRIAN IRWIN and D. V. SUBBA RAO, "Picoplankton: Contribution to phytoplankton production in the Straits of Messina", P.S.Z.N.I.: *Marine Ecology*, VIII, No 1 (1987), 21-31.




Fig. 2. Current flux during the maximum "montante" phase (above) and maximum "scendente" phase (down) (Vercelli, 1925, from Genovese *et al.*, 1967)⁷

* GENOVESE, BRUNI, BUZZANCA, "Ulteriori osservazioni", 96

from north to south "Rema Scendente"⁷. Although the tidal amplitudes are relatively small (27-10 cm), current speed reaches 2-3 m/s, especially during the syzygial periods, due to the morphology of the two contiguous marine basins, Tyrrhenian and Ionian, in the proximity of Messina. Near the coasts the currents originate secondary currents, locally called "refoli" and "controrefoli", vortices and the so-called "sorgimenti d'acqua", like oil spots, closely connected to the vortex forming⁸. Upwelling and mixing of the fertile Levantine Intermediate Water (LIW) with surface waters occur during "Rema montante". Therefore different water masses dynamically coexist in the area of the Straits, with steep energy

⁷ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, VIVIA BRUNI and ERNESTO BUZZANCA, "Ulteriori osservazioni sulle condizioni microbiologiche dello Stretto di Messina", *Atti Soc. Peloritana* (1967), XIII, 93-108.

⁸ FERRUCCIO MOSETTI, "Tidal and other currents in the Straits of Messina", in GUGLIEMMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina*, 71-82.

gradients at their boundaries, causing a high variability of hydrographic features even on a small spatial and temporal scale⁹.

The hydrographic, physical-chemical and biological features of the Straits have a remarkable effect on the abundance and structure of planktonic, benthic and nektonic communities, making this ecosystem unique in the Mediterranean Sea with regard to the biodiversity, biocoenoses and species abundance. Many species, known as rare in the Mediterranean, reach significant concentrations of individuals in the Straits, defined as a zone of "accumulation" that produces a subsequent "insemination" of the neighbouring Tyrrhenian and Ionian seas¹⁰. In fact, it is common to find deep species at the surface and vice versa, or open-sea species along the coast¹¹. Moreover, the water up-welling gives one the possibility to easily watch abyssal organisms still alive which, under favourable conditions of time and wind, are dragged by the streams flowing from the bottom to the surface and sometimes even stranded on the shore. The abundance and variety of the living organisms that can easily be collected for research have always attracted scientists from all over the world, thus playing an important role in biological progress.

The first scientific observations probably date back to the 4th century B.C. (Aristotele, 384-322 B.C.)¹², but documentary studies are only found at the end of sixteenth century, when the University of Messina was established and became the centre of both humanistic and scientific activities, drawing famous biologists to Messina. Naturally, biological research in Messina was above all directed towards marine organisms, caught in the Straits. In this review it will be possible to briefly remember only some among the most famous, according to Genovese (1977)¹³.

Among these, the Benedictine Abbot Francesco Maurolico, born in Messina (1494-1575), mathematician, in the *Tractatus per Epistolam Francisci Maurolici messanensis ad Petrum Gillium de piscibus siculis*, written in 1543, attended to list the fishes of seas around Messina. He made a detailed list of the more common fishes, furnishing the Latin and popular used names, describing also their morphological characteristics and usual catch means. Specially some his observations about the gill covers of *Lam-*

⁹ DONATO MARINO, ADRIANA ZINGONE, "Phytoplankton populations in the Straits of Messina as related to the hydrological characteristics of the area: a review", in GUGLIELMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina*, 181-190.

¹⁰ LETTERIO GUGLIELMO, NUNZIO CRESCENTI, GIUSEPPE COSTANZO and GIACOMO ZAGAMI, "Zooplankton and Micronekton Communities in the Straits of Messina", in GUGLIELMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina*, 247-269.

¹¹ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, LETTERIO GUGLIELMO and ANTONIO BERDAR, "Spiaggiamenti di fauna abissale nello Stretto di Messina", *Atti Soc. Peloritana*, XVII (1971), 331-370.

¹² MARINO, ZINGONE, "Phytoplankton populations in the Straits of Messina", 181.

¹³ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, *Lezioni di Idrobiologia*, Messina 1973, 9-18.

petra and the etology of *Xiphias gladius* (the sword-fish) and *Thunnus thynnus* are particularly notable for sharpness and effective scientific validity. Moreover, he described also the “Paludes Pelori”, talking exactly of two and not of three brackish environments, as somebody will say later. The Maurolico’s “Epistola”, for a long time unknown, was again published in 1893 by Facciola¹⁴, who emphasized as it can be considered the prototype of papers regarding to regional ichthyology.

Marcello Malpighi (1628-1694), who taught Medicine at the University of Messina remaining from November 1662 to May 1666, carried out other than research on Anatomy and Botany also about the optical nerve of the *Xiphias gladius* Linneo (the sword-fish). The Malpighi’s interest for the sea of Messina is confirmed also by its sketch furnishing topographical information of historical importance.

Later on, Anastasio Cocco, born in Messina (1799-1854), doctor of Medicine and teacher of Pharmacology at the University, found 15 new fish species, among which the well-known *Argyropelecus hemigymnus* (figure 3). In 1845 he presented in Naples two papers to scientific communities: “Sullo stato attuale dell’Ittiologia” and “Indice Ittiologico del Mar di Messina”, listing 317 species, among whose 58 were new. Even if he manifestly was not an evolutionist, he treated the problem of both the organ-



Fig. 3. *Argyropelecus hemigymnus*
(picture by Francesco Costa)



Fig. 4. *Myctophum punctatum*
(picture by Francesco Costa)

ism modifications and the forces acting on the evolutionary development. He studied the hycotyofauna with particular regard to the *Myctophidae* (figure 4), of which he described seven new species and five species of *Sternoptyctidae*, belonging to the new three genera, *Argyropelecus*, *Coccia* and *Maurolicus*; these, such as the related *Gonostoma* and *Chauliodus* (figure, 5), are rare in all seas of the world, except than in the Straits of Messina. The Cocco’s papers were known far and wide by national and inter-

¹⁴ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, *Lezioni di Idrobiologia*, 15.



Fig. 5. *Chauliodus sloani*
(picture by Francesco Costa)

national scientific societies. He continued his research as demonstrated by letters and communications he sent to famous zoologists of his time.

Especially, the papers of the above remembered naturalists on the “stranding phenomenon” and on the peculiar species abundance led to the running of many naturalists to Messina. Among them, it could be remembered Rüppel, Milne-Edwards, Müller, Claus, Koelliker, Fol, Gegenbaur, Haeckel, Metchnikov, Hertwig, Dorhn and Khron, who defined the Straits of Messina as “The zoologists’ paradise”¹⁵.

In this crowded swarm of scientists, it is particularly interesting to mention Metchnikov (1845-1916) who discovered just in Messina the phagocytosis mechanism of the leukocytes. He came for the first time to Messina in 1868 for carrying out research on the Poriphera *Sycandra raphanus* and its larval development, and then in 1882-1883. During this last period, by the experiments carried out in the aquarium placed at home in the “Ringo” village, he so noted the role of ameboid cells of the mesoderm “quelque-uns parmi ces corps subissent une véritable digestion dans l’intérieur des cellules amiboides...”. To confirm this observation, he introduced some rose thorns under the epidermis of *Bipinnaria* (Asteroidea larva); successively, he saw a large number of amebocytes surrounding the foreign bodies and englobing them. On the basis of this finding, he enunciated the hypothesis that the particular richness of leukocytes in the inflamed tissue played a defence role, by the phagocytosis mechanism¹⁶. That was surely a very important biological discovery for the development of human pathology and it really took place in Messina.

Successively, Luigi Facciola (1851-1943), born in Messina, doctor of medicine and ichthyologist, recognized (1892), ten years before Grassi

¹⁵ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, *Lezioni di Idrobiologia*, 17. ROSARIO MOSCHEO, “Nikolaus Kleinenberg e il suo progetto di una stazione Zoologica”, *Atti della Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti, Classe di Lettere, Filosofia e Belle Arti*, LXXIII (1997), 93-111.

¹⁶ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, “no published notes”.

and Calandruccio, that some marine organisms represented the transition forms of the fishes belonging to *Leptocephalidae* (*Leptocephalus kollicheri*) and *Murenoidae* (*Conger mistax*)¹⁷.

Regarding to the research on planktonic organisms in the Straits, many historical information are reported by Guglielmo *et al.* (1995)¹⁸, who refer that "Currieri in 1899-1900 noted that, in some zones of the Straits, there are accumulations of plankton on account of the coastal counter-currents, while Lohman, studying the vertical distribution of the Appendicularians, concluded that the currents of the Straits had a great influence on the spatial and vertical distribution of the organisms. In fact, some species were subjected to a passive transport both to the surface, in the area of divergence, and to lower water layers in the zone of convergence, essentially along the Ganzirri-Punta Pezzo sill. The possibility of finding at the same time, and abundance of individuals and a high variability of species attracted, already by the end of the last century and the beginning of this one, many Italian and foreign students of zooplankton" (Amphipods, Euphausiids Mysids, pelagic Crustacea, Appendicularians, Mollusca Pteropoda and Ostracods).

Regarding to the research on the peculiar benthonic organisms of the Straits, historical information is reported by Giaccone (1972)¹⁹, Di Geronimo (1995)²⁰ and Fredj and Giaccone (1995)²¹. The last Authors write that "Since antiquity and since Homer (Odyssey, Book XII), if Giaccone is right (1972), certainly since after the Renaissance in that print by Ferrante Imperato (1599) leaves no doubt as the assemblages of Laminariales (figure 6). Since Gualtieri (1742), Aradas and Benoit (1870), Hermann Fol (1885) for the assemblages with *Errina aspera* (figure 7)."

The scientific and cultural tradition of the marine biology of the Straits has been kept alive by many experts who have succeeded one another at both the University and the Experimental Thalassographic Institute of Messina (now named IAMC, Institute of the marine coastal environment, of the National Research Council, CNR²²), which was founded at the be-

¹⁷ GENOVESE, GUGLIELMO and BERDAR, "Spiaggiamenti di fauna abissale".

¹⁸ GUGLIELMO, CRESCENTI, COSTANZO and ZAGAMI, "Zooplankton and Micronekton Communities in the Straits of Messina", 247.

¹⁹ GIUSEPPE GIACCONO, "Struttura, ecologia dei popolamenti a Laminarie dello Stretto di Messina e del Mare di Alboran.", *Memorie Biol. Mar. Oceanogr.*, II (1972), 37-59.

²⁰ ITALO DI GERONIMO, "Benthic assemblages of plio-quadernary soft and hard substrata in the Straits of Messina area", in GUGLIELMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina*, 105-118.

²¹ GASTON FREDJ, GIUSEPPE GIACCONO, "Particularités des peuplements benthiques du Détroit de Messine", in GUGLIELMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO (eds), *The Straits of Messina*, 119-128.

²² ANTONINO CAVALIERE, ERMANNINO CRISAFI and GIUSEPPE MAGAZZÙ, CNR. *L'Istituto Speri-*



Fig. 6. *Laminariales*
(picture by Gianmichele Iaria)




Fig. 7. *Errina aspera*
(picture by Francesco Costa)

ginning of the last century (1916), more or less when also the Station of Marine Biology, Hydrobiology and Aquaculture of the University of Messina was built in Ganzirri on the Straits' seaside²³. Among these we must recall Kleinenberg, Mazzarelli, Sanzo, Scordia, Dulzetto, Bolognari and Genovese.

Kleinenberg (1842-1897), who was professor of Zoology in the University of Messina from 1878 to 1895, tried but, unfortunately, with no success due to the silliness of the local government, to found in Messina the zoological Station that later on (1870) Anton Dohrn established in Naples²⁴. Mazzarelli (1870-1946), as it is reported by Cavalieri *et al.*, (1999)²⁵, is to be mentioned for the first real systematic observations on the stranding. He provided information about the periods of the phe-

mentale. *Talassografico di Messina. 1916-1996. Ottant'anni di ricerche* (Messina, 1999), 1-139.

²³ ARTURO BOLOGNARI, "La stazione di Biologia marina e di idrobiologia e piscicoltura di Ganzirri (Messina)", *Atti Soc. Peloritana Sc. Fis. Nat.*, X (1964), 503-507.

²⁴ MOSCHEO, "Nikolaus Kleinenberg", 100.

²⁵ CAVALIERE, CRISAFI and MAGAZZÙ, CNR. *L'Istituto Sperimentale Talassografico*.

nomenon and compiled a list of organisms stranded during a period of two years, including the sites, the frequency and the abundance of the different species. Sanzo's (1874-1940) observations confirmed the role of the Straits' hydrodynamics in concentrating and selecting planktonic and abyssal species. His hypothesis will be strengthened in the following years both about plankton and abyssal fauna. Scordia (1902-1942) and Dulzetto (1892-1977) studied above all the ichthyofauna of the Straits and of the brackish lakes near Capo Peloro (Lake of Faro and Lake of Ganzirri) with particular regard to the biology, development and comparative anatomy of the current species.

After the Second World War, a new and strong impulse towards marine biology came with Bolognari (1917-1981) and Genovese (1927-1982), who were surrounded by many young researchers and students, full of enthusiasm and passion for this field of study. Numerous experts from all parts of Italy and the world were drawn again to Messina, to investigate several fields of the marine biology in the Straits of Messina and in the neighbouring seas.

We must remember, just as example, the observations on the benthonic populations, carried by underwater innovative equipment, that has permitted to better know the spatial and vertical distribution of the vegetable and animal species, some of which rare or nonexistent in the Mediterranean, such as the great laminaria *Laminaria ochroleuca* or the only Mediterranean Stylasterina, *Errina aspera*²⁶. Then, it is to be remembered the immersion campaigns in the Straits, carried out in 1979, under the supervision of Genovese, for collecting samples down to 800 meters of depth and observing the zooplanktonic and micronektonic fauna. So it was noted that, due to the Straits' turbulence, many organisms are found at a depth which is certainly higher than in any other area of the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, a series of dives, undertaken with the use of the deep-diving vehicle "F.A. Forel"²⁷, constructed by J. Piccard, permitted to observe the behaviour and the bioluminescence phenomena of the mesopelagic fishes in their natural habitat and the formulation of a more precise hypothesis concerning the preferential stranding of some species²⁸.

Thorough ecological interdisciplinary investigations in this area were developed also in 1991 (Straits of Messina) and in 1994 and 1995 (low

²⁶ FREDJ, GIACONE, "Particularités des peuplements benthiques", 120.

²⁷ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, "Deep diving in Messina Straits", *World Offshore*, III (1980), 17-21.

²⁸ SEBASTIANO GENOVESE, LETTERIO GUGLIELMO, ADRIANA IANORA and BRUNO SCOTTO DI CARLO, "Osservazioni biologiche con il mesoscafo "Forel" nello Stretto di Messina", *Archo Oceanogr. Limnol.*, XX (1985), 1-30.

Tyrrhenian Sea) carrying out oceanographic cruises with the participation of experts from all the world²⁹.

Today, the peculiar features of the ecosystem of the Straits of Messina continue to interest the scientific community from all over the world.

Acknowledgments: My thanks to Prof. Emilio De Domenico and Prof. Letterio Guglielmo for kindly furnishing the pictures and materials on the matter.

²⁹ GUGLIELMO, MANGANARO and DE DOMENICO, *The Straits of Messina Ecosystem*. Proceedings of Symposium held in Messina, April 4-6, 1991 (Messina, 1995), 1-269.

Claude Arnal

Jeannette Villepreux Power à Messine: l'Argonauta Argo et l'invention de l'Aquarium (1832)

1. L'Aquarium est né à Messine

Au début du XIX^{ème} siècle, toute capacité cérébrale de haut niveau était déniée à la femme. Son éducation était soigneusement organisée pour la tenir en dehors de la Science.

C'est par le plus grand des hasards que nous avons trouvé, ici, à Messine, une preuve éclatante de l'absurdité de ce comportement qui a eu surtout comme résultat de faire perdre beaucoup de temps à l'avancée de la Science.

C'est à Messine en effet qu'un cerveau hors du commun, mais indéniablement féminin, a apporté à la Science ce qui est devenu l'aquariophilie et la biologie marine. Disons, pour convaincre les incrédules éventuels, que l'illustre professeur anglais Richard Owen, qui a été une lumière indéniable de la Science du XIX^{ème} Siècle en a témoigné en 1858 quand il a rédigé son important ouvrage *Mollusca*: «But to Madame Jeannette Power (née de Villepreux), according to the testimony of professor Carmelo Maravigna in the *Giornale Letterario dell'Accademia Gioenia di Catania* (December 1834), ought to be attributed, if to any one individual, the invention and systematic application of the receptacles now called Aquaria to the study of marine, and principally of molluscous animals»¹.

Ainsi, c'est à une femme qu'est due l'invention de l'aquarium dès 1832, vingt ans plus tôt qu'il n'était admis auparavant par les historiens de l'aquariophilie. C'était en même temps la naissance de la biologie marine qui a pris aujourd'hui l'importance que l'on sait.

¹ RICHARD OWEN, *Mollusca* (London, 1858). Richard Owen (1804-1892): chirurgien de formation, il est appelé le «Cuvier anglais». Il est le plus célèbre naturaliste de l'époque victorienne et un des créateurs du «British Museum of Natural History» de Londres. Paléontologue de renom, on lui doit l'invention du mot «dinosaur».

2. Une femme oubliée

Que savons-nous de cette femme oubliée pendant plus de cent vingt ans et aujourd'hui ressuscitée? A défaut de détails sur sa vie privée, car elle est restée très discrète à ce sujet, nous avons une assez bonne documentation sur son œuvre et les grandes étapes de sa vie.

Jeanne Villepreux était française. Elle est née à Juillac, un chef-lieu de canton du département de la Corrèze dans le Sud-Ouest de la France, le 5 Vendémiaire de l'An 3 du calendrier révolutionnaire que nous traduirons par 25 Septembre 1794 pour la commodité des calculs. Elle était la première née des quatre enfants de Pierre Villepreux successivement: gendarme, cantonnier, garde champêtre, cordonnier, pour finir rentier. En d'autres temps, la famille Villepreux avait connu des jours plus brillants et même porté la particule².

La légende veut que la jeune fille ait été bergère, ce qui est difficile à croire car la famille avait certains biens et n'était pas du tout dans le besoin. A la campagne, tous les enfants gardaient un jour ou l'autre les troupeaux³. Nous avons la preuve que Jeanne savait au moins lire et écrire, contrairement à sa sœur et à son frère qui, adultes, seront déclarés illettrés dans divers documents.

Dès 1804, le drame entre dans la famille quand meurt la petite Gabrielle, le numéro trois des enfants du premier lit. Là, grave erreur aux conséquences multiples, le père Villepreux se trompe de prénom en déclarant le décès de sa petite fille. Pour lui, Jeanne était Lili et seulement Lili. L'erreur n'a jamais été rectifiée. Nous trouverons plus tard Jeanne rebaptisée Jeannette. Il faut en retenir que Jeanne et Jeannette sont la même person-

² Sur la famille et la biographie de Jeannette Villepreux Power v. ALPHONSE REBIÈRE, "Madame Power, une naturaliste oubliée", *Bulletin de la Société des lettres de la Corrèze*, 1899; J. HALLAURE, "La bergère Lili Villepreux, mère de l'océanographie", *Bulletin archéologique de Tulle*, 1935; CLAUDE ARNAL, "La Dame des Argonautes. Jeannette Villepreux (1794-1871)", *Bulletin de la Société des lettres, sciences et arts de la Corrèze*, 1994; CLAUDE ARNAL, "La dama degli Argonauti", in J. POWER, *Guida per la Sicilia*, reprint, ed. by M. D'ANGELO (Messina, 1995; 2008); CLAUDE ARNAL, "La Bataille de l'Argonaute", *Bulletin de la Société des lettres, sciences et arts de la Corrèze*, 1995; CLAUDE ARNAL, "Jeannette Power-Villepreux. Une naturaliste Corrèzienne en Sicile", *Bulletin de la Société des lettres, sciences et arts de la Corrèze*, 1996; CLAUDE ARNAL, "Une Corrèzienne sur la Planète Vénus", *Bulletin de la Société des lettres, sciences et arts de la Corrèze*, 1997; CLAUDE ARNAL, "Jeanne Power-Villepreux. A pioneering experimental malacologist", *Bulletin of the Malacological Society of London*, 2000; NADINE LEFEBURE, *Femmes océanes. Les grandes pionnières maritimes* (Paris, 1995); RAFFAELLA SIMILI, "In punta di penna. Donne di scienza e di cultura fra cosmopolitismo e intimità meridionale", in *La scienza nel Mezzogiorno dopo l'Unità d'Italia* (Soveria Mannelli, 2008); CLAUDE DUNETON, *La Dame de l'Argonaute* (Paris, 2009). Pour l'«Association Jeanne Villepreux-Power. Femme de science et artiste»: www.anne-lan.com (email: JeanneVillepreux@yahoo.fr).

³ HALLAURE, "La bergère Lili Villepreux, mère de l'océanographie".

ne. Puis c'est la mère qui meurt en 1805, un an plus tard. Jeanne n'a que onze ans⁴.

Est-ce à cause de l'arrivée d'une très jeune belle mère que notre future naturaliste a quitté Juillac, ou est-ce à cause d'une idylle amoureuse mal terminée? Cela s'est dit... Quand elle part à pied pour la Capitale, en 1812, Jeanne a 18 ans. Mineure, elle ne peut pas voyager seule. Elle est donc confiée à un cousin qui convoie des troupeaux vers les abattoirs parisiens. C'est un trajet de 480 km effectué habituellement en une douzaine de jours. On savait marcher à cette époque! Les choses se passent très mal. A Orléans, 120 km avant l'arrivée à Paris, le tuteur agresse sa pupille qui doit se réfugier à la gendarmerie. Elle restera à Orléans – dans un couvent paraît-il – le temps de recevoir de Juillac de nouveaux papiers pour terminer le voyage⁵.

Quand elle arrive enfin à Paris, elle n'est plus attendue. Sa place a été prise et la voilà sans travail. Fort heureusement pour elle, le hasard est parfois miséricordieux. Une grande couturière de l'époque lui fait confiance et l'engage. La voilà midinette. Elle sera brillante. Elle se révélera même d'une telle habileté que en 1816, lorsque la princesse Maria Carolina di Borbone venue de Sicile épousera à Paris le Duc de Berry, neveu du Roi de France, la confection de la robe de la mariée lui sera confiée en grande part.

C'est à l'occasion de ce mariage qu'un jeune Anglais de passage à Paris, James Power, venu de la Dominique (une petite île des Antilles) et en route vers la Sicile où il pratiquera le négoce, tombe amoureux de Jeanne. Il l'épousera à Messine en mars 1818. Il n'a que trois années de plus qu'elle⁶.

A Messine Jeanne est riche maintenant. En profitera-t-elle pour se laisser vivre? Pas du tout. La voilà qui se rue sur les études et devient petit à petit savante⁷. D'une curiosité insatiable elle se passionne pour tout ce qui concerne les Sciences dites naturelles. A pied, elle parcourra la Sicile dans tous les sens pour découvrir ses richesses, son environnement et sa culture. Il en sortira un *Itinerario della Sicilia riguardante tutt'i rami di storia naturale e parecchi di antichità che essa contiene* et un très érudit *Guida per la Sicilia*⁸.

Si'il est impossible de mentionner ici tout ce qu'a accompli Jeanne, il se-

⁴ ARNAL, "La Dame des Argonautes. Jeannette Villepreux (1794-1871)"; ARNAL, "La dama degli Argonauti", xxix.

⁵ ARNAL, «La dama degli Argonauti», xxx.

⁶ Eglise de Saint Luc (Messine), *Liber Matrimoniorum* (1812-1849), 4 Mars 1818. ELIANA FERRARA, *James e Jeannette Power a Messina nella prima metà dell'800* (tesi di laurea, Università di Messina, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, a.a. 1999-2000).

⁷ ROSARIO MOSCHEO, "Ipazia in Sicilia", in J. POWER, *Guida per la Sicilia*, reprint, ed. by M. D'ANGELO (Messina, 1995; 2008), xix-xxvi.

⁸ JEANNETTE POWER, *Itinerario della Sicilia riguardante tutt'i rami di storia naturale e parecchi di antichità che essa contiene* (Tipografia Giuseppe Fiumara, Messina, 1839); JEANNETTE POWER, *Guida per la Sicilia* (Stabilimento tipografico di Filippo Cirelli, Napoli, 1842).

rait impardonnable de ne pas évoquer, même succinctement, l'affaire qui l'a rendue un moment célèbre dans les milieux naturalistes.

3. La "bataille de l'Argonauta"

La vedette est l'*Argonauta argo* qui pullulait à l'époque dans les eaux messinoises. Ce mollusque mythique n'est autre que le *Nautilus* de l'Antiquité rebaptisé par Linné. A son sujet deux opinions s'affrontaient depuis des siècles car une des caractéristiques de ce mollusque étrange était la cause d'un sévère affrontement où l'on retrouve en tête d'affiche les grands maîtres naturalistes de l'époque que sont Richard Owen en Angleterre et Ducrotay de Blainville en France⁹.

La cause du litige était la suivante: l'*Argonauta* est-il un squatter de la coquille où on le trouve à l'exemple du Bernard-l'ermite où la construit-il lui-même? Etrange! Il n'y a nulle adhérence entre l'occupant et cette coquille. On ne connaissait rien de semblable à l'époque. Il y a bien deux des huit tentacules largement palmés du petit poulpe qui enserrant en permanence la dite coquille comme pour la retenir mais comment supposer que c'est par ce simple contact que la fine coquille est secrétée. En réalité ce n'est pas une cuirasse mais un pondoir. Le poulpe y tient ses œufs à l'abri puis ses petits les premiers temps.

Jeanne habitant Messine où les *Argonautes* pullulaient à son époque pensa qu'elle était au bon endroit pour résoudre le problème par l'expérimentation. Elle se mit au travail. Expérimenter en milieu marin était alors une chose nouvelle, les naturalistes de l'époque se contentant jusque là d'examiner des spécimens que l'on apportait à leurs "cabinets", loin de la mer.

4. Les "cages à la Power"

Il fallait innover et c'est ce que Jeanne invente et fait en créant, dès 1832, les "cages à la Power" (le mot "aquarium" est apparu plus tard)¹⁰. De grandes cages, construites expressément, étaient immergées dans la mer près du Lazzaretto de Messine. Jeanne y plaçait les pensionnaires qu'elle voulait étudier et il y en eut beaucoup de toutes sortes. D'autres, pensionnaires étaient étudiés à terre dans des réceptacles en verre qui deviendront

⁹ Ducrotay de Blainville (1777-1850): élève de Cuvier dont il a combattu les thèses en suite. Monsieur de Blainville, avec tout son prestige de détenteur de la chaire de conchyliologie du Musée d'Histoire Naturelle de Paris, était le champion incontestable de la thèse de la coquille empruntée à l'extérieur; et il était loin d'être isolé.

¹⁰ Le mot peut-être une appellation commerciale. Dans son exposé de 1839 sur l'*Argonauta*, Richard Owen emploie les expressions «molluscus vivarium» et «marine vivarium».

les fameux aquariums. Assurer pendant plus de dix ans la nourriture de tout ce petit monde vorace a dû être une corvée des plus contraignantes!

L'*Argonaute* est difficile à observer. Il supporte très mal la captivité. Jeanne en aurait étudié des centaines avec des résultats divers qu'elle communiquait à l'Académie voisine de Catane (*Accademia Gioenia*) et au naturaliste anglais Richard Owen qui s'était intéressé tôt à l'*Argonaute*. En plus de la coquille, un autre mystère intriguait les savants. Si on trouvait immanquablement des œufs au fond de la coquille, fallait-il en déduire que tous les *Argonautes* sont femelles ou bisexués comme l'escargot. Jeanne pressentira qu'il doit y avoir quelque part un mâle non encore identifié. C'est bien le cas en effet mais ce mâle minuscule est tellement dissemblable qu'il avait été pris pour un parasite.

Jeanne tranchera définitivement la question en montrant que l'animal est capable de reconstituer ou de réparer sa coquille si on la brise. Il fallait y penser et Jeanne y a pensé ... Blainville, partisan de l'*Argonaute* squatter a fini par s'incliner mais il y a mis le temps. Ce fut une belle bataille!

L'admiration est unanime et, en 1839, Jeanne sera admise comme membre correspondant de la célèbre *Zoological Society* de Londres, comme de 18 autres académies. C'était un très rare honneur pour une femme¹¹.

Où sont les magnifiques collections de Jeanne? Au fond de la mer. Le brigantin *Bramley* qui les emportait de Messine à Londres en 1838 n'est jamais arrivé. C'est une catastrophe. Son cabinet était estimé être un des plus beaux d'Europe¹².


En 1842, le couple Power quitte la Sicile et va s'installer à Paris. Pourquoi? Nous ne le savons pas. De mauvaises affaires peut-être! James Power y créera une affaire d'électrolyse avant de devenir, dès 1851, le représentant en France de la "*Société du Câble Télégraphique Sous-marin entre la France et l'Angleterre*", le premier câble sous la mer. Il restera à ce poste jusqu'à son décès en janvier 1872. Entre-temps, Jeanne qui s'était réfugiée à Juillac en 1871 pour échapper au terrible Siècle de Paris y est décédée. Elle avait 77 ans. James et Jeanne n'ont pas eu d'enfants. Il ne reste à Juillac aucune trace des époux Power¹³.

¹¹ J. POWER, *Cenno sulle conchiglie fossili nei circondicini di Milazzo* (Messina, 1839); J. POWER, *Observations physiques sur le poulpe de l'Argonauta Argo, commencées en 1832 et terminées en 1843* (Imprimerie Charles de Morgues frères, Paris 1856); J. POWER, *Observations et expériences physiques sur la Bulla lignaria, l'Astérias, l'Octopus vulgaris et la Pinna nobilis, la reproduction des testacés marins, moeurs du Crustacé powerii, moeurs de la martre commune, faits curieux d'une tortue, l'Argonaute argo, plan d'étude pour les animaux marins, faits curieux d'une chenille* (Typographic Charles de Morgues frères, Paris 1860); J. POWER, *Observations sur l'origine des corps météoriques, aérolithes, bolides* (Imprimerie centrale des Chemins de fer, A. Chaix, Paris 1867).


¹² FERRARA, *James e Jeannette Power a Messina*.

¹³ ARNAL, "La Dame des Argonautes. Jeannette Villepreux (1794-1871)".

Considérant le mérite exceptionnel de Jeanne – une des premières femmes de l’Histoire de la Science – l’International Astronomic Union (Union Astronomique Internationale) au cours de son Assemblée Générale triennale de 1997 à Kyoto, a donné le nom “Villepreux-Power” au grand cratère patéra vénusien de coordonnées 22°S/210°E¹⁴.



Dessin d’une “cage à la Power” réalisé par Jeanne en 1832 (Modèle destiné à être immergé)



Dessin d’Argonaute réalisé par Jeanne Power en 1839

¹⁴ ARNAL, “La dama degli Argonauti”.

Salvatore Speziale

Navigare in acque “tem-pestose”.
Epidemie e controllo marittimo in Africa Mediterranea
dall’età della peste all’età del colera

Questo contributo tratta un aspetto particolare di un più ampio *work in progress* dal titolo *Epidemie ed economie in Africa mediterranea dalla peste al colera: mari, campi e città*. Considerare i mari come primo campo di interesse vuol dire che, in questo contesto di ricerca, le relazioni marittime – entro ciascuna provincia dell’Africa mediterranea e tra ciascuna provincia e il resto dell’Impero ottomano e l’Europa – sembrano destinate ad apportare i risultati più interessanti, sia nel campo della Storia economica che in quello della Storia marittima. Lasciando adesso da parte tutti gli aspetti che concernono interamente le conseguenze economiche delle epidemie sul commercio marittimo (come la rovina o la perdita dei carichi, la morte di membri dell’equipaggio e di passeggeri, il ritardo o perfino il blocco di ogni transazione commerciale e così via), questo intervento ruoterà attorno solo ad alcuni fattori legati esclusivamente a questioni marittime¹.

Prima di andare al cuore di questo *paper* è necessario premettere tre considerazioni. La prima è abbastanza ovvia. La navigazione mediterranea durante l’età moderna era legata indissolubilmente a tre importanti e imprevedibili variabili negative: epidemie, corsari (e pirati) e tempeste. Ciascuno di questi fattori implicava un tasso elevato di rischio che, indubbiamente, intaccava il commercio marittimo. Mettendo da parte gli ultimi due fattori, rimane il primo e il più terribile: le ondate epidemiche. Esse erano generalmente dovute alla peste e più tardi al colera, erano di solito originate in Oriente (alcune province dell’Impero ottomano per la prima malattia e le aree intorno al Golfo del Bengala per la seconda) e successivamente si diffondevano verso Occidente (il Mar Mediterraneo, l’Europa

¹ Per i restanti aspetti particolare attenzione deve essere data alle tesi precorritrici di DANIEL PANZAC, *La peste dans l’Empire Ottoman (1750-1850)*, Leuven 1985, e di GIUSEPPE RESTIFO, *Peste al confine. L’epidemia di Messina del 1743*, Palermo 1984, rispettivamente seguite da ricche serie di pubblicazioni.

e il Maghreb) seguendo imprevedibili percorsi. Tali ondate epidemiche, in particolare, avevano numerosi effetti sul traffico marittimo: esse causavano numerose morti tra le ciurme ed i passeggeri, producevano ingenti perdite economiche, implicavano lunghi ritardi, ma più di tutto, costituivano un rischio notevole per la popolazione locale. Questo fatto spinse verso importanti azioni sanitarie costringendo gli attori di questo teatro marittimo (capitani, consoli, autorità locali, commercianti e così via) ad agire in funzione di differenti, a volte opposti, interessi. La maggior parte degli storici occidentali afferma che ciò avvenne solo in Europa e che solo le potenze coloniali europee fecero sì che ciò avvenisse nel resto del Mediterraneo musulmano. La tesi qui sostenuta è piuttosto differente.

Secondariamente, e conseguentemente, potrebbe essere degno di nota mettere in evidenza che l'attitudine "fatalista" di fronte alle epidemie, ascritta senza alcuna seria distinzione a tutte le popolazioni di religione musulmana del Mediterraneo da molti osservatori occidentali, non regge il confronto con altre fonti primarie contemporanee. Infatti, l'analisi sia di fonti indigene sia di fonti esogene² mostra che alcuni significativi passi contro la propagazione marittima delle epidemie furono fatti almeno a partire dal diciottesimo secolo, in diverse parti dell'Africa e con interessanti risultati in vari casi. Inoltre, i concetti occidentali di contagio e di prevenzione, diffusi ovunque dagli europei, furono gradualmente integrati nel mondo musulmano. A questo proposito è doveroso aggiungere che questo processo può essere considerato solo in parte come un processo di secolarizzazione. Difatti quelle idee di contagio e di prevenzione, e le misure corrispondenti di protezione marittima e terrestre (quarantene e cordoni sanitari), furono imposte in maniera assolutamente autoritaria solo in un primo periodo. In un secondo periodo esse vennero progressivamente giustificate dagli *ulema*³ appartenenti a differenti scuole giuridiche ed incorporate nella giurisprudenza islamica⁴, in modo da essere accolte più volentieri dalla popolazione.

² I punti di vista sono: Alessandria, Derna, Bengasi, Tripoli, Sfax, Susa, Tunisi, Biserta, Tabarca, La Calle, Bona, Algeri, Orano, Tangeri e così via. Gli europei (consoli, dottori, viaggiatori, preti...) sono i più attenti osservatori, ma, a volte, anche i membri del potere locale (governatori, consiglieri, ufficiali, notabili...) discutono e scrivono di problemi sanitari. Le loro voci possono essere ascoltate grazie ad una ricchissima e varia documentazione sia edita che inedita.

³ Gli *ulema* sono esperti in questioni religiose e appartengono ad una delle seguenti e differenti scuole giuridiche: hanafita, malikita, shafiyta, hanbalita. Più recentemente, il movimento wahhabita ha offerto una più rigida interpretazione della scuola hanbalita. A questo punto è necessario sottolineare che le parole arabe contenute in questo contributo sono traslitterate in maniera semplificata in quanto la pubblicazione non è rivolta a specialisti del mondo arabo-islamico ma a un pubblico più ampio e più vario.

⁴ Due pubblicazioni possono essere citate qui tra le altre: KAMAL MOHAMMED BEN MO-

Come terza considerazione, conseguente anch'essa alla prima, è importante sottolineare che l'idea di un sistema sanitario marittimo creato solo per volontà dei colonizzatori tra la seconda metà del diciannovesimo secolo e l'inizio del ventesimo è principalmente (se non esclusivamente) un mero prodotto dei colonizzatori stessi. Misure sanitarie, anche se non effettive riforme sanitarie, furono già una realtà durante quella che può essere intitolata come l'"età della peste", il lunghissimo periodo durante il quale tale malattia epidemica fu largamente prevalente. Almeno a partire dal diciottesimo secolo, dei lazzaretti vennero creati in prossimità delle principali città commerciali e le quarantene acquisirono un'importanza sempre crescente e vennero applicate sempre più spesso. Infine, i governatori locali per prevenire la diffusione marittima delle epidemie crearono espressamente dei consigli sanitari. Questi diventarono presto importanti corpi di controllo del traffico marittimo a cominciare dalla terza decade del diciannovesimo secolo, in coincidenza con gli scoppi colerici nel Mediterraneo. La loro esistenza e la loro attività sono testimoniate da un'ampia, e a volte giornaliera, documentazione conservata in diversi archivi degli stati delle coste africane⁵.

Il controllo marittimo fu dunque una preoccupazione crescente dei diversi governatori dell'Africa mediterranea dall'"età della peste" all'"età del colera". Capitani e consoli dovettero affrontare sempre più regolarmente le prescrizioni degli ispettori locali in luoghi come Alessandria, Tripoli, Tunisi, Algeri e Tangeri. In accordo o in contrasto con gli interessi commerciali stranieri, i governatori delle province ordinarono una più o meno stretta osservanza di regole sanitarie intaccando così la navigazione e il commercio. In questo senso i regolamenti quarantenari, la loro osservazione e la loro violazione, le lamentele e le negoziazioni tra capitani, consoli e autorità marittime locali, a partire dall'ultimo periodo dell'"età della peste" (diciottesimo secolo - inizi diciannovesimo secolo), vengono posti al centro di questo contributo.

Regolamentazione della quarantena: la volontà dei governatori e la diligenza degli amministratori locali

Il primo punto degno di essere discusso è il rapporto spesso conflittuale tra la volontà dei governatori e la più o meno diligente esecuzione di tale

STAF A BEL EL KHODJA, *La médecine et les quarantaines dans leurs rapports avec la loi musulmane (Tanouir El Adhen)*, Alger 1896; BECHIR DINGUIZLI, *La variole en Tunisie*, Bordeaux 1897.

⁵ Uno dei più importanti fondi archivistici nordafricani per la storia della sanità pubblica consultati in queste ricerche è il seguente: Archives Nationales de Tunis (ANT), Série historique, Fondo Santé publique.

volontà da parte degli amministratori locali. Diversi documenti testimoniano i casi di prevenzione epidemica marittima a cominciare dall'inizio del diciottesimo secolo e il numero dei casi registrati di applicazione di misure marittime aumenta man mano che si avanza nel tempo. Possono esserci stati anche casi nel secolo precedente ma la documentazione sopravvissuta non permette di andare così indietro nel tempo⁶.

Ciò che può essere facilmente notato dai numerosi casi registrati da fonti straniere e indigene è che in questo periodo l'imposizione delle quarantene alle navi provenienti da aree infestate dalla peste era indissolubilmente legata ad azioni locali e non coordinate. In altre parole, il sultano ottomano non sembra aver dato alcuna direttiva generale o perfino alcun semplice consiglio o avviso ai governatori locali delle province per cui ogni cosa venne affidata alla volontà di ciascun governatore e, soprattutto, al suo personale convincimento circa l'esistenza del contagio. Questo è il primo elemento. Il secondo è che al momento in cui il governatore, bey o dey o pascià⁷, imponeva le quarantene alle navi straniere con patente di sanità sporca nella sua provincia o reggenza, l'esecuzione di questa misura non era sempre certa. Difatti, essa dipendeva dall'obbedienza dell'amministratore locale ad una regola che non era ancora contemplata dalla *sharia*, ovvero dalla legge di ispirazione religiosa. Non ancora in quanto lo sarà in un momento successivo⁸, come è stato già accennato. Inoltre, durante questo primo periodo la maggior parte della popolazione (a terra e a bordo) non condivideva ancora i punti di vista dei governanti sul contagio e, di conseguenza, accettava con difficoltà l'imposizione di quarantene e cordoni sanitari.

In breve, i casi di imposizione di più o meno durevoli periodi di quarantena in tutte le città portuali dell'Africa mediterranea nei confronti di navi

⁶ Le fonti europee più importanti esaminate in queste ricerche sono: la corrispondenza consolare di Gran Bretagna, Francia, Austria e stati italiani prima dell'unità, conservata negli archivi dei ministeri degli esteri di Londra, Parigi, Vienna, Torino, Venezia, Firenze, Roma e Napoli e la corrispondenza sanitaria (in particolare le patenti di sanità) conservate negli archivi degli uffici sanitari di Marsiglia, Venezia e Livorno.

⁷ Il bey era un tempo l'ufficiale in capo dell'amministrazione di una provincia dell'Impero ottomano, il dey era un tempo l'ufficiale in capo dell'esercito di una provincia e il pascià era il governatore. Tutte queste tre cariche vennero per un lungo periodo attribuite dal sultano. Durante il diciottesimo e il diciannovesimo secolo alcuni bey in certi casi e alcuni dey in altri crearono delle dinastie ereditarie solo formalmente dipendenti dal sultano.

⁸ Specialmente durante il periodo coloniale gli *ulema* e i *mufti* (giuristi) di diverse scuole giuridiche islamiche vennero incoraggiati dalle autorità coloniali a discutere e diffondere pareri legali atti a giustificare l'adozione di misure quarantenarie. Le scuole giuridiche più importanti nell'Africa Mediterranea erano (e sono) quella malikita, seguita dalla gran parte della popolazione araba locale, e quella hanafita, seguita dalla minoranza turca di governatori, ufficiali e soldati.

provenienti da aree colpite dalla peste sono ben testimoniati durante tutto il diciottesimo e il diciannovesimo secolo e troppo numerosi per essere discussi qui. Due o tre esempi tra i più degni di nota sono comunque necessari per dimostrare le questioni appena menzionate. Nel 1781, Ali bey di Tunisi ordinò ai governatori delle province di respingere verso La Goletta o via dal paese ogni nave proveniente dall'Egitto dove la peste stava facendo stragi. L'esecuzione di quest'ordine da parte del *qaid*⁹ di Sfax nel caso di una nave veneziana proveniente da Alessandria con casi di peste a bordo e la conseguente distruzione della nave stessa a Malta fu all'origine di un contenzioso tra Tunisi e Venezia che sfociò in una lunga guerra durata dal 1784 al 1792¹⁰. Del 1784 è appunto il caso della corvetta *La Rose* del capitano Ignace Sauzet di Saint-Tropez, proveniente da Alessandria e diretta a Tripoli, che aveva già gettato tre passeggeri morti in mare durante il tragitto. Il bey proibì l'entrata nel porto della corvetta costringendola a fare vela per un altro porto dove fare quarantena. Tunisi rifiutò la nave e Malta pure. Dopo altri tentativi in porti limitrofi¹¹ essa fece vela verso Smirne dove fu finalmente accolta. Questo pellegrinaggio marittimo da incubo ebbe termine dopo ben quattro mesi¹². Differente è il caso della nave veneziana del capitano Michele Zizzovich che, essendo stata accolta nel porto di Tunisi, trascorse lì il periodo di quarantena più lungo mai registrato nella documentazione: 60 giorni nel 1796¹³.

Si prendano adesso, ad esempio, due eccezioni che possono confermare la regola. Nel luglio del 1701 tre navi tunisine provenienti da Scio arrivarono a Porto-Farina (porto situato ad alcuni chilometri ad ovest di Tunisi noto in arabo come Ghar-el-Melh), con 1.200 passeggeri turchi, 40 dei quali erano morti di peste durante il viaggio¹⁴. Un dottore ed alcuni chirurghi

⁹ I *qaid* erano giudici ufficialmente incaricati dal governo di amministrare la giustizia in ciascuna parte del paese.

¹⁰ Questo fatto storico è ben registrato da fonti veneziane ma anche da un'importante fonte araba: la cronaca di Ibn Maqdish, *qaid* di Sfax. CARLO ALFONSO NALLINO, *Venezia e Sfax nel secolo XVIII secondo il cronista arabo Maqdish*, in *Venezia e Sfax. Raccolta di scritti editi ed inediti*, III volume, Roma 1941, 345-402. Si veda anche SALVATORE SPEZIALE, *Oltre la peste. Sanità, popolazione e società in Tunisia e nel Maghreb (XVIII-XX secolo)*, Cosenza 1997, 175.

¹¹ Si riporta che la nave si fermò anche all'isola di Lampedusa dove trasmise il contagio alla popolazione locale. SPEZIALE, *Oltre la peste*, 175.

¹² PANZAC, *La peste*, 138. Si veda inoltre: Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (ADBR), 200E, 458, Tripoli, 19 aprile, 30 giugno e 21 ottobre 1784, Console francese in Tripoli agli intendenti di sanità di Marsiglia.

¹³ Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV), PS/380/5, Tunisi, 9 e 27 maggio 1796, Console veneziano ai provveditori di Sanità; Tunisi, 8 settembre 1796, Console veneziano ai provveditori di Sanità.

¹⁴ L'arrivo della nave è riportato dal console francese. Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille (ACCM), J/1416, Tunisi, 5 agosto 1701, Console francese ai membri della camera.

consigliarono le autorità locali di isolare i passeggeri e l'equipaggio in un campo per fare scontare la quarantena¹⁵. Questa precauzione, purtroppo, incontrò il rifiuto del bey Murad III che salì a bordo delle navi e si intrattene con i passeggeri malati volendo dare in tal modo un esempio di condotta da tenere per le autorità locali. Un simile caso venne registrato nel 1799 in Marocco. Mentre la peste stava imperversando in diverse parti del regno, alcuni governatori avevano imposto delle misure di sanità marittima per impedire la sua diffusione nelle loro province ma vennero severamente rimproverati dal re sulla base di convincimenti religiosi¹⁶.

Guardando dall'altra parte: osservanza e violazione, lamentele e negoziazioni

Dall'altra parte della barriera c'erano le navi, i capitani, le ciurme, i mercanti, le merci e i passeggeri e, infine, i consoli incaricati di difendere gli interessi delle navi della propria nazione. Migliaia di lettere, inviate dai consoli di diversi paesi europei ai loro rispettivi ministeri degli esteri e alle loro rispettive intendenze sanitarie d'Europa, mostrano come furono complesse e difficili da conciliare le interferenze tra gli interessi locali e gli interessi marittimi.

I capitani presentavano continuamente lamentele di vario genere ai propri consoli. Ad esempio, protestavano perché la quarantena non era imposta a tutte le navi in arrivo con patente sanitaria sporca o sospetta¹⁷; oppure in quanto la quarantena era troppo breve o troppo lunga¹⁸; o per il fatto che le misure non erano applicate in maniera razionale¹⁹; o in vista del fat-

¹⁵ NICOLAS BÉRANGER, *Mémoire pour servir à l'histoire de Tunis depuis l'année 1684 à 1706*, in PAUL LUCAS, *Voyage du Sieur Paul Lucas, fait par ordre du roi dans la Grèce, l'Asie Mineure, la Macédonie et l'Afrique*, 2 vols., Paris 1712, 117. Si veda anche: PAUL SEBAG, *La peste dans la Régence de Tunis aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, in "IBLA", N° 28 (1965), 40, e SPEZIALE, *Oltre la peste*, 171.

¹⁶ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères français (AEF), C.MA/21, Mogador, 30 giugno 1799, Vice console al ministro degli affari esteri.

¹⁷ I casi sono troppo numerosi perché siano discussi qui. Generalmente gli europei si lamentavano del fatto che le autorità locali fossero meno intransigenti con le navi ottomane e più rigide con quelle europee. È impossibile sapere se ciò servisse da pretesto per fare pressioni sulle autorità locali o fosse una pratica reale.

¹⁸ Per esempio il caso già citato del capitano Zizzovich. ASV, PS/380/5, Tunisi, 9 maggio 1796, Console veneziano ai provveditori di Sanità.

¹⁹ The National Archives (UK), Foreign Office 77/3, Tunisi, 15 settembre 1790, Console britannico al ministro degli affari esteri. "A ragusean vessel put in here with a foul Bill of health from the Morea. But the *Bey* after that the crew had been on shore ordered her away. The rest of their precautions against plague are equally absurd. They have ordered at La Goletta to purify the letters by smoke when there is reason to suspect infection, but the way it is performed is by taking them with the hands and placing them in a pair of tongs for the operation".

to che le tasse per la quarantena erano troppo elevate o ingiustificate²⁰; o poiché si operava una certa discriminazione nel caso la nave fosse cristiana o musulmana.

Molte di queste lamentele nascondevano il comprensibile desiderio dei capitani di evitare la perdita di tempo causata dalla quarantena, l'esborso delle tasse, i danni ai carichi e i rischi di contagio durante la sosta in lazzaretto, nei casi migliori. Nei casi peggiori i capitani tentavano di evitare le quarantene e i lazzaretti perfino nel caso in cui avevano peste a bordo in modo da sbarcare tutte le persone malate e le merci pericolose e fuggire via. Numerosi erano i casi di negoziazione tra i capitani e i consoli da una parte e gli ufficiali sanitari e i governatori locali dall'altra. Altrettanto numerosi erano i tentativi di evitare i controlli sanitari alle navi, causando così, nel migliore dei casi, imbarazzo presso i corpi diplomatici e, nel peggiore dei casi, la diffusione di epidemie nel paese. A volte queste azioni colpevoli e pericolose provocarono forti reazioni da parte dei governatori.

Gli episodi più comuni di violazione di regolamenti quarantenari consistevano nel fatto che i capitani sbarcavano i passeggeri e i membri dell'equipaggio malati sulla costa prima dell'arrivo ai porti, oppure che gettavano a mare i corpi dei morti²¹. Tale fu il caso del capitano Hyppolite Gubert di Saint-Tropez nel 1784. Dopo aver sbarcato parte dei passeggeri malati sulla spiaggia vicino a Tabarca, tentò di essere accolto a Malta, a Tunisi e a Tripoli, ma venne sempre invitato a fare quarantena in un altro porto dalle autorità locali²². Un altro caso piuttosto frequente era quello di lasciare il porto appestato senza la necessaria patente di sanità vistata dal console e contenente la descrizione della situazione epidemica dell'area²³. Si registrarono anche casi documentati di corruzione delle guardie e degli ufficiali sanitari allo scopo di ottenere il permesso di scaricare le merci²⁴ o di sbarcare i pellegrini senza ritardo perfino con peste a bordo. L'epidemia di Tunisi del 1784-1785 fu probabilmente causata da una nave francese avente a bordo 150 pellegrini musulmani provenienti dalla Mecca e imbarcati ad Alessandria. Anche se la peste era sicuramente a bordo, in quanto dieci passeggeri ne erano morti ed erano stati gettati a mare, il ca-

²⁰ Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN), Affari Esteri, Tunisia 7286, Febbraio 1820, Risposte del console napoletano al ministro degli affari esteri circa le tasse sanitarie del porto de La Goletta.

²¹ ADBR, 200E/458, Tripoli, 10 febbraio 1785, Console francese agli intendenti di sanità di Marsiglia.

²² Archives Nationales de France (ANF), Affaires Etrangères, B-I/1110, Tripoli, 20 maggio 1784, Console francese al ministro degli affari esteri.

²³ ACCM, G.12. Versailles, 26 luglio 1702, Segretario del re ai membri della Camera di Commercio di Marsiglia.

²⁴ ANF, Affaires Etrangères, B-I/1130, Tunisi, 6 Agosto 1721, Console francese al ministro degli affari esteri.

pitano evitò i controlli corrompendo le guardie de La Goletta e fece sbarcare i passeggeri senza essere costretto a sottostare alla quarantena²⁵.

Una circostanza sicuramente più eccezionale di quelle già menzionate è data dalle navi militari che tentavano di entrare in porto senza il permesso del governatore durante le epidemie. Si può citare, ad esempio, il caso della flotta degli ammiragli Jurien e Freemantle a Tripoli nel 1819 e l'udienza a distanza, davvero fuori dell'ordinario, che il pascià concesse agli ammiragli nella sala del trono proprio a causa della sua paura del contagio pestifero²⁶.

I luoghi e i nodi: lazzaretti e condizioni

Il modo - o i modi - in cui le procedure quarantenarie venivano concretamente applicate nei porti dell'Africa mediterranea merita sicuramente qualche attenzione. Il controllo delle coste era generalmente affidato alla responsabilità del *qaid*, come un tale Bakkar al-Jalluly di Sfax rimasto famoso per via di una sua decisione gravida di conseguenze internazionali. Egli venne incaricato nel 1781 da Alì, bey di Tunisi, di inviare a La Goletta, o via dal paese a seconda dei casi, ciascuna nave proveniente dall'Egitto per sottostare alla quarantena sotto la sorveglianza delle guardie sanitarie²⁷. Al porto le navi ricevevano la visita di un *aga* (ufficiale militare) incaricato di verificare le patenti di sanità, di proibire lo sbarco di persone o merci se ci fosse stato un sospetto di peste, di controllare tutte le merci da trasportare a Tunisi, di bloccare l'entrata di merci proibite (come le bevande alcoliche). L'*aga* era anche incaricato di controllare tutte le merci e i passeggeri da imbarcare in quanto era obbligatorio un permesso scritto del bey²⁸.

La reggenza di Tunisi fornisce alcuni esempi dei diversi modi di esegui-

²⁵ ANF, Affaires Etrangères, B-I/1151. Su questo episodio si veda anche LUCETTE VALENSI, *Calamités démographiques en Tunisie et en Méditerranée orientale aux XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles*, in "Annales E.S.C.", No 6 (nov.-dic. 1969), 1543 e 1554; e JEAN-LOUIS GENEVIÈVE GUYON, *Histoire chronologique des épidémies du nord de l'Afrique*, Alger 1855, 330.

²⁶ AEF, C.TR/34, Tripoli, 12 ottobre 1819, Console francese al ministro degli affari esteri.

²⁷ NALLINO, *Venezia e Sfax*, 376-377.

²⁸ LOUIS FRANK, *Tunis par le docteur Louis Frank*, Paris 1850, 8. Questo osservatore, medico del bey di Tunisi, affermò che all'inizio del diciannovesimo secolo le navi che arrivavano al porto de La Goletta vi trovavano "un *aga*, qui est chargé de vérifier les lettres des capitaines qui arrivent, de lui en donner immédiatement connaissance, et de ne laisser descendre personne à terre, lorsque le navire vient d'un pays suspect de peste. Il surveille également toutes les marchandises qui sont portées à Tunis, et interdit l'entrée des articles prohibés, comme le vin, l'eau-de-vie et les liqueurs. Sa vigilance s'étend également sur tous les objets de sortie, et principalement sur tous les passagers, qui ne peuvent s'embarquer sans une permission spéciale du Bey".

re la quarantena, simili a quelli eseguiti in Egitto e in altri paesi. Il primo modo è esemplificato dal caso della piccola isola di Scikly. L'isola, situata in uno dei laghi di Tunisi che si trovano tra la città e il porto de La Goletta, fu usata come lazaretto almeno sin dall'inizio del diciottesimo secolo. Le navi rimanevano ancorate nell'area portuale ma i passeggeri e le merci dirette a Tunisi venivano trasportate in quella piccola isola grazie a piccole barche a vela chiamate feluche. Lì c'era un forte spagnolo, usato come riparo per i passeggeri e come magazzino per le merci e una cisterna con acqua salmastra usata per i bisogni basilari. Dopo la quarantena e la "sirena" o "spurgo", cioè l'aerazione delle merci, ogni cosa veniva trasportata a Tunisi con i mezzi precedentemente usati.

Il secondo modo è esemplificato dal caso delle isole di Zembra, Cani, Plane, Kuriate, Kerkenna e così via. Quando il traffico marittimo divenne più intenso, alcune isole piuttosto deserte e sufficientemente distanti dalla costa (come in effetti erano tali isole a quel tempo) vennero usate per fare la quarantena nel modo più semplice: sulla nave stessa o sulla costa. Guardie sanitarie rimanevano a bordo tutto il tempo imposto dal governatore de La Goletta o di Susa o di Sfax e l'aerazione delle merci era normalmente effettuata sul ponte della nave.

Il terzo ed ultimo modo è esemplificato dal caso di Porto-Farina. Si tratta del sistema più moderno in quanto implicava l'utilizzazione regolare di un forte arabo situato vicino al porto, come lazaretto. Questo sito venne progressivamente meglio equipaggiato e venne diviso in settori per evitare il contatto tra passeggeri provenienti da navi diverse. Alcune guardie sanitarie erano incaricate di controllare la situazione e un dottore registrava quanto accadeva quotidianamente. Un direttore, nominato dal consiglio sanitario di stanza in Tunisi, supervisionava ogni cosa.

Quadri simili a quelli qui menzionati si riscontrano in altri paesi come l'Egitto, soprattutto, con i lazaretti situati nei pressi di Alessandria e nel Mar Rosso, ma anche a Tripoli, Algeri, Orano, Tangeri e così via. Essi testimoniano, da una parte, la volontà dei governatori di prevenire la diffusione delle epidemie nei loro territori e, dall'altra, anche l'influenza che la medicina europea e i concetti sanitari avevano sulle élites musulmane. Con tutti i difetti di un sistema non regolare tipico di questi territori musulmani durante il diciottesimo secolo e parte del diciannovesimo e con tutti i difetti tipici di tutti i sistemi di sanità pubblica, europee o meno.

La razionalizzazione del sistema fino alla "età del colera"

Alla fine del diciottesimo secolo alcuni importanti cambiamenti furono registrati in direzione di una normalizzazione delle misure sanitarie marittime contro la propagazione epidemica. Il Marocco e la Tunisia sono particolarmente interessati a questo processo. L'imperatore del Marocco,

Mulay Hisham, fin dall'anno 1792 pose le basi per un più regolare controllo degli arrivi marittimi e per l'effettuazione delle quarantene, in accordo con i consoli europei e le autorità marittime locali²⁹. In Tunisia, il pascià Hammudah, che governò dal 1782 al 1814, riorganizzò il sistema medico e mise ordine ai controlli quarantenari³⁰. Negli anni successivi, l'Egitto, con Muhammad Ali, divenne il teatro della più importate riforma sanitaria dell'Africa mediterranea. Una riforma che toccò profondamente il controllo marittimo in relazione alla diffusione epidemica³¹. Il bey Ahmad, nella reggenza di Tunisi, lavorò nella stessa direzione³².

Il punto di svolta venne dato da due fattori: la diffusione di una nuova e terribile malattia epidemica, il colera, che raggiunse il Mediterraneo per la prima volta negli anni Venti e Trenta del diciannovesimo secolo, e l'arrivo dell'esercito francese in Algeria nel 1830. Questi due fattori accelerarono il processo di integrazione del controllo marittimo delle due sponde del mare allo scopo di prevenire la diffusione epidemica. Nel breve lasso di tempo di cinque o sei anni tutti e cinque i diversi paesi che componevano l'Africa mediterranea crearono moderni consigli sanitari e, al tempo stesso, costruirono più efficienti e numerosi lazzaretti. Diversi tra loro furono i consigli sanitari dell'Africa mediterranea basati però tutti sulla cooperazione tra personale indigeno e straniero e sullo scambio di esperienze tra cristiani e musulmani ed ebrei. Tutti eccetto in Algeria dove il sistema sanitario venne completamente governato dalle forze militari nel primo periodo dell'occupazione³³.

Un grande cambiamento si è registrato quindi prima del colonialismo. Un grande cambiamento ma, è necessario sottolinearlo, non nato dal nulla.

²⁹ AEF, C.MA/30, Tangeri, 10 dicembre 1835, Console francese al ministro degli affari esteri. Il console riporta che "Dés l'année 1792, les six consuls qui résidaient alors à Tanger furent autorisés par l'Empereur Mulay Hischam à prescrire les mesures sanitaires qu'ils jugeraient propres à préserver le Maroc de la peste qui y était plus ordinairement importée de l'Égypte".

³⁰ SALVATORE SPEZIALE, *Le domaine sanitaire tunisien aux temps d'Hammoudah Pacha (1782-1814)*, in "Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine", XXXII, No 117, Janvier 2005, 123-135.

³¹ Le pubblicazioni sulla sanità pubblica egiziana del diciannovesimo secolo sono numerose e piuttosto valide. È necessario citare almeno le seguenti: KUHNKE LAVERNE, *Lives at Risk. Public Health in Nineteenth-Century-Egypt*, Berkley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1990, 233; DANIEL PANZAC, *Un inquiétant retour d'Égypte: Bonaparte, la peste et les quarantaines*, in "Cahiers de la Méditerranée", 57 (dicembre 1998), 271-280; DANIEL PANZAC, *Médecine révolutionnaire et révolution de la médecine dans l'Égypte de Muhammad Ali: Le docteur Clot-Bey*, in "ROMM", 52-53 (1989), 95-110; ANNE-MARIE MOULIN, *Révolutions médicales et révolutions politiques en Égypte (1865-1917)*, in "ROMM", 52-53 (1989), 111-123.

³² SALVATORE SPEZIALE, *Il colera e la nascita dei Consigli sanitari nell'Africa Settentrionale: un problema epidemiologico, storico-sociale e storiografico*, in *Epidemie e storia sociale nel Mediterraneo di età moderna*, a cura di GIUSEPPE RESTIFO, Messina 2001, 111-141.

³³ SPEZIALE, *Il colera*, 130-141.

Maria Sirago

La balneazione a Napoli tra '800 e '900

La nascita e lo sviluppo della "civiltà balneare"

Lo studio sui bagni consigliati da Ippocrate per la cura di varie malattie è stato ripreso ai primi del '700 da un medico inglese, Sir John Floyer¹. Ma l'iniziatore della "civiltà balneare" è il medico londinese Richard Russel, che nel 1750 costruì sulla spiaggia di Brighton il *Royal Albion Hotel* dove seguiva le terapie a base di acqua marina dei suoi pazienti – bagnanti, esposte poi in un trattato². Il suo lavoro fu basilare per la nascita della moderna vacanza marina, poiché convinse la società erudita del tempo ad avvicinarsi alle spiagge ed al mare³. Egli consigliava di bere l'acqua di mare e fare il bagno, precetti seguiti alla lettera dallo Schliemann che durante le ricerche di Troia e Micene curava con acqua marina le piaghe prodottesi durante gli scavi⁴.

In Italia la "moda" dei bagni di mare, diffusa dagli inglesi, destò molta curiosità, tanto che nel 1817 fu tradotto in italiano il trattato del Buchan per far conoscere i benefici effetti dei bagni marini, che suscitavano ancora molta diffidenza. Il medico scozzese descriveva l'abitudine inglese di frequentare le spiagge del mare "tanto per cambiare... per sospendere... le ordinarie abitudini", sotto il pretesto di migliorare la salute⁵, dando l'avvio all'idea del "tempo libero" che la borghesia doveva "spendere" nei periodi di ferie dalle attività lavorative⁶. Tali teorie vennero riprese dal medico lucchese Giuseppe Giannelli, promotore dello "Stabilimento Balneario di Viareggio" inaugurato nel 1828 ed autore di un manuale per i bagni di mare, pubblicato nel 1833⁷. Verso gli anni '40 Tomaso Rima, chi-

¹ JOHN FLOYER, ΨΥΧΡΟΛΟΥΣΙΑ or the history of cold bathing both ancient and modern, London 1715 (4^a ed.).

² RICHARD RUSSEL, *De Tabae Glandulari, sive De usu Aquae Marinae in Morbis Glandularum Dissertatio*, Oxford 1750.

³ <http://www.balnea.net>

⁴ ANTONIO VEGRO, *L'evoluzione storica della talassoterapia*, 2004, in www.talasso.unimi.it.

⁵ ALEXANDER P. BUCHAN, *Trattato sopra i bagni d'acqua di mare*, Pisa 1817.

⁶ *L'invenzione del tempo libero 1850-1960*, a cura di ALAIN CORBIN, Bari 1996.

⁷ GIUSEPPE GIANNELLI, *Manuale per i bagni di mare*, Lucca 1833 (Prefazione).

urgo dell'Ospedale di Venezia, fece costruire presso la Chiesa della Salute un "bagno galleggiante" fisso su pontoni con una vasca e ideò una barca, "La Sirena", per la talassoterapia delle "gentili bagnanti"⁸. Nel 1856 Luigi Malagodi pubblicò uno studio in cui, dopo un *excursus* sull'uso della balneoterapia praticata dai popoli antichi, analizzava lo sviluppo di tale pratica in Europa, citando alcune stazioni balneari italiane, dove esistevano "moltissimi bagni fissi e galleggianti e capannetti portabili in ogni città e paese marittimo", quelli della laguna di Venezia, di Viareggio, Livorno, Trieste, Civitavecchia, Rimini, Ancona, Pesaro, Senigallia⁹. Anche il medico livornese Fabio Grilli, consigliere di Vincenzo Pancaldi nella costruzione dello stabilimento balneare inaugurato a Livorno nel 1867, pubblicò un trattato sulla cura idroterapica marina¹⁰. E Paolo Mantegazza pubblicò un codice igienico dei bagni di mare in cui dava alcune norme per usufruire al meglio dei bagni di mare¹¹. Inoltre continuavano gli studi sulla talassoterapia, per i quali nel 1910 Giulio Ceresole fondò l'Osservatorio per lo studio sulla Climato-talassoterapia sulla spiaggia di Venezia¹², pubblicando nel 1932 il primo *Trattato Italiano di Talassoterapia*¹³.

Nasceva così il turismo balneare con le sue norme, i suoi riti, la sua moda¹⁴, mentre il bagno da pratica curativa andava pian piano trasformandosi in evento mondano¹⁵. La vita balneare si sviluppava sulle piattaforme degli stabilimenti, con eventi mondani come balli e serate danzanti. Le cabine venivano dotate di una botola sul fondale per immergersi e cominciava a diffondersi la pratica del nuoto, anche tra le fanciulle. Pian piano le cure idrotermali e le pratiche dei bagni di mare cominciarono a diffondersi anche al di fuori della cerchia aristocratica, tra la borghesia; ed il miglioramento delle reti di comunicazioni e degli impianti strutturali (alberghi, locande, ristoranti), permetteva lo sviluppo della villeggiatura anche fra i ceti borghesi¹⁶. Poi a fine secolo il tempo di permanenza sulla spiaggia si dilatò e si cominciò a scoprire il "bagno di sole", anch'esso in un primo tempo consigliato

⁸ VEGRO, *L'evoluzione*.

⁹ LUIGI MALAGODI, *Guida ai bagni di mare*, Fano 1856.

¹⁰ FABIO GRILLI, *Della cura idroterapica marina e dell'uso dell'acqua di mare polverizzata*, Livorno 1869.

¹¹ PAOLO MANTEGAZZA, *Codice igienico dei bagni di mare*, in RUGGERO UGOLINI, *Guida ai bagni di Rimini*, Milano 1873.

¹² VEGRO, *L'evoluzione*.

¹³ GIULIO CERESOLE, *Trattato Italiano di Talassoterapia*, Pisa 1932.

¹⁴ MATILEA SOMARE, MARCO SORTENI, *Dai vestiti ai costumi*, in *Lido e lidi. Società, architettura e cultura balneare tra passato e futuro*, Catalogo della mostra, Venezia 1989.

¹⁵ EVELINA BETTE, MAURO TRANI, *Architettura della città di cura balneare ottocentesca*, Grado 1989.

¹⁶ *La villeggiatura in Italia tra Ottocento e Novecento*, Atti del Convegno (Alghero, 1-2 ottobre 1992), a cura di FRANCO DELLA PERUTA, in "Il Risorgimento", XLV, n. 23, 1993, 149-154 (Introduzione).

per ragioni terapeutiche; ma la pelle nivea restava il simbolo della bellezza femminile. Dagli inizi del '900 le donne cominciarono a dedicarsi a nuove professioni, che le portarono a liberarsi di alcune costrizioni nel vestiario, e ciò influì anche sulla moda balneare¹⁷. Nel contempo la nuova borghesia del primo dopoguerra trovava nello sdraiarsi al sole un modo di trasgredire. Si passò dunque da una "pelle di luna" ad una "pelle di sole": l'abbronzatura diventò simbolo del consumismo, della frenesia del divertimento, anche per il diffondersi dello sport. E questa tendenza, inizialmente americana, si diffuse rapidamente in Europa, dando vita alla "civiltà balneare" divenuta di vitale importanza per la società contemporanea¹⁸.

I "motivi del viaggio" a Napoli e nei dintorni

Fino ai primi del '700 visitavano Napoli e i dintorni pochi viaggiatori attratti dalle "antichità" dei Campi Flegrei, ripercorrendo gli itinerari virgiliani¹⁹. Tale "moda" indusse Ferrante Loffredo a comporre un testo per celebrare le bellezze del territorio da lui visitato durante un suo soggiorno per cure termali²⁰, praticate fin dall'antichità²¹. Ai primi del '700 il Parrino pubblicò una "guida" turistica "per l'Antichità curiosissime di Pozzuoli", ormai visitate da un gran numero di "forastieri"²². Questo itinerario, inserito nel percorso del *Grand Tour*, divenne tanto famoso da indurre un marinaio di Pozzuoli, a metà '700, ad utilizzare le sue barche per condurre i forestieri alle antichità²³. Si formò così la nuova figura professionale del "cicerone", antesignano della guida turistica, descritto da Dal Bono che pubblicava anche il *Regolamento di Polizia per le Guide de forestieri* con relative tariffe per evitare che si commettessero frodi nei confronti degli incauti visitatori²⁴.

L'itinerario di visita "alle antichità" campane venne ampliato a metà '700 dopo la scoperta dei resti di Ercolano e Pompei, divenuti meta obbli-

¹⁷ ADA GIGLI MARCHETTI, *Il vestito al mare, ai monti, in campagna tra Otto e Novecento*, in *La villeggiatura*, a cura di DELLA PERUTA, 243-249.

¹⁸ GIORGIO TRIANI, *Pelle di luna, pelle di sole. Nascita e storia della civiltà balneare 1700-1946*, Venezia 1988.

¹⁹ ALSTE HORN - ONCKEN, *Viaggiatori stranieri del XVI e XVII secolo nei Campi Flegrei*, in "Puteoli", VI, 1978, 67-135.

²⁰ FERRANTE LOFFREDO, *Le antichità di Pozzuolo et luoghi con vicini con le descrizioni de Bagni d'Agnano, Pozzuolo e Tripergole*, Napoli 1573.

²¹ Per una visione d'insieme cfr. AA.VV. *I Campi Flegrei nell'archeologia e nella storia*, Atti dei Convegni Lincei, 33, Roma 1977.

²² DOMENICO A. PARRINO, *Nuova guida de forestieri per l'Antichità curiosissime di Pozzuoli, dell'Isole adiacenti di Ischia, Nitida e Capri colla descrizione della città di Gaeta*, Napoli 1751 (1^a ed. 1709).

²³ Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN), Catasto Onciario, 307, 1745.

²⁴ *Usi e costumi di Napoli e contorni*, a cura di F. DE BURCARD, Milano 1977, 651-677.

gata per i viaggiatori del "Grand Tour"²⁵. Ai primi dell'800 De Jorio consigliava: "Per coloro che si trattengono qualche giorno in Castellammare sarà una passeggiata l'osservare i semplici indizi dello scavo", sia di Pompei che dell'antica Stabia²⁶. E Francesco De Bourcard consigliava di visitare l'antico porto di Stabiae, "qualche avanzo dell'anfiteatro nel luogo ora detto *Varano* e i ruderi di un ginnasio presso l'"Osteria del lapillo"²⁷. Poi a fine '700 furono scoperte anche le "antichità" di Paestum e quelle di Capri. Insieme alle "antichità" il viaggio comprendeva anche la "gita" al Vesuvio, una delle più affermate attrazioni turistiche della città partenopea. Ma per la difficoltà della "gita", inserita da Cook fin dai suoi primi tour degli anni '60, fu creata la "*Vesuvian Railway Company*", che nel giugno 1880 aprì la linea della funicolare; e dal 1886 la stessa "Tomas Cook & Son", che prometteva nei suoi pacchetti turistici una ascesa veloce, intervenne con propri capitali per permetterne il suo mantenimento²⁸.

Con l'avvento del vapore²⁹ furono organizzate le prime "gite di piacere" nel Golfo di Napoli, con sosta a Capri, Ischia e Sorrento o a Castellammare per assistere al varo delle navi³⁰. Cominciò così a diffondersi un "turismo borghese", meno colto rispetto a quello del "Grand Tour", ma aperto ad un pubblico più numeroso, desideroso di trascorrere piacevolmente il tempo libero, e furono pubblicate delle "guide tascabili" per i "turisti borghesi" (Murray³¹, Baedeker³²). Inoltre Thomas Cook, che aveva creato in Inghilterra un primo ufficio in senso moderno per organizzare "viaggi in comitiva", aprì una sede anche a Napoli³³, dato l'incremento di stranieri, in particolare britannici, attirati dal sud, luogo mitico per eccellenza, ricco di antiche testimonianze di un fulgido passato³⁴.

La diffusione del termalismo e della balneazione a Napoli e nel Golfo

Nel '700 la "riscoperta dell'acqua" e delle sue proprietà curative ed il fattore igienista diedero l'avvio alla creazione di vere e proprie città di va-

²⁵ ATTANASIO MOZZILLO, *Passaggio a Mezzogiorno. Napoli e il Sud nell'immaginario barocco e illuminista europeo*, Milano 1993.

²⁶ ANDREA DE JORIO, *Indicazione del più rimarcabile in Napoli e contorni*, Napoli 1818, 16.

²⁷ DE BOURCARD, *Usi e costumi*, 177-188.

²⁸ BARBARA DAWES, *La rivoluzione turistica. Tomas Cook e il turismo inglese in Italia nel XIX secolo*, Napoli, 2003, 95-100.

²⁹ MARIA SIRAGO, *Nuove tecnologie nautiche. Dal vascello alla nave a vapore*, in *Atti del I Congresso Nazionale di Storia dell'Ingegneria* (Napoli, 8-9 marzo 2006), Napoli 2006, 671-679.

³⁰ *Giornale del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, Napoli 7 novembre 1824, gita del *Real Pacchetto a vapore San Ferdinando* nel Golfo di Napoli con sosta a Capri.

³¹ JOHN MURRAY, *Handbook for travellers to Southern Italy*, London 1853.

³² KARL BAEDEKER, *Italie Meridionale*, Leipzig 1900 (1ª ed. 1862).

³³ DAWES, *La rivoluzione*, 87 ss.

³⁴ JOHN PEMBLE, *La passione del Sud. Viaggi mediterranei nell'Ottocento*, Bologna 1998.

canza (città *loisir*) in cui le cure termali andavano di pari passo col divertimento, in piacevoli soggiorni. Un primo esempio si ebbe a Bath, in Inghilterra, le cui acque termali, usate dai romani, furono "riscoperte" nel '700, quando fu costruita una città termale e di villeggiatura che ben rispondeva sia alle esigenze curative che alle attese della nuova "borghesia", desiderosa di divertimenti, balli, musica, rappresentazioni teatrali e, perché no, incontri romantici³⁵. Dai primi dell'800 anche in Francia si diffuse la moda dei bagni e delle villeggiature in apposite città "delle acque" frequentate da sovrani e primi ministri, come Aix Les Bains, Plombières, Vichy³⁶.

Anche in Italia dal '700 si diffuse la "moda" dell'idroterapia, specie in Campania, terra vulcanica, ricca di sorgenti minerali, dove il termalismo era praticato fin dall'antichità e fu studiata la "medicina dell'acqua [per] la prima volta introdotta [...] a Napoli"³⁷. Dai primi dell'800, in epoca francese, fu costruito uno stabilimento di "bagni caldi" nel fossato di Castelnuovo³⁸, seguito da altri in tutta la città. Intanto gli stranieri dalla fine del '700 avevano diffuso la moda dei bagni di mare³⁹. Il ministro William Hamilton nel 1780 scriveva al nipote Charles: "ogni mattina sguazzo voluttuosamente nel mare ed alla sera ceno nel Casino di Posillipo"⁴⁰.

Nel contempo si costruivano delle "capannette di legno per l'uso dei bagni" al Ponte della Maddalena⁴¹ ed a Posillipo⁴². Pian piano questa moda si diffuse, tanto che furono costruiti stabilimenti balneari lungo le spiagge della Capitale e del suo Golfo. A Napoli i bagni al Ponte della Maddalena e quelli della Marinella, verso il Carmine, una antica zona di pescatori, erano frequentati dai ceti popolari e nascevano continui contenziosi con i pescatori, che vedevano ridotti gli spazi per stendere le reti⁴³. Anche nel borgo marinaro di Santa Lucia, un pittoresco rione con innumerevoli bancarelle di "ostricari" e venditori di polipi e numerose trattorie⁴⁴, i "ba-

³⁵ TRIANI, *Pelle di luna*, 14 ss.

³⁶ DOMINIQUE JARRASSÉ, *Les thermes romantiques. Bains et villégiatures en France de 1800 à 1850*, Aurillac 1992.

³⁷ NICCOLÒ CRESCENZO, *Ragionamenti intorno alla nuova medicina dell'acqua e come la prima volta introdotta ella fosse, difesa e sostenuta in Napoli*, Napoli 1727.

³⁸ ASN, Intendenza di Napoli, 1635/1846, 1817.

³⁹ CORBIN, *L'invenzione del mare*.

⁴⁰ GUIDO DONATONE, *William Hamilton. Diario segreto napoletano (1764-1789)*, Napoli 2000, 103.

⁴¹ GIUSEPPE MARIA GALANTI, *Breve descrizione della città di Napoli e del suo contorno* (1^a ed. 1792), a cura di MARIA ROSARIA PELIZZARI, Cava dei Tirreni (SA) 2000, 210.

⁴² ASN, Casa Reale Amministrativa, III Inventario, Siti Reali 1929 e 11 febbraio e 25 giugno 1800, 3 maggio 1801, sito reale di pesca di Posillipo.

⁴³ ASN, Intendenza di Napoli, 1752/6488, 1830, pagamento del diritto "di palmaggio" per i costruttori dei "camerini ... per uso de bagni".

⁴⁴ DE BOURCARD, *Usi e costumi*, 477-501.

gniaiuoli” costruivano dei “camerini” di legno per i bagni di mare⁴⁵, frequentati dallo stesso ceto.

Invece dalla fine di Santa Lucia, verso Castel dell’Ovo, cominciava il quartiere elegante di Chiaia, con il “passeggio” della Villa Ruele, dove furono costruiti numerosi alberghi frequentati dai viaggiatori stranieri, specie inglesi⁴⁶. Vicino a Castel dell’Ovo vi era “un casino di Sua maestà ... fornito di vasche comodissime per i bagni [e] ... un boschetto annesso che lo rende[va] deliziosissimo”⁴⁷. E nella seconda metà dell’800 nelle vicinanze, al Chiatamone, dove esistevano delle sorgenti termali, fu costruito un elegante stabilimento balneare con un “bel vestibolo a colonnato jonico” con bagni idroterapici termali e marini, con alle spalle l’Hotel du Chiatamone⁴⁸. Ed anche l’Hotel Royal des Etrangeres, aperto nel 1877, e l’Hotel de Rome avevano dei bagni ordinari, minerali e di acqua di mare⁴⁹. Perciò proprio in considerazione di queste strutture e del buon clima, che permetteva di prolungare la sua stagione balneare, ai primi del ‘900 i dottori Giuseppe Schmeer e Vincenzo Masullo ritenevano che Napoli dovesse diventare “una stazione balneare invernale della più alta importanza”⁵⁰.

Altri eleganti stabilimenti balneari dai primi dell’800 erano stati costruiti allo “sbarcatolo” della Vittoria, vicino alla Villa Reale⁵¹, accanto ai “casini della real passeggiata”, rimessa a nuovo e sistemata con nuovi “caffè” e trattorie all’uso francese ed italiano⁵², ed a Mergellina⁵³. Il più elegante era però l’Eldorado-Lucia, vicino al Castel dell’Ovo, luogo di ritrovo della migliore aristocrazia. Altro “luogo di delizie” era Posillipo dove dal ‘700 erano state costruite numerose “casine di delizia”⁵⁴. Proprio in quegli anni, ultimata la strada iniziata dai francesi nel 1812⁵⁵, si aprivano numerose trattorie per le “scampagnate” domenicali come quella di Frisio⁵⁶; e dagli anni ‘30 erano affittati dei “casini” per la villeggiatura⁵⁷. Intanto dai primi

⁴⁵ ASN, Intendenza di Napoli, 1662/3145, 1820-1821, pagamento del “palmaggio” per i “camerini”.

⁴⁶ BENEDETTO e GIUSEPPE GRAVAGNUOLO, *Chiaia*, Napoli 1990.

⁴⁷ FILIPPO MARZULLO, *Guida del Forestiere per le cose più rimarchevoli della Città di Napoli*, Napoli 1823, 108.

⁴⁸ DOMENICO FRANCO, *I Bagni del Chiatamone. Brevi notizie*, Napoli 1880.

⁴⁹ FRANCO, *I Bagni*, inserto pubblicitario.

⁵⁰ GIUSEPPE SCHMEER, VINCENZO MASULLO, *Napoli stazione termale d’inverno*, in AA.VV., *Napoli d’oggi*, Napoli 1900, 442-447.

⁵¹ *Monitore Napoletano*, 9 giugno 1810.

⁵² *Monitore Napoletano*, 3 giugno 1811; GIANCARLO ALISIO, *Il passeggio di Chiaia. Immagini per la storia della Villa Comunale*, Napoli 1993.

⁵³ *Giornale del regno delle Due Sicilie*, Napoli 9 luglio 1818.

⁵⁴ DOMENICO VIGGIANI, *I tempi di Posillipo: dalle ville romane ai casini di delizia*, Napoli 1989.

⁵⁵ FRANCESCO ALVINO, *La collina di Posillipo*, Napoli 1845, 61 ss.

⁵⁶ ALVINO, *La collina di Posillipo*, 80.

⁵⁷ *Giornale del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, Napoli 30 aprile 1829.

dell'800 nel palazzo appartenuto alla famiglia Carafa di Roccella, all'inizio della strada di Posillipo, il proprietario, Giacinto di Bernardo, costruì un elegante "stabilimento di bagni", con "convenienti camerini di legno e di fabbrica", "rinfreschi, luoghi di riposo e sala da bigliardo", un'elegante osteria, ed anche bagni di acqua dolce calda e fredda, dove affittava appartamenti mobiliati per la villeggiatura⁵⁸. Poi dagli anni '40 fu aperto un bagno nei pressi di Palazzo donn'Anna, a Villa Quercia (da fine '800 ribattezzato "Bagno Elena"), uno dei punti di ritrovo del bel mondo cittadino⁵⁹. Ed anche nella nuova via Caracciolo, di fronte alla Cassa Armonica della Villa, furono costruiti l'elegante stabilimento "Vittoria" ed il "Risorgimento" (di Gennaro Limongelli) alla Rotonda⁶⁰. Con la diffusione della vita mondana furono pubblicate delle "Strenne estive per bagnanti e villeggianti", una sorta di diario in cui si descriveva la giornata tipica di una giornata al mare, dal mattino, quando alla "Rotonda" le signore si facevano ammirare nei loro adorabili costumini, all'ora di pranzo, quando il lido si vuotava e si cercava riposo tra la frescura dei giardini, al pomeriggio quando la "Rotonda" si affollava nuovamente per la passeggiata pomeridiana⁶¹. Si sviluppò così una "moda" per la villeggiatura, con vestiti particolarmente complicati, obbligo del cappello di paglia, in modo da mantenere la pelle candida, sostituito poi da cuffiotti da bagno e scarpette legate ai polpacci da stringhe incrociate. Ma dopo la grande guerra la moda della "pelle di luna" venne sostituita da quella dell'abbronzatura⁶² e la diffusione delle attività sportive, tra cui il nuoto, permise ai vestiti di diventare agevoli⁶³.

Dagli anni '70 per le precarie condizioni igieniche della città partenopea si propose di costruire alla Marinella dei bagni gratuiti per i poveri⁶⁴, per diffondere le cure idroterapiche, che potevano prevenire molte malattie causate dalla mancanza di igiene⁶⁵. Tutto però rimase allo stato progettuale. Difatti nel 1873 l'ingegnere francese Emilio Pelard progettò di costruire uno stabilimento balneare in muratura lungo la Villa Reale per le classi

⁵⁸ *Giornale del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, Napoli 20 luglio 1821, 15 luglio 1822, 8 maggio 1823.

⁵⁹ AA.VV., *Bagno Elena in Posillipo dal 1840 due secoli di estati napoletane*, Napoli 2004.

⁶⁰ ASN, Questura, A.G., Il inventario, 2476, 21 giugno e 2 luglio 1899. Per notizie bibliografiche ed archivistiche sugli stabilimenti balneari napoletani cfr. GIOVANNI LOMBARDI, *Questioni e fonti per la storia del turismo campano dall'età borbonica al primo Novecento*, in "Quaderni dell'Istituto di Studi sulle Società del Mediterraneo" CNR, Napoli 2004.

⁶¹ *In riva al mare. Strenna estiva per bagnanti e villeggianti*, Napoli 1894.

⁶² TRIANI, *Pelle di luna*.

⁶³ GIGLI MARCHETTI, *Il vestito*, 244 ss.

⁶⁴ Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli (BNN), Atti del Consiglio Comunale, 21 maggio 1884, Napoli 1885, 514-515.

⁶⁵ ADOLFO FASANO, *I Bagni Marini*, in *Napoli! Storia - Costumi - Igiene - Clima - Edilizia - Risanamento - Statistica - Industria*, Napoli 1896, 83-91.

agiare, a cui dovevano seguire simili stabilimenti per la classe media ed operaia, da costruire a spese del Comune⁶⁶.

L'Amministrazione Comunale concesse l'autorizzazione per costruire tre grandiose stazioni balneari in muratura, permanenti, alla "Vittoria" ed a Posillipo per i ceti aristocratici ed alla Marinella per quelli popolari⁶⁷, ma non furono trovati i fondi per le costruzioni, per cui rimasero i soliti stabilimenti in legno. In effetti tra gli anni '80 e '90 dell'800 una parte del ceto dirigente napoletano voleva inserire Napoli in un modello di sviluppo europeo, quello delle "città di loisir", ricca di risorse naturali come acque termali, mare, sole, clima. In particolare Nicola Amore proponeva di riorganizzare la città partenopea come "grande albergo e grande museo", ampliando la sua balneabilità sia termale che marina con la costruzione di eleganti stabilimenti balneari per richiamare un notevole numero di turisti. Ma queste idee si contrapponevano all'idea di sviluppo del modello industriale, che pian piano prevalsero, specie dopo l'epidemia di colera che fece decidere per un drastico "Risanamento" dei quartieri popolari, in primis quello di Santa Lucia. Così i pescatori luciani furono trasferiti al Borgo Marinaro, sull'isolotto di Castel dell'Ovo, mentre veniva aperta via Caracciolo e scomparvero le spiagge del litorale, dal Carmine a Mergellina, frequentate da almeno 20.000 persone, per lo più di basso ceto, mentre quelle rimaste, dalla Vittoria a Posillipo, erano troppo care per i meno abbienti⁶⁸. Si spegneva così il sogno di una "grande città balneare".

Lo stesso accadde a Bagnoli, dove nel corso dell'800 si era sviluppata una fiorente attività termale, insieme a quella balneare, che occupava tra le 500 e le 600 persone⁶⁹. Qui dal 1875 l'ingegnere Lamont Young progettò un nuovo quartiere, il "rione Venezia", che doveva essere servito dalla metropolitana in costruzione, con laghi, canali di mare, edifici balneari, giardini, alberghi, un "palazzo di cristallo", attrezzature sportive e ricreative. Il progetto nel 1892 ottenne l'approvazione ma, come quello di Napoli, non si riuscì a reperire i fondi per realizzarlo⁷⁰. Furono costruiti solo dei villini nei terreni lottizzati della proprietà Giusso, per la villeggiatura di quanti praticavano il termalismo e la balneazione. Ma con l'apertura dell'ILVA, nel 1904, anche questo sogno fallì⁷¹.

⁶⁶ BNN, Atti del Consiglio Comunale, 7 luglio 1872, Napoli 1873, 454-459.

⁶⁷ PAOLO COZZOLINO, *Napoli balneare*, in *Napoli!*, 93-95.

⁶⁸ GABRIELLA CORONA, *Risorse nella città. Natura e territorio a Napoli tra Otto e Novecento*, in *Ambiente e risorse nel Mezzogiorno contemporaneo*, a cura di PIERO BEVILACQUA e GABRIELLA CORONA, Corigliano Calabro 2000, 191-208, in part. 195 ss.

⁶⁹ CORONA, *Risorse nella città*, 197 ss.

⁷⁰ GIANCARLO ALISIO, *Lamont Young. Utopia e realtà nell'urbanistica napoletana dell'Ottocento*, Roma 1993, 234-255.

⁷¹ *Vivevamo con le sirene. Bagnoli tra memoria e progetto*, a cura di MARIELLA ALBRIZIO e MARIA ANTONIETTA SELVAGGIO, Liceo Scientifico Statale "Arturo Labriola", Napoli 2001.

Un altro territorio delizioso era il “miglio d’oro”, la costa nella zona orientale di Napoli, tra San Giovanni a Teduccio e Torre del Greco, dove dal '700 erano state costruite sontuose ville per la villeggiatura del ceto aristocratico, dopo che i sovrani avevano costruito la villa di Portici, cioè il Palazzo Reale⁷². Proprio qui, al porticciolo del Granatello, furono costruite le “peschiere reali” dove i sovrani si trastullavano nelle battute di pesca; ed ai primi dell'800 una povera vedova di un marinaio ottenne il permesso dal sovrano di poter costruire ogni anno delle baracche di legno necessarie per le cure di “molte croniche indisposizioni”, secondo le testimonianze mediche⁷³. Poi nel corso dell'800 erano stati costruiti stabilimenti balneari lungo tutta la costa, da San Giovanni a Torre del Greco.

Un'altra città “di loisir” era Castellammare di Stabia che vantava un'antica tradizione di termalismo, incrementato dagli anni '30 dell'800 con lo stabilimento termale costruito dal Comune “al largo del Cantiere” con una bella sala nel mezzo ... per trattenimento de bagnatori”, una sala da bigliardo⁷⁴ ed un ampio giardino⁷⁵; e dagli anni '40 erano stati costruiti anche stabilimenti balneari nella “Strada Marina”⁷⁶. Perciò da metà '800, specie dopo l'apertura della ferrovia, la ridente cittadina diventò meta obbligata per quanti volessero abbinare le cure termali a piacevoli soggiorni, richiamando 6000 villeggianti tra “nazionali ... ed esteri”, tra cui “le più distinte persone civili e diplomatiche ... e quelle di reale famiglia” che passeggiavano ogni giorno nei viali dello stabilimento termale e la sera affollavano i caffè ed i ristoranti sorti sul lungomare⁷⁷ o prendevano i bagni di mare nei numerosi stabilimenti balneari. Castellammare diventò così uno dei luoghi “di loisir” più famosi della costa napoletana, frequentato dalla nobiltà e dalla ricca borghesia che alla cura delle terme alternava le passeggiate nel parco dove si esibiva un concertino e frequentava i locali alla moda. Ed a fine '800 era considerata una “stazione igienica e di villeggiatura di prim'ordine, con vari e grandiosi Hotels, tra cui il Quisisana”⁷⁸, tanto che nel 1885 era stato bandito un concorso per rendere Castellammare una “dimora comoda e ricer-

⁷² CELESTE FIDORA, SERGIO ATTANASIO, *Ville e delizie vesuviane del '700. Passeggiata da Napoli a Torre del Greco*, Napoli 2004.

⁷³ ASN, Casa reale Amministrativa, III Inventario, Siti reali, 1166, 1832, affitto della pesca del Granatello, concessione alla vedova Marianna Battaglia di costruire bagni, necessari per le cure mediche della popolazione.

⁷⁴ FRANCESCO ALVINO, *Da Napoli a Castellammare*, Napoli 1845, 229 ss.; CATELLO PARISI, *Cenno storico-descrittivo della città di Castellammare di Stabia*, Firenze 1842, 69.

⁷⁵ ASN, Intendenza di Napoli, 1750/6383, 1829 e 1754/6576, 1830 (fitto nel 1830 per 1481 ducati annui e nel 1831 per 1210 ducati annui).

⁷⁶ Archivio Comunale di Castellammare, 815/3, busta 3, 16 aprile 1850.

⁷⁷ PARISI, *Cenno storico*, 27.

⁷⁸ DOMENICO FRANCO, *Prolusione al primo corso d'idrologia e balneoterapia nella Regia Università di Napoli*, Napoli 1881, 103-104.

cata per i bagnanti e i villeggianti". Tutto questo fervore costruttivo portò Errico de Renzi a consigliare questa stazione climatica sia per le sue proprietà curative che per la sua bellezza paesaggistica, posta com'era tra mare e monti⁷⁹. Ancora ai primi del '900, quando il termalismo attirava 15.000 frequentatori annui⁸⁰ si studiava il modo di rendere la cittadina sempre più accogliente e prospera. Così fu costituita una società anonima per azioni, la "Società Anonima Stabia per lo sviluppo climatico e termale di Castellammare"⁸¹.

Nello stesso periodo si sviluppò anche il "mito di Sorrento", la ridente cittadina descritta nel 1847 da Julia Kavanagh come "il più delizioso centro turistico e balneare del Mezzogiorno ...e ... del mondo intero". E Nietzsche nel suo soggiorno del 1876-77 faceva cenno anche ai bagni di mare. Ma ancora più interessante è la descrizione di Albert Robida del 1877 sul bagno delle donne a Meta di Sorrento, "un quadro davvero degno di Vernet!":

"Una decina di donne prendono il bagno in costumi più o meno complicati; altre si spogliano tra gli scogli; tra di loro un finanziere, le mani in tasca e il fucile a tracolla, fuma tranquillamente la sua sigaretta: né importuno, né importunato. Una bella ragazza, semicoperta, si ravviva i capelli ...e si staglia meravigliosamente sul fondo nero di una grotta scavata nella falesia. In questa grotta è accuratamente sistemata la flotta di Meta; non c'è che da attraversare il gruppo di bagnanti, fortunatamente non troppo intimidite, per andare a cercare, in fondo alla grotta, una barca ...O Sorrento! Città delle Sirene... I figli dell'Inghilterra, ...proprietari di queste ville senza pari ...fuggendo le brume della madrepatria, qui si bagnano di sole e d'azzurro"⁸².

Qui dal 1837 fu chiesta l'apertura delle "calate a mare" che si potevano raggiungere dalle ville dei duchi di Laureto, di Monforte o dagli alberghi (come Villa Sirena), che ospitavano i turisti stranieri, specie inglesi, già dediti alla pratica dei bagni di mare⁸³. Pian piano tutti i migliori alberghi, come l'Hotel Tramontano, si dotarono di discesa a mare e costruirono cabine di legno lungo la spiaggia del porto⁸⁴. Carlo Merlo, autore di una prima guida, ricordava che quasi tutti gli anni la cittadina "nella stata [era frequentata] dai forestieri" che vi si fermavano a lungo, frequentando i numerosi alberghi che avevano comode discese al mare, in particolare il

⁷⁹ ERRICO DE RENZI, *Castellammare di Stabia. Stazione climatica e stazione balneare*, Napoli 1894.

⁸⁰ CORONA, *Risorse nella città*, 200.

⁸¹ ASN, Tribunale Civile, Contratti di società, 141, 16 settembre 1906, 14-31.

⁸² BENITO IEZZI, *Viaggiatori stranieri a Sorrento: prima centuria bibliografica*, Sorrento 1989, 84 (Kavanagh), 109-110 (Nietzsche), 112 (Robida).

⁸³ ASN, Supremo Magistrato di Salute, 118/194, 10 maggio 1837.

⁸⁴ BENEDETTO PELLERANO, *Guida di Napoli e dintorni*, Napoli 1884.

Cocumella, sito nel villaggio di Sant'Agello, il più elegante⁸⁵. Ed un'altra guida, in francese ed inglese, finanziata dalle inserzioni pubblicitarie delle molte imprese commerciali sorrentine, fu pubblicata nel 1895, quando la cittadina, ormai meta di numerosi turisti nord europei, avvertiva la necessità di presentarsi come "health resort"⁸⁶. Ormai l'"esercizio degli alberghi" e l'industria del turismo si erano sviluppati al punto che proprio qui fu organizzato un "Congresso degli Albergatori"⁸⁷. E nel 1901 Matilde Serao annotava:

"La penisola sorrentina, antico asilo delle sirene leggendarie, già risuona delle giocondità dei primi villeggianti"; e fra poche settimane "nessun sito del mondo gareggerà con essa, per rianimazione, per eleganza, per vivacità della colonia internazionale che vi si recherà... Sorrento vince tutti gli altri siti di villeggiatura per clima, salubrità perfetta, per ricchezza e originalità di paesaggio, per amenità dei dintorni"⁸⁸.

Perciò si auspicava un migliore sfruttamento di Sorrento come "stazione climatica", per attirare un numero sempre maggiore di visitatori, anche se la città veniva già visitata da circa 40.000 "turisti", di cui 10.000 soggiornavano per un certo periodo in buoni alberghi, regolati da sistemi moderni, ma tale "industria" doveva essere ulteriormente incrementata, in modo da far divenire la cittadina "una sede linda e tranquilla di riposo e salute"⁸⁹.

Un luogo famoso dall'antichità per il termalismo era l'isola d'Ischia, "riscoperta" ai primi dell'800 e ricordata nella *Guida* di Giovanni Mazzinghi, dove si menzionavano i "bagni e le acque minerali de villaggi de Bagni e di Casamicciola [che] spingono gli ammalati a frequentare molto quest'isola"⁹⁰. Ma non esistevano alloggi, per cui il marchese di Linfreschi affittava un appartamento al secondo piano del suo palazzo, con vista mare, "per uso di quelle persone di riguardo che [dovevano] prendere i balneoli"⁹¹. Ai primi dell'800 il casino, ceduto dalla famiglia al re, fu inserito tra le "delizie

⁸⁵ CARLO MERLO, *Guida della città di Sorrento, del villaggio di S. Agata e dell'Isola di Capri*, Napoli 1857.

⁸⁶ SALVATORE GARGIULO, *Sorrento & ses environs. Nouveau guide*; JAMES DUNBAR-BRUNTON, *The peninsula of Sorrento as a Health resort*, Napoli 1895.

⁸⁷ MANFREDI FASULO, *La penisola sorrentina*, Napoli 1906.

⁸⁸ MATILDE SERAO, *La villeggiatura ideale*, in "La Riviera", 15 luglio 1901, n. 13, 3, ora anche in *La Penisola Sorrentina attraverso i 90 anni de "La Riviera"*, a cura di ANTONINO CUOMO, Sorrento 1991-1992; MARIA SIRAGO, *Matilde Serao e il "saper vivere... marino"*, Napoli 2010.

⁸⁹ ANGELO F. GUIDI, *Sorrento La Stazione Climatica e le sue risorse naturali*, in "Nuova Antologia", 1° agosto 1910.

⁹⁰ JOHN MAZZINGHI, *Guida alle antichità e curiosità nella Città di Napoli e nelle sue vicinanze. Compilata da' migliori autori con un'aggiunta delle ultime scoperte*, Napoli 1817, con testo a fronte in inglese, 200 ss.

⁹¹ *Giornale del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, 29 gennaio 1820.

reali" ed usato per la villeggiatura e per la pesca. Nel contempo dal 1845 il Comune costruì uno stabilimento termale per entrare nella "industria" del turismo, già sviluppata a Casamicciola, dove fin dall'epoca antica si praticava il termalismo. Dopo l'apertura del porto, nel 1854, la "Villa de Bagni", ormai conosciuta come Ischia Porto, si sviluppò enormemente mentre iniziava un servizio giornaliero di vaporette che permetteva un afflusso sempre maggiore di visitatori. Nel 1865 fu progettato dal Governo un nuovo impianto termale, realizzato nel 1881. Ed in esso si organizzavano delle grandiose feste da ballo⁹². Perciò Andrea Giuochi osservava compiaciuto: il Porto d'Ischia è diventato "oggi una interessante stazione balnearia con l'elegantissimo bagno Municipale fornito di tutto quanto occorre per la cura"⁹³. E nel 1903 anche il direttore dello "Stabilimento Balneario Municipale" pubblicò una *Guida* in cui esaminava le possibilità terapeutiche e recettive della "Grande stazione balnearia e climatica", accludendovi la pubblicità di alberghi, come il Grand Hotel Jasolino, l'Albergo Restaurant Epomeo, con sorbetteria, caffè, sala da biliardo, e di altri locali di ritrovo, ristoranti, caffè che proponevano ogni sorta di divertimento durante la stagione dei bagni termali, a cui pian piano si andava affiancando anche quella dei bagni marini⁹⁴. Era nata così un'altra "città di loisir", stazione preferita per il soggiorno estivo della borghesia napoletana ma anche meta di molti turisti stranieri, attratti dal dolce clima e dalle nuove attrezzature alla moda. Nel contempo si sviluppava anche Casamicciola dove furono costruiti numerosi alberghi, il Grand Hotel Villa Sauvè, l'Hotel Piccola Sentinella, e furono aperti il Gran Ristorante Manzi ed il Caffè Centrale. Anche Casamicciola cominciò ad assumere l'immagine caratteristica della "ville d'eau" dove coloro che venivano alle terme non erano più solo i poveri infermi, ospitati gratuitamente a spese dello Stato, ma erano i nobili e gli aristocratici che venivano a trascorrere il tempo in cure e piacevoli divertimenti. Ed anche se nel 1883 un terribile terremoto aveva distrutto i begli edifici, essi furono in breve ricostruiti insieme alle Terme Bellizzi, a spese del Comune⁹⁵, e frequentati da 20.000 persone nel 1907⁹⁶. Infine anche il Comune di Lacco da metà '800 costruì uno stabilimento balneare per le sue "Acque e le arene di Santa Restituta"⁹⁷ per incrementare l'afflusso di turi-

⁹² MICHELANGELO MENDELLA, *Sulla storia della restaurazione delle terme comunali di Ischia (1806-1906)*, in "Bollettino Flegreo", n.s. VIII, 1986, 3, 186-196.

⁹³ ANDREA GIUOCHI, *Ischia dalla sua origine fino ai nostri giorni*, Roma 1884, 13 ss.

⁹⁴ MARIO E. ABBAMONTE, *Porto d'Ischia. Grande stazione balnearia e climatica*, Napoli 1903.

⁹⁵ G. BARBIERI, *Casamicciola Terme*, Forio 1993.

⁹⁶ CORONA, *Risorse nella città*, 200.

⁹⁷ ASN, Ministero degli Interni, Inv. II, 3675/7175, "Provincia di Napoli. Comune di Lacco. Bagni termo minerali", 1844-1850.

sti, specie stranieri, che potevano alloggiare in alberghi e “decenti casini mobiliati”, già visitati da personalità illustri come il re di Baviera. Lacco ed il suo stabilimento termo-minerale Manzo continuarono ad essere frequentati per tutto l'800 da re e principesse per la sua amenità e la sua “buon'aria”. Nel 1898 furono riscoperte le terme “Regina Isabella”, con resti degli antichi stabilimenti di epoca romana, per cui si ebbe un ulteriore afflusso di visitatori, che utilizzavano sia i benefici effetti del termalismo che le sabbie con le “arene” termominerali. Ed un'affluenza maggiore si ebbe quando cominciarono a sorgere anche gli stabilimenti balneari marini⁹⁸. Perciò ai primi del '900 fu costituita una “Società per l'incremento dell'isola d'Ischia”, entrata ormai a pieno diritto nel circuito turistico internazionale⁹⁹.

Anche l'isola di Capri, fino ai primi dell'800 conosciuta solo da pochi avventurosi viaggiatori desiderosi di vedere le sue “antichità”, dal 1826, dopo la scoperta della Grotta Azzurra, diventò meta di piacevoli soggiorni. Molti stranieri cominciarono a visitarla, attratti dal mito romantico; e per loro il notaio Giuseppe Pagano trasformò una parte della propria casa in locanda, la prima aperta sull'isola¹⁰⁰. Nel contempo diventò meta di “passeggiate” sui battelli a vapore su cui erano organizzate gite domenicali che prevedevano una sosta di due ore per ammirarne la bellezza paesaggistica. E nel 1838 Francesco Alvino pubblicò una prima “guida”, dando anche notizie sui prezzi e sulle modalità per la visita alla “Grotta Azzurra”, un'attrattiva divenuta già famosa¹⁰¹. Ormai l'isola era entrata a far parte dell'immaginario collettivo, tanto che verso il 1840 si contavano circa 400 visitatori annui, di cui due terzi stranieri, specie tedeschi ed inglesi, e molti pittori. E nella seconda metà dell'800 si contavano quattro alberghi, di cui il Quisisana, il primo grande albergo di lusso, che offriva un soggiorno di ottima qualità ed era consigliato dalla guida Murray¹⁰². Qui, come a Sorrento, nel 1857 si chiese di aprire le “discese a mare” per ottemperare alle richieste degli stranieri, che desideravano bagnarsi nelle sue acque cristalline, come aveva già fatto abusivamente nel 1846 Salvatore Pedagna, per dotare la sua locanda di una tale “comodità”¹⁰³. Pian piano l'isola divenne la residenza preferita di pittori e artisti stranieri che vi soggiornavano a lungo, tanto che Thomas Cook organizzava soggiorni nella sua filiale napoletana¹⁰⁴. Nel contempo

⁹⁸ *Ischia d'altri tempi*, a cura di ILIA DELIZIA, Napoli 1990, 143-144.

⁹⁹ ASN, Tribunale Civile, Contratti di Società, 149, 1906, 130 ss. Il contratto manca (nella nota del 4 ottobre 1950 si riferisce che i documenti sono stati trasferiti a Roma, ma non si dà indicazione del luogo del trasferimento).

¹⁰⁰ EWA KAWAMURA, *Alberghi storici di Capri*, Capri 2005, 31-83.

¹⁰¹ FRANCESCO ALVINO, *Due giorni a Capri*, Napoli 1838.

¹⁰² KAWAMURA, *Alberghi*, 105 ss.

¹⁰³ ASN, Supremo Magistrato di salute, 118, 12 giugno 1857.

¹⁰⁴ MARIA SIRAGO, *La 'scoperta del mare': il mito di Capri dal Grand Tour al turismo di massa*, in “Rassegna Storica Salernitana”, XXI, giugno 2004, 49-66.

dalla seconda metà dell'800 Capri veniva consigliata come stazione climatica per la cura della tubercolosi. Perciò il medico inglese George Sidney Clark fondò un piccolo sanatorio chiamato "Villa Quisisana" (trasformata in albergo dopo la sua morte, nel 1868), dove lavorava il medico Vincenzo Cuomo, ufficiale sanitario del Comune di Anacapri, che nel 1894 pubblicò uno studio in cui riproponeva di stabilire una stazione climatica nell'isola¹⁰⁵. Capri venne così consacrata come centro del desiderio, come sogno turistico internazionale, ma anche come luogo terapeutico, dove l'aria balsamica e gli splendidi scorci del golfo napoletano alleviavano le sofferenze. E da ultimo cominciò a diventare meta del viaggio borghese e del "turismo di massa" che si andava sviluppando dai primi del '900.

Una giornata al mare, Napoli 1897. In *Storia Fotografica di Napoli 1892-1921. La città prima e dopo il "Risanamento"*, Napoli 2005, 62



Bagno Partenope, Napoli 1925. In *Storia Fotografica di Napoli 1921-1929. La città fra opposizione e fascismo*, Napoli 1998, 84

Bagno Donn'Anna a Posillipo, Napoli 1905. In *Storia Fotografica di Napoli 1892-1921. La città prima e dopo il "Risanamento"*, Napoli 2005, 135

¹⁰⁵ VINCENZO CUOMO, *L'isola di Capri come stazione climatica con una carta geografico-geologica dell'isola*, Napoli 1894.

SEA, CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY

Ruthy Gertwagen

The emergence of the cult of the Madonna as the Patron Saint of Sailors and of Ports

Introduction

The veneration of the Virgin in the Mediterranean in association with matters to do with the sea has been widespread since the early modern period. The churches and the feasts dedicated to her and the naming of vessels after her by people who make their living from the sea or who live in close proximity to it are very evident demonstrations of this devotion. This paper, which sets out the preliminary findings of a work-in-progress, will look at the origin and evolution of this phenomenon up to the sixteenth century, map its distribution in the Mediterranean, and seek to establish the extent to which the emergence of this phenomenon was intentional¹.

The various facets of Saint Mary as Virgin, Queen, Bride, Mother, and Intercessor have been the subject of a number of studies². There is, however, an aspect which may have not received the attention which it deserves, namely, the Blessed Virgin as patron saint of seafarers and seafaring communities, although this aspect of the Blessed Virgin, with its origins probably in the Hellenistic *Isis Pelagia* and other preceding Sea Goddesses, had been venerated in the Mediterranean since at least the late Middle Ages and has since become widespread.

Through the ages, Christian seafarers have had recourse to a number of saints in search of protection against the many perils of the sea. Some were intercessors whom seafarers shared with other, non-seafaring, members of the community, as was the case on the island of Malta where votive offerings from seamen constitute only part of the rich collections that can be found adorning churches dedicated to, amongst others, Our Lady of Victories, Our Lady of Light, Our Lady of Mercy, and Our Lady of Gra-

¹ I wish to thank Dr. CARMEL VASSALLO for his considerable assistance.

² Refer ANNE WINSTON-ALLEN, *Stories of the Rose: The making of the rosary in the Middle Ages* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) for relevant bibliography.

ces³. Other patron saint have been specifically identified with matters maritime across time and space. Saint Peter, for example, has often been associated with fishermen, while Saint Elmo has been associated with seafarers. Saint Nicholas, on the other hand, has been identified with both fishermen and seafarers. In overall terms, it is nevertheless, probable that in the epoch under consideration the Blessed Virgin was as important as any of the aforementioned saints as a patron of those whose livelihood was dependent on the sea or who lived in close proximity to it⁴.

In the Aegean, for example, many of the vessels sailing between the islands bear the name *Panaghià Thalassini* as a form of protection against the hazards of the sea. In the same area, fishermen revere the Madonna of the Fishermen, *Panaghià Psarionì*.

In Chioggia, Venice's southernmost fishing community in the Adriatic, the *Beata Vergine della Navicella* is venerated primarily as the patron saint of fishermen and has her feast in June. The role of the Virgin as a protector of vessels and seamen there is clearly illustrated by the rich nineteenth-century ex-voto evidence⁵.

In Ringo, a location outside the ancient walls of Messina along the north-east coast of the island of Sicily, there is a church dedicated to Jesus and *Maria del Buon Viaggio*, which is also known as the 'Church of the Seamen'. In the twentieth century it was still frequented by local sailors before sailing from Messina. A seventeenth-century interpretation of the late sixteenth-century icon of the Madonna holding the infant Jesus in her left arm, with a strong gesture of her other hand and with angels in attendance, attributes to the Virgin the power to becalm the waters of the Straits and of the anchorage of Messina, and the promise of a safe journey. This icon, painted on canvas, can still be seen on the eighteenth-century altar in the church. On their return, seamen visited the church of the *Madonna di Portosalvo*, half a kilometre away from the previously mentioned church, before tying up in Messina, to thank the Virgin for granting them the grace of successfully completing their voyage. The statue of the famous patron of Messina, known as *La Madonna della Lettera* was placed at the entrance of the present port in 1934⁶.

³ Refer A.H.J. PRINS, *In Peril of the Sea*, (Malta 1989) and JOSEPH MUSCAT, *Il-Kwadri Marittimi Maltin*, (Malta, 2003).

⁴ ANTONI SELLA and ENRIC GARCIA, *Creences de la Mar*, (Barcelona 2003), 33–36.

⁵ U. MARCATO, *Il bragozzo, nella marinaria tipica dell'alto adriatico e nell'arte religiosa degli ex-voto* (tolèle), catalogo di mostra (Chioggia 1979).

⁶ I would like to thank Prof. MARIA TERESA DI PAOLA of Messina University for this information and the relevant bibliography: GIOVANNI MOLONIA, 'La Chiesa di Gesù e Maria del Buon viaggio' in MOLONIA, *La Chiesa di Gesù e Maria del Buon viaggio al Ringo* (Messina 2000), 51 n. 18; F. CHILLEMI, *I borghi di Messina. Strutture urbane e patrimonio arti-*

In Spain, at the western end of the Mediterranean, the devotion to *Nuestra Señora del Carmen*, is a long-established one among fishermen. Its association with the Navy, on the other hand, only dates to the Civil War (1936-1939) and displaced previous devotions to Saint Peter, Saint Elmo, and others that had been common in the past⁷.

The veneration of the Virgin Mary as a patron of those associated with the sea has even been 'exported' from the Mediterranean to the Americas. As we shall see further on, Spanish seafarers and explorers took her with them in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries while Boston's historic North End has, since 1911, been the venue for a Fishermen's Feast held in August that is based on the tradition of devotion to the *Madonna del Soccorso* (Our Lady of Succour) of the fishermen of Sciacca, Sicily, which originated in the sixteenth century⁸.

The aim of this essay is to set out a preliminary assessment of the evolution of the cult of the Virgin as a patron of seafarers since its apparent inception in the sixteenth century, and its spatial distribution.

stico (Messina 1994), 102-105; P. SAMPERI, *Iconologia della gloriosa Vergine madre di Dio protettrice di Messina* (Messina 1644), reprint with introductions of G. LIPARI, E. PISPISA E G. MOLONIA (Messina 1990) 583-584.

⁷ I would like to thank ENRIC GARCIA DOMINGO, Head of the Maritime Documentation Centre at the Maritime Museum of Barcelona for this information.

⁸ STEPHAN, CLAESSEON *et al.*, 'Fishing Heritage Festivals, Tourism and Community Development in the Gulf of Maine', in JOHN G. PEDEN, *et al.*, *Proceedings of the 2005 Northeastern Recreation Research Symposium*, 2005 April 10-12 (New York 2005), 423-424. It should, however, be stressed that the Madonna had originally been venerated in Sciacca since at least the fourteenth century as a result of miracles involving the curing of people suffering from various ailments or freeing them from possession by the devil. Indeed, the Madonna del Soccorso is the patron saint of the town. None of the miracles were connected to the sea or to fishing folk. Realizing how lucky they were to be in the good graces of the Mother of God, the people of Sciacca decided to show their gratitude and devotion to her by commissioning a statue to be built in her honour. In 1492, two local artists went to Palermo and sculpted the statue out of solid marble. Upon completion of the statue in 1503, the people of Sciacca were confronted with the daunting task of transporting the very heavy statue from Palermo to Sciacca. The fishermen of Sciacca therefore decided to send their fleet of fishing boats to Palermo and to bring the statue to Sciacca. Over two hundred fishermen were needed to carry it to the docks to be loaded on the largest fishing boat available. With such a heavy weight on board, the fishing boat was barely able to stay afloat let alone move along the seas under its own power. Using their fishing nets and drop lines the fishermen secured their other boats to the vessel carrying the statue and tug boat fashion carefully escorted the statue of the Madonna out of Palermo, across the seas and back home to Sciacca. Upon entry into the harbour of Sciacca, the fishermen were given a tumultuous welcome. In recognition of their feat and as a sign of gratitude, the town of Sciacca gave the fishermen in perpetuity the exclusive right to carry the statue of the Madonna. When the fishermen migrated to America in the early 1900s, they took their traditions with them to Boston <<http://www.fishermansfeast.com/What%20is%20the%20FF.html>>

From West to East: The Spread of the Cult

a) *Barcelona*

The earliest formal evidence of a veneration of the Virgin in a maritime context that we have encountered is in Catalonia. In Barcelona, the capital of the Crown of Aragon, a church dedicated to the Virgin and named *Santa Maria del Mar*, was built in what is at present the trendy Gothic quarter of the city. Until the end of the early modern period this area was adjacent to the sea and outside the city walls, so it is possible that the name was not unrelated to its physical location. The present church is from the late fourteenth century, although the first mention of a church there is to be found in documentation dating back to the year 998, when it was known as *Santa Maria de las Arenas*, or St. Mary of the Sands. The first reference to *Santa Maria del Mar* is in 1102. In 1106 it appears as part of the diocese of Barcelona.

From the second century BCE until the eleventh century CE, Barcelona's port facilities had been located in the area between Montjuïc and the mouth of the Llobregat River, south-west of the city, but as a consequence of silting they were relocated in the area around the Church of *Santa Maria de Mar* from the middle of the eleventh century onwards. As this area grew it became known as the *villa nova maris*, an *urbus* inhabited by noble families as well as by merchants, ship-owners, sea-related workers and others. During the twelfth but, especially, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the area grew in line with the city's commerce. This evolution prompted the cathedral chapter of Barcelona to replace the south-east facing tenth-century Romanesque church with the present south-west facing Gothic basilica. Started in 1329, it was finally consecrated in 1384. The money for the construction came from the wealth accrued from overseas ventures by the rich merchants living in the district and from the craftsmen and workers belonging to specific guilds, especially seamen and the huge numbers of haulers and porters who worked in the port⁹. The two bronze figures of porters bearing their loads depicted on the large oak doors of the church attest to the contribution of this sector of the population to the building of the church. There are several other such references to be found inside the church in the form of stone reliefs and it is, therefore, possible that the qualifier 'del Mar', which had in the first instance probably been a reference to a spatial location, eventually came to acquire a more 'actively' maritime role with the Virgin chosen as a patron

⁹ S. ORVIETANI-BUSCH, *Medieval Mediterranean Ports: The Catalan and Tuscan Coasts, 1100 to 1235* (Leiden-Boston-Köln 2001), 43, 45-46 and 45, n. 67; 122-123; 137-138; 141-142 and 141, n. 98.

saint by those involved in various maritime activities. It is interesting to note that this happened some forty to a hundred years after the compilation of the *Cantigas de Santa Maria*, in which the Virgin intercedes on behalf of both merchant and naval galleys¹⁰.

b) *Palermo*

In the first half of the twelfth century, George of Antioch, chief minister to Roger II, the Norman king of Sicily, initiated the building of a church in Palermo, the capital of the island since the Middle Ages. After its completion in 1143, George of Antioch dedicated the church to the Virgin as an expression of his gratitude for the protection and support she had given him in peace and war throughout his long and eventful career. The church is known by two names: *S. Maria dell' Ammiraglio* and *La Martorana*¹¹. The first name had to do with one of George of Antioch's official roles, namely that of raising funds for military campaigns, but he also took an active part in warfare, including naval expeditions. In 1132–1133 he was given the title of Emir of Emirs, or Grand Commander, of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Norman Kingdom¹². However, the name of the church, St. Mary of the Admiral, was not popular in the late twelfth century, and in December 1184, when the traveller Ibn Jubair visited Palermo and the church on his way back to Andalusia from the Levant, he referred to the church as 'the one of the man of Antioch'. It is interesting that when referring to George of Antioch, Ibn Jubair ignored his title of 'emir', and only indicated that 'he was the minister of the great-father (Roger II) of the present king (William I)'¹³.

The first references we have encountered to the church built by George of Antioch are in documents from the late thirteenth century (1295) and

¹⁰ In the late thirteenth century King Alfonso X of Castile, 'the Wise', initiated the compiling of the *Cantigas de Santa Maria*, comprising 420 narrative and lyric poems, in praise of the Virgin Mary, almost all accompanied by music. Among other miracles attributed to the Virgin, Chant no. 36 deals with miracles made by her at sea, saving merchants as well as war galleys under the command of the admiral (*The Songs of Holy Mary by Alfonso X, the Wise: A Translation of the Cantigas de Santa Maria*. Translated by KATHLEEN KULP-HILL. Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Tempe 2000).

¹¹ E. KITZINGER, *The Mosaics of St. Mary's of the Admiral in Palermo* (Washington 1990), 21. In fact, the church lost its original function after the Sicilian Vespers in summer 1282.

¹² When at sea his title was 'emir el bahr', or commander of the sea, which gradually evolved and became *admirato* in Latin, *ammiraglio* in Italian, or 'admiral' in English. Nevertheless, the title *admirato* relating directly, but not exclusively, to naval commander became prevalent only after 1177. LAWRENCE V. MOTT, *Sea Power in the Medieval Mediterranean, The Catalan-Aragonese Fleet in the War of Sicilian Vespers* (Florida 2003), 81–84, 87–95.

¹³ IBN JUBAIR, *Voyages*, M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes (trans.) (Paris 1949), vol. VI, 390–391.

the first half of the fourteenth century (1305 and 1330) which refer to it as 'S. Maria de Admirato'¹⁴. In this period it served as a meeting place for the Assembly which offered the realm to King Peter of Aragon. This particular use to which the church had been put is mentioned in the anonymous *Chronicon Siculum ab anno 1320 usque ad MCCCXXVIII*, which also referred to the church as 'S. Maria de Admirato'. The other documents referred to previously indicate that the Royal Curia of the city of Palermo held court proceedings in the atrium and that notaries had their offices there¹⁵.

Santa Maria dell' Ammiraglio, in Palermo, has also been commonly referred to as La Martorana. This, however, dates only from the fifteenth century. The name is derived from Goffridus Marturana, an official of the Royal Curia who in 1193–1194, together with his wife, established a Benedictine nunnery right next door also called *Santa Maria del Admirato*, which was also dedicated to the Virgin but which was called *S. Maria Nova* to distinguish it from the previously-mentioned one. In 1433–1434, the church of St. Mary of the Admiral was ceded to the convent of *S. Maria de Marturana* by Alfonso, the Aragonese King of Sicily. In this way the Greek orthodox rite of the original *S. Maria del Admirato* was replaced by the Latin rite¹⁶. Up to the fifteenth century, however, the church retained its previous name which is also the one that is used at present, namely, *Santa Maria del' Ammiraglio*.

In the late fifteenth century another church dedicated to the Virgin as a patron of seafarers and seafaring communities was constructed at the eastern end of the port of Palermo. This church, dedicated to *S. Maria della Catena*, has a clear Catalan-Gothic influence. It was named after the chain that closed the entrance to the port during the night or in times of war. It was hoped that the Virgin and her church would add to the protection given by the chain.

c) Catania

Further information concerning the cult of the Virgin as a patron of seafarers also comes from Sicily. Ludolf of Suchem, who went through the Sicilian Channel in 1350 on his way to the Holy Land from the Western Mediterranean, informed his readers that in the city of Catania, on the eastern coast of Sicily, there was a Dominican church of Saint Mary in which there was an icon of the Virgin which had been made by the friars and which was revered by both the people of the town and by passing mariners. He further claimed that, '...no ship passes within a certain distance thereof wi-

¹⁴ KITZINGER, *The Mosaics*, 22.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 22 and n. 49 and 50.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 21–23.

thout greeting and visiting this picture, and they tell one and firmly believe that if any ship were to pass by without greeting or visiting the picture, it would not reach home without meeting with a storm¹⁷.

Catania lies on the sea route leading from the western Mediterranean to the East via the Straits of Messina and the Ionian. Leaving the Messina Channel, vessels headed South West along the eastern Sicilian coast, as did Richard the Lionheart's fleet on its way to the Holy Land in 1190. The vessels subsequently headed North West towards Calabria. Richard's fleet spent the night anchored between Calabria and Mount Etna but the wind – probably a north-easterly from the Straits of Otranto – then changed to the opposite direction and hit the fleet near Cape Spartivento, dispersing it¹⁸.

It should be pointed out that Richard the Lionheart visited Catania and the church of St. Agatha, the patron of the city, on the eve on his departure from Sicily to the Holy Land in 1190, but he did not mention the church of St. Mary, probably because it was still to be built¹⁹. The year 1190 should be, therefore, regarded as the earliest possible date for the existence of the church. By the late thirteenth century or the opening years of the fourteenth century the Virgin in Catania took on the association with the sea.

d) Cagliari

After their conquest of Sardinia in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the Catalans built their houses, a church and a monastery run by the Mercedarian Order, on a hill in Cagliari which they called Bonayre, because it was healthier than the lower-lying areas in the vicinity²⁰. In 1370, a Catalan merchant ship found itself in difficulties as a consequence of a storm and the crew were obliged to jettison the cargo. All the goods sank except for a box which when thrown overboard remained afloat and becalmed the sea and following it the ship arrived at Bonaria. Monks belonging to the Mercedarian Order took the box to their

¹⁷ 'Ludolph of Suchem, Description of the holy Land and of the way thither. Written in the year A.D. 1350', trans. A. STEWART in *Palestine Pilgrimage Text Society*, vol. 12.C (London 1895), P. 23 & 14.

¹⁸ RUTH GERTWAGEN, 'Harbours and Facilities along the eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to *Outremer*', in JOHN PRYOR, *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades* (Ashgate 2006), 104 and n. 39.

¹⁹ 'Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene', W. Stubbs (ed.), in *Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi Scriptores*, 51 (London 1964), III, (rep.), 93.

²⁰ In the thirteenth century, the Mercedarian Order was variously designated as the Order of Captives, reflecting its original purpose as an institution to ransom captives, the Brothers of Ransom (or Mercy), the Order of Santa Eulàlia, and the Order of Santa Maria of Ransom (or Mercy).

church and opened it on the 25 March, the feast day of the Annunciation, and within they found a statue of the Virgin and Child which they placed in a chapel to one side of the main altar. The next morning they found that the statue had miraculously moved to the main altar. They took it back to the side chapel but the next morning they again found that it had shifted back to the main altar where, after a number of other attempts to put it back in the side chapel had failed, it finally remained. In recognition of these portents, the church, which had been dedicated to the Holy Trinity, was rededicated to the Virgin of Bonayre and soon became the Protector and Patron of seafarers. Via the monks of the Mercedarian Order and Spanish seafarers the devotion eventually spread to Spain itself during the course of the fifteenth century. In Seville there was a chapel belonging to the Seafarers Guild at Triana, on the banks of the river Guadalquivir, dedicated to Nuestra Señora del Buen Aire and ships setting out to explore the Americas were reputed to carry with them an image of Nuestra Señora del Buen Aire. In 1536, Don Pedro de Mendoza founded a city with that name in the estuary of the River Plate and several places of worship were eventually established there dedicated to the protection of seafarers²¹. The city subsequently became known as Buenos Aires.

e) Corfu

As we proceed further East, information concerning the establishment of the cult of the Virgin as a patron of seafarers and seafaring communities becomes dependent on the reports of travellers as formal evidence of the establishment of a church or its dedication to Saint Mary is often not available. The earliest information we have refers to a church dedicated to Our Lady of Cassiopi, recorded at the Bay of Cassiopi in north-eastern Corfu, in the Ionian. It was devoted to a Virgin which was considered by sailors as their patron and they frequented it whenever possible²². It is not clear when the church was built but in 1395 Le Seigneur d'Anglure claimed that he found a lamp full of oil in the church. The author of *La Sainte Cytè de Hierusalem* stated in 1480 that a fire burned constantly in the lamp without the need for oil to be added²³. Both travellers were presu-

²¹ ANGELO MONTONATI, 'La Madonna di Bonaria; Da Cagliari all'Argentina' *Attualità* (August, 2006), 66-69. I would like to thank Professor Sergio Di Giacomo, of the University of Messina, for this information.

²² *Fratris Felicis Fabri Evagatorium in Terrae Sanctae, Arabiae et Egypti peregrinationem*, C.D. HASSLER (ed.), (Stuttgart 1843), vol., III, 352; *Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia* (BNMV) Cristoforis Buondelmonti, *Isolario*, Ital. Class. VI. Cod. XIX, (=6087), secolo XVI, f. 2r; W. MILLER, *The Latins in the Levant* (New York 1908), 545 and n.2.

²³ *Le Saint Voyage de Jhérusalem du Seigneur d'Anglure*, F. BONNARDOT et Q. LONGNON

mably referring to a light house or some other signalling device used to warn mariners and ships of the presence of dangerous reefs in the vicinity and directing the vessels to a safe anchorage at the eastern end of the bay.

In 1418, Le Seigneur de Caumont said that the Virgin with Christ twice saved the Catalan nef on which he was sailing from a shipwreck, after its master and mariners had made vows: the first time was in Zonchio (Navarino), along the western coast of the Peloponnese, and the other was in the Gulf of Messina. In Navarino, the master's vow, that he subsequently fulfilled, was that he would donate the profits from the sale of the merchandise there to the building of a church by the sea dedicated to *Sainte Marie de Pitié*²⁴.

f) *Cape Saint Mary, Turkey*

The next mention of the Virgin being associated with the sea refers to a toponym rather than an actual place of worship. On his way to Samarkand in 1403, Spanish ambassador Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo reported the existence of a 'Cape of St. Mary' in Ottoman territory between Lesbos and the island of Tenedos in the north-eastern Aegean, at the very spot where the vessel he was on, on his way to the Dardanelles, met a storm²⁵. This cape, known currently as Baba Burun in Turkish, is dotted with shoals and reefs and is, therefore, a hazardous crossing during the prevailing north-easterlies²⁶. Naming it after the Virgin must have been a way of protecting against the risk of distress while crossing the Cape or as an expression of gratitude after someone had been saved from shipwreck, although the actual origin of the toponym is not known.

g) *The Black Sea*

The aforementioned ambassador, namely Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, also declared that the vessel on which he was sailing in the south-western part of the Black Sea was saved from shipwreck by Christ and the Virgin²⁷.

(eds) (Paris 1878), 7; *Le voyage de la Sainte Cyté de Hierusalem avec la description des lieux, portz, vilees, citez et aultres passaiges fait l'an 1480*, publié par CH. SCHEFER, (Amsterdam 1970), 44.

²⁴ *Narrative of the Embassy of Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo to the Court of Timour at Samarcand A.D. 1403-06*, CLEMENTS R. MARKHAM (trans. and ed.) (New York 1970), 22, 25.

²⁵ Great Britain, Admiralty, Hydrographic Office, *Mediterranean Pilot* (London 1941), vol. IV, (seventh edition), 279, 381-382.

²⁶ *Narrative of the Embassy of Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo*, 52.

²⁷ *Voyage d'outremer en Jerusalem par le seigneur de Caumont l'n MCCCCXVIII*, Marquis de la Grange (ed.), (Paris 1858), 89, 96-96.

h) Rhodes

There is also mention of the Virgin as a saviour from the perils of the sea in *La Sainte Cyté de Hierusalem* in 1480. The author reports that on his way back from the Holy Land he joined a pilgrimage to a church dedicated to *Nostre Dame de Philarme*, the Virgin of Philaremos (Filermo), on the Turkish coast between Cyprus and Rhodes, five miles away from Rhodes. She performed miracles on both land and sea. The author and his companions needed her intercession, because they had been sailing for four days and nights with contrary winds or calms, and were in some difficulty because their provisions had become considerably depleted and their water had gone bad²⁸. It should be noted that in 1395 *Le Seigneur d'Anglure* referred to the same icon but omitted to mention the attribution to it of miracles at sea, so its association with the sea must have been a subsequent development. He said that the church was on a high mountain and only performed miracles for the whole population of the Island of Rhodes²⁹.

i) Apulia

In his late fifteenth-century *Itinerary to the Holy Land*, Anselme Adorno reported that on the coastline of Molfetta, in Apulia, there was a church dedicated to the Madonna called *Notre-Dame des Martyres*, after several martyrs buried there³⁰. The church contained an icon of the Virgin that according to local tradition had been brought there from Constantinople in 1188. The icon was credited with many miracles at sea, although it is not clear whether these had happened before or after its arrival in Italy, or both. A priest from Barletta, another town on the coast of Apulia, told Anselme that he had personally experienced one of the miracles attributed to the icon. The tempest that had hit the ship on which he was sailing broke its mast, rudder and other gear. The master of the ship made a vow to the Virgin promising half of the ship if it was saved. The Virgin appeared on the prow in front of a Jew with leprosy and promised to cure him and save the ship if he would accept to be baptized. Immediately after this had happened, she led the ship to safety into the channel of Corfu. Due to such miracles, many pilgrims visited the church of *Notre-Dame des Martyres* in Molfetta³¹. The only other information we have about the church is

²⁸ *Le voyage de La Sainte Cyté de Hierusalem*, 110-111.

²⁹ *Le Saint Voyage de Jhérusalem du Seigneur d'Anglure*, 91-93.

³⁰ It was a characteristic of the early Christians to establish places of worship in the places where martyrs were known to repose. Refer PETER ROBERT LAMONT BROWN, *The cult of the saints: its rise and function in Latin Christianity*, Chicago, 1982.

³¹ *Itinéraire d'Anselme Adorno en Terre Sainte 1470*, J. HEERS and G. DE GROER (eds.) (Paris 1978) 391.

that it was constructed by William II, the Norman king of Sicily and Southern Italy, in 1162.

j) Dalmatia

In 1494, a pilgrim named Casola reported that on the island of Lesina, off the coast of Dalmatia, there was a Franciscan monastery with a church dedicated to *S. Maria delle Grazie*, both built by Don Giovanni Soranzo in gratitude for a great miracle brought about by the intercession of the Virgin. One night he had found himself at sea in a great storm and the ship's rudder had broken. He commended himself to the Virgin and found himself safe on the island. 'That was the origin of the building, which was extended and maintained along with the friary by the offerings of sailors'³².

Was the Diffusion of the Cult of the Virgin as a Patron Saint of Seafarers and Seafaring Communities Circumstantial or Premeditated?

The data we have in hand at the moment would seem to suggest that diffusion of the cult was partly circumstantial and partly premeditated. From the thirteenth century onwards, the Catalano-Aragonese Crown conquered a number of islands in the Western Mediterranean that would constitute a chain of veritable stepping stones to Sicily and beyond. Subsequently, during the latter half of the thirteenth century, the Catalans even penetrated into the eastern Mediterranean in a variety of ways. There were acquisitions by way of matrimony, as happened with Cyprus in the fourteenth century, but there was also conquest. In the early fourteenth century, a group of Catalan mercenaries conquered the Latin-ruled Duchy of Athens after falling out with their employer. Catalan was made the official language in both it and other territories which were subsequently added³³. It is probable that this expansion must have favoured the implantation of the cult.

Another factor that may have helped extend the cult to the Virgin was trade. In the late thirteenth century the naming of vessels after the Virgin was a common phenomenon in the Western Mediterranean. However, it should be noted in this context that the naming of ships after other saints preceded the use of the name of the Virgin for this purpose. Ships had been given the names of other saints since the second decade of the thirteenth century in Pisa, Genoa and Venice³⁴.

³² M.M. NEWETT, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, (Manchester 1907), 330.

³³ MARIA TERESA FERRER MALLOL, 'The Mediterranean from the 13th to the 15th Centuries: The Catalan Expansion', in E. GUEDEA *Mediterraneum Splendour of the Medieval Mediterranean. 13th-15th Centuries*, (Barcelona 2004), 143-160.

³⁴ G.P. BALBI, *Una città e il suo mare. Genova nel Medioevo*, (Bologna 1971), 79-83; L. BAL-

Conclusions

The material we have at present points towards the possibility that the cult of the Virgin as the patron of seafarers and seafaring communities may have started at the far end of the Western Mediterranean in Catalano-Aragonese Spain in the late thirteenth century. What is unquestionable is the fact that by the fifteenth century the Virgin was venerated as a patron by mariners and their communities in both basins of the Mediterranean.

Veneration which started off as a personal or local matter, whereby merchants, seafarers, and seafaring communities demonstrated their devotion or gratitude by either constructing new places of worship in honour of the Blessed Virgin, or re-dedicating existing churches to her, would acquire renown beyond the original locality and attract visits by outsiders.

Establishing how this veneration of the Virgin actually spread to other parts of the Mediterranean and beyond is more problematic. We have suggested that the political expansion of the Crown of Aragon may have had much to do with the spread of the cult beyond Barcelona, the probable epicentre, although trade and navigation may also have had an important role. Catania in Sicily and Cassiopi in Corfu were two essential ports of call connecting both basins of the Mediterranean. In fact, Corfu was also a focal point of two other coastal routes to the Eastern Mediterranean. A second originated in Brindisi or Otranto in Apulia while a third route went down the east coast of the Adriatic and along the Dalmatian coast and its islands. Does the fact that the Bay of Cassiopi was frequented by sailors from all over the Mediterranean mean that it may have acted as a sort of cultural clearing house where onward transmission could have taken place? There is no doubt that considerably more work will have to be done in order to establish whether what we see before us is indeed a process of cultural diffusion or whether these various phenomenon developed independently of one another.

Eric Dursteler

Muslim renegade women. Conversion and agency in the early modern Mediterranean

In late March 1637, the galleasses of the Venetian Mediterranean fleet docked in the port of the small Ottoman island of Milos. Captained by Pietro Mocenigo, the fleet was charged with keeping the sea lanes of the Adriatic and beyond safe for Venetian and Ottoman shipping, a weighty task given the threats that seemed to lurk in every inlet. The arrival of ships from all corners of the Mediterranean was a regular occurrence in the protected port of the island which, because of its propitious location as the western gateway to the Cyclades, had been since antiquity a regular port of call for travellers, merchants, pilgrims and corsairs¹. During the early modern era, the island was less a destination than a convenient place to replenish supplies on the way to somewhere else, usually nearby Crete, Cyprus, Constantinople, or some other important Levantine port.

Before the demographic decline of the later seventeenth century, Milos was peppered with 'villae multae ... & unum castrum', and it enjoyed a certain ecclesiastical importance in the region because of its status as the seat of a bishop, and because of the two Orthodox monasteries located in the mountains on the southern side of the island. Milos' economy was primarily agricultural, with cotton and grapes among its major products. The island was famed among both Muslim and Christian writers for its fine millstones, quarried from the characteristic white rock of the island; it was also noted for its sulphurous hot baths².

¹ ELISABETTA BORROMEO, 'Les Cyclades à l'époque ottomane. L'insularité vue par les missionnaires jésuites', in *Insularités ottomanes*, eds. NICOLAS VATIN and GILLES VEINSTEIN (Paris, Maisonneuve and Larose, 2004), 128.

² *Turcograeciae Libri octo a Martino Crusio, in Academia Tybingensi Graeco & Latino Professore, utraque lingua edita. Quibus Graecorum status sub imperio Turcico, in Politia & Ecclesia, Oeconomia & Scholis, iam inde ab amissa Constantinopoli, ad haec usque tempora, luculenter describitur* (Basel, Leonhard Ostein für Verlag Sebastian Henricpetris, 1584), 207; ROBERT DANKOFF and ROBERT LESLIE, *Evlia Celebi in Albania and Adjacent Regions (Kosovo, Montenegro, Ohrid)* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 143; WILLIAM LITHGOW, *The Totall Discourse of The*

Politically, the early modern era represented a time of transition for Milos. From the late fourteenth century the island had been ruled by the Crispo family, but in the last decades of their rule it became effectively a tributary of the Ottoman sultans, and following the death of the last Crispo in 1566, the island passed under more or less direct Ottoman rule³. The Cyclades and the other islands of the Aegean belonged to the Ottoman *eyelet* of Djazair-i Bar-i Safid (which was part of the lands of the Ottoman *kapudanpaşa*), and were part of the Sancak of Naxos⁴. Being under Ottoman rule played out differently from island to island in the Aegean. The larger islands – Rhodes, Chios, and Crete – were incorporated quite directly into the political and religious structures of the empire: inhabitants were forcibly resettled, Muslim immigrants moved to the islands, mosques were constructed and kadis and other Ottoman officials established. This model was generally applied, however, only on the largest islands, or those closest to the mainland. In the Cyclades, in contrast, the Porte made no attempt to Islamicize the population, and indeed it intervened to prevent colonization and complete integration into Ottoman administrative structures⁵. The islands enjoyed significant autonomy from oversight and interference by the central power, which often only manifested itself ‘during the annual levy of the harac’. There were few Ottoman officials in the region: Milos was governed by an Ottoman bey responsible for the political and military administration of the island, and a kadi responsible for all legal matters⁶. Jesuits who passed through the Cyclades reported that only Santorin, Sifnos, Andros and Milos had a permanent kadi, and in reality there were probably only one or two actual kadis who simply travelled between the small islands⁷.

Rare Adventures and Painfull Peregrinations ... to the most famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia and Affrica (Glasgow, James MacLehose and Sons, 1906), 84; ERMANNIO ARMAO, *In giro per il Mar Egeo con Vincenzo Coronelli: Note di topologia, toponomastica e storia medievale, dinastie e famiglie italiane in Levante* (Florence, Olschki, 1951), 259-261; CECIL ROTH, *The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos* (Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 5708-1948), 81.

³ CHARLES FRAZEE, *The Island Princes of Greece: The Dukes of the Archipelago* (Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 1988), 11-42, 63, 87-89.

⁴ ‘Djaza’ir-i bahr-i safid’, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, New Edition, ed. BERNARD LEWIS, et alii (Leiden: Brill, 1979-), 2:521.

⁵ NICOLAS VATIN, ‘Îles grecques ? Îles ottomanes ? L’insertion des îles de l’Égee dans l’Empire ottoman à la fin du XVI^e siècle’, in *Insularités ottomanes*, eds. VATIN and VEINSTEIN, 72-73; B.J. SLOT, *Archipelagus Turbatus: les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane c. 1500-1718* (Istanbul, Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1982), 91-92.

⁶ SLOT, *Archipelagus turbatus*, 1:14, 24-25, 100-101, 286-287; BER. RANDOLPH, *The Present State of the Islands in the Archipelago, or Arches, Sea of Constantinople and Gulph [sic] of Smyrna; With the Islands of Candia and Rhodes* (Oxford: n.p., 1687), 32-4.

⁷ BORROMEO, ‘Les Cyclades à l’époque ottomane’, 133-134; ELIZABETH ZACHARIADOU,

Almost all of Milos' 2,000-4,000 inhabitants were Orthodox Christians, along with a small number of Roman Catholics; the Muslim population of Milos and the surrounding islands is more difficult to estimate. From travellers' and missionaries' accounts, it would appear that few Muslims lived on Milos, and those who did were almost invariably Ottoman officials⁸. In commenting on the inhabitants of Milos, the many (invariably male) travellers to the island inevitably made mention of its women. Bernard Randolph reported 'the women are equal in beauty with any in the Archipelago, and pretend to exceed others in breeding; most of them speaking Italian'⁹. Thévenot found the women less alluring; he observed, their 'clothing is terribly ugly, they speak very badly and cannot pronounce the letter L. They are very charitable to strangers'¹⁰. Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, who visited the island in 1573 on his way to Constantinople, was more explicit about the 'charitable' reputation of the women of the island: 'it is said that on this island, as soon as a ship arrives, the young girls with their mothers run to the shore [and] lovingly receive the strangers, and with an infinity of caresses they invite them to serve themselves with the girls'¹¹.

When the ships of the Venetian fleet anchored in the port of Milos in late March of 1637, several women from the island did meet them, however, their intentions were quite different than those alluded to by male travel narratives. On the eve of the fleet's departure, with the assistance of the local Venetian consul, four women from the island – a certain Maria and her three daughters, Aissè aged seventeen, Eminè aged nine, and the youngest, Catigè aged four – surreptitiously boarded Captain Mocenigo's great galley, and slipped away from the island. Except for the hour, there was nothing particularly unusual about this occurrence; ships of the Venetian fleet often carried passengers between the various islands of the eastern Mediterranean. These four women were far from normal passengers, however, and their presence on the Venetian ships would eventually result in a significant political and diplomatic confrontation between the Porte and the Venetian Signoria¹².

'The sandjak of Naxos in 1641', in *Festgabe an Josef Matuz: Osmanistik – Turkologie – Diplomatiek*, eds. CHRISTA FRAGNER and KLAUS SCHWARZ (Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1992), 329-330, 337. For a comparative context, see HALIL İNALCIK, 'Ottoman Methods of Conquest', *Studia Islamica*, 2 (1954), 104-129.

⁸ BORROMEO, 'Les Cyclades à l'époque ottomane', 134-135.

⁹ RANDOLPH, *The Present State of the Islands in the Archipelago*, 32-34.

¹⁰ JEAN THÉNEVOT, *Voyage du Levant*, ed. STÉPHANE YERASIMOS (Paris, François Maspero, 1980), 174-175.

¹¹ PHILIPPE DU FRESNE-CANAYE, *Le Voyage du Levant*, ed. M.H. HAUSER (Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1897), 171-172.

¹² Archivio di Stato di Venezia (hereafter ASV), Bailo a Costantinopoli, b. 364, Sept 1637; ASV, Capitano delle Galeazze, b. 1375, #64, 20 July 1637, Pietro Mocenigo to Senate.

The oldest of the women, Maria, was in her late thirties and was the widow of Hassan Ağa, a janissary who had resided on the island. She claimed to have been kidnapped and forcibly married by her husband, but we have no way of knowing whether this was true, or whether her marriage had been arranged by her family (perhaps against her will). The latter was certainly a common occurrence, as Greek women often married (or were married to) Muslim men as a means of upward social mobility¹³. Whether her marriage was voluntary or forced, it does not appear that Maria converted to Islam, which would not have been uncommon as Muslim men were permitted to marry non-Muslim women, though, of course, the converse was strictly forbidden. Maria claimed to have continued to live as a Christian after her marriage, and indeed to have baptized her three daughters without their father's knowledge¹⁴. Whatever her personal religious identity, and despite the fact she had baptized her daughters, Islamic law considered children of mixed marriages as Muslim, and by the girls' own admission they were raised in their father's faith¹⁵.

When the Venetian ships appeared in the port, the two youngest daughters still lived at home with their mother. The eldest, Aissè (named after Aisha, daughter of Abu Bakr and favourite wife of Muhammad), had been fairly recently married to a certain Mustafa Effendi, the kadi of the island. Ottoman kadis were trained in religious Shari'a and secular *kanun* law, and were responsible for local judicial and administrative functions. Kadiships were limited in number and highly sought after, and so this represented a fine marriage for an isolated Muslim girl on a small, predominantly Christian island¹⁶.

Ultimately, however, Aissè's dissatisfaction with her marriage precipitated her family's flight. One factor was the long absences of Mustafa, whose legal responsibilities took him to a number of the other small islands in the western Cyclades¹⁷. More significant, however, was the fact that Aissè was soon to be constrained to follow her husband to the Black Sea, where he was to be transferred. This move would certainly not have been unexpected by the girl or her family, as by the seventeenth century

¹³ PAUL SAINT CASSIA, 'Religion, politics and ethnicity in Cyprus during the Turkocra-tia (1571-1878)', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 27 (1986), 22; SURAIYA FAROQHI, *Subjects of the Sultans* (London, I. B. Tauris, 2000), 102.

¹⁴ ASV, Bailo a Costantinopoli, b. 364, 15 July 1637.

¹⁵ FAROQHI, *Subjects of the Sultans*, 102.

¹⁶ NORMAN ISKOWITZ, *The Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972), 43; HALIL INALCIK, 'Decision Making in the Ottoman State', in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. CAESAR E. FARAH (Kirksville, Mo., Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 14-15.

¹⁷ Biblioteca Marciana, IT VII 1085 (8522), cc. 61v-65r, 28 May 1637, Alvise Contarini to Senate.

kadis usually served one to two years in each posting, and were regularly transferred. This practice had developed to do away with nepotism, favouritism and malpractice among the Ottoman judiciary¹⁸. Faced with this imminent separation from her mother and sisters, Aissè balked. Her husband, in an attempt 'to make her go, took all her most precious possessions such as pearls, jewels and necklaces'. He may also have done this because he suspected she might try to flee Milos¹⁹.

Flight was not necessarily the only option available to Maria and her daughters, indeed while women in Islam have historically often been figured as oppressed and powerless victims, scholarship of the past twenty years has decisively challenged this 'orientalist' view, which is based on normative literature rather than actual lived experience²⁰. Scholars have shown that Ottoman women had available to them what Madeline Zilfi has termed 'a wide field of action ... despite an inherited gender system that prescribed women's subordination to men'²¹. Indeed, in some ways Ottoman women enjoyed legal and cultural rights and freedoms much greater than those of Christian women in many parts of Europe and the Mediterranean. Ottoman Muslim women were considered subjects of the empire upon reaching puberty, and Islamic law and tradition granted them the right to control property, to register complaints, and to defend their rights in court before the local kadi. These rights seem to have generally been protected by Ottoman jurists: scholars have found that both rural and urban women of all social levels regularly used the Ottoman court system to defend their interests, and in most instances judges upheld women's legal and property rights. Indeed, non-Muslim Ottoman women frequently had recourse to kadi courts because they were perceived as more favourably inclined towards issues of particular concern to women. Ottoman women also had more flexibility in ending unwanted marriages through divorce, separation and annulment, and while these were not always easily obtained, in eighteenth-century Istanbul divorces initiated by women became common enough that they attracted concerned comment by social observers. Motivations for divorce in these cases included abuse, abandonment, and failure to provide adequate fi-

¹⁸ INALCIK, 'Decision Making in the Ottoman State', 14-15; RONALD JENNINGS, 'Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th Century Ottoman Kayseri', *Studia Islamica*, 48 (1978), 136-138.

¹⁹ ASV, Bailo a Costantinopoli, b. 364, 15 July 1637.

²⁰ HAIM GERBER, 'Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City, Bursa, 1600-1700', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 12 (1980), 31; MOHJA KAHF, *Western Representations of the Muslim Woman* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1999).

²¹ MADELINE C. ZILFI, 'Introduction', in *Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era*, ed. MADELINE C. ZILFI (Leiden, Brill, 1997), 5.

nancial support. In addition to utilizing kadi courts, for non-Muslim Ottoman women whose traditions did not normally permit divorce, conversion to Islam was a relatively easy way to be liberated from an unwanted spouse, and these types of conversions were quite common²². Of course, in the case of Aissè, since she was married to the local kadi, her legal options were clearly significantly more limited.

After boarding the Venetian ship, Maria and her daughters travelled with the fleet for two months, until they arrived at the fortified Venetian island of Corfu. Upon their arrival, several of 'the chief citizens' of the town made offers of marriage to the two oldest girls, even though they were allegedly without dowries. In an interesting reversal of the practice of Christian women converting to Islam to free themselves from an undesired marriage, Aissè quickly married Santo Marlion, 'one of the chief gentlemen of that city', and in doing so severed her ties to her Muslim husband. The two youngest girls were sent to live with another important Corfiot family, and Eminè was promised to one of the family's sons. The mother, Maria, in contrast, chose to enter a monastery²³. The speed with which these marriages were arranged suggests that the women were financially better off than they claimed in a subsequent depositions, in which they alleged they had left Milos with nothing more than a few personal effects. Arranging marriages so quickly was a clever move on the part of the women, as it effectively forced Venice's hand when the matter mushroomed into a major diplomatic issue. Already, for the patriarchal rulers of Venice the thought of sending innocent women who had converted to Christianity back into Muslim hands was distasteful, and the fact that they were married to Christian men, or in a monastery, made such an action nearly impossible. To close the door on any lingering thoughts of forcing the women to return to Milos, within a month of her marriage, Aissè announced she was pregnant²⁴.

Once it was discovered that the women had fled Milos for Corfu, their case quickly became a complex political and diplomatic affair. Aissè's husband, Mustafa, went to Constantinople and claimed variously that the women had been forced onto the galley and kidnapped, or that they had

²² GERBER, 'Social and Economic Position of Women', 231-33; SURAIYA FAROQHI, 'Crisis and Change, 1590-1699', in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. HALIL INALCIK and DONALD QUATAERT (Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1994), 2: 598-599; MADELINE C. ZILFI, 'We Don't Get Along', in *Women in the Ottoman Empire*, 269-272.

²³ ASV, Capitano delle Galeazze, b. 1375, #64, 20 July 1637, Pietro Mocenigo to Senate; ASV, Inquisitori in Levante, b. 1192, #97, 30 Aug 1637, Inquisitors to Senate.

²⁴ ASV, Senato Deliberazioni Costantinopoli, Minute, b. 24, c. 60v, 19 Sept 1637, Senate to Alvise Contarini; ASV, Inquisitori in Levante, b. 1192, #97, 30 Aug 1637, Inquisitors to Senate.

fled voluntarily but had stolen significant assets belonging to him. Whatever the details of their departure, he insisted that this represented an affront not only to his own honour and property, but was also against Islamic law and the capitulations that existed between Venice and the Ottomans, which expressly forbade Muslim conversions to Christianity, particularly those of women and young girls. The Venetian Signoria and its representative in Constantinople, the able and experienced Bailo Alvise Contarini, countered that the women had left of their own free will and had taken no possessions which did not belong to them, and that their conversions were entirely voluntary. The political and diplomatic machinations of Aissè's husband and his supporters in the divan, and Contarini and other Venetian officials in Constantinople and in Venice raged until the end of 1637. Venice engaged a wide range of its bureaucracy, including the Captain of the Gulf and the Inquisitors in the Levant, and expended significant amounts of money in gifts and bribes to many of the parties involved, all to avoid the unsavoury possibility of returning the women with the attendant blow to the prestige and honour of Venice. In the end, a settlement was arrived at in which Venice agreed to pay a rather small settlement to the aggrieved husband, which in turn he was constrained to divide among his chief supporters in the Ottoman capital. With this monetary settlement, the case and the four women of Milos disappeared completely from the documentary record.

While on one level the case of Maria and her daughters functions as an engaging narrative, it also serves as a valuable window into questions of religious identity and conversion, and suggests ways in which the unique frontier setting of the Mediterranean provided women with additional, or alternate modes of subordinating the gender roles and expectations of their society and culture. Of course, to say early modern women were agents is not to say anything particularly new. Much work in recent years in both the Ottoman and European contexts has illustrated that women were 'active agents in their own destinies rather than passive victims'²⁵. This case (and a number of others which will form the basis of a forthcoming study) contributes to this discourse by illuminating the unique modes of subversion available to women in the context of the early modern Mediterranean. Maria and her family utilized the Mediterranean's intersecting political, religious and cultural frontiers as a means to free themselves from a troubled personal situation, and as a form of leverage which functioned to protect them from being compelled to return to Milos once their flight had been found out.

²⁵ SALLY SCULLY, 'Marriage or a Career?: Witchcraft as an Alternative in Seventeenth-Century Venice', *Journal of Social History*, 28 (1995), 857.

This case also suggests the need to complicate some of our assumptions about early modern women's religious identity. Women are often axiomatically assumed to be more profoundly religious than men, and therefore more solidly rooted in and less likely to alter their religious identities. Mark Meyerson and Mary Elizabeth Perry have argued that Iberian Jewish and Muslim women were more resistant to conversion because of their 'acute sense of responsibility for perpetuating ... traditions through socializing their children ... Baptism signified for them not just a personal abandonment of [their faiths] but also a negation of their accustomed maternal role in the lives of their children.' The case of Maria and her daughters does not controvert this position, but it certainly does elaborate it. This case and many other similar cases suggest that some early modern women chose conversion without coercion or compulsion, and indeed conversion may have functioned as a means of asserting their 'maternal role in the lives of their children'²⁶.

This case also says something about masculinity, it seems to me, or perhaps better about what notions of honour imposed on male-dominated political institutions in their dealings with women. The paternalistic attitudes of public bodies, both Venetian and Ottoman, treated women's religiosity as paradoxically both weak and powerful. Women were stereotypically considered more spiritually inclined than men, yet they (along with children) were also 'judged more susceptible to conversion'²⁷. Thus one of the roles of male ruling classes was to protect the fragile faith of women. Religion and manhood, as expressed in the institutions of the state, required that Venice protect the Milos women, even though doing so carried a potentially high political price, and ultimately did cost Venice significant financial outlays in the form of bribes. The degree to which these women were aware of this situation and even consciously played on the burden of honour that both states were under is difficult to answer. The quick marriages or entry into convents suggests strongly to me that they understood the functioning of this system of honour and employed this knowledge as a means of exerting influence on the decisions that these institutions made that affected them. If societal attitudes and structures subordinated women, they also afforded a certain power to subvert

²⁶ MARK D. MEYERSON, 'Aragonese and Catalan Jewish Converts at the Time of the Expulsion', *Jewish History*, 6 (1992), 138; MARY ELIZABETH PERRY, 'Contested Identities: The Morisca Visionary Beatriz de Robles', in *Women in the Inquisition: Spain and the New World*, ed. MARY GILES (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 179, 181.

²⁷ BARTOLOMÉ BENNASSAR and LUCILE BENNASSAR, *Les chrétiens d'Allah: l'histoire extraordinaire des renégats, XVI^e-XVII^e siècles* (Paris, Perrin, 1989), 235; ROBERT MANTRAN, *Istanbul au siècle de Soliman le Magnifique* (Paris, Hachette, 1994), 168; STEPHEN CLISSOLD, 'Christian Renegades and Barbary Corsairs', *History Today*, 26 (1976), 510.

and to manipulate gender structures in ways that benefited them, all, of course, within the limits of socially assigned and accepted roles²⁸. And the intersection of religious and political boundaries in the early modern Mediterranean created a unique context in which crossing these boundaries permitted women to assert a degree of agency in ways unique to this time and place.

²⁸ JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Analysis', *American Historical Review*, 91 (1986), 1072-1073; MATTHEW RESTALL, 'He Wished It in Vain': Subordination and Resistance among Maya Women in Post-Conquest Yucatan', *Ethnohistory*, 42 (1995), 578-580, 586.

José Manuel Vázquez Lijó

Los escenarios de las deserciones. Refugios y salidas profesionales de los prófugos de la Real Armada del siglo XVIII

Este trabajo es parte de nuestras investigaciones sobre el régimen de inscripción marítima conocido como *matrícula de mar*, y más en particular sobre la carga militar que implicó. El mayor fruto obtenido hasta el momento es nuestra tesis doctoral¹, en la que se dedica un capítulo a analizar las deserciones en la Armada española. En las próximas páginas nos limitaremos a responder básicamente a tres preguntas: ¿cuándo y dónde se produjeron las deserciones?, ¿cuál fue el destino de estos prófugos?, y ¿qué factores hicieron posible que sus salidas profesionales fuesen mayores de las que cabría pensar a priori? Otros aspectos del fenómeno en cuestión (sanciones e indultos, causas y cifras de la deserción...) son tratados en el mencionado capítulo de la tesis. Hemos utilizado sobre todo documentación contenida en los fondos de la Secretaría de Marina, el organismo central competente, que se conservan en el Archivo General de Simancas (AGS) y en el Archivo General de Marina Álvaro de Bazán (AGM).

Entrando en materia, puede afirmarse que, en general, la mayoría de los matriculados desertaron en tres circunstancias comunes:

- a bordo aprovechando la estancia en puertos de los navíos donde servían plaza;
- antes de incorporarse a la Armada, en sus domicilios, nada más conocer que su inmediato destino al Real Servicio, o incluso sin esperar al resultado del sorteo;
- en las capitales departamentales a donde fueron conducidos, mientras no fueron enrolados.

La primera de las situaciones comprende a los prófugos de la tabla de abajo. Los datos en ella contenidos apuntan a la deserción como acto colectivo; 72 (64,86%) de los 111 marineros de la escuadra armada en Ferrol

¹ JOSÉ MANUEL VÁZQUEZ LIJÓ, *La Matrícula de Mar y sus repercusiones en la Galicia del siglo XVIII* (Santiago de Compostela, 2005).

y evadidos entre el 13 de marzo y el 5 de agosto de 1739, se dieron a la fuga en seis días concretos. Mayor es todavía la concentración temporal de estas fugas si analizamos por separado las circunstancias de determinados navíos de dicha flota: el 89,47% (17 de 19) de los que desertaron a bordo del *Galicia* lo hicieron el primero de julio de 1739. La arribada a puertos menores, fue una ocasión propicia para intentar la fuga; por ello no es de extrañar que 12 de los 23 desertores de *El Príncipe* escapasen en Corcubión. En ocasiones la marinería aprovechó circunstancias excepcionales, caso de un naufragio cerca de la costa² o la confusión a bordo a raíz de un tumulto³ para escapar.

Cronología de las deserciones en la escuadra armada en Ferrol en 1739

| Navíos | Fechas de la deserción | | | | | | | Total |
|--------------------|------------------------|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1-VII | 26-V | 2-VII | 15-III | 12-VII | 4-VII | Otras | |
| <i>Santa Ana</i> | 2 | 2 | 11 | - | - | - | 3 | 18 |
| <i>Santiago</i> | 4 | - | - | 2 | - | - | 16 | 22 |
| <i>La Reina</i> | - | - | - | 4 | - | 5 | 4 | 13 |
| <i>Galicia</i> | 17 | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 19 |
| <i>La Princesa</i> | 1 | - | - | - | 3 | - | 6 | 10 |
| <i>El Príncipe</i> | 6 | 9 | - | - | 3 | 1 | 4 | 23 |
| <i>San Felipe</i> | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 3 |
| <i>San Carlos</i> | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 3 |
| TOTALES | 32 | 11 | 11 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 39 | 111 |

Fuente: AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 277, 1 septiembre 1739

Según una relación oficial de julio de 1793, durante la anterior campaña se habían fugado nada menos que 137 hombres del *San Ildefonso*: más de la mitad, 83 habían desertado en los dos puertos de Cataluña donde había recalado dicho navío: 16 en Barcelona y 67 en Rosas⁴. Esto es lógico dado que la mayoría de estos prófugos eran catalanes, los más propensos al delito en cuestión a juicio de las autoridades de Marina. De los restantes 54, 18 se dieron a la fuga en Cartagena, 13 en Málaga y 23 en Génova. Otro aspecto a tener en cuenta es que la mayor parte de estos huidos eran voluntarios, de la "calidad de gente comprada que sólo les estimula el enganche que le han franqueado los Pueblos"⁵.

Por otra parte, las deserciones antes del embarque en la Armada fueron

² Por ejemplo, varios marineros de la flota al mando del teniente general Rodrigo de Torres al tiempo de producirse un desorden con ocasión del naufragio de los buques donde servían en la bahía de La Habana. AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 252, 10 febrero 1735.

³ ALAIN CABANTOUS, *Le Vergue et les Fers: mutins et déserteurs dans la marine de l'ancienne France* (París, 1984), 89.

⁴ La concentración de fugas en Rosas creemos que se debe a su cercanía a Francia, refugio de muchos desertores catalanes. AGM, Matrículas, 1.964, 19 julio 1793; 30 julio 1793.

⁵ Se ordenó un castigo severo por este delito, tanto más grave cuanto la situación era de guerra. *Ibidem*.

seguramente muy habituales. Lo fueron en Francia, donde la inmensa mayoría de los marineros huyeron antes de enrolarse, con la salvedad de las tripulaciones de los navíos de la Compagnie des Indes que desertaban tanto en las escalas como al arribar a los puertos de destino de China o de Bengala, y de los equipajes de los bacaladeros que se fugaron al arribar al litoral de Terranova⁶. El éxito de estas fugas estuvo condicionado por el esfuerzo de las autoridades competentes en detenerlas. Identificados los prófugos, el primer paso era la retirada de sus licencias para navegar con el fin de dificultarles la huida por mar; así se actuó con motivo de cierta desertión de marinería de la provincia de Mataró en 1784; en libertad con cargos, antes de ser enviados al arsenal como castigo, habrían de presentarse diariamente a los ministros de Marina más próximos a sus domicilios; en caso contrario serían multados con más de 2.000 reales de vellón⁷.

La incapacidad por falta de medios policiales de las autoridades de Marina de los pueblos del litoral para contener las desertiones se manifestó igualmente ante episodios de insubordinación al tiempo de ejecutarse las periódicas revistas de inspección de matrículas o durante los sorteos de plazas para la Armada⁸. Especialmente graves, por reincidentes, fueron las fugas de matriculados de la subdelegación catalana de San Feliu de Guixols; como castigo extraordinario todos los miembros de la cuadrilla de turno serían enviados a Cartagena, la capital departamental. Una vez allí se sortearían; los elegidos harían campaña sin sueldo y los restantes con la mitad de la paga. Y en abril de 1785 el subdelegado de Vinaroz llegó a publicar tres bandos dando a la marinería insubordinada de aquel partido un plazo de seis días para presentarse. Nadie de los llamados entonces al servicio se personó⁹.

Dada su condición de apostaderos navales, en las capitales departamentales¹⁰ y más que en ningún otro sitio en Cádiz, se produjeron gran número de desertiones de marineros mientras sus buques se carenaban o

⁶ CABANTOUS, *La Vergue*, 88; GERARD LE BOUËDEC, *Activités maritimes et sociétés littorales de l'Europe atlantique, 1690-1790* (París, 1997), 274.

⁷ Sanción que equivalía a 30 meses de sueldo de un marinero en la Real Armada en campañas de Europa. Con estas medidas, en tres meses se había logrado "asegurar" a sesenta de los 82 desertores. AGM, Matrículas, Asuntos Particulares, 1.949, 18 septiembre 1784.

⁸ Abundan los testimonios de desertiones al tiempo del reparto de las "boletas". Por ejemplo, huyeron muchos de los movilizados para la escuadra a armar en Cádiz en el invierno de 1750, precisándose del empleo de tropa para su captura. AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 259, 1 abril 1750.

⁹ AGM, Matrículas, Asuntos Particulares, 1.950, 3, 7 y 10 mayo 1785.

¹⁰ Caso de Ferrol. En 1782 se notificó que a pesar del temor a la condena de cuatro años de cárcel, los matriculados se ausentaban de continuo sin permiso, tanto del Arsenal como de los navíos de guerra "pues no hay semana que no se conduzcan reos de esta naturaleza..." AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 275, 13 diciembre 1782.

se aprestaban para partir¹¹. Por ejemplo, desde que se les había pasado revista el 17 de abril de 1727 – el día anterior a formársele asiento en los libros de tripulaciones – hasta el 22 de junio de dicho año, desertaron 35 de los 196 reclutados en Galicia con plaza en ocho de los buques de la escuadra gaditana durante su armamento. Es decir, en dos meses y pico se habían dado a la fuga en puerto el 17,8% de estas plazas¹².

La realidad francesa no fue otra, como ilustra el hecho de que por encima de la cuarta parte de los más de trescientos arrestados entre 1781 y 1782 por el delito que nos ocupa habían desertado a su llegada a Brest, Rochefort, Lorient o Tolón¹³. Son muchas las pruebas documentales que señalan en esta dirección y que hablan por lo tanto de la facilidad con que estos prófugos sorteaban la vigilancia a bordo y en tierra a cargo de tropas de guardia. En ocasiones fueron los centinelas de puerto los que interesadamente, haciendo la vista gorda, propiciaron las deserciones¹⁴. Al respecto, de los 44 matriculados gallegos que habían desertado de la Escuadra de Tolón y que se presentaron en Ferrol entre el 14 de agosto y el 24 de septiembre de 1742 para acogerse al indulto, 23 de ellos, más del 50%, habían aprovechado la estancia de sus buques en el puerto de la capital gaditana para darse a la fuga¹⁵.

También el momento de la liberación fue aprovechado por cautivos para fugarse. Los 36 prisioneros españoles que huyeron nada más poner pie en tierra en Camariñas en el otoño de 1781 a donde habían llegado a bordo de un bergantín inglés de bandera parlamentaria, sin duda procedían de la Real Armada¹⁶. Los 54 restantes que no se habían dado a la fuga habían sido capturados cuando tripulaban los Correos marítimos. En relación con esto, se ha constatado la estrategia de la administración de Marina inglesa que en tiempos de guerra y consciente de que todo hombre de mar era un prófugo en potencia¹⁷, a la hora de la entrega de prisioneros,

¹¹ En 1765, a la espera de resultados de la revista y respecto de la anterior inspección extraordinaria, se anotó que en Cádiz, Málaga, Sevilla y Ayamonte, había “porción” de marinería sin registrar y formada sin duda por “desertores de Ferrol y Cartagena”. AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 300, 29 enero 1765.

¹² Veinte, más de las mitad de los huidos, eran del equipaje del navío *San Antonio*. AGM, Matrículas, 1.948, 22 junio 1727.

¹³ CABANTOUS, *La Vergue*, 88-89.

¹⁴ A. SAGARRA GAMAZO y N. RUPÉREZ, “Las deserciones en la Marina española del siglo XVIII”, *Revista de Historia Naval*, IX, N° 35 (1991), 67.

¹⁵ AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 256, 22 febrero 1743.

¹⁶ Para resolver una controversia de jurisdicción entre el Capitán General de Galicia y el subdelegado de Marina de Corcubión, una real orden de 7 de noviembre de 1781 prohibió a los ministros y subdelegados el despacho de pasaportes y “contentos” de prisioneros, competencia reconocida de los gobernadores militares. AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 273.

¹⁷ Aunque no todos tenían la misma propensión a este delito. De hecho, en las listas

intentó desembarcarlos lo más lejos posible de su puerto de origen para facilitar su huida y de este modo restar brazos al enemigo. Alain Cabantous estima que en torno a una décima parte de la marinería francesa apresada desertó al tiempo de recuperar su libertad para evitar ser enviada de nuevo a campaña¹⁸.

Los escenarios de las deserciones que acabamos de presentar condicionaron en parte los refugios y las salidas profesionales de estos evadidos, facilitados por una conjunción de factores: la referida falta de tropa armada bajo la autoridad directa de los subdelegados de Marina, problemas de descoordinación y roces, cuando no enfrentamientos abiertos, por cuestiones competenciales entre estas autoridades y las mandos militares y justicias locales, y la restringida oferta de mano de obra en el sector marítimo-pesquero español, entre los más importantes.

En la flota pesquera, posiblemente en mayor medida la mercante¹⁹, y en los buques *correos* se enrolaron bastantes desertores haciendo valer su presumible experiencia profesional, por corta que esta fuese. Los armadores y patrones - nunca sobrados de tripulación adecuada y mucho menos en épocas de armamentos masivos dada la siempre restrictiva política de habilitaciones a los no matriculados para practicar actividades marítimas y las coyunturales urgencias de la Armada - , corrieron el riesgo de hacerse con los servicios de unos hombres que por su estado al margen de la ley, no estaban en condiciones de exigir desde el punto de vista laboral.

Respecto a los *correos*, en 1781, cuando la Armada padecía una seria carencia de tripulantes, el Capitán General de Galicia se negó a apresar a unos prófugos españoles que habían llegado al puerto de A Coruña en un convoy francés, y de los que se sospechaba que formaban parte de la dotación de los paquebotes de este servicio postal con puerto base en A Coruña²⁰. Y en coyunturas bélicas, cuando lógicamente las fugas se dispararon, los corsarios también se surtieron de estos delincuentes²¹.

de prófugos de la Royal Navy abundan los contrabandistas enrolados a la fuerza y aquéllos sobre los que pesaba un consejo de guerra. N.A.M. RODGER, *The Wooden World. An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (London, 1986), 189.

¹⁸ ALAIN CABANTOUS, "Gens de mer, guerre et prison", *Revue d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine*, No 2 (1981), 265 y ss.

¹⁹ De la mayoría de los matriculados de la subdelegación valenciana de Vinaroz que en 1785 no habían acudido al acto del sorteo, se sospechó que se habían dirigido a Cádiz, San Lúcar de Barrameda y al Puerto de Santa María para ganarse unos buenos reales en la flota mercante. Fue deficiente el control de las dotaciones de estos buques por parte de las autoridades de Marina, lo que dio pie a ocultaciones en las listas de enrolados. AGM, Matriculas, Asuntos Particulares, 1.950, 3, 7 y 10 mayo 1785.

²⁰ AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 292, 19 y 25 junio 1781.

²¹ En marzo de 1806, el subdelegado de Vigo, refiriéndose a las tripulaciones del Rey sitas en Redondela y prestas a marchar hacia Ferrol, tenía motivos "para recelar deserción principalmente de los Andaluces" quienes intentarían presentarse "disimulando

Una posibilidad de eludir la carga militar de la Armada fue el enrolamiento en buques de otras potencias, picando el anzuelo del enganche ofertado por “personas obscuras”²², antes o una vez en el servicio naval, aprovechando la escala en algún puerto extranjero. Esta travesía fue protagonizada por bastantes desertores catalanes enrolados en mercantes galos. Además de lo geográfico, factores como la identidad cultural y los vínculos familiares tejidos entre miembros de uno y otro lado de la frontera, explican que las regiones francesas limítrofes con los estados flamencos y con España presentasen tasas de desertión más elevadas que la media²³. Por ejemplo, muchos marineros de San Juan de Luz pasaron a España, cruzando los Pirineos o a bordo de alguno de los muchos mercantes que comerciaban con puertos del Cantábrico, mientras que el destino preferente de la marinería desertora de *quartiers* del levante francés fue Génova y los puertos de la costa ligur²⁴.

Esta válvula de escape suponía para muchos de estos perseguidos por la justicia el inicio de una vida errante, de un periplo marinero a la espera de regresar clandestinamente a sus domicilios o de acogerse a un indulto. En Francia, otros prófugos buscaron refugio en zonas pantanosas poco pobladas a donde no llegaban los tentáculos del poder real²⁵. Y en Inglaterra, los prófugos que no se emplearon en el mar, huyeron al campo, alejados de las principales vías terrestres y del circuito principal de actuación de los *gangs* de reclutamiento²⁶.

Las huidas a Portugal están ampliamente constatadas. De la magnitud de las fugas de *quintos* (reclutas regulares del Ejército) da idea el cierre de la frontera decretado por el Capitán General de Galicia en 1764. Los frutos del tratado bilateral para el intercambio de prófugos firmado en 1778 pa-

quien son a tomar partido en los corsarios. Otros querrán reunirse, con el fin de ganar algo para el camino, a los Patrones Pescadores”. Museo de Pontevedra (MP), Archivo de mareantes, Sampedro 287. Los armadores de los privateers ingleses, principales clientes de los *crimps*, traficantes de marinería, incentivaron la contratación de desertores de la Navy mediante primas de enganche extraordinarias. RODGER, *The Wooden World*, 185-189.

²² AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 271, 8 diciembre 1788. Y JOSÉ PATRICIO MERINO NAVARRO, *La Armada española en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1981), 108.

²³ Las diferencias intrarregionales fueron notables. Cabantous habla de tasas de hasta el 15% de los movilizados en Dordoña mientras que en Libourne rondaría el 5%. A juicio de Le Goff, la resistencia al *systeme des classes*, y en particular su manifestación más evidente, las desertiones, fueron por lo general más acusadas en el litoral mediterráneo que en de Poniente. LE BOUËDEC, *Activités maritimes* 274. Sobre los contrastes advertidos entre provincias marítimas españolas, VÁZQUEZ LIJÓ, *La Matrícula*, 1.110-1.115.

²⁴ CABANTOUS, *La Vergue*, 88-89.

²⁵ *Ibidem*. Como muestra, las ciénagas de Merlimont fueron el lugar de escondite de la mayor parte de los prófugos del *quartier* de Boulogne-sur-Mer.

²⁶ RODGER, *The Wooden World*, 192.

rece que fueron escasos; lo cierto es que en las guerras finiseculares las deserciones se incrementaron²⁷. En cuanto a la marinería, huyó por mar o bien cruzando a pie la *raya*. Aunque los acuerdos hispano-lusos contemplaban la extradición por éste y otros delitos, la lentitud de los mecanismos administrativos dejó bastante margen de maniobra a los fugitivos. Ante el volumen considerable de este “éxodo” ilegal, en 1779 el Conde de Fernán Núñez, a la sazón embajador de Carlos III en Lisboa y su futuro biógrafo, tomó cartas en el asunto. A propuesta suya se decidió el envío a las plazas consulares de filiaciones de los fugitivos que una vez detenidos se destinarían a las capitales de los tres departamentos navales²⁸.

Por regla general, la intención de los matriculados que desertaron al tiempo de ser llamados a la Armada, particularmente los casados con hijos a su cargo, fue regresar cuanto antes cerca de los suyos. A la espera de la ocasión propicia, lo normal fue que estos fugados se ganasen el pan en los puertos o se embarcasen ocultando su identidad. La presencia de desertores en sus propios vecindarios está sobradamente probada; incluso se presentaban “a cara descubierta”²⁹, sacando partido de la aludida falta de fuerza policial al servicio de los subdelegados de Marina³⁰, que no siempre actuaron con el celo debido. Las insinuaciones veladas y las referencias genéricas a la falta de celo de las autoridades locales de la matrícula a la hora de luchar contra este delito son corrientes en la documentación de la Secretaría de Marina que hemos manejado, no así la personificación de la culpa³¹. Y esto pese a sanciones como la suspensión de empleo y sueldo para los funcionarios de Marina corruptos o simplemente permisivos con este

²⁷ DOMINGO GONZÁLEZ LOPO, “La emigración a Portugal desde el S.O. de Galicia en los siglos XVIII y XIX”, in *Colóquio Internacional sobre emigração portuguesa nos séculos XIX-XX*, (Lisboa, 1992).

²⁸ AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 291, 20 junio 1779. El citado diplomático apuntó a Vila Real de Santo António como una localidad de recepción de desertores. Enclavada en la desembocadura del Guadiana en frente a Ayamonte había sido reedificada al objeto de convertirla en el centro portuario de la *Companhia Geral das Reais Pescarias do Reino do Algarve* establecida en enero de 1773 y que por entonces estaba en fase de expansión.

²⁹ El inspector de revista de las matrículas del departamento de Cartagena denunció en 1799 “la osadía con que los desertores viven y se mantienen en sus domicilios” como uno de los males que estaban conduciendo a la Armada a un estado deplorable. R. FERNÁNDEZ DÍAZ and C. MARTÍNEZ SHAW, “Las revistas de inspección de la Matrícula de Mar en el siglo XVIII”, in C. MARTÍNEZ SHAW (ed.), *El Derecho y el Mar en la España Moderna* (Granada, 1995), 263.

³⁰ Para reforzar la autoridad efectiva de los subdelegados de Marina, en 1793 se propuso sin éxito que cada uno tuviese bajo sus órdenes a un cabo y dos soldados como mínimo. AGM, Matrículas, Generalidad, 2.001, 29 marzo 1793.

³¹ Uno de los muchos cargos que en 1798 las mujeres y viudas de matriculados imputaron al subdelegado de Rianxo fue la tolerancia que practicaba con los desertores que al parecer habían comprado su silencio. AGM, Matrículas, Asuntos Particulares, 1.975, 4 mayo 1798; 7 octubre 1798.

delito dispuestas en 1778 por el Intendente de Ferrol, tras denunciar “el paradero de los Desertores del Real Servicio en sus mismos Pueblos, sin que les aprehendan ni den parte de ello hasta que de aquí son reclamados...”³². Viendo el mal ejemplo de sus superiores, no es de extrañar la vista gorda de los *cabos celadores*³³ hacia los prófugos, más si cabe en caso de tratarse de familiares o amigos. Prueba inequívoca de esta extendida falta de diligencia es la real orden de 11 de abril de 1795, en virtud de la cual los capitanes generales de los departamentos habrían de destinar a un brigadier o capitán de navío a visitar todos los puertos bajo su autoridad con el preciso propósito de recoger a toda la marinería prófuga “atendiendo igualmente a remediar la ineficacia u otros abusos que tal vez puedan hallarse de parte de los cabos y alguaciles de las matrículas, prohombres y demás gefes subalternos de los gremios de mar”. En pos del éxito de esta medida, puesta en marcha con el fin declarado de atender las demandas urgentes de marinería para la Armada, expresamente se requirió la ayuda de la jurisdicción ordinaria y de las autoridades militares para perseguir y conducir a los desertores al departamento o escuadra más próximos³⁴.

Si transitorio fue el destino europeo de los prófugos españoles, la huida en o hacia América, tierra de oportunidades, fue sin retorno o en todo caso duró varios años. Ilustra esta realidad el periplo vital de Agustín de Villaverde. Matriculado por el puerto coruñés de Padrón en noviembre de 1755, su primer destino fue el navío *Héctor* con plaza de marinero. Restituido a su domicilio con pasaporte en noviembre de 1756, y de nuevo en el servicio desde mayo de 1757, en la inspección de matrículas de noviembre de 1758 “no se pudo averiguar su paradero”, siendo anotado como desertor. Declaró que se había casado en Valparaíso (Chile) y que en 1779 se había embarcado en una fragata portuguesa que hacía la ruta Oporto-Liverpool. En 1781, cuando contaba 58 años de edad, fue hecho prisionero por la fragata española *Escolástica* cuando formaba parte del equipaje del bergantín *Guillermo*, de bandera enemiga³⁵.

Las deserciones aprovechando la arribada a puertos coloniales de los navíos del rey resultaron habituales, al igual que las fugas de marineros de la Royal Navy en Norteamérica y en las Indias Occidentales como evi-

³² AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 275, 13 diciembre 1782.

³³ El mencionado Gregorio Davila y Estrada opinó que estos auxiliares, sin remuneración alguna por su función administrativa, no “disimularían” el delito en cuestión si “tubieran sólo un real diario de sueldo”. Por ello se mostró partidario de gratificarlos por cada desertor que capturasen “pues como en ellos reyna tanto el interés y por éste a nadie perdonan, desde luego se arrojarían a prenderlos, siendo este un freno capaz de contener a muchos que se presentan en los Pueblos sin temor alguno como lo hacen con el mayor desahogo e insolencia”. AGM, Matrículas, Generalidad, 2.001, 29 marzo 1793.

³⁴ AGM, Matrículas, Inspección, 1.883, 11 abril 1795; 9 mayo 1795.

³⁵ AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 273, 9 febrero 1781.

dencian las listas oficiales de *run* (escapados) de cada barco³⁶. En un porcentaje de casos muy elevado, aunque difícil de calcular, se trató de pérdidas irrecuperables para la Armada. Un carácter que también revistieron las deserciones entre los equipajes de los barcos de la *Compagnie des Indes*³⁷. Es bien conocido este fenómeno en la Carrera de Indias desde su inicio. Muchos sentaban plaza como tripulación o gente de guerra en los buques de esta ruta con el objetivo de procurarse el salto al Nuevo Mundo. Las situaciones más propicias fueron los internamientos en centros hospitalarios por falsas dolencias, las guardias y las *aguadas*. Desde 1607 se adoptaron diversas disposiciones encaminadas a frenar estas prácticas (multas a los infractores, inhibición de las justicias ordinarias del territorio colonial, etc.), alentadas por la complicidad de los habitantes de los puertos de llegada (Cartagena de Indias, Portobelo, La Habana, Veracruz, etc.); los resultados de esta política punitiva fueron escasos; hasta finales de la década de 1630, los evadidos suponían entre el 10 y el 18 % del total de la gente embarcada³⁸.

La puesta en circulación de los mencionados *correos* marítimos facilitó la marcha de marinería fugitiva a Indias³⁹

“donde encuentran tantos atractivos para establecerse y tanta facilidad, como se sabe, para ocultarse a la más perspicaz vigilancia de quien los busque, deve suponerse que ninguno buelve a España a exponerse al riesgo de ser conocido y castigado por desertor, y siendo tan frecuentes las oportunidades de estas transmigraciones, quantos son los Correos que se despachan cada año, por pocos que lleve cada uno es forzoso que el total con el tiempo vaia ascendiendo considerablemente”⁴⁰.

³⁶ Por el contrario, fueron pocos los que desertaron en las Indias Orientales, zonas con escasa presencia europea y donde las posibilidades de fortuna eran más inciertas. RODGER, *The Wooden World*, 196.

³⁷ Los tripulantes de los barcos de esta compañía privilegiada, significativamente muchos de ellos voluntarios, al ser interrogados una vez apresados declaraban que el móvil de su fuga había sido el probar fortuna, un espíritu aventurero. CABANTOUS, *Le Vergue*, 94.

³⁸ La flota de Nueva España presentó porcentajes superiores. En 1631 su capitana y almiranta registraban un 24% de bajas por deserción en sus plazas por un 11% de sus homólogas de Tierra Firme. F. SERRANO MANGAS, *Armadas y flotas de la plata* (Madrid, 1989), 211-215.

³⁹ Se sabe de la utilización de los correos por marineros vascos, y en particular vizcaínos, para huir a Indias. Para contener los fraudes tan frecuentes en sus tripulaciones y en particular el refugio de prófugos, el ministro de Marina de la provincia de A Coruña planteó en abril de 1792 la necesidad de efectuar una revista de inspección periódica de estos navíos. A.M^º RIVERO MEDINA, “El Astillero de Zorroza y la Carrera de Indias, in *Comerciantes, marineros y nautas. Los vascos en la economía americana* (Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2000), 129. AGM, Matriculas, Asuntos Particulares, 1.961, 28 abril 1792.

⁴⁰ AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 292, 15 abril 1781. Se ha apuntado el gran número de

Según afirmaba en 1781 el intendente ferrolano, en estos buques postales, no sólo “se refugian y toman partido [...] los que desertan de los Navíos y Arsenales, más aun también otros de sus mismos Domicilios, como frecuentemente me lo avisan” La aprehensión de estos prófugos se dificultaba extraordinariamente, proseguía diciendo, “tal vez porque se mudan sus nombres y apellidos”⁴¹. Y es que el cambio de identidad había sido y continuó siendo una de las estrategias más comunes de los desertores⁴².

Sin duda, los mercantes que partían desde Cádiz a Indias fueron un refugio habitual de los prófugos andaluces⁴³ que aprovecharon el fraude en las listas de tripulación interesadamente consentido sino fomentado por armadores y capitanes. Aunque estaba regulada la inspección de los buques antes de partir para Indias por parte de los ministros togados de la Casa de Contratación y la consecuente formación de listas de todas sus plazas, lo cierto es que estos controles no fueron lo suficiente estrictos o en todo caso a menudo resultaron ineficaces a la hora de destapar a los muchos desertores que se enrolaban en los *registros*. Por este motivo, según minuta del Intendente gaditano, se acordó en septiembre de 1742 que, sin menoscabo de las atribuciones de los magistrados del Consejo de Indias, los ministros de Marina examinasen estos navíos a la ida y a la vuelta⁴⁴. Teniendo presente las dimensiones de las fugas de marinería una vez en América, el ministro de Marina de Barcelona llegó a proponer en febrero de 1789 que sólo se concediese licencia para viajar en la flota de comercio a las colonias del Nuevo Mundo a los que acreditasen una campaña en buques de guerra. Esta idea fue juzgada inconveniente por el inspector general de matrículas Muñoz de Guzmán⁴⁵; éste recordó que al

pasajeros ilegales que se escondían en dichos barcos para cruzar el Atlántico y la elevada tasa de desertión entre los soldados destinados a los regimientos americanos. Tanto los prófugos de la Armada como del Ejército pudieron jugar un papel importante a finales de la etapa colonial en la formación de las primeras cadenas de emigración al Nuevo Mundo. ANTONIO EIRAS ROEL (ed.), *La emigración española a Ultramar, 1492-1914* (Madrid, 1991), 34.

⁴¹ AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 271, 9 diciembre 1778; Secretaría de Marina, 292, 15 abril 1781.

⁴² DAVID GOODMAN, *El poderío naval español. Historia de la armada española del siglo XVII* (Barcelona, 2001), 301. SAGARRA AND RUPÉREZ, “La desertión”, 66-67. MP, Archivo de marreantes, Sampedro 287.

⁴³ En este sentido es revelador que la orden de arresto contra un desertor de la matrícula de la ciudad de Málaga fuese dirigida por el Intendente Gutiérrez de Rubalcaba al ministro principal de la provincia marítima de Cádiz y al subdelegado de la limitrofe Isla de León. AGM, Matrículas, Asuntos Particulares, 1.955, 27 agosto 1788. Sobre el deficiente control de las dotaciones de los buques registros, AGM, Matrículas, Asuntos Particulares, 1.950, 3 mayo 1785; 7 - 10 mayo 1785.

⁴⁴ AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 279, 14 agosto 1742; 17 septiembre 1742.

⁴⁵ A falta de más informes sobre este supuesto vínculo entre la proliferación de las desertiones y la libertad de navegación a Indias, Muñoz de Guzmán se mostró en des-

franquear la navegación a Indias se había tenido en consideración que rara vez estos viajes se prolongaban más de un trienio desde la ida, tiempo que regularmente tenían los recién despedidos del Real Servicio antes de que su cuadrilla fuese embargada de nuevo. Aunque para hacer campaña en América en navíos de la Armada tenían preferencia los que acreditaban servicios a la Corona, al parecer mediaron sobornos a las autoridades de Marina para franquearse este destino con el objetivo inconfesable de huir nada más poner pie en los dominios americanos⁴⁶.

Si en la metrópoli estaban al tanto de la "franqueza" con que se desertaba en Indias, sobra decir que los ministros de la Corona allí destinados sabían del problema. En un oficio enviado a la Secretaría de Marina desde Montevideo en 1784 se hizo referencia a los muchos "estímulos" que fomentaban el delito en cuestión y entre los que no se incluyó, extrañamente la oferta laboral en el sector portuario y en la navegación mercante. En primer lugar se citó el ingreso en la milicia de estos prófugos sin previo interrogatorio sobre su identidad y estado; otra salida fue el cultivo de la tierra ("se dispersan por los campos formando casas de paxa"), trabajar como jornaleros en las haciendas rurales, como mano de obra muy rentable dado que estos delincuentes, eran víctimas propiciatorias de las coacciones de propietarios o capataces en condiciones de forzarles a emplearse por sueldos míseros, sólo por techo y comida; los menos, cabe suponer, se dedicarían a la agricultura por cuenta propia ("vendedores de sus frutos y ortalizas"), y a otros oficios, como aguadores, "con cuyos ejercicios son sostenidos como útiles a los pueblos por que a éstos nada les perjudica el detrimento que se sigue al Real Servicio y al comercio marítimo"⁴⁷.

Si a la luz de los estos testimonios cabría imputar a las autoridades y poderosos indianos la existencia cómoda de muchos desertores en aquellos territorios, en Filipinas la permisividad fue tanta o mayor. A raíz de que el comandante de la fragata *Palas* solicitase colaboración para apresar a miembros de su equipaje que se habían dado a la fuga, el Gobernador de este archipiélago no tuvo reparo en informar en 1773 al Secretario de

acuerdo con esta reforma en la legislación con carácter general. Para el caso particular de Barcelona, por el contrario, vio oportuna esta restricción de los permisos de navegación a Indias si se demostrase esta relación causa-efecto. AGM, Matrículas, Asuntos Particulares, 9 y 20 febrero 1789.

⁴⁶ Sobre esta preferencia, también lucrativa desde el punto de vista salarial, y de los fraudes para beneficiarse de ella, VÁZQUEZ LIJÓ, *La Matrícula de Mar*, 650-656, 975-982. Un destacado erudito hispanista afirmó que: "...el marinero que sabía ingeniárselas y sobornaba con estas miras al ayudante de distrito, jamás salía a hacer campaña en el Mediterráneo, sino que lograba ser enviado a las Indias, y una vez allí, y con la connivencia de las autoridades locales, se establecía y no regresaba a su país". G. DESDEVICES DU DÉZERT, *La España del Antiguo Régimen* (París, 1899; reed. traducida, Madrid, 1989), 554.

⁴⁷ En el peor de los casos, los desertores se introducían en las redes del contrabando o sobrevivían del robo de ganados. AGM, Matrículas, 1.948, 17 enero 1784.

Marina que a consecuencia de la escasez de europeos, especialmente para servir como oficiales de mar y maestranza, “se han tolerado siempre los desertores que no han podido ser cojidos antes de la salida de los vageles”. De hecho, bastantes de los oficiales y tripulación del *giro* de Acapulco eran prófugos, al igual que los carpinteros y calafates empleados entonces en el astillero de Manila. Muchos habían echado raíces casándose allí. Por todo ello, el Gobernador de Filipinas, al tiempo de solicitar el fomento de la emigración española a aquel territorio⁴⁸-defendió que se tuviese por legal la situación de estos antiguos prófugos, habiendo de evitarse, no obstante, que en lo sucesivo se fugasen los tripulantes de las embarcaciones reales que arribasen a la isla. Así lo aprobó el rey, y en consecuencia se fijó bando para la aprehensión de los desertores de la fragata *Palas*, mientras que se confirmó la tolerancia con aquellos otros⁴⁹.

En suma, que las posibilidades laborales de los desertores fueron mayores de las que cabría suponer y guardan relación con la rigidez de la oferta de mano de obra marítima debido a la defensa a ultranza de la teórica exclusividad de los matriculados en las actividades del mar. Ni las duras penas, cuya severidad varió en función de la gravedad del delito (huida en tiempo de guerra, reincidencia...), paliadas con periódicos indultos, ni la promoción de las delaciones mediante premios en metálico y exenciones del servicio militar lograron mitigar esta sangría en al Armada. A favor de los desertores jugó la complicidad de sus familiares y la económica de patronos y armadores, sin olvidar que los medios coactivos de los subdelegados de Marina para contener este delito fueron claramente insuficientes y escasa la colaboración que les prestaron las restantes autoridades.

⁴⁸ En particular para gobernar las embarcaciones del tráfico interior, cuyos propietarios experimentaban a menudo perjuicios por los desórdenes de los indios que las tripulaban, calificados de “hombres sin obligaciones” y “lentos de vicios”. AGS, Secretaría de Marina, 269, 30 diciembre 1773; 28 septiembre 1774.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Rosaria Bottari

Questione della lingua: matrice veneta e rotte commerciali

Come e perché Venezia e il Veneto abbiano non solo avuto importanza strategica, ma presieduto all'elaborazione di una lingua letteraria 'nazionale' nella prima metà del sedicesimo secolo, rimangono domande che Carlo Dionisotti pose circa quarant'anni fa¹ e alle quali solo un'occasionale, benché pregevole, impegno ha cercato di far fronte².

Numerosi e stimolanti sono stati gli spunti che *passim* l'insigne studioso ha offerto all'escussione filologica e alla riflessione letteraria seriore, ma una malintesa settorialità degli studi italianistici non ha permesso di cogliere i frutti più maturi di un approccio versatile e sintetico.

Diversi fattori hanno concorso a fare delle Serenissima e dei suoi domini terrestri e marittimi un luogo ideale in cui, tra la seconda metà del '400 e la prima metà del '500, la circolazione di lingue, di costumi, di letterature diverse ha creato un punto di vista linguistico distante tanto da municipalismi quanto da sperimentazioni eslegi dall'uso e, proprio per questo, determinante nella soluzione della Questione rinascimentale della lingua³.

¹ In occasione del III Corso Internazionale d'Alta Cultura «Rinascimento europeo e Rinascimento veneziano», promosso dal Comune di Venezia e dalla Fondazione Giorgio Cini nel Settembre del 1961, Dionisotti tenne quattro lezioni (*La lingua italiana da Venezia all'Europa, Il Fortunio e la Filologia umanistica, Niccolò Luburnio e la letteratura cortigiana, Pietro Bembo e la nuova letteratura*) nelle quali cercò di dimostrare, attraverso il resoconto storico di personaggi ed episodi più o meno noti, quale fosse stato il contributo di Venezia e del Veneto nella Questione della lingua e nella creazione di una lingua di cultura che nel XVI secolo divenne paradigma europeo. Le quattro lezioni, come peraltro tutti gli atti del Corso Internazionale, furono pubblicati nel volume *Rinascimento europeo e Rinascimento veneziano*, a cura di V. BRANCA, Firenze 1967.

² Tra i pochi vi è il corposo sforzo rivolto in una direzione storico-culturale della *Storia della cultura veneta*, 10 voll., Vicenza 1976-86, all'interno della quale vi è il pregevole contributo di PIERO FLORIANI, *Grammatici e teorici della letteratura volgare*, 3.1, 139-181.

³ Pletorico il numero di esempi di testi a carattere pratico scritti in volgare nel Veneto nel Cinquecento: si va da formulari di lettere commerciali a manuali di contabilità come il *Libro mercantile* di Domenico Manzoni, Venezia 1564-65, ai resoconti di viaggi che proprio dopo la scoperta dell'America conoscono una diffusione straordinaria, tra que-

Grazie all'indebolimento dell'espansionismo ottomano⁴ e all'occupazione della preziosa Marca trevigiana, il quindicesimo secolo si apre per il *Comune Veneciarum* all'insegna di un recuperato vigore economico e mercantile. Proprio su quelle rotte che garantiscono i contatti con gli empori del Mediterraneo orientale e segnatamente rumeni incomincia a viaggiare l'attività diplomatica del Crisolora⁵ e, attraverso questa, il recupero testuale ed archeologico della classicità greca che proprio in quegli anni diventa necessario *pendant* della filologia umanistica latina⁶. I viaggi di

sti uno dei più diffusi è *Paesi nuovamente ritrovati et Novo Mondo da Alberico Vesputio Fiorentino intitolato* (Vicenza 1507), una raccolta dei celebri resoconti di Colombo, Vespucci ed altri messa insieme da Fracanzio Moltalabbo. Tralasciamo gli esempi di raccolte epistolari in volgare di uomini illustri come l'Aretino, il Bembo e varie raccolte antologiche la cui notizia si trova agevolmente nei manuali di letteratura tanto quanto l'impiego del volgare nella commedia veneziana e nelle raccolte liriche di Maffeo Venier e Bartolomeo Cavassico.

⁴ Si allude alla sconfitta subita ad Ankara (Angora) da parte di Tamerlano e del suo esercito turco-mongolo nel 1402. Tale disfatta causa un decennio di crisi interna nel regno ottomano dell'Asia minore cui metterà fine l'ascesa al potere di Maometto I (1413-21) e del suo successore Murad II (1421-51). Il breve periodo di anni però darà modo all'agonizzante impero bizantino, di intensificare i suoi rapporti diplomatici con l'Europa e con Venezia in particolare.

⁵ Emanuele Crisolora (Costantinopoli, 1350 – Costanza, 15 aprile 1415), umanista bizantino. Compì numerosi viaggi diplomatici per conto dell'Imperatore Manuele II Paleologo, cercando di avvicinare gli stati europei (e in particolare lo Stato Pontificio) all'Impero Bizantino per fronteggiare la pressione turca. In questa veste riuscì anche ad esportare la cultura greca e a rilanciare la conoscenza del greco antico. In particolare in Italia l'intellettuale creò un vasto consenso che gli fruttò nel 1396 la prima cattedra di greco presso lo *Studium* fiorentino.

⁶ Guarino Veronese (Verona, dicembre 1370 – Ferrara, 4 dicembre 1460), umanista italiano. Conobbe a Costantinopoli Emanuele Crisolora che gli fu maestro nell'apprendimento del greco e lo accompagnò in alcuni viaggi. Rientrato in Italia succedette al Crisolora nella cattedra fiorentina di greco e nel 1411 Venezia gli offrì la possibilità di aprire una scuola di lingua greca. Giovanni Aurispa (Noto, 1376 – Ferrara, 1459), umanista e mercante italiano, si trasferì in Grecia attorno al 1413 dove imparò il greco, al ritorno dal suo viaggio riportò numerosi manoscritti, si stabilì a Firenze nel 1419, qui si dedicò all'insegnamento del greco presso lo Studio fiorentino. Continuò comunque a esercitare la sua attività di mercante e a svolgere missioni diplomatiche. I suoi numerosi viaggi lo portarono di nuovo a Costantinopoli nel 1421. Francesco Filelfo (Tolentino, 25 luglio 1398 – Firenze, 31 luglio 1481), umanista italiano. A partire dal 1419 svolse per sette anni funzione diplomatica a Costantinopoli per conto della Repubblica veneziana e acquisì una buona conoscenza della lingua. Conobbe il Crisolora e ne sposò la nipote Teodora, e su segnalazione del dotto bizantino fu impiegato in diverse missioni diplomatiche dall'imperatore Giovanni VIII Paleologo. Ciriaco Pizzecolli detto Ciriaco d'Ancona (Ancona, 1391 – Cremona, 1452), archeologo, epigrafista e viaggiatore italiano. Figura originale dello scenario intellettuale italiano, di famiglia di commercianti iniziò già da ragazzo a recarsi al seguito del nonno a Venezia, i suoi spostamenti lo portarono in giro per il Mediterraneo. Studiò il latino a Roma e il greco a Costantinopoli e si dedicò al recupero dei monumenti dell'antichità classica tramite dettagliate descrizioni, corredate di disegni di suo pugno e raccolte nei sei volumi dei suoi *Commentarii*. La sottile trama che lega l'Italia, segnata-

Guarino, dello stesso Crisolora, dell'Aurispa⁷, del Filelfo e di Ciriaco D'Ancona si svolgono all'ombra di contatti commerciali e politici che salpano nella quasi totalità dei casi da Venezia e la velocità e l'intensità con cui un impressionante numero di manoscritti, in copie o in originali, transitano in direzione della penisola italiana sarebbe stata impensabile al di fuori delle rotte marine venete⁸.

Il Concilio di Firenze e Ferrara (1438-42), alimentato dalle ansie unionistiche della *pars* bizantina che vede sempre più concretizzarsi il pericolo turco, rinserra queste acquisizioni anche sul versante patristico: le controversie teologiche vengono risolte all'interno di agguerrite dispute esegetiche in cui risulta essenziale l'operazione ermeneutica sul testo sacro e sugli scritti teologici dei Padri, nonché sulle rielaborazioni latine altomedievali.

La caduta di Costantinopoli (1453) trasforma la città in un *carrefour* da cui affluiscono in Italia i maestri e gli intellettuali greci, transfughi da Bisanzio, e l'afflusso di codici dall'Asia e dalla Grecia prende i connotati di una autentica *traslatio studii*: fiumi di manoscritti, esemplati su commissione o acquistati, vengono a riversarsi in importanti biblioteche da cui trarrà linfa gran parte dell'Umanesimo greco⁹. Una di queste, quella del neocardinale Bessarione, trova ospitalità proprio a Venezia¹⁰.

È singolare notare come la letteratura greca, il fattore destabilizzante

mente meridionale, con la lingua greca nell'alto e basso Medioevo è ricostruita in W. BERSCHIN, *Medioevo greco-latino*, Napoli 1989, per la parte umanistica meglio N.G. WILSON, *Da Bisanzio all'Italia: gli studi greci nell'Umanesimo italiano*, Alessandria, 2000.

⁷ Per molti di questi viaggi risultano ancora insostituibili gli studi di REMIGIO SABBADINI *Guariniana: 2, La scuola e gli studi di Guarino veronese*, Torino 1964 (rist. anast.) e *Le scoperte dei codici latini e greci ne' secoli 14. e 15.*, Firenze 1996 (ripr. dell'edizione Firenze 1967).

⁸ Della sterminata bibliografia si consulti almeno B. ARBEL, *Venezia e il Mediterraneo nel Cinquecento*, in 1490. *En el umbral de la modernidad*, Valencia 1994, 15-22; E. ASHTOR, *East-West Trade in the Medieval Mediterranean*, London 1986; F. BRAUDEL, *La vita economica di Venezia nel secolo XVI*, in *La civiltà veneziana del Rinascimento*, Firenze 1958, 81-102; *Venezia centro di mediazione fra Oriente e Occidente (sec. XV-XVI). Aspetti e problemi. Atti del II convegno internazionale di storia della civiltà veneziana (Venise, 3-6 octobre 1973)*, a cura di H.G. BECK, M. MANOUSSACAS e A. PERTUGI, Firenze 1977; J. C. HOCQUET, *Les routes maritimes du commerce vénitien au XV^e et XVI^e siècles*, in *Atti del V convegno internazionale di studi colombiani. Navi e navigazione nei sec. XV e XVI*, Genova 1990, 581-605; e soprattutto U. TUCCI, *Il patrizio veneziano mercante e umanista*, in *Mercanti, navi, monete nel Cinquecento veneziano*, Bologna 1981, 15-42; TUCCI, *Mercanti, viaggiatori, pellegrini nel Quattrocento*, in *Storia della cultura veneta*, 3.2, *Dal primo Quattrocento al Concilio di Trento*, Vicenza 1980, 317-353; *La psicologia del mercante veneziano*, in *Mercanti, navi, monete nel Cinquecento veneziano*, Bologna 1981, 43-94; *Tra Venezia e mondo turco: i mercanti, in Venezia e i Turchi*, Milano 1985, 38-55.

⁹ Per le ricadute filologico-letterarie del Concilio: *Firenze e il Concilio del 1439. Convegno di studi (Firenze, 29 Novembre-2 Dicembre 1989)*, a cura di P. VITI, Firenze 1994, e J. GILL, *Il concilio di Firenze*, Firenze 1967.

¹⁰ L. LABOWSKY, *Bessarion's Library and the Biblioteca Marciana*, Roma 1979, R. ZORZI, *La Libreria di San Marco. Libri, lettori, società nella Venezia dei Dogi*, Milano 1987.

del primato linguistico del latino nella cultura umanistica nello scorcio del XV sec., abbia il suo abbrivio proprio sulle rotte commerciali venete – sia quelle adriatiche che le nuove, le quali, attraverso il periplo della penisola italiana, e toccandone i principali porti, attraccano nella Francia meridionale – e raggiunga l'acme della propria feconda, tuttavia indiretta, influenza nella questione linguistica italiana proprio nel luogo da dove era partita con sorprendente effetto *rebound*.

Più di un cinquantennio di scavi filologici, di sofisticata prassi scolastica e agguerrite dispute accademiche costituiscono la *humus* su cui si sviluppa una complessa e copiosa attività a stampa, prevalentemente veneta, di cui il magistero manuntino in ambito greco rappresenta l'esito più incisivo.

Ma cinquanta anni di studio comparato della classicità latina e greca, di "bilinguismo imperfetto"¹¹ da parte dei filologi umanisti apre la strada ad una letteratura plurilingue: lo studio dell'ebraico nei collegi più elitari e la ripresa della letteratura volgare affiancano e stimolano questa plurivocità la cui cassa di risonanza è il nuovo 'contenitore' poliglotta ed adattato ad un pubblico in rapidissima espansione e differenziazione: la stampa. Le corsive alpine raccolgono questa eredità e hanno forza tassonomica sulle altre stamperie italiane¹².

Il Cinquecento nel Dominio non si apre solo con una alacre e sperimentale attività editoriale: per le stesse rotte del secolo appena passato si muove adesso il ceto intellettuale di tutto il polo veneziano che rappresenta all'inizio del Cinquecento il momento dinamico e di confronto sia con la roccaforte romana dell'Umanesimo, sia con la rete delle corti centro-settentrionali le quali, sulla scorta di avviate tradizioni letterarie, mettono in campo i primi esempi di un volgare in posizione antagonista rispetto al latino. Sarebbe fuorviante in ogni caso collocare la problematica linguistica esclusivamente all'interno di preoccupazioni retoriche di una vivace letteratura volgare, andrebbe piuttosto inquadrata all'interno di più vaste problematiche e strategie comunicative nel processo osmotico di integrazione culturale dei vari centri italiani: l'infittirsi dei rapporti di-

¹¹ L'espressione è mediata dalla sociolinguistica ed applicata alla cultura umanistica dove in presenza di due lingue di cultura la posizione di maggior prestigio (e comprensione) è stata sempre attribuita al latino.

¹² Oltre a rendere maggiormente accessibile le opere recuperate della classicità latina e greca in virtù della propria capacità esponenziale di diffusione, la stampa opera intrinsecamente un processo di razionalizzazione ortografica e dunque di omologazione linguistica che è tra i maggiori fattori che concorrono alla creazione di uno standard nazionale per l'italiano. Cfr. P. TROVATO, *Con ogni diligenza corretto. La stampa e le revisioni editoriali dei testi letterari italiani (1470-1570)*, Bologna 1991; TROVATO, *L'ordine dei tipografi: lettori, stampatori, correttori tra Quattro e Cinquecento*, Roma 1998. Per la vicenda editoriale di Manuzio C. DIONISOTTI, *Aldo Manuzio editore. Dediche, prefazioni, note ai testi* (testo latino, traduzione, note di G. Orlandi), Milano 1975.

plomatici e commerciali tra la Serenissima e il sistema regionale italiano – proprio in virtù dell’anomala congiuntura storica e politica di questo periodo – si associano ad una ‘territoriale’ curiosità e propensione ai problemi della comunicazione linguistica ai più vari livelli della vita sociale.

Non c’è da stupirsi dunque se il Veneto costituisca terreno fertile per il dilagare delle tesi riformistiche: lo *Studium* patavino, dopo un breve periodo di chiusura, riprende la propria attività divenendo polo d’attrazione di studenti italiani, francesi e tedeschi che vi porteranno il nuovo dibattito religioso, mentre a Venezia, tra le preoccupazioni del patriarca Querini e le lagnanze di Mons. Carafa, la predicazione luterana e la circolazione clandestina o demandata al prestito di testi come *l’Unio dissidentium* ha cittadinanza già dal primo ventennio del Cinquecento. Particolare vigore ha inoltre la diffusione del pensiero didattico religioso erasmiano che assieme all’anabattismo attecchisce nelle zone più periferiche del Dominio in forza di una pratica devota sommersa, ma molto capillare, e dell’azione di alcune scuole umanistiche i cui programmi pedagogici prevedono la compulsazione in lingua della Bibbia e di tutti quei testi eruditi e filosofici *de rebus divinis*¹³.

La riforma in Veneto non è priva di presupposti e di conseguenze linguistiche: incide profondamente il pensiero teologico dei riformatori italiani, Iacopo Sadoletto e Marcantonio Flaminio ne sono assi portanti. Sono per lo più umanisti, menti formate al culto della retorica, dell’educazione, dell’*institutio* linguistico-letteraria come tappa obbligata nella formazione dell’uomo cui non può essere disgiunto un sentimento religioso nutrito dalla lettura assidua e diretta della *lectio* evangelica. Si capisce allora come tale *renovatio* morale e religiosa, per la verità avvertita più dai fedeli che dai ranghi ecclesiastici, abbia bisogno di un *medium* linguistico che coniughi necessità comunicative e solide strutture retorico-grammaticali.

Il modello di lingua teorizzato da Pietro Bembo nelle *Prose della volgar lingua* (1525), che rappresenta la sintesi della questione della lingua, non

¹³ G. COZZI, *Politica, cultura e religione nella Venezia del ‘500*, in *Cultura e società nel Rinascimento tra riforme e manierismi*, a cura di V. BRANCA e C. OSSOLA, Firenze 1984; G. FRAGNITO, *Cultura umanistica e riforma religiosa*, in “Studi Veneziani”, 11 (1969); H. JEDIN, *Gasparo Contarini e il contributo veneziano alla riforma cattolica*, in *La civiltà veneziana del Rinascimento*, Firenze 1958; H. JEDIN, *Venezia e il Concilio di Trento*, in “Studi veneziani”, 14 (1972). Per la capillare diffusione in area veneta: PIO PASCHINI, *Eresia e riforma cattolica al confine orientale d’Italia*, Roma 1951; A. STELLA, *Dall’anabattismo al socinanesimo nel Cinquecento veneto*, Padova 1963; A. STELLA, *Movimenti di riforma nel Veneto nel Cinque-Seicento*, in *Storia della cultura veneta*, a cura di F. ARNALDI e M. PASTORE STOCCHI, 4.1; L. DE BIASIO, *L’eresia protestante in Friuli nella seconda metà del secolo XVI*, in “Memorie storiche feroigiuliesi”, 52 (1972). In particolare per l’edizione di testi greci si veda *Le edizioni di testi greci da Aldo Manuzio e le prime tipografie greche di Venezia*, a cura di M. I. MANOUSSACAS e C. STAIKOS, Atene 1993.

poteva non nascere sotto questi auspici, non poteva non risentire di questa tradizione, non poteva non rispondere a esigenze molteplici e di natura assai diversa come quelle che si prospettano nel territorio veneto. La foltissima schiera di studi sulla Questione della lingua rendono ragione di uno sviluppo diacronico, quantunque di medio e breve raggio, della prassi e delle teorie che nel primo trentennio del sedicesimo secolo presiedono all'elaborazione ed individuazione del modello volgare veneto fuori da quella grande officina teorica che furono le discussioni linguistiche cinquecentesche, ma non rende giustizia a tutte quelle concause sincroniche di ordine storico, politico e culturale, nel senso più ampio del termine, che individuano nel Dominio veneto l'unica area strategica in cui vengono a convergere, a cavallo tra il Quattrocento e il Cinquecento, traffici commerciali e fratture culturali di portata epocale in un tessuto sociale tradizionalmente aperto e curioso nei confronti della lingua volgare e specialmente in un'aristocrazia che, lontana dagli accademismi dell'Umanesimo italiano, ne recepisce le ricadute più rivoluzionarie e le coniuga alla *renovatio* religiosa che attraverserà fino al secolo seguente l'intero continente europeo.

Carmen Depasquale

Le rôle de la mer dans la vie maltaise
d'après quelques ouvrages en français
du XVIII^e siècle

«Les Maltais sont attirés par la mer et non par l'agriculture (la moitié de l'île est inculte)»¹. Cette affirmation se trouve dans un mémoire joint à une lettre que le Grand Maître Emmanuel Pinto² adressa le 3 mai 1763, au chevalier Turgot³ pour lui expliquer pourquoi il ne pouvait pas accueillir la demande de Louis XV pour l'envoi des Maltais en Guyane qui venait d'être colonisée. Vingt-quatre ans auparavant, c'est à Malte qu'avait pensé l'empereur Charles VI lorsqu'il avait besoin de «quelques centaines de matelots et [...] un certain nombre d'officiers» pour servir sur le Danube. En accueillant cette demande le Grand Maître Ramon Despuig⁴ lui avait envoyé «trois cents matelots d'élite [...] avec quatorze chevaliers pour les commander [...]». Une note nous apprend que «ce secours [était] accompagné d'un aumônier, d'un médecin et d'un chirurgien [...] et que] la Religion⁵ [a donné] double paye aux matelots, quarante écus par mois à chaque chevalier, avec cent écus pour l'habit uniforme. Le Grand Maître a voulu aussi se charger d'habiller les trois cents matelots à ses dépens»⁶.

¹ National Library of Malta (NLM), *Arch* 1578, 188-190.

² Le Grand Maître de l'Ordre de Malte, Emmanuel Pinto de Fonseca, Portugais, né en 1681, régna de 1741 à 1773.

³ Etienne-François Turgot (1721-1788) fut reçu en minorité dans la Langue de France à l'âge de 15 mois. Son frère était l'économiste et ministre des Finances de Louis XV, Anne Robert-Jacques Turgot. Le chevalier Turgot fut nommé gouverneur général de la Guyane en 1763, mais y séjourna à peine quatre mois, du 22 décembre 1764 jusqu'au mois d'avril 1765. Il fut nommé associé libre de l'Académie royale des sciences en 1765. Dès 1768, il se retira dans son château de Bons en Normandie où il se consacra à la botanique et à l'agronomie. Il s'y éteignit le 25 décembre 1788.

⁴ Ramon Despuig, Aragonais, fut élu Grand Maître en 1736. Il mourut en 1741.

⁵ Une autre appellation pour l'Ordre de Malte.

⁶ NLM, *Misc* 276, pièce n° 10. La lettre de Charles VI est datée du 7 janvier 1739 et la note, du 30 mai 1739.

Tous les voyageurs remarquent les qualités du matelot maltais. L'auteur anonyme de *Malte, Corse, Minorque et Gibraltar*⁷ en fait ce portrait fort élogieux: «En général on est content du Maltais. Fidélité, intelligence, empressement, services, docilité, générosité, rien ne lui manque. Le voyageur y trouve la plus sûre sauvegarde et la tutelle la plus douce, une propriété, et même de la grâce dans tous leurs mouvements et l'agilité d'un oiseau». Pour Roland de La Platière qui arrive à Malte en 1776, «les Maltais qui se comparent aux Génois passent pour les meilleurs marins de la Méditerranée»⁸. Lorsque ce voyageur décrit le port, il observe que l'île est bien équipée pour pourvoir à tout ce qui se rapporte avec l'industrie marine: «Qu'un gros bâtiment souffre dans la Méditerranée; il ne peut se réparer, se fournir de gros agrêts, de matures, voiles, câbles, etc. dans presque aucun port. A Malthe, on trouve de tout et les meilleurs ouvriers pour préparer et mettre en place»⁹. Le même voyageur assiste à l'inspection des chanvres qui servaient à la manufacture des cordes, faite «très scrupuleusement en présence des chefs des corderies et voileries» par un chevalier, pour le compte de la marine de l'Ordre. Il s'étonne de l'habileté des Maltais qui «sont les meilleurs plongeurs que l'on connaisse» pour réparer «un bâtiment [qui] a quelque voie d'eau. Ils la bouchent très bien sans décharger le navire», jusqu'à découvrir la voie; ils «replongent pour travailler: ils font une espèce de calfat et clouent dessus une plaque de fer, aussi bien qu'on le ferait hors de l'eau»¹⁰.

«La nation [maltaise] a conservé de son origine l'esprit mercantile et de calcul»¹¹. Cette phrase de Dominique Vivant Denon, arrivé à Malte en 1778, trouve son écho dans *Malte, Corse, Minorque et Gibraltar*: «Il se forme des associations pour les chargements, même pour les voyages; et on partage ou l'argent ou les parts des marchandises avec scrupule, et des hommes qui ne savent ni lire ni chiffrer font des fractions exactes et trouvent l'aliquote de leur multiplicateur aussi promptement qu'un habile mathématicien»¹². De même, François-Emmanuel Guignard de Saint-Priest affirme que le commerce maritime est bien réglé, et ce, depuis 1697: «On trouve à Malte des compagnies de spéculateurs qui assurent à un taux raisonnable les biens, la vie et la liberté. Les causes relatives au commerce sont portées à un tribunal consulaire qu'institua en 1697 à la cité

⁷ Anonyme, *Malte, Corse, Minorque et Gibraltar* (s. l., 1791, 1797), 146.

⁸ JEAN-MARIE ROLAND DE LA PLATIÈRE, *Lettres écrites de Suisse, d'Italie, de Sicile et de Malthe* (Amsterdam, 1776), III, 41.

⁹ ROLAND DE LA PLATIÈRE, *Lettres*, 69.

¹⁰ ROLAND DE LA PLATIÈRE, *Lettres*, 89-90.

¹¹ DOMINIQUE VIVANT DENON, *Voyage en Sicile* (Paris, 1788), 146.

¹² Anonyme, *Malte*, 71-72.

Vallette le Grand Maître Perellos¹³, après avoir fait d'exactes recherches sur les usages des plus célèbres places de commerce»¹⁴.

La mer c'est la vie, de l'Ordre d'abord: les revenus recueillis des divers prieurés et commanderies arrivent à Malte par les vaisseaux de l'Ordre, comme aussi toutes sortes d'équipement pour la défense de l'île. Équipement pour la vie dans le sens strict du terme: les instruments chirurgicaux arrivaient à Malte, principalement de Paris¹⁵, les drogues y arrivaient de Paris, de Marseilles, de Naples, de Venise et de Florence, les objets en verre nécessaires au laboratoire de pharmacie arrivaient principalement de Marseilles, des manuels et des livres de médecine arrivaient de France et d'Italie¹⁶. Ces vaisseaux amenaient aussi des ingénieurs français, comme Louis-François d'Aubigné de Tigné et Charles-François de Mondion¹⁷, ainsi qu'ils avaient amené le siècle précédent d'autres fameux bâtisseurs de fortifications dont les Italiens, Francesco Lapparelli en 1565 et Pietro Paolo Floriani en 1635.

La mer représente le gagne-pain pour la grande partie de la population. L'activité portuaire est intense. Le blé, le vin¹⁸ et la glace sont importés de Sicile, on exporte les oranges¹⁹, l'eau de fleur d'orange, du cumin, le

¹³ Ramon Perellos y Rocaful, Aragonais, régna de 1697 à 1720.

¹⁴ Anonyme [FRANÇOIS-EMMANUEL GUIGNARD DE SAINT-PRIEST], *Malte par un voyageur français* (Malte, 1791), 46.

¹⁵ PAUL CASSAR, *Medical History of Malta* (London, 1965), 133.

¹⁶ PAUL CASSAR, "Importation of Drugs and Equipment for the Pharmacy of the Holy Infirmary of Valletta in the Eighteenth Century", *Journal of the Malta Union of Pharmacists*, I (1967), 19.

¹⁷ Voir NLM, *Libr 1219, Dissertation sur l'état présent de la cité Cottonere, des forts Sainte-Marguerite, du Bourg et de l'Isle*, datée du 15 mai 1715 et signée par cinq ingénieurs dont Tigné et Mondion.

¹⁸ ALAIN BLONDY, *L'Ordre de Malte au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 2002), 102-103: «La production maltaise étant insuffisante, l'importation des vins siciliens était nécessaire [...]. En 1723, il y avait 28 négociants importateurs et 5 patrons de bateaux spécialisés dans le commerce du vin».

¹⁹ Sur ce commerce, voir ALAIN BLONDY, *Parfum de cour, gourmandise de rois: le commerce des oranges entre Malte et la France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, La Valette, 2003). *L'Avant-Propos* explique qu'il s'agit de «la correspondance [...] échangée entre Joseph Savoye, épicier de luxe à Paris, et son fils aîné Louis, jeune abbé rattaché à l'Ordre de Malte, correspondance dont l'unique thème est le commerce des oranges et de leurs produits dérivés entre le centre essentiel de leur production, Malte, et le royaume de France. Ce sont 144 lettres qui courent la période qui va de 1777 à 1787 [...]. Cet échange épistolaire [...] est une mine pour la connaissance du commerce des oranges au moment même où celui-ci se développe. En effet, le dernier tiers du XVIII^e siècle vit à la fois un changement des goûts et une transformation des pratiques commerciales. La généralisation de la culture de l'orange douce transforma alors ce fruit d'un objet de luxe exotique en un produit de consommation. Dès lors la demande accrue en entraîna une commercialisation

cynomorium coccineum, champignon très recherché pour ses qualités pharmaceutiques²⁰ et le coton et sa filature, y compris la manufacture des bas, des bonnets et des gants. Dans sa correspondance, le commandeur de Dolomieu signale plusieurs aspects de ce commerce. «Je compte employer quelque argent à acheter à Malte des citrons et à les vendre en France; c'est une spéculation qui peut être avantageuse, et dans l'état de détresse où tout le monde se trouve, il faut employer toutes sortes d'industrie», écrit-il à son ami, le chevalier de Fay, qui se trouve à Malte, dans une lettre datée du 4 décembre 1795, ce qui explique «l'état de détresse» postrévolutionnaire dont il parle. Dans la même lettre, il demande à son ami de «recommander [à Marguerite, son ancienne servante à Malte] de [lui] faire des bas [...]». «J'en voudrais de blancs et de jaunes, tous à côtes [...] fins ou gros, pourvu qu'ils soient forts [...]»²¹, précise-t-il. Il en est de même pour le vin. Son ami, Picot de Lapeyrouse, avait demandé à Dolomieu qui se trouvait à Malte de lui procurer du vin et du café. Le chevalier lui répond le 3 juin 1783: «J'écris à Trieste pour le marasquin et à Chypre et en Sicile pour le vin. Le moka sera plus difficile à vous procurer; il faut pour cela attendre l'occasion de quelques prises sur les Turcs». Presque deux ans après, en avril 1785, il lui expédie «trois caisses et deux petits tonneaux [...]. L'un des tonneaux contient environ 55 bouteilles de vin muscat de Syracuse et l'autre 30 de vin dit *Calabrese*, espèce précieuse qui se fait auprès d'Augusta en Sicile. Une des caisses renferme trente bouteilles, dont quatre des fleurs d'orange double et vingt-six de différentes espèces de marasquin [...]». Quant au café, il ne lui en envoie pas, car «le moka est extrêmement cher, et tout celui qui [...] vient du Levant est déjà mêlé avec de plus de moitié de café des îles»²².

Malte est, surtout au XVIII^e siècle, un grand entrepôt. L'auteur anonyme de *Malte, Corse, Minorque et Gibraltar* affirme: «Les rubis de Messine sont un commerce que les Grecs font par les Maltais dans le Levant. Toutes les marchandises du Levant vont à Messine par Malte ou par Livourne [...].

à grande échelle. Malte en fut alors l'unique centre de production et de commerce».

²⁰ Ce champignon – d'ailleurs un lichen – poussait à Gozo sur un rocher appelé *Gebblatal-General* (la pierre du général). On le ramassait uniquement par ordre du Grand Maître. À l'époque, on l'utilisa comme remède contre les hémorragies, la dysenterie et les maladies vénériennes.

²¹ ALFRED LACROIX, *Déodat Dolomieu* (Paris, 1921), I, 107-108. Dieudonné, dit Déodat de Gratet Dolomieu (1750-1801) fut reçu dans la Langue d'Auvergne le 4 octobre 1750 et obtint la commanderie de Sainte-Anne en 1780. Il est l'auteur de plusieurs ouvrages dont *Voyage aux îles Lipari* (1783) et *Mémoire sur les tremblements de terre de la Calabre qui eut lieu en l'année 1783* (Rome, 1784). Minéralogiste et géologue, son nom reste associé aux Dolomites.

²² LACROIX, *Déodat Dolomieu*, 137.

Le débit considérable de provisions de toute espèce qu'entraîne le grand nombre de navires qui fréquentent le port de Malte donne un bénéfice aux marchands dont l'active intelligence met à profit le plus léger besoin des étrangers»²³. Roland de La Platière signale, lui aussi, cette activité portuaire: «Le port, vaste, sûr, est dans la position la plus avantageuse pour le commerce de la Méditerranée. Les bâtiments qui reviennent du Levant y relâchent tous, surtout depuis qu'on a supprimé le Lazaret de Messine; souvent ils y vendent leur cargaison, ils y trouvent toujours du moins les ordres des armateurs pour la destination. On y vend actuellement un navire napolitain et sa cargaison, pris par un corsaire africain et vendu à un Anglais qui s'en défait ici»²⁴. L'historien Alain Blondy répertorie une liste exhaustive de marchandises. «Du Levant arrivèrent les grains, les dattes, les figues, les raisins secs, l'huile, le coton, la soie, le lin, les cordages, le cuir (brut ou travaillé), le bois de buis; d'Occident, vinrent les grains, le bois à brûler, les draps, la laine, les produits manufacturés. Malte devint donc un grand centre d'échanges, au point que les magasins et entrepôts du quai de la Barrière s'avérèrent insuffisants. En 1752, Pinto décida de construire [...] dix-neuf magasins»²⁵.

Lorsque Charles V offrit l'île de Malte à l'Ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem en 1530, il savait très bien que la marine de l'Ordre, quoique petite, était capable de s'occuper de la police de la Méditerranée. Dans ses *Réflexions politiques sur l'état et les devoirs des chevaliers de Malthe* (La Haye, 1739), le chevalier Luc de Boyer d'Argens cite parmi les «principaux devoirs des chevaliers [celui] de défendre la Religion contre les Infidèles, de détruire les pirates et les Mahométans»²⁶. Il consacre un chapitre intitulé *De l'utilité des chevaliers de Malthe et des services considérables qu'ils rendent à toute l'Europe*, pour démontrer que l'Ordre sert de «boulevard contre les Infidèles» pour l'Italie, que ses escadres «garantissent [l'Espagne] des pirates barbaresques [...] et] la sûreté des bâtiments [français, hollandais et anglais] qui vont dans le Levant. [...] Ces pays] doivent regarder les vaisseaux de Malthe comme des escadres employées perpétuellement à purger la Méditerranée des corsaires dont elle est si infectée»²⁷. C'est dans ce

²³ ANONYME, *Malte*, 70-71.

²⁴ ROLAND DE LA PLATIÈRE, *Lettres*, 69-70.

²⁵ BLONDY, *L'Ordre de Malte*, 46-47.

²⁶ LUC DE BOYER D'ARGENS, *Réflexions politiques sur l'état et les devoirs des chevaliers de Malthe* (La Haye, 1739), 115.

²⁷ BOYER D'ARGENS, *Réflexions*, 106-108. Les archives maltaises conservent plusieurs lettres envoyées par des souverains aux Grands Maîtres pour les remercier des services rendus au cours de leurs campagnes. Telle la lettre de Louis XIV datée du 10 août 1664 où le roi remercie le Grand Maître Nicolas Cotoner pour avoir envoyé les galères de l'Ordre à Gigeri.

contexte que l'auteur de *Malthe, Corse, Minorque et Gibraltar* constate que «les prises sur les barbaresques procurent [aux Maltais] des objets de trafic»²⁸. Parmi ces «objets», on compte aussi les hommes qui, devenant captifs, eux aussi, font partie du butin. Ainsi, le voyageur Roland de La Platière, assistant aux préparatifs pour le départ d'une caravane²⁹, constate-t-il que «ces corsaires disparaissent» quand le bruit court qu'une caravane maltaise est partie en mer. Il poursuit son récit en traitant du commerce des esclaves: «on trafique ces hommes comme des animaux» et il cite les prix qui varient «depuis 300 jusqu'à 1200 livres [...] et l'on paie quelquefois cent louis et mille écus»³⁰. Ces captifs deviennent des galériens, d'autres, moins robustes, achetés par les particuliers, deviennent leurs domestiques et embrassent souvent la religion chrétienne. Le Grand Maître se sert des captifs pour des raisons diplomatiques ainsi, par exemple, le 5 octobre 1787, le Grand Maître Emmanuel de Rohan Polduc (1775-1797) fait-il don au roi de France de quelques esclaves marocains³¹. À l'occasion de la visite à Malte de l'ambassadeur du bey de Tripoli, le même Grand Maître fait également au bey don de six esclaves. Sous la date du 23 mars 1776, l'abbé Boyer écrit dans son journal: «On prépare les présents destinés au bey de Tripoli et à son ambassadeur qui partira incessamment. Entre autres choses, il sera chargé de présenter à son maître six esclaves tripolitains qui se sont trouvés dans la prison»³². Trois jours après, Boyer constate que le Grand Maître «a bien voulu donner encore un esclave de mille écus – or»³³ à l'ambassadeur.

Tout chevalier reçu dans l'Ordre qui voulait poursuivre sa vocation de chevalier de Malte, venait à Malte entre ses 18 et 25 ans pour faire son noviciat. Cette préparation demandait à chaque novice, non seulement l'accomplissement des devoirs religieux et hospitaliers, mais aussi quatre caravanes en mer. C'est là que commença souvent la carrière des grands marins, comme celle du célèbre bailli de Suffren³⁴, nommé vice-amiral du roi de France en 1784. Les journaux de bord et les relations officielles dé-

²⁸ BOYER D' ARGENS, *Réflexions*, 71.

²⁹ Voir COMTE DE SAINT-PRIEST, *Mémoires, Règnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI* (Paris, 1929), 10: «Les 'caravanes' étaient des croisières auxquelles tout chevalier de Malte était astreint de prendre part au moins une fois dans sa vie. Elles avaient pour objet, le plus souvent, d'assurer la police des mers en faisant campagne contre les pirates barbaresques».

³⁰ ROLAND DE LA PLATIÈRE, *Lettres*, 60-63.

³¹ NLM, *Arch* 274, 129 r^o.

³² NLM, *Libr* 137, 161 v^o.

³³ *Ivi*, 165 v^o.

³⁴ Pierre-André de Suffren (1729-1788) fut reçu en minorité dans la Langue de Provence en 1737. Hardi marin, il remporta une série de victoires au large des Indes (1782-1783) jusqu'à la signature de la paix de Versailles en 1783.

posées à la fin de chaque expédition en mer racontent en menus détails les jours passés en mer, les arrêts dans les ports, les visites rendues, la chasse aux vaisseaux barbaresques, les combats en mer et, dans certains cas, les tempêtes et les dégâts, sinon la perte de vie.

La prise du vaisseau la *Couronne Ottomane* par les captifs chrétiens qui étaient à bord et qu'ils conduisirent à Malte suscitait un incident diplomatique important. C'était le vendredi 19 septembre 1760 que l'équipage était descendu à Stanchio³⁵ pour aller à la mosquée. Après s'être libérés, les captifs chrétiens firent prisonniers les Turcs restés à bord et s'emparèrent du vaisseau. Ce n'était donc pas une prise suivant un combat, mais aux yeux du Sultan, un bien volé. Le Grand Vizir se présenta chez l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople, le comte de Vergennes, pour lui demander que la France s'interposât pour obtenir de Malte la restitution du vaisseau turc. Si la France refusait, le Sultan menaçait de rompre tout commerce avec elle. Une crise diplomatique s'ensuivit, il courut le bruit de l'armement turc contre Malte et, le 19 février 1761, le Grand Maître décréta la citation des chevaliers «ad obsequia Religionis», c'est-à-dire les chevaliers qui ne se trouvaient pas dans l'île étaient appelés à venir à sa défense. Mais la solution diplomatique fut bientôt trouvée: la France acheta le vaisseau à l'Ordre et la *Couronne Ottomane* fut restituée au Sultan.

Trois documents d'archives intitulés *Registro degli arrivi e delle partenze dei religiosi Gerosolomitani dall'isola di Malta in cui si trovano anche notati gli arrivi e le partenze delle navi di guerra della Religione* allant de 1753 à 1798³⁶ nous permettent de constater la fréquence des voyages et on peut même s'étonner que, malgré les périls des corsaires et des tempêtes, le nombre de chevaliers qui faisaient le va-et-vient entre Malte et leur pays d'origine était assez élevé. On peut prendre un exemple à partir de la correspondance du commandeur de Dolomieu, publiée en 1921 par Alfred Lacroix. Selon cette correspondance, dans la période qui va de 1768 à 1790, Dolomieu voyage entre Malte, la France et l'Italie au moins treize fois³⁷.

³⁵ Aujourd'hui Cos. Les relations officielles rédigées par les capitaines des vaisseaux étaient enregistrées en Chancellerie, après leur lecture en Conseil. Souvent, le Grand Maître accordait une pension aux veuves des matelots maltais au service de l'Ordre, après une demande de leur part.

³⁶ NLM, Arch, 2231-2233.

³⁷ Voir LACROIX, *Déodat Dolomieu*, 296-302. Selon cette correspondance qui va du 31 octobre 1768 au 9 novembre 1801, Dolomieu écrit de Malte en octobre 1768 et en février 1769, de Paris en 1776, de Malte en 1777, de Palerme en août 1781, de Malte de novembre 1781 à janvier 1782, de France en 1782 et en avril 1783, de Malte pour le reste de l'année 1783, de Paris et de Rome de janvier à septembre 1784, de Malte depuis le 8 novembre 1784 jusqu'au 28 décembre 1785, de Messine, Rome, Florence et Naples en 1786, de Malte de janvier à février 1787; on le retrouve à Malte le 20 avril 1790; il écrit de

Le port de Malte offre aussi des spectacles. Le voyageur anglais Patrick Brydone qui arrive à Malte le 4 juin 1770, décrit dans son récit de voyage un «spectacle [qui lui] a procuré beaucoup de plaisir. C'était le départ d'une escadre maltaise qui [allait] se rejoindre aux Français contre le roi de Tunis [...]. L'escadre [était] composée de trois galères dont la plus grande [était] montée par 900 hommes et chacune des deux autres par 700, de trois galiotes et de plusieurs *scampavias* qu'on appelle ainsi à cause de la vitesse prodigieuse de leur sillage [...]. Il y avait dans chaque galère environ trente chevaliers, faisant pendant tout le chemin des signes à leurs maîtresses qui pleuraient leur départ sur les bastions»³⁸. L'auteur de *Malte par un voyageur français* est plus discret. Son observation se limite à cette remarque: «Lorsque les galères sortent du port de Malthe, ou qu'elles y rentrent, la foule du peuple couvre toujours les bastions»³⁹.

Naissances, mariages royaux, accession au trône de divers princes européens et autres occasions de réjouissances étaient célébrés à Malte avec faste: dîners, illuminations, musique, danse, fontaines de vin, feu d'artifice. Le port fournissait à son tour un cadre exceptionnel. Les fêtes organisées par le bailli de Tencin à l'occasion de l'élévation au cardinalat de son oncle, l'évêque d'Embrun, en mai 1739, comprenaient la traversée du Grand Maître en gondole de La Valette à Burmola⁴⁰. Tous les vaisseaux tirèrent des salves d'honneur. Le port était illuminé, il y avait le feu d'artifice, et une sérénade, *serenata in mare*, y fut jouée et chantée. On dressa aussi une cocagne en mer⁴¹. Dans la *Relation des fêtes qu'ont été faites à Malte à l'occasion de la convalescence de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne*, datée du 26 octobre 1744, les fêtes nautiques qui avaient lieu comprenaient «la visite du Grand Maître à l'escadre française qui avait apporté la nouvelle»⁴². La construction de dix-neuf magasins sur le quai de Marsa par le Grand Maître Pinto fournissait l'occasion de célébrations dans le port. Le soir du 10 août 1752 fut dévoilé le buste de bronze du Grand Maître. La façade des magasins

Rome du 28 avril au 14 juillet 1790; puis 2 lettres de Malte en octobre et décembre 1790. À partir de 1791, il n'est plus à Malte. Il y revient en 1798 avec le Général Bonaparte, prend un rôle actif dans les négociations de la cession de Malte à Bonaparte et repart avec lui en Egypte. Il quitte Alexandrie le 7 mars 1799, fait naufrage à Tarente et est fait prisonnier de guerre. Transféré à Messine et dénoncé par des chevaliers siciliens, il est enfermé dans un cachot terrible où, dans ses propres mots, il éprouve «les traitements les plus atroces» physiques et moraux. Libéré après vingt et un mois, il ne survivra que neuf mois. Il meurt en 1801.

³⁸ PATRICK BRYDONE, *Voyage en Sicile et à Malthe*, traduit de l'anglais par M. Démeunier, 2^e éd. (Amsterdam, Paris, 1776), 342-343.

³⁹ Anonyme, *Malte*, 48.

⁴⁰ La ville de Burmola ou Cospicua est une des trois villes situées en face de La Valette.

⁴¹ Voir NLM, *Libr*1146, I, 745.

⁴² NLM, *Arch* 268, 296 r^o.

était éclairée d'un grand nombre de torches et la foule était énorme. La mer grouillait de bateaux telle «qu'elle ressemblait à une plaine couverte de gens». S'y trouvait une barge décorée de tapisseries et de torches⁴³.

C'est par la voie de la mer qu'arrivent à Malte les comédiens de l'opéra napolitains et siciliens, enrichissant par leur répertoire la vie culturelle maltaise. Après la construction du nouveau théâtre en 1731, on assistait à Malte aux mêmes spectacles auxquels on assistait dans les villes principales d'Europe, souvent à une année de distance de leur première représentation à Naples, comme l'opéra comique de Giovanni Fischietti, *Il Barone della Trocciola* ou *Vologeso re dei Parti* di Rinaldo di Capua. C'est à Catane, à Naples et à Trapani qu'on imprimait les *libretti* avant 1756, année ou fut rétablie l'imprimerie de l'Ordre. La vie intellectuelle à Malte fut aussi soutenue par la voie de la mer: c'était le seul moyen par lequel arrivaient à Malte les livres achetés et ceux dont l'Ordre héritait à la mort des chevaliers vivant à l'étranger qui grossissaient la bibliothèque publique, aujourd'hui la bibliothèque nationale de Malte⁴⁴. C'est aussi dans des universités européennes, à Florence, à Naples et à Salerne, à Montpellier et à Paris parmi d'autres, que des Maltais poursuivaient leurs études en médecine, en droit, en lettres et en théologie. Plusieurs Maltais étaient membres d'Académies étrangères: diplômé de l'Université de Padoue, le chanoine Jean-François Agius de Soldanis était membre de l'*Accademia degli Apatisti* de Florence, de l'*Accademia botanica* de Cortona, de l'*Accademia Buongusto* et de l'*Accademia degli erranti* de Palerme. Le comte Jean-Antoine Ciantar, historien et poète, fut membre associé de l'*Accademia degli Intronati di Siena* et de la *Colombaria* de Florence. Il fut nommé honoraire étranger en 1745, puis académicien libre, le 9 mai 1750⁴⁵, de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres de Paris.

La mer unissait les amis moyennant les lettres. Le chanoine Agius de Soldanis, premier bibliothécaire de la bibliothèque publique, a laissé une vaste correspondance qui révèle ses qualités et ses intérêts variés. Avec le chevalier Turgot, le chanoine échangea une correspondance traitant de leur intérêt commun en botanique. La langue maltaise est aussi un sujet

⁴³ NLM, *Libr* 1029, 6v^o-7r^o.

⁴⁴ Les chevaliers de Malte, résidant à Malte ou dans leur pays d'origine ne pouvaient disposer dans leur testament que du quint, c'est-à-dire d'un cinquième de ce qui leur appartenait. En outre, l'Ordre était l'héritier des livres et des instruments de mathématiques. Les livres étaient incorporés dans la bibliothèque publique, les doubles étaient vendus et avec ce qu'ils rapportaient on en achetait d'autres.

⁴⁵ *L'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. Histoire, prix et fondations, publications* (Paris, 1924), *Index biographique*, 195.

qui revient dans leurs lettres – le chanoine est l’auteur d’une grammaire maltaise et avoue à son correspondant qu’il a l’intention de rédiger un dictionnaire: Turgot l’y encourage. Le chanoine est le procureur à Malte du bailli Déricard et dans leur correspondance, les deux bons amis s’entretiennent de leurs projets et de leurs inquiétudes. Plusieurs documents d’archives conservent une riche correspondance, échangée entre des Maltais et autres, fournissant une mine d’information sur la vie à Malte au XVIII^e siècle.

L’immense mer entoure une île minuscule, influencée par un kaléidoscope de cultures héritées des puissances qui ont dominé le bassin méditerranéen au cours des siècles. Cette influence européenne et chrétienne qui date de 1090 lorsque prit fin la domination arabe sur l’île, est renforcée à partir de 1530. S’il reste toujours aujourd’hui quelques anciennes traditions dont l’origine est perdue dans la nuit des temps, comme la fête folklorique de Mnarja, célébrée du 28 au 29 juin, d’autres traditions communes aux pays européens, souvent liés à la religion catholique, comme le carnaval, trouvent leur source dans l’établissement de l’Ordre à Malte, la première communauté d’Européens vivant ensemble à Malte pendant 268 ans. Selon la phrase éloquente de Patrick Brydone, écrite en 1770: «Comme Malte est un abrégé de l’Europe et un assemblage des cadets de famille des meilleures maisons, c’est sûrement une excellente académie de politesse»⁴⁶. Paradoxalement, c’est la mer qui, avant les voyages en avion, faisait que les Maltais ne restaient pas insulaires de sorte que les bornes spatiales d’une île minuscule fussent dépassées. La plupart des voyageurs du Grand Tour visitaient Malte. Peut-on dire que vers la fin du XVIII^e siècle Malte faisait déjà l’expérience de l’Union Européenne et du tourisme culturel?

⁴⁶ ROLAND DE LA PLATIÈRE, *Lettres*, 369-370.

Carmelina Gugliuzzo

Il cosmopolitismo e l'identità marittima maltese

Malta è stata da sempre, grazie soprattutto alla sua posizione geografica al centro del Mediterraneo, luogo d'incontro di stranieri. Dalle dominazioni subite fin dall'antichità – ricordiamo che conobbe le influenze romane, bizantine, musulmane, e di nuovo cristiane dopo la riconquista siciliana dell'XI secolo – fino all'arrivo dei Cavalieri del Sovrano Ordine di San Giovanni di Gerusalemme è stato un continuo mescolamento di lingue, civiltà, modi di fare differenti.

Il cosmopolitismo maltese ha componenti epocali, etno-geografiche, religiose, sociali, occupazionali, che è possibile distinguere in base ad una periodizzazione e ad una identificazione dei flussi che hanno portato di quando in quando, gruppi demici al popolamento dell'isola; non vi è dubbio che la posizione geografica dell'isola, le sue secolari tradizioni marittime e commerciali, la sua appartenenza a un peculiare insieme geo-politico, le politiche insediative cui è stata sottoposta, l'abbiano resa particolarmente sensibile al dislocarsi di gruppi etnici, religiosi, professionali tra medioevo ed età moderna.

Durante il periodo medievale coesistevano due comunità monoteiste; ebrei e cristiani si riconoscevano e tolleravano gli uni con gli altri¹. I *leaders* ebraici presentavano regolarmente doni ai *leaders* clericali e laici della comunità cristiana. Le autorità cristiane aiutavano il "rabbi" a mantenere la sua autorità incarcerando i recalcitranti tra il suo gregge di fedeli, scomunicandoli se lo inseguivano o minacciavano: essi applicavano la legge di Mosè nei casi matrimoniali concernenti gli ebrei, sanzionavano il "gked", la legge ebraica sul divorzio.

L'anno 1492 segna un cambiamento importante poiché, politicamente dipendente dalla Spagna, Malta applica gli editti reali d'espulsione degli ebrei e dei musulmani, inaugurando un periodo di intransigenza cattolica². Anche se, come del resto avvenne in quasi tutte le altre aree del Me-

¹ G. WETTINGER, *The Jews of Malta in the late Middle Ages*, Malta 1985.

² Il decreto di espulsione fu firmato in Spagna il 31 marzo 1492 e promulgato a Palermo il 18 giugno 1492. Anche se vi furono parecchie proteste, il 13 luglio le disposizioni

diterraneo, molti ebrei locali annunciarono la loro conversione, genuina o meno che fosse, al cristianesimo in modo da non lasciare le isole e la loro proprietà³.

Gli unici ebrei che vivevano sull'isola durante l'età moderna erano coloro i quali erano stati catturati dai Cavalieri dell'Ordine o dai corsari cristiani: erano venduti all'asta e venivano tenuti come schiavi dai loro 'padroni' fino a quando essi o i loro 'fratelli' all'estero pagavano il loro riscatto. Essi provenivano da ogni angolo del Mediterraneo e generalmente non avevano alcun legame con i discendenti delle precedenti comunità ebraiche di Malta e Gozo. Ad essi era consentito la libera pratica religiosa ed anche di intessere affari commerciali in modo da mantenersi, come del resto facevano gli schiavi musulmani con i quali si mescolavano⁴.

preliminari erano ormai avviate a Malta. Le proprietà degli ebrei erano già state inventariate. La data della loro partenza fu in un primo tempo rimandata di due mesi, poi di un altro mese fino al 18 dicembre, ed infine al 12 gennaio 1493. "Anche contro la loro volontà, gli Ebrei sarebbero stati necessariamente condannati ad essere i grandi artigiani degli scambi. Sono o sono stati dappertutto; una volta cacciati, non abbandonano definitivamente i luoghi loro proibiti, ma vi ritornano": cfr. FERNAND BRAUDEL, *Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II*, Torino 1976, vol. I, 859.

³ Rimase qualche traccia della comunità ebraica che aveva abitato a Birgu nella toponomastica, ad esempio il sito del cimitero ebraico identificato a Gharixem, vicino Mtarfa, venne chiamato *Qbur-il-Lhud*, letteralmente "Le tombe degli ebrei".

⁴ *The Jew of Malta* di Christopher Marlowe, scritto tra il 1589 e il 1590 (non si ha una precisa indicazione dell'anno), è stata l'unica opera letteraria, di qualsiasi epoca ed in qualsiasi lingua, legata agli ebrei delle isole maltesi. È notorio che non potesse essere stata ispirata dagli ebrei presenti in Malta del tardo sedicesimo secolo, i quali in buona parte erano schiavi e per quanto fosse loro concesso commerciare, non potevano mai giungere al punto di acquisire una vasta fortuna privata. Dal momento che l'isola era visitata occasionalmente da navi mercantili inglesi durante le ultime decadi del XVI secolo, Marlowe aveva accesso a fonti di informazione non-letterarie, quali i racconti dei marinai tornati a Londra con cui poteva facilmente entrare in contatto. La storia dei tesori nascosti di Baraba di C. Marlowe si lega ad una caratteristica costante della vita maltese dei secoli XV e XVI, ossia quella di cercare tesori nascosti nei periodi di insicurezza o di persecuzioni religiose. Cfr. C. MARLOWE, *The Complete Plays*, Penguin, London 1986. Lo stesso rabbi Abram Safaradi fu accusato dalle autorità reali nel 1474 di essere coinvolto nella ricerca illegale di ricchezze, e durante il sedicesimo secolo, furono emanate licenze per la ricerca di tesori, nel 1530, nel 1537 e nel 1582. Nel 1525 furono trovate 13 libbre di monete d'oro bizantine, nel 1618 fu scoperto un sostanziale ammontare di monete arabe. Nel 1604 Don Ambrosius Paci affermò davanti all'inquisitore dell'isola che in quanto canonico della cattedrale di S. Paolo, viveva in una casa della Notabile; per anni, numerose persone anziane gli avevano detto, in più occasioni, che la casa in cui viveva era appartenuta in tempi remoti agli ebrei, per queste ragioni un giorno in cui si trovava da solo e senza nulla da fare, fu colto dall'irrefrenabile desiderio di cercare un eventuale tesoro e iniziò a scavare fino ad una profondità di quattro o cinque spanne senza successo, sino a quando si persuase di fare uso dei poteri divinatori di un musulmano per sapere se esisteva un tesoro, andando successivamente incontro ai problemi con l'Inquisizione. Cfr. WETTINGER, *The Jews of Malta*. Anche nella sua opera Marlowe descrisse come la casa di Baraba fosse stata trasformata in un conven-

I secoli XVI e XVII sono stati un momento di intensi movimenti di popolazione in direzione dell'isola e del suo porto.

Il luogo più rappresentativo del cosmopolitismo maltese è stato il Grande Porto, dove corsari barbareschi, Cavalieri appartenenti a otto lingue diverse, viaggiatori stranieri, si incontravano, si confrontavano, entravano continuamente in contatto. Fin dallo sviluppo del commercio e della pirateria il numero degli stranieri crebbe sensibilmente in tutto il sito portuale che diveniva luogo di grande attrazione per la manodopera maltese e straniera. Su ciascun lato di Valletta, le antiche Tre Città sul Grande Porto ed il relativamente nuovo distretto di Sliema, dall'altra parte del quasi parallelo porto di Marsamxett, sono chiaramente visibili dalla capitale. Nell'area portuale e nella nuova città capitale stessa, molti dei nativi vivevano e lavoravano in numero sempre crescente. Più di ogni altro singolo sito o arteria, i porti di Valletta, con le loro acque profonde, e così strategicamente localizzati e ben riparati, sono sempre stati come la raffigurazione di una cartolina, mostrando in un solo sguardo un popolo *in progress*. Questi porti sono stati lo scenario di guerre e di festività, accogliendo o cacciando via i visitatori per migliaia di anni ed hanno permesso la circolazione di persone, beni, mercanzie, arti e idee⁵.

A partire dall'installazione dell'Ordine di San Giovanni nel 1530, che porta con sé un'ampia comunità di rodioiti⁶ e, soprattutto a partire dallo

to; il sito della sinagoga di Mdina fu assegnato per la costituzione di un secondo monastero, eretto *ex novo* al posto della *meschita* o sinagoga degli ebrei di Malta. Non esiste una singola fonte per il racconto, vari episodi traggono origine dalla letteratura popolare italiana ed inglese. La vita dell'ebreo può essere stata derivata in buona parte dalla conoscenza di Marlowe dell'ebreo portoghese Juan Miques: a tal proposito cfr. A. FREEMAN, *A Source for the Jew of Malta*, in «Notes and Queries», April 1962, 139-141, dove vengono suggerite ulteriori possibili fonti.

⁵ "Il modo più comune che le isole hanno per mescolarsi al mondo è ancora quello di organizzare le proprie emigrazioni. Tutte le isole (...) sono esportatrici di uomini". Cfr. BRAUDEL, *Civiltà e imperi*, 155-156.

⁶ La prima fase della vita dell'Ordine va collocata a Gerusalemme, dove il beato Gerardo fondò - intorno al 1099 - un ospedale nel quale accogliere e curare i pellegrini che si recavano in Terra Santa. Attorno al beato Gerardo si unirono altri devoti i quali, con l'emissione dei voti canonici di castità, povertà ed obbedienza, dettero vita al primo nucleo dell'Ordine religioso approvato da Papa Pasquale II con bolla del 15 febbraio 1113. Al beato Gerardo succedette Fra Raimondo del Podio, il quale, per primo, assunse il titolo di Gran Maestro, a ribadire la loro preminenza sull'ospedale dedicato a San Giovanni Battista: "Sacrae Domus hospitalis Sancti Joannis (Magnus) Magister". A seguito del mutamento della situazione politica e militare dei luoghi Santi, l'Ordine di San Giovanni venne cacciato da Gerusalemme. I frati scelsero a quel punto di impegnarsi direttamente nel tentativo di riconquista della Terra Santa, modificando la natura dell'Ordine il quale oltre che religioso divenne anche cavalleresco, in modo tale che i suoi membri, pur essendo frati, legati da voti canonici, esercitassero anche l'attività militare. I Cavalieri di San Giovanni ebbero la possibilità di assicurarsi una prima patria nel 1306. Un corsaro genovese, Vignolo dei Vignoli, aveva ottenuto l'affittanza del-

sviluppo della corsa e del commercio, il numero di stranieri crebbe sensibilmente nell'area portuale. In effetti nel XVI secolo la fisionomia portuale di Malta mutò completamente l'isola. Per ironia della sorte, i Cavalieri, insediandosi a Malta e costruendovi le meravigliose fortificazioni, consentirono ed incoraggiarono un movimento di persone mai visto in precedenza, che avrebbe esercitato notevole influenza culturale in tutte le sfere della società. Per secoli, il mare circostante aveva rappresentato per la comunità locale una minaccia, una frontiera che sovente diventava ostile; con la costruzione delle fortificazioni l'isola assumeva un nuovo ruolo che le consentiva di aprirsi al mare, un vero e proprio osservatorio sul mondo islamico e su un mare molto 'frequentato'.

Si avviò un processo interessante non ristretto solamente a soldati e marinai, ma che coinvolgeva un più ampio circolo di impresa locale e mercanti stranieri, artisti, architetti ed ingegneri militari, nonché schiavi di diverse nazionalità.

I maltesi acquisiscono competenze e capacità, soprattutto nei settori legati alla vita del mare, che talvolta vengono richieste anche dal "mercato esterno". Non è singolare, ma significativa, la direzione dei lavori di costruzione della galera "Santa Barbara", la nave più importante della marina da guerra di casa Savoia, affidata ad un maltese. La galera, prevista nel 1737, fu terminata nell'estate del 1739: "pare che il lavoro effettuato dal capo mastro Raimondo Scolaro di Malta fosse di ottima qualità, tanto che questi si guadagnò una 'gratificazione' di £ 800"⁷.

La base di questo continuo progresso verso una crescente integrazione con il mondo esterno era quella che D.K. Fieldhouse⁸ definisce "the mental attitude" di un ampio settore della società nativa.

"The initial cultural shock which the Order's forceful presence must

le isole di Coo e di Lero, nel Dodecaneso. Egli si presentò al Gran Maestro Foulque de Villaret per proporgli un'alleanza: unendo le loro forze militari avrebbero potuto catturare tutte le isole della zona, in cambio egli avrebbe trattenuto un terzo dei redditi. Il Gran Maestro approvò il progetto sebbene si rendesse conto di dovere ricevere l'autorizzazione papale per la conquista di un territorio che apparteneva ad un altro monarca cristiano, approvazione che giunse prontamente da parte di Clemente V. L'Ordine gerosolimitano soggiornò quindi a Rodi dal 1310 e il 1522, data in cui i Cavalieri vennero cacciati via da Solimano il Magnifico. Dopo aver errato otto anni in lungo e in largo in Europa, dietro le insistenze di Carlo V, giunsero a Malta. M. FONTENAY, *De Rhodes à Malte: l'évolution de la flotte des Hospitaliers au XVI^e siècle*, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi Colombiani. Navi e navigazioni nei secoli XVI e XVII, Genova 1990, 109-133.

⁷ L. LO BASSO, *A vela e a remi. Navigazione, guerra e schiavitù nel Mediterraneo (secc. XVI-XVIII)*, Ventimiglia 2004, 119. Cfr. inoltre: M. FONTENAY, *Pour une géographie de l'esclavage méditerranéen aux temps modernes*, in "Cahiers de la Méditerranée" n. 65, déc. 2002, 17-52; F. MOUREAU (dir.), *Captifs en Méditerranée (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles): histoires, récits et légendes*, Paris 2008.

⁸ D.K. FIELDHOUSE, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, London 1991, 103.

have caused within the Maltese society was gradually transformed into a much longer, slower, and barely perceptible process of shattering the traditional archaism by exposing, through continuing influence, the islanders' experience to different degrees of European sensibility as it had never been exposed before"⁹.

L'Ordine gerosolimitano si avvicinò al porto; abituati alla vita marittima di Rodi, i Cavalieri installarono il Convento a Birgu¹⁰, che poi ingrandirono, e dopo il Grande Assedio del 1565 venne costruita la Valletta, la Città Nuova, tutta attorno il Grande Porto. Dopo il 1575 il porto della Valletta assunse la sua fisionomia pressoché definitiva. La Valletta nasceva nel momento in cui si effettuava la corsa ed in cui si sviluppava il commercio, e diveniva luogo di grande attrazione per la manodopera maltese e straniera. Tanti erano gli impieghi offerti dall'Ordine: soldati per proteggere le navi, marinai, rematori per le galere¹¹, timonieri, barbieri, scrivani, cuochi, ed anche chirurghi per la Sacra Infermeria come Andrea Salutio¹². Agli stranieri venuti deliberatamente a lavorare si aggiungevano coloro i quali, approdati per caso nell'isola e nel suo Grande Porto, decidevano di fermarvisi, incantati e sedotti dalla bellezza della capitale, famosa in Europa, tanto che visitarla divenne una moda.

⁹ Cfr. V. MALLIA-MILANES, *Was early modern Malta an 'isolated world'?*, in *Peregrinations. Acta et Documenta, Accademia Internazionale Melitense* (<http://www.orderofmalta.org/pdf/pub/WasearlymodernMalta.pdf>)

¹⁰ Quando i Cavalieri arrivarono a Malta, decisero di stabilirsi (con grande sollievo della nobiltà locale che risiedeva a Mdina, la Città Notabile) su una stretta fascia di terra sporgente sul lato sud del Grande Porto a Birgu che era un misero villaggio di pescatori, e presentava all'estremità un vecchio fortino. "Alle esigue difese (*di Birgu*) l'Isle Adam unì lavori ovunque ciò fu permesso dalla natura del terreno, riparò le esistenti mura del Forte di Sant'Angelo (sull'estremità verso mare della penisola)... ma per il resto interruppe la propria opera poiché intimamente progettava di riconquistare Rodi e considerava il soggiorno a Malta solo come un espediente temporaneo. A tale fine la flotta dell'Ordine fu messa in assetto di guerra e, come movimento preparatorio, fu inviata a Modon, nel sud della Grecia. Nel corso di questa azione subirono una terribile disfatta e fu quindi abbandonata ogni ulteriore idea di occupare nuovamente l'isola di Rodi". Così ha scritto Quentin Hughes a proposito della trasformazione della prima sede dell'Ordine nell'arcipelago maltese, come citato in E. BRADFORD, *Lo scudo e la spada*, Milano 1975, 123.

¹¹ Un censimento del 1590 indica per le galere della Religione e del Gran Maestro un personale effettivo di 2180 persone, i Cavalieri dello stato maggiore e i "caravanisti" erano contati a parte, con il Convento. Se si sottraggono i 785 schiavi musulmani e i 218 forzati (di cui molti erano prestati dai sovrani stranieri), resta un migliaio di impieghi come "bonnevoles", marinai e soldati, disponibili per la popolazione locale. Considerando che al di là dei Cavalieri e degli schiavi, sull'isola vi erano circa 9000 uomini sopra i quindici anni, si deduce che le galere potevano offrire l'imbarco a più del 10% della popolazione attiva. Cfr. M. FONTENAY, *La place de la course dans l'économie portuaire: l'exemple de Malte et des ports barbaresques*, in «Annales ESC», nov-déc. 1988, n. 6, 1325.

¹² National Archives of Malta (NAM), Registro Revelationis Municipiorum, 1588-1617 (vol. unico), f. 34.



Matthaus Merian, *Valletta, Città Nova di Malta*, 1680

La costruzione della Valletta ha fatto apparire il porto di Malta come un luogo fondamentale del cosmopolitismo, di scambio e di *brassage* culturale tra gli isolani e gli stranieri. In questo porto attivo la maggior parte degli stranieri era composta da italiani, circa il 60%, e di questa percentuale il 78% era rappresentato da meridionali, siciliani, napoletani e calabresi. La predominanza dei meridionali si comprende grazie alla posizione geografica di Malta e all'estrema dipendenza dell'isola nei confronti dei regni di Sicilia e di Napoli. Questi legami economici privilegiati – avendo i maltesi diritto d'importazione gratuita delle derrate siciliane – spiegano il ruolo preminente dei siciliani nel commercio del grano e del vino nel Grande Porto. Dopo gli italiani, una grande presenza nell'isola era quella francese, soprattutto gli appartenenti alla Francia meridionale, essi si concentravano essenzialmente nella capitale. La restante parte degli stranieri era costituita da alcune nazionalità mediterranee, (spagnoli e portoghesi) e nordiche (inglesi, olandesi, tedeschi, russi).

La presenza degli stranieri, a parte i Cavalieri, non è raggruppata in quartieri. Gli Archivi Nazionali, come quelli dell'Inquisizione o dell'Ordine dei Cavalieri, testimoniano una massa di emigrazioni individuali, al massimo di coppie, quasi mai di intere famiglie. Gli stranieri arrivati nell'isola generalmente si conformano alle usanze e al calendario delle festività maltesi,

adottano i loro culti, come quello di San Paolo¹³. Essi si fondono nella società portuale grazie anche ai matrimoni. Quale che sia la loro nazionalità, gli stranieri si sposano per il 72% con maltesi. Come Luigi di Calabria¹⁴ che viveva a Vittoriosa ed aveva sposato una prostituta maltese o Louiso di Armenia¹⁵ che viveva a Bormula nel 1620 ed aveva sposato una maltese proveniente dall'area portuale. Le famiglie maltesi sembravano accettare di buon grado il matrimonio di una loro figlia con uno straniero, di conseguenza non era per nulla raro che alcune novelle spose maltesi ricevessero qualche amara sorpresa e fossero costrette a denunciare all'Inquisitore i loro mariti per bigamia; questo è il caso di Matteola¹⁶, la quale scopre che il marito era già sposato a Palermo prima di giungere a Malta. Ma per i maltesi un cattolico non rappresentava uno straniero, era semplicemente "uno di loro", le differenze di nazionalità o di linguaggio non costituivano un problema. Non era lo stesso per ebrei o musulmani, essi erano ben accetti nelle famiglie maltesi a patto che si convertissero. Avvenivano molti matrimoni tra cattolici e stranieri convertiti, come Valentia, ex schiava musulmana, che, una volta divenuta libera sposterà un francese stabilitosi a Malta¹⁷. C'era anche un cospicuo numero di cortigiane provenienti spesso dall'estero e che, dopo avere raggranellato un po' di denaro, potevano sposarsi ed essere considerate donne oneste e rispettabili¹⁸.

Ma fu soprattutto tra la fine del XVIII secolo e le prime due decadi del XIX, che Malta conobbe un incredibile "ricambio umano". Accadde di

¹³ Non lontano dalla Città Notabile c'era una chiesetta dedicata a San Paolo, e accanto alla chiesa era stata collocata una statua del santo con una vipera in mano. Si riteneva che la statua occupasse il luogo esatto dove era situata la casa in cui egli era stato accolto dopo il suo naufragio sull'isola, e dove egli aveva scosso giù dalla mano la vipera senza esserne morso, facendola finire nel fuoco. I maltesi affermavano che in quell'occasione il santo avesse maledetto tutti gli animali velenosi dell'isola, scacciandoli da Malta per sempre. Lo stesso trattamento che aveva riservato San Patrizio, patrono dell'Irlanda (dove era andato in missione nel 432), il quale aveva scacciato, secondo la leggenda, tutti i serpenti velenosi dall'isola.

¹⁴ AIM, Proc. 19°, f. 186, anno 1601.

¹⁵ AIM, Proc. 40C, f. 872, anno 1620.

¹⁶ AIM, Proc. 32B, f. 785.

¹⁷ AIM, Proc. 42D, f. 965, anno 1622.

¹⁸ "The Number of the Curtesans is extremely great; their Trade is not at all reputed scandalous, and when they have earn'd a little Money, they may Marry, and are esteem'd as honest Women as if they had kept their Maidenhead for their Husbands. No Person whatsoever dares offer'em the least indignity; far they are look'd upon as Publik Persons that ought to be Sacred; and there are even some Ladies of Honour who disdain not their Acquaintance and Society; so that 'tis not an easie Task to distinguish those Prostitutes from Vertuous Women": Du Mont, Sieur, *A New Voyage to the Levant' Containing an Account of the most Remarkable Curiosities in Germany, France, Italy, Malta and Turkey; With Historical Observations relating to the Present and Ancient State of those Countries*, printed by T. H. for M. Gillyflower, London 1696, 131-139.

tutto: la fine del governo dell'Ordine, due anni di dominazione francese, le rivolte, la presa di possesso dell'isola da parte degli inglesi, il sempre più rimarchevole arrivo di commercianti e viaggiatori stranieri, resero il Grande Porto un privilegiato luogo d'incontro cosmopolita.

Le frequenti relazioni con i mercanti stranieri sono sottolineate da un importante elemento: nel XIX secolo a Malta c'erano circa venti consolati stranieri ed una novantina di consoli maltesi sparsi lungo le coste del Mediterraneo, a conferma delle numerose rotte e approdi frequentati dei mercanti maltesi, una chiara indicazione del trend. Era una conglomerazione di popoli marinari, provenienti dall'Inghilterra, dal Belgio, dalla Francia e dalla Spagna, altri da Venezia, dalla Toscana, da Genova, da Napoli e dalla Sicilia; e altri ancora dall'Armenia, dalle isole greche, dalla Siria e dalla Dalmazia e dall'Egitto. Nuovi consolati vennero costituiti nel XVIII secolo per olandesi, ragusei, sardi, corsi, ungheresi e commercianti americani, che facevano affari con o tramite l'isola del Mediterraneo centrale. Oltre a questi altri centri (come le reggenze barbaresche e Costantinopoli) le cui mercanzie erano dirette verso il Grande Porto sotto la protezione di una bandiera straniera, molto spesso francese. Inoltre, un significativo numero di mercanti stranieri nei secoli XVII e XVIII chiesero la naturalizzazione a Malta in modo da fare affari sull'isola, richiedendo il privilegio nazionale di legittimare il trattamento preferenziale. Lo stesso può essere detto dei consoli maltesi nei porti stranieri.

Il flusso della libertà di 'nomadismo' delle persone che partivano dal nord e dal Mar Baltico per raggiungere le coste maltesi per lo scambio di merci e per altri fini commerciali, colpì l'attenzione di Mons. Angelo Durini, Inquisitore e Delegato Apostolico, che nel 1760 descriveva l'isola come un prospero luogo d'incontro, "not of one people, but of several nations"¹⁹.

Così alla fine del XVII secolo - e soprattutto durante il XVIII - Malta sviluppò la sua dimensione commerciale, entrando a far parte delle moderne reti economiche che legavano due sponde antagoniste e *partners* al tempo stesso²⁰. Il commercio insulare era diventato un'attività strutturata, 'mescolando' un numero crescente di mercanti che godevano di supporti familiari o di relazioni amicali o di interessi intrecciati nei porti delle due sponde - occidentale ed orientale - mettendo insieme persone di culture differenti con la conservazione della propria identità. Anche se i maltesi e 'gli altri' appartenevano a religioni diverse o parlavano lingue diverse, il mare che aveva permesso questo *brassage* rese l'isola una piccola regina del cosmopolitismo d'età moderna.

¹⁹ Cfr. MALLIA-MILANES, *Was early modern Malta an 'isolated world'?*

²⁰ F. CIAPPARA, *Christendom and Islam: a Fluid Frontier*, in «Mediterranean Studies. The Journal of the Mediterranean Studies Association», vol. 13, 2004, 165-187.

Jan Berting

Représentations collectives et manières de penser l'Autre dans le cadre des relations Nord-Sud, Sud-Nord

L'analyse des stéréotypes de l'Autre se limite souvent à une description des stéréotypes, à la détermination de leurs fonctions pour les groupes qui véhiculent ces stéréotypes, à leur rôle dans les interactions avec l'Autre et aux conséquences de celui-ci. Dans notre cas: l'impact des stéréotypes sur les relations Nord-Sud entre l'Europe et le monde arabe. Une telle analyse s'avère être souvent trop limitée, parce qu'elle commence par les stéréotypes collectifs, ces images figées de l'Autre, et néglige d'aller en amont, vers les sources de ces stéréotypes, vers les représentations collectives qui les contiennent et qui peuvent élucider leur contenu spécifique et leur dynamique. Dans notre contribution nous proposons d'entreprendre ce voyage vers les représentations collectives, vers ces manières de penser l'Autre qui dominent dans les relations entre représentants des cultures, des religions et des collectivités ethniques différentes.

Les représentations collectives

Le concept de représentation collective joue un rôle important dans les approches théoriques des sciences sociales. On peut penser au 'symbolic interactionism' américain, une approche dans laquelle les chercheurs accentuent le fait que les acteurs sociaux 'définissent' leurs actions réciproques au lieu de réagir simplement à ces actions. Les acteurs sociaux ne 'répondent' pas directement aux actions des autres. Au lieu de cela, leur réponse est fondée sur la signification qu'ils attribuent à ces actions. De ce fait, il s'ensuit que l'interaction humaine est 'guidée' par l'utilisation des symboles, par l'interprétation, ou par la définition de la signification de leurs actions. Le comportement social ne peut pas être interprété comme une simple 'réponse' à un 'stimulus', parce qu'entre le stimulus et la réaction il faut insérer le processus d'interprétation des acteurs¹.

¹ HERBERT BLUMER, *Symbolic Interactionism. Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs,

Mais les acteurs sociaux n'inventent pas leurs interprétations dans la plupart de situations dans lesquelles ils sont impliqués. Presque toujours leurs réactions sont 'structurées' par eux de la même manière. Ils développent et acquièrent des interprétations ou des définitions communes pendant des interactions précédentes, qui leur apprennent comment se comporter dans les situations semblables, qu'ils rencontrent plus tard. Ces définitions communes permettent aux gens de coordonner leurs actions². Ces interprétations communes sont des représentations collectives, chargées de symboles et de stéréotypes.

La sociologie française connaît une approche des représentations collectives qui peut être distinguée très clairement de l'approche américaine, tout en montrant un noyau commun important. Les représentations collectives jouent un rôle central dans l'œuvre de Durkheim, mais on voit d'emblée la différence entre cette approche et celle de l'interactionnisme symbolique américain quand il écrit: 'Les représentations collectives sont le produit d'une immense coopération qui s'étend non seulement dans l'espace, mais dans le temps; pour les faire, une multitude d'esprits divers ont associé, mêlé, combiné leurs idées et leurs sentiments; de longues séries de générations y ont accumulé leur expérience et leur savoir'³. Cette grande différence entre les deux approches ne doit pas nous amener à ignorer le fond commun: les représentations collectives ne sont pas le produit immédiat des causes déterminantes, des simples réflexions de conditions économiques et de 'structures sociales'. Elles sont elles-mêmes des facteurs de changement. Comme le disent Fauconnet et Mauss: 'Et on peut même dire que tout changement dans les institutions est, au fond, un changement dans l'opinion: c'est parce que les sentiments collectifs de pitié pour le criminel entrent en lutte avec les sentiments collectifs réclamant la peine que le régime pénal s'adoucit progressivement. Tout se passe dans la sphère de l'opinion publique; mais celle-ci est proprement ce

New Jersey, 1969), 79: 'Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpreting, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another's actions. This mediation is equivalent to inserting a process of interpretation between stimulus and response in the case of human behavior'.

² BLUMER, *Symbolic Interactionism*, 86: 'The common repetitive behavior of people in such situations should not mislead the student into believing that no process of interpretation is in play; on the contrary, even though fixed, the actions of the participating people are constructed by them through a process of interpretation.... However, many other situations may not be defined in a single way by the participating people. In this event, their lines of action do not fit together readily and collective action is blocked. Interpretations have to be developed and effective accommodation of the participants to one another has to be worked out. In such a case of "undefined" situations, it is necessary to trace and study the emerging process of definition which is brought to play'.

³ EMILE DURKHEIM, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968 (1912), 22.

que nous appelons le système des représentations collectives. Les faits sociaux sont donc des causes parce qu'ils sont des représentations ou agissent sur des représentations. Le fond intime de la vie sociale est un ensemble de représentations⁴. La vie sociale est impossible sans les représentations collectives. Celles-ci ne sont pas seulement cognitives, mais aussi évaluatives et normatives. Les représentations collectives contiennent une carte 'géographique' sociale du monde dans lequel nous vivons. Elles sont des constructions sociales qui transmettent une signification pratique pour nous orienter dans la vie sociale⁵.

Ces représentations collectives ont, vues d'une entité sociale donnée, un caractère fonctionnel, parce qu'elles permettent les membres de cette unité (société, groupe ethnique, communauté etc.) de s'orienter dans une réalité extrêmement complexe. Elles nous indiquent notre appartenance et distinguent entre 'nous' et les 'autres' (les ennemis, les adversaires, les alliés (potentiels), les amis et les étrangers). Elles sont la source de nos idées de solidarité et elles sont liées aux codes d'inclusion et d'exclusion, de 'pur' et d'impur', de 'civilisé' et de 'sauvage'. Elles sont chargées de métaphores, de stéréotypes collectifs, de symboles et de relations entre ces symboles et de concepts comme 'L'unité nationale', 'le Progrès', 'La Liberté', 'Notre identité nationale', 'La volonté de Dieu', etc. Il faut connaître ce côté intérieur de la vie sociale afin de comprendre les comportements des membres d'une collectivité sociale, leurs préjugés envers l'Autre, leur admiration ou leur rejet d'autres styles de vie que le leur, leur angoisse envers l'Autre, leur arrogance envers l'Autre et leur dédain de l'Autre.

Une société complexe et démocratique comme la nôtre est toujours une société au pluriel, une société qui contient une multitude de représentations collectives dont quelques-unes coexistent plus au moins paisiblement, tandis que d'autres sont en compétition entre elles. Normalement, une telle société est régie par des principes fondamentaux qui sont le résultat d'un long processus de conflits et d'adaptation, comme la séparation entre l'église et l'état, la priorité de l'individu face aux exigences de certaines collectivités, la tolérance envers des styles de vie différentes, l'égalité de chaque personne devant la loi, l'égalité de toutes les expressions culturelles et religieuses, le vote universel, etc. Tout cela implique que cette multitude de représentations est, finalement, soumise à ces règles, qui imposent quelques restrictions à l'expression de l'identité collective des unités sociales. Sous des conditions démocratiques, certains groupes

⁴ PAUL FAUCONNET et MARCEL MAUSS, *La sociologie: objet et méthode* (1901), in MARCEL MAUSS, *Essais de sociologie* (Paris, 1968), 26.

⁵ D. JODELET, "Représentations sociales: un domaine en expansion", in D. JODELET, ed., *Les représentations sociales* (Paris, 1989), 36.

qui réclament une identité spécifique (ethnique, religieuse, 'raciale') peuvent être la source de problèmes graves, parce qu'ils rejettent les postulats de l'égalité de tous les individus et de toutes expressions culturelles. De ce que nous venons de dire s'ensuit, qu'il est nécessaire de distinguer entre des types différents de représentations collectives.

Les deux approches que nous venons de distinguer se concentrent sur le jeu de rencontres entre représentations collectives dans une société moderne, ou bien dans les sociétés démocratiques et occidentales. Cela dénote une restriction importante, parce que les sociétés de l'Occident ont, quand même, malgré leurs différences, un fond commun, une représentation collective des principes de l'ordre démocratique⁶.

Représentations ouvertes et closes en relation avec une conscience collective relativiste ou absolutiste

Commençons avec une observation sur les stéréotypes collectifs qui sont transmis dans la vie quotidienne: ce sont des représentations collectives portant sur l'Autre en tant que personnalité collective. Ils sont des représentations collectives en soi, mais on peut également dire qu'ils sont des éléments figés dans des représentations de l'Autre dans laquelle ils font partie intégrante. Cette imagerie a une fonction importante pour l'unité qui la véhicule. Gilles Boëtsch et Christiane Villain-Gandossi l'expriment très clairement: '...il s'agit de donner forme à une identité attribuée à l'Autre, par opposition à l'identité revendiquée par soi'⁷.

Arrivé à ce point, nous devons poser une question pertinente: 'Les membres d'une unité sociale, ont-ils une conscience de la nature spécifique de ces représentations collectives à travers lesquelles ils 'observent' le monde? Est-ce qu'ils croient vraiment que l'Autre se comporte comme suggèrent leurs représentations collectives avec leurs stéréotypes?'. Il nous semble qu'il existe sous ce rapport des différences assez notables entre des régions culturelles, entre des unités sociales et entre des personnes. Nous connaissons tous des personnages qui nous montrent une rigidité mentale marquée, qui témoignent d'une inflexibilité de leurs idées et de leurs opinions face aux arguments bien fondés qui vont contre leurs convictions. Cette rigidité mentale peut être un élément important de la structure d'une personnalité. Dans ce cas nous pouvons parler d'une

⁶ Cf. TALCOT PARSONS, *The system of modern societies* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1971).

⁷ GILLES BOËTSCH et CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, "Introduction. Les stéréotypes dans les relations Nord-Sud: images du physique de l'Autre et qualifications mentales", in GILLES BOËTSCH et CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, éd., *Stéréotypes dans les relations Nord-Sud*, Revue *Hermès. Cognition, Communication, Politique* (Paris, 2001), 18.

mentalité close ou d'un caractère individuel clos⁸. Chaque groupe social contient un nombre d'individus avec ce trait de personnalité qui semble être ancré dans leur structure génétique. Plus important pour nous est le constat qu'il y a des *variations* entre sociétés et autres unités sociales, ainsi que variations dans une unité sociale *dans le temps*, qui ont trait à ce phénomène de rigidité, des variations qui sont liées aux conditions sociales et culturelles et à leurs changements. Dans une société complexe et démocratique, dans laquelle les membres sont continuellement en contact avec des personnes qui ont des convictions, des croyances et des opinions qui sont différentes des leurs, il est normalement plus facile de reconnaître qu'il doit exister une disparité entre ses représentations (collectives) et la 'réalité', le monde qui est décrit par ses représentations, que dans une société ou une communauté où on est entouré de gens qui sont du même bord. L'hétérogénéité sociale et culturelle peut être la source d'un relativisme, d'une conscience que l'on ne possède pas la vérité unique, qu'il y a, sans doute, un décalage entre ses représentations collectives et celles d'autrui, entre les représentations et la 'réalité' qu'elles décrivent.

Néanmoins, dans les sociétés ouvertes également, il y a souvent des contre-courants qui sont générés par des changements sociaux et culturels qui bousculent la vie quotidienne de beaucoup. Ces contre-courants peuvent se manifester comme des mouvements sociaux qui colportent une idéologie rigide, anti-relativiste. Nous pouvons ici référer à des mouvements religieux fondamentalistes ou intégristes au 19^{ème} siècle, à certain types de sectes de nos jours, à certaines manifestations du socialisme et du communisme, au fascisme et nazisme et aux manifestations du fondamentalisme islamiste.

En relation avec notre discussion de la relation entre le Nord-Sud, il est également nécessaire de poser la question s'il y a des différences sur ce plan entre l'Europe et le monde arabe/musulman. Cependant, avant de commencer cette discussion, il est souhaitable d'introduire une distinction entre deux types de groupes sociaux: des unités sociales qui peuvent être caractérisées comme des unités avec des *identités collectives faibles et ouvertes* et celles avec des *identités fortes et fermées*. Nous ne proposons pas une dichotomie entre ces deux types, mais plutôt un axe avec un pôle «faible-ouvert» et un pôle «fort-fermé».

On comprend d'emblée que plus l'identité est forte, plus elle est fermée aux autres valeurs, au relativisme et au pluralisme des styles de vie, plus elle est ethnocentrique et chargée de préjugés envers l'Autre⁹.

⁸ Cf. MILTON ROKEACH, *The Open and the Closed Mind* (New York, 1960), chapter 2.

⁹ JAN BERTING, "Identités collectives et images de l'autre: les pièges de la pensée collectiviste", in VILLAIN-GANDOSSI et BOËTSCH, *Stéréotypes*, 49.

Ce qui nous intéresse dans cette contribution, ce sont les différences plus ou moins persistantes qui existent entre sociétés ou régions quant aux caractéristiques dominantes de leurs représentations collectives (acceptation d'un certain degré de relativisme, acceptation de l'Autre comme différent et équivalent, le rejet de tout relativisme, etc.), l'avènement des mouvements sociaux avec leurs idéologies closes et fortes et leurs manières de se répandre dans la société sous des conditions sociales et culturelles spécifiques, et les interactions entre des groupes avec des représentations collectives différentes et les conséquences de ces interactions.

L'importance des représentations collectives dans les relations Nord-Sud/Sud Nord

Après cette introduction précédente, nous avons à notre disposition tous les instruments dont nous avons besoin pour élucider les relations entre le 'Nord' et le 'Sud' sur le plan des représentations collectives. Rappelons-nous que, en général, ces relations sont discutées en termes des stéréotypes collectifs.

Christiane Villain-Gandossi a remarqué, d'une manière pertinente: 'Ainsi, essayons sur le plan des symboles, d'analyser le fond signifiant relatif aux relations *Nord/Sud*. Le Nord forme traditionnellement avec le Sud un «couple d'opposés». Dans la dialectique des couples d'opposés, le Nord/-Sud appartient aux structures symboliques dont la puissance évocatrice repose sur la tension entre deux éléments – éléments de ce système pris isolément ayant une force bien moindre: - (ainsi: Orient/Occident, midi/minuit, jour/nuit, haut/bas...). Phénomène «archétypique» universellement répandu, cette vision du cosmos reposerait sur l'expérience de Moi face au monde extérieur, remontant aux origines de l'humanité. Dans le monde entier, l'idée répandue d'une thèse (incluant le Moi) et d'une antithèse renvoyant à une instance différente (Soi, monde extérieur etc.) possède une dynamique interne et elle est si bien ancrée dans l'esprit humain qu'aucune synthèse idéale ne devrait pouvoir la dissoudre (l'opposition au sein du couple cesse sitôt qu'on parvient à une *coincidentia oppositorum*, ou à ce que les alchimistes appellent le mystère de la conjonction'¹⁰. Du fait que ce couple Nord/Sud est universellement répandu en suit que le couple Nord/Sud dans l'espace euro-méditerranéen est un cas spécifique qui est chargé d'oppositions liées à l'histoire de leur relations dans les domaines du pouvoir, des développements culturels et religieux, du commerce etc. De cette approche il découle directement qu'il est

¹⁰ CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, "La genèse des stéréotypes dans les jeux de l'identité/altérité Nord-Sud", in VILLAIN-GANDOSSI et BOËTSCH, *Stéréotypes*, 37.

très important d'étudier les représentations collectives croisées et les stéréotypes collectifs qu'ils contiennent. Il ne suffit nullement d'étudier les stéréotypes collectifs du 'Nord', qui ont trait au Sud, et vice versa, parce qu'on ne peut seulement comprendre leur signification qu'au cœur d'une représentation collective.

Néanmoins, l'analyse des stéréotypes collectifs en soi peut déjà être révélatrice. Nous constatons que les chercheurs européens et arabes sont très impliqués dans des recherches qui ont trait aux stéréotypes collectifs des Européens concernant les Arabes et le monde arabe/musulman. En revanche, on ne trouve guère de traces d'études dans le monde arabe qui s'occupent des stéréotypes collectifs dans le monde arabe relatifs aux Européens et au monde européen¹¹. Quelle est la source de cette inégalité frappante? Est-ce le résultat du fait que le monde européen est plus modernisé que le monde arabe, que les sociétés européennes sont devenues plus hétérogènes, pluralistes et ouvertes en comparaison avec les sociétés du Sud; d'où il s'ensuit que la majorité des Européens, et surtout les chercheurs européens, sont plus conscients de la relativité de leurs représentations collectives et des distorsions qu'elles produisent? Il y a des chercheurs arabes qui pensent que cette différence entre le Nord et le Sud est le résultat de la colonisation européenne, une colonisation qui obligeait les colonisateurs de trouver des 'bonnes raisons' pour leur exploitation de l'Autre. En revanche, les exploités n'avaient pas besoin des stéréotypes pour rationaliser leur position. Eux sont capables d'observer le monde européen comme il est en réalité. Cette thèse ressemble à la thèse marxiste: la bourgeoisie ne peut pas voir le monde comme il est réellement, n'étant pas capable d'écarter le voile de l'idéologie capitaliste. En revanche, le prolétariat, la victime de l'exploitation capitaliste, peut voir le monde d'une manière objective.

Il découle de cette thèse qu'il n'y a pas vraiment de stéréotypes collectifs à étudier dans le monde arabe/musulman, parce que l'imagerie arabe concernant l'Europe ou l'Occident ne contient pas des stéréotypes collectifs, mais des représentations qui décrivent ce monde comme il est réellement. Donc, il n'y a pas une bonne raison de douter de leur 'validité'.

On comprend que sous ces conditions les relations internationales Nord/Sud peuvent s'avérer être difficiles. Le Nord accepte que leurs représentations collectives en relation avec le monde arabe véhiculent des idées et des images qui ne correspondent pas à la 'réalité' du Sud, mais le Sud écarte la possibilité que leurs images ne sont pas en accord avec la 'réalité' du Nord. Il n'y a pas, selon le Sud, une double distorsion dans les relations Nord/Sud, mais seulement une distorsion simple, celle des Européens. Ce

¹¹ J. BERTING and C. VILLAIN-GANDOSI, "The Significance of Collective Identities in Intergroup Relations", *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, Volume 11, 1 (2001), 33.

problème d'inégalité entre la position des représentations collectives devient encore plus aiguë quand des oppositions Nord/Sud se développent au sein d'une société moderne, comme conséquence de l'installation permanente dans le Nord des minorités qui viennent du Sud.

Nous tenons à dire que toutes les relations entre groupes, y incluses les relations entre le Nord/Sud, sont soumises à cette distorsion double, cette distorsion croisée¹². Seule une coopération intense entre personnes du Sud et du Nord peut contribuer à une augmentation du niveau de la conscience de cette double distorsion, à une meilleure compréhension de son rôle dans les interactions entre groupes (sociétés, régions) et, peut-être, à trouver des moyens pour pallier des conséquences considérées être négatives.

Le problème de la distorsion double est lié à un autre problème, d'une envergure plus impressionnante. L'Europe s'est constituée, dans son histoire, pour une grande partie en opposition au monde arabe et musulman. Une certaine idée de l'Europe, un début d'une identité européenne, s'est forgée en relation avec cet 'autre monde'. Aujourd'hui, ce processus est loin d'être terminé. Le discours concernant les relations entre le Nord et le Sud continue, accentuant le rôle de l'Islam dans l'avenir de l'Europe. L'Islam a joué son rôle non négligeable dans le passé de l'Europe, comme nous le savons tous. Dans notre ère la comparaison entre 'Nous' et l'Autre change: il y a donc lieu de se demander si la comparaison entre l'Europe et l'Islam, dans la mesure où elle est toujours définie (ou au moins abordée) en termes de conflit, n'est pas souvent vue comme une sorte de synonyme de l'opposition Occident-Islam, ou de l'opposition modernité-Islam (ce qui introduirait une nouvelle complication, celle de la tendance implicite à considérer qu'Occident et modernité ne font qu'un), ou encore comme une poursuite d'un «duel» immémorial entre l'Europe et l'Asie...¹³. Donc, il faut souligner que les relations Nord/Sud, c'est à dire les relations entre l'Europe – dans un sens large – et le Sud – le monde arabe et le monde musulman – peuvent être placées dans une perspective d'images inversées l'un de l'autre. Ce qu'on 'voit' chez l'Autre est toujours lié à l'image de soi-même, bien que cette dernière peut rester, comme image, largement subconsciente. Cela est certainement le cas quand 'l'observateur' n'accepte pas l'idée que sa représentation collective et la 'réalité' ne font pas une. Cette perspective d'images inversées décrit les relations Nord/Sud surtout en termes d'oppositions (fidèles-infidèles, fiable-non fiable, riche-pauvre, austère-lascif, moral-immoral, pur-pourri, agressif-paisible, supérieur--

¹² BERTING and VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, "The Significance of Collective Identities", 33: 'Also in international relations this double distortion may be a source of misunderstanding and conflict and may be a serious hindrance to the establishment of peaceful international relations'.

¹³ FRANCO CARDINI, *L'Europe et l'Islam. Histoire d'un malentendu* (Paris, 2000), 12.

inférieur, etc.). Une telle approche laisse peu de place aux images, dans lesquelles est accentué le fond commun du Sud et du Nord, et les périodes de l'histoire qui témoignent d'une coopération entre les deux pôles et des processus d'acculturation réciproques.

On peut se demander pourquoi les relations Nord/Sud attirent plus d'attention en Europe à l'heure actuelle que les relations Ouest/Est, ou Est/Ouest. Jusqu'à la chute du mur de Berlin et de l'Union Soviétique, l'attention européenne privilégiait l'axe Ouest-Est, conçu en termes d'opposition entre le monde libre et le monde totalitaire. L'axe Nord/Sud attirait beaucoup moins d'attention. Après l'effondrement du système totalitaire, l'axe Nord/Sud est devenu plus important dans la pensée politique et populaire. Il faut, peut-être, dire que cet axe a repris la place qu'elle avait historiquement pendant une très longue période dans la pensée européenne. Le Sud méditerranéen est à la fois le voisin de l'Europe est en même temps culturellement plus différent que l'Est (de l'Europe). L'Europe a des frontières floues à l'Est et l'Autre y est, ou bien assez éloigné comme pôle culturel, ou bien assez près, mais sans organisations sociales et militaires menaçantes. Aussi l'Ouest (l'Outre-atlantique) n'est pas un bon candidat, étant à part entière un élément extrêmement important de l'Occident. Le Sud méditerranéen, le berceau de trois religions qui ont fortement influencées la vie, bien au-delà de l'espace euro-méditerranéen, a son propre Sud vis-à-vis duquel il figure comme le Nord. Mais dans cette perspective ce Nord semble avoir plusieurs options, son Sud étant plus diversifié que son Nord (l'Europe). Mais il faut immédiatement ajouter à cette observation, que le monde européen est, depuis l'expansion de son commerce et la colonisation mondiale, depuis son industrialisation et le développement de ses sciences et de ses technologies, le centre de la mondialisation. L'Occident (l'Europe, puis surtout les Etats-Unis de l'Amérique) a provoqué des changements sociaux, idéologiques et politiques partout dans le monde et le monde arabe et musulman n'a pas échappé à ces influences. Le regard du Sud vers le Nord est très marqué par ce développement, un regard qui privilège l'axe de domination-soumission dans un discours anticolonialiste. Cependant, il ne faut pas oublier que l'opposition à la colonisation a souvent eu recours aux produits idéologiques de l'Occident: le nationalisme, les droits de l'homme, les droits des peuples à l'autonomie, le socialisme, le communisme... Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que cette fixation du Sud sur l'ère coloniale lui convient, afin de culpabiliser le Nord comme la source de tous ses échecs, mais qu'elle est fautive, partiellement au moins, parce que le déclin de la culture arabe/musulman a commencé bien avant l'avènement de l'Europe expansionniste.

Bernard Lewis, l'orientaliste américain, constate que, lorsque la puissance musulmane était à son apogée, seule une autre civilisation, la Chine, pouvait se comparer à elle par l'ampleur, la qualité et la diversité de

ses réalisations¹⁴. Mais, contrairement à la civilisation chinoise, qui restait essentiellement limitée à une aire géographique, l'Extrême-Orient, et à une famille de peuples, l'Islam avait créé une civilisation mondiale, pluri-ethnique, multiraciale, internationale et l'on pourrait même dire transcontinentale. Le déclin de cette civilisation commence depuis le 14^{ème} siècle. Nous ne nous occuperons pas des causes de ce déclin. Ce qui est le plus important pour nous, c'est le constat de Lewis: la civilisation arabe n'a pas cessé depuis ce déclin de chercher les causes de celui-ci en dehors de ses propres sociétés. On écarte une analyse systématique de causes internes. Les causes sont les Tartares, les Chrétiens, la colonisation, le communisme, et, dans notre ère, le capitalisme international, la mondialisation, qui empêchent le monde arabe d'obtenir une position dominante dans le monde. Bref, dans cette perspective, on est toujours la victime de forces extérieures, qui sont maintenant représentées par l'Occident, avant tout par les Etats-Unis, et selon le schéma religieux, par les chrétiens ou les croisés et les juifs. Vu du Sud, le Nord est la source de tous ses malheurs. On culpabilise le Nord, le Sud est sa victime. On peut observer cette attitude non seulement dans le Sud, mais également, d'une manière très aiguë, parmi les populations des immigrés du Sud qui se sont installées dans le Nord.

Le monde arabe/musulman d'aujourd'hui est un monde stagnant sur le plan social, économique, politique et religieux, malgré les énormes richesses dont il dispose. Richesses, qui s'évaporent par la fraude et la corruption, ou qui sont accaparées par une mince couche gouvernante, une élite qui ne veut ou ne peut pas utiliser ces ressources pour stimuler le développement de leurs pays. Le monde arabe est le seul au monde¹⁵, quelques états africains exceptés, où la population n'a pas connu une amélioration économique depuis des décennies. Et Bernard Lewis de constater : 'Pour un observateur occidental baignant dans la théorie et la pratique de la liberté, c'est précisément le manque de la liberté – liberté de l'esprit affranchi des dogmes et de la censure; liberté de l'économie affranchie de corruption et de l'incurie; liberté des femmes affranchies de l'oppression masculine; liberté des citoyens affranchis de la tyrannie – qui est à la base des maux dont souffre le monde musulman. Toutefois, comme l'histoire de l'Occident le montre d'abondance, le chemin vers la démocratie est long et ardu, semé d'embûches et d'obstacles'¹⁶.

Cependant, ce manque de liberté, n'es-il pas lié – au moins partiellement – au fait que le monde arabe et musulman est fortement ancré dans un style de vie traditionnel? Cela implique que chaque individu est avant

¹⁴ BERNARD LEWIS, *Que s'est-il passé? L'Islam, l'occident et la modernité* (Paris, 2002), 11.

¹⁵ Le rapport de l'UNDP (United Nations Development Program) sur la situation socio-économique dans les 22 états-membres de la Ligue arabe, 2002.

¹⁶ LEWIS, *Que s'est-il passé?*, 221-222.

tout défini par sa place dans les structures traditionnelles: la famille, le clan, la religion? Ses choix comme individu sont très limités dans ce monde où l'influence de la modernité est limitée. Le Sud de la Méditerranée est restée plus traditionaliste que le Nord. Cela implique que le rôle de l'identité collective est différent dans le Sud en comparaison avec le Nord. Dans le Sud, l'identité collective est imposée par la naissance. Il n'y a pas un choix. Dans le Nord, l'identité collective est souvent une construction individuelle, elle est le résultat d'un choix parmi plusieurs options. Ce manque de choix dans le Sud doit peser fortement sur les représentations collectives et les stéréotypes que les gens du Sud ont en relation avec le Nord. Martucelli remarque: 'La modernité, toute modernité, est concernée par la crise de l'identité. Il faut dès lors prendre des distances face à l'idée même d'une crise contemporaine de l'identité liée à une phase de bouleversements particuliers, en la comprenant comme ce qu'elle n'a jamais cessé d'être, une sempiternelle illusion moderne'¹⁷. Dans les pays arabo-musulmans, il n'y a pas de choix d'identité. Ou faut-il dire pas encore? Selon certains observateurs, les structures traditionnelles commencent de s'écrouler, ce qui provoque des tensions psychiques dans la société. Mais comme le dit le psychanalyste arabe Gehad Marzaweh: «on a peur de la clarification, de la prise de conscience. On affirme volontiers: 'Nous, nous n'avons pas besoin de la psychanalyse. Ce genre de chose, c'est pour l'Occident décadent'»¹⁸.

Cette situation sans issue dans laquelle une grande partie de la population se trouve, en relation avec la grande influence de la 'culture des victimes' dont nous avons parlé plus haut, empêche encore l'analyse objective des influences intérieures, qui freinent les changements nécessaires, génèrent sous l'influence des médias de masses arabes un ressentiment violent contre l'Occident. Une telle situation est facile à exploiter par les mouvements intégristes et par les organisations et réseaux fondamentalistes terroristes, qui renforcent ce ressentiment en une haine profonde vis-à-vis de l'Occident parmi certains groupuscules. Ce fondamentalisme musulman est naturellement basé sur le Coran et la Shari'a, mais l'interprétation fondamentaliste de ces sources est extrêmement pauvre et simpliste.

Adelwahab Meddeb remarque que: 'Le monde islamique n'a cessé d'être l'inconsolé de sa destitution'¹⁹. Lui aussi soulève le thème du ressentiment : 'Imperceptiblement, ce sentiment, qui était ignoré du sujet islamique, va croître en lui et s'installer au centre. A mon sens, les opérations intégristes dont l'agent est le sujet islamique s'expliquent par la

¹⁷ DANILO MARTUCCELLI, *Grammaires de l'individu* (Paris, 2002), 345.

¹⁸ GEHAD MARZAWEH, "Quand Freud rencontre l'islam", *Le Nouveau Courrier*, n. 822-824, du 3 au 23 août 2006.

¹⁹ ABDELWAHAB MEDDEB, *La maladie de l'islam* (Paris, 2002), 18.

croissance du ressentiment, un état qu'il ignorait historiquement et qui ne l'avait pas constitué comme tel depuis qu'il était entré en tant que sujet dans l'histoire²⁰.

Le ressentiment, qui s'enracine facilement dans l'homme qui reçoit, mais qui n'a pas des moyens de donner, est un sol fertile pour le fondamentalisme. Le fondamentalisme se développe souvent en relation avec des changements économiques, sociaux et culturels profonds, comme une dernière défense contre la modernisation. Les fondamentalismes sont attractifs pour ceux qui se sentent rejetés dans ce processus. Le fondamentalisme 'répare' d'un seul coup ce statut minable: on devient supérieur aux 'autres' par le simple fait d'adhérer à la religion vraie, ou en croyant appartenir à la race supérieure ou à la classe porteuse de l'avenir. Ces types de fondamentalisme se ressemblent énormément. Ainsi Alexandre del Valle peut dire qu'après le totalitarisme, fondé sur la notion de la lutte de classe et après le totalitarisme basé sur la notion de la race pure, nous sommes maintenant confrontés au totalitarisme qui se définit par la distinction entre la religion pure et les infidèles et les exclus. Il parle d'un fascisme rouge, brun et vert²¹.

Sans aucun doute, la perspective fondamentaliste donne l'interprétation la plus rétrécie de la relation Sud-Nord qui soit. Cela n'est pas seulement le cas parce que cette relation est définie uniquement en termes de la dichotomie 'fidèle-infidèle'. Beaucoup plus important est le fait que le fondamentalisme témoigne d'une représentation collective qui est extrêmement close et forte, qui rejette toute pensée relativiste et qui, par conséquence, n'a aucun doute sur le fait qu'il possède la vérité. Des doutes doivent être présents, mais ils sont refoulés par la véhémence des idées et des actes des croyants. Le fondamentalisme est fondé sur *une seule vérité, qui est immuable et qui exclut toutes autres revendications à la vérité*. La pensée fondamentaliste est *dogmatique et dualiste ou manichéiste*. Elle est aussi, vue de l'intérieur, *'universaliste'*. Elle rejette *l'historicité*, l'idée que nos manières de penser sont conditionnées par les développements historiques. Le fondamentalisme est *holistique*, ce qui implique que la totalité (ou la collectivité) détermine totalement les éléments qu'elle contient. Ainsi, l'individu n'a pas d'autre raison d'être qu'en étant un élément de la totalité. Une conséquence importante de cette représentation collective, c'est *qu'elle ne voit que des différences entre 'nous' et les Autres*. Toute idée qu'on partage des éléments communs avec l'Autre est rejetée.

De ce que nous venons de souligner suit, que le fondamentaliste est, selon lui-même, *supérieur à tous les autres êtres humains que ne partagent pas*

²⁰ ABDELWAHAB MEDDEB, *La maladie de l'islam*, 19.

²¹ ALEXANDRE DEL VALLE, *Le totalitarisme islamiste à l'assaut des démocraties* (Paris, 2002), 28.

ses idées. Les Autres sont 'dégénérés', 'pourris', 'impurs' etc. Les Autres sont la source du mal, des complots contre eux. Sans l'Autre le monde serait parfait, parce que organisé selon les principes pures et limpides de la seule vérité.

Dans la pensée fondamentaliste, *l'individu n'a qu'une seule identité*, définie par son appartenance à la communauté pure. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. Le fondamentalisme est, normalement, accompagné d'*intolérance* envers tous ceux que ne partagent pas la 'vérité' et d'*exclusion totale de l'Autre*. La 'nécessité' de cette exclusion permet l'utilisation de tous les moyens disponibles, y inclus l'extermination totale de l'Autre.

Le fondamentalisme est opposé à la démocratie, parce que la pensée fondamentaliste inclut déjà toutes les idées concernant l'organisation de la société. On n'a pas besoin des processus démocratiques, parce que la pensée unique du fondamentalisme n'accepte pas l'expression des doutes. Ceux qui connaissent la 'vérité', l'élite, ont l'obligation d'*expliquer et d'initier, et d'exterminer ceux qui témoignent d'une pensée critique*.

Le fondamentalisme islamiste ou musulman présente une image inverse de l'image que le Nord a de lui-même: terre de la démocratie et de pluralisme, des libertés individuelles et civiles, du rejet du primat du collectivisme sur l'individu, de l'acceptation de l'égalité fondamentale de tous les êtres humains et du rejet de revendications des collectivités d'être supérieures en termes de race, culture, idéologie et religion. Afin d'absorber tous ces principes fondamentaux, la pensée occidentale doit être relativiste, accepter une certaine distance entre ses représentations collectives et la 'réalité'. Cette capacité d'absorber l'Autre a forcément ses limites, parce que la démocratie ne peut pas intégrer les mouvements fondamentalistes ou intégristes sans dégrader la qualité de la démocratie et ses institutions démocratiques.

Le Nord doit reconnaître qu'il a connu, dans sa propre évolution, le développement des mouvements fondamentalistes et que son identité comme société démocratique est étroitement liée aux combats –souvent sanglants – contre ces développements fondamentalistes et aux victoires que la démocratie a emportées contre la répression religieuse, contre les agressions des idéologies de la pensée unique, comme le nazisme. Le fondamentalisme musulman, comme il a été défini plus haut, s'insère dans la même 'tradition' nauséabonde. En même temps, il faut accentuer que le Nord et le Sud ont un terrain commun, étant donné que la pensée fondamentaliste non-islamiste, bien que marginalisée à présent, est toujours une menace contre la démocratie. On peut même dire qu'une croissance forte du fondamentalisme islamiste provoquera des réactions fondamentalistes en Occident. Ainsi, l'expression du président des Etats-Unis, George Bush: il est nécessaire de déclencher une guerre contre 'l'axe du mal', peut être considérée comme l'indication d'une pensée fondamentaliste.

Le mépris des fondamentalistes islamistes pour l'Occident, leurs actes de barbarie et leurs menaces contre l'Occident, de même contre les populations arabes, provoquent aisément des réactions véhémentes contre l'Islam, des réactions dans lesquelles on oublie que le fondamentalisme islamique ne concerne qu'un noyau dur très restreint dans les populations musulmanes, aussi bien dans le monde arabe que dans les minorités musulmanes qui se sont installées en Europe. Le grand danger, c'est la généralisation des opinions qui ne concernent, en fait, que ce noyau dur²².

Nous espérons d'avoir démontré que l'analyse des stéréotypes collectifs sur 'l'Autre' doit être placée dans l'étude des représentations collectives et qu'il faut analyser le caractère spécifique de ces représentations collectives en termes de leurs définitions avec le monde 'réel', leur rigidité ou flexibilité, leur absolutisme ou relativité etc. Ce qui est extrêmement important dans ces analyses, c'est la conscience que les représentations collectives sur l'Autre sont toujours formulées en relation avec les représentations collectives de nous-mêmes (et vice versa) et que nous devons être conscients des conséquences de nos actes, par exemple sur le plan politique, étant donné que nous sommes observés à travers la représentation collective de l'Autre. Si beaucoup de personnes d'origine arabe en Europe se considèrent comme des victimes de l'Occident qui ont, par conséquence, droit à une réparation, une telle définition de leur situation provoquera beaucoup de malentendus et d'irritations dans les relations entre 'eux' et 'nous'²³.

²² Par exemple: Oriana Fallaci, *La rage et l'orgueil* (Paris, 2002).

²³ Les émissions télévisées montrent souvent l'influence de cette 'culture de victimes' et qui essaie toujours de culpabiliser l'Autre, même dans des cas où le contraire est bien évident.

Christiane Villain-Gandossi

Les stéréotypes dans les jeux de l'identité-altérité Nord-Sud dans l'espace méditerranéen

Les événements du 11 septembre 2001 ont semblé donner raison, jusqu'à la caricature au "paradigme de Huntington" qui attribue aux confrontations culturelles les désordres actuels et à venir. Rarement les perceptions identitaires et différentielles reposant sur l'Image de l'Autre et s'appuyant en particulier sur la construction croisée de l'Autre selon une dynamique des relations Nord/Sud et Sud-Nord n'ont suscité autant de jugements stéréotypés. Ces jugements - qui peuvent prendre la forme de slogans éculés, de graves logorrhées xénophobes - sont préalables à toute analyse concrète des événements et rebelles à toute autre forme d'argumentation. L'Islam et ses fidèles sont classés comme agressifs et rétrogrades par des intellectuels occidentaux reconnus, alors que les oulémas et autres mollahs musulmans rejettent l'Occident pervers, corrompu et amoral. La référence à la "guerre des cultures" a eu des effets redoutables sur le clivage Nord/Sud, en "naturalisant" ce qui n'était perçu jusqu'alors que comme des différences économiques et sociales réductibles¹.

La question encore récente de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union a invité à réfléchir sur les risques de facteurs ethno-culturels dans la construction d'une frontière de l'espace européen en Méditerranée: "elle a mis en lumière l'importance de cette dialectique de construction d'un clivage culturel entre "Eux" et "Nous"².

Nous sommes d'ailleurs de moins en moins en terrain connu. La dimension religieuse a fait ouvertement son apparition. Déjà présent, à l'ouverture de la deuxième guerre du Golfe, Dieu est revendiqué par chaque camp. Force, en tout cas, est de reconnaître que nous sommes en face de visions fondamentalistes. Le "choc des civilisations", "la fin de l'histoire", "la fin de l'homme", "la fin des idéologies", "la destruction massive", avec dans cette optique le suicide comme possible "mesure

¹ JEAN-ROBERT HENRY, "Le renouveau de la problématique Nord-Sud", *Projet*, juin 2002.

² JEAN-ROBERT HENRY, "L'élargissement euro-méditerranéen: une utopie réaliste", in MICHEL WIEVIORKA, *L'avenir de l'Islam en France et en Europe* (Paris, 2003).

préventive", "l'axe de la haine", "l'axe du mal", "l'éternité du conflit"... , seul le jugement dernier y mettrait une fin : nous serions en état de survie. Nous sommes bien en présence de cette catégorie de stéréotypes qui émanent d'une pensée collectiviste.

Les stéréotypes ethniques

Dans le cadre de ce type de représentations collectives, les stéréotypes "ethniques et nationaux" apparaissent comme une forme particulière générant une tendance des groupes à l'ethnocentrisme. Et il ne s'agit pas de simples constructions imaginaires, dans la mesure où les groupes sont en contact les uns avec les autres et où leurs relations s'accompagnent de contradictions et de rapports de domination et de dépendance. Les stéréotypes remplissent une fonction idéologique à l'égard des conflits et des discriminations réelles et ils s'intègrent dans la gestion de l'interculturel. Inutile d'insister.

Dans sa *Théorie des opinions*, Jean Stoetzel souligne que l'effet puissant des stéréotypes tient à ce qu'ils sont, comme les clichés, les symboles ou les slogans, "les significations elles-mêmes", c'est-à-dire quelque chose d'immédiatement communicable et assimilé par les individus³. Ils apparaissent ainsi comme un élément de la structure des représentations. Le stéréotype est donc soit quasi-totalement contraire aux faits, soit partiellement conforme, tout en créant les apparences de véracité totale de ses contenus: aussi constitue-t-il un excellent instrument pour la pratique des opérations de dissonance cognitive et du maintien de l'état de l'"esprit fermé".

Ce qu'il faut souligner, c'est son caractère fondamentalement sécurisant: il est, en effet, de longue durée, et offre une grande résistance aux changements, ce qui est lié au fait qu'il est indépendant de l'expérience. Autre facteur sécurisant: le stéréotype sur l'Autre fait intervenir la conception élémentaire de la dichotomie entre *in-group* et *out-group*, c'est à dire la volonté d'identification à son propre groupe. Si nous avons tendance à accentuer les similitudes entre membres d'un même groupe (*in-group*), c'est souvent pour nous valoriser au détriment des autres (*out-group*). L'esprit ne peut penser sans avoir recours à des catégories. Le stéréotype remplit donc une fonction de conservation du groupe⁴.

L'axe Nord/Sud

Si nous privilégions l'analyse des stéréotypes qui relèvent des attitudes d'identification/inclusion de l'individu ou d'un groupe à une collectivité

³ X. ROZE, "Stéréotypes sociaux", in *Encyclopaedia Universalis* (Paris, 1992), 594-595.

⁴ CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, "La genèse des stéréotypes dans les jeux de l'identité/altérité Nord-Sud", *Hermès*, n. 30 (2001), 28.

de valeurs communes et d'altérisation/exclusion des autres, en choisissant l'axe des relations Nord/Sud, thème singulièrement porteur, plusieurs observations préalables peuvent être faites.

Il s'agit tout d'abord d'un champ de recherches immense à explorer aux frontières indécises, tant la batterie de stéréotypes est constamment réactivée et que la pratique de la recherche sur ce thème nourrit encore l'imprécation et l'exécration; elle a installé l'Autre *a priori* dans une fonction de "fauteur" de troubles. Mais quelle réalité se cache derrière cette dyade Nord/Sud? Il est certain que la vision actuelle des rapports "Nord/Sud" *stricto sensu* s'inscrit dans l'héritage colonial à un degré qu'il est difficile d'évaluer et qui explique bien, par ailleurs, l'obstacle rencontré dans la compréhension de la genèse des stéréotypes.

Sur le plan de la pratique, depuis huit années, le Nord/Sud est traité dans le cadre du "partenariat euro-méditerranéen", nouvelle figure de la politique méditerranéenne de l'Europe. Ce partenariat économique, politique et sociétal avec 12 pays d'Outre-Méditerranée, dont 9 à majorité musulmane (il faut y ajouter Chypre, Israël et Malte) avait porté beaucoup d'espoirs, lorsqu'il a été lancé en 1995, dans le cadre de la Conférence de Barcelone, et dans la foulée du processus de paix au Moyen-Orient⁵. Mais au fil des rencontres diplomatiques qui ont suivi, on n'a cessé de déplorer la lenteur et la modestie des réalisations et surtout l'extrême pauvreté de ses perspectives, en matière d'organisation de l'espace humain méditerranéen. Chaque nouvelle conférence a été l'occasion d'appeler à une "refonte du partenariat". "Au total, c'est donc une double crise, tenant à des facteurs internes ou externes, qui affecte aujourd'hui le processus de Barcelone.

L'aspect le plus nouveau de la réinscription du débat Nord/Sud sur la scène politique internationale tient à la surpuissance américaine. "Elle affaiblit la capacité d'initiative des organisations internationales et la voix des autres États, comme la France, bien plus discrète sur le sujet qu'il y a trente ans. Surtout, elle rend difficile l'organisation d'un nouveau dialogue Nord/Sud sur le modèle de celui des années 70"⁶.

On peut entendre *a priori* par Nord/Sud, les relations dans l'espace méditerranéen. Mais il est intéressant de constater que ces représentations sont construites en reproduisant les stéréotypes existant entre pays du Nord et du Sud de l'Europe. Le rapport Nord/Sud, en fait est déjà explicite dans les idéologies nationales. A certains moments de l'histoire, il a été transposé entre peuple d'Europe occidentale et d'Europe centrale. Les oppositions entre civilisation/barbarie, modernité/archaïsme, progrès/im-

⁵ HENRY, "L'élargissement euro-méditerranéen".

⁶ *Ibidem.*

mobilisme ont représenté autant d'éléments constitutifs des stéréotypes. Ce sont encore ces mêmes éléments qui récemment encore servaient à dénoncer le contraste entre l'Europe occidentale et l'Orient représenté soit par la Turquie, soit par la Russie. On peut aussi inclure dans ce type de relations, les rapports concernant le "centre" et sa périphérie (ville/campagne, pays industrialisés/pays en développement) ou de manière générale, tout phénomène de "méridionalité" ou de "septentrionalité". En fait, la dyade Nord/Sud peut servir de métaphore pour tout genre de rapports d'inégalité, de domination ou de volonté dominatrice entre état-nations ou régions. Ces jeux de représentations visent toujours la hiérarchie et reflètent des rapports de domination dont l'expression Nord/Sud n'est qu'une forme privilégiée mais aussi - répétons-le - métaphorique⁷.

L'altérité : universalité du phénomène

De toute manière, il est opportun de replacer la construction de cette altérité précise, quelle que soit l'aire géographique prise en considération, dans l'universalité du phénomène: on est, on fut, on sera toujours l'Autre de quelqu'un. L'hyper médiatisation, qui permet à un rythme vertigineux la présence de chaque groupe humain à tous les autres, qui véhicule des images - même virtuelles -, renforce la persistance de stéréotypes, de préjugés, d'images de l'Autre, forgés et charriés par l'Histoire depuis des millénaires, comme s'il y avait une dynamique autonome des jugements sur autrui, ces derniers cheminant comme une cryptographie souterraine⁸. La peur devant la différence a été nourrie, alimentée par une batterie impressionnante de représentations collectives qui pèse très lourd et provoque nombre de réactions d'ethnophobie, à la suite d'une longue, collective et pernicieuse imprégnation de l'esprit.

Dans nombre de sociétés "archaïques", il est bien vrai que les anthropologues ont remarqué que les frontières du *Nous* étaient aussi celles de l'humanité, rejetant les *Autres* dans le domaine du non-humain, représentations qui persistent dans des imaginaires sociaux de sociétés plus proches - les hommes-animaux et autres monstres qui se situent hors des limites du *re-connu* - voire contemporaines: le racisme rejette constamment les autres aux limites de l'humanité et de l'animalité et manipule ces frontières *ad-infinitum*. A l'heure de la mondialisation, du métissage des hom-

⁷ GILLES BOËTSCH et CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, "Les stéréotypes dans les relations Nord-Sud: images du physique de l'Autre et qualifications mentales", *Hermès*, n. 30 (2001), 20.

⁸ HÉLÈNE AHRWEILER, "L'image de l'Autre: étrangers, minoritaires, marginaux. L'image de l'Autre et les mécanismes de l'altérité", in *Actes du XVIe congrès international des sciences historiques* (Stuttgart, 1985), 60-66, et J. KI-ZERBO, "L'image de l'Autre. Regards sur l'Afrique et regards africains", in *Actes du XVIe congrès*, 81.

mes et des cultures, les stéréotypes, sans changer profondément de nature, se déploient dans un autre espace sémantique. Le racisme qui emprunte au langage des sciences biologiques, mais aussi l'antisémitisme, première manifestation peut-être de ces évolutions contextuelles ne se réduisent pas à la politique raciale des nazis⁹.

Ce n'est pas tant le concept de race qui est pernicieux, mais le stéréotype qui a présidé à sa naissance et fondé un "racisme avant le racisme" sur quelques discriminations simples. La taille et la morphologie, la pigmentation de la peau, la pilosité, la couleur des cheveux, le timbre de la voix, les odeurs "spécifiques" sont les marqueurs d'identité le plus souvent retenus, mais les "comportements déviants" ne sont pas moins importants pour justifier un "racisme différentialiste".

C'est ainsi que dans l'Europe médiévale chrétienne, l'Eglise va alimenter par ses propres canaux cet imaginaire ambigu. L'antinomie "civilisé/barbare", "Blanc/Non-Blanc", par extrapolation, oppose chrétien à non-chrétien, la Méditerranée, l'antique *mare nostrum*, prédestinée au rayonnement de l'Evangile, servant d'axe à toute la construction du monde connu. On dénote bien ce fait de la persistance très significative de la représentation de la Méditerranée sur la cartographie chrétienne du VIII^e au XIII^e siècle, en tant que barrière entre deux mondes. De la même manière que les Chinois ont conçu leur Empire du "Milieu", les Occidentaux ont représenté l'univers centré autour de leur monde rétréci et de leur culture¹⁰.

A partir de l'hégire, les chrétiens n'ont cessé d'être confrontés à la réalité musulmane. L'Islam va fomenté et hanter l'Europe. L'Islam s'était introduit par la force en Occident et cette constatation imprégna résolument les mentalités médiévales à la manière d'une faute originelle. Tombeurs de cités, destructeurs, pillards, faiseurs d'otages... tels sont les défauts les plus fréquemment attribués aux Sarrasins: "gentem perfidam sarracenorum", "la nation perfide des Sarrasins". L'adversaire, le Sarrasin n'est pas perçu comme l'adepte d'une religion, mais comme un adversaire militaire guère différent des Saxons, des Suèves, et bientôt des Normands. L'appel à la Croisade opéra une flexion notable dans cette perception de l'Autre: le *Sarrasin* devint l'*Infidèle* et cette vision excessive, grossière, caricaturale que l'Occident en avait, il fallait la communiquer, la répandre.

Cette expansion de l'image de l'Islam dut emprunter des formes originales de propagande: représentations de guerriers musulmans sur les chapiteaux, chansons de gestes, romans d'amour, miracles, joués sur le parvis des églises de toute la Chrétienté médiévale. Ces Musulmans sont

⁹ JAN BERTING, "Identités collectives et images de l'Autre: les pièges de la pensée collectiviste", *Hermès*, n. 30 (2001), 41-58.

¹⁰ MICHEL MOLLAT DU JOURDIN et MONIQUE DE LA RONCIÈRE, *Les portulans. Cartes marines du XIII^e au XVII^e siècle* (Fribourg, 1984), 18-19.

représentés affublés d'un gros nez épaté, les cheveux bouclés, et bientôt, ils ont la peau sombre: ils sont dangereux donc (c'est ainsi qu'ils apparaissent dans le livre des *Las Cantigas*, qu'Alphonse X le Sage fit illustrer entre 1252-1284). Obligés de reconnaître à l'adversaire des qualités guerrières, morales et culturelles, les Occidentaux, soucieux de prolonger la différence durent emprunter de nouvelles formes d'expression et optèrent pour l'emploi de la couleur noire comme signe extérieur de distinction¹¹.

Cette perception qui sert de prétexte pour étayer un jugement de valeur, pour appuyer un rapport de force, pour autoriser la violence, s'attache au phénotype, mais aussi aux vêtements, à la parure, à la langue, aux mœurs, aux qualifications mentales. En tout cas, c'est ce qu'il apparaît d'une analyse des stéréotypes physiques et mentaux dans les relations Nord Sud¹².

L'originalité du corpus analysé par les auteurs réside dans le fait qu'il était constitué à la fois de matériaux construits et de matériaux "fugaces". En effet, ces "images dans notre tête", ces représentations, ces constellations figées et préexistantes peuvent être liées à des signes linguistiques (lexèmes ou configurations lexématiques), dont l'énonciation évoque souvent l'expression d'un jugement, d'un sentiment, d'une image ou tout simplement d'un halo d'associations/connotations plus ou moins confuses. Mais l'on peut être en présence également de formes non-lexicalisées, gestuelle, iconique, voire musicale.

Dans cet état des lieux du discours sur le physique de l'Autre et ses qualifications mentales (caractères sociaux ou culturels), entrepris avec une équipe de chercheurs venant des deux rives de la Méditerranée, ont été mises en évidence, les conséquences de l'évidente dissymétrie concernant la période coloniale, durant laquelle seul le Nord produisait un discours facilement repérable sur le Sud. Pour ce dernier, la méthode relève de l'ethnohistoire, puisque les seules "archives" existantes passent généralement par la tradition orale.

Notre relation au Maghreb fonctionne sur le même schéma que durant l'époque coloniale, puisque dans les modes d'expressions privilégiées de l'imagerie populaire, comme la caricature, par exemple, ou les "histoires arabes", la figure de l'Arabe, tant au physique qu'au mental, mobilise les principaux fantasmes et stéréotypes de l'altérité radicale¹³.

Et qu'en est-il des stéréotypes que le Sud fabrique sur le Nord? Pour certains, le monopole du Nord, pour ce qui est de la production et de la

¹¹ Cf. l'ouvrage de PHILIPPE SÉNAC, *L'image de l'Autre. L'Occident médiéval face à l'Islam* (Paris, 1983), 72 et sqq.

¹² Cf. les résultats de cette analyse dans BOËTSCH et VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, «Stéréotypes dans les relations Nord-Sud», *Hermès*, n. 30, 2001.

¹³ SALAH-EDDINE BARIKI et JEAN-ROBERT HENRY, "Imaginaires 'populaires' et stéréotypes: à propos des histoires arabes", *Hermès*, n. 30 (2001), 103-114.

circulation des images, est tout juste "écorné" par le Sud, "tant les capacités de production du Nord écrasent de fait les balbutiements et les tentatives du Sud"¹⁴. Mais la véritable raison ne tient-elle pas au caractère de "duplicité" des stéréotypes qui renseignent plus sur le groupe producteur - auquel il renvoie - que sur l'altérité visée? Le Sud ne semble pas fonctionner selon ces catégories, car il établit des constats, et parmi ceux-ci, peut-être celui de dénoncer comme une réalité objective la propension du Monde Nord Atlantique à être surtout tourné sur Soi. En réalité, nous savons bien que c'est face à l'identité que se situe l'altérité considérée comme miroir de l'identité ou comme identité de l'Autre¹⁵.

Prenons un exemple. Ozan Serdaroglu qui analyse le contenu de la chaîne francophone TV5 - qui oscille entre affirmation d'une culture française dominante et expression multiculturelle - démontre que ce sont plutôt les émetteurs du Nord qui assignent une identité à l'Autre, tandis que pour les "Autres" (les pays du Sud), l'enjeu n'est pas de communiquer avec le Nord, mais d'influer sur son opinion pour la mise en place d'une juste perception et représentation de lui-même. Dans l'espace francophone, il existe un mécanisme d'identification de l'Autre, qui se reproduit sans arrêt. Néanmoins, c'est toujours le Sud qui est perçu comme l'Autre. Le Nord est connu, il est le centre du monde, il est universel, car il agit selon la "Raison humaine", il représente la civilisation, etc.¹⁶.

Pour Jean-Noël Ferrié¹⁷, qui examine les visions orientales de l'Occident - en prenant le cas de l'Égypte contemporaine, copte et musulmane - et l'ambivalence de représentations faisant apparaître les continuités entre un Orient qui emprunte à l'Occident les instruments rationnels de sa domination, la pensée scientifique, mais revendique une supériorité morale qui s'exprime dans la morale sexuelle plus particulièrement, il s'agit d'un trait constant de l'Islam. La typification morale instaure, en d'autres termes, un invariant social.

En tout cas, à travers les analyses recueillies dans le numéro d'*Hermès*, vérification est faite que le stéréotype a une fonction - en plus de celles de catégorisation et de typification - d'identification de soi et des autres, ainsi qu'une fonction cognitive. On pourrait dire qu'il est *mé-connaissance* de l'Autre et étroitement associé aux mécanismes mêmes du savoir, anthro-

¹⁴ KACEM BASFAO, "Appel à la conquête du Maroc, ou du stéréotype comme machine à influencer", *Rives Nord Méditerranéennes*, n. 10 (1995), 75-98.

¹⁵ AHRWEILER, "L'image de l'Autre", 60 sqq.

¹⁶ OZAN SERDAROGLU, "TV5: quand le Nord et le Sud se rencontre en français. On n'habite pas un pays, on habite une langue", *Hermès*, n. 30 (2001), 187-200.

¹⁷ JEAN-NOËL FERRIÉ, "L'identité morale de l'Égypte, ou de la relation de l'histoire sociale des typifications identitaires et des pratiques qui les utilisent", *Hermès*, n. 30 (2001), 73-84.

pologique, par exemple, dont plusieurs auteurs notent qu'il n'échappe pas lui-même, par nature, au jugement stéréotypé; après tout le racisme moderne apparaît comme un avatar de la pensée biologique moderne¹⁸.

Genèse des représentations collectives dans l'espace Nord/Sud

On a cherché les racines du stéréotype, tantôt dans des motivations individuelles de type psychologique, tantôt dans des facteurs sociaux. La première approche, avec son chef de file Adorno, dans les années 1940-1950, offre une perspective dite psychodynamique qui emprunte à la psychologie certains de ses concepts pour faire dériver le préjugé et le stéréotype de problèmes individuels et de conflits intra personnels. En d'autres termes, la source des représentations hostiles à l'Autre serait à rechercher dans une dynamique psychique, dans la structure profonde de la personnalité, plus que dans les contraintes intrinsèques à la vie sociale (c'est ainsi que l'équipe d'Adorno voit dans le syndrome autoritaire - mécanisme psycho-paranoïde - le principal responsable du fascisme et de l'antisémitisme)¹⁹.

Pour la seconde approche, l'origine des stéréotypes dévalorisants attribués à l'Autre est plutôt connue en termes de tensions sociales. Ainsi la théorie des conflits sociaux introduite par Muzafir Sherif voit dans les situations compétitives le principal levier du "stéréotypage" et du préjugé²⁰. Cela semblerait le cas de subordination d'un groupe ethnique ou national à un autre. Ce sont les intérêts du groupe au pouvoir qui suscitent une image de dominés propres à justifier leur subordination.

Mais ne faut-il pas aller davantage à l'amont pour déceler les racines du stéréotype? Le processus cognitif part-il de structures plus ou moins abstraites, suit-il un parcours qui part de l'information collectée directement, ou part-il d'une image préalable stockée dans l'univers de l'inconscient collectif, du moins dans sa mémoire? Ne faut-il pas puiser dans tout ce qui appartient au monde des symboles proprement dits et qui peut relever de l'archétype, dans cette zone où se situe justement la prédominance du symbole sur le concept et par l'interpénétration entre jugement et affectivité? Nous pourrions aller jusqu'à rappeler l'analyse du fonds signifiant relatif à la dyade Nord/Sud. Le Nord forme traditionnellement avec le Sud un "couple d'opposés" appartenant aux structures symboliques dont la puissance évocatrice repose sur la tension entre deux éléments²¹.

¹⁸ PIERRE BONTE, "Compte Rendu à propos de *Hermès*", n. 30, *L'Homme*, n. 165 (2003), 311-313.

¹⁹ ROZE, "Stéréotypes sociaux", 595.

²⁰ *Ibidem*. Cf. aussi R. AMOSSY et P. HERSCHBERG, *Stéréotypes et clichés. Langue, discours, société* (Paris, 1997), 39.

²¹ J. CHEVALIER et A. GHEERBRANDT, *Dictionnaire des symboles* (Paris, 1982), 771.

Mesures ou palliatifs possibles

Il s'agit d'évoquer aussi bien des attitudes cognitives possibles pour une éradication prophylactique de ces typifications des Autres, que des mesures concrètes. Les investigations des sciences sociales situent le stéréotype à la croisée de plusieurs interrogations, qu'il s'agisse du stéréotype en tant que facteur universel de la connaissance humaine, ou du caractère plus concret du stéréotype ethnique qui est plutôt un fait de culture. Dans son versant négatif, elles le relient à la question des typifications d'autrui, des tensions entre groupes; dans son versant positif, elles le mettent au centre d'une réflexion sur l'identité sociale. Considéré dans le dynamisme du "stéréotypage", on peut évoquer aussi une exploration de la cognition sociale.

Un fléchissement de telles attitudes est-il envisageable? Tout d'abord, ne plus percevoir l'Autre en termes taxinomiques devrait passer par l'analyse du discours. Cette analyse du discours sur l'Autre doit tenir compte de la relation entre schémas cognitifs et formes linguistiques, renforcées par les métaphores et les structures lexicales. Car il faut souligner ce rôle des métaphores sur lesquelles sont axés les transferts et les convergences intertextuels, donc inter politiques. C'est à dire, quand les idées négatives sur l'Autre se répandent presque imperceptiblement, à travers l'aire politique d'une société, ces idées suivront les canaux habituels, à demi cachés, de l'imaginaire politique enraciné dans la langue, la culture et les mécanismes cognitifs.

Or les attitudes antiracistes sont prises dans un dilemme. Ou bien le discours antiraciste prend le chemin intégrationniste (comme le fait un certain courant rationaliste, universalisant et républicanisant), ou bien il prend le chemin du "différentialisme". Et là, on risque d'être mal entendu par les récepteurs qui auraient été conditionnés par un différentialisme plus extrême qui mène à l'exclusionnisme. En revanche, prôner l'intégration conduit, paradoxalement, au même effet. Car s'intégrer, s'assimiler ne signifie pas effacer la différence, mais la renforcer. S'intégrer implique s'intégrer à quelque chose, en l'occurrence, une entité politique - l'état-nation - conceptualisée justement à partir des schémas profonds de la différence²².

Une analyse sémantico-cognitive peut certes approfondir l'explication du pouvoir affectif du discours raciste, de son aspect apparemment normal ou "naturel" et de la difficulté qu'éprouve le discours antiraciste à se dépêtrer du différentialisme. Mais il serait absurde de prétendre que le phénomène des néo-racismes et des néo-nationalismes s'explique par une

²² PAUL CHILTON, "Schémas conceptuels et discours stéréotypé: sur les métaphores-clefs du discours raciste", in JAN BERTING et CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, *The role of stereotypes in international relations* (Rotterdam, 1994), 131-147.

pathologie du discours. Encore plus erroné de suggérer que l'analyse du discours pourrait y remédier. Cependant elle permet d'exposer et de comprendre les particularités discursives en voie de transformation, ce qui permet éventuellement de rechercher des voies alternatives.

Quant au poids des images, il est considérable. Inutile d'insister. Songeons - entre mille exemples - aux emballements audiovisuels à la suite des attentats du 11 septembre. Les images de liesse palestinienne immédiatement après les attentats, les scènes d'insurrections intégristes au Pakistan, les séquences malheureuses du match France-Algérie au Stade de France..., ces scènes ont réactivé de manière extrême les batteries de stéréotypes, excitant les imaginaires à travers l'imprécation, l'exécration de l'Autre, désigné comme auteurs de troubles²³.

D'une manière générale, en ces temps où l'information devient le nerf de la guerre, il faut traiter différemment le problème de la communication. Celle-ci, désormais inséparable de l'identité culturelle, est à la fois une marchandise et un facteur d'émancipation, à la fois un instrument de domination du Nord sur le Sud et un moyen d'échanges et de connaissances entre les peuples. C'est précisément en jouant sur cette ambivalence que nous pouvons, écrit Dominique Wolton²⁴, inventer "une identité culturelle" mondiale: non pas la "salade multiculturelle" chère aux élites, adeptes d'un "cosmopolitisme d'aéroport" qui se gargarisent de métissage, non pas les "cultures refuges", prisées par les communautarisations, mais un balancement constant entre des patrimoines consolidés et une modernité fédératrice entre la mobilité des peuples et leur enracinement. A condition d'en finir avec la dépréciation systématique des cultures de masse, à condition de repenser l'universalisme.

Le monde est devenu un village global sur le plan technique, mais il en va tout autrement sur le plan socioculturel: aujourd'hui, chacun voit tout, sait tout, mais réalise aussi ce qui le sépare des autres. Informer n'est pas communiquer. En rendant visible les inégalités culturelles, l'information mondialisée nous lance le défi du XXI^e siècle. Il est donc urgent de penser les conditions de cette mondialisation, si nous voulons éviter qu'elle ne devienne un facteur de guerre.

Il est vrai que rien n'est plus vain que cette prétention cosmopolite. Pour

²³ PAUL VIRILIO: "Le vrai problème aujourd'hui, c'est le "live" ou la prétention du "live", c'est à dire de l'immédiateté et de l'ubiquité: on est plongé dans la confusion des langues mais aussi dans la confusion des images... A cette confusion, il faut encore ajouter le travail de ceux qu'on appelle les "spin doctors" (... ceux qui sont chargés d'orienter, voire de manipuler les médias auprès des gouvernements)... C'est à l'échelle du monde, celle du mensonge, de la perception perdue du vrai et du faux. Le bluff, à une échelle globale et en direct... La force du texte revient...", *Le monde*, du 29 mars 2003.

²⁴ DOMINIQUE WOLTON, *L'Autre mondialisation* (Paris, 2003), 45 sqq.

affronter un monde toujours plus ouvert, et donc plus incertain, il faut au contraire être confiant dans son identité, prêt à se confronter à d'autres valeurs. Bref avoir des racines. Ce n'est pas parce que l'Autre est aujourd'hui plus accessible qu'il est plus compréhensible, c'est même précisément l'inverse. Plus nos différences sont visibles, plus elles créent des tensions. Curieusement, alors qu'on ausculte à la loupe la mondialisation économique, on oublie de penser cette "autre mondialisation", dont dépendent pourtant la paix et la guerre de demain. A quelles conditions donc, organiser au niveau mondial une cohabitation des cultures?²⁵

Après avoir été politique, puis sociale, la démocratie du XXI^e siècle sera culturelle au sens où individus et collectivités reconnaîtront les multiples identités culturelles. Penser politique, c'est penser un mode qui à la fois garantisse les appartenances culturelles et oblige à les transcender; c'est arbitrer les heurts qu'implique la logique "communautariste" dans des sociétés de plus en plus hétérogènes. A cet égard - ajoute Dominique Wolton - l'Europe est bien placée pour servir de laboratoire à une cohabitation culturelle, en particulier la France grâce aux DOM-TOM, à la francophonie et aux ressortissants des anciennes colonies²⁶.

Dans la communication de la Commission préparatoire à la Conférence euro-méditerranéenne de Valence (avril 2002), il était précisé que "Cette région (la région méditerranéenne) doit ... être une source de dynamisme, de créativité et d'échange, autant de fruits d'une diversité culturelle séculaire". Pour Jean-Robert Henry, c'est sans doute attribuer un bien grand rôle au facteur culturel pour réduire ou accroître la fracture méditerranéenne. En réalité, l'accentuation de celle-ci doit beaucoup à la dynamique contradictoire du projet européen, qui tend à faire de la Méditerranée à la fois une région périphérique de l'Europe et une frontière identitaire et culturelle²⁷. En fait l'Europe peut-elle en même temps vouloir intégrer son Sud et continuer à l'altérer? Ne faut-il pas renouer avec le débat des années soixante sur le "village mondial" et la réforme de l'ordre économique international et rejoindre les partisans d'une "autre mondialisation" pour être le plus apte à gérer l'avenir de l'espace méditerranéen.

"Voir ce n'est pas seulement voir, mais ce n'est pas tout à fait savoir... c'est dans cet écart que se prend la posture de l'"intellectuel"...(qu'il soit la mauvaise conscience de son temps, nous le savons depuis

²⁵ Voici certaines propositions de Dominique Wolton: assumer la diversité des langues; promouvoir la laïcité; garantir le pluralisme médiatique; relier diversité culturelle et droits de l'homme; valoriser l'apport de l'immigration; mettre en œuvre la cohabitation culturelle; faire voter les immigrés; repenser le tourisme... (101 sq.).

²⁶ On peut avoir le sentiment parfois que l'auteur à force de sévérité à l'égard des "fautes" occidentales dédouane toutes les autres cultures.

²⁷ HENRY, "L'élargissement euro-méditerranéenne".

Nieztche qui l'a formulé ainsi à propos du philosophe. Que le travail critique de la pensée... consiste à rendre manifestes les a priori historiques, sémantiques ou cognitifs, Michel Foucault l'a magistralement montré. Que cette entreprise de description et d'analyse minutieuses soit à poursuivre en croisant les regards et les démarches Nord/Sud pour contribuer à l'édification d'une mémoire non pas commune mais partagée et assumée, voilà une tâche qui n'a rien de désespérant²⁸.

A condition de réellement la "vouloir". En fait, ce qui est en jeu dans ces visées d'analyse, de politique, d'éthique, c'est la gestion sociale de l'Autrui dans un espace culturel qui prend l'Autrui pour l'Autre²⁹.

²⁸ DOMINIQUE CHEVÉ, "Les stéréotypes, entre opinion et posture critique", *Hermès*, n. 30 (2001), 206 (201-206).

²⁹ J. BAUDRILLARD et M. GUILLAME, *Figures de l'altérité* (Paris, 1994), 13.